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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

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RE'i10N IV.

Report Nos. 50-313/79-17'

50-368/79-15

Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51

50-368 NPF-6

Licensee: Arkansas Power and Light CompanyP. O. Box 551Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted: August 12 through September 8, 1979

Inspectors: 7< I. /A d od ) A O ''//T7IW. D. Johnson, Resident Reactor' Inspector Date '

k <h 0cY 0, /97f.' G. Spangler4 Reat' tor Inspector Date

f'G. H. Verduzco,'' React'or In'spectorY %bd G W Z /$ 7 k _.&

Date

de/2 3 //77Reviewed By: '

T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects DateSection

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Inspection Summary

Inspection conducted during period of August 12 through September 8,1979(Report No. 50-313/79-17)

4Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection consisting of inspectorfollow-up of previously identified inspection items, licensee actions takenin response to IE Bulletins, review of unit trip, power coefficient ofreactivity, core power distribution liinits, audit program and follow-up

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on licensee event reports. The inspection involved 91 inspector-hourson-site by three (3) NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the seven (7) ateas inspected, no items of noncompliancewere identified.

Inspection conducted during period of August 12 through September 8, 1979(Report No. 50-368/79-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of licensee actions taken inresponse to IE Bulletins, previously identified inspection items, review of" Millstone Syndrome" fix, audit program and follow-up on licensee event reports.The inspection involved 54 inspector-hours on-site by three (3) NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the five (5) areas inspected, no items of rc,ncompliancewere identified.

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DETAILS-

1. Persons Contacted

Arkansas Power & Light Company Employees

J. P. O'Hanlon, ANO General ManagerG. H. Miller, Engineering & Technical Support ManagerB. A. Baker, Operations SuperintendentT. N. Cogburn, Plant Analysis SuperintendentT. Holcomb, SchedulerP. Jones, Maintenance SupervisorB. A. Terwilliger, Operations and Maintenance ManagerF. Foster, Plant Administrative ManagerR. Elder, I&C SupervisorJ. McWilliams, Planning & Scheduling SupervisorD. Trimble, Licensing ManagerJ. Lamb, Safety and Fire Prevention CoordinatorC. Shively, Plant Performance Engineer

.A. Cox, Nuclear EngineerP. Rogers, Nuclear Support SupervisorD. Lomax, Nuclear EngineerB. Bata, QA Engineer

2. Follow-up on Previoucly Identified Items (Units 1 and 2)

(Closed) Item of Noncompliance (Inspection Report 313/368/79-02,paragraph 4): Failure to follow procedure 1005.02, Control ofPreventative Maintenance.

The inspector determined that the licensee appears to be implementingfully the requirements of Revision 1 to Procedure 1005.02 datedJuly 9, 1979. This completes t'ae review of corrective actions forthe above item of noncomplianu .

(Closed) Open Item 313/7813-24 (Inspection Report 78-13, paragraph 5):The term 10E-9 should be IE-09 in step 6.1.18 of Procedure ?302.03.

A permanent change to Procedure 1302.03 was initiated by the licenseeto correct the above.

(0 pen) Open Item 313/7725-34 (Inspection Report 77-25, paragraph 3):Air flow from the Spent Fuel Pool floor through an adjoining door tothe Unit 1 computer room.

During discussions with licensee health physics personnel the inspectorfound that the reactor auxiliary building does not appear to be normally(with both supply and exhaust fans in operation) at negative pressure

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with respect to the surrounding " clean" areas. Section 9.7.1 of theUnit 1 FSAR states that the design basis flow path for the HVAC systemsis from low activity to high activity areas. A request has been submittedto plant engineering to review and evaluate the HVAC design. This itemwill remain open pending the results of the engineering review.

(Closed) Open Item 368/7907-01 (Inspection Report 79-07, paragraph 6):Standing Order 32, Fire Brigade, appeared to be outdated.

The licensee cancelled the outdated standing order on May 21, 1979.

(0 pen) Open Item 368/7909-01 (Inspection Report 79-09, paragraph 8A(1)):Procedure revisions required.

The licensee has completed the necessary revisions to Procedures 2304.70,2104.29 and 2102.01 (Category E Valve List) identified as the first,third and fourth items of this open item. The second and fifth itemsremain open. These involve cross referencing the Category E Valve Listof 2102.01 to the valve list attachments of the operating proceduresto assure that valves are shown as locked in position on both lists and

. adding a locked open designation to 2HPA-37 and adding 2HPA-38 (lockedopen) to the valve list for 2104.44.

(Closed) Open Item 313/7909-15; 368/7909-04 (Inspection Report 79-09,paragraph 9A): Post LOCA status of ECCS pump room doors.

