TheFatefulAllianceGERMANCONSERVATIVESANDNAZISIN1933:

THEMACHTERGREIFUNGINANEWLIGHT

HERMANNBECK

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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDataBeck,HermannThefatefulalliance:GermanconservativesandNazisin1933:theMachtergreifunginanewlight/

HermannBeck.p.cm.Includesbibliographicalreferences.ISBN978-1-84545-496-8(hbk)ISBN978-1-84545-680-1(pbk)1.Germany—Politicsandgovernment

—1918–1933.2.DeutschnationaleVolkspartei—History.3.NationalsozialistischeDeutscheArbeiter-Partei—History.4.Conservatism—Germany—History.5.Nationalsocialism.I.Title.

DD240.B33892008943.086'2—dc22

2008007615BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData

AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibraryAversionofChapterIVwasoriginallypublishedin2005asHermannBeck,

“TheNazisandtheirConservativeAlliancePartnerin1933:TheSeizureofPowerinaNewLight,”TotalitarianMovementsandPoliticalReligions6:2(2005),

215–243,Taylor&Francis,journalwebsite:http://www.informaworld.com.

AversionofChapterVwaspublishedin2006asHermannBeck,“BetweentheDictatesofConscienceandPoliticalExpediency:Hitler'sConservativeAlliancePartnerandAnti-SemitismduringtheNaziSeizureofPower,”

TheJournalofContemporaryHistory41:4(October2006),611–640,Copyright@SAGEPublications,2006,bypermissionofSagePublicationsLtd.

PrintedintheUnitedStatesonacid-freepaperISBN:978-1-84545-496-8hardbackISBN:978-1-84545-680-1paperback

CONTENTS

Preface

IntroductionPerspectivesontheNaziSeizureofPower,30Januaryto14July1933NewAspectsoftheNaziSeizureofPowerPreviousAssessmentsoftheNaziSeizureofPowerTheDNVP:MassPartyorPartyofNotables?OverviewofContents

CHAPTERIPragmatistsversusFundamentalists:TheDNVPintheWeimarRepublic,1918–1933TheDNVPduringtheEarlyRepublic(1920–1924)TheDawesPlanFromtheDawesPlantoHugenberg(1924–1928)TheEndofConservativeModerationTheYoungPlanTheFirstDivisionTowardaMoreAuthoritarianRepublicTheSecondDivisionTheDNVPandtheRiseofNazismGermanNationalAssessmentsofNazismbefore1933

CHAPTERIIUneasyPartners:TheRelationshipbetweentheDNVPandtheNazis,30January–5MarchTheImpactof30JanuaryOppositiontoNaziRepressionandIncreasingTerror

CHAPTERIIIConservativesandtheNSDAPduringthe“NationalRevolution”ofMarch1933

BecomingObsolete:TheOutcomeoftheMarchElectionsCrusadesagainstBourgeoisCorruptionandSpecialInterestsNaziAttacksPreparetheTakeoverConservativeBastionsunderAttackTheLastHurdle:PotsdamandtheEnablingAct

CHAPTERIVTheNazisandtheConservativeBürgertum:AClashofWorlds

Nazi“RevolutionaryFervor”inActionTraditionalHierarchiesandConservativeValuesontheLineAnti-BourgeoisIdeologyandRhetoricThe“Demise”oftheBürgerTheAnti-BourgeoisThrustoftheNaziSocialRevolution

CHAPTERVBetweentheDictatesofConscienceandPoliticalExpediency:TheDNVPandAnti-SemitismAContradictoryRecord:PreviousResearchontheDNVPandAnti-SemitismAnti-SemiticViolenceConservativesandAnti-SemitismNationaleJudenProtest,Regret,andEffortstoHelpRejectionandDisapprobationTheGermanNationalPredicamentConclusion

CHAPTERVIRebellionagainsttheInevitable:TheTribulationsofSpring1933

“FalseFriends”:NazisTurnTheir“RevolutionaryFervor”againstGermanNationals

LossofInfluenceinEconomicandProfessionalOrganizationsPhysicalViolenceandtheThreatofArrest

TheVainStruggletoSurvive:GermanNationalsImitateNaziStyles

CHAPTERVIIIgnominiousDemise:Defections,Prohibitions,andFinalDissolution

AChangeinClimateProhibitions,Desertions,andDissolutionsTheEnd

EpilogueConservatism,NationalSocialism,andGermanHistoryNationalSocialismasanAnti-BourgeoisMovement

Appendix

SelectBibliographyArchivalSourcesNewspapersandtheContemporaryPeriodicalPressPublishedPrimarySourcesandSecondaryLiterature

Index

PREFACE

Thisstudyhasalonghistory.In1996,whenIshiftedthefocusofmyresearchfromnineteenth-centuryconservativesandbureaucratstothelateWeimarRepublicandtheearlyNaziperiod,IwasinterestedinitiallyinthepoliticalbehaviorofGermanprofessionalclassesandhigherofficials,commonlysummarizedunderthetermBildungsbürgertum,or“cultivated”bourgeoisie.Germanyoweditsreputationinscholarship,administration,andtechnicalexpertisetothisnumericallysmall,butsociallyinfluential,university-trainedelite.TheBildungsbürgertumwasauniquelyGermanphenomenonthatoriginatedasadistinctsocialclassinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies.Fromthefirst,itwascharacterizedbyitscloserelationshiptothestate,sinceitsstrongestcomponentcamefromtheupperechelonsofstatebureaucraciesinthevariousGermanstates.Inadditiontohighofficials,thisclassincludedtheacademicallytrainedprofessions,notablyuniversityprofessors,membersofthelegalprofession,theProtestantclergy,andmedicaldoctors,mostofwhomwerestateofficialsaswell.Until1879lawyers,forexample,hadtobelicensedbythestate,andmedicaldoctorshadbarelymanagedtoextricatethemselvesfromthefettersofstategovernmentsbytherevolutionsof1848.UniversityeducationandexaminationsinGermanycontinuetobestate-regulatedtothisday.TheconstituentelementoftheBildungsbürgertumwasthecommonBildung

ofitsmembers.1Bildungwasshapedbyabeliefinhumanperfectibility,specificallythatanindividual'spotentialcouldberealizedthroughaclassicaleducation.ThiswasthecentralnotionofGermanIdealismandacornerstoneofWilhelmvonHumboldt'sreformofthePrussianuniversitysystem,fromwheretheconceptspreadthroughoutGermany.BetweentheReformEraandtheRevolutionsof1848,thepowerwieldedbyhighofficialsinthelargerstatesoftheGermanConfederationaddedtotheprestigeofthegroupandservedasjustificationforitscorporateprideandfeelingofself-importance.Germany'slateindustrialization,aswellastheinitialweaknessofabourgeoisieoftenhamperedbystateregulations,furtheradvancedtheascendancyoftheeducatedeliteandthesocialprestigebestowedonthosewithacademicachievementsandtitles.InthehierarchicallystructuredworldofCentralEuropebefore1933,

establishedmembersoftheBildungsbürgertumwerethusboundtobecomerolemodels,whosebehaviorsetsocialandoccasionallyevenpoliticalstandardsthatwereeagerlyemulatedbytheirsocialinferiors.2Politically,theBildungsbürgertuminitiallytendedtowardliberalideas,

thoughthereweregreatdifferenceswithinthegroupasawhole:lawyersandmembersoftheemergingfreeprofessionsweremoreliberalthancivilservants.IntherevolutionaryFrankfurtparliamentBildungsbürgerrepresentedallpoliticalorientations,thoughliberalsclearlyoutnumberedconservatives.TheliberalismofthemajorityoftheBildungsbürgertumwasdeterminedbyitsoppositiontothearistocracy,itsstruggleforconstitutionalreform,andthequestforasovereignnation-state.Before1866,nationalismwasaliberalideal;thearistocracyandotherconservativesallacrosstheGermanstateswereopposedtoanationalunificationthatwouldentailpartialforfeitureoftheirprivileges.ButasoppositiontoBismarck'spoliciesevolvedintosupport,“progressive”liberalismturnedinto“national”liberalismand,gradually,bytheendofthe1870s,thebulkoftheBildungsbürgertumhadlostitsforward-drivingliberalorientation.Bythe1890s,manyhadturnedintoadvocatesofimperialistpoliciesanddefendersofanaggressivenationalism.Inthisshifttoconservatism,aslatertoNationalSocialismattheendoftheWeimarRepublic,thefuturemembersoftheBildungsbürgertum—universitystudents—wereinthevanguardofpoliticalchange:studentsprecededtheestablishedBildungsbürgertuminappropriatinganewconservatism.BeforetheGermandefeatintheFirstWorldWarandthesubsequenteconomicturmoilandinflation,thiscultivatedbourgeoisiehadenjoyedsignificantmaterialsecurityandcomfort,aswellasgreatersocialprestigethanitscounterpartsinotherEuropeancountries.Tothem,defeatinthewarwasmorethanamilitarydisaster:itsignifiedapersonalhumiliationandthelossofadistinctculturalidentity.Asaresult,largesectionsoftheeducatedelitemovedfurthertothepoliticalright.Fromthebeginning,theyvehementlyrejectedthenewRepublicthatborethebirthmarkofahumiliatingdefeat.Theeducatedelite'sfatehadbeencloselyalignedwiththatoftheEmpire;withtheEmpire'sdemise,itsufferedadeclineinreputationthatincreaseditsalienationfromWeimar,towhichinflationaddedthegrievanceofmaterialdestitution.TheinflationbroketheeconomicspineoftheBildungsbürgertum,whoselifestylehadbeensupportedlargelybytheirsavings,asregularsalariesrarelysufficedtomaintainthematerialaccoutrementsthatwentwiththeirexaltedsocialposition,suchasdomesticservants,Bildungsreisen,andacostlyeducationfortheiroffspring.ProbablynopartoftheGermanpopulationfeltthehumiliatingchangesineverydaylifemoredeeplythantheeducatedelite;nonefeltmoredistantfromarepublicanregimewithwhichreconciliationseemedimpossible.

