fdny report on fatal fire, june 17, 2001

8/4/2019 FDNY report on fatal fire, June 17, 2001

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FIRE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICES COMMAND

INVESTIGA TIVE REPORT QUEENS BOX 5-57512 12-20/22 ASTORIA BOULEVARD JUNE 17,2001 CASE NUMBER 47-01 FATAL INJURY

FIREFIGHTER JOHN DOWNING LADDER COMPANY 163 FIREFIGHTER BRIAN FAHEY RESCUE COMPANY 4 FIREFIGHTER HARRY FORD

RESCUE COMPANY 4 VOLUME I

THE INVESTIGATION


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I. SUMMARY

On Sunday June 17,2001, at 1420 hours, the Queens Communications Office of the NewYork City Fire Department received a telephone alann, reporting a fire in a hardware store at 1222 Astoria Boulevard. The dispatcher assigned Engine Company 260, Ladder Company 163 andBattalion 45 to respond at 1421 hours.

Squad Company 288, which had taken up from a hazardous material incident in the area,received a verbal report of a building fire. Squad Company 288 notified the dispatcher andinvestigated. Arriving first at the scene, the Officer of Squad Company 288 investigated anddiscovered that the location of the fire was actually 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. He notified thedispatcher and initiated standard firefighting procedures.

The fire building was a two-story, non-fireproof structure, approximately 20 feet wide by55 feet deep. A hardware store occupied the cellar, first and second floors. The cellar was usedfor storage and the second floor contained office space and storerooms. The fire building wasattached on the exposure #2 side to a similarly constructed building (12-22 Astoria Boulevard).This was a two-story, non-fireproof structure, approximately 51 feet wide by 60 feet deep,irregular and triangular in shape. The exposure #2 building was occupied on the first floor andcellar by the hardware store. The second floor of the building was used as a dwelling containingtwo apartments. The fire building and exposure #2 were interconnected at both the first floorand cellar levels. An opening of approximately 27 feet had been made on the first floor, joiningthe two stores. A 2 ~ - f o o t - w i d e opening through the foundation wall had been made in thece]]ar. This opening was protected by a sliding metal fire door, which did not function because itwas blocked open with a piece of wood.

Squad Company 288 stretched a 2 ~ - i n c h hoseline to the front entrance of the hardwarestore and initiated forcible entry. Other units arrived and began operating at their assignedlocations. The front entrances were forced open. Squad Company 288 stretched their 2Y2-inchhoseline through the main entrance of the hardware store (exposure #2). Hoselines also werestretched to the rear exterior cellar entrance of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. Searches were initiatedto identify the fire area and locate endangered occupants in the buildings. The location of thefire was in the cellar, with possible extension up into the stores. The degree of fire invo]vementcould not be immediately determined. Smoke and heat were found at the top of the cellar stairsin 12-22 Astoria Boulevard.


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Two 2V2-inch charged hoselines were stretched into position. Squad Company 288positioned one hoseline in the vicinity of the interior stairs to the cellar. Engine Company 262posltioned the other hoseline in the vicinity of the rear exterior entrance to the cellar. Back-uphoselines also were stretched to both locations. Battalion 49 believed that the attack on the firevia the rear exterior cellar entrance would provide the safest path. Lines were in position, butdue to difficulties in gaining entry, no water was placed on the fire for approximately 25 minutespreceding the explosion.

The door assembly at the rear exterior entrance to the cellar was very well secured in anunconventional manner. Units ordered to gain entry used conventional forcible entry tools, arabbit tool, a power saw equipped with a metal cutting blade and a Hurst tool in a prolongedeffort to open this door. After 14 minutes of effort, Ladder Company 163 had partially openedthis door approximately 18 inches. The explosion occurred soon afterwards.

At approximately 1447 hours, a powerful explosion occurred in the cellars of bothbuildings. The force of the explosion ejected some FDNY members out of and away from thebuilding. The wall on the 14th Street side of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard crumbled to the ground.completely burying Firefighters Harry S. Ford of Rescue Company 4 and John J. Downing ofLadder Company 163. Both succumbed to their injuries. The Outside Ventilation Firefighter ofLadder Company 116 was partially buried under this collapsed wall and sustained serious injury.The Lieutenant working in Ladder Company 163, who had been operating at the rear exteriorentrance to the cellar on exposure #3, was injured and knocked unconscious as a result of theexplosion. Both the Lieutenant from Ladder Company 163 and the Outside VentilationFirefighter from Ladder Company 116 were hospitalized in critical condition.

On the first floor of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard, Firefighter Brian D. Fahey of RescueCompany 4 was thrown down the stairs into the cellar by the force of the explosion. He calledfor help over his handie-talkie radio. All efforts to reach and rescue this member wereunsuccessful. Firefighter Fahey succumbed to his injuries. Fire Department EMS transported allthree Firefighters (Harry S. Ford, John J. Downing and Brian D. Fahey) to Elmhurst Hospital.

A rapidly expanding fire condition in the cellar, first and second floors of the firebuilding and in exposure #2 followed the explosion and collapse. The threat and the occurrenceof a secondary collapse necessitated removal of all Firefighters from the front of both buildingsfor a period of time. Many other Firefighters also were injured in the explosion. They wereremoved to areas of safety, stabilized by EMS and transported to area hospitals.


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As a result of the Safety and Inspection Service Command's investigation, 21recommendations are made to improve fireground safety:

1. Implement a series of Chief Officer tactical training conferences with Command Chiefs.

2. Units commencing an interior attack optimally should start with a full SCBA air2ylinder.

3. Reinforce to all members the requirement that they must communicate significantfireground information to the Incident Commander.

4. Review the information contained in Professor Robert Zalosh's report, BackdraftExplosion in June 17, 2001, Fire in Astoria Hardware Store, for possible inclusion intodepartment documents and training programs.

5. Train all Officers of the need to immediately transmit proper radio signals at incidents toensure that adequate resources are assigned and arrive in a timely manner.

6. Classify hardware stores as buildings or occupancies to be inspected annually.7. Update and reissue Inspection Guides A-268 through A-299 as inspection forms.

8. Amend the Fire Prevention Manual, Chapter 8, to include actions that can beimplemented to assist units unable to achieve their fire prevention inspection objectives.

9. Train all members performing fire prevention inspections to be fully aware of conditionsthat must be entered into the Critical fuformation Dispatch System (CIDS) and the effectthat CIDS information may have on Fire Department operations.

10. Train all members on the importance of recognizing and evaluating problems presentedby altered buildings and the proper reporting procedures required by Chapter 6 of the FirePrevention Manual.

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11. Enhance the Department's Target Hazard Program and develop a standardized TargetHazard pre-fire plan (template) specifying the type of data that must be included in theplan.

12. Initiate a Quality Assurance Program to audit fire prevention inspections performed byfield units.

13. Develop a means of culling pertinent information for Fire Department purposes from theDepartment of Building permits regarding alterations to buildings.

14. Review and update the lesson plans regarding fire prevention and inspection proceduresfor both Probationary Firefighter School and 'First Line Supervisors Training Program.

15. Improve communications between the FieldlPublic Communications Unit and field units.

16. Improve the education and training program for Fire Protection Inspectors.

17. Improve the Bureau of Fire Prevention's Quality Assurance Program in order to providemore thorough inspections by its Fire Protection Inspectors.

18. Review the methods by which Fire Protection Inspectors notify administrative units ofvarious conditions or hazards in buildings or occupancies.

19. Review and ensure that Fire Department documents arc current and complete regardinghazards associated with commercial cellar fires and the precautions that can be taken toreduce serious injury.

20. Review and ensure that Fire Department documents are current and complete regardingthe coordination of ventilation between the inside and the outside teams.

21. Instal! audio recorders in a11 Battalion vehicles to record handie-talkie transmissions.


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II. THE INVESTIGATION

On June 17,2001. Firefighter John 1. Downing of Ladder Company 163, and FirefightersBrian D. Fahey and Harry S. Ford of Rescue Company 4 responded to a stluctural fire at 12-20Astoria Boulevard in the Borough of Queens. While operating at Box 55-7512, all threeFirefight.ers sustained fatal injuries.

Battalion Chief Lawrence Stack and Firefighter Brian Myers were on duty in the SafetyBattalion and responded to the fire on the second alarm. The Safety Battalion arrived on thescene just as the front parapet wall of the two-SLOry building collapsed onto the sidewalk. Thetime of their arrival was approximately 1502 hours. Chief Stack conducted a brief survey of thescene and operated at the fTOnt entrance to the apartments where the attempted rescue ofFirefighter Brian Fahey was in progress. At approximately 1700 hours, Deputy Assistant ChiefAlbert Turi of the Safety and Inspection Services Command requested the response to the sceneof on-duty Chief Officers with Safety Battalion experience and off-duty Chief Officers assignedto the Safety Battalion. These Chief Officers were fonned into work groups and given specificassignments. The assignments included documenting the scene, interviewing members,collecting physical evidence, and visiting area hospitals to determine status of injured members.

