field artillery [may june 2001]

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. HQDA PB6-01-3

A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs May-June 2001

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PURPOSE: (as stated in the first Field Artillery Journal in1911): To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowl-edge and furnishing information as to the Field Artillery's progress,development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the otherarms, a common understanding of the power and limitations ofeach; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the differentarms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understand-ing between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all ofwhich objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

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A Professional Bulletin for Redlegs

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Editor:Patrecia Slayden Hollis

Assistant Editor:Donnis D. Blount

Art Director:Bob T. Coleman

Toney StricklinMajor General, United States ArmyField Artillery School Commandant

Eric K. ShinsekiGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

May-June 2001 HQDA PB6-01-3

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JOEL B. HUDSONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army, 0107201

INTERVIEW

2 CENTCOM: Targeting in a Unified CommandAn Interview with General Tommy R. Franks, Commander-in-Chief ofUS Central Command, MacDill AFB, Florida

ARTICLES: Targeting

6 Nonlethal Targeting Revisited—The Kosovo ExperienceBy Chief Warrant Officer Two Richard L. Gonzales and Major (Retired)Marc J. Romanych, AD

11 DOCC: Sustaining Corps Deep Operations ProficiencyBy Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte, Brigadier General Guy M. Bourn,Colonel James C. Boozer, Sr., and Lieutenant Colonel David A. Schneider

17 Artillerizing PIRsBy Major Johnny Cook, MI, and Captain Kirk D. Steege, MI

20 Air Support Functionality in AFATDSBy Major Alford J. Williams

24 Reactive Targeting: Firefinder and AFATDS in the DigitizedDivision

By Chief Warrant Officer Two Eric J. Moran and Lieutenant ColonelDominic D. Swayne

28 Joint Targeting for Time-Sensitive Targets—To Boldly GoWhere No Army Has Gone Before

By Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bernd L. Ingram

32 JTRGS: Common Reference System for Coordinating andSynchronizing Joint Fires

By Major Adam J. Legg

37 Q-47 Future Firefinder RadarBy Chief Warrant Officer Three Robert A. Nelson, Jr.

38 The Role of the GS FA Battalion Targeting OfficerBy Chief Warrant Officer Three Harold A. Thacker, Jr., and ChiefWarrant Officer Two Robert S. Fortenbaugh

40 The Law of War and Fire Support: A Primer for Fire SupportersBy Captain Jon D. Holdaway, JA

44 Expanding Role of Marine Artillery WOsBy Chief Warrant Officer Three Quint D. Avenetti, USMC

DEPARTMENTS

1 FROM THE FIREBASE

31 FROM THE GUN LINE

Field Artillery May-June 2001 1

Last month, Fort Sill hosted itsSenior Fire Support Conference,“The FA in Transformation.”

Many senior leaders, including the Chiefof Staff of the Army, shared their in-sights and dialogued about the chal-lenges we face. Active, reserve and re-tired provided thoughtful input andgained a better appreciation for themonumental transformation effort inwhich the Army and FA are engaged—thanks to conference chairman ColonelTed Janosko and his hard-working team.

Transformation. Although the Armystill has long-term decisions to makeabout the Objective Force, the FA’svision is on track with the Army’s trans-formation. We remain poised to pro-vide maneuver commanders the samedevastating fires that have been ourhallmark since the birth of the nation.

One highlight of the conference wasthe dedication of Snow Hall’s audito-rium to General (Retired) Walter T.“Dutch” Kerwin, Jr., former Vice Chiefof Staff of the Army and Field Artille-ryman extraordinaire. During the dedi-cation, General Kerwin commented thatthe FA’s last major transformation waswhen we went from mule-drawn tomechanized and truck-towed artillery—a significant emotional event for some.However, the result was a more effec-tive fighting capability. While our 21stcentury transformation may still con-cern some, it likely will have the sameresult: a more effective FA as an inte-gral part of the combined arms team.

Responsive, Accurate Fires. As I re-ported in my first “From the Firebase”column in 1999, the branch has a long-standing problem of timeliness and ac-curacy of fires. Recently in the Novem-ber-December 2000 Red Book, I laidout our top priority: changing the per-ception that our fires are unresponsive.Since then, an article has been pub-lished in the April edition of Army:“Classical Fire Support vs Parallel Fires”by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R.Leonhard, Infantry. Although I strongly

disagree with some of the author’s points,he correctly says that task force and com-pany commanders no longer enjoy theimmediately responsive, dedicated artil-lery support necessary in close combat.

As part of the FA School’s ongoingefforts to improve our close supportfires, we have determined several meansto meet the challenge. First, we muststreamline calls-for-fire. Since the tac-tical fire direction system (TACFIRE),our digital architecture has routed calls-for-fire through the company, task forceand brigade fire support elements (FSEs)sequentially before they reach the de-livery units. In theory, a call-for-fireshould pass through at the speed of elec-tricity…but it does not.

Today’s advanced FA tactical datasystem (AFATDS) has the same ar-chaic digital architecture, which we arechanging rapidly to route calls-for-fireto the delivery unit first. AFATDS willdetermine whether the target meets themaneuver commander’s intent and co-ordinate to clear fires while simulta-neously accomplishing technical andtactical fire direction.

Secondly, we will adapt our equip-ment to “stream” sensor information tothe fire direction center (FDC). If thedecision is to engage the sensor-ac-quired target, the target’s location willbe updated constantly from a namedarea of interest (NAI) to a target area ofinterest (TAI), streaming the updatedlocation digitally through the FDC non-stop to the firing platform, creating areal-time sensor-to-shooter link.

Thirdly, we must allow the direct sup-port (DS) battalions to take advantageof force FA allocation rules. These bat-talions have become utility infielders atour Combat Training Centers (CTCs),attempting to provide concurrentcounterfire, close supporting FA fires,suppression of enemy air defenses(SEAD) and other tasks, such as deliv-ering family of scatterable mines(FASCAM), while focusing on targetsdeep in the brigade area.

Our CTCs do not allow us to replicatethe range and utility of two FA brigadessupporting each committed division.This results in reinforcing battalion ordivision artillery (with some FA bri-gade assets) tasks being thrust upon theDS battalions. This is unrealistic. Weare working to resolve this issue withinthe Training and Doctrine Command.

Finally, once these and other correc-tions are in place, we must ensure FAeffects have a realistic impact on thefights at the CTCs by removing the arti-ficial constraints in simulating the FA’slethality. It does not take 54 rounds ofdual-purpose improved conventionalmunitions (DPICM) to kill a singletank—we have the live-fire data to sup-port that. And a battery-one with anaccurate target location should be morethan “suppressive.”

The FA must become a more effectivekiller at our CTCs; I accept that chal-lenge. However, once we improve ourtimeliness and accuracy, we must get thelethality credit that live artillery brings tothe fight. That might mean there’s noclose, direct fire laser fight some days--sobe it.The combined arms must fight as anintegrated team, and we must grow ma-neuver commanders who truly under-stand what the FA can do for them.

Thanks for Your Service. As Com-mand Sergeant Major (CSM) AnthonyJ. Williams departs Fort Sill to becomethe CSM of the Sergeants Major Acad-emy, I thank him sincerely for his tire-less efforts on behalf of branch NCOsand enlisted soldiers and for enhancingthe quality of the relationship betweencomponents. I welcome our skilled newleader, CSM Rodney L. Beck, the newCSM of the FA, who joins us from FortDrum where he was the CSM of the10th Mountain Division Artillery.

Also, thanks to all who have investedtime and talents to help transform theFA and provide input on improving theeffectiveness of our fires. These arechallenging times, but as always, FieldArtillerymen are up to the challenges.

The Senior Fire Support Conferenceand Responsive, Accurate Fires

May-June 2001 Field Artillery2

CENTCOM:Targeting in a Unified Command

Q

INTERVIEW

A

Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis, Editor

General Tommy R. Franks, Commander-in-Chief of US Central CommandMacDill Air Force Base, Florida

CENTCOM has had a lot of tar-geting experience in Iraq since

Operation Desert Storm. What are theprocedures to develop targeting detailsfor effective strike operations?

To understand the targeting pro-cess in CENTCOM, you first must

understand our day-to-day operations.Our Coalition/Joint Task Force-South-west Asia [CJTF-SWA], headquarteredin Saudi Arabia, enforces the southernno-fly zone in Iraq in support of Opera-tion Southern Watch. And everyday, ifCENTCOM aircraft are engaged orthreatened by the Iraqis, the pilots canattack targets on the ground immedi-ately in self defense. The commander ofCJTF-SWA “makes the call” as to whe-ther or not to attack other targets andwhich targets to attack. If a pilot is beingthreatened by a target he cannot at-tack—for example, one that has civil-ians around the attacking asset—then,with commander of the CJTF-SWA ap-proval, he can move laterally to a set ofother targets on the CENTCOM targetlist. Such targets include assets in theintegrated air defense system or a firingunit—perhaps command and controlassets or a radar. This process happenseveryday.

CENTCOM establishes that list of tar-gets and updates it every 24 hours. Forexample, for our ground element targetset, we use national and theater intelli-gence surveillance and reconnaissance(ISR) to detect Iraqi assets that couldthreaten coalition states. We maintainthe locations and configurations of thosetargets down to their DMPI. [DMPI isthe desired mean point of impact, anexact point on the target for maximumdestruction.]

So, now that you understand how weoperate, I can get to the question—which is how we conduct targeting forstrike operations.

The US Central Command (USCENTCOM), headquartered at MacDillAFB, Florida, has an area of responsibility (AOR) encompassing 25 countriesin Southwest Asia—an area that is about twice the size of the continentalUnited States. The region extends from Egypt and Jordan to the Horn ofAfrica, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and the Central Asianstates as far north as Kazakhstan. The sources for potential conflict in thisdynamic region are many and varied and could call for operations that coverthe entire spectrum of conflict.

CENTCOM maintains a robust presence in the region. On a given day, USforces range from 18,000 to 25,000 soldiers, sailors, airman, Marines andCoast Guardsmen; between 175 and 200 aircraft; and some 30 naval vessels.


Legend:ARCENT = US Army Forces Central Command

CENTCOM = US Central CommandCENTAF = US Air Forces Central CommandCFACC = Coalition Forces Air Component CommandCFLCC = Coalition Forces Land Component Command

WartimeUnified Command**

PeacetimeTitle 10 Command*

Mutually SupportingStanding Task Forces

CENTCOMMacDill AFB, FL

ARCENTThird Army,

Fort McPherson, GA

CJTF-KuwaitKuwait

CFLCC

CENTAFNinth Air Force,Shaw AFB, SC

JFSOCC

CJTF-SWASaudi Arabia

CFACC

NAVCENTFifth Fleet,

Manama, Bahrain

CJTF-Arabian GulfBahrain

CFMCC

SOCCENTSpecial Operations

Command,MacDill AFB, FL

SOCCENT-ForwardQatar

* Includes US Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT) with Marine Forces Pacific at Camp Smith, Hawaii; in "III Wartime Unified Command," Marine Forces Pacific are part of CFLCC.

**Can include a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) or other task forces as circumstances dictate.

I

II

III

CFMCC = Coalition Forces Maritime Component CommandCJTF-SWA = Coaltion/Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia

JFSOCC = Joint Force Special Operations Component CommandNAVCENT = US Naval Forces Central CommandSOCCENT = US Special Operations Component Central Command

CENTCOM has a unique command and control structure, allowing it to transition rapidly from peacetime to wartime unified operations. It maintains four standing “intermediate” task forces in its area of responsibility (AOR) to facilitate the transition.

INTERVIEW

Q

A

CENTCOM has a Coalition Coordi-nation Board (CCB), headed by theDCINC [deputy commander-in-chief],which is similar in construct to the com-bined targeting coordination board[CTCB] found in other commands. Thedifference is the CTCB focuses on justtargets and our CCB focuses on theater-wide operations—logistics, civil affairs,exchange of information with our coa-lition partners, etc.—as well as the co-ordination of targets.

Like other commands, CENTCOM’stargeting is based on the joint forcecommander’s guidance. I establish anddisseminate the guidance and provide thepriority for the target sets, and the targetsare built from there 365 days a year.

We conduct the CCB by video tele-conference with four of our compo-nents [see the section “I Peacetime Title10 Command” in the figure]. ARCENT[US Army Forces Central Command],which for our purposes would be the

land component command, is the ThirdUS Army, headquartered at FortMcPherson, Georgia. CENTAF [US AirForces Central Command], the air com-ponent command, is the Ninth Air Forceheadquartered at Shaw Air Force Base,South Carolina. Our NAVCENT [USNaval Forces Central Command], themaritime component command, is theFifth Fleet located in Bahrain, andSOCCENT [US Special OperationsComponent Central Command] is theSpecial Operations Command here atMacDill.

The components bring different tar-geting perspectives and sensing capa-bilities. For example, the land compo-nent processes targeting information byaccessing certain sensors while the aircomponent accesses different sensors.CENTCOM has a complete sensor suiteinvolved in everyday operations, andnot all the components have access toevery sensor in that suite all the time.

During the Coalition CoordinationBoard meeting, we also get targeting in-put from other coalition forces involved.

So that’s how we conduct targeting inCENTCOM and not just for contin-gency operations, but routinely.

How do you, the joint force com-mander, command and control

operations in a region some 7,000 milesaway, and what happens when theCENTCOM’s AOR gets “hot”?

Because of CENTCOM’s uniqueorganization, we can very rapidly

transition from out peacetime Title 10structure to our wartime unified con-figuration. We have four “intermedi-ate” or “lilly pad” task forces already inthe AOR that can absorb staff fromARCENT at Fort McPherson to be-come the coalition force land compo-nent command (CFLCC), absorbCENTAF staff from Shaw AFB to be-


INTERVIEW

come the coalition force air componentcommand (CFACC) and so on. [See “IIMutual Supporting Standing TaskForces” and “III Wartime Unified Com-mand” in the figure.]

For example, the CJTF-SWA in SaudiArabia I mentioned is the “pre-CFACC”in the CENTCOM AOR. It is a fullymanned task force responsible for de-veloping and executing the ATO [airtasking order] for Southern Watch anduses naval, marine and air force aircraftfrom the US, United Kingdom and othercountries in the region. In the event thatthings get really hot in the AOR, CJTF-SWA would become the core of theCFACC organization with staff addedfrom Shaw Air Force Base until it is afully functional air component command.

Another example is the pre-CFLCCorganization, called CJTF-Kuwait. Itoperates daily in Kuwait, with repre-sentatives from the United Kingdom,Australia, New Zealand and variety ofGulf states.

CJTF-Arabian Gulf in Bahrain, is thepre-CFMCC [coalition force maritimecomponent command] for the FifthFleet. CJTF-Arabian Gulf conductsmaritime intercept operations againstIraq as Iraq tries to smuggle illicit oilout of the Shatt al Arab (to put unac-counted for money in Sadam Hussein’shands) plus supports Operation South-ern Watch. CJTF-Arabian Gulf dailyhas varying numbers of coalition part-ners involved in its operations.

The fourth standing task force isSOCCENT-Forward headquartered inQatar. This is the pre-JFSOCC [jointforce special operations componentcommand] in the AOR.

So, to expand the understanding ofCENTCOM targeting in peacetime, wenot only get targeting input fromARCENT, CENTAF, NAVCENT andSOCCENT, we also get input from thefour standing intermediate CJTFs aswell—CJTF-SWA, CJTF-Kuwait,CJTF-Arabian Gulf and SOCCENT-Forward.

The command and control architec-ture for CENTCOM is unique. No othercommand uses lilly pad task forces togo from peacetime to wartime unifiedoperations.

How do you envision CENTCOMemploying ATACMS [Army tacti-

cal missile system] in your AOR? Whatare the procedures for getting ATACMSor Army aviation onto the ATO rapidlyand flexibly enough to facilitate theCFLCC’s shaping his battlespace?

Our battlespace will have certaincharacteristics. The operating area

will have left, right, rear and forwardboundaries for each echelon of com-mand. Behind the forward boundarywill be a fire support coordination line[FSCL]. We use Joint Pub 3-09 [Doc-trine for Joint Fire Support] to definethe characteristics of our battlespace.

The CFLCC is the uncontested ownerof the “real estate” short of the forwardboundary, and the FSCL is permissive.So when the land component com-mander needs to protect his forces fromenemy fires, he simply fires ATACMSat the enemy beyond the FSCL andnotifies the air operations center [AOC]for the purposes of deconflicting theairspace. It is the AOC’s responsibilityto publish a notice to airmen of thecounterfire. Then, with the help ofAWACS [airborne warning and con-trol system], the aircraft are responsiblefor getting out of ATACMS’ airspace.

I put preplanned ATACMS and Armyaviation on the ATO. Now, some mayquarrel with me for putting Army or-ganic assets on the ATO, but here’swhy I do that.

As we preplan operations for tomor-row, the next day and the day after, allsystems that need airspace deconflictedmust be identified and coordinated viaone means—the ATO. The unified com-mand strives to achieve the joint forcecommander’s objectives as a team effort.

If you consider the time it takes tocontrol the geographical dimensions ofour battlespace, you will understandwhy we employ mostly aviation assets:B1s, B52s, F117 Stealths, F16 Falcons,F15 Strike Eagles, EA-6B Prowlers, F-18 Hornets—and the list goes on fromthe Navy, Air Force, Marines and coa-lition forces. When the master air attackplan is executed at the designated time,all components know aircraft are at-tacking certain targets.

As the joint force commander, I haveto ask myself, “What happens to theoverall plan to achieve my objectives ifI allow the master attack plan to bestopped, say, to provide JSEAD [jointsuppression of enemy air defenses] insupport of attack helicopter operationsthat weren’t factored into the master airattack plan and put on the ATO?”

Now, does that mean we can’t re-spond to emerging targets? Absolutelynot. But to violate the master attackplan construct requires the land compo-nent commander to determine that, al-though previously unforeseen, he needsto employ attack helicopters at a lucra-tive target beyond the FSCL. He thensubmits that requirement to the AOC’sCurrent Operations to deconflict theairspace—that’s the purpose of CurrentOperations.

Q

A

General Franks —CINCCENT—is surrounded by a sea of faces from the USS Dextrous andUSS Ardent.


INTERVIEW

Q

A

Current Operations works with twocategories of targets: time-sensitive andtime-critical. Time-sensitive targets callfor speed but allow enough time tocoordinate to clear the airspace. Time-critical targets are like the Scud mis-siles during the Gulf War and call for anotice to airmen: “Clear the airspace.We are engaging the target now.”

The Army’s future concepts em-phasize fighting on a nonlinear,

noncontiguous battlefield against anadaptive threat. How does that trans-late in your theater?

The CENTCOM AOR may bethe last bastion of hope for an-

other “Kursk-style” linear battlefieldwhere miles of tanks line up side by sidefor a frontal attack. The fact is that incertain parts of Central Command’sAOR, I would anticipate a linear con-frontation simply because of the geog-raphy of the battlespace.

But also, interestingly enough, in otherparts of our AOR, I envision mass andeconomy of force being applied in adisjointed battlespace with pockets ofextreme violence at some points andrelative calm at others.

Battlefields of the future easily canhave combinations of all of the above.For example, we could be involved instopping asymmetrical threats to ourairfields and seaports while we are try-ing to receive, stage and move our forceson to integrate them into the theater.Simultaneously a few miles away, we

could be fighting what the Marines callthe “three-block war” in small pocketsof grueling building-to-building urbancombat. Just a few miles outside thecity, we could be attacking the enemyin a linear assault—tanks in the sand.Simultaneously, we could be conduct-ing special operations in other venuesaimed at countering the enemy’s ter-rorist threat. It is possible to have allthese forms of combat going on in amajor theater of war at the same time.

In my mind, Central Command’s AORis the only AOR where one can see thefull spectrum of operations. At anytime, Central Command can be engagedin operations at the low end of thespectrum in shaping the security envi-ronment, such as training coalitionforces, humanitarian operations orpeacekeeping. That same day, we can beengaged in a small-scale contingency inanother part of our AOR. And the poten-tial is there to move to the high end ofthe spectrum of conflict to fight a majortheater war as we did in Desert Storm.

So the question is, “Will the Army’stransformation into the lighter, moremobile, yet more lethal and survivableobjective force be effective in CENT-COM?” And my response is, “Trans-formation is right on.” When the objec-tive force is fully fielded, it will be equallycapable at any point on the operatingcontinuum. Daily, CENTCOM can em-ploy elements of such a force in opera-tions ranging from shaping the securityenvironment all the way to conductinghigh-end warfighting.

General Tommy R. Franks has been theCommander-in-Chief of US Central Com-mand, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, sinceJuly 2000. In his previous assignment, hecommanded the Third US Army at FortMcPherson, Georgia. He also commandedthe 2d Infantry Division and served as theG3 of the Combined/Joint Forces Com-mand, both in Korea. At Fort Monroe,Virginia, he was the first Director of theLouisiana Maneuvers Task Force as part ofthe Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.During Operations Desert Shield and Stormin the Persian Gulf, he was the AssistantDivision Commander for Maneuver of the1st Cavalry Division, the same division inwhich he served as Chief of Staff and,before that, commanded the Division Artil-lery at Fort Hood, Texas. General Franksalso served as the Assistant Commandantof the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla-homa. In Germany, he commanded the 2dBattalion, 78th Field Artillery, 1st ArmoredDivision; and Howitzer Battery, 1st Squad-ron, and the 84th Engineer Company, bothin the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

General Franks meets Italian tankers during a combined training exercise.

Q

A

What message would you like tosend Army and Marine Field Ar-

tillerymen stationed around the world?

The Field Artilleryman is the keyto the maneuver commander’s

success on the battlefield. His job is parttechnical, part tactical and part humanrelations. He brings a wonderful mix-ture of art and science to the combinedarms force.

And if the division or corps has atough problem to solve—any type ofproblem—you can just bet an artillerymanwill be associated with finding the solu-tion. The Field Artilleryman is the prob-lem solver because of the breadth ofknowledge he must have to do his job:understand fires and maneuver in thetactical or operational fight.

As a CINC, I need fire supporters whofully understand the capabilities andlimitations of Army, joint and coalitionassets and know how to employ them toinfluence the battlespace using any oneof a lot of different approaches. That’smy challenge: develop fire supporterswho are absolutely conversant with allmeans available to a coalition/joint forceto kill a target or modify behavior andwho can pair the right weapon (lethal ornonlethal) with the right target.

As Field Artillerymen, we have a lotto be proud of and a lot of work to do.


In 1998, 1st Armored Division plan-ners discovered that the process de-scribed in FM 6-20-10 Tactics

Techniques, and Procedures for the Tar-geting Process could be used to inte-grate information operations (IO) intotactical operations. (See the article “In-tegrating Targeting and Information Op-erations in Bosnia” by Lieutenant Colo-nel Steven Curtis, Captain Robert A. B.Curris and Major Romanych, July-Au-gust 1998.) With continuous refinement,the targeting process has progressed toanother plateau three years later.

During operations in Kosovo, fieldsupport teams from the US Army LandInformation Activity (LIWA) in con-junction with the fire support element(FSE) from the 1st Brigade, 1st ArmoredDivision, refined the process. The team

expanded targeting to merge IO not on-ly to synchronize lethal and IO engage-ment assets, but also to focus all thecommand’s nonlethal engagement as-sets into a single, integrated operation.

This article explains how Task Force(TF) Falcon (1st Armored Division)employed the targeting process duringOperation Joint Guardian in Kosovofrom April to December 2000 to planand execute nonlethal maneuver, civil-military operations (CMO) and IO en-gagements. These engagements shapedthe environment for future TF opera-tions.

Operational Framework. TF Fal-con’s primary mission was to maintaina safe, secure environment for the localpopulous, international community andTF Falcon soldiers. To do this, the TF

planned and executed tactical opera-tions within an operational frameworkof maneuver, CMO and IO. Within thesethree elements of “combat” power arevarious nonlethal operations, such astroop presence activities, FA illumina-tion missions, humanitarian assistance,medical civilian assistance program(MEDCAP), psychological operations(PSYOP) and public affairs.

The major challenge of targeting forpeace support operations is to shape theoperational environment using nonle-thal assets and means. In conventionalconflict, enemy formations and func-tions are targeted and the battlefield iscleanly divided into deep, close andrear operations; in peace support opera-tions, “adversary” target sets are thepopulace’s societal institutions and the“battlefield” is a nonlinear maneuverspace defined in terms of time and eventsrather than geographic locations.

To shape this ambiguous environment,TF Falcon employed PSYOP teams, apublic affairs detachment, civil affairstactical support teams, combat camerateams, medical treatment teams, unitcommanders and unit patrols. Thesedissimilar nonlethal assets used equallydisparate means, such as PSYOP loud-speaker operations and handbills, radiobroadcasts, press releases and mediaevents, medical assistance programs,reconstruction and short-term employ-ment projects, face-to-face meetings andforce presence.