Dispossessiondestroyeditspoliticalinstinct,makingitsusceptibletopoliticalchoicesthatformerlypridealonemightwellhaveprecluded.Pervadedbythecertaintyoftheirsocialandculturalsuperiority,themajority

oftheconservativeandnational-mindedBildungsbürgertuminitiallyshowedlittleinterestintheNazimovement,despitetheeconomicdeclineofamajorityofitsmembers.UntilaboutayearbeforeHitlercametopower,itwasthusmostlytheacademicproletariat,thedéplacéamongthecultivatedbourgeoisie,thosefilledwithfesteringresentmenttowardtheirmoresuccessfulcolleagues,whoexpressedtheirspitebyvotingfortheNSDAP.Eventhoughextremenationalism,thehatredofVersaillesandthe“Novembercriminals”and,insomeinstances,anti-SemitismprovidedcommongroundwithNationalSocialism,themessageputforthbyNationalSocialistswastoosimplisticfortheaveragememberoftheBildungsbürgertum.Itsclaimtoepitomizeaculturallysuperiorsegmentofthepopulationrancountertotheanti-intellectualismoftheNazis.ButwhythendidavastsegmentoftheBildungsbürgertumgoovertothe

Nazis,andhowcouldthegraduallyevolvingaffinitiesbetweentheNazimovementandthecultivatedbourgeoisiebeexplained?ThatmanydiddefecttoNazismhasbeendocumentedbeyonddoubt.Alreadyin1982RichardHamiltonshowedthat,beginningwiththespringof1932,largesegmentsofthehautebourgeoisie,includingtheBildungsbürgertum,votedfortheNaziparty.InhiselectoralanalysisofGermany'slargercitiesHamiltonimpressivelydemonstratedthatinhabitantsoftheVillenvororte,themoreaffluentsuburbsoflargeGermancitiesfromBerlintoHamburgandMunichtoMannheim,votedindisproportionatenumbersforHitlerandtheNSDAP.Apartfromfactoryownersandbusinessmen,thepopulationoftheseVillenvorortewasmadeuplargelyofmembersoftheeducatedmiddleclasses,professionals,andvariouscategoriesofhighercivilservantsemployedbytheReich,therespectivefederalstates,ormunicipalities.3AsMichaelKaterhasshown,inrelationshiptotherestofthepopulation,theeducateduppermiddleclassincreasedbothitsproportionaterepresentationintheNazipartyanditsmembershipinaffiliatedorganizations,suchastheNationalSocialistPhysicians'orJurists'Leagues,inthewakeofthetransferofpowertoHitler.4Alreadyin1932,universitygraduatesenteredtheNazipartyattwicetherateoftheirpercentageintheoverallpopulation.AndafterHitlerbecameChancelloron30January1933,theacademicallytrainedflockedintotheNSDAPtothepointthattherewasamarkedshiftintheparty'ssociologicalprofile,sincethemembershipquotaoftheeducatedelitewasfourtimesashighastheirshareinthepopulation.AccordingtoKater,membersofthelegalprofession,aswellasdoctorsanddentists,wereoverrepresentedinthe

SSbyafactorofseven,tenureduniversitylecturersandprofessorsbyafactoroffour.Itisbeyonddoubtthatthecultivatedbourgeoisie'sinitialenthusiasmfortheregimehelpedtoconsolidateHitler'sdictatorshipandcontributedtomakingthenewregimesociallyacceptable.Themotivationforthisfundamentalshiftinpoliticalorientationseemedwell

worthinvestigating.WereBildungsbürgerturncoatsoutofconviction?Opportunismalonedidnotseemtoexplainthewholehearted(andoftenunsolicited)enthusiasmwithwhichthe“NationalRevolution”waswelcomed.InthefeveraccompanyingtheNazisuccessesafter30January,theconversionofmanyBildungsbürgerappearedtobegenuine.TowhatexactlycouldNationalSocialismappealinthissegmentofthepopulationwhich,bydintofeducation,breeding,andsocialbackground,seemedunlikelypreyforthe“temptations”ofNazism,theearlypublicimageofwhichwasdominatedbyvulgarity,socialanimosity,andstreetviolence?Couldnationalismandthepromisetorestoredomesticunityandorder,combinedwithaconcertedefforttorebuildGermanmight,aloneaccountfortheenthusiasticconversion?Wasananti-Semitismthatsubtlyinsistedonculturalincompatibilityamajorfactor?Theactualsearchforspecificreasonsproveddifficult.Acarefulperusalofthefilesofcivilserviceorganizationsandthecorrespondenceamong,forexample,Philologenvereine,yieldedfewconcreteresults,whilesourcesofamorepersonalnature,suchascollectionsofletters,literarybequests,andautobiographies,wereoftensogeneralthattheymightbeappliedtoeveryoneorsodependentontheindividuallivesoftherespectivewritersthatgeneralizationswereimpossible.HereIcouldnotquitewardoffthesuspicionthatauthorsofsomeprominence,whoseletterswereimportantenoughtobepublished,orwholaterlefttheirpaperstoanarchive,mighthavetakencaretoleaveoutanyletterorotherdocumentthatmightbetoo“incriminating”withrespecttotheirrelationshipwithNationalSocialism.AdmissionsofearlyeuphoriaforNazismcouldwellharmtheirposthumousreputationswiththepostwarGermanaudience.Becauseofthisattempttoprotectone'spersonalreputation,thekindsofdocumentsIwaslookingforwouldthusbedifficulttounearth.MysubsequentsearchinlocalarchivesforthereactionoftheconservativebourgeoisietotheNazitakeoverin1933washardlymorefruitful.Icontactedmorethanfortylocalandregionalarchiveswhosepersonnelwereallkindenoughtorespondindetailtomyinquiries.Withanumberofsignificantexceptions,eitherfewrelevantmaterialsexistedorthebulkoftheholdingson1933weredestroyedbyairraidsinthesecondhalfofthewar.5Itwasstartlingtoseethattheprotocolsofcitycouncilmeetingsfor1933,oratleastforthedecisivefirsthalfof1933,whentheNazisarrogatedplenipotentiarypowerstothemselvesonthenational,regional,and

locallevel,wereconsistentlymissing.ThiswasthecaseevenincitiessuchasMannheim,whereprotocolsofcitycouncilmeetingshadbeencompletelypreservedsincethemid-eighteenthcentury.Here,too,itwasdifficult,forobviousreasons,tobelieveinmerecoincidence,andmorefeasibletopresumethat,inthelastdaysofthewar,localpoliticianswhohelpedseizepowerinthewinterandspringof1933(oracquiescedinit)didtheirbesttosuppresstheall-too-obviousconfirmationoftheirinvolvementwiththeregime.Butitis,ofcourse,alsotruethatintimesofrevolution(contemporariesofallpoliticalpersuasionsreferredtothewinterandspring1933assuch),fewornomeetingstookplaceand,whentheydid,insignificantandnonpoliticalissuestoppedtheagenda.TheQuellenlagechangedwhenIturnedtothepartythatuntilabout1932wasthemostlikelypoliticalhomeoftheBildungsbürgertum,theDeutschnationaleVolkspartei(GermanNationalPeople'sPartyorDNVP).Thisparty,asiswellknown,enteredthegovernmentalcoalitionwiththeNSDAPthatbroughtHitlerintopowerin1933.SubstantialsectionsofitspartyfilessurvivedthewarandwerekeptintheformerEastGermanZentralesStaatsarchivIatPotsdamandthen,inthewakeofGermanreunification,relocatedtothenewlyopenedBundesarchivatBerlin-Lichterfelde.Undertheimpactofthesenewandunexpectedfindings,ImodifiedmyinitialtopicsothattherelationshipbetweenconservativesandNazisduringtheperiodoftheseizureofpowerbecamethefocalpointofanalysisandtheconservativeBildungsbürgertumreceded—forthetimebeing—intothebackground.Inalaterstudy,Ihopetobeabletodealwiththiscompellingtopic.Oneisoftenmostimpressedbytheunexpectedand,inmycase,thiswasthe

openconflictbetweenGermanNationalsandNazisinMarch,April,andMay1933,especiallytheNazis'almostfrenetichatredfortheirconservativeallies.Thisextremeloathingwasoccasionallyevenexpressedinphysicalterms,withtheresultthatmembersofGermanNationalorganizationshadtobehospitalized.Frommid-Marchonwards,everythingthatsmackedof“conservatism”or“bourgeois”(bürgerlich)wasdenouncedasreactionary.OncetheoriginalenemiesofNazism—suchasCommunistsandSocialists—hadbeenrepressedandothers(liketheCenterParty)neutralized,theNaziscouldaffordtoventtheirfuryontheirconservativebrother-in-armsandcoalitionpartner.Asthefollowingchapterswillshow,duringthewinterandspringof1933,no“allianceofelites”existed.Traditionalconservativepoliticalandsocialbastionswerewillfullydestroyedandthen—underdifferentauspices—reconstructed,butonlyaftertheyhadfullyacknowledgedNazileadership.ThefollowingchapterswillalsoshowthatthecompleteandignominiouscollapseofconservatismwasnotonlybroughtaboutbyjudiciousandshrewdNazimaneuvering,butalso

acceleratedbysheerviolenceandintimidationandfosteredbytheZeitgeist,theuniqueclimateofopinionthatpervadedGermanybetweenFebruaryandJuly1933.Alreadybytheendof1933,disillusionmentanddisappointmentdashedthehighhopeswithwhichthenewgovernmenthadbeengreeted,andmanyfeltthattheyhadmisjudgedthenatureoftheNaziregime.6Butpoliticalreality,oncecreated,couldnolongerbeundoneundertheconditionsofarepressivedictatorshipthatwasalreadyfirmlyensconcedinpowerbyJuly1933.WhenGermanconservatives,theconservativebourgeoisie,andpartsoftheBildungsbürgertumrealizedtheirgrossmiscalculation,itwastoolate.Inthecourseofthisstudy,severalorganizationshavesupportedmyresearch,