The teams worked continuously throughout that day and night. On the following day. theSafety team members pooled all their collected infonnation. The investigation continuedthereafter, led by Battalion Chiefs Lawrence Stack and Brian O'Flaherty, both of the SafetyBattalion. More than ]00 interviews were conducted.

The following items, records, documents and photographs were collected, examined andevaluated:

1) Building and Enforcement Records from FDNY Bureau of Fire Prevention andEngine Company 262

2) The fire report3) Bureau of Fire Investigation report4) Communications records, including the incident history and FDNY radio

transmissions5) Records of response from the Bureau ofEmergency Medical Service6) Office of the Chief Medical Examiner autopsy report and findings7) Photographs of the fire building. adjacent areas, fire operations and equipment

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8) Riding lists and duty rosters9) Official weather reports10) Newspaper articles11) Injury reports12) Videotapes provided by FDNY, members of Fire Department "buff' organizations

and other concerned citizens13) Sketches, notes, and drawings made at the scene14)Examination and documentation of certain items of Personal Protective Equipment

andlor tools recovered at the scene15) Reports regarding serviceability and operability of certain tools used by members at

the scene (e.g., handie-talkie radios and self-contained breathing apparatus)

In addition, the following resources were used:1) FDNY Audio Visual Unit2) FDNY Communications and Telco Unit3) FDNY Forensic Unit4) FDNY Mask Service Unit5) FDNY Bureau of Fire Investigation6) FDNY Bureau of Fire Prevention7) FDNY Special Operations Command personnel8) FDNY Human Resources9) FDNY Bureau of Training10) Verizon Inc. personnel11)Russo Contracting personnel (demolition contractor)12) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)13)Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms14) Worcester Polytechnic Institute15) Study by Robert Zalosh, Backdraft Explosion in June 17. 2001 Fire at Astoria

Hardware Store (June 2002) . 16) City of New York Department of Buildings

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Information from photographs, witness statements, videotapes, physical evidence andgeneral knowledge were coupled with the expertise of the investigative team of the Safety andInspection Services Command to develop a time sequence chart reconstructing the events leadingup to the fatal injuries.

The Safety and Inspection Services Command recognized the need to understand andexplain the causes and manner of the structural collapse that occurred at this fire. The assistanceof the Bureau of Fire Investigation and opinions of experts from outside the New York City FireDepartment were sought during the investigation.

Investigations of this magnitude and gravity disclose a number of inconsistencies andconflicting statements in the witness interviews. It is the opinion of the investigative team thatthese inconsistencies and conflicting statements regarding the fatal injuries, resulted fromvarying memories, different perspectives and various emotional factors. They do not result fromany attempt to mislead or conceal facts.

NOTE: ' ---The investigative team would have liked to interview certain members again, either to

obtain additional information andlor provide clarification of their earlier interviews. However,these members died in the September 11,2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.

In addition, the investigation of the fatal fire at Queens Box 55-7512 was interrupted anddelayed when, due to the attack on the World Trade Center, two members of the Safety BattalionInvestigative Team were fatally injured and three others sustained injuries of such magnitudethat they were unable to return to fun duty.


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nI. PHOTOS OF 1220 AND 1222 ASTORIA BOULEVARD

Exposure 18 of 68


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Aerial View of Exposure 2 90f68


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v. FDNY OPERATIONS

On June 17,2001, at 1420 hours, the Fire Communications Office of the New York CityFire Department in the Borough of Queens received a telephone alarm, reporting a fire at 1 2 ~ 2 2 Astoria Boulevard. Engine Company 260, Ladder Company 163 and Battalion 45 were assignedto respond at 1421 hours.

After taking up from a hazardous material incident on 21 sl Street and 28 th A venue, SquadCompany 288 proceeded north on 14th Street to return to quarters. As the Company approachedAstoria Boulevard, a civilian stopped them and informed them that there was a fire in a building.At 1422 hours the Squad Company 288 Officer informed the dispatcher via Department radiothat they were stopping to investigate a verbal alarm for a fire in a store located at AstoriaBoulevard and I th Street. Squad Company 288 was assigned to the Box.

Based on this second source, the dispatcher filled out the assignment with the units thatbecame available from the hazardous material incident. Engine Company 262, Ladder Company117 and Battalion 49 were assigned to respond.

On arrival, a civilian took the Squad Company 288 Officer to the rear of the fire buildingby going through the basement of 12-18 Astoria Boulevard (exposure #4). After exiting out intothe rear yard, the civilian brought the Officer to the rear exterior cellar door of 12-20 AstoriaBoulevard. The Squad Company 288 Officer heard fire crackling behind the cellar door. Hecalled the Squad Company 288 Chauffeur on the handie-talkie radio and told him to transmit a10-75 signal. The time was 1424 hours. Transmission of the 10-75 signal prompted theresponse of Engine Company 312, Ladder Company 116 as the original FAST Unit, and RescueCompany 4.

The fire building, 12-20 Astoria Boulevard, was a two-story, class 3, n o n ~ f i r e p r o o f structure, approximately 20 feet wide by 55 feet deep. This building was adjacent to the lastbuilding in a row of similar buildings on that block. The first floor was used as a hardware storeand the cellar was used for storage. The second floor was used as office and storage space forthe hardware store. Access to the second floor was via an exterior door on the exposure #1 side

I Two mischievous teenagers were appJying graffiti near the rear exterior cel1ar door of 12-20 Astoria Boulevardwhen they spilled over a can of gasoline. The spilled gasoline flowed under the rear door and was ignited by lhepilot flame of the gas-fed hot water heater.

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that led to a stairway. There was also a spiral s tai r within the store that went up to a second-flooroffice/storage area.

Exposure #2 (12-22 Astoria Boulevard) was attached to the fire building. It was thecorner building on that block. It was a two-story, class 3, non-fireproof su-ucture, approximately51 feet wide by 60 feet deep, triangular in shape, with the same hardware store occupying thefirst floor. The cellar was used for storage for the hardware store. An opening in the foundationwall approximately 2 % ~ f e e t - w i d e interconnected the cellars of the two buildings 12-20 and 12-22Astoria Boulevard (Appendix B). This opening was protected by a sliding meta] fire door. Atthe t i m e ~ f the fire, the fire door was blocked open by a piece of wood in such a way thatprevented it from functioning properly. Both buildings also were interconnected on the firstfloor by an opening approximately 2 7 ~ f o o t - w i d e in the common wall, thereby creating one largestore (Appendix B). The second floor of the exposure #2 building was used as a dwellingcontaining two apartments. Access to these apartments was via an exterior door on the exposure#1 side that led to a stairway.

The fire occurred on a Sunday afternoon. The hardware store was closed for businessand well secured. Metal roll-down gates covered the front entrances to the hardware store.Access to the rear yard via 14th Street was secured by a large roll-down gate (to accommodatedelivery trucks) and a s m a l l e r ~ s i z e d doorway for personnel. Neither the 12-20 nor 12-22 AstoriaBoulevard building had a sprinkler or standpipe system. A detailed history of the FirePrevention2 inspections and enforcement actions for the two buildings is found in Appendix F.

Initial OperationsMembers of Squad Company 288 started to stretch a 1%-inch hoseline, but dropped it andstretched a 2V2-inch hoseline when the Officer told them that the fire was in the store. SquadCompany 288 initiated forcible entry to the store at. 12-22 Astoria Boulevard because a civiliantold them that this was the main entrance to the hardware store. A 2 ' 1 2 ~ i n c h hoseline wasstretched into 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. There was a Jight to medium smoke condition and thehoseline was positioned in the vicinity of the interior entrance to the cellar stairs.3

'2 Whenever the lerm "Fire Prevention" is used in the context of this report, it is to denote building inspectionperformed by field units per Ole Fire Prevention Manual and also inspections performed by Fire ProtectionInspectors assigned to the Bureau of Fire Prevention ..3 There was a stair to the cellar in 1220 Astoria Boulevard ("fire building"), but that cel1ar stairway had been closedoffprior to the fire. Heavy storage of stock piled on and in these stairs completely blocked this way to the cellar.

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The assigned FAST Unit. Ladder Company 116 was the first Ladder Company to arrive on thescene and immediately began operations.4 The apparatus initially was positioned on AstoriaBoulevard. Since overhead wires prevented use of the aerial ladder at this location, a 35-footextension ladder was raised for roof access. The Forcible Entry Team assisted Squad Company288 in forcible entry operations at the front of 12-22 and 1220 Astoria Boulevard. The LadderCompany 116 Officer quickly surveyed conditions on the second floor before immediatelyrejoining his Forcible Entry Team. Upon gaining entry the Ladder Company 1] 6 Officer andForcible Entry Team entered the hardware store to vent, search and locate the fire. The LadderCompany 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter initially went with the Ladder Company 116 RoofFirefighter to the roof via the portable ladder. The Ladder Company 116 Outside VentilationFirefighter then descended the same ladder and proceeded around the 14lh Street side to the rearof the buildings to assist in operations. The Ladder Company 116 Chauffeur repositioned theapparatus onto 14th Street and raised the aerial ladder to the roof of exposure #2.