The Kosovo ExperienceBy Chief Warrant Officer Two Richard L. Gonzales

and Major (Retired) Marc J. Romanych, AD

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NonlethalTargeting Revisited


The key to integrating nonlethal as-sets is a concept of “fires” (called “en-gagement”) that focuses availablemeans on those selected leaders andpopulace groups that influence the atti-tudes and behavior of the general popu-lace. Procedurally, the development ofa nonlethal concept of engagement isthe same as traditional targeting meth-odology. The difference is in the de-sired targeting effects (e.g., influence,warn, co-opt rather than destroy, dam-age, etc.) and the types of targets, whosemost important characteristic is theirability to influence the populace.

TF Falcon’s analysis and control ele-ment (ACE) produced two products fornonlethal targeting: a 30-day intelli-gence estimate and a high-value targetlist (HVTL). These products were usedto develop the concept of engagementand the high-payoff target list (HPTL).

The 30-day intelligence estimate de-scribed TF Falcon’s future operatingenvironment. The ACE accomplishedthis by identifying changes in the envi-ronment that could affect friendly op-erations and predicting courses of ac-tion (COAs), or at least the intentions,of individuals, organizations and popu-lace groups that could negatively im-pact the TF’s mission.

Threats to the mission included ethnicand political violence, obstructionist

interference or insurgent and criminalactivities. The HVTL listed those indi-viduals and groups in the area of re-sponsibility (AOR) that controlled orinfluenced the populace who had beenidentified as threats to the TF mission.Typical HVTs were political, civil andreligious leaders and discrete populacegroups, such as internally displaced per-sons, residents of specific villages or crimi-nal groups.

The Targeting Cycle. The targetingcycle drove the decide, detect, deliverand assess (D3A) targeting functions(see Figure 1). TF Falcon adopted athree-week targeting cycle divided intoone-week segments. In each week, aD3A function(s) was performed. Thus,the decide function was accomplishedin the first week, detect in the second,and deliver and assess functions con-currently during the third week.

The decide function began eachWednesday with the development of aconcept of engagement and culminatedon Sunday with the publication of atargeting fragmentary order (FRAGO).The engagement concept consisted ofTF-level nonlethal engagements, ma-neuver collection requirements, MED-CAPs, directed CMO and supportingbattalion IO tasks. The concept of en-gagement was planned for a one-weektargeting period, two weeks in advance

of current operations. Planned activi-ties and engagements were reviewedand adjusted the week before their ex-ecution to reflect changes in the AOR.

After the FRAGO was issued, the de-tect function provided TF-level assets(e.g., PSYOP, civil affair and publicaffairs) and subordinate battalions timeto plan assigned engagements and target-ing tasks. Units had one week to developa plan to execute the engagements as-signed by the targeting FRAGO.

The deliver and assess functions oc-curred concurrently as assigned engage-ments and targeting tasks were executed,reported and assessed. Generally, un-less otherwise required, tasked unitsreported the status of engagements andtargeting tasks to TF Falcon once eachweek.

Meetings and Work Groups. The de-cide function was composed of threemeetings and three special workinggroups. The meetings (an initial Tar-geting Meeting, Executive TargetingMeeting and the Commander’s Deci-sion Briefing) were the mechanisms bywhich the concept of engagement wasdeveloped, coordinated, integrated andapproved. Three working groups pro-vided analytical information to supportthe development of the concept of en-gagement: the IO, civil affairs and as-sessment working groups.

Commander’sDecisionBriefing

Approve conceptof engagement.

ExecutiveTargetingMeeting

Integrate andsynchronizeconcept of

engagement.

Civil AffairsWorking Group

Coordinatecivil militaryoperations.

Decide(Week 1)

TF Falcon develops theconcept of engagement.

TargetingMeetingDevelop

concept ofengagement.

Detect(Week 2)

TF-level assets andsubordinate battalions

plan assigned engagements.

TargetingFragmentary

Order(FRAGO)

Deliver/Assess(Week 3)

TF-level assets andsubordinate battalions

execute engagements and report.

Receivecommander’s

guidance.

AssessmentWorking Group

Determinetargeting

effectiveness.

InformationOperations

Working GroupCoordinateinformationoperations.

Assessment

Assessment

Figure 1: TF Falcon Targeting Cycle


The targeting cycle started with aninitial Targeting Meeting. The purposeof the meeting was to produce a conceptof engagement for the planned target-ing period. The concept was developedby defining the operational environ-ment, reviewing the mission statementand commander’s guidance, and out-lining planned TF operations for theproposed targeting period. This infor-mation then served as the basis fordeveloping targeting objectives, tasks,targets and priorities for TF-level andsubordinate battalion engagements. Thetargeting team then developed CMOand MEDCAP activities.

In the Executive Targeting Meeting,the TF chief of staff reviewed the pro-posed concept of engagement and sup-porting maneuver, CMO and IO withthe primary staff. The purpose of themeeting was to ensure staff integrationand unity of effort commensurate withthe commander’s guidance.

The meeting’s analytical summaryincluded the status of the previousweek’s intelligence, maneuver, CMOand IO; reviewed the upcoming week’stargeting plan; and discussed the pro-posed concept of engagement. The TFchief of staff directed changes to theproposed concept of engagement be-fore the concept was briefed to the com-mander.

The Commanding General’s DecisionBriefing was the forum for the TF com-mander to approve or revise the con-cept of engagement and provide guid-ance for future targeting. At the end ofthe meeting, the targeting team wroteand issued the weekly targeting FRA-GO.

The Assessment Working Group as-sessed the effectiveness of the previousweek’s engagements. The group deter-mined targeting effectiveness by as-sessing information and intelligencefrom unit operations and intelligencereports as well as input from the IOWorking Group (IOWG) and Civil Af-fairs Working Group (CAWG). Theassessment group developed measuresof effectiveness to quantify the extentto which the targets were serviced. Thisinformation then was checked againstthe current targeting objectives to de-termine whether the desired targetingeffects were being achieved.

The IOWG was the IO section’s fo-rum to coordinate TF IO, including IOtargeting tasks. The CAWG was theG5’s forum for coordinating CMO withother TF operations.

The Targeting Team. The targetingteam planned, coordinated, integratedand directed the TF’s targeting effort.The core targeting team consisted ofthe FSE targeting officer; IO analyst;and G2, G3, and G5 representatives.These members represented TF Falcon’sthree elements of combat power (ma-neuver, CMO and IO) and linked target-ing meetings and working groups withother staff functions that interfaced withthe targeting process. Other staff repre-sentatives, such as from PSYOP, publicaffairs and medical planners, helped thetargeting team, as needed.

The FSE targeting officer headed thetargeting team and orchestrated the tar-geting cycle. The targeting officer alsochaired the Targeting Meeting and pro-duced the weekly targeting FRAGO.

The IO analyst developed and pro-vided IO input to the targeting process.Because IO is a major component ofnonlethal engagements, the IO analystled the development of the nonlethalconcept of engagement and producedthe target synchronization matrix (TSM)and the IO execution matrix for theweekly targeting FRAGO.

The G2 representative produced andupdated the 30-day assessment andHVTL for the planned targeting period

and interfaced with the ACE to developand assess the collection effort. The G3representative established targeting pri-orities and synchronized the targetingeffort with maneuver operations. The G3representative also planned, coordinatedand assessed the maneuver component ofthe nonlethal concept of engagement.

The civil affairs rep planned and as-sessed the CMO component of the non-lethal concept of engagement. The PSYOPrep planned supporting PSYOP activitiesand assessed populace attitudes. Themedical rep planned and coordinatedMEDCAPs and other medical activitiesto support the targeting objectives.

Targeting Products. The targetingteam used standard fire support prod-ucts (e.g., the HPTL and TSM) to de-velop, coordinate and integrate the con-cept of engagement for TF assets andsubordinate maneuver battalions.

HPTL. TF Falcon used a modifiedHPTL (see Figure 2). HPTs were se-lected from the G2’s HVTL, based onwhether or not engaging the target wouldproduce the desired effect (i.e., payoffin support of planned operations). HPTswere selected if critical to both theadversary’s needs and the friendly con-cept of the operation as expressed bythe targeting objectives.

Party A President

Party A Vice President

Party B President

Party B Executive Secretary

Party B Vice President

Party C Leader

Municipal President

Municipal Vice President

Council President

Council Member

Municipal President

Council President

Council Member

Council President

Village Mayor

Council Member

Council Leader

Religious Leader

Council Member

TargetCategory

PoliticalParties

CivilGovernment

ReligiousOrganizations

TargetSet

Church Council

Mun

icip

alit

y X

Mun

icip

alit

y Y

Mun

icip

alit

y Z

High-PayoffTargets

Figure 2: High-Payoff Target List (HPTL)

X X X

X

X X

X X

X

X X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X X X

X X

X

Party A

Party B

Party C

Municipality X

Municipality Y

Municipality Z


Targeting objectives focused TF as-sets on leaders and population groupsto produce a desired effect that contrib-uted to accomplishing the mission.Unlike a conventional HPTL that con-tains only adversary targets, the HPTLfor a peace support operation also in-cludes “friendly” leaders and populacegroups that support TF operations.

Target sets and individual targets wererank-ordered on the HPTL by their rela-tive importance to the populace andtheir geographic area of influence. Therank-order, or priority, sometimeschanged, depending on the TF’s focusand concentration of effort.

On the TF Falcon HPTL, the influ-ence of a person or group was recordedin columns that indicated areas withinthe AOR where the leaders were influ-ential, typically in unit sectors. This dis-tinction significantly helped the targetingteam select HPTs, develop engagementcriteria and assign delivery assets.

Once constructed, the HPTL was re-viewed and adjusted each week duringthe Targeting Meeting. The nature ofthe targets and nonlethal engagementsmade dynamic revisions to the HPTLunnecessary. Unlike combat operationswhere targets are attacked according to

the priorities of the HPTL, in peacesupport operations, HPTs are engagedby priority, but nonlethal targets rarelyare removed from the HPTL. In TFFalcon, targets remained on the HPTLbut were re-prioritized and re-engaged,as needed.

TSM. The TSM is a tool used to estab-lish the targeting objectives and syn-chronize the D3A engagements for thetargeting period. The targeting teamproduced the TSM for the TF staff andunits to use to plan and execute engage-ments and was included in the weeklytargeting FRAGO. (See the modifiedTSM in Figure 3.)

The targeting team used targeting ob-jectives—for example, the two shownat the top of Figure 3—to translate thecommander’s intent, concept of theoperation and planning guidance intononlethal targeting of the populace andtheir societal institutions. Because tra-ditional targeting objective terms (i.e.,limit, disrupt, delay, divert, destroy anddamage) did not always describe thedesired effects, the targeting team hadto use other terms. TF Falcon used theterms “reduce,” “minimize” and “in-crease” in the targeting objectives todescribe the desired nonlethal effects.

Like other TSMs, the modified matrixused in TF Falcon assigned specificdecide, detect, deliver and assess re-sponsibilities for every planned HPT.However, there were differences in theinformation entered into the matrix,most notably engagement means, andthe use of non-standard terms to de-scribe nonlethal attack effects.

The primary means of engaging keyleaders was verbal messages deliveredduring face-to-face meetings. The mes-sages were a set of five to seven talkingpoints used by the person conductingthe meeting to guide the conversation.Specific messages were developed foreach target set and, on occasion, for in-dividual targets. Messages werematched to targets in the TSM’s delivercolumn and attached to the TSM.

TF Falcon used non-standard attack(engagement) effects for nonlethal en-gagements. To avoid confusion, theeffects were explained in detail at thebottom of the TSM (Figure 3).

Targeting FRAGO. The targetingFRAGO directed the execution of thetargeting concept of engagement. TheFRAGO was issued each week on Sun-day night for execution by subordinateelements one week later. In addition to

Purpose/Assessment

Purpose: Reduce interference.Assessment: Response to messages.

Purpose: Reduce interference.Assessment: Response to messages.

Purpose: Increase cooperation.Assessment: Response to messages.

Purpose: Maintain support.Assessment: None.

Purpose: Reduce interference.Response: Response to messages.

Response: Reduce violent behavior.Response: Attitudes toward other ethnic group.

Purpose: Reduce violent behavior.Response: Attitudes toward other ethnic group.

Targeting Objectives: 1. Reduce obstructionist leaders’ influence on the local populace.2. Reduce populace acceptance of ethnically motivated violence.

Decide

PoliticalLeaders

Target Set

PopulousGroups

CivilLeaders

Target(s)

Party APresident

Party A VicePresident

Party CPresident

MunicipalCouncilLeader

City Mayor

PopulaceTown X

PopulaceTown Y

Detect & Deliver

How

Messages1-6

Messages1-6

Messages1-6

Messages7-9

Messages10-12

Messages13-16

Messages13-16

When

NLT02 Nov

NLT02 Nov

NLT02 Nov

06 Nov

06 Nov

NLT06 Nov

NLT06 Nov

Effects

Warn

Warn

Influence

Inform

Warn

Influence

Influence

Asset

TF 1-1 IN

TF 1-1 IN

TF 2-3 AR

TF 1-1 IN211 CA

TF 2-3 AR

TF 1-1IN405 PSYOP

TF 1-1 IN405 PSYOP

Assess

Figure 3: Target Synchronization Matrix (TSM) for Information Operations Targets. Task Force Falcon messages in the “How” columnwere “Do not interfere in KFOR [Kosovo Force] operations,” “Cooperate with the KFOR,” “Violence does not solve anything,” and others.

Effects:Inform—Provide information (to counter misinformation).Influence—Curtail or cause a specific action.Warn—Provide notice of intent (to prevent a specific action).Co-Opt—Gain cooperation.

Disorganize—Reduce effectiveness or ability.Isolate—Minimize power or influence.Deny—Render ineffective by physically denying (e.g., confis-cate equipment, detain personnel, occupy terrain, etc.).


the TSM, the FRAGO included thecommander’s guidance, priority intel-ligence requirements (PIRs), maneuvercollection tasks, an IO execution ma-trix, TF-level directed civil affairs ac-tivities and MEDCAPs, and engage-ment re-tasking.

Maneuver collection tasks includedincreased or re-directed presence pa-trols in a specific area, mobile tacticalcheckpoints or increased monitoringand reporting of certain activities. Thesetasks were in named areas of interest(NAIs) and assigned to the maneuverbattalions for execution. Maneuver in-telligence collection tasks were linkedto collection requirements (e.g., PIRs),but also to specific tasks from the IOexecution matrix.

Engagement re-tasking involved ad-justing the previous week’s targetingFRAGO and directing re-engagementsof previously engaged targets. TheFRAGO also addressed re-tasking formaneuver and (or) IO resulting fromchanges in the operational environment.

Assessment. Lacking quantifiablephysical evidence, nonlethal targetingeffects are necessarily subtle. Engage-ment effects may be a target’s responseor non-response or changes in effortsand techniques. Targeting effects maybe manifested as trends, activities andpatterns in the operational environment.Effects also can be as simple as theabsence of activity.

To assess the status of the targetingeffort, the TF Falcon targeting teamreviewed unit intelligence and opera-tions reports for information that indi-

cated whether the targeting effort wasachieving its objectives. Two types ofinformation were gathered.

The first was incident data, which wasa record of key incidents that occurredduring a targeting period. These inci-dents were evaluated and categorizedas being either negative (counter to asafe, secure environment) or positive(inter-ethnic cooperation or observanceof the rule of law) in relation to the TF’smission. Examples of negative incidentstracked by TF Falcon included acts ofethnic violence, civil disobedience andanti-Kosovo Force (KFOR) rhetoric. Posi-tive incidents included peaceful demon-strations and refugee returns.

The tracked incidents must be definedin sufficient detail to ensure continuityof categorization from one targetingperiod to the next. The recorded inci-dents then can be analyzed to determinetrends over time (weekly and monthly)and across the AOR by unit sector.

The second type of collected informa-tion was an indicator. These were sig-nificant events that provided an indica-tion of change in the operational envi-ronment. TF Falcon examples of suchevents included an attack on an impor-tant political faction leader, anti-KFORgraffiti in several villages within thesame municipality or a series of violentdemonstrations. To properly assess andanalyze this type of information, thetargeting team had to have knowledgeof the AOR, operational environment,populace culture and other factors todetermine the relevance of the event totargeting effectiveness.

Chief Warrant Officer Two Richard L.Gonzales, until recently, was the TargetingOfficer for the 1st Brigade of the 1st Ar-mored Division, Germany. Currently, he isthe Counterfire Officer for the 75th FieldArtillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, FortSill, Oklahoma. He also served as the Tar-geting Officer of Task Force Falcon inOperation Joint Guardian in Kosovo. Pastassignments include serving as a Fire Sup-port NCO (FSNCO) for the 1st Battalion,75th Rangers, participating in OperationJust Cause in Panama and OperationDesert Storm in the Gulf; as an FSNCO forthe 2d Battalion 75th Rangers, participat-ing in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti;and as a Q-36 Radar Technician with CBattery, 25th Field Artillery of the 1st Ar-mored Division, participating in OperationsJoint Forge/Guard in Bosnia. He can bereached at [email protected].

Major Marc J. Romanych is a retired AirDefense Artillery Officer. He works for JBM,Inc., which is under contract with the ArmyLand Information Warfare Activity (LIWA).Since 1998, he has deployed with LIWAInformation Operations Field SupportTeams to Bosnia and Kosovo and on manyArmy and joint exercises. He can be reachedat [email protected] [email protected].

Conclusion. The greatest value ofemploying the targeting process forpeace support operations is its ability todirect disparate assets and means into asingle, focused operation. First Bri-gade’s experience in Kosovo not onlyreaffirmed the use of the D3A process asan integration tool for IO, but alsoproved the process can synchronizenonlethal maneuver, CMO and IO en-gagements.

But work still remains. Peace supportoperation planners must define target-ing objectives and attack effects to re-flect the focus of their nonlethal targetingplus develop a methodology to assess theeffects of nonlethal engagements.

D3A has been proven as an effectivemethodology to synchronize maneu-ver, CMO and IO both in Bosnia andKosovo. In Kosovo, nonlethal engage-ments were credited with successfullyshaping the environment for day-to-dayoperations and diffusing several poten-tially volatile situations, as well as settingthe conditions for significant events, suchas the Kosovo municipal elections.

Further innovations are required if thetargeting process is to realize its full po-tential in peace support operations.

US troops from the 1st Infantry Division in Kosovo conduct cordon and search operations.Timely, specific intelligence is required to engage the correct target.


The corps deep fight is the corpscommander’s primary fight. Hisability to shape the enemy be-

fore the enemy enters the divisionalareas of operations (AOs) depends onhis staff’s ability to plan, coordinate,synchronize, execute and assess deepoperations. The high rate of personnelturnover combined with ever-improv-ing technologies in the various battle-field operating systems (BOS) on an

uncertain battlefield demands rigorous,sustained training for all members ofthe corps deep operations coordinationcell (DOCC).

This article focuses on how III Corpsdetermined the corps battle rhythm fordeep operations; the organization andtactics, techniques and procedures(TTP) of Team DOCC; and the automa-tion and technology the DOCC neededto be most effective. III Corps refined

and tested its tactical standing operat-ing procedures (TACSOP) for deepoperations and trained Team DOCCduring three major exercises in a five-month period.

According to draft FM 100-15 CorpsOperations, the DOCC is not an organi-zation. Rather, it is a cell that bringselements of the corps staff together toexchange ever-changing, pertinent in-formation that enables the corps com-mander to focus his assets to accom-plish his purpose for deep operations. Adisciplined battle rhythm; proficient,cohesive staff members; and an organi-zation with effective information man-agement systems are critical.

III Corps has unique challenges. Itsheadquarters is at Fort Hood, Texas; itsaviation brigade is in Korea; and itscorps artillery is at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.This distance between key elements,combined with high personnel turn-over, intensifies the need for detailed,up-to-date TACSOPs as well as rigor-ous training during the few times it isable to bring the entire Team DOCCtogether.

By Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte,Brigadier General Guy M. Bourn, Colonel James C. Boozer, Sr.,

and Lieutenant Colonel David A. Schneider

Sustaining Corps DeepOperations Proficiency

DOCC


Corps Commander’s Decision Briefing• Review current evening’s plan (24 Hours).• Approve FRAGO (48 Hours).• Approve concept (72 Hours).• Approve initial concept (96 Hours).• Approve ITO nominations (72Hours).

001

Deep Attack

Pre-Targeting Meeting

Deep Attack

ATO Start

Targeting Meeting• Determine FRAGO (24 Hours).• Develop concept (48 Hours).• Select nominations for ITO

(72 Hours).

• Confirm enemy situation.• Confirm friendly situation.• Confirm coordination of

SEAD, EW and AI.• Confirm C2.

Synchronization Meeting

0600

ATO End

0800 1200 1500OA 1800

X-FLOT Minus 2 HoursCOMEX/RehearsalGo/No Go Briefing

2400

III Corps’ participation in Ulchi Fo-cus Lens (UFL), an exercise in Korealast December; Phantom Destroyer, acorps exercise in preparation for the 4thInfantry Division’s Battle CommandTraining Program (BCTP) Warfighterexercise; and, finally, Phantom Fighter,the 4th Division Warfighter providedopportunities to train deep operationsand build on our existing TACSOPs.

III Corps Battle Rhythm. The corpsdeep operations battle rhythm is thecenterpiece of deep operations. Thebattle rhythm is linked to the air taskingorder (ATO) planning cycle and divi-sional battle rhythms. (See Figure 1.) Itallows the divisions limited althoughadequate time to provide their input andgives the corps predictable gates for theplanning and execution of phases.

Figure 2 lists the principal membersof Team DOCC. Each staff element isinvolved in the corps’ military deci-sion-making process (MDMP), so allmembers understand the operationalplan and generally understand how thecorps commander intends to use deepoperations to influence his fight.

LegendATO =Air Tasking Order

AI =Air Interdiction

C2 =Command and Control

COMEX =Communications Exercise

EW =Electronic Warfare

Figure 1: III Armored Corps Deep Operations Battle Rhythm

FRAGO =Fragmentary Order

ITO = Integrated Tasking Order

OA =Operational Area

SEAD =Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

X- FLOT =Cross-Forward Line of Own Troops

Team DOCC’s mission is to developand synchronize the detailed plans re-quired to execute the deep fight, usingits deep operations MDMP. This beginswith the Pre-Targeting Meeting.

Pre-Targeting Meeting. This meetingat 0600 is chaired by the corps artillerydeputy commanding officer (DCO). Heserves as the DOCC chief throughoutthe planning phase.

During the Pre-Targeting Meeting, thecorps staff begins its intelligence prepa-ration of the battlefield (IPB) as appliedto four separate map sets: 0 to 24 hours,24 to 48 hours, 48 to 72 hours and 72 to96 hours. The staff first assesses theenemy capabilities that can affect thecorps and divisional areas of operations(AOs) during the current deep fight (0to 24 hours) as well as in the next 48, 72and 96 hours.

The Pre-Targeting Meeting beginswith the G2 targeting officer’s assess-ment of the enemy situation. He in-cludes unit locations and strengths, us-ing predictive and confirmed battle dam-age assessment (BDA) and enemycourses of action (COAs). This assess

phase of the continuous decide, detect,deliver and assess (D3A) targeting meth-odology is the first critical step in thenext round of deep operations planning.

Additionally, Team DOCC wargamesenemy COAs. It also updates the corpshigh-payoff target list (HPTL), the col-lection focus and the tasks and pur-poses for the current night’s fight—aswell as 48, 72 and 96 hours out.

The Targeting Meeting. The meetingis at 0800 and also is chaired by the corpsartillery DCO. Team DOCC reviews theupdated HPTL and current ATO. TheATO tells the team which deep targetswere approved for attack by USAF as-sets, lists the approved air routes, allo-cates close air support (CAS) assets andlists the approved pre-planned Armytactical missile system (ATACMS) tar-gets. This helps the team develop andwargame possible COAs and determinewhich HPTs they will recommend forattack, using the remaining corps as-sets, such as attack aviation and themultiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)with its extended-range munitions.

Each division liaison officer’s (LNO’s)ability to articulate his division’s deepoperations plan is critical as the corpsstaff attempts to maximize the com-bined and often supporting effects ofboth the corps’ aviation brigade anddivision deep attacks. The assignmentand timing of targets and supportingassets, as well as airspace deconfliction,are essential elements of the corps’ deepoperations plan.

The collection manager then refinesthe current collection plans and developsplans to support future target acquisi-tion and tracking requirements. Throughthis process, targets are selected anddetection assets are allocated and em-ployed. The DOCC is responsible forconfirming and validating the collec-tion manager’s plan to detect the vari-ous HPTs.

During the Targeting Meeting, TeamDOCC develops its staff recommenda-tions on what targets to detect and howto attack those in line with the com-mander’s guidance and intent. The teamthen validates and, if necessary, refinesrecommendations for the current deepfight; finalizes recommendations forthe next 48 hours; refines its concept for72 hours out; and develops an initialconcept for deep operations 96 hoursout. This results in the deep operationsdecision briefing.

The Corps Commander’s DecisionBriefing is at 1200 and the next step in


quirements for those attacks before theybegin. The LNOs pass the requirementsto their units, and the DOCC continues tomonitor the deep operations execution toaffect other coordination, as necessary.