andanumberofcolleagueshavegenerouslylentmetheirtimeandexpertise.IshouldespeciallyliketothanktheSchoolofHistoricalStudiesattheInstituteforAdvancedStudyatPrinceton,whereIspentayearduringtheearlystagesofthisproject,aswellastheUniversityofMiami,whichhasconsistentlysupportedmyresearchwithaseriesofOrovitzSummerResearchAwardsandtravelgrants.AmongthelibrarieswhosedebtIhaveincurred,specialthanksareduetothestaffsatPrincetonUniversityLibrary,theWürttembergischeLandesbibliothekinStuttgart,andtheUniversityLibraryinHeidelberg.Iamobligedtothestaffsofthefollowingarchives,whodiligentlyrespondedtomyvariousinquiries:theStadtarchiveatAugsburg,Baden-Baden,Bonn,Bremen,Dortmund,Düsseldorf,Duisburg,Essen,Freiburg,Göttingen,Hannover,Heidelberg,Heilbronn,Hildesheim,Kaiserslautern,Karlsruhe,Kassel,Köln,Leipzig,Magdeburg,Mannheim,München,Münster,Saarbrücken,Stuttgart,Ulm,andWiesbaden;theLandesarchiveinBerlinandMagdeburg;theHessischesStaatsarchivDarmstadt,StaatsarchiveinBremen,Hamburg,andMünchen;theGenerallandesarchivKarlsruhe,theBayerischesHauptstaatsarchivMünchen,HessischesHauptstaatsarchivWiesbaden,NiedersächsischesHauptstaatsarchivHannover,LandesarchivKoblenz,Nordrhein-WestfälischesHauptstaatsarchivDüsseldorf,HauptstaatsarchivStuttgart,andSächsischesHauptstaatsarchivDresden,aswellastheWestpreussischesLandesmuseuminMünster.IamespeciallyindebtedtotheaccommodatingandcooperativearchivistsattheBundesarchivBerlin-Lichterfelde,whounfailinglyansweredallmyquestionsandfurnishedmewiththenecessarymaterials,notablytoHerrLange,HerrKlein,FrauMüller,andFrauHessel.Fortheirgeneroussupportinhelpingmelocatearchivalmaterials,IamalsogratefultoHerrFehlauerattheBerlinDocumentCenter,FrauKlaußattheGeheimesStaatsarchivPreußischerKulturbesitzatBerlin-Dahlem,FrauAnnegretNeupertandHerrAloisFischerattheBundesarchivKoblenz,EvaRimmeleattheInstitutfürZeitgeschichteinMunich,AgnesPetersenandHelenSolanumattheWestEuropeanCollectionsoftheHooverInstitutionatStanfordUniversity,SusanneKnoblichatthe

oftheHooverInstitutionatStanfordUniversity,SusanneKnoblichattheLandesarchivBerlin,Dr.BöhmeattheStadtarchivGöttingen,Dr.BlumattheStadtarchivHeidelberg,MichaelCaroliandDr.RingsattheStadtarchivMannheim,Dr.BeckerattheStadtarchivSaarbrücken,Dr.MargaretaBull-ReichenmüllerattheHauptstaatsarchivStuttgart,andDr.RolandMüllerattheStadtarchivStuttgart.Ofthenumerouscolleagueswhoreadselectedchaptersofthemanuscript,IwishtothankinparticularmycolleaguesattheUniversityofMiami,EdwardL.DreyerandMichaelMiller.AgreatdebtremainstoHenryTurner,whoreadthemanuscriptforthepressandmadevaluablesuggestionsforimprovement;JamesRetallack,whoprovidedimportantinsightandconstructivecriticismthatledtoanumberofnecessarychanges;aswellastoDavidBarclay,LarryE.Jones,StanleyPayne,andJamesTent,whoreadtheentiremanuscriptandgenerouslyofferedsuggestions,criticisms,andincisivecomments.Itgoeswithoutsayingthatanyshortcomingsremaintheresponsibilityoftheauthor.NowordscansufficientlyexpressthedebtofgratitudeIowetoMarcia,whoindefatigablyreadseveralversionsofthisbookandspentcountlesshourswithmediscussingitsarguments,fine-tuningitsstyle,meticulouslycritiquingeveryparagraph,andforcingmetobemorepreciseinexpressionandeconomicalinwording.Herunfailingattentiontodetail,notleastwhendealingwithproblemsofintricatedocumenttranslationsfromtheGerman,havemadethisamorecoherentandreadablebook.

1.Theconceptcannotbeexactlytranslated.ArecentrenderingofBildungas“theexperienceofpersonalgrowththroughanindividualizedappropriationofclassicalhighculture”isunwieldy,butapproximatestheGermanmeaning.SeeJonathanSperber,“Bürger,Bürgerlichkeit,bürgerlicheGesellschaft:StudiesoftheGerman(Upper)MiddleClassandItsSocioculturalWorld,”JournalofModernHistory69(1997),276(note9).ThetermBildungsbürgertumhasbeeninuseonlysinceabout1920;itevolvedfrom“gebildeteStände,”and“Gebildete,”to“gebildetebürgerlicheGesellschaftskreise”and“gebildetesBürgertum.”SeeUlrichEngelhardt,“Bildungsbürgertum.”Begriffs-undDogmengeschichteeinesEtiketts(Stuttgart,1986).

2.WilliamS.Allen,inTheNaziSeizureofPower,makesthepointthatitbecamesociallyacceptable(inthesmalltownstudiedinhisbook)tojointheNazipartyonceaprominentBildungsbürgerhadspokenoutpubliclyinsupportofHitler.

3.RichardHamilton,WhoVotedforHitler(Princeton,1982).Hamiltonalsoestablishedthefactthatthosewhocouldstillaffordasummerholidayin1932andthusvotedbyStimmscheinintheelectionsof31July1932alsofavoredtheNSDAPindisproportionatenumbers.Here,too,onemaysurmisethatmembersoftheBildungsbürgertummadeupasubstantialpercentageofthosestillabletoaffordasummerholidayatthehighpointofthedepression.

4.MichaelKater,“SozialerWandelderNSDAPimZugedernationalsozialistischenMachtergreifung,”inWolfgangSchieder,ed.,FaschismusalssozialeBewegung,2nded.(Göttingen,1983),25–69.

5.ThisseverelyaffectedtheholdingsatEssen,Köln,Hamburg,Heilbronn,Hildesheim,andKassel.6.ThispointisconvincinglymadebyNorbertFrei,DerFührerstaat.NationalsozialistischeHerrschaft

1933bis1945,6thed.(Munich,2001).

INTRODUCTION

PerspectivesontheNaziSeizureofPower,30Januaryto14July1933

DuringthepastfiftyyearsmuchdetailedhistoricalresearchhasbeendevotedtoexplainingtheprehistoryofHitler'srisetopower:whyHitlerbecameChancellorlessthanthreemonthsaftertheNSDAPsufferedamajordefeatinthe6November1932elections;howthetransferofpowerwasaffectedaftermuchconfusion,prevarication,andbehind-the-scenesintrigue,allofwhichresultedinHitlerbecomingheadofgovernmenton30January1933;andwhy,afterthedemocraticpressintheir1933NewYear'seditionshadpredictedtheprematuredeathofhismovementanditscertaindeclineintooblivion,NationalSocialismcouldemergetriumphant.1Muchlessisknown,however,aboutthedevelopmentoftherelationshipbetweentheGermanNationalPeople'sParty(DNVPorGermanNationals),Germany'smainconservativepartyduringtheWeimarRepublic,andtheNSDAP—thepoliticalcoalitionthathelpedbringHitlerintopower.Littlescholarlyattentionhasbeenpaidtothetension-riddenrelationsbetweentheNSDAPanditsconservativeally,whoseleadersthoughtHitlerboxedinbytheirsuperiornumbersintheCabinet,ortotheastonishingspeedwithwhichtheNazimovementsucceededinturningtheWeimarRepublicintoadictatorship.Anumberofdetailedstudiesfocusonthemainhistoricalfigures,suchasAlfredHugenberg,chairmanoftheDNVPfromOctober1928toJune1933.2Thereisalsoaseriesofwell-researchedbooks,dissertations,andarticlesonvariousaspectsoftheDNVPduringtheWeimarRepublic.3ButthereisnocomprehensiveoverviewofthehistoryoftheDNVP,andnostudythataddressesthedynamicbetweentheDNVPandtheNSDAPduringtheperiodoftheseizureofpoweror,morebroadly,betweenGermanNationalsandtheirsupporters,ontheonehand,andNationalSocialism,ontheother.4WhydidtheDNVPanditssupportersacquiesceinNazitransgressionsandviolentattacks,andwhydidtheynotstopthe“implementationofNazism'sracialidiocies,”5asexpectedbysomeprominentGermanJews,suchasGeorgBernhard,evenaftertheyhadfledthecountry?AndexactlyhowdidtherelationshipbetweentheNazisandtheDNVP(andtheirconservativesupporters)evolveandchangebetween30Januaryand14July1933,whenHitleroutlawedallparties,savehis

own,andthusformallysealedtheestablishmentoftheone-partystate?Thisbookaddressesthesequestions.Itexaminestherelationshipbetween

GermanconservatismandNationalSocialism,asreflectedinthecoalitionbetweentheDNVPandtheNSDAP.Itanalyzestheprehistoryofthealliance,aswellastheoften-violentconflictsthatcharacterizeditbetween30JanuaryandthedemiseoftheDNVPinlateJune1933.TheperiodoftheNaziseizureofpowerfrom30Januaryto14July1933(alsoreferredtoastheMachtergreifung)ischaracterizedhereasaneraofall-pervasiveviolenceandlawlessnessmarkedbyincessantconflictsbetweenNazisandtheiralliancepartner,afarcryfromitstraditionaldepictioninmuchofthepreviousliteratureasarelativelybloodless,virtuallysterileassumptionofpowerbyonevastimpersonalapparatuswrestingcontrolfromanother.ThepresentstudyreinterpretstheprocessoftheNaziseizureofpowerasmore“revolutionary,”violent,andfarlessorderlythanpreviouslyassumed.Itallocatesgreaterimportancetotheroleofviolenceandrabble-rousinggrassrootsinitiativesbylocalNaziorganizationsastheessentiallubricantsoftheNazitakeover.Contrarytocommonassumptions,asearlyasMarchandApril1933,Naziviolencesparednoonewhodaredopposethevictoriousmovement;neithersocialstatusnorpoliticalprominenceofferedprotection.TheanalysisthenturnstothequestionoftheDNVP'sroleastheNSDAP'sgoverningalliancepartnerintheearlymonthsof1933:CouldthepartyhaveactedasabrakeonNaziexcesses,orwasitapawncaughtupinthespiritofthetimes?TheexaminationoftheDNVP'svacillatingapproachtowardNazianti-Semiticattacks,andtheparty'sowninconsistentactionsconcerning“theJewishquestion,”highlightsthedifferentnatureofconservativeanti-Semitismandshowsthat,partlyoutofconcernforitsownposition,thepartydidnothingtoalterthefateofGermanJews.ByinvestigatingthefundamentalchangesinGermany'spoliticalclimateandtheastonishing,oftengenuine,increaseinNazisupportduringthisperiod,thebookseekstoprovideanswerstothequestionofhow,withinaspanofsixmonths,ademocratic,ifcrisis-riddenstatesuchastheWeimarRepubliccouldbeturnedintoatightlycontrolleddictatorshipthatenjoyedsignificantpopularacclaim.ThebookscrutinizestherevolutionarycharacteroftheNaziseizureofpower,theNazis'attackonbourgeoisvalues,andtheirco-optationofconservativesymbolsofstatepowertoserveradicallynewgoals,whileaddressingtheissueofwhytheDNVPwascomplicitintheseactionsandparadoxicallyparticipatedinerodingthefoundationsofitsveryownprinciplesandbasesofsupport.Thepresentstudythusfocuseslessonpeopleandeventsthanonchangesin