Ladder Company 117 arrived as the second Ladder Company. The Officer and ForcibleEntry Team ascended the stairway to the second-floor apartments at 1222 Astoria Boulevard.InitialJy. there were no reports of any fire extension to the upper floors of either building. Due tothe light smoke condition, windows on the second floor were removed instead of broken. TheLadder Company 117 Outside Ventilation Firefighter forced the roll-down gate on 14th Street,which provided access to the rear yard, and operated at that location. The Ladder Company 117Roof Firefighter assisted the Ladder Company] 16 Roof Firefighter in roof operations. TheLadder Company 117 Chauffeur assisted in forcible entry of the front doors, raised a 24-footextension ladder to the second floor and assisted in operations in the apartments.

Battalion 49 arrived as the first Chief Officer on the scene at 1425 hours and observed alight smoke condition in front of the buildings. The Chief walked around to the exposure #2 side(14th Street) and was taken by a civilian to the rear yard. As he walked on 14th Street, the Chiefnoticed that the streetsloped downward. In the rear yard, both the fire building and the exposure#2 building were three stories high with the cellar fonning the additional story. The civilianexplained that the fire was just inside the rear exterior door to the cellar of 12-20 AstoriaBoulevard. The manner of extension and degree of extension to the exposure #2 building couldnot be ~ s c e r t a i n e d immediately. There was no door to the rear yard from the exposure #2 (12-22Astoria Boulevard) building.

4 Ladder 115 subsequently was dispatched as the replacement FAST Unit,


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Engine Company 262 arrived as .the second Engine Company (Squad Company 288arrived first and stretched the first hoseline) and was directed by Battalion 49 to stretch a'hoseline to exposure #3. Engine Company 262 proceeded to stretch to the rear of the buildingthe 13A-inch hoseline that Squad Company 288 initially had stretched. The Officer of EngineCompany 262 after sizing up the situation at this location directed two of his members to stretcha 21h-inch hoseline to replace their initial hoseline.

Engine Company 260 arrived as the third Engine Company and assisted Engine Company262 in their stretching the 13A-inch hoseline and the 2Y2-inch hoseline. Engine Company 262manned the 2Yz-inch hoseline and Engine Company 260 manned the l.!-inch hoseline. Shortlythereafter, the Officer of Engine Company 260 directed his members to stretch another 21h-inchhoseline to the exposure #3 location.

Hazardous Material Company 1 was passing the scene after taking up from the previoushazardous material incident and reported to Battalion 49 to see if they could be of any assistance.Battalion 49 directed them to the rear exterior cellar door of the fire building (exposure #3).Hazardous Material Company 1 assisted in forcing access to the rear yard and was directed by acivilian to the location of the fire.

Ladder Company 163 arrived as the third Ladder Company and positioned the apparatuson J4th Street near the corner of exposures #2 and #3. This position facilitated ventilation of rearwindows in the fire building, access to the roof and eventuaHy tower ladder stream operationsinto the rear of the fire building. Battalion 49 assigned Ladder Company 163 to also performforcible entry of the rear exterior cellar door to the fire buiJding.

Engine Company 312 was the fourth Engine Company to arrive and was directed byBattalion 49 to assist in the hoseline stretches. Engine Company 312 eventually stretched a2Y:z-iuch hoseline to the front of the building.

Battalion 45 arrived as the second Battalion on the scene at 1430 hours. Battalion 49directed Battalion 45 to supervise operations in the rear of the fire building (exposure #3).

Initial Operations in Hardware Store and Second FloorAfter forcing entry to the main entrance of the hardware store at 12-22 Astoria

Boulevard, Ladder Company 116 and Squad Company 288 entered the store. Squad Company288 located the interior door leading to the cellar stairs about 30 feet into the store. LadderCompany 116 began a search of the hardware store in a smoke condition without excessive heat

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and reached the rear wall of the store: Ladder Company 116 then went to the location of thedoor leading to the interior cellar stairs. The Ladder Company 116 Officer opened this interiordoor and observed flames behind it. There was no charged hoseline yet in position, so he closedthe door and continued the search of the hardware store. Squad Company 288 charged their 2Y2inch hoseline and positioned it to allow advancement down the cellar stairs.

It was determined that the fire was in the celJar below them and had not extended to thefirst floor. Returning to the location of the intell0r stairs, the Ladder Company 116 Officeropened the door a second time and observed heavy, black smoke and no flames. He heardBattalion 49 say to keep the interior cellar door closed, since an exterior entrance was found andthe Chief did not want opposing hoselines operating. Battalion 49 had entered the hardwarestore and informed Squad Company 288 that a hoseline would be coming in from a rear exteriorcellar entrance. The Squad Company was to hold its present position and protect tJle inteliorcellar stairs from any extension of fire.

When it was transmitted over the handie-talkie radio that the operating units at theexposure #3 location were having difficulty gaining entry, the Ladder Company 116 Officeropened the interior cellar door a third time and entered the cellar stair enclosure. Obstructionswere removed from within the strur enclosure. There was shelving filled with stock on bothsides of the enclosure leading to the stairway. The Ladder Company 116 Officer attempted todescend the cellar stairs, but noted that a piece of plywood was placed over the steps, therebycreating a slide. The plywood was then turned sideways and removed. The Ladder Company116 Officer descended halfway down the stairs. There was no visibility and conditions wereworsening. The stairway was narrow and cluttered. Popping sounds were heard coming fromthe cellar. These sounds were similar to electrical arcing or an electrical transformer fire. Thepopping sounds were almost constant. The investigativc tcam of the Safety and InspectionServices Command believes that bursting aerosol cans of paint and other materials caused thesepopping sounds.

Rescue Company 4 arrived on the scene at 1430 hours. The Rescue Company 4 Officerand Can Firefighter entered the hardware store via the 12-20 Astoria Boulevard address. TheRescue Company 4 Can Firefighter searched the hardware store with the thermal imagingcamera (TIC) and asked why the units were not advancing down the cellar stairs with thehoseline. The Squad Company 288 Officer informed him that Battalion 49 ordered the SquadCompany to hold their position. The smoke condition worsened. The smoke behind the interior

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cellar door was puffing and smoke was pushing up through cracks in the floor. At one point, thedoor blew open and blue flames filled the lower half of the doorway. Just as the SquadCompany 288 Nozzle Firefighter was about to open the hoseline, the flames went out. The fire litup again and this time orange flames filled the entire door opening. The Squad Company 288Nozzle Firefighter operated the hoseline for a few seconds and knocked down the fire. Theflames did not seem normal. The hoseline then was operated for a few more seconds. Themembers recalled that flames were blue and then later orange. The smoke had an unusual odoror smell, not the odor of regular smoke from burned wood.

Taking the hoseline down the cellar stairs was discussed. However, due to thenarrowness of the cellar stairway and the stock load, it was believed that there would be greatdifficulty evacuating the cellar should the need arise. Squad Company 288's hoseline wasbacked away from the stair enclosure.

Handie-talkie transmissions indicated that the units in the rear would be operating on thefire shortly. At about this time, Battalion 49 entered the store again. The Chief conferred withSquad Company 288 and told them to continue holding their position since a hoseline would becoming in from the rear.

Ladder Company 117 performed vent and search operations of the second-floorapartments at 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. Initially, the smoke condition was light and windowswere removed instead of broken. Ladder Company 117 had operated there for about 20 minuteswhen the explosion occurred. During that time, the smoke became heavier, but no fire wasdiscovered on that level. Ladder Company I ITs Forcible Entry Team and Chauffeur performedsearches at that location. At various times members from other units (Ladder Company] 16,Rescue Company 4, Squad Company 288, Hazardous Material Company 1 and Engine Company312) operated in these apartments. Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 and the SquadCompany 288 Control Firefighter examined the second floor of the fire building (12-20 AstoriaBoulevard). The Roof Firefighters from Ladder Company 1] 6, Ladder Company 117, LadderCompany 163 and Rescue Company 4 vented the skylights and scuttle covers. The smokecondition was light on the roof during the early stages at this operation.

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Initial Operations in the RearThe rear exterior door to the cellar of the fire building ( 1 2 ~ 2 0 Astoria Boulevard) was a

wooden door covered with sheet metal. It opened inwardly. This door was recessed in thefoundation wall, making forcible entry operations more difficult. Behind this exterior door was aheavy gauge iron gate, covered with steel plating. Securing the iron gate were two flat steel barsplaced horizontally across the gate, approximately one-third the distance from the top and bottomof the gate. These bars were held in place by brackets on both sides of the door that were boltedthrough the foundation wall. In addition, there were two vertical steel rods, approximately3/4 inch thick placed against the horizontal bars and secured into the floor and top of theopening.

Using conventional forcible entry tools (axe and halIigan tool, commonly referred to asthe irons), Hazardous Material Company 1 initially started forcible entry of the rear cellar door.The first member forcing the door heard popping sounds coming from the cellar and noted a lightsmoke condition. The Hazardous Material Company 1 Officer heard a strange sound like waterhitting the rear door from the inside and thought that Squad Company 288 must be using water.Ladder Company 163, assigned forcible entry operations at the exposure #3 location in additionto Hazardous Materials Company I, also initially used their normal forcible entry tools, butswitched to a power saw with a metal cutting blade when the irons proved unsuccessful. Thesaw blade quickly wore down after a small triangular hole was partially cut into the metalcovering the door. Members of Ladder Companies 116 and 117 soon joined the above members.