Additionally, the EW officer (EWO)and aviation brigade LNO verify thetimes and locations of lethal and nonle-thal suppression of enemy air defense(SEAD) support.

The collection manager discusseswhich collection assets will be focusedon which targets and how unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) will support theaviation brigade route and target areareconnaissance. It is imperative that thecollection manager understand theDOCC’s information requirements andthat the G2 targeting officer and FAintelligence officer (FAIO) can pass the

information to the DOCC in real time tosupport the attack of designated targets.

After the Synchronization Meeting,the staff and major subordinate com-mands (MSCs) coordinate with theirrespective sections for the current deepoperations plans while the executingunits complete their rehearsals. Theanalysis and control element (ACE) isfocused on producing the targeting in-formation to support the decision toexecute deep operations (target identi-fication and UAV route reconnaissancefor attack aviation units).

Once those critical information re-quirements (CIRs) are satisfied, theaviation brigade commander conductsa Go/No Go briefing with the corpscommander or, if he is unavailable, thecorps executive agent for deep opera-tions, the corps artillery commander.There are many different formats forthe Go/No Go briefing. III Corps’ for-mat focuses on identifying enemy airdefenses along routes and the targetarea, the availability of lethal and non-lethal SEAD, target fidelity, combatpower and weather limitations.

Once the corps commander approvesthe deep attack by corps attack aviation,the DOCC execution van is mannedand prepared to monitor the executionof the deep attacks. Figure 3 on Page 14depicts III Corps’ DOCC set-up duringthe execution phase of deep operations.

Key Lessons Learned. During thethree exercises, the III Corps DOCClearned a lot about designing informa-tion products, taking advantage of tech-nology to upgrade automation systemsand devising TTP to more responsivelymeet the needs of the corps commanderand his staff in deep operations.

• Information Products. In the first exer-cise, the DOCC modified existing statusboards, coordination and execution ma-trices and reference cards. These toolsare a product of operational experience,and there is no “right” solution. Differ-ent commanders and staffs prefer dif-ferent formats and have unique infor-mation requirements. The key is thatnew teams inevitably will go throughthis process; tackling the design of in-formation products early will enablethe team to get on with refining or de-veloping deep operations TTP.

For example, our DOCC status boardincluded a map depicting the deep at-tack targets on the current ITO, a list offire support coordinating measures(FSCM); the deep attack schedule(cross-forward line of own troops, or

Corps CGCorps Artillery CGCorps Artillery DCO, CofS, G2, G3Deep Ops Planners (Corps G2, G3)A2C2

EWOAFSCOORDAir Force LNOCorps AviationCorps ACE Chief

• Collection Manager• Targeting Officer

Corps Chemical OfficerCorps Engineer OfficerCorps G3 (Information Officer)Staff Weather OfficerSOCCECorps Air Defense OfficerCorps Aviation Brigade PlannerLRS Company CommanderCorps SJAMSC and Flank Unit LNOs

Legend:A2C2 = Army Airspace Command and

ControlAFSCOORD = Assistant Fire Support

CoordinatorCofS = Chief of StaffDCO = Deputy Commanding OfficerEWO = Electronic Warfare OfficerLNO = Liaison OfficerLRS = Long-Range SurveillanceSJA = Staff Judge Advocate

SOCCE = Special Operations Commandand Control Element

MSC = Major Subordinate Commands

Figure 2: Team Deep Operations CoordinationCell (DOCC)

the deep operations battle rhythm. TeamDOCC, led by the corps artillery com-mander and DCO, briefs the corps com-mander to review that night’s deep op-erations and get his approval of the next48-hour deep operations plan, the 72-hour refined concept and the 96-hourinitial concept.

Team DOCC briefs weather, projectedenemy and friendly situations, most sig-nificant threats, the HPTL, tasks andpurposes of deep operations and thecollection focus for each ATO (24, 48,72 and 96 hours). Additionally, the teambriefs specific attack plans for the firstthree ATOs—air interdiction (AI), CAS,artillery or attack aviation—plus elec-tronic warfare (EW), information op-erations (IO) and psychological opera-tions. The 72-hour concept approval iscritical as it enables Team DOCC toformally submit its ATO nominationsfor incorporation into the integratedtasking order (ITO), which is deter-mined 72 hours before execution.

Synchronization Meeting. The corpsartillery chief of staff chairs the Syn-chronization Meeting at 1500 and servesas the DOCC chief throughout the syn-chronization and execution phases ofdeep operations (detect and deliver func-tions of D3A). During the Synchroniza-tion Meeting, Team DOCC uses therelevant map boards at the decisionbriefing to conduct a detailed map re-hearsal of the current and next day’sdeep operations. Each team memberbriefs his portion of deep operationsand makes final adjustments to the deepoperations synchronization matrix.

The meeting begins with the deepoperations planner briefing that night’sdeep operations. The corps aviationbrigade LNO and division LNOs thenbrief their deep operations and are fol-lowed by each Team DOCC memberbriefing how his staff element is sup-porting those operations.

A critical piece of this is airspace de-confliction. Corps and division air routesand deep operations are posted andbriefed. The aviation brigade and divi-sion LNOs, in concert with the corpsArmy airspace command and control(A2C2) manager, verify the corps avia-tion brigade and division air routes andthe times the units will use the routes.Additionally, they identify potentialconflicts in those cases where routesintersect. This is critical as attack timesoften change during execution.

If and when the deep attack timeschange, the DOCC coordinates the re-


XFLOT, and who, what, Go/NoGo intime sequence); corps artillery status ofATACMS and extended-range MLRSshot and on hand; FA organization forcombat; the corps HPTL; the corpscommander’s CIRs; battle rhythm timelines for Fort Hood and Korea; and theintelligence synchronization matrix.

• Automation Tools. This was anotherarea the DOCC assessed and updated.This ranged from upgrading newer,more powerful computers and colorprinters to adding an all-source analy-sis system (ASAS) feed to give theDOCC the same operational picture thecorps commander sees in his tacticalcommand post (TAC CP).

• Maximizing Technology. Team DOCCfound manually updating four sets ofmaps a monumental task. While main-taining the manual maps is a necessityin the event of a catastrophic poweroutage, the process cannot keep pacewith systems such as ASAS—givingthe corps commander a slightly differ-ent picture than through the DOCC.

III Corps Artillery purchased a digitalprojector and 100-inch screen to projectthe ASAS picture in the DOCC duringthe execution phase. This significantlyimproved the DOCC’s ability to portraya rapidly changing battlefield in realtime.

Because the corps TAC was in Koreaand the corps main CP at Fort Hood, weconducted our briefings to the corpscommander via secure video telecon-ferencing (VTC). Additionally, wepassed information tools, such as theproducts listed for the DOCC statusboard, over the tactical local area net-work (TACLAN) by posting them tothe DOCC web site. The TAC printedthe information products and passedthem to the corps commander at thestart of each briefing.

VTC proved to be invaluable as itallowed planners to brief and answerthe corps commander’s questions fromany location while getting his immedi-ate guidance and decisions. Simulta-neously, the corps aviation brigade anddivision staffs could view the decisionbriefing, thereby enhancing informa-tion flow throughout the corps.

•Detecting and Tracking Targets. Al-though not a fielded Army system, theautomated deep operations coordina-tion system (ADOCS) software wasgreat for locating artillery formations,which were often the number one HPT.ADOCS provided the counterfire of-ficer a picture of where enemy artilleryfires were coming from by depictingrays from their points of origin to theirpoints of impact. This enabled the

counterfire officer and corps artilleryG2 to provide the DOCC and aviationbrigade higher quality target locationsand descriptions (based on ranges andlocations).

The DOCC often was able to directUAVs over the known artillery loca-tions to verify the type of artillery for-mations and pass the targeting informa-tion to the aviation brigade commanderfor deep attack. When attack aviationassets were not available, the DOCCwas, in some cases, able to divert AI tothose targets.

Team DOCC refined its TTP for de-tecting and tracking other deep targetsas well, based on the nesting of alltarget collection systems. These includeQ-37 Firefinder radar, UAV, the jointsurveillance and target attack radar sys-tem (JSTARS), airborne reconnaissancelow (ARL), long-range surveillanceteams (LRSTs) and special operationsforces (SOF). The result was more le-thal effects in the deep fight.

• Jump-DOCC Operations. For the sec-ond exercise, Team DOCC had to con-duct jump-DOCC operations at the TACCP while the corps main moved. Thistraining forced all team members to re-look their bulky, heavy equipment andassess the best time to jump the DOCCwithout interrupting the corps’ battlerhythm. (See Figure 4.)

Again, improved technology providedlighter flat-screen monitors, laptop com-puters and a compact, portable colorprinter. These tools enabled the jumpDOCC to quickly set up and begin op-erations out of two standard integratedcommand post systems (SICPS) collo-cated with the TAC CP.

The jump DOCC was highly mobileand required only a couple of hours toset up and break down. The jump DOCCused many of the staff officers alreadylocated in the TAC CP to perform theduties of their counterparts in the corpsmain throughout the planning and ex-ecution phases. The personnel who hadto move from the main CP to the TACCP during jump operations are listed inFigure 4.

Team DOCC also determined that thebest time to conduct battle handoverbetween the DOCC and jump DOCCwas immediately after the Commander’sDecision Briefing or just before thenext Pre-Targeting meeting. This en-abled one of the shifts to set up andprepare to assume control of deep op-erations while the current shift sus-tained the corps battle rhythm. The pri-

DeepOperations

PlannerDesk

UAV

AMDWS

C/A G2

Audio VisualControl Desk

CommoSpecialist

UAV

AFATDS Counter-fire Client

Avn Officer

Commander’s Tactical Display

Avn BdeCommander

A2C2

OfficerG2

TargetingOfficer

C/A CG

CollectionManager

Manual Map

DOCCChief

SJA

DivLNO

DivLNO

DeepPlanner

Legend:AFATDS = Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data SystemAMDWS = Air Mobile Defense Warning System

Avn = AviationA2C2 = Army Airspace Command and ControlC/A = Corps Artillery

CG = Commanding GeneralDiv = Division

LNO = Liaison OfficerSJA = Staff Judge AdvocateUAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Figure 3: DOCC Execution Van. This is the DOCC set up during the execution phase of deepoperations.


mary consideration in determiningDOCC hand-over time was battle rhy-thm rather than main CP movementtime, providing a seamless transition.

• Briefing and Rehearsing Off ManualMaps. Using a manual map does notensure automated systems, such as theairmobile defense warning system(AMDWS) and the advanced FA tacti-cal data system (AFATDS), have thesame information. When the DOCCconducted its pre-combat checks be-fore execution, it sometimes found airroutes and FSCM absent from those data-bases or final refinements not yet posted.

To minimize this problem, the DOCCconnected its various feeds to its moni-tors during the planning and synchroni-zation meetings, thereby enabling thestaff officers to display and verify theinformation was entered correctly be-fore and during the synchronizationmeeting and Go/No Go briefings. Thisgreatly reduced the number of instanceswhere the staff had to enter the informa-tion at the last minute before execution.

• DOCC’s ASAS Feed. The ASAS feedwas a shared feed from the G3 currentoperations section. While this provideda better real-time picture of the battle-field, the DOCC was unable to customizethe shared feed with detailed deep op-erations graphics it needed. Thus, theDOCC obtained its own ASAS program.

• LNOs Checklist. During the secondexercise, Team DOCC developed a bet-ter checklist of information require-ments from the division LNOs—espe-cially to cover divisional changes dur-ing execution, such as a division failingto cross the FLOT at the expected time.As with corps operations, division op-erations often change as commandersfight the enemy, not the plan. The DOCCadded periodic plan verifications to thechecklist, causing the divisional LNOs tocontact the divisional DOCCs to verifytime lines, engagement areas and units.

• Robust A2C2. Changes to the planduring execution also highlighted theneed for a robust A2C2 cell, not onlyduring planning and synchronization,but during execution as well. Whilehaving an aviation officer in the DOCCduring execution helps, the DOCC needsa 24-hour-capable A2C2 cell that is fullystaffed to coordinate and disseminatechanges to airspace management.

• Corps Artillery G2 in the DOCC.The corps artillery G2 was in the DOCCthroughout execution. This improvedTeam DOCC’s ability to assess effectson deep targets. He managed the UAV,

JSTARS and ADOCS feeds to helplocate and assess targets. He was alsothe DOCC’s executive agent for BDAand provided the DOCC chief periodi-cal updates on target strengths. Thisenabled the team to re-direct attackassets against targets requiring furtherattrition and also let the DOCC knowwhen it could stop servicing varioustargets, thereby enabling it to directattack assets against other HPTs.

The DOCC chief worked with theACE to develop cumulative BDA andpassed that information to the plannersfor their use in refining the next day’sdeep attack plans during the Pre-Tar-geting Meeting. This helped close theloop in the D3A targeting methodology.

• DOCC-ACE Intelligence Focus Dis-connects. Occasionally, in the first twoexercises, the DOCC and ACE lost theircombined focus during execution for a

couple of reasons. As the corps met itsobjectives for various targets (destroy,neutralize or suppress), the DOCC didnot always focus the ACE on the nexttarget set. The ACE continued to focusvaluable collection resources on theserviced target rather than on the nexttarget. In other cases, the ACE divertedcollection assets to another area of thebattlefield without notifying the DOCC.The diversion was to develop intelli-gence on other target indicators detectedduring the battle. This hindered theDOCC’s ability to determine whether ornot to attack some of the scheduled deeptargets.

During the last exercise, the DOCCdesigned procedures to prevent this dis-connect. The corps artillery G2 reviewedhis BDA with the ACE chief once hebelieved the corps met its objective foreach deep target. Together they recom-

(From Corps Main)Chief x 2Deep Planner x 2EWO x 2 IO/PSYOP x 2Driver & TCSOCCE x 2

G2

Copier

G3GCCS

ASAS

MCSASASLight

Video Operator

Screen

CG

FSEG2

A2C2

SJA Chem

Eng

ADE

ALO

FSE

ADE

ChemLNO/Staff

Video Bank

G6

Monitors & Maps

DOCC-ForwardG2

G3

G3

G2G3

G3

Legend:ADE = Assistant Division EngineerALO = Air Liaison Officer

ASAS = All-Source Analysis SystemEWO = Electronic Warfare OfficerFSE = Fire Support Element

Figure 4: Jump-DOCC Layout

GCCS = Global Command and Control CenterIO = Information Operation

MCS = Maneuver Control SystemPSYOP = Psychological Operations

SWO = Staff Weather Officer


mander and staff unless informationmanagement systems are developed andimplemented in concert with the im-provements to technology.

Just as our TACSOPs will provide theframework for conducting deep opera-tions, exercises allow the DOCC to usenewer technologies to develop new in-formation management TTP. As a re-sult, current and future teams will bebetter able to preserve peace by beingprepared for war.

Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte hasbeen the Commanding General of the IIIdArmored Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, sinceAugust 1998. In his previous assignment,he served as an Assistant Deputy Chief ofStaff for Operations and Plans at the Pen-tagon. He commanded the 1st CavalryDivision, also at Fort Hood, and, previ-ously, served as the division’s G3 duringOperations Desert Shield and Storm in theGulf and as the Commander of the divi-sion’s 3d Greywolf Brigade at Fort Hood.

Brigadier General Guy M. Bourn has com-manded the IIId Armored Corps Artillery atFort Sill, Oklahoma, since March 2000.Previously, he served as a Special Assis-

mended to the DOCC chief whether ornot to continue servicing that target andwhich target the corps should focus onnext. In turn the DOCC chief passed hisrecommendations to the corps artillerycommander who made the final deter-mination with the G2 targeting officerand (or) the ACE chief present. Thisensured the conscious and seamless tran-sition of the corps’ intelligence focusthroughout the corps’ deep fight.

Additionally, the G2 targeting officerand (or) the ACE chief briefed theDOCC chief on the current collectionfocus and his assessment of the enemy’scapabilities once an hour. The DOCCchief confirmed or denied whether ornot the DOCC and ACE were in synchand made adjustments at that time. ThisTTP proved to be extremely effectivein ensuring the DOCC and ACE sus-tained their collective focus throughoutthe final exercise.

Conclusion. While the purpose of deepoperations remains constant, techno-logical improvements throughout thecorps often affect the manner in whichthe DOCC can plan, coordinate, syn-chronize, execute and assess the deepfight. The speed and quantity of infor-mation can quickly overload the com-

tant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Hecommanded the 17th Field Artillery Bri-gade, part of the IIId Armored Corps Artil-lery, and served as the Fort Sill Chief ofStaff. He also commanded the 3d Battal-ion, 29th Field Artillery, part of the 4thInfantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood.

Colonel James C. Boozer, Sr., is the DeputyCommanding Officer of the IIId ArmoredCorps Artillery, Fort Sill. He commandedthe 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery (Mul-tiple-Launch Rocket System, or MLRS),part of the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, IIIdArmored Corps Artillery, and served as S3of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)Artillery, Germany. Colonel Boozer is sched-uled to assume command of the 214thField Artillery Brigade, IIId Armored CorpsArtillery, at Fort Sill in August.

Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) David A.(Al) Schneider is the Chief of Staff of the IIIdArmored Corps Artillery at Fort Sill. Herecently commanded the 2d Battalion, 18thField Artillery (MLRS), part of the 212thField Artillery Brigade, also in the IIId Ar-mored Corps Artillery. He was the BrigadeS3 and S3 of the 5th Battalion, 18th FieldArtillery, both in the 75th Field ArtilleryBrigade. Among other assignments, heserved as a Staff Officer in the Office of theChief of Staff of the Army at the Pentagon.

Joint Targeting School Joint Targeting Staff Course (JTSC). The JTSC is a three-week course on the application of the six-step joint targeting

cycle: determine objectives and guidance, developtargets, conduct weaponeering, apply weapon-tar-get match to the force, execute the plan and assess

the effects.Joint Targeting Application Course (JTAC).

JTAC is a two-week study of the weaponeeringstep of the joint targeting cycle. Students receive

training on the air-to-surface and surface-to-surfacemethodologies necessary to match weapons to targets.

Joint Battle Damage Assessment (JBDA). The JBDAcourse is one week and focuses on the last step of the jointtargeting cycle: combat assessment. JBDA examines theconcepts and theory associated with combat assessmentand the functions of a BDA cell at the operational or JTF level.

Mobile Training Teams (MTT): Between sessions of thein-residence courses, the school offers a one-week versionof the JTSC and a slightly modified JBDA course to provideintroductory training on the joint targeting process to unifiedcommands and eligible JTF staffs.

To request a seat for one of the courses or coordinate for aMTT, call the school Quota Control Coordinator at DSN 492-0276/0277 or commercial at (757) 492-0276/0277. The fax isDSN 492-0280 or commercial (757) 492-0280. For moreinformation, view the Joint Targeting School web site atwww.jts.damneck.navy.smil.mil.

Major Gregory P. Fenton, FAJoint Targeting School, Virginia Beach, VA

Targeting is not just an Army concept. Each servicehas developed its own doctrine and targeting meth-odologies. With the revision of FM 6-20-10Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for theTargeting Process, the Army and Marine Corps usethe decide, detect, deliver and assess (D3A) targetingmethodology. However, the Air Force and Navy target-ing methodologies evolved from the Air Force’s air taskingorder (ATO) cycle. And as the services try to conduct jointoperations, targeting problems occur at the operational andstrategic levels of war.

The Joint Targeting School in Virginia Beach, Virginia, ad-dresses joint targeting problems and provides joint targetingtraining. The school offers three courses in the theory andapplication of the joint targeting process. The instruction isfor intelligence, operations and planning officers, warrantofficers (WOs) and NCOs who are involved in targeting oncombatant command or joint task force (JTF) staffs. For FieldArtillerymen, the school’s curriculum applies to fire support-ers in corps and division fire support elements (FSEs), deepoperations coordination cells (DOCCs), battlefield coordina-tion elements (BCEs) and those on joint staffs in the J2, J3and J5 sections.

Historically, the Army has had the fewest attendees amongthe three services. Most of our Army graduates have beenWOs and intelligence officers. The Joint Targeting Schooloffers the following courses.


Artillery units can develop betterpriority intelligence require-ments (PIRs) to help command-

ers execute their FA support plans(FASPs). As indicated by the observa-tion of units rotating though the NationalTraining Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin,California, the PIRs generally do not con-sider the impact of the threat’s capabili-ties and his courses-of-action (COAs) onunit missions or force protection.

As Mao Tse-Tung said, “War is hardthinking.” This article discusses tactics,techniques and procedures (TTP) for theFA battalion battle staff to “artillerize”PIRs, especially force-protection PIRs,and do the “hard thinking” up front.

The Problems. NTC FA TacticalOperations Center (TOC) Trainers haveobserved two trends in developing PIRs.First, some artillery units integrate thePIRs from their supported brigade’soperations order (OPORD) withoutmodifying or tailoring them for theirunits. Some PIRs are linked to thebrigade’s artillery unit’s essential firesupport tasks (EFST)—for example,“What is the location of the 168th Mo-torized Rifle Regiment’s (MRR’s) regi-mental artillery group (RAG)?” SuchPIRs have targeting implications thatare critical to the brigade and must beincorporated into the FA battalion’sPIRs. However, other brigade PIRs donot apply and shouldn’t be included inthe FA PIRs.

FM 3-09.21 (6-20-1) TTP for the FieldArtillery Battalion reminds us that “theS2 also further develops the FA bat-talion’s PIRs and begins incorporatingthem into reconnaissance and surveil-lance (R & S) plans, the PIRs the ma-neuver/higher FA headquarters taskedthe battalion to answer.” Additionally,the battle staff must develop PIRs spe-cifically for the FA battalion.

The second trend is that too many FAunits use a standard list of PIRs for

offensive and de-fensive missions.Sometimes these“boiler plate” PIRsare even included inthe unit’s tacticalstanding operating pro-cedures (TACSOP). When theunit plans for a mission, it selects PIRsfrom this list. FM 34-8-2 IntelligenceOfficer’s Handbook cautions, “There isno set of PIRs that we can present thatwill be useful for all tactical situations.”

Using standard PIRs predisposes unitsto avoid thinking through the impact ofthe threat’s capabilities and his possibleCOAs. There is a tendency to try tomake the listed PIRs fit the mission,even if they are unsuitable or do notapply.

Tuning In to the Threat. Duringbattles at the NTC, the opposing force(OPFOR) employs predictable formsof contact against FA battalions thatresult in significant combat powerlosses. For the OPFOR, FA units arehigh-payoff targets (HPTs). OPFORcommanders will commit a sizeableforce to destroy cannon and rocket units.

The OPFOR consistently destroys ar-tillery units with anti-tank fires fromair- and ground-inserted infantry dur-ing MRR attacks, even when the BlueForce (Bluefor) has anticipated thepoints of insertion and the objectives ofthe infantry. In fact, additional combatpower losses have occurred as FA bat-talion combat and field trains movewithin range of anti-tank fires from thesame infantry forces.

In addition, enemy reconnaissance andunconventional forces have destroyedthe brigade’s only Q-36 Firefinder ra-dar, command and control centers, andcritical signal nodes. The OPFOR alsowill employ attack helicopters, scat-terable mines and chemical munitionsto destroy artillery units.

Units generally have indications ofthese enemy movements and pendingattacks, but they fail to respond to pre-serve their combat power. FA units mustevaluate the OPFOR’s capabilities andhow these capabilities can affect artilleryoperations. Appropriate, well-thought-outPIRs can help the commander make timelydecisions to avoid such losses.

Defining PIRs. Several manuals de-fine PIRs, but the best definition withexamples of “good” PIRs is in FM 34-8-2. It states, “PIR are intelligence re-quirements associated with a decisionthat will affect the overall success of thecommand’s mission.”

According to FM 34-8-2, good PIRsdo the following: “Ask only one ques-tion; focus on a specific fact, event, oractivity; provide the intelligence re-quired to support a single decision; aretied to key decisions that the commanderhas to make; and give a latest time ofinformation of value (LTIOV).”

Typically, PIRs for artillery units fallinto two categories: those that supportEFSTs, which come from the brigadefire support element (FSE), and thosethat are force-protection oriented. Whenthe unit receives PIRs from the brigade,it must incorporate the applicable onesinto the battalion PIRs. The unit thenanalyzes the threats to its force, basedon the enemy’s capabilities and COAs.Next, based on the friendly scheme ofmaneuver, the FA unit develops its PIRsto recommend to the brigade commander.

The S3 selects the PIRs from the IRsdeveloped during mission analysis andvalidated as PIRs during wargaming.

ArtillerizingPIRs

By Major Johnny Cook, MI, andCaptain Kirk D. Steege, MI


Legend:Div Arty = Division Artillery

FASCAM = Family of Scatterable Mines

LZ = Landing ZoneMRR = Motorized Rifle RegimentPAA = Position Area for Artillery

PL = Phase LineRAG = Regimental Artillery GroupRPA = Radar Position Area

The PIRs are linked to decisions thecommander must make and reflect thelatest time the commander requires theinformation to make that decision.