politicalclimate,thebehaviorofgroups,anddifferencesinpoliticalinterestsandmentalitybetweenNazisandsupportersoftheDNVP.Itexaminesthepolicies

oftheDNVPand,evenmoreimportantly,explorestheparty'srelationshiptoNationalSocialism,whichisintegratedintothelargerhistoricalcontextandZeitgeistoftheage,andtakesintoaccountthedifferentmindsetsandidentitiesofthetwo“national”parties.ThenumerousincidencesofunbridledviolencedirectedagainstconservativeHonoratiorenandDNVPmembershighlightedhereshowthatthe“BündnisderEliten”(pactofelites)wassuspendedduringtheMachtergreifung,asmanylocalNaziandSAleadersviolentlyturnedagainstlocalconservativeelites.Thistookplacewithinthementalclimateprevalentduringthewinterandspringof1933:theall-pervasivefearofcommunismaftertheReichstagfireandtheenormousAufbruchsstimmung—theatmosphereofawakening—generatedbytheNazisinMarchandApril1933.Bythispoint,Nazismhadsucceededinputtingitselfforwardasaprotestmovementagainstbourgeoislifestylesandclaimedtoofferabetteralternativeforthefuture,justaspotentialpoliticalopponentstoNazismfalteredandcavedinwithoutresistanceordefectedtotheenemyoutofgenuineconviction,opportunism,oroutrightfear.

NewAspectsoftheNaziSeizureofPower

Overtime,ourunderstandingofthenatureoftheNaziseizureofpowerhaschanged,withsignificantconsequencesfortheinterpretationofthecharacterofNazismasawhole.Untilthe1980s,historiansgenerallyunderestimatedthewantonviolencethataccompaniedtheNaziseizureofpower,notonlyinthetakeoverofthedifferentGermanstates(Länder)after5March1933,butatalllevels.Thisviolencemanifesteditselfnotonlyinanti-SemiticattacksthroughoutGermany,butalsoincountlessactsofrevengeandintimidationagainstpoliticalopponents,neighbors,businessrivals,oranyonewhohadeverfallenfoulofprominentNazisorNaziorganizations.Ubiquitousterrorwasthelubricatingoilintheprocessofeliminatingopponents,inrenderinginnocuouspotentialenemies,andin“persuading”organizationsliketheCatholicChurchthataccommodationwiththenewmasterswasthebetterpartofvalor.ThethreatofviolencethatwaspresentinallspheresoflifeinthewakeoftheReichstagFireDecreeof28February1933acceleratedtheprocessofGleichschaltung,the“bringingintoline”ofthemanifoldassociationsandinterestgroupsofGermansociety.Thisbookhighlightsoneaspectofviolencethathistorianshavetendedtooverlook:Naziattacksagainsttheircoalitionpartner,theDNVP,includingitsmembersandsupporters.ThetendencytodisregardNaziattacksonGermanNationalsandtheirsupportersintheconservativeBürgertumisconnectedwithafailure—orpossiblyanunwillingness—torecognizethesocialrevolutionary

overtonesoftheNazimovement,inparticulartheNazis'loathingoftheBürgertum,itsvalues,anditsentirebourgeoiswayoflife,whichmanyNazissawreflectedintheDNVP.WhenanalyzingtherelationshipbetweentheDNVPandtheNazimovement,historianshaveemphasizedtheircommonalities,sharedbeliefs,congruenceofinterests,andpracticalcollaboration,withouttakingintoaccountNaziattacksonGermanNationalorganizations,interestgroups,andvalues.6TooverlookstrifeanddiscordintherelationshipbetweenNazisandtheDNVPmeanstoignore,oratleastminimize,thesocialrevolutionarythrustoftheNazimovementduringthewinterandspringof1933andthus,toacertainextent,misrepresentthecomplexandoftencontradictoryrealityoftheperiodbetween30Januaryand14July1933.Twomainreasonsmayexplainthetendencytodisregardtheopenconflict

betweentheNazisandtheirconservativealliancepartner.First,theovertcooperationbetweenMussoliniandconservativeelitesinItaly,andthefactthattheItalianvariantoffascismrarelycameintoconflictwithtraditionalforcesinsociety,mighthaveaffectedinterpretationsoftheGermancase.Secondly,theMarxistinterpretationoffascism,whichplayedanimportantroleindiscussionsofthe1960sand1970s,emphasizedtheconnectionbetweenfascismandthecapitalistbourgeoisie.ThosewhosubscribedtoMarxistinterpretationstendedtoreject“thesignificanceofanydistinctionbetweenthecorefascistgroupsandforcesofrightauthoritarianism,”asStanleyPayneputit.7ProponentsofMarxisttheories,fromtheorthodoxSoviethistorianstoAugustThalheimer,OttoBauer,andMaxHorkheimer,allarguedthatfascistmovementswereatbottommanifestationsofbourgeoisinterestsandagentsofthetraditionalupperclasses.8ButeventhoseWesternhistorianswhorejectedMarxistinterpretationstendedtodownplayclashesandconflictsofinterestbetweenconservativeelitesandNazis.WeretheyreluctanttocounterMarxistpositionsbyappearingtodepictGermanconservativesasvictimsandthusbeaccusedofvindicatingorevenexoneratingthemfromtheburdenoftheirresponsibility?Or,giventhatconservativesaroundPapenandHindenburghadtransferredpower(albeitreluctantly)toHitleron30January,diditseemjustifiabletodismisstheissueofconflictbetweenthetraditionalforcesinGermansocietyandtheNazisaltogether?TheargumenthereisthatneitherthetransferofpowertoHitlernorthe

tacticalalliancebetweentheDNVPandNSDAPshouldobscuretheconfrontationbetweenNazisandtheconservativeforcesinGermansocietyduringtheNaziseizureofpower.The“revolutionaryfervor”oftheNaziPartyanditsorganizations,notablytheSA,wasatitsheightduringthemonthsofthetakeoverwhen,withgreatspeedandbrutality,theNaziswrestedpowerfroma

largelyconservativestateapparatus.Inthewinterandspringof1933,allleadingNazisbehavedina“revolutionary”fashion,blurringdifferenceswithintheNazileadershipbetweenamore“conservative”HermannGöringandamore“radical”JosephGoebbels.Oncetheirmoreobviouspoliticaladversaries,suchasCommunists,SocialDemocrats,andtheCatholicCenterhadbeenbrokenorbrowbeatenintosubmission,theNazistrainedtheiraggressionontheirally,theDNVP.ThesocialrevolutionaryovertonesofNaziattacksagainstconservativeswerecomplementedbytheirpoliticalinstrumentality.NazisneededtobreakthestrongholdsofconservativepowerinlocalpoliticsandgaincontrolofthestateapparatustofacilitatetheGleichschaltung.OncethepositionofGermanNationalsandtheirsupportersintheconservativeBürgertumhadbeensuccessfullyundermined,theirorganizationsbroken,and—whatNazisperceivedas—theiroutmodedvaluesscornedandridiculed,thenewmasterscouldturnonceagaintoestablishingclosercooperationwithanow-chastenedestablishment.AfterdeclaringtherevolutionendedinJuly1933,Hitlerneededtheirexperienceandexpertisetohelprunthecomplexmachineryofstate.Thus,latercooperationbetweentheGermanconservativeestablishmentandtheNazipartyshouldnotbeinterpretedascooperationbetweenequalpartners.Bythesummerof1933,theconservativeestablishmenthadbeenshownwhowasreallyincharge,anditsmembersfellintolinemorecompliantly.ThefollowingsectionconcentratesonthehistoriographyoftheNaziseizureofpowerandhighlightsthemoreimportantinterpretationsoftheperiodsincetheearly1960s.

PreviousAssessmentsoftheNaziSeizureofPower

ThemostdetailedstudyoftheNaziseizureofpower,themonumentalDienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,firstpublishedin1960byKarl-DietrichBracherandhiscollaboratorsWolfgangSauerandGerhardSchultz,examineseveryaspectofstate,society,bureaucracy,economy,military,ideology,education,andforeignpolicyinthefirstyearandahalfofHitler'srule.9Thismagisterialanalysis,whichoffersnotonlydetailedchronologicaldiscussionsofeventsanddevelopmentsbutalsostructuralsociologicalanalysis,omitstheelementofpoliticalmobilizationfrombelow—ofchaos,disorder,andturmoil—almostcompletely.Instead,thereaderisleftwiththeimpressionthatthegiganticapparatusofstateistakenoverbyanimpersonal,tenaciouslymovingmachinethatgraduallypermeatesbureaucracyandsociety.Theworkstressesthe“pseudo-legal”characteroftheNazitakeover,butthereislittlesenseofthedynamismoftheseizureofpower,oftheubiquitousrandomviolence,ofactsofrevenge,SAunitsoutofcontrol,andinnumerableinstancesofanti-Semitic

bestiality.EventhoughWolfgangSauerdealswiththeterroroftheSAinthelastthirdofthebook(pp.855–880),thecentralaspectofviolenceremainscuriouslyperipheralandneverfullyintegratedintotheoverallexplanationoftheNaziseizureofpower.Inthesamevein,Bracher'snextclassic,comprehensivework,Diedeutsche