Battalion 45 supervised the operations at the exposure #3 location. Little headway wasmade using the Rabbit Too] on the sides of the door. It was then decided 10 try the Hurst Tool.Firefighter John Downing, Ladder Company 163 Chauffeur brought the Hurst Tool to the rearexterior cellar door. Ladder Company 163 members started to operate the Hurst Tool atapproximately 1440 hours. The Hurst Tool was only partially successful in opening the twodoors. The outer door was well secured and the steel bars securing the inner iron-gate would notyield completely.

Initially, there was a light brownish/yellow smoke condition at the rear door location.This smoke had an unusual smell and taste. According to one Firefighter, the smoke conditionactually became lighter in this area as units operated. As the forcible entry operation progressed,

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members noticed that water was hitting the inside of the rear cellar door. It was assumed that. aninterior hoseline was in place and hitting the fire, however this assumption was incorrect.

After operating at the scene for approximately 14 minutes, Ladder Company 163 wasable to open the cellar door approximately 18 inches. The Ladder Company 163 Officer andBattalion 45 Chief squeezed into the cellar. There was a light smoke condition "hanging" mostlyat the ceiling level. The smoke wasn't pushing and it wasn't under pressure. There was stockburning in the cellar. The Ladder Company 163 Officer used the thermal imaging camera andsaw "red" up at the ceiling level, which indicat.es high heat levels. As Battalion 45 and theLadder Company 163 Officer entered the cellar, water was coming down on them from aboveand also hitting the inside of the door. It was believed that a unit had water on the fire. TheLadder Company 163 Officer believed that the fire had been knocked down and that his unitwould be used to overhaul. The investigative team of the Safety and Inspection ServicesCommand believes that the water was coming from burst water lines in the ceiling area, perhapswater lines leading to the hot water heater.

Battalion 45 surveyed the situation and felt that the limited access and egress provided bythe partially opened door presented an unacceptable danger to members who would operate inthis area. Before Battalion 45 would allow the Engine Company to enter the cellar with thehoseline, Ladder Company 163 was directed to remove the door completely. Ladder Company163 members resumed cutting the steel rods. Battalion 45 now notified Battalion 49 that therewas partial access in the rear and it would take a few more minutes to remove the door.Battalion 45 also mentioned that an oifbumer or tank was blocking their path inside the cellar.There was a gas boiler and a water heater to the right, just inside the door to the cellar. The timewas now approximately 1446 hours.

Initial Operations on Exposure #2 SideOn the 14tb Street side of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard were two cellar windows accessible

from the sidewalk. The top of these windows was about waist high. Each was enc10sed in asteel bar cage. Galvanized tin covered each window opening.

Venting the cellar area was important to allow members to advance the hoseline into thecellar. Firefighters Harry Ford of Rescue Company 4 and John Downing of Ladder Company163 worked together at this location. They operated Rescue Company 4's Hurst Tool to forcethe steel bars on the rear-most window. When the tin was being removed from this opening, a

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greenish/yellow smoke appeared for about 10 seconds. Later, the smoke was light in color andcame out from the top of the window. Firefighters Harry Ford and John Downing thenproceeded to the front most window. When the tin was being removed from this opening, agreenish/yellow smoke appeared for about 20 seconds. Later, the smoke became darker andcame out from the top half of the window. The smoke was not rolling and it was not beingdriven or forced out. The Ladder Company 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter was nowoperating at the rear most window on the 14th Street side, pushing one-gaBon yellow cans fromthe shelving inside the window to better vent the opening.

The Engine Company 260 Officer was walking to the rear on the 14th Street side whenFirefighter John Downing told him, "I don't see any fire, but it's pushing like helL"

C o n d i t i ~ n s Prior to ExplosionBattalion 49 conferred with Battalion 45 several times regarding progress in the rear

(exposure #3). Battalion 45 reported that units finally were getting in, but an "oil burner or tank"was blocking their access. Battalion 49 decided that he no longer could delay attacking the fire.Battalion 49 entered the store and infonned Squad Company 288 to get ready to advance thehoseline down the interior stairs. The Squad Company 288 Officer instructed members to checkthe amount of air remaining in their cylinders. All members had about one-half tank left in their45-minute cylinders. The Squad Company 288 Officer then gave the members the necessaryinstructions for hoseline advancement down the cellar stairS. At this timet the Squad Company288 Nozzle Firefighter remembered hearing a vibralert sound, and then shortly thereafter anothervibralert sounded nearby. These were apparently the vibralert's of the Ladder Company 116Officer, and the Ladder Company 116 Irons Firefighter.

Battalion 49 ordered a hoseline stretched to back up Squad Company 288's position.Ladder Company 116 was low on air by this time as the Ladder Company 116 Officer's vibralertwas sounding and Ladder Company 116 Irons Firefighter had about one-quarter tank of airremaining. The Ladder Company 116 Can Firefighter had exited the hardware store earlier toreplace his own cylinder,

The Engine Company 260 Nozzle Firefighter was standing by at the rear exterior doorwith the hoseline when he noticed that the smoke from the rear of the first floor looked greenishand heavy, similar to "pea soup," The Engine Company 260 Officer noticed that greenish/brownsmoke was coming out windows in the rear on all floors prior to the explosion, The Engine


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Company 260 Chauffeur stated that the explosion occurred within a short time after FirefightersHan), Ford and John Downing had vented the two cellar windows on the 14th Street side. TheLadder Company 163 Officer stated that the explosion occurred about two to three minutes afterthe rear door was partially forced open.The Rescue Company 4 Floor Above Firefighter, who was operating in the second-floorapartments of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard (exposure #2), notified his Officer via hand ie-talkie of anodor of varnish. In less than one minute after this transmission, the explosion occurred.

The Ladder Company 116 OUlside Ventilation Firefighter was perfonning fUitherventilation of the rear-most cellar window on the 14th Street side. He heard either FirefighterHarry Ford or Firefighter John Downing shout, "It's going to blowl" He does not know whatFirefighter Harry Ford or Firefighter John Downing saw that prompted tbis response. LadderCompany 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter "took two steps" away from the building and heard"a deep, hollow boom." The next thing he remembered was the wall falling on him.

A witness noticed that heavy yellowlbrown smoke was coming from the rear-most cellarwindow on the 14th Street side. There was no visible fire, only smoke. The Ladder Company116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter was operating there to vent the window. The witness statedthat in less than one minute after he noticed the heavy smoke, the explosion occurred.While perfonning a size-up of the fire operation, Division 14 realized more help would benecessary and directed the Division 14 Firefighter to transmit a second alarm. The Firefighterstarted to walk toward the Battalion 49 car when suddenly a violent explosion occurred. Thetime was approximately 1447 hours.

The ExplosionExposure #1 Side

Members operating in the front of the building were blown off their feet as a result of theexplosion. A member operating on the front sidewalk reported that he was thrown 15 feet intothe street; another member operating in the hardware store was blown out onto the frontsidewalk. One member described hearing a sound like a jet engine just prior to being thrown outinto the street. The force was described as a strong gust of wind and debris. A fireball was seencoming from the hardware store. When the Division 14 Firefighter recovered, he ran to theHazardous Material Company apparatus across the intersection and requested a full second alarmfrom the Queens dispatcher. The second alarm was transmitted at 1448 hours. The Division 14

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Firefighter also infonned the dispatcher that there had been a major explosion. Under ordersfrom Division 14, the Battalion 49 Firefighter transmitted the following to the Queensdispatcher: "We're going to go to a fourth alarm. We've had an explosion; exposure #2collapsed. We may have members underneath debris, K." Battalion 49 also requested theresponse of EMS due to many injured members. A member of Hazardous Material Company ]transmitted a request to the dispatcher for two additional Rescue Companies. He also stated thatFirefighters were possibly trapped.At the time of the explosion, a police officer was standing on the sidewalk near the front

of the building. He stated that the ground shook and there was a sound like thunder. He then felta rush of air "almost like a vacuum" pulling him toward the building. Then, everything blew outat him.Fire Building and Exposure #2 Building

The Ladder Company 116 Officer and Irons Firefighter were preparing to exit thehardware store and replenish their air supply when the explosion occurred. The explosion wasdescribed by members in the store as a rumbling sound, followed by the floor suddenly liftingupward about three feet. All members were thrown to the ceiling. When they fell to the floor,some thought they were in the cellar. Debris and inventory were falling on them.Members in the second-floor apartment were thrown violently upward as the floor roseseveral feet. In the cellar of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard, the explosion lifted the ceiling upward. Alally column supporting the girder was lifted upward and pulled several inches out of its base inthe concrete flooring. As the ceiling rose, a steel bolt holding the column to the girder snapped.