At the NTC, units are generally suc-cessful at addressing PIRs related toEFSTs in the “method” portion of theiressential FA tasks (EFATs)—particu-larly as PIRs relate to triggers for ex-ecuting the EFSTs. (The EFATs are thespecific FA tasks derived from the EFSTs.)Units are less successful in identifyingforce-protection related PIRs.

Force-Protection PIRs for Defen-sive Operations. The following sce-nario illustrates the process for deter-mining force-protection PIRs based onthe enemy’s capabilities and COAs.

PIR 1. An enemy MRR will conduct adeliberate attack against a US brigadecombat team (BCT). A RAG and divi-sional artillery group (DAG) will sup-port the MRR attack.

During the intelligence preparation ofthe battlefield (IPB), the battalion S2decided the enemy’s most likely COAwas to attack through the northern taskforce to penetrate the brigade’s defense.The S2 believes the MRR would attackwith its light infantry the night before themain attack to help shape the battlefield.

The next day at first light, an enemyregimental forward detachment attackedin the north to create an initial point of

penetration. Simultaneously, an envel-opment detachment attacked in the southto fix the brigade forces and preventthem from repositioning to reinforcethe task force in the north. At the sametime, a flank security detachment attackedsouth of the envelopment detachment toprotect the MRR’s southern flank.

After these three elements made con-tact, the enemy fired a persistent chemi-cal agent to further isolate the task forcein the north. The enemy positioned hisradar forward to support his counterbatteryoperations. He revealed his RAG, whichhe had purposely masked, to initiate firesto destroy and suppress brigade units atthe point of penetration.

The forward detachment culminatedits attack after creating a point of pen-etration. The first-echelon motorizedrifle battalion (MRB) attacked to ex-ploit the point of penetration and culmi-nated its attack within the BCT’s sector.The second-echelon MRB attacked alongthe same avenue as the first-echelon MRBto seize the MRR objective.

If the envelopment detachment andflank security detachment are success-ful, the MRBs will continue to attacktoward the MRR objective to createmultiple points of penetration, causingthe BCT to fight in multiple directions.This would prevent the BCT from mass-ing its combat power.

The FA battalion S2 templated theenemy infantry that would be air as-saulted into the vicinity of NV490070and estimated the infantry would takeapproximately 30 minutes to consoli-date forces on the landing zone beforemoving to the objective.

The S3 noted that if the enemy insertsinto that location, A and B Batterieswould be within enemy observationand anti-tank weapons range. The S2and the S3 developed PIR 1 listed in thefigure. The PIR is based on the enemy’sCOA to air-insert infantry. (The figure isa modification of the “Enemy CriticalEvents Matrix,” Figure 4-5 on an EventTemplate found in FM 3-09, Page 4-33.)

PIR 2. During the mission analysisprocess, the battalion fire direction of-ficer (FDO) identified one of the EFATsis to emplace a family of scatterablemines (FASCAM) minefield in the vi-cinity of NV345165 in Brown Pass.The task and purpose of the FASCAMis to delay the first-echelon MRB westof Brown Pass for 15 minutes to isolatethe regimental forward detachment eastof the pass. The brigade fire supportofficer (FSO) established a trigger forfiring FASCAM as the forward detach-ment is identified east of Brown Pass.

The FDO determined that C Batterywill be the primary FASCAM shooterand B Battery the alternate shooter. To

Latest Time Informationof Value

NLT 30 minutes after the enemy airassaults into his LZ.

The forward detachments reaches theH-1.30 TPL, allowing C Battery at least90 minutes to be in position ready tofire the FASCAM.

MRR’s first-echelon main body crossesTPL H-1.

Firing batteries in place ready to fire insupport of the main battle area defenseand identification of the enemy’s pointof penetration NLT when first-echelonforces reach TPL H-1.

Enemy penetrates PL Blue with two ormore motorized rifle platoons.

#

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Priority InformationRequirement

Has the enemy air assaultedinfantry vicinity NV490070?

Has the enemy employedspecial munitions along RouteAdams?

Is the RAG within acquisitionrange of the Q-36 radar andwithin range of 2-5 FA firingbatteries?

What is the location of theARC-1 radar?

Where will the enemy establisha point of penetration?

Decision

Occupy alternate position areas for artillery.Reroute A and B Batteries to avoid air-inserted infantry observation and contact.Engage enemy infantry with indirect fires.

Alter movement route of C Battery fromRoute Adams to Route Madison.

Reposition the Q-36 from RPA 1 to RPA 2.Request Q-37 coverage from Div Arty tocover the Q-36 move. Direct 2-5 FA toreposition to the west. Refine radar zones.

If the ARC-1 is located, engage with director indirect fire. If ARC-1 is destroyed,change survivability movement criteria from6 volleys or every 10 minutes to 10 volleysor every 40 minutes.

Displace firing batteries to PAA 3A, PAA2B, and PAA 3C. Displace Q-36 to RPA 3;displace the TOC to NV575112.

FA Battalion Battle Staff Force-Protection PIRs

NAI

1

3

9, 10

8

2, 4, 5

TOC = Tactical OperationsCenter

TPL = Time Phase Line


range the pass, C Battery will movefrom one position area to another alongRoute Adams, the fastest route overeven terrain. The battle captain deter-mined it would take C Battery 40 min-utes to move during limited visibility.

During the wargame, the S2 templatedtwo possible persistent chemical strikeswithin a three-kilometer diameter. Onechemical strike was templated atNV4614 near Route Adams with thepurpose of isolating the northern taskforce, thus facilitating the penetrationof first-echelon forces. The other tem-plated chemical strike was at NV5110,which is over the BCT’s tank companyreserve.

If the enemy emplaced the persistentchemical in the vicinity of NV4614, itwould affect both B and C Batteries.The S3’s reaction to this possibility wasto establish an alternate route for CBattery, Route Madison, which traversesrough and broken terrain. The battle cap-tain determined C Battery would need 90minutes for this more difficult move.Based on this wargame, the S2 and S3established PIR 2 listed in the figure.

PIR 3. As the wargame progressed,the S2 asserted the enemy will supporthis maneuver plan with indirect fires bypositioning his RAG near target areasof interests (TAIs) 9 and 10. Addition-ally, the division artillery established acommon sensor boundary to the west ofTAIs 9 and 10.

During the wargame, one of theenemy’s regimental reconnaissanceteams called for indirect fire against BBattery, destroying two howitzers andone ammunition resupply vehicle. Nei-ther the Q-36 nor the Q-37 Firefinderradar acquired the enemy artillery. TheS3 conducted an analysis and deter-mined that the TAIs and artillery wereoutside the Q-36’s range of 24 kilome-ters and short of division artillery’scommon sensory boundary.

Based on this assessment, the S3 de-cided to reposition the Q-36 farther tothe west to acquire the RAG. He alsodetermined the latest time he wouldneed to know if the RAG can acquirethe Q-36 and artillery firing units oc-curs when the MRR’s first-echelon mainbody crosses Time Phase Line (TPL) H-1. This would trigger the repositioning ofthe friendly radar and artillery to the west.Based on this interaction, the staff com-piled PIR 3 listed in the figure.

PIR 4. As the wargame continued, theS2 positioned the enemy’s ARC-1counterbattery radar to acquire both the

Major Johnny Cook, Military Intelligence(MI), is the Reinforcing Artillery BattalionIntelligence Trainer on the Werewolf Team(Fire Support Task Force Trainers) at theNational Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin,California. He also has held positions at theNTC as Senior Training Analyst and Intelli-gence Trainer on the Tarantula Team (LightInfantry Task Force Trainers), G2 PlansOfficer and G2 of the 52d Infantry Divisionon the Lizard Team. Major Cook com-manded an MI company in the XVIII AirborneCorps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Hisother assignments include serving as As-sistant S3 of the 519th MI Battalion and S2of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, both inthe 2d Infantry Division in Korea.

Captain Kirk D. Steege, MI, is the DirectSupport Artillery Battalion IntelligenceTrainer on the Werewolf Team at the NTC.He also served as the G2 Plans Officer onthe Lizard Team. Among other assign-ments, he was the S2 of the 34th SupportGroup and Commander of an MI companyin the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade inthe Eighth Army, Korea. He also served asthe Battalion S2, Battalion Targeting Of-ficer, Battalion Ammunition Officer andRecon Survey Officer in the 1st Battalion,5th Field Artillery, part of the 1st InfantryDivision (Mechanized) at Fort Riley, Kan-sas.

direct support and reinforcing battal-ions. As Bluefor artillery supported theBCT commander’s scheme of maneu-ver with fires, the ARC-1 acquired Blue-for artillery and returned counterfire,destroying two howitzers and severalwheeled vehicles. Based on this enemyaction, the battalion S3 would counterby changing the survivability move-ment criteria for his firing batteries anddirecting battery commanders to in-crease dispersion between howitzersections.

The S2 glanced at the BCT’s HPT list.He identified the ARC-1 as a HPTwhen the RAG is set and ready to sup-port the MRR’s commitment of thefirst echelon into the BCT’s main de-fensive area.

Examining the BCT’s scheme of fires,the S3 noted one of the BCT’s EFSTs isto mass indirect fires when the enemyenters task force engagement areas, thedecisive point of the battle. During thisphase of the battle, the battalion willexecute its highest volume of fire andwill be more susceptible to enemy ac-quisitions and counterfire.

The S2 and S3 agreed the location ofthe ARC-1 needed to be determinedbefore this decisive point. Based onthis discussion, the battle staff pro-duced PIR 4 listed in the figure.

PIR 5. The staff continued wargamingand determined it is possible the enemycould penetrate the brigade’s defense.The S2’s assessment was that if theenemy penetrated the brigade’s defense,it would be in the northern task forcesector initially, followed by further pen-etrations in the south as the defensecollapsed.

If penetrations occurred, the FA bat-talion would have to reposition its fir-ing batteries, Q-36 radar and TOC toavoid contact with enemy armored for-mations. The staff developed PIR 5listed in the figure to address this en-emy action.

The previous discussion details pos-sible PIRs for a BCT defensive missionand, by no means, are all-inclusive.

Force-Protection PIRs for Offen-sive Operations. Here are some pos-sible force-protection PIRs for an of-fensive mission. If one of the enemy’sCOAs is to employ a raiding detach-ment, the staff can establish a PIR witha decision point to reposition batteries,the Q-36 radar, logistics sites and com-mand, control and communicationsnodes away from the enemy’s avenueof approach.

Another enemy option may be to em-ploy an artillery raid. In this instance,the battle staff can produce a PIR witha decision point to reposition the Q-36and a firing battery to deliver coun-terfire. If the enemy has enough time toprepare a detailed obstacle plan, thestaff can develop a PIR related to iden-tifying minefields and obstacles tied toa decision point to travel along alter-nate routes.

One of the most intellectually chal-lenging aspects of the military deci-sion-making process is wargaming. Aspart of wargaming, the battle staff pro-duces several products, including a de-cision support template (DST) that de-tails PIRs to support key commanderand staff decision points. These PIRshelp the commander by filling in intel-ligence gaps and allowing him to maketimely decisions.

As Mao would echo, the creation of adetailed DST and associated PIRs re-quires “hard thinking.” The differencebetween thinking hard up front or wait-ing until after the battle begins could bethe success of the unit and the lives ofits soldiers.


The fire support coordination process is a flexible process that mustbe kept as simple as possible to produce the desired results. The JointForce Commander and component commanders synchronize joint firesupport operations to place the right attack means on the correct targetat the precise time. To achieve synchronization, commanders and staffsmust have a thorough knowledge of each service’s doctrine, majorsystems, significant capabilities and limitations and often their TTP[tactics, techniques and procedures].

Joint Pub 3-09 Doctrine for Joint Fire Support

Efficient planning, coordinationand execution of air support forUS Army forces (ARFOR)

ground operations are essential to thesuccess of the ARFOR mission. Thebattlefield coordination detachment(BCD) is the ARFOR commander’s linkbetween the ARFOR ground operationsand the joint force air componentcommander’s (JFACC’s) joint air op-erations center (JAOC). The Army’sBCD in the JAOC processes Army re-quests for tactical air support, monitorsand interprets the land battle situationfor the JAOC and provides the interfacefor the exchange of current intelligenceand operational data.

The BCD synchronizes air and groundoperations for the following seven airmissions: air interdiction (AI); air re-connaissance; close air support (CAS);electronic warfare (EW); theater airlift;reconnaissance, intelligence, surveil-lance and target acquisition (RISTA);Army airspace command and control(A2C2); and air and missile defense. TheBCD achieves this synchronization byintegrating Army operational require-ments into the ATO development pro-cess by way of the advanced Field Ar-tillery tactical data system (AFATDS).AFATDS is fielded from echelons abovecorps (EAC) down to the firing platoonlevel.

Internally, the Marine Corps has thesame requirement to synchronize airand ground operations. This coordina-tion and synchronization is conductedat the tactical air control center (TACC)at the marine expeditionary force (MEF)level. When the Marine Corps cannotservice air support with internal assets,it coordinates support with the JFACCthrough the Marine air liaison officer(MARLO). Even though the TACC hasAFATDS, the link between the TACCand the MARLO is voice, not digital.

This article discusses how AFATDSprocesses pre-planned and immediaterequests for air support for both theArmy and Marine Corps. These capa-bilities are part of AFATDS’ VersionA98 software currently fielded.

AFATDS Interface. During the pastyear, great advances have been made inthe interoperability between AFATDSand the Air Force’s theater battle man-agement system (TBMCS), signifi-cantly improving our ability to plan andcoordinate air support. AFATDS pro-vides important capabilities to coordi-nate and synchronize air and groundoperations.

AFATDS has an air support list (ASL)used to manage the commander’s airsupport requests (ASRs). (See Figure1.) An ASL is simply a list of ASRs fora unit for a given day that correspondsto a specific ATO. The ASL manages aunit’s air requests throughout the ATOdevelopment and execution cycle fromthe time the requirement for air supportis identified to the approved missionsbeing flown the current air day.

The ASL supports the seven air mis-sions synchronized by the BCD in addi-tion to medical evacuation (MEDE-VAC) and air assault missions. Cur-rently, TBMCS supports the automatedprocessing of AI missions and pre-planned ASRs at the JAOC and CASmission requests at the air support op-erations center (ASOC).

Air SupportFunctionality inAFATDS

By Major Alford J. Williams


ASL Lists in Current Phase 1File Target View

List: ASL EXAMPLE Plan: Current Phase: 1

Absolute Start:

D-Day End:

201200ZDEC00

211200ZDEC00

X

CurrentSOP Phase 1DIV OPORD DEFEND Phase 1DIV OPORD DEFEND Phase 23BDE STRESS PLAN Phase 1

ASR No Tgt No Target Type Ver 1 Ver 2 Start Time Air Stat1 AAA0000 AA0000 Defile 011200ZDEC012 AAA0002 011400ZDEC013 AAA0005 011456ZDEC014 AAA0001 AA0001 Hill 011300ZDEC015 AAA0003 011500ZDEC016 AAA0006 011344ZDEC017 AAA0004 011545ZDEC01

Figure 1: Air Support List (ASL) in the Advanced FA Tactical Data System (AFATDS)

DIV = Division 3BDE = 3d Brigade OPORD = Operations Order SOP = Standing Operating Procedures Legend:

Pre-Planned Requests. Planning be-gins with the military-decision makingprocess (MDMP) and higher headquar-ters planning guidance, which desig-nates the priority of effort for air sup-port. Higher headquarters also providethe unit a maximum number of ASRs itcan submit (normally by mission type).

The pre-planned ASR functions inAFATDS allow each unit to developASRs and construct an ASL for a spe-cific air day. The ASL is then for-warded to the next higher headquartersin the request chain for fire supportprocessing. The higher headquartersanalyzes the subordinate’s ASL, con-ducts fire support processing, resolvesconflicts and checks for duplications.Approved subordinate ASLs then aremerged for submission to the next higherheadquarters. This process is repeatedat each echelon until the ASLs reach theARFOR’s BCD.

The request process may begin as lowas the maneuver battalion task force, butthe consolidation process begins at themaneuver brigade. This processing planfacilitates the submission of pre-planned

ASRs via the ASL from battalion to bri-gade to division to corps to the ARFOR.

Once higher headquarters has mergedits subordinates’ ASLs into it’s ASL, itthen reviews the consolidated ASL forcorrectness and compliance with thehigher commander’s intent. During thereview, the higher headquarters usesthe AFATDS sorting function, whichhelps “stack” (group) similar ASRs to-gether in the ASL. This allows the head-quarters to determine which air missionsto forward and which, if any, to deny.

The headquarters also uses AFATDSto check for duplications and violationsof fire support coordinating measures(FSCM). In the duplication check,AFATDS lists the target numbers (ASRnumbers) that are duplicates, based ontarget locations and the unit’s AFATDS“Duplication Guidance.” The FSCMcheck compares each ASR target sizeand location to the FSCM that will be ineffect during the execution of that ASR,as modified by that unit’s “Fire SupportBuffer Distance Guidance” in AFATDS.

At the BCD, the process is performedone last time on the ASL before being

sent to TBMCS for processing and ATOdevelopment.

Processing pre-planned ASRs is simi-lar for the Marine Corps. (See Figure 2 onPage 22.) The fire support coordinationcenter (FSCC) in the maneuver battal-ion forwards the ASRs digitally to theregimental FSCC for review and decon-fliction with its ASL. The consolidatedASL is then forwarded to the divisionFSCC and then Marine expeditionaryforce (MEF) for review and approvalbefore the MEF’s consolidated ASL issent digitally to the TACC. The TACCprocesses ASRs for all air mission cat-egories and only forwards those ASRsit can’t support with Marine assets tothe AOC. The TACC interfaces withthe MARLO by voice to access supportfrom the AOC.

When the AOC publishes the ATO,AFATDS receives and processes theATO via its interface with TBMCS atthe BCD. AFATDS matches the ASLwith the same time window as the ATOand automatically updates the ASRs onits ASL (based on the ASR numbers).After AFATDS at the BCD updates the


XXX

XX

JFACC

BattalionFSCC

BattalionFSCC

BattalionFSCC

Regimental FSCC

Division FSCC

MEF FFCC

XXX

TACC

MARLO AOC

Voice Link

Figure 2: USMC Pre-Planned Air SupportRequest (ASR) Mission Flow. The battal-ion FSCCs create and send their ASRs forthe air support list (ASL) to regiment, whichmerges all requests and sends them tohigher headquarters, etc. For those airmissions that cannot be serviced by Ma-rine Air, the TACC coordinates for airsupport via a voice link with the MARLO atthe JFACC’s AOC.

AOC = Air Operations Center

FFCC = Force Fire Coordination Center

FSCC = Fire Support Coordination Center

JFACC = Joint Force Air Component Com-mander

MARLO = Marine Air Liaison Officer

MEF = Marine Expeditionary Force

TACC = Tactical Air Control Center

ASL, AFATDS automatically sends thisrevised ASL to all the subordinate unitswhose ASRs were merged into thatASL. The process is the same forchanges from the top-down. AFATDSautomatically updates any ATO changesto the ASL published by the AOC anddisseminates the revised ASL digitally.

After developing the ASL, some ofthe target data may change, for examplewhen a target’s location changes.AFATDS allows the operator to updatethe target data for pre-planned ASRs.The update occurs on individual ASRs,and each is forwarded for processing.

AFATDS provides other functional-ity to help the user manage his approvedASRs. For example, the operator can settwo alarm clock-type alerts to notify himwhen higher headquarters requires verifi-cation of each mission’s validity.

Additionally, when a mission has beenflown and TBMCS sends the BCD’sAFATDS a mission report (MISREP),AFATDS changes the status of the mis-sion to “Completed” and annotates theresults indicated on the ASL. These andother functions help the AFATDS op-erator track the status of the pre-plannedair missions from initial submissionthrough completion.

The operator also can select an ap-proved ASR on an ASL and “Execute”or “Divert” that mission. Either of theseactions causes an immediate ASR to begenerated and sent to the unit in theimmediate ASR routing guidance (us-ing the number of the selected ASR).

Immediate Requests. AFATDS al-lows each echelon to develop immediateASRs and send them up the chain forapproval. (See Figure 3.) The processingfor immediate ASRs is different from theprocess for pre-planned ASRs.

Each unit in the air mission chainmonitors the current ASL. As the pre-planned ASL becomes effective, theunit uses AFATDS to manage its im-mediate missions. There should neverbe two ASLs with overlapping times.

For immediate ASRs, CAS requestsare routed digitally to the ASOC whileall other requests are sent to the AOC.Each AFATDS unit establishes a rout-ing path up its chain of command forimmediate air requests. This allows theunit to send two copies of the immedi-ate request—one copy destined for theASOC or AOC and one to remain as aninfo copy for the higher headquarters asthe request rapidly passes through thatheadquarters to the next higher head-quarters.

Each higher headquarters receives andreviews its info copy of the ASR as theimmediate ASR continues up the chain.If the headquarters finds no problemswith the request, then it takes no action,allowing the mission request to pro-ceed. On the other hand, if a higher

headquarters finds a problem with themission, it can send “Denied.” The denymessage automatically goes back viathe chain of command to the originat-ing unit and forward to the ASOC orAOC.

If a unit receives an immediate re-quest for CAS or AI, AFATDS checksthe current ASL to verify if the unit hasan approved pre-planned CAS or AImission with the same ASR number asthe immediate request. If there is amatch, AFATDS changes the state ofthe mission to “Execute” and sends theASR to the AOC or ASOC.

If AFATDS can’t match an ASR num-ber with the request, AFATDS looks atapproved pre-planned on-call andscheduled missions the unit created. Ifpossible (based on a match of the targettype and the “No Earlier Than/No LaterThan” time of execution), AFATDS re-commends a request to divert one ofthese missions to service the immediateASR. When this happens and the opera-tor approves the recommendation,AFATDS changes the mission state ofthe pre-planned mission to “Divert,”associates the new target number andlocation with the immediate ASR andsends the request to the ASOC.

Again, the process is similar for theMarine Corps, except it sends all imme-diate requests up the chain (with infocopies at each higher headquarters) tothe division air support center (DASC)for processing. If the DASC cannotsupport the immediate ASR, it returnsthe request to the division for submis-sion to the MEF. At this point, the re-quest follows the route for pre-plannedASRs.

Air Mission Improvements. TheTraining and Doctrine Command Sys-tem Manager (TSM) Field ArtilleryTactical Data Systems (FATDS) at theField Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla-homa, and the Program Manager forFATDS (PM FATDS), are working toimprove the air functionality inAFATDS. The goal is to minimize thenumber of keystrokes required to cre-ate or initiate an ASR and makeAFATDS windows “look and feel” likethe commercial software applicationsused by soldiers and Marines daily. Thefollowing air mission processing im-provements are being incorporated intoeither A99-Plus software scheduled forfielding in June 2002 or Version 7 to befielded in April 2003.

Reduce the Number of Windows. Cur-rently when an AFATDS operator wants

Legend:


X

JFACC

BCD AOC**

Battalion FSE

Brigade FSE

XX

Division FSE

XXX

Corps FSE

ASOC*

XXXX

ARFOR

Figure 3: Army Immediate Air Support Re-quest (ASR) Mission Flow. The battalionFSE passes an immediate ASR throughthe brigade FSE (with an info copy for thebrigade FSE), which passes it through tothe division (with an info copy to the divi-sion), etc. ASRs for CAS missions stop atthe ASOC, and ASRs for all other missionsgo to the BCD.

Legend:AOC = Air Operations Center

ARFOR = Army ForceASOC = Air Support Operations Center

BCD = Battlefield CoordinationDetachment

FSE = Fire Support ElementJFACC = Joint Force Air Component

Commander

* Immediate ASRs for close air sup-port (CAS) missions.

** Immediate ASRs for all other mis-sions: air interdiction, reconnais-sance, electronic warfare, air lift/drop, assault support and medicalevacuations.

to create an ASR, he must enter data ontwo or more windows and use a “Next”button to navigate from window to win-dow. This format will change to onewindow with tabs. All the mandatoryinformation will be located on the ini-tial window, or tab, so it will take onlyone window to create an ASR. Anyother information (not mandatory) maybe entered on the additional tab(s).

One Set of Start and Stop Times.AFATDS’ mission start and stop timesestablished in the ASL will be the samemission start and stop times for theASR. The operator, however, will beable to change these times if he wantstime for target execution.

Updating Data Fields. AFATDS willhave expanded capabilities for ASRdata fields. After receiving an ATO,fields of the corresponding ASR auto-matically will be updated and (or) filledin with the information contained in theATO. This information will be passedto all units in the air request chain.Additionally, a medium-level alert willbe posted to notify the operator he hasreceived an updated ASL as the resultof an ATO update.

Tracking Multiple Missions. For thefirst time, AFATDS will be able to trackmultiple Air Force missions assigned toa single ASR. For example, currently, ifan ASR requires 10 missions, AFATDSdoes not show a mission completeduntil all 10 missions are flown. The newsoftware will track each mission flownon an ASR.