Diktatur,whichalsodevotesagooddealofattentiontotheNazitakeover,stressesthe“semblanceoflegality”thatcharacterizedtheprocess,butagainneglectstoemphasizemoreemphaticallythemobilizationofgrassrootsviolence.10Brachercorrectlystressesthefactthat“noneoftheinstitutionsresponsibleforthemaintenanceoftheRechtsstaat”opposedNaziactions,11buthefailstoimpressuponthereaderthatacentralreasonfortheirfailuretoactwasrawfearofNazireprisals.Whenreferringtoactsofviolence,Bracheremploysconceptssuchas“terroristseizure-of-poweracts”(p.290)thatdefydescriptionandlackplasticity.Sinceheoffersnoconcreteexamplesthatwouldfilltheseconceptswithlife,hisaccountoftheperiodinvariablyleavesthereaderwiththewrongmentalimageofamore-or-lessorderlyprocess,withouttakingintoaccounttheturmoilandupheavalsthatcontemporariesfeltwhen,supportersandopponentsalike,theyemployedtheterm“revolution”inreferringtothemonthsofMarchthroughJune1933.Bracherusestermssuchasthe“atanyrateunstoppablerevolution”andspeaksofa“regimewithatempestuousandviolentbearing”(p.291),butsincehisanalysisfocuseslargelyonthesphereofstate,bureaucracy,andthecontentofemergencyordinanceswithoutgivingdueweighttothepressureofthestreet,hispreciseexaminationofeventsremainsstrangelycolorlessandatvariancewiththeperceptionofcontemporaries.12Undoubtedly,Bracher'sanalyticalapproachandthealmostcompleteabsenceofnarrativearepartiallytoblameforthecuriouslyneutralfeelingwithwhichthereaderisleftafterreadinghisaccount.Bynotgivingsufficientweighttodetailsandtellingepisodesthatwerepartofthechangesandupheavalsoftheage,Bracherfailstocapturethemoodofintimidationandpowerlessnessonthepartofpotentialandactualvictims,ontheonehand,andtheexhilarationandexultation—amoodwhichhadtakenholdofGermanyinthosemonths—ofNazisandNazisupporters,ontheother.13BracheraptlydepictsNazicontrolofsocietybyarguingthat“thecharacteristic,exceedinglysuccessfulmethodconsistedinthemixtureofpseudo-legalgovernmentaldecreeswithrevolutionarythreatsandterroristpressure”(p.299).Thiswasverytrue,butsincelittleissaidaboutthenatureofrevolutionarythreatsandformsofterroristpressure,theseconceptsserveonlytostiflehistoricalrealityandfailtorenderarealisticdepictionofthepast.

MartinBroszat'sDerStaatHitlers,theclassicworkontheNazistatethatanalyzesindetailtheseizureofpower,againevincesthetendencytoconveytheimageofanimpersonaltakeoverofagiganticmachinerywithafocusonlegalandbureaucraticaspects.14ThisdespitethefactthatBroszatisfarmoreconcreteinhisapproachthanBracher.WhenexploringpurgesofthePrussianbureaucracy,forexample,heliststhenamesofsuspendedOberpräsidenten(provincialgovernors)andpointstoregionaldifferencesintheNazitakeover.Broszatusesconceptssuchas“partyrevolution”and“revolutionfrombelow”(pp.258–267)without,however,capturingtheatmosphereofthreat,panic,anddisquietude.Thereadergetslittlesenseofthebreakdownofcivilsocietyandlawandorder,orofthewidespreadbrutality,mayhem,andconfusion.TheNazistateappearstohavesupersededWeimarwithoutthecountlesstremors,cracks,andfissuresatthefaultlinethatmarkedthisall-encompassingearthquake.HansMommsen,anotherkeyproponentofthestructuralistapproachto

Nazism,alsoimplicitlydownplaystheviolentandrevolutionaryaspectsoftheNazitakeoverbypostulatingaVerschränkung(crossingover)oftraditionalandNazielites,whichhedepictsasarelativelysmooth,frictionlessprocess.15Mommsenassertsthatdespite“theundeniablesocialandfrequentlyalsogenerationalantagonism”(p.158)betweenthetraditionalandNationalSocialistelite,aclosecooperationbetweenbothgroupscameaboutinthecourseoftheGleichschaltung.Thefactthatcooperationcouldcometopassinspiteofsocialandgenerational“antagonisms”wasduelargelytothe“far-reachingcongruenceofintereststhatstoodatthecradleofthealliancebetweenconservative-authoritarianleadershipgroupsandtheNationalSocialistleadership.”16MyargumenthereisthatthiscongruenceofinterestswaslessextensivethanMommsenhasassumed.ItwasclearlynotimportantenoughtokeepNaziaggressionandhatredfor“conservative-authoritarianleadershipgroups”(asMommsenputit)incheck.Inanotherarticle,MommsenmaintainsthattherelativestabilityoftheNationalSocialistregimeduringthephaseoftheseizureofpowerstemmedfromthefactthat“Hitlerhadbeenobligedtomakefar-reachingconcessionstotheconservativeelitecontrollingthearmy,economy,andadministration,therebyfrustratingthoseelementsintheNazimovementwhopressedfortotalseizureofallsocialandpoliticalinstitutions.”17Theevidencepresentedheresuggeststhattheseconcessionsmaynothavebeenasfar-reachingasMommsenclaims.Inthesamearticle,MommsenaffirmsthatGoebbelsconsideredtheprocessofGleichschaltungarevolutionaryact,insistingthat“theGermanrevolutionhadbeencarriedoutfrombelowandnotfromabove.”18ElsewhereMommsenconceded“thatNationalSocialists

succeededincreatingtheimpressionthattheThirdReichwasanopensociety,”19whichseemstoindicatethatMommsen,too,ispreparedtoacceptthatNationalSocialismaffectedsomekindofsocialrevolution.KlausHildebrand,inhisshortsurveyofNaziGermanythatiscoupledwithan

extensivediscussionofthehistoriography,putslessweightontheaspectofScheinlegalität(semblanceoflegality)intheNazitakeoverthanBrachertwentyyearsearlier.20Hildebrandmaintainsthatduringthecourseofthe“graduallyaccomplishedconquestofpower,”legalandterroristmeasures“dovetailedinsuchawaythatitwasdifficulttokeepthemapart.”21HeclaimsthattheThirdReichhadbeen“nourishedonahithertounknowncombinationoftraditionandrevolution.”Ontheotherhand,inconcurringwiththeassessmentofJohnWeiss,whoconsidersGermanfascismtobe“thelastgaspofconservatism,”Hildebrandde-emphasizestheanti-bourgeoiselementofNationalSocialism.22Thisrunscountertothefindingsofthepresentstudy.TheNazis'scornandcontemptforGermanconservatismandtheclassesthatsupportedit—theinfamous“Reaktion”oftheNazimarchingsong—burstforthviolentlyduringtheMachtergreifung.ConservativeswereconsideredunfittohaveanyshareinthegovernanceofGermany,blamedforthehalfheartedconductofthewar,andaccusedofcowardicein1918.Asthisbookshows,therewasabroadconsensusamongNazisaboutnotwantingtohearthemselvesmentionedinthesamebreathasconservatives.Duringthe1980s,theemphasisofinterpretationshifted.AccountsoftheNazi

seizureofpowerinsurveysofNaziGermanythatdealtwiththeeventsof1933insomedetail,suchastheworksofGotthardJasper,Hans-UlrichThamer,andNorbertFrei,devotegreaterspacetoNaziviolenceandaccentuatelessits“pseudo-legal”aspects.23ThesestudiesbenefitedfromtheresultsofdetailedresearchontheSAthathadbroughtouttheimportanceofbruteforceandcoercionduringtheNazitakeover.24Bythe1980s,ithadbecomeclearthatlawlessnessandviolenttransgressionshadbeentheorderoftheday,sothattheconceptofScheinlegalitätwasdeprivedofitsheuristicvalue.Yeteveninthesemorerecentstudies,thechaotic-arbitraryaspectofviolence,itswantonwillfulness,andlackofplanningandcoordinationaremostlyunappreciated.Inhisconcisesurveyandinterpretationoftheyearsfrom1930to1934,Jasperdismissestheterm“legalrevolution”asultimatelymisrepresentingthecharacteroftheMachtergreifung,sinceconsiderationsoflegalitywouldonlyobfuscatethelawlessnessandillegaltransgressionsthatactuallytookplace.25JaspercontraststheterroroftheSAwiththeinactivityandcollusionofthepolicethatmadeashamoftheMarchelectionswhile,inhisanalysisofthetakeoverofthe

Länderafter5March,hestressestheimportanceof“spontaneousinitiativefrombelow”(p.143).Ontheotherhand,incastigatingthegullibilityoftheCenterPartyanditshalfheartedinsistenceonbindingconcessionstosafeguardtheruleoflawinreturnfortheCenter'ssupportfortheEnablingAct(seetheinterpretationinchapter3below),JasperslightlyminimizestheweightoftheDamoclesswordthathungoverNaziopponentsastheyconsideredtheiroptionsinlightoftheNazis'capacitytobrowbeatthemintosubmission.Inhisimportantaccountoftheyearsbetween1933and1945,Hans-UlrichThamerlaysstressupontherevolutionaryelementofNationalSocialism,especiallythecomponentofprotestagainsttraditionalauthoritythatconsiderablyaddedtotheattractivenessandallureofNazism.26ThameralsopresseshometheoftendisregardedpointthatthespeedoftheNazitakeovershouldnotleadtotheconclusionthatamasterplanhadexistedbeforehand.27HereThamerdigressessignificantlyfromBracher'sapproachwhich,initsinterpretationofdifferent“stagesofMachtergreifung,”seemstoimplya“rationalprogressiontopreconceivedgoals,”asIanKershawonceputit.28Thamerbestencapsulatestheirrationalcomponentoftheperiodbyraisingthequestion:“the‘nationalrevolution’—adeliriouswhirl?”29Throughouthisanalysis,Thamerunderlines“therevolutionarycharacter”(p.245)oftheMachtergreifung,thelubricatingfunctionofterrorthatacceleratedthepaceofthetakeover,andtheimportanceof“pressurefrombelow,”withoutwhichpoliticalpowercouldnothavebeenusurped.30Inthesamevein,NorbertFrei'sskillfullycomposed,compactsurvey,DerFührerstaat,givesprominencetotheimportanceofthe“partyrevolutionfrombelow,”especiallyinthecourseofappropriatingpowerintheLänder.31FreiisamongthefirsttoappreciatethefactthatNaziviolencewasnotonlyanti-Semiticinnature,ordirectedsolelyagainstthe“Marxist”milieu,butthatitalsotargeted,ifinalesscomprehensiveandsystematicway,membersoftheBürgertum.Inanappositesummary,heconcludesthatthesuccessoftheNaziPartyandtheSA“resultedfromthechaoscreatedandgeneralintimidation,notfromanysystematicplanningofhowtoproceed.”32ThemostrecentGermansurveysofNazismpublishedinthe1990slay