Exposure #2 Side (14th Street)The Ladder Company 117 Irons Firefighter, operating in the second floor apartment of

exposure #2, was blown out of a window opening. He landed and rolled head over heels on thecollapsed pile of bricks on 14th Street. The entire exposure #2 wall of 12-22 Astoria Boulevardseemed to lift up and collapse. A witness described seeing a blue/white flash, similar to a flashbulb going off at the roofline and all around the perimeter of the wall. This occurred as the wallwas lifting up. It exhibited a "halo effect." Two witnesses described the exposure #2 wall of12-22 Astoria Boulevard as that it had "come out at the bottom followed by the collapse of theentire upper section of the wall". The upper two stories of the wall then broke and fell in a


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cUltain-fall type collapse. An EMS member standing on the 14th Street side stated that the wallfell in a wave. burying everyone on that side. Losing the support of the wall, the roof and secondfloor sagged toward 14th Street. The debris covered the area from the foundation wall out pastthe curb line.Firefighters Harry Ford of Rescue Company 4 and John Downing of Ladder Company163 were operating to vent the front-most window on that side. Both Firefighters Harry Fordand John Downing were completely bUlied under the falling bricks of the exposure #2 waIL TheLadder Company 116 Outside Ventilation Firefighter was buried up to his chest with bricks anda sign across his body, possibly fTom the side ofthe building. Fire now appeared on the first andsecond floors on the 14th Street side, accompanied by a heavy smoke condition.

Exposure #3 SideOn the exposure #3 side, bricks fell from the rear wall of the buildings. There was black

smoke, followed by a force that pushed members backward. Members forcing the rear exteriorcellar door were thrown off their feet and back into the rear yard. The Ladder Company ] 63Officer was covered with debris and rendered unconscious. A large section of the rear wall of12-20 Astoria Boulevard was pushed outward and in immediate danger of further collapse.Battalion 45 ordered the units to account for their members. All members were removed fromthe rear yard.

Conditions on the RoofAt the roof level, there had been a minor smoke condition and members were opening

skylights and scuttle covers. Fortunately, no members were on the roof of 12-22 AstoriaBoulevard when the explosion occurred. There was a parapet wall separating the roofs of 12-20and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. There was heavy smoke pushing from the chimney above the roofof 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. Suddenly the roof shook and members were knocked back either onor off their feet. An extremely heavy smoke condition occurred at the entire roof level. TheLadder Company 116 Roof Firefighter noticed that the roof of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard wasgone. Actually, the roof of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard was sagging downward toward the 14thStreet side, and was not visible to the Ladder Company 116 Roof Firefighter. There was fire andheavy smoke showing as roof cuts were made. There was heavy fire coming up from the rear of

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the building. The members continued cutting holes on the roof of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard.Shortly afterward, Division 14 ordered everyone off the roof.

Rescue OperationsAfter recovering from the initial impact of the explosion, the Deputy Chief of Division 14

ran to the corner of 14th Street. He saw that the entire wall on 14th Street had collapsed. Division14 immediately told the BattaHon 49 Firefighter to transmit a fourth alarm and inform thedispatcher that there was an explosion, a major collapse with members trapped and that EMSwas needed. The fourth alarm was transmitted at 1449 hours and the fifth alarm was transmittedat 1452 hours.

Injured members appeared on the first and second floors. Members of Squad Company288, Rescue Company 4 and Ladder Company 116 were trying to make their way out of thehardware store via the collapsed wall opening on 14th Street or through the front doorway. Manymembers came to their aid and assisted them to safety. There were injured members of RescueCompany 4 and Ladder Company 117 hanging from debris at the edge of the opening on thesecond floor (14th Street side). Portable ladders were raised on the exposure #1 and #2 sides tofacilitate members' escape. .Members operating at the exposure #3 location also were injured.The Lieutenant working in Ladder Company 163, who was operating by the rear exterior cellarentrance, was critically injured and rendered unconscious. He was removed by less seriouslyinjured members to an awaiting EMS ambulance and was en route to New York Cornell Hospitalat 1458 hours.

Division 14 attempted to control the handie-talkie network and ordered the roll caJJ of allunits. When it was determined that Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 was trappedin the cellar, Ladder Company 115, the FAST Unit, and Squad Company 41 were assigned tothis rescue operation. Witnesses reported to Division 14 that several members had been workingon the 14th Street side where the wall had collapsed. Division 14 assigned members and units tosearch that area. Initially, there were several reports of other missing members. During and afterthe ron call, some of the missing members were accounted for. Division 14 now was aware thatRescue Company 4 was missing two members and that Ladder Company 163 was missing onemember. Division 14 also was aware that one member was trapped in the cellar and that twomembers were buried in the rubble of the collapsed wall.


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The Ladder Company 116 Officer informed Division 14 that a large section of the frontwall on 12-22 Astoria Boulevard was leaning and in danger of collapse. Division 14 orderedeveryone in that area evacuated. The wall section fell to the sidewalk shortly thereafter. Somepeople interviewed descIibed a second explosion. This collapse of the front parapet wall wasprobably the noise that they perceived as a "second explosion".

Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 was seen at various locations whileoperating at this fire. Prior to entering the first floor of the fire building, the Rescue Company 4Officer noticed Firefighter Brian Fahey and the Rescue Company 4 Floor Above Firefighter atthe main entrance to the hardware store. This is where Squad Company 288's hoseline waspositioned. Hazardous Material Company 1 Decon 1 then observed Firefighter Brian Fahey reentering the first floor of the fire building (12-20 Astoria Boulevard).

After completing ventilation of the storefront of exposure #2, the Squad Company 288Door Firefighter observed Firefighter Brian Fahey attempting to force the exterior entrance to thestairway leading to the second floor of the fire building. Firefighter Brian Fahey, along with theSquad Company 288 Control Firefighter forced entry of this exterior entrance to the secondfloor, and searched the second floor storage area. Upon completion they exited this building andoperated in the second-floor apartment of exposure #2 (12-22 Astoria Boulevard). The SquadCompany 288 Control Firefighter returned to the hardware store on the first floor when informedvia handie-talkie radio that Squad Company 288 was going to take their hose line inlo the cellar.It appeared that Firefighter Brian Fahey also exited the second-floor apartment and entered thehardware store.

The Rescue Company 4 Officer was operating in the hardware store in the vicinity of theopening that connected both stores. Just prior to the explosion, the Rescue Company 4 Officerheard Firefighter Brian Fahey's voice coming from the area in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard, forwardof Squad Company 288's position. The explosion lifted the floor, throwing everyone about. It isbelieved that Firefighter Brian Fahey was thrown down the stairs and landed on the floor in thecellar, however no one witnessed this event.

In the post-fire investigation, the investigative team of the Safety and Inspection ServicesCommand found a Halligan tool on the landing leading to the interior ceUar stairs. The Halligantool had a bJue marking of the type used by Rescue Company 4. Also, an axe marked ~ ' R - I " anda handlight were found on the cellar floor near the base of the stairs. A work glove with theinitials "BP' was recovered on that stair under the debris. Considering the fire conditions prior

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to the explosion. the investigative team believed that Firefighter Brian Fahey never would havedescended that stairway voluntarily without his Halligan tool. Firefighter Brian Fahey wasinjured and trapped in the cellar at the bottom of these stairs.

A fireball came out the front of the store during the explosion. A pushing black smokefollowed and fire eventually engulfed the entire store. The fire was unusual in that it waspushing in and out. Fire a]so erupted on the exposure #2 (l4lh Street) and exposure #3 sides.Hoselines and Jarge-caliber streams were assembled and put into operation on the exposure #1(Astoria Blvd.), #2 and #3 sides. Ladder Company 163 operated their tower ladder stream intothe rear of the top floor of the fire building.

Rescue Operations for Firefighter Brian FabeyThe Rescue Company 4 Officer conducted a roll call of his members via handie-talkie

radio. Firefighter Brian Fahey of Rescue Company 4 responded, "Rescue Irons, rm trapped inthe basement."

Engine Company 312 operated their hoseline into the hardware store as Engine Company312's Officer entered the front stair hallway of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. The staircaseproviding access to the second floor had been dislodged, thereby creating an opening at the baseof the stairs. Through the opening. the Engine Company 312 Officer observed the stripes of aFirefighter's bunker coat directly below in the cellar. The Officer immediately summonedBattalion 49 to that location. Battalion 49 could see the reflective stripes on Firefighter BrianFahey's coat. Battalion 49 called to Firefighter Brian Fahey. but received no response.

Initial rescue efforts by the Rescue Company 4 Officer and Can Firefighter to reachFirefighter Brian Fahey involved an attempt to cut and enlarge the hole at the base of these stairs.At this time, there was an expanding fire in the cellar of the hardware store. The heat risingthrough the opening at the base of the stairs became unbearable. Visibility was zero. Attemptsby the Rescue Company 4 Can Firefighter to cut the stairs with the saw were unsuccessful andthe Firefighter had to retreat due to extremely high heat conditions at the opening. The RescueCompany 4 Officer now attempted to cut the flooring, which was composed of tile and concrete.At approximately 1457 hours, Firefighter Brian Fahey gave another MAYDAY via the handietalkie a?d indicated that he was trapped under the stairs. His voice was lower than the firstmessage and the vibralert alarm on his Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SeBA) was audiblein the background.