Improved Printing. The operator willbe able to print the “Desired Effects”and “ Rationale” fields plus the ASLwith latitude-longitude grid coordinatesinstead of Universal Transverse Mer-cator (UTM).

Enhancing ASR Numbering. Cur-rently, AFATDS uses three alpha char-acters and four numbers to define theASR number. Based on input from thefield, this format will change to allowup to five alphanumeric characters andthree numbers per ASR.

An AFATDS operator will be able toenter any ASR number he desires aslong as it meets the new eight-characterformat; he also will be able to allow thesystem to auto-generate an ASR num-ber from the ASR numbering block.The operator will be able to establishthe auto-generation ASR numbering toassign a prefix to each ASR by missiontype or ATO designation based on hiscommander’s guidance. The operatorwill be able to edit the ASR number.

With the implementation of the en-hanced numbering system, some unitstanding operating procedures (SOPs)will change, but AFATDS won’t loseany interoperability with older systems.

Ideas and Questions On Line. Thegeneses of these improvements werecomments from users in the field. If youhave ideas for improvements, emailthem to me and include a point of con-tact with a telephone number and emailaddress: [email protected]. MyFax is 580-442-2915 (DSN 639).

You also can share your ideas withother soldiers and Marines via the ArmyKnowledge Online (AKO) website atwww.us.army.mil. You log in as a newuser. After registering with AKO, visitthe TSM-FATDS discussion forum atwww.workplace.us.army.mil usingyour new password. We have set up adiscussion forum for everyone inter-ested in sharing ideas or getting ques-tions answered about AFATDS and firesupport command and control.

Today, AFATDS software interfaceswith the TBMCS to process ASRs forthe ATO. With the planned improve-ments, the software will be even betterin the near future.

AFATDS is the fire supporters’ digi-tal command and control system forfire mission processing, helping thecommander “synchronize joint fire sup-port operations to place the right attackmeans on the correct target at the pre-cise time” (JP 3-09).

Major Alford J. (A.J.) Williams is the Assis-tant Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) Systems Manager for Field Ar-tillery Tactical Data Systems (TSM-FATDS),part of the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill,Oklahoma. In TSM-FATDS, he is respon-sible for determining software requirementsof the Advanced FA Tactical Data System(AFATDS) and ensures the interoperabilityof Air Force and Navy command and con-trols systems with AFATDS. Prior to thisassignment, he participated in Trainingwith Industry at Raytheon Systems Com-pany, at Fort Wayne, Indiana; Raytheondesigns AFATDS software. Among otherassignments, he was the Targeting Officerand Assistant G3 Plans for the XVIII Air-borne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg, NorthCarolina. He also was the Division ArtilleryCounterfire Officer and then Company FireSupport Officer and Assistant S3 for 3dBattalion, 1st Field Artillery, all in the 3dInfantry Division (Mechanized), Germany.He commanded Service Battery of the 3dBattalion, 321st Field Artillery in the 18thField Artillery Brigade at Fort Bragg.


New capabilities in the FieldArtillery’s advanced FA tacti-cal data system (AFATDS) and

Firefinder radars mandate a shift in tra-ditional reactive targeting tactics, tech-niques and procedures (TTP). Whilethe fundamental doctrine of the decide,detect, deliver and assess (D3A) target-ing methodology established by FM 6-20-10 TTP for the Targeting Processremains sound, hardware and softwarefielding have added new dimensions.

With the AFATDS’ new capabilitiescome additional responsibilities for thefire support elements (FSEs) and firecontrol elements (FCEs) to articulate

Reactive TargetingFirefinder and AFATDSin the Digitized Division

By Chief Warrant Officer Two Eric J. Moran andLieutenant Colonel Dominic D. Swayne

and design the guidance and geometry toprioritize missions to meet the com-mander’s intent. The targeting officer,counterfire officer and radar sectionmust be able to support rapid reactivetargeting by simplifying radar zonemanagement.

This article discusses how the radarsystem works, how changes in technol-ogy are affecting radar zone manage-ment and the TTP adopted to maximizethe counterfire system of systems in the4th Infantry Division (Mechanized),Fort Hood, Texas.

Firefinder Primer. First, we need acommon understanding of how Fire-

finder works and interacts with differ-ent fire control computers. Firefinderacquires incoming projectiles, deter-mines their origin, extrapolates the pointof impact and reports these acquisitionsto the operator whether or not they vio-late a zone. If the acquisition violates anestablished zone, the radar sends a firemission to the supported FCE using anFM;CFF (fire mission; call-for-fire)message format. If the acquisition doesnot violate an established zone, the ra-dar generates an intelligence report us-ing the ATI;CDR (artillery targetingintelligence; coordinates report) format.

Location Averaging. The Firefinder islimited to 99 acquisitions in the buffer,and there was early concern that it liter-ally could be overwhelmed with acqui-sitions. Based on this, Firefinder in-cludes a location-averaging function thatcan be activated by the radar operator.

With location averaging enabled, theFirefinder computer averages all detec-tions from a 238-meter radius and con-verts that into a single average grid inthe center (see Figure 1). The 238-metercriterion is a standard that can’t be ad-justed by the operator. With location

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averaging, Firefinder can “generate” atarget that is more than 200 meters awayfrom the actual acquisition.

Auto-Censoring. Firefinder also hasan auto-censoring function that allowsthe operator to screen acquisitions froma particular area once the threshold isset and reached. Auto censoring pre-vents tracking the same weapon numer-ous times. When the function is en-abled, the radar ignores acquisitionsthat originate from the same location(500 meters) after the designated num-ber of tracks are detected (two to 16).

Once the number of tracks are de-tected, all subsequent acquisitions fromthe designated area are ignored. Theauto-censoring function can lead to a“blind-spot” because the radar will ig-nore any additional targets that origi-nate from that area.

Both these methods significantly re-duce the volume of missions generated byFirefinder and decrease target locationaccuracy and situational awareness.

Four Zones to Prioritize Acquisitions.The Firefinder uses four zones and canhandle a maximum of nine active zonesat any time. Traditionally, the counter-fire officer establishes multiple zones toprioritize calls-for-fire for legacy systems.These four zones were designed to priori-tize acquisitions sent to legacy systems;specifically the tactical fire direction sys-tem (TACFIRE) that is no longer in theforce, ballistic computer system (BCS),fire direction system (FDS) and initial firesupport automated system (IFSAS). Thefour zones are as follows.

1. Critical Friendly Zone (CFZ). Whenthe radar’s computer predicts an enemyround will impact in a CFZ, the com-puter reports the location of the weaponthat fired in precedence ahead of allother detections. Because the legacy firecontrol systems prioritized missionsbased on message format, any locationof a weapon firing into a CFZ wouldresult in a priority “immediate” call-for-fire (FM;CFF).

2. Call-for-Fire Zone (CFFZ). In lega-cy systems, a target identified in a CFFZgenerates a FM;CFF Priority 2 mes-sage.

3. Artillery Target Intelligence Zone(ATIZ). Any weapons acquired in thiszone are reported to legacy systemsahead of all target detections, exceptCFZ and CFFZ; the detections onlyresult in a target report (ATI;CDR).

The ATI;CDR message also is thedefault format for Firefinder. Any ac-quisition that does not violate a zone is

reported to the supported artillery unit inthis format. The message provides thecounterfire officer or the intelligence of-ficer (S2) intelligence on the enemy artil-lery’s location and activities.

4. Censor Zone (CZ). A CZ preventsthe radar computer from generating ac-quisition solutions.

AFATDS Primer. Prioritization basedon multiple zones was a technique wellsuited for legacy digital systems, but itis not ideal for managing reactivecounterfire with AFATDS. The impor-tant distinction between AFATDS andIFSAS is that AFATDS prioritizes tar-gets based on mission value while legacysystems, such as IFSAS, use a message-based priority system. Using IFSAS, anFM;CFF message has priority over anATI; CDR. AFATDS does not recog-nize the character in the message headerthat distinguishes the ATI;CDR mes-sage from the FM; CFF message asIFSAS does. AFATDS uses the targetinformation contained in each messageto calculate a mission value, which be-comes the basis for multiple automatedprocesses and, ultimately, prioritization.

As division and brigade planners de-velop courses-of-action (COAs),AFATDS determines the componentsof mission value and other criteria formission processing and automated de-cision making, using the commander’sguidance, the high-payoff target list(HPTL), priority of fires and location ofthe target (AFATDS uses target area ofinterest, or TAI). These are all productsof the military decision-making pro-cess (MDMP) and D3A methodology.These traditional decide targeting prod-ucts provide the data the AFATDS op-erator needs to generate the desiredmission-value prioritization.

Each target type, subtype and cat-egory on the HPTL receives a uniquevalue and enables AFATDS to calcu-late the mission value. While the entriesin AFATDS are pretty straight forward,AFATDS employs a substantial amountof analysis and “art” to establish the mis-sion values to ensure the recommendedsolutions meet the commander’s intent.During mission processing, AFATDSderives mission values from the entriesshown in Figure 2.

Figure 1: Location Averaging in Firefinder. When location averaging is turned on, the radaraverages all detections from the same 238-meter radius into one single grid location. Thisprevents overloading the radar’s storage queue with acquisitions from the same locationbut can “generate” a target more than 200 meters away from the actual acquisition.

ActualAcquisitions

AveragedLocations Computedby the Radar

Figure 2: AFATDS Database Settings for Mission Analysis. Each category of the databaseis weighted and factored into an AFATDS formula that determines the target value.

•Target Type Value. This value is based on the target value in the target manage-ment matrix (TMM) for non-high-payoff targets (non-HPTs) on the high-valuetarget (HVT) list.

•Associated Target Area of Interest (TAI) Value. The TAI value is based on theTAI, if any, that encloses the target. If the target is in multiple TAIs, the TAI withthe highest ranked value in the mission-prioritized guidance is used.

•Associated Priority-of-Fires (POF) Value. This is based on the observer’sidentification, the observer’s supported unit identification or the unit that sent themission to the local operational facility (OPFAC). If more than one of these unitsare in the POF guidance, then the unit with the highest ranked POF is used in thecalculation.

•On-Call Value. This value is based on whether or not the mission was initiatedoff the on-call target list.


IHF (OPLAN 01-02) Security Zone

High-Payoff TargetDescriptions

AD

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AFATDSTarget Type

AFATDSTMMData

Attack System Preference(Shooter Unit)

AFATDS FA Attack Preference

DS/R GS ATACMS AtkHel

CAS EW

TSSMaxTLE(M)

TSSMax

ReportAge(Min)

Min# Activity

RemarksIEW, Coordination

Required, Exclusion,TBA, etc

ADA (AFATDS HVTL Data: D/A/100)

Engineer (AFATDS HVTL Data: D/A/86)

Fire Support (AFATDS HVTL Data: D/A/96)

SA-11 (FireDome, Snow Drift, TubeArm)SA-8 (Land Roll, Flat Face)SA-13 (Hot Box)CrotaleRolland (Thompson-CSF)Rapier (Marconi)

WM-80 (273-mm)9A52 (300-mm)Arty UNKMortar UNK2S7 (203)BM-11, -21 (122-mm)G-5 (155-mm)G-6 (155-mm)GCT/AU-F1 (155-mm)BL904 (Type 704)

GMZ MineclearerUMZ MinelayerPMR-3 Trailer MinelayerBAT M DozerBTM DozerMDK-2 Tank Ditcher

ADA, Missile

ADA,MissileADA,MissileADA,MissileADA,MissileADA, Light

Missile, HvyArty, UNKMortar UNKArty, Hvy SPMissile MedArty, TowedArty, Med SPArty, Med SP

Missile, Hvy

CounterbatteryRadar

Armor, LightArmor, LightArmor, LightArmor, LightArmor, LightArmor, Light

A/D/100/YA/D/98/YA/D/96/YA/D/99/YA/D/95/YA/D/97/Y

A/D/100/YA/D/99/YA/D/98/YA/D/97/YA/D/96/YA/D/95/YA/D/94/YA/D/93/YA/D/92/YA/D/91/Y

A/D/100/YA/D/99/YA/D/98/YA/D/97/YA/D/95/YA/D/96/Y

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StationaryStationaryStationaryStationary

StationaryStationary

ADA and associatedradars protecting firedirection artillery/maneuver ASAS target;type is: ADAMSL, RDRAS, ADAL, RDRFC,RDRGDN, SAM






Figure 3: Appendix 5 ( Digital HPT/AGM) to Annex D (Fire Support) to OPLAN 01-01 (Ironhorse Destroyer). The HPTs are rank ordered by categorybased on the AFATDS HVTL data; the categories include ADA; Fire Support; Engineer; Maneuver; Command and Control; Nuclear, Biologicaland Chemical (NBC); Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA); and Combat Service Support (CSS).

Legend:ADA = Air Defense Artillery

AFATDS = Advanced FA Tactical Data SystemAGM = Attack Guidance Matrix

ASAS = All-Source Analysis SystemATACMS = Army Tactical Missile System

CAS = Close Air Support

DS/R = Direct Support/ReinforcingEW = Electronic WarfareGS = General Support

HPT = High-Payoff TargetHVTL = High-Value Target List

IEW = Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

IHF = Ironhorse FighterSP = Self Propelled

TLE = Target Location ErrorTMM = Target Management MatrixTSS = Target Selection StandardsUN = Unknown

AFATDS has additional features thatstreamline the counterfire process.AFATDS can degrade targets over time.This target decay time helps manageany backlog in processing.

Much like a shot clock, a unique timesetting can be established for each tar-get type so missions against highlymobile targets will “time-out” if theyaren’t processed quickly enough to havea high probability of effects. The decaytime is determined for each target typeduring the MDMP and is a componentof the digital attack guidance matrix(DAGM). An example of a DAGM isshown in Figure 3.

AFATDS also can employ fire sup-port rules that further refine the tacticalfire control solution. These rules can beused to designate targets located in de-fined areas (TAIs) or target types forattack by specific fire units.

Unit leaders and the counterfire teamnow can develop TTP that capitalize onthe software and user interface advancesin AFATDS, as well as improvementsin the Firefinder software.

Reactive Targeting TTP. As we de-veloped our TTP, we based them onfour considerations. First, the value ofthe target, not the value of the messageformat, is the basis for target prioritySecond, managing multiple small zonesis inefficient; it can interrupt acquisi-tion processing. Third, we want to killall enemy artillery capable of influenc-ing our area of operations. Last, wewant to automate as many of the deci-sions as possible using AFATDS.

Additionally, we considered the en-emy has spread out his artillery, so weplanned to fire at individual pieces. Ourmultiple-launch rocket system (MLRS)and cannons, to some extent, can fire

accurately at several discrete locationssimultaneously. If we set the standardfire orders and mission value criteriacorrectly, we can rapidly engage mul-tiple targets and allow AFATDS to au-tomatically process acquisitions accord-ing to the criteria.

One Large Zone. With these consider-ations in mind, we established one ATIZ.(Because the default in the radar is ATIZ,this is the equivalent of having no zone.)The ATIZ covers the entire battlespaceforward of the coordinated fire line(CFL) within the supported headquar-ters boundaries. (See Figure 4.) Previ-ously, multiple CFFZs were establishedover suspected enemy locations andmanipulated during the fight to main-tain the proper message-based priority.Now, all acquisitions are processed asATI;CDR messages and sent to AFA-TDS.


CFLFLOT

FSCL

3-Km Buffer

ATIZ

X XChief Warrant Officer Two Eric J. Moran isthe Field Artillery Intelligence Officer (FAIO)for the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)at Fort Hood, Texas. In this capacity, ChiefMoran developed the tactics, techniquesand procedures in this article and testedthem during the 4th Division’s DigitizedDivision Capstone Exercise in April at theNational Training Center, Fort Irwin, Cali-fornia. In his previous job, he was a BrigadeTargeting Officer with 3d Battalion, 16thField Artillery and Q-36 Radar Section Chiefwith C Battery, 2d Battalion, 20th FieldArtillery, the latter the divisional Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion,both also with the 4th Infantry Division.Among other jobs, he served as a PaladinSection Chief in 2d Battalion, 17th FieldArtillery, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, IIICorps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Heholds an Associate’s Degree in GeneralStudies from Pikes Peak College, ColoradoSprings, Colorado.

Lieutenant Colonel Dominic D. (Nick)Swayne is the Deputy Fire Support Coordi-nator (DFSCOORD) for the 4th InfantryDivision at Fort Hood. Previously, he servedas the 4th Division Artillery Executive Of-ficer and S3 of the 2d Battalion, 20th FieldArtillery, the divisional composite Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) battalion,also in the 4th Division. He commandedtwo batteries: Headquarters and Headquar-ters Battery of the 212th Field ArtilleryBrigade, III Corps Artillery, and A Battery,1st Battalion, 19th Field Artillery, Field Artil-lery Training Center, both at Fort Sill. Healso served as the Division Artillery FireDirection Officer for the 3d Armored Divi-sion in Germany. Lieutenant ColonelSwayne is a graduate of the Command andGeneral Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, and holds a Master of Public Ad-ministration from Northeastern University,Boston, Massachusetts.

AFATDS checks the acquisitionsagainst the fire support coordination mea-sures (FSCM) and uses its DAGM todetermine the correct method of attack. Ifthe target description is loaded in AFATDSas a HPTL, AFATDS generates a targetand sends the fire mission directly to thefiring unit without user intervention. Theclearance of fires and focus of fires deci-sions are made in advance. One majoradvantage of the ATI;CDR format is itindicates the points of origin and impactof enemy fires, enabling AFATDS togenerate red vectors on its battlefielddisplays showing the enemy shooters’locations and his targets.

Recognizing the need to focus friendlyfires when the enemy concentrates hisresources, we can build TAIs in AFATDSto generate mission values and priori-tize the missions in the ATIZ much thesame way as for CFFZs. The key is thatwe maximize AFATDS by using itsdigital analysis of target data to deter-mine mission values rather than usingthe priority value of the message formatto generate calls-for-fire.

There are several benefits to using onelarge ATIZ. Foremost, the AFATDSscreen displaying the ATIZ points of ori-gin and impact of enemy fires allows thefire support coordinator (FSCOORD) toshow the maneuver commander preciselywhere the enemy is focusing fires, therebytelegraphing his intent. Further, one zone

simplifies zone management for the coun-terfire officer, brigade targeting officerand radar section. It maximizes AFA-TDS digital mission prioritization andsaves time, allowing the targeting of-ficer more time to perform other duties,such as targeting with the unmanned aerialvehicle (UAV) or tracking the battle withthe joint surveillance and target attackradar system (JSTARS).

As we fight the counterfire battle, weuse our counterfire acquisitions to cueother sensors, such as the UAV. Thebattalion or division artillery S2 receivesa “copy” of acquisitions from AFATDSon his all-source analysis system(ASAS) in an ATI;ATR (artillery targetintelligence; artillery target report) for-mat. Using the newest version of theArmy tactical command and controlsystem (ATCCS), Version 6.2x, the S2refines templated artillery groups anddevelops a counterfire overlay that is“shared out” to other ATCCS systemsacross the division.

The brigade targeting officer and thedivision FA intelligence officer (FAIO)use the counterfire overlay to orientsensors to look for artillery groups ac-quired by Firefinder radars. Sensors,such as the UAV, can assess battle dam-age and conduct proactive targeting.

Conclusion. As the Army moves to-ward full digitization, we must care-fully assess our technology-based TTP

and ensure they keep pace with theadvantages of new capabilities.

The radar’s mission to acquire hostileartillery systems hasn’t changed; ourability to process its acquisitions hasbecome more efficient by relying onAFATDS. By using one large ATIZ andmaximizing the automated features ofAFATDS, we can streamline thecounterfire process. These TTP giveour targeting officers the opportunity toaggressively cross-cue detection sys-tems as well as manage simplified zones.

By integrating reactive and proactivefires, we maintain constant pressure onthe enemy and our situational domi-nance, taking the fight to the enemy andmaking the 4th Infantry Division moreefficient and lethal.

Figure 4: One Large Artillery Target Intelligence Zone (ATIZ). The three-kilometer bufferzone facilitates clearance of fires. MLRS has a two-kilometer surface danger zone, and thethree-kilometer buffer ensures all acquisitions will be clear of the CFL.

CFL =Coordinated Fire Line

FLOT = Forward Line of Own Troops

FSCL = Fire Support Coordination Line

MLRS = Multiple-Launch Rocket System

Legend:


When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you donot wait until he has struck before you crush him.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 September 1941Joint Pub 3-60 Joint Doctrine for Targeting (Draft), Page IV-1

Time-sensitive targets (TSTs)—ever heard of the term? TSTs arehot topics among the services in

the joint targeting arena.With improving technology and our

enemies sharing lessons among them-selves (as the Serbs did with a fewunfriendly Middle Eastern countriesafter our Balkan campaigns), there is asurge in enemy efforts to make ourtargeting more difficult. Potential en-emies are making their most criticaltargets more mobile and harder totrack—therefore, more survivable andthreatening. Increasingly, every com-mander-in-chief (CINC) faces new chal-lenges targeting TSTs.

This article examines ongoing effortsto deal with this challenge and outlinessome considerations for targeting offic-ers working the problem at joint head-quarters. Those who recently haveworked with targeting and fires inKosovo or Bosnia and those who manthe outposts in Southwest Asia andKorea know the challenges well.

TSTs Defined. Joint Pub (JP) 3-60Joint Doctrine for Targeting (Final Co-ordination Draft, 5 April 2001) definesTSTs as “air-land- or sea-based targetsof such high priority to the friendlyforce that the JFC [joint force com-mander] designates them as requiringimmediate response because they pose(or will pose) a danger to friendly forcesor because they are highly lucrative,fleeting targets of opportunity. TSTs,such as airborne aircraft and missiles andsubmerged submarines, may be handledby separate components while others, in-cluding those on the surface of the earth,may require detailed inter-Service and/orfunctional component planning and coor-dination” (Page B-1).

TSTs are high-payoff targets (HPTs)identified by a JFC or joint task force(JTF) staff. They can be anticipatedtargets and planned for on the jointintegrated priority target list (JIPTL) ormanaged on a separate TST list, depend-ing on procedures in the theater. Theyalso can be unanticipated targets, need-

ing immediate responses. They all havelimited engagement windows, usuallydue to short dwell times or limited ac-quisition or tracking times.

There has been confusion in the fieldabout TST terms. Previous manuals anddrafts used the additional terms of time-sensitive surface targets (TSSTs) andtime-critical targets (TCTs) as subsetsof the TSTs. The distinction was thatTSSTs are targets on the surface only,vice airborne or submarines. TCTs arethose TSTs that have even shorter win-dows of engagement. JP 3-60 uses oneterm to define all time-sensitive targets(surface, air or sea-based): TSTs. Thefocus of this article is surface-based TSTswith very short presentations times.

Joint Doctrine. Except for JP 1-02Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms (23March 1994, Page 364), few doctrinalreferences tell us much about TSTs andattack operations against this criticaltarget set. JP 3-03 Doctrine for JointInterdiction Operations (10 April 1997)and JP 3-09 Doctrine for Joint FireSupport (12 May 1998) do not mentionTST attack operations. JP 3-01 JointDoctrine for Countering Air and Mis-sile Threat (19 October 1999) talks toTST-type targets in a general discus-sion of the changing threat but does notdiscuss any special considerations inconducting TST attack operations (PageI-4). In JP 3-01.5 Doctrine for JointTheater Missile Defense, target typestypically included in the TST set, again,are discussed in general terms (Chap-ters I and Pages III-10 and III-11).

So where do we turn for anythingdefinitive? FM 90-36 The Targeting

Process and Procedures for Time-Critical Targets (July 1997) is the

current Army “word” on TSTs.It is a tactics, techniques and

procedures (TTP) manualbeing integrated into JP

3-60. The FM 90-36

To Boldly Go WhereNo Army Has Gone BeforeBy Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bernd L. Ingram

SC

UD

Mis

sile

Site

Joint Targeting forTime-Sensitive Targets


version contains the heart of the TSTattack operations process, which needsto be amplified and integrated into thetargeting effort outlined in Appendix Bof draft JP 3-60.

TST Targeting. Regardless of the ac-tual individual target type, operationsagainst these targets cross the bound-aries of many of the other target catego-ries we are so familiar with. A proactivetargeting process in a theater will iden-tify the proposed TST targets in theenemy order of battle and examine eachin relation to the proposed enemycourses-of-action (COAs) or campaigngoals and objectives.

For example, if an enemy’s doctrineespouses first use of tactical chemicalweapons to enable tactical and opera-tional successes, then it is a pretty goodbet that chemical munitions develop-ment, production, transport, storage,delivery and any other system that en-ables the use of chemical weapons goeson a target list. Based on chemical weap-ons tactical and operational effects aswell as their strategic impact, many ofthese targets would be added to the TSTtarget set for the campaign.

The most important action taken willbe the JFC’s approval of the TSTs rec-ommended by his staff based on hiscampaign and the impact the TSTs mayhave on it. The JFC must not only agreeto the targets, but also concur with hisstaff’s proposals for conducting stream-lined operations to attack the TSTs—from acquisition, to immediate engage-ment, to allocation of resources and otherconsiderations, such as rules of engage-ment (ROE) and collateral damage.