increasingemphasisontheviolent,terroristaspectsoftheThirdReich,asreflectedintheirdiscussionoftheMachtergreifung.33JostDüfflerunderscoresthat“theuseofintimidation,terror,anddeprivationofrights”wasanessentialelementoftheNazitakeover,andmentionsthat“therewasalsopersecution”directedagainsttheGermanNationals.34Still,heoverstatesthenatureofthepoliticalalliancebetweenconservativesandNazisinassertingthat:“fromthe

verybeginninganalliancedevelopedbetweenthenewmassmovementandimportantpartsoftheoldGermanbureaucratic,economic,andmilitaryelite.”35Whileitistruethatsuchanallianceeventuallycameabout,itdidnotoccurinassmoothafashionasDüfflersuggests.36InthesameveinasMommsen,Düfflerarguesthataftertheotherpartieshadbeenabolished,“thealliancebetweenNationalSocialistsandtheconservativescontinuedtodevelop,inpublicaffairsandadministration,atendencytowardauniformeliteloyaltothestate”(p.41).This,too,isquestionable:itwashardlyanallianceofequals;thetraditionaleliteshadtocompromiseandadapttotherequirementsofthenewstate.Duringthemonthsofturmoilandupheavalfollowing30January1933,theywereforcedtolearnthestarklessonoftheirpowerlessnessandmusthaverealizedthatremaininginofficemeantseekingaccommodationwiththenewmasters.Thiswasahumblingexperiencebutpreferable,intheireyes,tolosingpowerandinfluencealtogether.Giventhebrevityofthespaceallocated,Düffler'ssynopsisisadmirableinitscomprehensiveness,thoughhe,too,failstoaccountforthetumultandchaosofthewinterandspringof1933thatgavetheNazisgreaterascendancyoverGermansocietythanwasbelievedpossibleandputthetraditionalelites,atleasttemporarily,inapositionofdependency.Inacompetentandeminentlyreadablesurvey,LudolfHerbstimpressesonthereadertheimportanceofterrorandpropagandainthecourseoftheNazitakeover.37Incontrasttosomeoftheothershortersurveys,Herbst'saccountgivesprominencetothemultitudeofanti-Semiticattacksandthewantonbrutalitythatcharacterizedthem(pp.73–80).AndheunderlinesthefactthatinitiallyevenHitlerprovedpowerlesstochannelthechaoticterrorofthepartyrankandfile.ThemostrecentEnglish-languagestudiesthatdealwiththeperiodoftheNazi

Machtergreifung(albeitfromverydifferentvantagepoints),thoseofSaulFriedländer,MichaelBurleigh,IanKershaw,andRichardEvansallgiveweighttotheelementofviolenceandterror.38BothFriedländerandEvansappreciatethementalclimateofthemonthsfromMarchthroughJune1933muchbetterthanmostoftheolder,lessempiricalGermanstudies.Yet,eventheselatestaccountsdonotalwaysaccordsufficientweighttotheNazis'hatredoftheirconservativealliancepartnerandthesocialrevolutionaryovertonesoftheMachtergreifung,thoughthismaywellbeduetothespecificfocusoftheiranalyses.

TheDNVP:MassPartyorPartyofNotables?

Anoverviewoftheroots,identity,andstructureoftheDNVPisneededtoappreciatethefullspectrumofconflicts,commonalities,andtactical

collaborationbetweenNazisandGermanNationals.TheDNVPwasfoundedinNovember1918asaconfluenceofallprewarconservativepoliticalparties.NeverbeforeinGermanhistorysincethefoundingofthefirstconservativeorganizationsinPrussiainthe1830shadconservatism,bothasanideologyandapoliticalorganization,becomemorecompletelydiscreditedthanintheautumnof1918,whentheseeminglywell-entrenchedmonarchicalorderthatitrepresentedcollapsedwithoutfanfareorresistance.39AllthegroupsthatgatheredundertheroofofthenewpartywerekeenlyawareofthepainfulfactthattheywereinoppositiontotheprevailingpostwarZeitgeist.Giventhattheyhadsupportedtheoldorder,theywereconsideredatleastpartiallyresponsiblefortheunexpectedmilitaryandpoliticalcatastropheofNovember1918.GrafWestarpexpressedtheprevailingsentimentinconservativecirclesinthefallof1918:“Nonationhadevercollapsedmorecompletelyinthefaceofsuchasuddenturnofeventsaswehave.Wehavebeenthrowndownfromagrandsummit,thehighestpeak.Atthebeginningoftheyear,therewestood—crownedinalaurelwreath,proud,andpowerful;nowwelieinthedust.Wehavebecomepooranddisgraced.”40SupportersoftheGermanConservativeParty(DKP),theFreeConservative

Party(FKP),theChristianSocialParty,thePan-GermanAssociation,anti-Semiticsplinterparties,andanumberofformerNationalLiberalsformedtheDNVPinthelatefallof1918.Theconfluenceofsomanydifferentgroups,fromconservativenotablestopettybourgeoisanti-Semitesfearfulofslidingintotheproletariat,madetheDNVPoneofthemostheterogeneouspartiesoftheWeimarRepublic.ThenumericallystrongestandpoliticallymostsignificantelementthatflowedintotheDNVPweremembersoftheformerGermanConservativeParty,theEmpire'sstrongestconservativeparty,foundedin1876.Despiteitsname,whichsignifiedanorientationawayfromPrussiaandtowardthenewEmpire,theDKPhadbeenprimarilyaPrussianparty.Lessthanone-fifthofthe285seatswonbytheDKPinReichstagelectionsbetween1890and1914camefromnon-Prussianareas.41WithinPrussiaitself,theoverwhelmingmajorityofparliamentarydeputiescamefromtheOldPrussianprovinceseastoftheElbe,notablyfromPomerania,EastPrussia,andBrandenburg.Before1918thepartyvociferouslysafeguardedtheinterestsoflandowners,Prussiancivilservants,andtheProtestantclergyandconstitutedaneffectiveblocthatdoggedlycounteredanytendenciestowardfurtherdemocratization.SinceitspowerbaselayinPrussia,thepartystrenuouslyresistedanyweakeningofPrussia'sconstitutionalpositionwithintheReich.Beginninginthelate1890s,thepartyfellincreasinglyundertheinfluenceoftheAgrarianLeague(Bundder

Landwirte),andthusgraduallydevelopedintoavehicleforagrarianinterests.42DuringtheFirstWorldWaritsupportedtheannexationistpoliciesofthePan-Germans,advocatedunlimitedsubmarinewarfare,repudiatedtheReichstag'sPeaceResolution,andstaunchlyopposedtherepealofPrussia'sthree-classvotingsystem.TheFreeConservativeParty,bycontrast,wasapartyofnotableswithoutan

elaborateorganizationthatrecruiteditsmoreimportantrepresentativesfromtheupperechelonsofthebureaucracyandtendedtofavorheavyindustry.43DespiteitsstatusasanumericallyweakHonoratiorenpartei,theFreeConservativePartyexercisedconsiderableinfluenceonnationalpoliticsthroughitsnetworksofpersonalcontacts.Itwasconsideredtobethepartyof“MinistersandDiplomats”;agreatmanygovernmentministersandundersecretariesofstatecamefromitsranks.LiketheDKP,FreeConservativesstaunchlyopposedeffortsatdemocratizationwithintheReich.DuringtheFirstWorldWar,theparty'spoliciesresembledthoseoftheDKP,eventhough,alltold,FreeConservativeswerelessradicalandmorewillingtocompromisethantheDKP.Thethird(numericallylesssignificant)politicalforcethatflowedintotheDNVPwastheChristianSocialParty,foundedin1878astheChristianSocialWorkersPartyledbyCourtChaplainAdolfStoecker.Theparty'smainpurposewastoshieldtheworkingclassfromSocialDemocraticinfluencebybringingworkersclosertoChristianbeliefsandtheideaof“KingandFatherland.”In1881,theChristianSocials,maintainingtheirstatusasanautonomousgroup,affiliatedthemselveswiththeGermanConservativeParty,whosemembershoped,inturn,thattheanti-SemiticslogansofChristianSocialismmighthelpthemgainamassfollowingamongthelowermiddleclasses.Thishopenevermaterializedsinceanti-SemiticsplintergroupsotherthantheChristianSocialWorkersPartysuccessfullyappearedonthesceneinthe1890sandwontheirownmandates.44NotwithstandingthefactthattheGermanConservativePartyincorporatedanti-Semitismintoits“TivoliProgram”of1892,ChristianSocialismsmackedtoomuchofleftistpoliticstobefullypalatabletomostGermanConservatives,whiletheChristianSocials,fortheirpart,becameincreasinglyalienatedfromtheDKP.45Aftersomeinitialsuccessesinthe1890s,theanti-SemiticpartiesoftheEmpiredisintegratedintomeresplinterpartiesaftertheturnofthecentury;whatremainedofthemalsoflowedintotheDNVPafterthewar.46IncontrasttotheDKP,thegeographicalcenteroftheseanti-SemiticpartieslayinthewesternpartoftheReich,andtheirsocialbasisofsupportwascomprisedmostlyofsmallfarmersandthelowermiddleclasses.ThemostimmediateprecursoroftheDNVPwasthe“FatherlandParty,”

whichhadbeenfoundedinanatmosphereofanticipatedvictoryandnationalexuberanceon2September1917asaprotestagainsttheReichstag'sPeaceResolution.Itincludedallshadesofconservatives,nationalists,anti-Semites,andnationalliberals.47Tosomeextent,thewartimeFatherlandPartypreparedthegroundforagatheringofallconservativeforces—aconceptthatwastoberealizedbytheDNVP.ButinNovember1918,littlemorethanayearlater,attheheightofthesuddenandprofoundnationalhumiliation,thepoliticalatmospherehadradicallyaltered.Alreadytheepithet“people'sparty”(Volkspartei),halfheartedlyappendedtothecoreterm“GermanNational,”wasareluctantconcessiontowhatDNVPleadersconsideredtheodiousdemocraticZeitgeist.Yet,sincethesmallerconservativegroupshadbroughttheChristiantradeunionsintotheparty,theDNVPwasaveryheterogeneouspartywithamassfollowing.48ItssocialstructureresembledthewartimeFatherlandPartymorethantheDKP,anditnolongerremainedgeographicallyconfinedtoEastElbianPrussia,butextendeditsreachwellintothemiddleclassesofthelargecitiesofwesternGermany.49Thetransitionfromtheexclusivepoliticalstyleofcliquishnotablestoapeople'spartywithalargeapparatusandamassorganizationhadproceededrelativelysmoothly,sincethegroundworkforthechangehadalreadybeenlaidattheendofthenineteenthcenturywiththepoliticalcampaigningandpropagandizingoftheAgrarianLeague.50Beforethewar,thetwomainconservativepartieshadnoveryelaboratecentralpartyapparatus;thischanged,toacertainextent,withtheDNVP,eventhoughtheparty'sregionalLandAssociationsremainedofcrucialimportance,afactthatwouldlaterworktoHugenberg'sadvantage.51TheDNVP'sindisputableinfluenceonGermansocietyduringtheWeimar