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The Rescue Company 4 Officer and Can Firefighter continued operating in the hallwayuntil ordered to evacuate the area due to instability of the front wall. They then moved theiroperation into the cellar of exposure #4.

Squad Company 41 had arrived at the scene at 1453 hours. After operating for a fewminutes on 14th Street, the Squad Company 41 Officer heard the MAYDAY given by FirefighterBrian Fahey indicating that he was under the stairs. Battalion 49 assigned Squad Company 41the task of trying to reach Firefighter Brian Fahey via the front stair hallway of 12-22 AstoriaBoulevard. The Squad Company 41 Officer entered the stair entrance area, but quickly waspul1ed out by a Chief Officer due to the instability of the front wall. Seeking another avenue ofaccess to the cellar, the Officer of Squad Company 41 went to the cellar of exposure #4 (12-18Astoria Boulevard). A breaching operation was begun through the foundation wall betweenexposure #4 (12-18 Astoria Boulevard) and the fire building. That proved to be a formidabletask as the concrete and stonewall was very thick. Three members of Squad Company 41 wereassigned to continue this operation, while the Officer returned to the front stair hallway at 12-22Astoria Boulevard.

It was after the front parapet wall collapsed that Squad Company 41 began theiroperations in the hallway at the base of the stair to the second floor of 12-22 Astoria Boulevardin an attempt to reach Firefighter Brian Fahey. There was fire burning in the hallway at thistime. After Engine Company 312 extinguished the visible fire, the Squad Company 41 Officerhad his members use a partner saw in an attempt to open the floor. These attempts wereunsuccessful due to the penny tile floor on top of several inches of concrete. There was extremeheat in this hallway. There was so much debris from the collapse that only one member at a timecould fit in the area. Members were getting burned as they worked. The Squad Company 41Officer noticed that the staircase had been dislodged by the explosion and was in danger ofcollapse. He described the staircase "as going upward at a 90-degree-angle," but was unable tosee the upper portion due to the smoke condition. His men were working at the base of thesestairs. The entire staircase moved when hand tools were used to enlarge the opening in the stairs,so a cordless sawzall was put into operation.

There was extreme heat rising from the opening in the hallway. A hoseline had to beused for a period of time to cool that area. A scissor ladder was placed into the hole. AFirefighter attempted to descend the ladder, but quickly was driven back by the intense heat. Thethermal imaging camera was used in an attempt to locate Firefighter Brian Fahey again. This

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proved unsuccessful due to the intensity of surrounding heat and hot spots. A second attempt todescend the ladder was made by a Chief Officer, but due to the intense heat, this attempt alsofailed. Operations to gain direct access into this area continued for some time. The hoseline wasused again. Cel1ar pipes and distributors also were used.

Eventually, the breaching operations through the foundation wall from exposure #4 intothe cellar of the fire building were completed. Squad Company 4] had breached an openingapproximately in the center of the cellar wal1, measuring front to rear. Rescue Company 3 hadbreached an opening more toward the rear. These members discovered that there was aboutthree feet of water throughout the cellar of the fire bUilding. Numerous hoselines, tower laddersand multiversals had been used to control the heavy fire condition, which occurred after theexplosion. There were flammable liquids spreading and burning on the surface of the water inthe cellar.

In an attempt to enter the cellar through the breached opening made by Squad Company41, a hoseline was operated to cool the area. There was fire in several directions. Every time thehoseline was shut down, the fire on the surface of the water quickly would intensify. Twomembers entered through the breached opening with the hoseline. They soon were driven backby the enveloping fire conditions. Pyrocool foam was obtained from the Hazardous MaterialCompany. It was injected into the hoseline and began controlling the flames. Two moreattempts were made to establish a base of operations on the fire side of the breached opening bymembers of Rescue Company 2, Squad Company 41 and Ladder Company 14 under thesupervision of the Special Operations Battalion. Deteriorating conditions thwarted bothattempts. There were extraordinary amounts of pipes, stock, wires and shelving, blocking thecellar aisles. There was a heavy odor of fumes in the cellar. Noting the possible danger of aflash fire erupting and the near-impossible mobility conditions in the cellar, operations ill thecellar were ordered discontinued at that time. According to the Squad Company 41 Officer, "itwas at least three hours into the operation".

Breaching operations also were being carried out on the first floor of 12-18 AstoriaBoulevard for access into the first floor of the fire building. Operations into the cellar of the firebuilding via the rear yard proved to be too hazardous.

The fire and intense heat continued to be a problem for some time. In one of manyefforts to gain control, Hi-Expansion Foam was pumped into the cellar of the fire building in anattempt to extinguish the fire and suppress the vapors. Rescue Company 3 was assigned the task


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I

of bringing down the remaining front wall of exposure #1, which was hanging overhead. Thisexposed some fire that was then extinguished, and this improved the conditions.

Eventually, members of the Special Operation Command were able to enter the cellar of12-22 Astoria Boulevard via the interior cellar stairs and operated a hoseline therein. Reachingthe bottom of the stairs, they found the body of Firefighter Brian Fahey at approximately 1830hours. He was face down in the water. He was wearing his SCBA facepiece, but the regulatorhad been removed. He was secured in a Stokes basket and removed up the stairs.

Firefighter Brian D. Fahey of Rescue Company 4 was removed to Elmhurst Hospital byEMS. As noted on the certificate of death, the date and time of death was June 17,2001, at 6:45P.M. The immediate cause of death was smoke inhalation.

Rescue Operations for Firefighters John Downing, Harry Ford, and Ladder Company116's Outside Ventilation Firefighter

Firefighters John Downing of Ladder Company 163 and Harry Ford ofRescue Company4 were completely buried under the collapsed brick wall on the 14th Street side of 12-22 AstoriaBoulevard. When the Rescue Company 4 Officer conducted a roll call of his members,Firefighter Harry Ford did not respond. The Ladder Company 116 Outside VentilationFirefighter was partially buried and in need of immediate help. He was buried up to his chest inbrick and debris. A sign, possibly from the side of the building, was across his body. He wasfound in front of a white car toward exposure #3 and halfway between the curb and the building.The distance from the curb to the building line was approximately 16 feet. The Ladder Company116 Firefighter was extricated and transported to Elmhurst Hospital via EMS at 1510 hours.

There was a heavy smoke condition on the exposure #2 side following the explosion.Smoke became so heavy at times that the injured members who were being treated on theopposite side of 14th Street had to be moved to another location. A whirlwind of smokeconstantly changed due to a slight breeze. Heavy fire foHowed shortly thereafter. During rescueoperations at the exposure #2 side, rescuers were confronted not only with heavy smoke and fireconditions, but also flying missiles (aerosol cans). Many small explosions and hissing soundscould be heard. The flames from the fire were orange and, at times, blue flames sporadicallywould erupt from the bUilding.

Members of the Hazardous Material Company and others were assigned to search andrender assistance at the 14th Street location. On their arrival, Rescue Company 2 also was

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assigned by Division 14 to assist in the< search for the two missing members under the collapsedwalL While digging in the collapse debris to search for buried members, the Hazardous MaterialCompany was directed by a sounding PASS alarm to an area some 15 feet north of their presentlocation. Hazardous Material Company members dug toward the sound of the PASS alarm andfound Firefighter Harry Ford in the vicinity of a white car. Digging continued in that area andFirefighter John Downing was located in close proximity to Firefighter Harry Ford. FirefighterJohn Downing was discovered while Firefighter Harry Ford was still being extricated from hisposition. During the entire extrication operation, there were l o w ~ l e v e l fire eruptions andexplosions. Both Firefighters were completely buried under about two feet of brick. First aidwas given to both members and neither had any vital signs. They were removed from the debrispile at approximately 1555 hours and transported to Elmhurst Hospital by EMS.

Firefighter Harry S. Ford of Rescue Company 4 was removed to Elmhurst Hospital byEMS. As noted on the certificate of death, the date and time of death was June 17, 2001, at 4:27P.M. The immediate cause of death was massive blunt trauma.

Firefighter John J. Downing of Ladder Company 163 was removed to Elmhurst Hospitalby EMS. As noted on the certificate of death the date and time of death was June 17,2001, at4:30 P.M. The immediate cause of death was massive blunt trauma.

Post-Fire InvestigationExamination of the fire's path of travel found that the fire spread from the cellar of 12-20

Astoria Boulevard to the cellar of 12"22 Astoria Boulevard through the opening in the foundationwall. This opening should have been protected by the fire door. The fire door was preventedfrom closing as a result of a wooden stick or dowel placed into the lower door track and by theramp built over the lower door track. The ramp used to move stock over the lower track of thisfire door was nailed together and affixed in a somewhat permanent position. Numerous nailswere used to hold the sections together.

Reasonable attempts were made by the investigative team after the incident to collect andexamine personal protective clothing and safety equipment used by the three deceasedFirefighters, the critically injured Firefighter of Ladder Company 116, and the critically injuredLieutenant of Ladder Company 163. This testing is routine in any such case. In accordance withDepartmental policy, their SCBA and handie-talkies would have been tested at the start of thetour and found to be serviceable or replaced if not serviceable at that time. Some items sustained


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physical damage due to the explosion ,and resulting collapse. In any case, no failure ordeficiency of protective clothing, tools or equipment was found that contributed to the injuriessustained by these five members.