A key issue related to these targets isthey must be located precisely, tracked,attacked and assessed in a joint environ-ment using a multitude of joint assets.These assets have varying capabilities,and the JFC requires support from com-ponent commanders and national assetsto conduct attack operations. He alsoneeds a detailed concept of operationsfor accessing, tasking and deconflictingthe assets involved.

TST TTP. A prudent targeting effortbegins with planned targets againstwhich both intelligence collection anddelivery assets can be allocated and,second, a deliberate process that ac-quires, tracks, targets and assesses dam-age on TSTs.

TST attack operations also must takeinto account special procedures to al-low the rapid, effective attack of un-planned and unanticipated TSTs. The

most critical aspect of these targets isthey are fleeting and, therefore, of lim-ited dwell or presentation time. They donot give the joint force enough time toreact upon discovery by traditionalmeans—find them, task attack assetsand move the assets into attack range,all with assets already occupied in otherparts of the battle or otherwise not beingused. The joint force requires some estab-lished system of attack that can minimizecommand and control requirements andthe time needed to engage the TSTs.

Appendix B of JP 3-60 offers a num-ber of options to improve the rapid

attack of TSTs. They include methodsfor referencing planned joint targetsand options for establishing real-timelinks for command and control, stream-lining organizations and pre-position-ing acquisition and strike assets.

The following is a sample scenario forTST attack operations. During an ex-amination of the enemy order of battleand operating procedures, the joint forceidentified the strong likelihood that en-emy long-range tactical missiles that candeliver chemical munitions would be inone area. Without specific point targetingdata, multiple intelligence assets still have

• The JFC sets TSTs as priorities in his objectives, guidance and intent andidentifies specific TSTs for immediate response. The JFC’s objectives andguidance set the procedural framework for components to expedite targetingTSTs. The JFC’s guidance must allow the components flexibility in selectingattack options for the TSTs.

• Based on the commander’s guidance and target details, the JFC must deter-mine how he will task subordinate units to attack the TSTs and execute the plan.For example, will he retain authority for the TSTs or delegate some or all of thetarget set to one or more components? Command and control for attackingTSTs must be streamlined to meet time constraints.

• Components execute attack operations after conducting technical fire con-trol. The JFC staff (most likely the joint fires element, or JFE) exercises tacticalfire control of TST attack operations.

• The JFC still must plan for and conduct combat assessment.

• Once TSTs are detected, responsiveness is critical to take advantage of briefwindows of target opportunities.

• No single weapon system/capability is the best to deal with every TST en-countered by a joint force. The JFC has several options for attacking TSTs, eachwith varying degrees of effectiveness, responsiveness, range, accuracy andeffects. The JFC staff must devise a system for considering and optimizing allattack assets and recommended attack solutions.

• The nature of the threat, avoidance of collateral damage and rules of engage-ment (ROE) may limit or severely constrain TST attack options.

• Given the capabilities of current and future sensor systems, each componentcan locate and attack surface TSTs in mutually accessible areas of interest. Assuch, the JFC must consider how to prevent fratricide or duplication of effortamong components and where he is willing to accept risks.

• The length and complexity of planning procedures for attacking surface TSTsdetermines the probability of the joint force’s success. The fleeting nature ofsurface TSTs are more difficult to execute with traditional mechanisms forplanned targets. The joint force must compensate for this by using various fixes,such as having Army tactical missile system (ATACM) fire missions on call,conducting airborne surface TST combat air patrols (CAPs), establishing proce-dures for diverting attack aircraft assets and other fixes.

• The execution of attacks against immediate surface TSTs requires the JFC toestablish procedures for components to carry out attacks. Planned proceduresmust include, but are not limited to control and coordinating measures, firesupport coordinating line (FSCL) procedures and associated attack options,airspace coordination area (ACA) options, and weapon systems procedures.

Considerations for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) Com-mander in Attacking Time-SensitiveTargets (TSTs). Doctrinally, very little is written abouthow to attack surface TSTs with short presentation times. These considerations weretaken from a number of sources and constitute an attempt to lay the groundwork to begindeveloping tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for attacking TSTs.


Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bernd L.Ingram is a Depth and Simultaneous At-tack Battle Lab Action Officer for JointContinuous Strike Environment (JCSE) andTheater Precision Strike Operations (TPSO)Advanced Concept Technology Demon-strations (ACTDs) in the Field ArtillerySchool, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He retired asthe Chief of NATO Enlargement at theHeadquarters of the European Commandin February 2000. His previous assignmentsinclude service as a Tactics, AdvancedTactics, and Fires Author/Instructor at theCommand and General Staff College, FortLeavenworth, Kansas; Executive Officer of1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, and Divi-sion G-3 (Rear), both in the 1st CavalryDivision, Fort Hood, Texas; and ExecutiveOfficer and Force Modernization Officer inthe Directorate of Combat Developmentsin the Field Artillery School. He is a gradu-ate of the Command and General StaffCollege and holds a master’s degree inManagement from Webster University ofKansas City, Missouri.

to be assigned a “sector” col-lection effort and both surfaceand air attack systems pre-posi-tioned to respond.

One or more dedicated rocketor missile batteries, offshoresurface support ships, airborneTST strike aircraft, or all theseassets could be ready and wait-ing to attack the targets oncethey are identified. The mostrapid and effective means ofattacking the TSTs would be tomaximize sensor-to-shooterlinks and tie pre-arranged collectors tocommand and control platforms ornodes that can instantly transmit targetlocations to dedicated delivery systems.

These efforts, as well as proceduresfor various weapon systems and plat-forms (Army tactical missile system,called ATACMS; fighter/attack assets;C-130 gunships; and attack helicopters)are briefly discussed in JP 3-60, but thereis truly little “meat on the bones.”

So if one suddenly were assigned to aJFC or JTF targeting cell, what are thekey pieces of TST attack operations toknow or consider? Including informa-tion culled from a number of sources,the figure lists JFC or JTF targetingconsiderations, a beginning frameworkfor the development of TTP to attackTSTs.

The services must address the issuesin the figure on Page 28 and many moreto successfully attack this challengingtarget set. JP 3-60 does not provide TTPor even a working concept for JFCs andJTFs to plan and execute TST attackoperations. It also does not address thegrowing trend to centralize and auto-mate TST attack operations.

Joint Developments. Each of the ser-vices is working on this targeting chal-lenge. These efforts hold much promisenot only for service-centric approachesto TST targeting, but also to providevenues where joint procedures and inter-faces can be explored and developed.

The Navy has been working on attackoperations in several of their experi-ments to examine new procedures, in-telligence collection, weapons and ca-pabilities. Among other efforts, the Navyalso has been integrating TST attackoperations into the development of itsconcept for future Naval fires, named“Poseidon’s Fury.” An explanation ofthis and other related concepts are avail-able on the Navy’s Warfare DevelopmentCommand web site at http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/ProductsEx/ConceptsFr.htm.

The Air Force has been working TSTattack operations for some time undervarious organizations, to include theirAerospace Command and Control, In-telligence, Surveillance and Reconnais-sance Center at Langley, Virginia.Among the many efforts are its con-cepts for “Defeating Theater Time-Criti-cal Targets” as a “Family of SystemsRequirements Document” (11 January2000). The USAF also is conductingjoint expeditionary force experimentsand developing new automation andtools, such as its Attack OperationsDecision Aid (AODA).

The Army is working TST attack op-erations at both Fort Bliss, Texas, underthe umbrella of Theater Missile De-fense operations, as well as at Fort Sill,Oklahoma, via the Depth and Simulta-neous Attack Battle Lab. The BattleLab is supporting the Advanced Con-cept Technology Demonstrations(ACTDs) for the Joint Continuous StrikeEnvironment (JCSE) and for TheaterPrecision Strike Operations (TPSO).

The JCSE ACTD will improve auto-mated software to facilitate targetingTSTs. The software automatically willprioritize targets, constantly updatingthe list of emerging targets, and monitorthe status of joint force weapons. It willpair the most effective weapon per tar-get, based on the Joint Munitions Ef-fects Manual (JMEM) and status/avail-ability of the weapon. It then willdeconflict airspace to engage TSTs im-mediately. JCSE was briefed and demon-strated at the Battlefield CoordinationDetachment-Deep Operations Coordina-tion Cell (BCD-DOCC) Conferencehosted by the Battle Lab in April 2000.

The purpose of the TPSO ACTD is todevelop and experiment with techno-logical solutions to fully integrate USand coalition force counterfire and strikeoperations from the forward line of owntroops (FLOT) to the forward bound-ary. To date, the ACTD has developed

the automated deep operationscoordination system (ADOCS),which some units are experi-menting with. The Battle Lab isevaluating and helping to fur-ther develop ADOCS to targetrapidly, share situational aware-ness, enhance command andcontrol and decision making, andprovide responsive weapons de-livery. Targeting nodes at theArmy corps and above would useADOCS with these capabilities.

Army efforts have lagged be-hind in other areas as TST attack opera-tions have been primarily addressedthrough the joint force air componentcommander (JFACC) and, therefore,primarily led by the USAF.

Army targeteers needing to addressTST challenges can contact the Battle Labat DSN 639-4229 or (580)-442-4229 oremail me at [email protected]. Wewelcome input on procedures and TTPto support manual as well as automatedjoint attack operations against TSTs atthe JFC or JTF staff levels.

Advancing technology in joint intelli-gence, surveillance and reconnaissance(ISR) systems; weapons; automation;and other areas make efforts to devise aTST attack process with supporting re-sources difficult. The good news is thatit is a top priority for the services tocome up with a process to help our jointforces dominate the battlefields of thefuture.

USAF E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System(JSTARS). This aircraft is a long-range air-to-ground surveillanceplatform designed to locate, classify and track ground targets.


Are You on the Train orStill on the Platform?Command Sergeant Major Thomas J. Donohue1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery

As I go around the Division Artil-lery talking to soldiers andNCOs, I hear a lot of concerns

about changes occurring in the Army.I’ve seen a lot of changes in my 26 yearsin the Army. I’ve seen people opposedto change and try to stop it from happen-ing. I’ve seen the same people stagnatein promotion, be left behind and, even-tually, get out of the Army.

Regardless of how much you mayoppose change, it’s inevitable. So ac-cept it and start preparing for it.

The Army’s goal is to transform into abetter-equipped, more responsive forcewith technologically advanced units.The goal is to be ready to go anywherein the world our National CommandAuthority may send us to accomplishthe mission—be it peacekeeping, peaceenforcement or low- or high intensityconflict—and return home safely.

As leaders, we must set the example byembracing the changes that will fulfillthe Army’s goal. For if we opposechange, our soldiers certainly will op-pose it; a unit takes on the personalityand attitudes of its leaders. Each of usmust keep an open mind and maintain apositive attitude.

Training to Standard. To implementthe transformation, we must establish agood plan to train soldiers, NCOs andofficers. This starts at the training meet-ings. We must schedule relevant NCOand officer professional developmentclasses.

We must train soldiers using hands-onrepetitive, realistic training until theymeet the standard. Leaders must usetheir leader’s books to track subordi-nates’ proficiency in the tasks beingtrained and take advantage of everyopportunity to reinforce training whilewaiting for the next event to happen.The better we are trained and familiar-ized with the new equipment and itsmaintenance or the more informed we

are about the changes in tactics andprocedures, the less stressful and moreeffective the change process will be.We all have to be proactive in stayingabreast of the changes.

Staying with the Times. The com-puter age is here. If you haven’t learnedhow to use computers, you have missedthe train and it is speeding away, leav-ing you standing on the depot platform.You must know computers and ensureyour soldiers get the computer trainingthey need to stay competitive—thatmeans computer training during dutyhours or in civilian classes after duty,whatever is necessary.

Distance learning is here to stay. Re-gardless of how you feel about long-distance instruction, accept it. It’s yourjob to get soldiers enrolled in the coursesthey need for their professional devel-opment and to be competitive for pro-motions.

Once you have soldiers enrolled in theproper courses, you have to set them upfor success by ensuring they have thetime and resources to complete thecourses. You must ensure each has aschedule to complete his work and as-sign him a sponsor to help when he hastrouble and keep him on track.

The changes I hear the most about arethe changes in promotions. Because ofshortages of sergeants, the Army hasbeen pushing promotions for special-ists—notably for the FA to fill the short-ages of 13B sergeants. That does notmean we have to promote every spe-cialist in the Army. But it does mean wemust do our best to prepare every spe-cialist to assume responsibilities as asergeant.

If a specialist is fully eligible for pro-motion but won’t be recommended forpromotion, then you must counsel himon why he won’t receive the recom-mendation. First-line leaders must coun-sel soldiers monthly and explain to them

their promotion status, what the require-ments are for promotions, their strengthsand weaknesses, and exactly what theyneed to do to be recommended for pro-motion. Two tools leaders can use arecareer maps for that soldier’s militaryoccupational specialty (MOS) and theArmy web page at www.counseling.army.mil.

Too often I hear the statement thatsoldiers are just not ready for promo-tion, yet when I ask the leader why, theleader can’t explain. Those same lead-ers fail to remember that we recom-mend soldiers for promotions based ontheir demonstrated potential. No oneexpects a soldier to know everythingthere is to know for his new rank beforehe is promoted. He is expected to readhis MOS FMs and TMs, gain profi-ciency in his new job and have a self-development program. And his super-visor is expected to coach, train andmentor him through this process.

The Army is changing—with or with-out us. We must train our subordinatesto be adaptive, flexible leaders to helpimplement the force of the future. Thatmeans we must train soldiers to fighttoday or tomorrow and develop them tomake them proficient and promotable.

You can be proactive and help theArmy speed forward or you can standon the platform and complain. Whichwill it be?

Command Sergeant Major (CSM) ThomasJ. Donohue is the CSM of the 1st InfantryDivision (Mechanized) Artillery in Germany.In his previous assignment, he served asCSM of the 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery,part of the 1st Armored Division at FortRiley, Kansas. Among other assignments,he served as the Operations Sergeant Ma-jor for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)Artillery in Germany. He has held every keyposition from Section Chief, to PlatoonSergeant, to Intelligence Sergeant, to FirstSergeant, the latter in three headquartersunits. He also served as a Drill Sergeant inA Battery, 1st Cannon Training Battalion(One-Station Unit Training) in the Field Ar-tillery Training Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.He holds a bachelor’s degree in GeneralBusiness from the University of the State ofNew York.


Recently, the V Corps Fires andEffects Coordination Cell(FECC) staff, Schwetzingen,

Germany, helped develop the US Ar-my Europe/US Air Force Europe(USAREUR/USAFE) joint tactics, tech-niques and procedures (JTTP) for com-mand and control of joint fires. Fromthis effort grew the Joint Target Refer-ence Grid System (JTRGS). JTRGS wastested initially in Urgent Victory, a corpsBattle Command Training Program(BCTP) Warfighter exercise, and re-fined later by the USAREUR andUSAFE staffs.

The JTTP currently consist of 10 TTPareas, but this article focuses on JTRGSto coordinate and synchronize the corpsresources and its supporting joint firesassets.

for battle tracking maps. Preferably, theArmy battle command systems (ABCS)and other components’ automated sys-tems (i.e., the Air Force’s automatedtheater battle management core system,or TBMCS) would be able to managethe reference system.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-60 Joint Doc-trine for Targeting (Final CoordinationDraft, 5 April 2001) as well as FM 90-36 (FM 3-60.1) Targeting: The JointTargeting Process and Procedures forTargeting Time-Critical Targets (July1997) state the purpose of a referencesystem is to provide a common frame ofreference and common situationalawareness to facilitate joint attack coor-dination, deconfliction and synchroni-zation. This is important because differ-ent components refer to target locationsand areas by different means as well asgraphics.

For example, the Air Force uses lati-tude and longitude in geographic refer-ence, and the Army uses the militarygrid reference system. In addition, thesetwo components most certainly will usea different set of control measures whenreferring to vertical and horizontal bat-tlespace.

The bottom line is that a joint refer-ence system allows multiple compo-nents to “see” the battlespace from acommon frame of reference and quicklyorient and direct the effects of theircombined forces within it.

Common Reference System. Thecommon reference system or “Kill Box,”as it is sometimes called, is simply a gridoverlay established by the joint forcecommander (JFC) or his representative.It normally is based on a grid work oflines superimposed on map latitude andlongitude lines covering the entire jointarea of operations (AOR).

To command and control joint fires,the grid system must be developed incoordination with higher, lower and adja-cent as well as supporting commandheadquarters. Its size must take intoaccount the capabilities and coordina-tion requirements of all joint weaponsthat will use the reference system. Thejoint force must understand and be ableto display the common reference sys-tem, at a minimum as acetate overlays

Common Reference Systemfor Coordinating and

Synchronizing Joint FiresBy Major Adam J. Legg

JTRGS:


During our development of JTRGS,we found the term “kill box” was con-fusing. Kill box implies the systemsusing it only attack whatever is in thegrid box. For example, an Army or Ma-rine unit could use the common refer-ence system to designate named areasof interests (NAIs) during the intelli-gence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).In this case, designating “kill box” 7A asan NAI to observe could cause othercomponents to think the forces in the boxare to be attacked instead of just observed.

The JTRGS Reference System. TheJTRGS grid boxes cover the joint AOR.(See Figure 1.) Each grid box is 30-by-30 minutes in latitude and longitude,but the size may be modified by the JFCwhen necessary. The JTRGS may beused to establish any type of airspacecontrol measures (ACM), fire supportcoordination measures (FSCM) and (or)to designate a kill box.

JTRGS allows component battle man-agement staffs maximum flexibility tocoordinate user requirements for jointoperations during planning and for syn-chronizing execution in real time. Forexample, the following Army messageswould be clear to all components: “De-stroy MRL [multiple rocket launcher]targets in the following JTRGS boxes:in priority, 7K1, 7M1 and 7N1.” An-other example: “Disrupt the 9th TankRegiment as it moves through 8K1,8K2 or 8K5.”

The JTRGS grids can be communi-cated over nonsecure channels (voiceor data) without risk of compromise aslong as the origin’s coordinates are notassociated with them. The initial refer-ence coordinates are published in clas-sified orders and instructions. TheJTRGS is disseminated to each compo-nent and its command and control andattack assets as a portion of the airspacecontrol order (ACO) or in the specialinstructions (SPINS) portions of the airtasking order (ATO).

Employing JTRGS. The followingare examples of key procedures wherethe JTRGS enhanced V Corps’ abilityto rapidly synchronize and coordinatejoint fires and effects: describing thepriorities, effects and timing of air sup-port; establishing FSCM and ACM; rap-idly establishing NAIs or target areas ofinterest (TAIs) to focus intelligencecollection; pre-clearing areas for proce-dural control of close air support (CAS)without endangering friendly forces;facilitating the targeting of moving en-emy forces; and rapidly deconflicting

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Figure 1: Joint Target Reference Grid System (JTRGS). The JTRGS grid boxes cover thejoint area of responsibility. Each grid box is 30-by-30 minutes in latitude and longitude andidentified by a number (west/east) and letter (north/south). Each box is divided into ninesectors, measuring 10 minutes by 10 minutes. Each sector is further divided into four sub-sectors, five minutes by five minutes, that are labeled “A,” “B,” “C” and “D.” Eachsub-sector then can be divided in half vertically, forming east (E) and west (W) halves.

FLOT = Forward Line of Own Troops FSCL = Fire Support Coordinating LineLegend:

airspace for the Army tactical missilesystem (ATACMS).

FSCM and ACM Coordination. Youare a member of a hastily assembledtargeting team to take advantage of theunanticipated detection of a second-echelon enemy mechanized regimentdelayed by a minefield in JTRGS Box

4C. (See Figure 2.) The original plancalled for the regiment to be attackednear JTRGS Box 4B.

Using JTRGS, the team planners couldrapidly re-target the enemy formationfor a cross-forward line of own troops(FLOT) attack by the original AH-64squadron, assuming the squadron’s

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Figure 2: Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) and Air Control Measures (ACM)

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planned ingress and egress routes onlyneeded minor modification. In this case,the team could rapidly designate Box4C as a no-fire area (NFA) to prohibitthe divisions from firing into the squa-dron’s engagement area (EA) and at-tack-by-fire positions.

Additionally, the air component’s airoperations center (AOC) could estab-lish Box 4C as a restricted operatingzone (ROZ) to prohibit CAS or air inter-diction (AI) aircraft from operatingwithin the EA.

All this coordination could take placein real time with the air and ground

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Legend:DAG = Division Artillery Group

LD/LC = Line of Departure/Line of ContactNAI = Named Area of Interest

Justification: CAS [close air support] is required to destroy the 23d DAG[division artillery group] vicinity JTRGS 3C, 3D, 4C and 4D to prevent massedfires on the division and allow rapid penetration of first-echelon regiments.

Desired results: Destroy 30 2S3s and 14 BM-21s between LD [line of departure](0600Z) and plus 4 hours. Expect the DAG to be located NLT LD plus 1 hour.Upon location, the division will establish a kill box with an informal ACA [air-space coordination area] for altitude separation to prevent air fratricide andallow CAS aircraft to operate under procedural control. The ability to mass airsupport assets on artillery targets during this time is critical to the success ofthe division’s operations and if not provided, could cause the division to losemomentum moving through first-echelon regiments. CAS requirements follow-ing this time are minimal and expected to require no more than two sorties perhour to support lead TFs [task forces] between JTRGS 4B, C and D and 5B, Cand D.

Comments: The division will conduct opportune SEAD [suppression of enemyair defenses] to destroy acquired air defense systems in JTRGS 3C, 3D, 4C and4D to help provide a permissive air defense environment NLT the divisioncrossing LD.

Figure 4: Division A’s ASR for CAS. This request is based on the scenario in Figure 3 andrefines the corps’ focus.

components, including subordinate di-visions and the attack helicopter regi-ment in the absence of any plannedgraphic control measures (FSCM andACM).

Air Support Requirements for NAIsand Collection Efforts. In continuingthe planning, Division A identifies thatit needs the weight of its future CASsorties available from the time the divi-sion crosses the line of departure (LD)at 0600Z and for four hours after. (SeeFigure 3.) Division A established its tar-get priority for CAS as the enemy’s divi-sion artillery groups (DAGs) located near

Boxes 3C, 3D, 4C and 4D. The DAGsconsisted of 2S3 and BM-21 artillerysystems. These grid boxes were the sameboxes designated as NAIs and TAIs dur-ing the IPB and targeting process.

The planners determined they neededto destroy enemy air defense systemsthat could affect the CAS aircraft in theboxes. With the grid boxes identified,the collection manager can build thecollection plan to support the operation.

Division A’s air support request (ASR)for CAS to refine the corps CAS focusand massing plan would read some-thing like the information in Figure 4.

Using this method of describing thedivision’s air support targeting priori-ties, attack timings and desired effectsin relation to the JTRGS allows the aircomponent planners to more easily un-derstand the division’s requirements,visualize where they will provide therequired effects and understand howand where the division will enable theoperation with suppression of enemyair defenses (SEAD).

Activating Kill Boxes. To continue theprevious example, before Division Acrosses the LD, the DAGs reposition togain the advantage. While executingthe collection plan, the corps unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) detect both ar-tillery groups predominantly in Boxes4D and 4F. Knowing we had estab-lished a permissive air defense environ-ment based on the success of our airdefense targeting plan and ability toprovide lethal SEAD if required, thecorps FECC could designate both 4Dand 4F as kill boxes for air support tokill the DAGs.

Because each of the boxes can bedefined vertically as well as horizon-tally in battlespace, planners can easilyuse the same boxes to define the altitudeseparation requirements for informalACAs in the JTRGS boxes, now alsodesignated as kill boxes. This allows thecorps to rapidly flow pre-plannedmassed CAS aircraft into the boxes todestroy the artillery formations, pre-venting air fratricide as well as facilitat-ing the artillery’s ability to fire SEADunder the separation altitude, if required.

We defined the kill box to mean thatCAS aircraft in an active or open killbox could operate under proceduralcontrol. In managing this process, wefound it useful to develop a checklist foractivating or opening kill boxes. Anexample checklist is shown in Figure 5.

Deconflicting ATACMS Airspace.JTRGS can help rapidly deconflict air-


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allows us to define a vertical volume ofairspace. Because most aircraft easilycan modify their flight to avoid verticalrestrictions, this provides a means tominimize the potential for air fratricide.

Although the advanced FA tacticaldata system (AFATDS) can computethe exact size of the TAH and PAHROZs and transmit this information tothe BCD for clearance, we found manualdeconfliction using JTRGS to be faster.Perhaps, in the future, if AFATDS com-municates this information to theTBMCS, it will be more beneficial toprocess the deconfliction in AFATDS.