Republictranscendedbyfartheparty'sshareoftheelectorate.Thiswasduetothefactthatlargepartsoftheupperanduppermiddleclasses,thearistocracy,andtheProtestantsectionsoftheprofessionalclassesandeducatedbourgeoisie(Bildungsbürgertum),thatis,themainshareoftheProtestantclergyandofuniversityprofessorsandgrammarschool(Gymnasium)teachers—allofwhomhadcivilservantstatus—aswellassubstantialsectionsofthehighbureaucracyintheReichandLändergovernments,supportedtheDNVPuntil1930.TheReichAssociationofHigherCivilServantswasclosertotheDNVPthantoanyotherparty.52Thosepolitical,social,andreligiousinstitutionsthatwereofcentralimportanceinGermanlifeduringtheWeimarRepublic,suchastheProtestantchurches,universities,theGymnasien,andtheupperechelonsoftheadministrativeandjudicialbureaucracies,werethusinfluencedtoagreaterextentbytheDNVPthanbyanyotherparty.Partsofthelowermiddleclasses,

includingcraftsmen,white-collaremployees(Angestellte),shopkeepers,andtosomeextentfarmers,providedthemassbasisofsupportfortheDNVPbefore1930.53ThediversesetofinterestsrepresentedintheDNVPmightwellhavestymied

themodicumofpartyunitynecessaryforittobecomeasignificantforceinWeimar'spoliticalsystem.Ironically,thegreatcommondenominatorofitsdiversemembershipandsourceofpartyunitywouldbetheirreconcilablehostilitytowardtheverypoliticalsysteminwhichithadtofunctioninordertopursueitsmembers'interests.TheconservativegroupsthatcomprisedtheDNVPsharedacommonanimositytowardtheveryprinciplesonwhichtheWeimarRepublicwasbased.Fromthebeginning,theDNVP'smainpurposewastoorganizecounter-revolutionaryforces:thepartywasvociferousinitsoppositiontodemocracyandthedemocratizationofpoliticallife;ityearnedforareturntotheEmpire,whichhadsignifiedstrength,materialwell-being,andrelativeunityunderauthoritarianleadership,whiletheRepublicstoodfordefeat,revolution,anddomesticstrife.ThisoppositiontoWeimarlayattherootoftheparty'scontradictorypoliciesandinherentpredicament:theDNVPhadtooperateproductivelyinasystemitwassystematicallytryingtoundermine.AbsoluterejectionoftheWeimarRepublicwasthusboundtobecounterproductive.Somemeasureofpracticalcooperationwithotherpartieswithintheconfinesofthenewpoliticalruleswasunavoidableandnecessary,ifonlytosafeguardtheinterestsofthevariousgroupsthatsupportedtheparty.Thedifferenteconomicinterestgroupsclosetothepartyeachhadtheirownagendas:theRuralLeaguefoughtforprotectivetariffs(whichtheDNVPprocuredwhenitentereditsfirstcoalitiongovernment),54whiletheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistantsadvocatedthestrengtheningofsocialservicesforwhite-collarworkers.NoneofthesegoalscouldbeattainedwithoutclosecooperationwithotherpoliticalforceswithintheframeworkoftheState.Inadditiontocraftingoptimalpoliciesfortheirpoliticalclientele,itwas

incumbentupontheDNVPtopreserveconservativeculturaltraditionssothatthoseclassesandoccupationalgroupsthatwereassociatedwiththeparty,suchastheupperechelonsofthebureaucracyandEastElbianlandowners,couldmaintaintheirinfluence.MostinfluentialGermanNationalshadbeenrearedinatraditionofpoliticalpaternalism:theysawthemselvesaspartofapublic-spiritedupperclassworkingcloselywiththegovernmenttofurtherthenationalinterest.Despitetherevolutionaryupheavalsof1918–1919,therootsoftheDNVPintheEmpirethus,toacertainextent,hadpreparedthegroundforapolicyofconstructiveopposition.LeadingDNVPpoliticianscouldnotlongremain

unwillingtocollaboratewithotherpartiesonparticularpracticalmattersinspiteoftheirprincipledcontemptforthepopulist,socialist-oriented,anddivisiveparliamentaryRepublic.Thisinnercontradictionbetweenfundamentalopposition,ontheonehand,andawillingnesstocooperateactivelywithintheframeworkoftheRepublic,ontheother,gnawedawayattheDNVP'sidentityduringthefirstdecadeofitsexistence.TheinherentdilemmaoftheDNVPwasaccentuatedbythefactthattheparty'srigorouslyauthoritarianpoliticalideologystoodinglaringcontrasttothe(new)democraticrulesofpolitics.Weimar'spoliticalsystemdemandedmeasuresandmodesofbehaviorthatrancountertotheDNVP'sraisond'être.OlderDNVPdeputiesconsideredthisneworientationespeciallyreprehensible,foritseemedtocallintoquestiontheirconservativeheritageandmadethepartyappearasanoffshootoftherevolution;whereas,foritsyoungermembers,manyofwhomyearnedtoparticipateinpoliticallife,theparty'sinitialintransigentoppositiontotheRepublicprovedtobeastrain.TheDNVPadvocatedadecentralized,federatedReich,opposedanyfurther

strengtheningofcentralgovernment,stoodforthepreservationofastrongPrussiaandGermancustomsandtraditions,andpromotedanational-minded,Christiansystemofeducation,thestrengtheningofmatrimonyandthefamily,andthesanctityofprivateproperty.In1919,thefirstDNVPpartyconferencepreparedaprogramthatremainedinforceuntil1932,whenitwassupersededbyHugenberg's“FreedomProgram,”theelaborationofwhichhadbeenentrustedtoonlytwodeputies,bothcloselyassociatedwiththePan-GermanAssociation.The“FreedomProgram”highlightedeconomicconcernsandstronglyemphasizedtheparty'soppositiontosocialism,whichwasblamedforruiningtheorganicallygrownconnectionsamongstate,economy,andsociety,andforunderminingtheinstitutionsofthefamilyandlocalgovernment.WrittenatatimewhentheNazishadbecometheDNVP'smostdangerousrivalandwhenGermanNationalvotersweredefectingindrovestotheNSDAP,Hugenberg'sprogramwaspositionedmoreagainsttheNaziparty'sputativesocialismthanthatoftheSPD.Consequently,theDNVPalsocontrasteditsown“individualism”withthepernicioustenetsofsocialism:“soullessmassesofmen,standardizedmasssouls—thatisitsgoal.”55Evenafter1918,Germany'sEastElbianregions,suchasPomerania,East

Prussia,theeasternpartsofBrandenburg,andlowerSilesia,remainedtheelectoralstrongholdsofconservatism.Inthewesternparts,theDNVPdidwellincentralFranconiaandsectionsofSchleswig-Holstein.56IntheelectionsofMay1924,forexample,theDNVPemergedasthestrongestpoliticalforceinEastPrussia;itreceived49.5percentofthevoteinPomerania,40.5inthe

electoraldistrictFrankfurtanderOder(whichincludedmostlytheNeumarkeastoftheOder),38.9intheMarkBrandenburg,30.9inSchleswig-Holstein,and29.9intheLiegnitzelectoraldistrictofLowerSilesia.ThepartywasleastsuccessfulintheelectoraldistrictsofUpperBavaria-Swabia(7.5percent),Koblenz-Trier(7.4),andlowerBavaria(2.9).57Thispictureremainedlargelyunalteredintheelectionsof20May1928.TheregionalstrongholdsoftheDNVPtalliedwiththoseoftheNaziparty.InareaswheretheDNVPwastraditionallymostsuccessful,itlostlargenumbersofvoterstotheNSDAP.MartinBroszathasimpressivelydocumentedthiselectoralchangefromconservativestoNationalSocialists.58IntheconfessionallymixedregionsofsouthernandwesternGermany,wherevotingoftencorrelatedwiththedenominationalcharacterofpoliticalparties,theDNVPalmostbecametheProtestantcounterparttotheCenterParty,thoughitneverquiteachievedsimilarstabilityinvotingpatterns.59InsouthernGermany,thepartyevincedamarkedconfessionalcharacterandinareaswithpronouncedProtestantdiasporas,Protestantmiddle-classminoritiesusuallyvotedfortheDNVP.TheDNVP'spercentageofwomenvotersandmemberswaslargerthanthatofmostotherparties,andthepartyalsoreceivedadisproportionatelylargeshareofruralandsmall-townvotes.60Itwasalsosuccessfulinnonindustrializedcitieswithahighshareofself-employed,salariedemployees,pensioners,andservicepersonnel,whovotedfortheDNVPundertheinfluenceoftheiremployers.61WhilethetotalnumberofDNVPvotersinthewesternpartsoftheReichwaslower,thestabilityoftheirvotingbehaviorwasgreater.HereahighpercentageofbürgerlicheDNVPvotersremainedtruetothepartyoutofhabitandtradition.Inthepartyschismsof1929and1930,theRuralLeague,theChristianSocials,andtheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistantshadsplitfromtheparty,andmembersandsupportersofthesegroupsnolongervotedfortheDNVP.62Onemaythereforeassumethatafter1930itwasprimarilyhighofficials,theportionoftheBildungsbürgertumthathadescapedmaterialdestitution,andapartoftheProtestantbourgeoismiddleclassesthatremainedtruetotheDNVP.IncontrasttotheDKP'sparliamentaryfactionbefore1914,theDNVP