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VI. FINDINGS

1. Approximately 25 minutes passed between the time of arrival of the first fire companyand the time of the expiosion. No water was applied to the fire in the cellar during thiscritical time period. The dangerous conditions presented by the interior stair to the cellarin 12-22 Astoria Boulevard precluded their initial use due to the presence of the exteriorentrance that led directly into the fire area from the rear yard. Extreme difficulties inforcing entry into the cellar of the fire building from the rear doorway delayed theapplication of water from hoselines pOSitioned at that entry point.

2. When the decision was made for Squad Company 288 to advance their 2lh-inch hoselinedown the stair to the cellar of 12-22 Astoria Blvd., they had been operating on the firstfloor of the hardware store for approximately 15 minutes. The members checked their airsupply in preparation of descending the stair and reported that they had approximately ahalf tank of air remaining in their 45-minute air cylinders. A 45-minute cylinder contains1834.9 liters of air. At half capacity, there would be approximately 917.5 liters of airremaining in the cylinder. The maximum deliverable airflow into a properly donnedfacepiece is 102 liters per minute (lpm) as called for in the NFP A Standard. This is abreathing rate that Firefighters would rarely reach. NIOSH uses a standard airflow rateof 40 lpm, which measures breathing rales at a sedentary physical level of activity and isunrealistic due to the heavy exertion levels associated with normal firefighting activities.A breathing rate of 70 lpm is associated with a level of activity equaling a brisk walk.Assuming that the members of Squad Company 288 were using a breathing rate of 80lpm, these members would have commenced their advance into the cellar withapproximately 5.7 minutes of operational firefighting time before their vibralertssounded. They would have had approximately 5.7 minutes of exit time until their airsupply would have been depleted.

3. Unusual conditions observed from the many different locations in and around the firebuilding were n ~ t 5 ~ ~ u n i c a t e d 10 the Incident Commander. At this operation, variousmembers observed many unusual conditions, e.g. smoke of unusual colors, such asyellow smoke coming from the exterior cellar door at exposure #3 and from both


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windows on the 14th Street side of exposure #2 (yellow smoke is an indication of apOlential backdraft). Unusual were emanating from various building openings atdifferent times and locations. Popping noises were coming from the cellar. Blue flamescame up the ce)]ar stairs at one point. These conditions occasionally appear individuallyat working fires. However, taken together. a more ominous situation may have becomeapparent to the Incident Commander.

4. Professor Robert Zalosh prepared a report titled "Baclalraft 'txpiosion in June 17, 2001Fire at Astoria Hardware Store" (Appendix E), for the New York City FireDepartment's Bureau of Fire Investigation. Professor Zalosh's conclusions are valuableregarding backdraft explosions and should be evaluated for future Fire Departmenttraining and tactical planning. He stated, "If the fire door [in the cellar] between 12-20and 12-22 had dosed .. there would not have been a large fuel vapor concentration andsignificantly reduced oxygen concentrations in 12-22. Therefore, there would probablynot have been any backdraft explosion when the window covers on the 14th St. wall wereremoved. The opening of the rear basement door would probably not have caused abackdraft explosion (indeed an explosion did not occur when the door was opened at1442 011 June 17,2001) because the hot ceiling temperatures and shelving temperaturesnear the ignition site were very close to the dOOIway, and there would not be much spaceor time to develop a large mixing region before ignition occurs at the interface betweenthe fuel-rich region and the inflowing air.,,5

5. The 10-60 signal was not transmitted for this incident following the explosion. At acollapse, fire and rescue operation staffing resources and Chief Officer supervision is ofthe utmost importance. Additional Chief Officers are needed to reinforce the commandstructure. Division 14 was ill the process of transmitting a second alarm when theexplosion occurred. Shortly thereafter a request for two additional Rescue Companies,fol1owed by a fourth and fifth alann, were transmitted. Prompt transmission of the Signal10-60 would have provided an earlier response of some units such as an additiona1Deputy Chief, 4 additional Battalion Chiefs, Squad Company 1 with their second piece of

:; Zalosh, Robert. BACKDRAFf EXPLOSION IN JUNE 17.2001 FIRE AT ASTQRIA HARDWARE STORE.p. 15, June 2002.

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apparatus, and an additional Squad Company (Some of these units were eventuallyassigned and responded).

6. The buildings located at 12-20 and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard were not classified as "A"buildings. In 1995, the Fire Department Inspection Procedures were rewritten. The newFire Prevention Manual allowed Unit Commanders flexibility in creating an individualcyc1ical inspection program adapted to the specific needs of its area. The goal was toinspect all buildings (except private dwellings) within a specific time period. TheApparatus Field Inspetion Duty (AFID) schedule established that time period as amaximum of five years. A building would be inspected on a schedule according to thepotential risk and incidence of fire in relation to other buildings in that unit's district.When these revised procedures took effect, 12-20 Astoria Boulevard and 12-22 AstoriaBoulevard were classified as "E" buildings for inspection purposes and were to beinspected every five years. These buildings by reason of their degree of hazard(construction, alterations, occupancy, and hazardous contents) could have been classifiedas A" buildings and inspected annUally.

7. Using Inspection Guides A-268 through A-299 as actual inspection fonns instead of theFire Prevention Checklist Fonn A-1OI would have made for a more thorough,meaningful inspection and reduced the likelihood of members on AFID overlookinghazards such as fire doors purposely blocked open. The Fire Prevention InspectionChecklist Fonn A-lO 1 was created with the introduction of the Fire Prevention Manual.It is a generic checklist which when completed, is signed and placed in the appropriatebuilding folder until the next inspection for that building. Inspection Fonns A-268through A-299 were reclassified as Inspection Guides and became reference material asper section 3.6 of the Fire Prevention ManuaL

8. The administrative unit was unable to complete their five-year cyclical inspectionprogram. According to an endorsement by Battalion 49 on a report dated August 11,2001, concerning Engine Company 262 Inspections, Battalion 49 stated that the timeallotted for Engine Company 262 was insufficient for the Company to complete their "E"bUildings. Fire Prevention activity for Engine Company 262 reflected that 58 percent of


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their inspection time was lost to Fire Duty, EMS response, fe-inspections (A-134P), andinclement weather. According to entries on the Field Record Card Form A-119. duringthe period 1970-1994, there were only six inspections with completed entries on the FieldRecord Card (Appendix F) by the Administrative Company for the buildings in question.During that time, these buildings were scheduled to be inspected every two years. It wasprojected that these buildings (12-20 and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard) would have beeninspected in October or November of 2001, approximately 4 to 5 months after the fire.

9. There was no Critical.Information Dispatch System (CIDS) card for these buildings.Members are often in a position on building inspection, response, and outdoor activities,to recognize conditions that shouJd be incorporated into the CIDS program. There werenumerous reasons why these two buildings 12-20 and 12-22 AstOlla Boulevard, shouldhave been entered into CIDS:

The buildings were interconnected on both the first and cellar levels Large quantities of flammable liquids and gases were stored in the cellar areas The interior cellar stairs in 12-20 Astoria Boulevard were sealed The rear exterior entrance to the cellar was well-secured

10. These buildings had numerous a1terations as noted in Appendix F of this InvestigativeReport entitled "Building Description!' The alterations included these buildings beinginterconnected in the cellar (1947) and first floor (1950); a portion of the existing showwindow sealed up (1985); interior cellar stairs in 12-20 Astoria Boulevard sealed (dateunknown); and numerous exterior openings sealed (date unknown). Even though therewere major structural alterations in both ]2-20 Astoria Boulevard and 12-22 AstoriaBoulevard, no inspection form A-270R, "Alterations in Buildings Involving StructuralChanges," and no sprinkler recommendation was found in the Building Folders of theAdministrative Fire Company's Building Records. NOTE: Form A-270 "ALTERATIONS IN BUILDINGS INVOLVING STRUCTURAL CHANGES" wasoriginally promulgated in January 1967, and revised in November 1994 and January1997.


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11. Fire Protection Inspectors were at the premises annually from August 1995 throughAugust 2000, but did not conduct complete building or occupancy inspections.NOTE:Fire Protection Inspectors conduct inspections on the need for and the updating ofpermits as well as witnessing on-site tests of various systems such as fire detectionsystems, fire suppression systems, and sprinkler systems. They will cite other violationswhen noticed in the performance of these duties. The Job Description in the FireDepartment's General Statement of Duties and Responsibilities for Fire ProtectionInspector, and in the"Notice of Examination for Fire Protection Inspector (Appendix D,Section 3) states: Under supervision. pelforms work in the conduct of i1lhpections todetect violations of laws, rules and regulations which are intended to reduce or eliminatefire hazards or assist in extinguishing fires; performs related work.