Lack of Automation Support. ABCSautomated support of common refer-ence system currently does not exist.Automated deep operations coordina-tion software (ADOCS) allows all corpsADOCS users as well as those in theBCD to visualize which kill boxes areactive or open. (The software horizon-tally integrates information from othersystems into one fused common operat-ing picture for deep operations.) Addi-tionally, the system tracks cursor move-ment by JTRGS grid box and automati-cally produces an overlay of the com-mon reference system for JTRGS, theUS Central Command (CENTCOM)Kill Box Reference System, and theKorean Grid System. No current sys-tems can designate or directly linkACMs, FSCM or other control mea-

• Applicable ground commander initiates a request through the G3/S3 air in thefire support element (FSE) or deep operations coordination cell (DOCC).

• The FSE and Army airspace coordination center (A2C2) initiate air controlmeasure (ACMs) and fire support coordination measures (FSCM) for the kill box.

• The G3/S3 air confirms the kill box is clear of friendly troops.

• The S3 passes the request to the division FSE/DOCC for concurrence.

• The division G3 air approves the kill box before passing it forward to the corpsA2C2.

• The division A2C2 enters the request into the automated deep operationscoordination system (ADOCS) and forwards it to the G3 air via the A2C2 in thecorps fires and effects coordination cell (FECC).

• The corps A2C2 coordinates with the air support operations center (ASOC) andthe corps G3 air before activating the kill box and notifying the battlefieldcoordination detachment (BCD).

• The corps A2C2 notifies the affected division A2C2 of the kill box’s open statusand sends a broadcast message confirming its activation through ADOCS.

• A kill box is not considered open without coordination with the ASOC and corpsG3 air in the FECC.

• Reasonable assurance and procedural control is in effect for tactical air(TACAIR) aircraft expending ordnance in an active kill box.

Figure 5: Procedures for Establishing JTRGS Kill Boxes Short of the Fire SupportCoordinating Line (FSCL)

PAH = Platoon Area Hazard ROZ = Restricted Operating Area

Figure 6: Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Airspace Deconfliction

Legend: TAH = Target Area Hazard

space for ATACMS missions. Such mis-sions call for the airspace deconflictionof the ATACMS platoon launch site,missile flight path and target area. TheJTRGS allows for using a sector, a smallersubdivision of the 30-by-30 minute gridboxes. (See Figure 6.) We have found iteasier to designate a battalion-sized areaof one sector (10-by-10 minutes) for the

hot firing unit and pre-plan this platoonarea hazard (PAH) ROZ with the BCD.After the target is detected, we desig-nate the smaller division of the sector,the five-by-five minute sub-sector, asthe target area hazard’s (TAH) ROZbecause most TAH ROZs fall withinthat size. Designating the area hazardsas a ROZ in relation to the JTRGS


Major Adam J. (A.J.) Legg until recentlywas the Deep Fires Coordinator in the Firesand Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) as-signed to V Corps Artillery Fire SupportElement (FSE) in Germany. Currently, he isthe S3 of the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artil-lery, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, also in V

sures to the common reference system.ABCS systems only allow the operatorto manually build an overlay to refer-ence the common reference system.

If we are truly to realize the benefits ofthe joint common reference system, thenABCS systems will have to acquire toolssimilar to those provided by ADOCS.Otherwise, the joint force will be re-stricted to overlays with no ability toautomatically update changes across allsystems in real time and no ability toquickly link to other functionalities toestablish ACMs and FSCMs.

JTRGS Challenges. Unfortunately,the application of the common refer-ence system is different theater by the-ater, making it hard to define one refer-ence system in joint doctrine. TheUSAREUR/USAFE JTRGS is differ-ent than CENTCOM’s kill box refer-ence system and both are different thanthe Korean theater’s system. All thesesystems are based on joint doctrine foundin JP 3-60 (Draft) and the Air Land SeaApplication (ALSA) Center’s “Multi-

service TTP for Targeting.” The doc-trine allows these differences by statingthat the JFC and component command-ers each have a role in establishing theirsystems.

Of the two doctrinal publications, onlythe ALSA publication is approved doc-trine, and it defines the system as the“Grid Box” reference system. Uponapproval, JP-3-60 will rename the gridbox as the kill box reference system—which we found could be misleadingand confusing. For joint doctrine to beeffective, it must be designed from allcomponents’ perspectives and the com-ponents must uniformly understand andaccept it.

Corps. He also served as the TargetingOfficer in the V Corps Deep OperationsCoordination Cell (DOCC) and as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General of VCorps Artillery. He commanded a detach-ment at the Warrior Preparation Center inGermany; and C Battery, 3d Battalion, 321stField Artillery and Headquarters and Head-quarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 8th FieldArtillery, both part of the 18th Field ArtilleryBrigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. MajorLegg is a graduate of the Command andGeneral Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, and holds a Master of Science inComputer Resources and Information Man-agement from Webster University, St. Louis,Missouri.

The author wishes to acknowledge USArmy Europe’s (USAREUR’s) 4th Battle-field Coordination Detachment (BCD) aswell as US Air Force Europe’s (USAFE’s)32d Air Operations Group and the 4th AirSupport Operations Group for invaluableassistance in developing the Joint TargetReference Grid System (JTRGS) andUSAREUR/USAFE joint tactics, techniquesand procedures for command and controlof joint fires.

NTC’s First Senior Radar and Targeting NCOThe National Training Center (NTC),

Fort Irwin, California, has added a newmember to the Fire Support CombatTrainers. In November, Sergeant FirstClass Robby K. Steadham, Military Oc-cupational Specialist (MOS) 13R40

Firefinder Radar Operator, became thefirst Senior Radar and Targeting NCOto join the Were Wolves. Since thattime, he has been an active coach, men-tor and trainer for rotational leaders andsoldiers at the NTC.

The Target Acquisition Division of the Fire Support andCombined Arms Operations Department (FSCAOD), FieldArtillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is hosting a Joint Tar-geting Conference 1-5 October. The purpose of the conferenceis to provide information on targeting, TA, new equipment,

and current operations and issues as well as exchange tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTP). The topics discussed will range from the tactical to strategiclevels.

Representatives of several installations and other military services will at-tend. Everyone who works with or is interested in targeting/TA subjects isinvited to attend. All Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 131A TargetingTechnicians are encouraged to attend.

If you would like to present a briefing at the conference, suggest a specific topicto discuss or register for the conference, contact me at DSN 639-5045/4925/2971or commercial (580) 442-5045/4925. My email is [email protected].

CW3 Christopher A. Saindon, Instructor/WriterTarget Acquisition Division, FSCAOD, FA School, Fort Sill, OK

This new era at the NTC is greatlybenefiting the NCOs and soldiers inradar sections who are employing theirsystems in the country of Mojavia. SFCSteadham’s extensive knowledge andbackground in targeting will help thoseNCOs transition into their new roles astargeting NCOs at the brigade, divisionand corps levels.

SFC Steadham is focusing his coach-ing efforts on radar employment, troop-leading procedures, risk management,pre-combat checks and inspections, em-ployment of security and survivabilityassets, radar site selection, radar shelteroperations, battle tracking and radarzone management. His priority is toensure radar NCOs become fully inte-grated into the military decision-mak-ing process (MDMP).

If you have questions, contact ChiefWarrant Officer Two Timothy D.Lancaster, Combat Radar/TargetingTrainer, or SFC Steadham of the WereWolf Team at DSN: 470-6962 or byemail at [email protected] [email protected], respec-tively.

LTC Glenn D. ReisweberReinforcing TOC Trainer,

NTC, Fort Irwin, CA

Joint TargetingConference at Fort Sill


Technology and the full-spectrum nature of today’sArmy requires a radar system that can provide moreaccurate targeting data and feed a common operating

picture to keep us one step ahead of any adversary. Theserequirements will be met by the new AN/TPQ-47 Firefinderradar, the next-generation replacement for the Q-37 radar,tentatively scheduled for fielding in FY06.

Overview. The Q-47 is an S-band phased-array system thatuses modular technology and computer-controlled signalprocessing to perform detection, verification, tracking andclassification of projectiles, rockets and missiles. The Q-47’smodular design will allow technology upgrades to extend thelife of the system.

The phased-array antenna will allow the radar to switchbeam positions electronically, thus searching for new targetswhile simultaneously tracking targets already detected. It alsowill enable the radar to detect and locate weapons firingsimultaneously from 25 to 50 different locations at rangesfrom four to 300 kilometers while operating in one of threemodes. The modes are normal, fast scan (increases thenumber of targets simultaneously tracked close in) andtheater ballistic missile (TBM) mode with the TBM datatransmitted through the advanced FA tactical data system(AFATDS) as a broadcast message.

The Q-47 will be able to register and adjust friendly indirectfire while simultaneously maintaining hostile surveillance.The detection and location functions of the system are similarto the Q-36 Version 8 and Q-37 radars.

Two Q-47s will replace Q-37s in the Army of Excellencetarget acquisition batteries (TABs) and the TAB of divisionalmultiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalions on a one-for-one basis. In addition, the Q-47 will be organic to the TAplatoon (TAP) in the direct support (DS) artillery battalion ofthe Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and the radarplatoon of the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS)battalion in the Interim Division (IDIV). The IBCT will haveone Q-47 and the IDIV will have three. Each corps TAdetachment (CTAD) will have two Q-47s to support theaterballistic missile and counterfire operations.

Crew and General Components. The Q-47 radar section willrequire nine personnel, three less than the Q-37 section. Theradar will be housed in a modified Q-36 V8 shelter mounted ona high-mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) thatwill allow the radar to provide data on the move.

The communications equipment will include two single-channel ground and airborne radio system advanced systemimprovement program (SINCGARS ASIP) radios, an en-

hanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) and atactical communications interface module (TCIM). The radarwill be able to transmit digital traffic to multiple subscriberssimultaneously on two separate digital nets. Digital transmis-sions will be sent using EPLRS, SINCGARS, mobile subscriberequipment (MSE) or wire (2W/4W). Further, the system will beable to send and receive voice and digital traffic on the move.

The Q-47’s power will come from a MEP-816A 60-kilo-watt, 400-hertz generator mounted on an M1080 light me-dium tactical vehicle (LMTV) and a MEP-806 60-kilowatt,400-hertz generator mounted on a trailer.

Q-47 Capabilities. The Q-47 will significantly upgrade therange, accuracy, classification capabilities, emplacement anddisplacement times, and transportability of the system ascompared to the Q-37.

Range and Accuracy. Like the Q-37, the Q-47 is optimizedfor rockets and artillery. The probability of locating an enemysystem in normal and fast-scan modes will be 83 percent orhigher for a specific target category. The Q-47 will locate lightand medium mortars at ranges out to 18 kilometers and heavymortars out to 30 kilometers with the same probability oflocation. It will locate artillery and light rockets out to 60kilometers and heavy rockets out to 100 kilometers.

In the TBM mode, the Q-47 will locate missiles and heavyrockets to the same accuracy as normal and fast-scan modes.TBM mode provides an extended range of 300 kilometers formissiles and 140 kilometers for heavy rockets.

Target Classification. The Q-47 will be able to classifyweapon-type of mortars, artillery, rockets and missiles and bysub-type of light, medium or heavy with a probability ofcorrect weapon-type classification of 80 percent.

Emplacement/Displacement. The Q-47 will significantlyimprove emplacement and displacement times: 15 minutesand seven minutes, respectively. (Actual times may varybased on the emplaced configuration.)

Transportability. The Q-47 will roll-on, roll-off C-130 andlarger aircraft without disassembly. One aircraft will be ableto transport the Q-47’s mission-essential equipment. In tacti-cal moves, a section will require three CH-47 sorties.

The Q-47 is the right radar, at the right time to meet the needsof the transforming Army. The improvements in this radarwill enable the Field Artillery to meet the acquisition chal-lenges that are part of the full-spectrum mission.

CW3 Robert A. Nelson, Jr., Targeting Project OfficerDirectorate of Combat Developments

Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK

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In the maelstrom of a National Train-ing Center (NTC) force-on-forcefight, at Fort Irwin, California, a Q-

36 Firefinder radar acquired a batteryof 2S1 howitzers firing and violating acall-for-fire zone (CFFZ). The reinforc-ing (R) FA battalion tactical operationscenter (TOC) cleared and passed thisacquisition to one of its batteries.

Minutes later, multiple-launch rocketsystem (MLRS) launchers fired, destroy-ing the 2S1s. The R FA battalion executedthe brigade combat team’s (BCT’s) es-sential fire support task (EFST) of sup-pressing enemy artillery to protect theforce during the BCT’ s attack.

Counterfire sounds simple—but it’snot. Interestingly enough, there is littledoctrine written specifically about theduties and responsibilities of the gen-eral support (GS) FA battalion target-ing officer who will be involved in thecounterfire process. This lack of doc-trine is being addressed in the rewrite ofFM 3-09.12 (6-121) Tactics, Techniquesand Procedures (TTP) for Field Artil-lery Target Acquisition. According tothe FM’s modified table of organiza-tion and equipment (MTOE), the battal-ion targeting officer, an FA TargetingTechnician (warrant officer 131A), isin the battalion intelligence section ofthe MLRS, Paladin and M198 generalsupport (GS) battalions.

This article describes the GS FA bat-talion targeting officer’s job and briefly

The Role of the GS FA Battalion

Targeting OfficerBy Chief Warrant Officer Three Harold A. Thacker, Jr., and

Chief Warrant Officer Two Robert S. Fortenbaugh

outlines his role in the GS mission plusthe other three standard tactical mis-sions: direct support (DS), R and gen-eral support reinforcing (GSR). It alsodescribes his role in nonstandard tacti-cal missions.

GS Targeting Officer Job Descrip-tion. The figure outlines the duties ofthe FA battalion GS targeting officerthat help integrate him into the GS FAstaff. The targeting officer is assignedto the TOC (MLRS/Paladin/M198). Hefacilitates the exchange and interpreta-tion of the scheme of fires between thesupported unit and the GS FA staff. Heis the link between the division artilleryand FA brigade counterfire officers, ma-neuver brigade S2 and fire support officer(FSO), and the brigade and division tar-geting officers. In this capacity, he helpsthe staff determine the supported unit’stargeting and counterfire focus.

The battalion targeting officer advisesthe FA battalion S2 on specific require-ments for target location accuracy, thesystems available to meet the standardsand the duration the target may be con-sidered viable for attack. He also helpsthe S2 and S3 control any weapons-locating radar that may be attached.

There are a few items the battaliontargeting officer should know, regard-less of his battalion’s tactical mission.First, he should be familiar with theoperations and capabilities and limita-tions of the Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder

radars and other friendly sensor sys-tems. Second, he should know the capa-bilities and limitations of friendly at-tack systems. Third, he should be knowl-edgeable of the enemy order of battle,the enemy’s disposition and composi-tion, and his attack and sensor systems.

Next, he must know the targetingmethodology: decide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A). He also must understandtarget selection standards (TSS), the ef-fects requirements of the high-payofftarget list (HPTL), attack guidance ma-trix (AGM), scheme of fires and theessential fire support tasks (EFSTs) ofthe supported unit. Last, he must beaware of the current ammunition countand FA tasks (EFATs).

The GS targeting officer faces somechallenges. The GS FA battalion sup-ports the force as a whole and stays underthe immediate control of the force FAheadquarters (FM 6-20-1 TTP for theField Artillery Cannon Battalion). Whileperforming the GS tactical mission, thetargeting officer should help thebattalion’s targeting process by imple-menting the division/corps attack guid-ance and TSS. He must thoroughly com-prehend the intent of the AGM and TSSin order to provide rapid fires to thesupported unit. He also may help the FAbattalion’s S2 compute battle damageassessment (BDA) and conduct predic-tive analysis.

The nature of GS FA is that it cansupport anyone in the fight. The target-ing officer does not have the benefit ofa habitual relationship with the sup-ported unit. He must familiarize himselfwith all available fire support systems inthe Army and prepare to integrate his unitinto the supported unit’s targeting efforts.Different versions of fire direction soft-ware, fire support equipment, communi-cations equipment, and unit tactical stand-ing operating procedures (TACSOPs) canmake the integration of the battalion tar-geting officer difficult.

The GS FA battalion must contributeto the supported unit’s targeting and coun-terfire focus. Often, the battalion is des-

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ignated the counterfire headquarterswith no additional planned fires, mak-ing counterfire its only mission.

The BCT may fail to use the GS FA toaugment its fires to accomplish itsEFATs. The battalion targeting officermust become part of the BCT’s target-ing effort and introduce his assets tosupport all the BCT’s fight.

FA targeting technicians are radar sys-tem experts first. The GS FA does nothave organic radar systems and mustrely on outside support from other unitsfor radar coverage. The battalion tar-geting officer must be ready to receivean attached radar section or one underhis unit’s operational control (OPCON)and be the primary staff advisor on allthings radar-related. His experience willbe invaluable when planning for posi-tioning, radar zones, movement andsupport of the radar sections. He alsoensures the radar section leader of theattached/OPCON radar section is inte-grated into the staff’s planning, prepa-ration and execution phases.

DS Mission. An FA battalion DS to amaneuver unit is primarily concernedwith the fire support needs of that unit(FM 6-20-1). For comparison, GS FAhas no organic forward observers (FOs)or fire support elements (FSEs). Whena GS FA battalion is given the missionof DS, the GS targeting officer is bestused in the BCTs FSE, unless that FSEhas its own targeting officer, such as inan armored cavalry regiment.

For whatever reason, if the reinforc-ing battalion does not have or did notbring its own targeting officer, then theGS FA battalion targeting officer goesto the reinforcing FA battalion to helpits staff. When both the brigade FSEand the reinforcing FA battalion havetheir own targeting officers, the GS FAbattalion targeting officer remains withhis own staff.

Reinforcing Mission. Reinforcing isa tactical mission that requires one FAbattalion to augment the fires of anotherFA battalion (FM 6-20-1). When theGS FA battalion has a tactical missionof reinforcing, the targeting officer musthave a counterfire battle drill and coun-terfire drill rehearsal. This providestimely counterfire for the BCT.

He must understand the Q-36 or Q-37radar plan as well as the BCT’s zoneplan. He participates in the counterfirebattle drill rehearsal as well as the bri-gade fire support rehearsal.

The battalion targeting officer mustunderstand the EFATs thoroughly to

Chief Warrant Officer Three Harold A.Thacker, Jr., is an Instructor/Writer for theWarrant Officer Basic Course in the FireSupport and Combined Arms OperationsDepartment at the Field Artillery School,Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In his previous assign-ments, he served as the Combat Radar/Targeting Trainer in the Fire Support Divi-sion of the National Training Center, FortIrwin, California, and FA Intelligence Of-ficer for the 1st Infantry Division (Mech-anized) in Germany. He was the BrigadeTargeting Officer in the 1st Battalion, 6thField Artillery in support of the 3d BrigadeCombat Team, also in the 1st Infantry Divi-sion in Germany, where he participated inOperation Joint Guard in Bosnia, and Ra-dar Technician for B Battery, 25th FieldArtillery, part of the 3d Infantry Division(Mechanized) in Germany, where he par-ticipated in Operation Joint Endeavor, alsoin Bosnia.

Chief Warrant Officer Two Robert S. (Sean)Fortenbaugh is the Counterfire Officer forthe 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III CorpsArtillery, Fort Sill. In his previous assign-ments, he served as the Battalion TargetingOfficer for the 6th Battalion, 32d Field Artil-lery (Proud Americans), also in the 212thField Artillery Brigade, and as a Q-37 RadarSection Leader for the 231st Field ArtilleryDetachment, III Corps Artillery. He is agraduate of the Warrant Officer BasicCourse, Fort Sill, and the Naval GunfireCourse at the Naval Amphibious School,Little Creek, Virginia, in addition to theOpposing Force (OPFOR) Weapons Courseat the Military Intelligence School, FortHuachuca, Arizona.

achieve the attack guidance and effects.This understanding comes from know-ing the priority, coordination needs,special munitions missions, triggers anddecision points for EFAT execution.Basically, he coordinates with the DSbattalion’s S3 and fire direction officer(FDO) to ensure the GS battalion’s firessupport the EFATs. He also may helpthe reinforcing FA battalion S2 com-pute BDA for the counterfire missions.

GSR Mission. The GSR FA battalionfires for the force as a whole and toreinforce the fires of another FA battal-ion as a second priority, remaining un-der the control of the force FA head-quarters (FM 6-20-1). The FA battaliontargeting officer assumes the same dutiesand responsibilities described for GS andR as he performs those missions.

The battalion targeting officer mustbe flexible because he must have knowl-edge of the GS unit’s plan and also theR unit’s plan and be able to differentiatebetween the two.

Nonstandard Tactical Missions. Thenonstandard tactical mission is one thatadjusts to an unusual tactical situation(FM 6-20-1). An example of a non-standard tactical mission for a GS FAbattalion would be serving in an FAheadquarters with a Paladin battery anda Q-37 radar attached in support of amaneuver battalion task force. In thiscase, the GS FA battalion targeting of-ficer may assume the role of the forceFA headquarters counterfire officer andintegrate the Q-37 into the task force’soverall plan. Integrated into these du-ties would be those he would perform ifthe battalion had an R tactical mission.

A well-trained targeting officer canprovide effects in support of the unit’sEFATs. The GS FA battalion targetingofficer position is a stepping stone tobecoming a division artillery or FA bri-

• Help the staff plan and supervise radar assets that are attached, organic orunder the operational control of (OPCON to) the battalion, i.e., refine andmanage the radar zone, produce the radar deployment order (RDO) or radarexception matrix (REM), position the radar and develop the cueing schedule.

• Monitor and ensure the processing (clearing) of counterfire targets in the FAtactical operations center (TOC) in an efficient and timely manner.

• Help the staff develop, refine and execute a counterfire battle drill.• Help the S2 determine battle damage assessment (BDA) and predictive

analysis estimates.• Perform target value analysis (TVA).• Develop proactive counterfire targets.• Monitor the processing of target acquisitions.• Monitor the development of the enemy order of battle while processing

target information and generate FA battalion intelligence requirements.

Duties of a General Support (GS) FA Battalion Targeting Officer

gade counterfire officer, division orcorps targeting officer, or an FA intelli-gence officer. Once integrated into theGS FA battalion staff, the targeting of-ficer can contribute significantly to thefight, regardless of the battalion’s mis-sion.


S ince the successes of World WarII, the primary feature of the USmilitary has been its ability to

mass overwhelming firepower into anarea with an amazing amount of accu-racy. This has, for the most part, beenaccomplished by different fire supportsystems, from FA systems to attackaviation to close air support (CAS) andstrategic bombing, sometimes using“smart” bombs. However, because thesesystems can cause such destruction, theiruse in combat has been controversial.

Before any organization engages tar-gets, it is imperative for that organiza-tion to confirm the legality of its courseof action (COA). While it seems a con-tradiction that the rule of law exists onthe battlefield, it nevertheless can be a

force multiplier, disarming an enemy’sability to shift attention from his ownmisconduct on the battlefield and homefront as well as helping the combatcommander avoid the negative “CNNMoment.” The stakes have become evengreater with the creation of the Interna-tional Criminal Court with primary ju-risdiction over alleged war crimes.

On top of this is the reality that theArmy is entering a state of doctrinal andoperational flux. As the Objective Forcematerializes and doctrinal shifts occur,targeting methodology and the nature oftargets will change as well. The mostimportant shift for fire support is the newemphasis on effects and the recognitionthat there are nontraditional target setsthat need to be managed, such as civil-

ians, the media and nongovernmentalorganizations.1 Even with these changes,the fundamentals of the Law of War andthe conduct of military operations un-der these principles will still apply.

The purpose of this article is to pro-vide a broad understanding of the Lawof War in the context of traditional firesupport targeting and a basis for ad-dressing future operations.

Legal Framework. Once a militaryforce engages in operations outside itsown borders, the laws that apply in-crease exponentially. For the US armedforces, these can include internationaltreaties, federal statutes, Supreme Courtdecisions, Department of Defense(DoD) directives and Department of theArmy (DA) regulations. In the jointenvironment, the regulations of sisterservices must be considered and thelaws and regulations of coalition part-ners also can affect operations. Appli-cable laws involve not just military-related issues but can include environ-mental, civilian-contract employment(e.g., Brown & Root), procurement, fis-cal and claims issues.

For fire support operations, however,the critical legal regimes are CustomaryInternational Law, The Hague Conven-tions, The Geneva Conventions of 1949and the Geneva Convention Protocols I

A Primer for Fire SupportersBy Captain Jon D. Holdaway, JA

The Law of Warand Fire Support:

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and II of 1977. Specific treaties andregulations also affect military opera-tions, including conventions on culturalproperty, biological weapons and con-ventional weapons. Further, DoD andDA have enacted directives, regulationsand field manuals that implement trea-ties and conventions, explain existingrules or establish further rules for mili-tary conduct. These instruments formthe “Law of War.”2

Principles of the Law of War. TheLaw of War can be narrowed down tofour principles: military necessity, hu-manity (or unnecessary suffering), pro-portionality and discrimination/ distinc-tion. These principles become a for-mula or filter by which military opera-tions can be analyzed for compliancewith the Law of War.