The emergency procedures for Units 1 and 2 have been revised to requireisolation of the ECCS pump rooms during initiation of the recirculationphase of LOCA cooling.

(Closed) Open Item 368/7910-01 (Inspection Report 79-10, paragraph 10A):Required revisions to OP 2202.06.

The licensee has revised this procedure to include the necessary changesidentified by this open item.

(Closed) Open Item 368/7910-02 (Inspection Report 79-10, paragraph 10B):Handling of valve lineups.

The licensee has implemented the requirements of the June 11, 1979,revision of Standing Order 3.

(Closed) Open Item 368/7913-01 (Inspection Report 79-13, paragraph 12):Power variation during performance of 2.800.01, Appendix W.

The Test Working Group discussed this item during a meeting held theweek of August 27, 1979, and concluded that the power variation duringthis test was of no consequence.

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3. Review of ANO Unit 1 Trip on August 13, 1979

The inspector reviewed the computer Sequence of Events Record and PlantAlarms and Status Messages for the trip that occurred at 17:49:43.000seconds on August 13. The trip occurred when n failed relay in the ANOswitchyard actuated the backup generator lockout relay. This relaysystem opened the generator output breakers and initiated a turbine trip.A burnt lead in the 125V DC circuit to the turbine lockout relay (286-T)caus:d an open circuit which prevented this relay from actuating theunit lockout. Eight seconds later the unit lockout actuated when thereactor tripped on high pressure. The H2 (6.9KV) and the A1 (4.16KV)buses successfully transferred from the unit auxiliary transformer toStartup Transformer No. 1; however, the H1 and A2 buses did not. The causeof the failure of the H1 and A2 buses to transfer could not be estab-lished. All breakers and associated circuitry functioned normallyduring plant recovery. Apparently the eight second time delay betweenthe turbine trip and the actuation of the unit lockout in combinationwith relay actuation and reset times was responsible for this failure.During this review, the inspector identified the following open items:

The Sequence of Events and the Alarm Status Log both indicatea.erroneously that a Startup Transformer No. 1 Lockout occurred. Thesource of this problem should be identified and corrected (0 penItem 313/'917-01).

b. Breaker 152-213 is the only breaker on which status information wasidentified in the Alarm Status Log despite the fact that theelectrical schemes for computer input from other breakers such as152-113 are similiar in design. This should be investigated (0 penItem 313/7917-02).

4. Review of " Millstone Syndrome" Fix for Unit 2

The licensee's design change to correct the problem identified as the" Millstone Syndrome" includes, among other things, the sequencing of safe-guards loads following their actuation regardless of the power supplysource for the ESF buses and load shedding of nonessential loads as afunction of bus undervoltage. During a previous inspection in this area,the inspector created Open Item 313/7906-02 identifing the requirementto add steps in appropriate surveillance procedures which will test thoserelay circuits associated with nonessential load shedding and bus isolationon undervoltage. Further review in this area indicates that surveillance

procedures do not currently test all of the time delay relays added forload sequencing of the engineered safety features components identified inFSAR Table 8.3.1. Specifically, the load sequencing of the 4.16 KVequipment is verified during the annual integrated ESF test; however,it does not appear that the time delay relays for the 480 volt system(see FSAR Table 8.3.1) are verified in any existing surveillance test.

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The inspector was able to find documentation that these time delay relayswere properly set during preoperational testing. This item will remainas an Open Item (368/7915-01).

5. Power Coefficient of Reactivity (Unit 1)

The ~nspector reviewed the appropriate steps of Procedures 1302.13,Sequencing of Low Power Physics Tests Following Refueling, and 1302.17,Reactivity Coefficients at Power, to determine:

a. That prerequisites and initial conditions were met

b. That indicated precautions were observed

That the measured values were within the acceptance criteria andc.appeared correct.

No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified during thisreview.

6. -Audit Program (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector examined licensee audit procedures and reports to verifythat the audit program has been developed and implemented in confarmancewith Regulatory requirements, commitments in the application, and industryguides or standards.

Audits conducted by the Safety Review Committee (SRC) were adequate inscope and frequency to satisfy requirements of Technical Specificationsand Topical Report APL-TOP-1A (Revision 4) (Quality Assurance ManualOperation). SRC Audit Reports conducted on the following dates wereexamined:

- January 19-20, 1977 (Unit 1)- July 26-28, 1977 (Unit 1)- July 19-20, 1978 (Unit 1)- December 12-15, 1978 (Units 1 and 2)- June 18-21, 1979 (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector followed-up on a sampling of SRC audit deficiencies, toverify response by cognizant supervisors. This sampling would indicatethat audit findings are followed-up and resolved.