12. The Bureau of Training is responsible for instructing probationary Firefighters attendingProbationary Firefighter School (PFS) and Lieutenants attending the First LineSupervisor Training Program (FLSTP) in Fire Prevention and Building Inspections.Currently, probationary Firefighters receive II Y2 hours of training on Fire Prevention.After graduating from PFS, probationary Firefighters should have the knowledge toidentify basic violations, as well as be able to properly complete appropriate forms(Notice of Vi olations-NOVs , Violation Orders-VOs, etc.). The Bureau of FirePrevention is capable of presenting Fire Prevention segments to probationary Firefightersattending PFS, paying particular attention to the proper completion of forms such as theNOV. Near the end of 2003, the Bureau of Fire Prevention started presenting a segmenton Fire Prevention to Lieutenants in FLSTP as well as to Battalion Chiefs in the ChiefOfficers Command Course. According to the Fire Prevention Enforcement Unit, asignificant number of violations written by FDNY personnel are faulty in that they fail toadequately describe the nature of the violation. Apparatus Field Inspection Duty (AFID)is a very important function of the Fire Department. The Fire Department must provide astrong commitment to Fire Prevention and Building Inspection for the safety of theresidents of New York City, and also for the well being of the uniformed force. Thecommitment to enhancing building inspection must begin with the proper training ofprobationary Firefighters and new1y promoted Lieutenants. The amount of instructional


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time currently given seems to be inadequate, considering the importance of and the_ _ _ _ ~ ~ - - - ~ - . - ..- ~ . - . - - - M amount of instructional material that should be included in the training curriculum.

13. Handie-talkie transmissions were not recorded until the Fjeld Communications Unit(FCU) arrived. This unit does not normalJy respond to first alarms in the beginning ofoperations. The FCU responds on second or greater alarms. Critical operationalcommunications occur during the beginning of operations with the arrival of the first FireDepartment unit. This information is not recorded until the FeU anives on the scene.This was evident at this fire with the FCU arriving at 1501 hours, thirty-seven minutesafter the signal 10-75 and fourteen minutes after the explosion occurred. Installingrecording devices in every Battalion vehicle would allow the handie-talkie channels to berecorded from the arrival of the first Battalion at an incident, aiding in the investigation offuture mishaps.NOTE: The Department is currently conducting a pilot program of handie-talkierecorders in Battalion vehicles.

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VII. CAUSES

DIRECT CAUSES

I) Inhalation of toxic levels of carbon monoxide and other gases (F.E Fahey),

2) Inhalation of the heated products of combustion (F.F. Fahey).

3) Blunt trauma to the head and torso from falling bricks (F.F. Ford).

4) Crushing injuries to the torso from falling bricks (EF. Downing).

INDIRECT CAUSES

1) A gasoline spill, by two mischievous young men applying graffiti near the rear exterior cellardoor of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. The Bureau of Fire Investigation determined that the pilotflame of the hot water heater was the ignition source of the fire.

2) The hardware store owner's failure to maintain the cellar fire door in proper operatingcondition. This allowed the fire to spread unimpeded from the original fire building (12-20Astoria Boulevard) to the exposure #2 building (12-22 Astoria Boulevard). The open firedoor was a critical element in allowing conditions to develop with the resulting explosion,which caused the collapse of the exterior wall in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard.

3) Fire Department units' inability to apply water on the developing fire in a timely fashion.

4) Physical conditions of the interior stairway leading to the cellar in 12-22 Astoria Boulevard.The stairway had shelving built out from the side, thereby reducing its width. There was apiece of plywood over the steps, which was used as a slide to handle the movement of stock.These conditions made use of this stairway for advancing a hoseline into the cellarinadvisable and hazardous.


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5) Existence of extremely well secured door protecting the rear exterior entrance into the cellarof 1 2 ~ 2 0 Astoria Boulevard.

6) Members' failure to communicate unusual smoke, noises, smells and other signs of apossible backdraft directly to the Incident Commander.

7) The occurrence of the backdraft explosion enhanced by the presence in the cellar of variousflammable liquids, which began to vaporize due to fire exposure. The explosion caused thecollapse of an exterior wall, resulting in injuries and death to Firefighters.

8) Members operating in an area that unexpectedly became a collapse zone.

BASIC CAUSES

]) Absence of a sprinkler system in the cellar of either building encompassing the hardwarestore.

2) Storage of flammable liquids and gases in the cellar.3) Elimination of access to the cellar of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard via the interior cellar stairs,

thereby impeding access to the fire by operating forces.

4) Sealing of cellar and first-floor exterior openings, preventing the units from accessing the fireand ventilating at the earliest possible time.

5) Failure of the Administrative Fire Company to classify these buildings, which containedhazardous storage, as "A" buildings. This classification would have required more frequentinspections of these buildings.

6) Failure of the Administrative Fire Company to enter these two buildings into the CriticalInformation Dispatch System (CIDS). Information indicating that the buildings wereinterconnected on first and cellar levels; large quantities of flammable liquids and gases were

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stored in the cellars of both buildings; the interior cellar entrance in 12-20 Astoria Boulevardessentially was closed off and unusable. This information would have been invaluable to theoperating forces.

7) Failure of the Administrative Fire Company that performed field inspection duty to recognizeand report significant structural alterations. There was no Inspection Form A270,"Alterations In Buildings Involving Structural Changes," on file in the Building RecordFolders of either building.

8) Failure of Fire Protection Inspectors who perfonned permit. inspections in the hardware storeto recognize and report fire hazards to the administrative unit.

NOTE:The Bureau of Fire Investigation of the New York City Fire Department determines the

cause of a fire or, in some cases the cause of explosions in the City of New York. As part oftheir investigation, Professor Robert G. Zalosh was asked by the Bureau of Fire Investigationto study and report on the circumstances surrounding this fire and explosion. ProfessorZalosh is a nationally recognized expert in the area of explosions. He has written theExplosions section of the N.F.P.A. Handbookfor Fire Protection, Nineteenth Edition. RobertZalosh is a Professor of Fire Protection Engineering at the Center for Fire Safety Studies,Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 01609.

Based on his study of this fatal fire, Professor Robert G. Zalosh has concluded that thecause of this explosion was an "unusually severe backdraft," caused by the flow of air into aroom in which high fuel vapor and low oxygen concentrations had developed. This was dueto the large quantities of flammable liquids, small openings in the basement walls and ceiling,the absence of an automatic suppression system, a wedged-open fire door and the delayedaccess by responding Firefighters. This particular backdraft produced higher pressuresbecause of the relatively small ventilation area, even after the air flowed into the basement(See Professor Zalosh's study in Appendix E).

In conunenting on the nature of the conditions that led to the explosion at this incident, theSafety and Inspection Services Command will defer to the expert findings of the Bureau of


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Fire Investigation and that of Professor Zalosh. Therefore, some of the causes must bepredicated on these findings.

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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Implement a series of Chief Officer tactical training conferences with Command Chiefs.Subjects should include risk management, as well as alternative strategies foraccomplishing fire and emergency goals during operations. The inability to apply waterstreams onto a fire early in Fire Department operations should be considered as greatlyincreasing the risk and dangers to members operating. Alternate methods for applyingwater should be employed as stated in Fire Department publications, improvising whennecessary. Incident, Sector, and Unit Commanders must continuously conduct riskassessment until operations are concluded.

2. Units commencing an interior attack should, optimally, start with a full SCBA aircylinder. When circumstances preclude this possibility, the unit officer must notify theIncident Commander of the units' remaining air supply status so that appropriate back upor relief can be provided. Members beginning an attack with less than a fun SCBA aircylinder may be able to operate for only several minutes before their vibralerts sound.When the vibralert activates, members are required to make the appropriate notificationto their Officer and exit the IDLH immediately. Delayed relief increases the likelihoodof members continuing to operate when they should be exiting to a safe atmosphere.Under these circumstances, exit time will be decreased, reducing the built-in safetyfactors afforded by the activation of the vibralert. At a usage rate of 80 lpm, an aircylinder depleted to half capacity will only allow approximately 5.7 minutes ofoperational time and 5.7 minutes of exit time. All officers must recognize this potentiallydangerous situation and notify the Incident Commander to ensure that when an interiorattack is initiated it continues safely and uninterrupted.

3. Reinforce to all members the requirement that they must communicate significantfireground information to the Incident Commander. Firefighters and Officers provideinformation for use by the Incident Commander in perfonning size-up, and mustcommunicate unusual conditions when necessary.


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4. Review the information contained in Professor Robert Z a l ~ s h ' s report, BackdraftExplosion in June 17, 2001, Fire in. Astoria Hardware Store, for possible inclusion intodepartment documents and training programs. His findings are found in Appendix E,Section ] and contain conclusions that are valuable regarding backdraft explosions thatmust be evaluated for future Fire Department training and tactical planning. Infonnationpublished in Department documents peltaining to backdrafts should be amended toinclude the warning signs of backdraft situations and recommended safety actions.

5. Train all Officers of the need to immediately transmit proper radio signals at incidents toensure that adequate resources are assigned and aITive in a timely manner. Additional

..alarms should be transmitted promptly to provide the required staffing for operations,staging, and relief purposes. There should be no dilay in transmitting appropriatecommunication signals such as the 10-60 signal for occl#tences tha

fdny report on fatal fire, june 17, 2001

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