Military Necessity. This requires mili-tary operations be limited to attackingthose objectives that make an effectivecontribution to military action or offer adefinite military advantage. As long asthe target has something to do with astrategic, operational or tactical objec-tive, it meets this criteria. For example,during the Kosovo campaign, NATOforces attacked a Serbian television sta-tion in Belgrade with the justificationthat the station was broadcasting as anofficial organ of the Milosevic govern-ment to further Serbia military aims.3

Humanity. This principle looks to thetypes of weapons involved in warfareand the manner in which they are em-ployed on specific targets. FM 27-10The Law of Land Warfare, Paragraph34b, states that injury-causing weaponsare not prohibited, but the Law of Warbans those weapons that inflame woundsor create an injury not related to a mili-tary objective. An example is that lasersare allowed on the battlefield for lim-ited purposes but cannot be used tointentionally blind enemy troops.

Proportionality. This requires a bal-ance between potential military advan-tage and the loss of life and damage.Whether or not an attack is proportionalis based on all the information availableto a commander at the time. The re-quirement is for the commander to makereasonable decisions and reasonablyweigh collateral damage against themilitary advantage.

A good example is where a bridge isidentified as a valid military objective,but sources also identify the bridge as adisplaced civilian movement route. Atany time, there may be 30 to 40 dis-placed civilians on the bridge. The ques-

tion for the targeting team and the com-mander is whether or not the value ofthe target outweighs the collateral dam-age that might be caused by the deathsor injuries of the fleeing civilians.

Discrimination and Distinction. Thisprinciple requires weapon systems andtargeteers distinguish between combat-ants and non-combatants. For the infan-try soldier, this is easily accomplishedthrough rules of engagement (ROE)training. However, for indirect-fire sys-tems, this requires more attention to thetarget’s nature. For instance, most en-gagement rules limit fire support in built-up areas and require direct, human ob-servation of the target, preventing in-discriminate attacks against impropertargets.

Methodology for Applying the Lawof War. Military leaders require a meth-odology for analyzing military opera-tions to determine whether or not theymeet Law of War standards. This meth-odology looks at four areas of militaryoperations: targets, weapons, ordnanceand tactics.

Targets.Targets fall into three catego-ries: persons, places and property. Ap-plying the principle of military neces-sity, these categories can be targeted ifthey make an “effective contribution tomilitary action,”4 actual or potential.

“Persons” are either combatants ornon-combatants (civilians, injured com-batants or prisoners of war). Combat-ants, obviously, are those engaging inmilitary actions. While most are “law-ful” combatants, there are individualson the battlefield who can be consid-ered “unlawful” combatants. Uniformed

members of a nation’s armed force arelawful combatants, but the Law of Waralso recognizes members of militias,volunteer forces or organized resistancemovements under limited conditions.5

If a combatant does not fall into thisdefinition, they are “unlawful” combat-ants, treated as mere criminals underhost nation law and afforded only themost basic due process protections ofthe Law of War.

“Places” are defended or undefended.Obviously, if an enemy chooses to de-fend a particular place, then that placebecomes a lawful target. For example,if the enemy positions an artillery bat-tery in the courtyard of a basilica, thereligious site becomes a lawful target.

On the other hand, an undefendedplace may not be targeted. The test: allcombatants and mobile military equip-ment are removed, no hostile use madeof fixed military installations or estab-lishments, no acts of hostilities are com-mitted by the authorities or by the popu-lation and no activities in support ofmilitary operations are undertaken.6

Specific places and “ property” areprotected under the Law of War. Theyinclude hospitals and safety zones es-tablished for the protection of sick andwounded and civilians (places that canlose their protection, however, if usedin a manner other than for medical pur-poses); cultural sites identified as “his-toric monuments, works of art or placesof worship which constitute the culturalor spiritual heritage of peoples”; 7 “worksand installations containing dangerousforces,”8 such as dams, dikes and nuclearelectrical generating stations; and “ob-

The question for the targeting team and the commander is whether or not the value of thetarget outweighs the collateral damage that might be caused by the deaths or injuries ofcivilians fleeing across a bridge, such as this bombed bridge in Kosovo.


jects indispensable to the survival of thecivilian population,”9 including agri-cultural areas, drinking water installa-tions or irrigation works, if targeted forthe purpose of denying sustenance tothe civilian population.

A good tool for tracking protectedplaces is the advanced FA tactical datasystem (AFATDS). Using civil affairsand military intelligence assets as re-sources, it can establish no-fire areas(NFAs) and restricted fire areas (RFAs).AFATDS then can help identify protectedareas during the planning process.

Weapons and Ordnance. The Law ofWar does not necessarily limit pros-ecuting combat with weapons and ord-nance as long as the enemy and theirplaces are properly targeted using weap-ons and ordnance in their proper man-ner.10 Under direction of DoD, allweapon systems and ordnance are re-viewed by The Judge Advocate Gen-eral for legality under the Law of War.11

Weapons can be illegal by their owndesign or by their improper use. Thisincludes exploding small-arms projec-tiles, hollow-point ammunitions or theuse of a properly designed weapon tocause unnecessary suffering. For in-stance, while there is no Law of Warprohibiting guided munitions, therecould be a Law of War violation if acommander selects non-guided muni-tions over guided munitions (assumingthey are in the inventory and available)for use in a civilian area with the intentto cause unnecessary suffering.

Land mines, because they are deliver-able by fire support assets, are of spe-cific concern, especially in deep opera-tions. Before 1997, the Law of Warrestricted the use of anti-personnel landmines (APL) in areas of civilian con-centration.12 Remotely delivered mines(such as artillery-delivered) are permis-sible only if their location can be accu-rately recorded or if they are self-destruct-ing. Non-remotely delivered mines areallowed in civilian areas only if there is amilitary objective under the control of anadverse party or measures are in place toprotect civilians, such as warning signs.

The international community, includ-ing most coalition partners, has movedto ban all APLs. In 1997, the “Conven-tion on the Prohibition of the Use, Stock-piling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruc-tion” was drafted and signed. As ofApril 1999, 133 nations had signed theconvention and 67 had ratified it, bring-ing it into force as international law.Because the international communitywould not give the US an exception forthe use of APLs in Korea and allow theusage of self-destructive mines, the USwithdrew from the convention.

The bottom line for APLs is that allmines in a combat unit’s inventory mustbe self-destructive, and those mines mustbe used carefully so as to avoid collat-eral damage to civilians.

Incendiaries, which include napalm,flame throwers, tracer rounds and whitephosphorus, are not illegal, per se, butmust be monitored for their use to pre-vent “unnecessary suffering.”13 For in-stance, white phosphorus is not bannedas a method for marking targets or forigniting flammable targets, but it shouldnot be used as an anti-personnel munitionunless other types of conventional anti-personnel ordnance are unavailable.

Air-delivered incendiaries have beenbanned in areas of civilian concentra-tion under a protocol to the 1980 Con-ventional, Weapons Treaty,14 but theUS has not ratified this protocol. TheUS position is that air-delivered incendi-aries may be proper against targets inareas of civilian concentration if theirusage would reduce civilian deaths, e.g.,to destroy a chemical weapons factory inwhich the incendiary device burns thechemicals rather than disperses them.

Even though chemical weapons havebeen banned as a matter of internationallaw for decades, 15 they are still in themilitary stockpiles of a few countriesand a factor in certain combat scenarios.

The prohibition applies to the use of alllethal, incapacitating and biologicalagents. The 1993 Chemical WeaponsConvention 16 bans the development,production, stockpile, transfer or en-gagement of chemical weapons and re-quires the destruction of chemical weap-ons currently stockpiled.

Biological weapons are banned undertheir own conventions, as well.17 Spe-cific treaties do not cover herbicides,such as Agent Orange, but the US hasrenounced all first use, except for do-mestic purposes and establishing de-fensive perimeters.18 Although no longerdelivered by artillery, nuclear weaponsare not prohibited by international law.19

Tactics. The final area of military opera-tions affected by the Law of War is tactics.The rules for prosecuting war protect allparties. Once the Law of War has beenbreached, then no party is immune andprotection cannot be guaranteed. Firesupporters should be concerned withreprisals, treachery and perfidy.

According to FM 27-10, reprisals areretaliation by a party using a methodthat violates the Law of War in responseto an act by another party that violatesthe Law of War.20 For instance, ifBlueland Forces killed Redland soldiersheld as POWs, Redland then could re-spond in an act of reprisal that may ormay not violate the Law of War. How-ever, the Geneva Protocols have cre-ated enough rules limiting reprisals thatthey are rarely, if ever, allowed.21 Fi-nally, under US policy, if reprisals areallowed under the Law of War, only theNational Command Authority can au-thorize the reprisals.

Treachery and perfidy are tactics thatinvolve harming an enemy through hisadherence to the Law of War.22 Ex-amples are feigning surrender or feign-ing death or injury and then using that asa surprise to attack an enemy force. Asrequired by the Law of War, enemiesensure all parties conduct operations inaccordance with the Law of War on thegood faith that the enemy will not vio-late the Law of War to gain a militaryadvantage. Once the Law of War is usedagainst an enemy as a tactic, then nei-ther side can be assured that it is pro-tected under the law.

Ruses, on the other hand, are proper.What distinguishes a ruse from perfidyis that a ruse, while deceptive in regardsto gaining an advantage, does not relyon an enemy’s adherence to the Law ofWar to establish the deception. There-fore, radar jamming, transmitting false

During a NATO airstrike in 1999, the Chineseembassy in Belgrade was accidently struckby five bombs and heavily damaged.


Captain Jon D. Holdaway, Judge Advocate(JA), is a Defense Counsel for the US ArmyTrial Defense Service, Fort Sill Field Office,Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In his past assignmentat Fort Sill, he served as a Legal AssistanceAttorney and Administrative/OperationalLaw Attorney for the IIId Armored CorpsDeep Operations and Coordination Cell(DOCC) and was the operational legal advi-sor to the IIId Armored Corps Artillery staff.Before joining the Judge Advocate GeneralCorps, Captain Holdaway was a KoreanLinguist with the 141st Military IntelligenceBattalion, providing support for interroga-tions and counterintelligence operations inKorea, as part of the Utah Army NationalGuard. He holds a Juris Doctorate fromBrigham Young University in Utah.

1. Colonel Jerry C. Hill and Major Carl R. Trout, “Effects-Based Fires—The Future of FireSupport Coordination and Execution,” FA Journal (November-December 2000), 6.2. The best resource for understanding Army commitments under the Hague and GenevaConventions is FM 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare, July 1956. FM 27-10 is being updated asa joint Law of War manual. The other primary document for the Law of War is “DA Pamphlet27-1-1, Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,” September 1979. The UShas not ratified the Geneva Protocols but recognizes many of its provisions.3. Dana Priest, “More US Troops Head to Albania as NATO Adds Targets; Electric PowerTransformers Attacked,” Washington Post (24 April 1999), A17.4. Geneva Protocol I, supra Note 2 Article 52(2). See also, FM 27-10, supra Note 2, Paragraph 40.5. FM 27-10, supra Note 2, Paragraph 61. Under Geneva Protocol I, supra Note 2, Article 43,medical personnel and chaplains are not considered combatants.6. FM 27-10, Change 1, supra Note 12, Paragraph 39b. See also, Geneva Protocol I, supraNote 2, Article 59, for further rules for occupying undefended areas.7. Geneva Protocol I, supra Note 2, Article 53(a).8. Ibid., Article 56.9. Geneva Protocol I, supra Note 2, Article 54.10. FM 27-10, supra Note 2, Paragraph 33.11. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5000.2, “Operation of the Defense AcquisitionSystem,” Paragraph 4.7.3.1.4. (23 October 2000).12. “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain Conventional WeaponsWhich May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects”

Endnotes:(CWT), October 10, 1980, Protocol II, Articles 4 and 5. Protocol II has not yet been ratified bythe US Congress, but the President directed US forces would no longer use non-self-destructing anti-personnel land mines (APL) except on the Korean Peninsula and for training.13. FM 27-10, supra Note 2, Paragraph 36.14. 1980 CWT, supra Note 17, Protocol III.15. “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” 17 June 1925. See discussion in FM 27-10,Change 1, supra Note 4, Paragraph. 38.16. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use ofChemical Weapons and on their Destruction,” 13 January 1993.17. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling ofBacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” 10 April 1972.18. Executive Order 11850, 8 April 1975.19. FM 27-10, supra Note 2, Paragraph 35.20. Ibid., at Paragraph 497.21. Geneva Protocol I, supra Note 2, Articles 51-56.22. FM 27-10, supra Note 2, Paragraph 50.23. Ibid., at Paragraph 51.24. Ibid., FM 60-20-10 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process, 8 May1996, 2-1.25. FM 27-100 Legal Support to Operations, 30 September 1999.

information to deceive an enemy, es-tablishing false units, using an enemy’ssigns and passwords and psychologicalwarfare are not Law of War violations.23

The Targeting Process and the Lawof War. The targeting methodology ofdetect, decide, deliver and assess (D3A)ensures attack of the right target withthe right asset at the right time. Thisincludes ensuring the “right target” is alegal target, the “right asset” is a properweapon or ordnance and the Law ofWar is followed through the entire pro-cess. During the targeting process, thecritical Law of War issues arise duringthe decide phase, The decide phase iswhere intelligence collection focuseson targets identified during the detectphase and attack planning takes place.24

The most important functions, from aLaw of War perspective, are establish-ing the high-payoff target list (HPTL),developing the attack guidance matrix

The destroyed baby milk factory in the AbuGhraid suburb of Bagahdad. Milk cans andother debris from the attack are left asBaghdad’s propaganda display after thecoalition force bombing in February 2000.

(AGM) and determining target selec-tion standards (TSS).

Fire supporters should be asking thefollowing questions. What is the natureof the target? Does it fall into a prohib-ited person/place/property category?What RFAs or NFAs are in place? Whatis the potential for collateral damage?Where, if any, are enemy weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) sites? Have Icross-checked with the ROE?

The best resource for developing RFAsand NFAs is the civil affairs team thathas the best knowledge of where poten-tially prohibited targets are. The teamplans and develops theater RFAs andNFAs and tracks the status of displacedcivilians. For example, a COA to de-ploy a Gator minefield on a particularenemy route may be affected by dis-placed civilians’ flow and potentiallycause high collateral damage.

Law of War problems can arise fromdetailed issues, such as munition effectssize and dispersion patterns. When us-ing indirect fire in built-up areas, as-suming the ROE allow it, collateral dam-age can be minimized through high-angle fires and the limited use of dual-purpose improved conventional muni-tions (DPICM).

Legal issues during the detect, deliverand assess phases decrease if the Law ofWar is considered during the decidephase. These other phases do includeLaw of War issues, from awareness byintelligence sensors and analysts—in-cluding the FA intelligence officer(FAIO) sitting in the analysis and con-trol element (ACE)—to using the as-sess phase to determine Law of Warcompliance during the fight. The key isfire supporters must anticipate and planfor these issues. Otherwise, as the smoke

of battle clears, the potential for thecombat commander to be assaulted bythe ubiquitous television camera andhave a “CNN Moment” increases expo-nentially.

Conclusion. Of course, any time Lawof War questions arise— from planningto execution to after-action reviews(AARs)—the best resource is the com-mander’s legal advisor.25 Recentchanges in doctrine place legal advisorsand experts in the Law of War fartherforward on the battlefield at the brigadeand division tactical command posts.

While it may seem inconsistent, theLaw of War provides an importantboundary for the conduct of all militaryoperations. The Law of War is notmerely a “nice” set of rules but is thefoundation for the way the US conductsits operations.

Fire support targeting sits at the cross-roads of the Law of War and the con-duct of military operations.


The USMC survey officer billetdates back to the early 1960s.The artillery needed technical

experts who could dedicate themselvesto understanding the complex art ofsurveying and sounding the atmospherefor meteorological information or coor-dinating sound and flash ranging teams.Therefore, the Marine artillery warrantofficer (WO) billet was established.

But times have changed. Today’s ar-tillery warrant officers have better sys-tems and more time to serve the MarineCorps in an expanded capacity, makingthe most of their considerable expertise.

This article gives a brief history of theMilitary Occupational Specialty (MOS)0803 Marine Warrant Officers’ role inthe Marine Corps, leading to the formu-lation of a plan to revise the 0803s’billets and professional developmentprogression. It also outlines the plan tomigrate the 0803 into the world of tar-geting and fires tactical systems, startingin late 2001, while not forsaking the 0803’sobligation to survey, Met and radar.

History of the Marine Artillery War-rant. The early warrant officer wasexpected to know how to maintain andfix the equipment, much like today’sArmy MOS 131A Targeting Techni-cian counterpart does with the radar.Some of the equipment, such as the AN/TPQ-4 countermortar radar and theGMD meteorological system, couldconsume a great deal of a warrantofficer’s time just to keep it running.

Vietnam saw survey crews cutting line-of-site with machetes to perform sur-vey. Radar personnel were largely do-ing sound and flash ranging or extremelyrisky crater analysis under fire to ac-quire enemy indirect fire (rating an “au-tomatic” Bronze Star). Meteorologicalcrews sounded the atmosphere with pi-lot balloons and manual theodolites andthen “cut” ballistic winds on a chart toextract zoned atmospheric informationto apply to the gunnery solutions.

Some units were starting to see theearly stages of solid-state equipment,which made their jobs somewhat easierbut required a lot of man-hours to main-tain or fix. This was the responsibilityof the 0803 Survey/Met Officer.

Operations in Beirut introduced peacekeeping into the Marines’ warfightingbook, and target acquisition continuedto play an important role. Marine TAplatoons rotated into Beirut in supportof the Marine amphibious unit, or MAU(now called a Marine expeditionary unit,or MEU), conducting a peace keepingmission. The 0803 coordinated survey,Met and TA operations, although it wascommon to have a lieutenant as the TAplatoon commander.

Beirut became the test bed for the AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radar; an Army teamfrom Fort Sill was dispatched to Beirutto reinforce the Marine TA and, eventu-ally, the counterfire effort. CWO3Richard Ortiz, MOS 0803, was the of-ficer-in-charge (OIC) of the team in

Beirut. He and his soldiers were killedin the terrorist bombing of the MAUheadquarters on 23 October 1983.

Technological advances delivered theAN/USQ-70 position and azimuth de-termining system (PADS), AN/TMQ-41 meteorological measuring set (MMS)and AN/TPQ-46A (Army AN/TPQ-36Version 8) Firefinder radar. These sys-tems were easier to maintain and oper-ate. Digital communications tied themtogether, and advanced tactical datasystems facilitated employing them.Thistechnology allowed the 0803 to focusmore on new methods of employing hisgear and, consequently, improve opera-tional efficiency.

In 1997, the 0803 community was chal-lenged to identify its future. The realityis that the 0803’s history in survey, Metand radar is coming to an end. The 0803community has had to ask itself if Ma-rine artillery warrant officers could notbetter serve the artillery in a differentrole. Thus, the development of a plan toexpand the role of the 0803 in the Ma-rine Corps began.

The 0803 Migration Plan. The 0803community examined the role of theArmy 131A. The Army artillery war-rants had migrated into targeting billetswhile maintaining a base as radar tech-nical experts. However, the MarineCorps was not prepared to leave meteo-rology “unattended.”

The 0803 was introduced to the fiveelements of accurate, predicted fires toachieve first-round fire for effect--thefive elements never to be taken forgranted. It was important the 0803 com-munity understood that “Artillery is whowe are and fire support is what we do.”

With personnel drawdowns and in-creasing demands on the 0802 MarineArtillery Officer, it seemed that oncethe officer learned his job as a TargetInformation Officer (TIO), he was trans-ferred to a new billet in the process ofgrooming him to be an artillery com-mander. Thus, the Marine artillery war-rant will progress to a TIO billet as aCWO3 in the new plan. (See Figure 1.)

The TIO is not only a targeting techni-cian, but also a manager of tactical firedirection data via the advanced FA tac-tical data system (AFATDS) or initialfire support automated system (IFSAS).The newly trained 0803 will not be acommunications officer, rather he willbe the resident expert on the connectiv-ity of artillery systems: information flowand tactical as well as technical consid-erations of employment.

By Chief Warrant Officer Three Quint D. Avenetti, USMC

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The increasing demands placed on thetechnical proficiency of an officer orenlisted Marine has necessitated thecreation of the Fires Tactical SystemsOfficer (FTSO) billet at the CWO2 level.One advantage the 0803 has is that, as arestricted (warrant) officer, he wouldnever leave the Field Artillery, givinghis commander the benefit of his conti-nuity as a subject matter expert.

After deliberation, the 0803 commu-nity developed a career progression pathsimilar to the Army’s 131As but with aMarine flavor. The new Marine 0803Target Acquisition Officer would con-tinue in survey with his initial assign-ment as the Survey Officer of an artil-lery battalion. Once the lightweight 155-mm (LW 155) with towed artillery digi-

tization (TAD) is fielded, the battalionsurvey officer will move to the maneu-ver regiment fire support coordinationcenter (FSCC) as the TIO/FTSO.

Logic called for the CWO2 to progressinto the Radar Platoon Commanderposition where he could train the radarpersonnel and be responsible for thedivision’s Firefinder assets, which aremaintained by the artillery regiment.The senior CWO3 then would go to thedivision FSCC to serve as the TIO.

To implement the plan, the currenttable of organization takes the duties ofthe Regimental Meteorological Officerand places them under the RegimentalSurvey Officer. The Survey/Met Of-ficer CWO4 will continue to be thesenior 0803 in the regiment and providesurvey and Met support when and whererequired. His duties will include over-sight of battalion survey sections in theabsence of the battalion survey officer.A key issue is that Marine artillery war-rants won’t divorce themselves fromoversight of survey and meteorology—ensuring units meet the five require-ments for accurate predicted fires issimply too important to the artillery.

The plan is scheduled to go into effectin October 2001 with the addition of a0803 TIO in each artillery regimentassigned to the division’s FSCC and a0803 FTSO assigned to the regimentaloperations section.

The transition of the battalion TargetAcquisition Officer is tied to the field-ing of TAD and AFATDS. Once fielded,the battalion Target Acquisition Officerwill move to the FSCC for duty as the

Chief Warrant Officer Three Quint D.Avenetti, US Marine Corps, is the Chief ofthe Meteorology Branch in the Fire Supportand Combined Arms Operations Depart-ment of the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill,Oklahoma. His previous billets include serv-ing as the Survey/Meteorological Officer forthe 1st Battalion, 11th Marines; Survey/MetOfficer for the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines;and Regimental Met Officer for the 11thMarines, all at Camp Pendleton, California.He also served as Assistant Battalion Op-erations Chief for the 1st Battalion, 12thMarines during Operation Desert Storm andBattery Operations Chief for Battery F, 2dBattalion, 12th Marines during OperationDesert Shield, both in the Gulf.

BilletAcquisition Officer

Survey/MeteorologicalOfficer

Target InformationOfficer

Radar PlatoonCommander

Fires TacticalSystems Officer

Battalion TargetAcquisition Officer*

LocationMarine Corps Systems Command(MARCORSYSCOM)

HQ Battery, Artillery RegimentOperations Platoon

HQ Battery, Artillery Regiment, DivisionFire Support Coordination Center (FSCC)

HQ Battery, Artillery RegimentRadar Platoon

HQ Battery, Artillery RegimentOperations Section

HQ Battery, Artillery BattalionOperations Platoon

StatusFilled

Filled, Responsible for Survey/Met

Authorized 01 October FY02

Filled, Responsible for Radars(Personal and Equipment)

Authorized 01 October FY02

Filled, Responsible for all TAIssues at Battalion

RankCWO5

CWO4

CWO3

CWO2

CWO2

WO1/CWO2

Figure 1: Typical Marine Artillery Regiment Structure for 803 Artillery Warrant Officers. The structure includes table of organizationchanges already scheduled for implementation.

TIO/FTSO. The TIO/FTSO will con-tinue to oversee the training and readi-ness of the battalion survey section.Figure 2 shows the career progressionand schooling path of the Marine 0803Target Acquisition Officer.

The 0803’s future includes the additionof an active duty TIO/FTSO billet in the14th Marines’ Force Artillery Headquar-ters. The 14th Marines’ mission callsfor a TIO/FTSO billet to mesh the TotalForce with respect to target acquisition.

This major transition of the small com-munity of 0803s in the Marine Corpswill have a significant impact on firesupport. The 803s will serve the forcewhere it matters the most.

As torchbearers of the five require-ments for accurate, predicted fires, theWO 0803 will continue to ensure theMarine artillery is on time and on target.

*After the lightweight 155-mm howitzer (LW 155) with towed artillery digitization (TAD) is fielded, the battalion TargetAcquisition Officer will transition to the artillery battalion fire support coordination center (FSCC) for duty as a TargetInformation/Fires Tactical Systems Officer. This move will be at the discretion of the commander.

WO1 The Basic School/WarrantOfficer Basic Course

CWO2 Advanced Geodetic SurveyCourse

CWO3 Warrant Officer AdvancedCourse

CWO4 Advanced TargetingCourse*

CWO5 Acquisition Courses**

Figure 2: Marine Artillery Warrant OfficerCareer Progression and Schooling Path

* Exact targeting course to bedetermined.

**As determined by the MarineCorps Systems Command(MARCORSYSCOM).

field artillery [may june 2001]

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