A long-range Quality Assurance Program, consistent with Regulatory require-ments, has been developed and implemented. The following Quality AssuranceAudits were examined:i

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- Documents Retention and Disposition conducted June 4-14, 1979

- Job Orders and Trouble Reports conducted January 21~26, 1979 '

Inspection of the QA Audit Finding Report Log and Punch List revealedthat while responses to deficiencies were made in a relatively timelymanner, many were made in excess of the 30 day guideline of ANSI N45.2.12(1977). This is an open item. (313/7917-04; 368/7915-02.)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Core Power Distribution Limits (Unit 1)

The inspector reviewed licensee procedures and' records to verify that theplant is being operated within the licensed power distribution limits.The following documents were reviewed:

- Procedures:

1304.48 Core Power Dist>ibution1302.15 Core Performance Monitoring and Fuel Management

Data Collection1304.32 Power Range Lineav: Amp Calibration1304.34 Incore Detector Functional Check and

Backup Recorder Calibration

- BAW-10123, Babcock-Wilcox ruclear Applications Software Package

- Computer Printouts of core data collected August 16, 17, and 27, 1979

- Operators Quadrant Tilt and Imbalance Log for July 1979

- Computer Daily Logs for July 1979

Reactor axial power imbalance and quadrant tilt data is recorded by theoperator from the plant on-line computer (0LC) on a 2 hour frequency.Operator logs indicated that imbalance and tilt valves were maintainedwithin license limits.

Core performance data is collected every 10 EFPD. Various parametersdescribing core power distribution and thermal characteristics arederived from incore instrumentation by the plant OLC using methodsdescribed in BAW 10123. ANO-1 cycle 4 reload data has been incorporatedinto the computer software and verified by a test case provided by B&W.Licensed power distribution limits as well as design core thermal limitswere maintained.

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Records of two.recent calibr c:,ns of incore detectors, backup recorders,and power range linear amplifier were reviewed. Applicable procedureswere followed and acceptable results obtained.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Inspector Follow-up on IEB Responses

The inspector reviewed documentation and interviewed various licenseepersonnel to determine that the following IEB requirements and licenseecommitments had been accomplished:

IEB 79-06B (Unit 2): The additional commitments of Revision 3dated August 16, 1979, to the licensee's bulletin response have beenimplemented. Although the requirement for the operators to useincore thermocoup?es to aid in assessing core conditions has beenadded to Procedure 2202.06, the operator can access, by computer, onlyone thermocouple at a time. An Engineering change has been requestedto provide a better method of computer access. This will remainas an open item (368/7915-03).

IEB 79-04 (Unit 1 and 2); IEB 79-10 (Units 1 and 2); IEB 79-11 (Units 1and 2): The information furnished by the licensee in responses indicatesno further actions are required.

IEB 79-09: The licensee has in place, for Unit 1, procedures and apreventative maintenarce program for the subject circuit breaker.However, a maintenance procedure for Unit 2 circuit breakers remainsto be written and performed. Inspector follow-up for this IEB onUnit 2 will continue.

IEB 79-05C and 79-06C (Units 1 and 2): Upon receipt of this bulletin,the inspector verified that the interim short term actions required byitem 1 of the bulletin had been accomplished by the licensee. Thelicensee's response to the other items of this bulletin will be reviewedduring a future inspection.

9. Follow-up Licensee Event Reports (LER's) (Unit 1)

The inspector discussed the disposition and corrective action for thefollowing LERs with the Manager of Operations and Maintenance: 78-08,78-23, 78-24, 78-25, 78-27, 78-26, 78-28, 78-29, 78-31, 78-32, 79-02,79-03, 79-04, 79-07, 79-08, 79-10. No further follow-up for the aboveevents is contemplated at this time.

10. Follow-up on LER's (Unit 2)

The inspector revieweu the disposition and corrective action for thefollowing LER's:

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,79-19 79-3779 -2'' 79-3979-31 79-4079-32 79-4379-35 79-50

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79-36 79-5379-54

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Sodium Hydroxide Tank (Unit 2)

While reviewing valve lineup sheets, the inspector observed that valves2BS-32 and 2B5-34 were open due to the NA0H tank (2T10) being it arecirculation mode. The inspector was informed that frequent recircula-tion of this tank is necessary due to the temperature element for thetank being located below the tank heaters. Without recirculation, theheaters would be energized much of the time. This leads to a possibilityof overflcuing the tank since the required level is near the top of thetank. The inspector stated that the licensee should evaluate this apparentdesign problem. (0 pen item 368/7915-04.)

12. Exit Interviews

Exit interviews were conducted at the end of various segments of thisinspection with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (Plant General Manager) and othermembers of the AP&L staff.

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