Reichstagfactionsawadefinitedeclineinthepercentageofnobilityandlargelandowners,sincemembersofvölkischsplintergroupsandChristianSocials,whosesupporterscamefromthelowerstrataofsociety,streamedintotheDNVPafterthewar.63After1919,industrialandcommercialinterests,aswellasmembersofoccupationalassociations(Verbände),playedagreaterroleintheDNVPparliamentarygroup.Decliningnumbersofdeputieswhorepresentedagriculturalinterestswerematchedbyanincreaseinthenumberofcivilservants

andrepresentativesofindustryandcommerce.Inthe1920s,aboutone-fifthoftheDNVPReichstagfactioncamefromindustryandcommerce,whilealmosthalfwerecivilservants,includingofficersandmembersofthecloth(Geistliche);eveninMarch1933,civilservantsstillaccountedfor43.8percent,whilethepercentageofleadersofeconomicassociations(Verbandsvorsitzende)fellfrom13.6(1919)to5.7bytheendoftheRepublic.ThedeclinewasduelargelytoAlfredHugenberg,whohadanalmostvisceralaversiontoanykindofinterest-basedpolitics.64AtthehighpointofGermanNationalelectoralsuccessinMay1924,the

DNVPReichstagfactionwascomposedofthirty-fourrepresentativesofagriculture(mostlyestateowners),twenty-one(mostlyhigh-ranking)civilservants,thirteensalariedemployeesandworkers,eightindustrialistsandrepresentativesofbigbusiness,eightmembersoftheprofessions,eightuniversityprofessorsandGymnasiumteacherswithcivilservantstatus,eighttradesmenandartisans,sixformerofficers,andfiveclergymen.65ThenumberofwarveteransandreserveofficersintheDNVPReichstagfactionincreasedduringthecourseoftheRepublic.Whereasafull80percentofthemembersoftheparliamentaryfactionhadnotactivelyservedinthewarin1919(mostlybecauseoftheirage),tensionsbetweentheincreasingnumberofex-servicemenandmembersoftheprewargenerationofrepresentativesintensifiedinthe1920s.66Infact,duringHugenberg'stenureaspartyleader,DNVPdeputiesoftencomplainedthatleadingmembersoftheparty,suchasHugenberghimself,hisconfidantePaulBang,andAxelvonFreytagh-Loringhoven,hadseennoactiveserviceinthewar.67ThesocialcompositionoftheNSDAPparliamentarygroupwasverydifferent:inOctober1932,its230membersconsistedoffifty-fiveworkersandwhite-collaremployees,fiftypeasants,forty-threeself-employed,twenty-ninepartyfunctionaries,thirty-twocivilservants,andnineformerofficers.68IncontrasttotheDNVP,which—despitethesocialheterogeneityofitselectoratebefore1930—neverquitesucceededincastingoffitsimageasaKlassenpartei,theNSDAPwasagenuineIntegrationspartei.69Fromthebeginning,clashesbetweenthetwopartieswereinevitable.While

theDNVPwasoftentorninitsattitudetowardtheRepublic,theNSDAPrejectedWeimarwithuncompromisingradicalism,asepitomizedinGregorStrasser'sbluntdictum:“NationalSocialismistheveryoppositeofwhatwehavetoday.”70IdeologicalconflictswererampantsincetheNazipartywasstronglyanti-bourgeoisinorientation.AlreadyinMeinKampf,Hitlerwrotewithderisivecontemptaboutthe“bourgeoisWahlstimmvieh”(electoralcattle),whosesupportwouldonlywaterdownhismovement,andcriticizedthebourgeoisie's

cowardlybehaviorin1918,aswellasitslackofnationalpride.71DuringtheRepublic'slastyears,opponentsofNazismgleefullyhighlightedtheNSDAP'shatredforthebourgeoisieanditslifestyle,thusunderliningtheincompatibilityofthetwopartiesoftheextremeright.72Finally,GermanNationalsandNazissubscribedtoverydifferentpoliticalstyles,though,beginningin1931,DNVPleadersstrenuouslytriedtoimitateNazimethodsandtechniques.FollowingtheStettinpartycongressinSeptember1931,thepartydecidedtobuildupthehithertoneglectedGermanNationalKampfstaffeln(fightersquadrons),thoughtheirnumbersnevercameclosetorivalingthoseoftheSA.73TheKampfstaffelnreachedtheirgreatestextensionwithabout100,000members74shortlybeforetheywerebannedinMayandearlyJune1933andneverwereaseriousopponentofthemuchbetterorganizedSAwithitsmorethanhalfamillionmembersinFebruary1933.Givenallthesedifferencesandanimosities,whythenwereDNVPleadersandpartsoftheparty'srankandfilestillwillingtoconsideranalliancewiththeNazis?Therewereseveralreasons.ThepatronizingbehaviorofGermanNationalsindicatedtheirviewofNazisasalesssophisticatednationalbrother-in-armswhoneededguidance,evenafterthestrengthoftheNSDAPvastlyexceededtheirown.Intheautumnof1930,aftertheNSDAP'sunexpectedbreakthroughatthepolls,theGermanNationalpressevenspokeofthe“votesofthenationalcamp,”asifNazivotesrightlywerealsotheirown.75ThefactthatNazileadersmadenobonesabouttheirultimategoalswasnotrecognizedbytheDNVP,butratherlightlydismissedasDiktaturspielerei76intheconservativepress.GermanNationalsthuswillfullyunderestimatedandmisjudgedthenatureofNationalSocialism.Intheend,itwasundoubtedlytheopportunitytoentergovernmentandreplacethehatedWeimarRepublicwithamoreauthoritariansystemthatmadeHugenbergandotherDNVPleadersdecideinfavorofacoalitionwiththeNaziparty.Thiswasafatefuldecision,evenfortheDNVP,forjusthowmuchthetwocampswereatloggerheadsbecameevidentonlyinthewinterandspringof1933,whenconflictsthathadlonglaindormantburstoutintotheopen.Finally,anexplanationoftheuseof“conservatives”and“conservative”isin

order.Leaders,members,andsupportersoftheGermanNationalPeople'sPartyaredenotedasconservative,thoughonemightarguethatWestarpwasmoreofatraditionalconservative,whileHugenbergwasaradicalnationalistwhohadlittleofthetraditionalconservativeinhim.IntheNazis'srelationshipwithandstrugglesagainstGermanNationals,suchdistinctionsmatteredlittle.InNazieyesallGermanNationalswereconservativereactionarieswhomtheydespised,eventherabidanti-Semitesamongthem.TherewerefewGermanNationals

HitlerdislikedmoreintenselythanPaulBang,Hugenberg'sStaatssekretärintheMinistryofEconomics,despitethefactthatBangwasadyed-in-the-wool,radicalanti-Semite.TheDNVPisreferredtoasa“conservative”party,eventhoughitincludedremnantsofanti-Semiticsplinterparties,radicalnationalists,and—aswillbeshowninChapterFivebelow—uncompromising,racistanti-Semites.Theterm“conservatives”isthususedinabroadsenseandincludesallshadesoftraditionalandradicalconservatism,sothatthesubtitleofthisbookcouldalsoread:“conservativeGermansandNationalSocialism.”Ifeltthatgettinginvolvedinaquagmireofdefinitionsmightresultinmakingclear-cutstatementsimpossible.InkeepingwithGermancustom,theDNVPisherereferredtoasa“bürgerlichePartei.”Itsaristocraticmembersandleaderswerelimitedinnumberandsignificance.SeveralofthechaptersthatfollowofferadetaileddocumentationofNazi

attacksonGermanNationalorganizations,meetings,andpublicofficeholdersinthewinterandspringof1933.IwouldliketowarnthereaderagainstthetemptationofinterpretingthisassympathetictotheDNVPandGermanconservatismorasanattempttocharacterizeGermanNationalsashelplessvictimsofNaziterror.Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruthorfrommyintentions.HugenbergandmanyofhissupporterswillinglyenteredintoagoverningcoalitionwithHitleranddidso,onemightsay,withtheireyeswideshut.IfNaziaggressionagainstGermanNationalsisemphasizedhere,itisbecauseitoccupiesaprominentplaceinDNVPpartyfiles,notbecauseIintendtoportrayGermanNationalsasco-equalvictimsofNaziterror.Itisatruismthat,asfaraspoliticalconflictwasconcerned,theLeftsufferedincomparablymore.Insofaraspossible,ithasbeenmyintentiontoletthedocumentsspeakforthemselvesinordertoenhanceourunderstandingofthenuancesoftheNaziseizureofpower.

OverviewofContents

Abriefsynopsisofthecontentsofthepresentstudyreadsasfollows:thefirstchapteroutlines,inbroadbrushstrokes,theDNVP'sdevelopmentasitadvancedthroughthethicketofWeimarpartypolitics,fromitsfoundationin1918uptothetransferofpowertoHitleron30January1933.Thoughthischapterwillnotaddsubstantiallytoourfactualknowledge,itoffersthefirstcontinuoushistoryofthepartyfromitsinceptiontotheeveoftheMachtergreifung.Thebook'ssixmainchaptersthenfocusonthetroubledalliancebetweenconservativesandNazisbetween30Januaryand14July1933,whentheone-partystatewaslegallysanctioned.ApartfromexaminingtheinternaldevelopmentoftheDNVPduringthisperiod,thesechaptersanalyzetherapidlychangingZeitgeistofwinterandspring1933thatgreatlyfacilitatedaswiftNazitakeover.ChapterTwodocumentsDNVPpolicybetween30Januaryandtheelectionsof5March1933,thestrugglebetweenthetwonationalpartiesoverwhowouldbethelegitimateheirtothenationalheritage,aswellasthechangingattitudeoftheBürgertumwhich,forfearofCommunism,becameincreasinglysympathetictoNazipoliciesinthewakeoftheReichstagfire.ChapterThreefocusesonthe“revolutionofMarch”followingthatmonth'selections,theNaziterrorthatactedasthelubricantofthisrevolution,andtheDNVP'sreactiontoboth.ChapterFourconcentratesonideologicalconflictsbetweenNazisandtheconservativeestablishment,especiallytheNaziefforttounderminetraditionalhierarchies.ItalsoanalyzesthechangingpublicimageoftheNazimovement,whichincreasinglyportrayeditselfasamassiveprotestagainstbourgeoislifestyles.ChapterFivedealswiththeDNVP'sreactiontotheproliferationofanti-Semiticattacksandanti-SemiticmeasuresinMarchandApril,aswellaswiththeparty'sowninherentanti-Semitism.ChaptersSixandSevencovertheperiodfromearlyApriltotheparty'sdissolutioninJune.Thesetwochaptersexaminethepoliticalclimateinthespringof1933andtheincreasinglyferociousNaziattacksonGermanNationals,whodesperatelytriedtokeeptheallianceintact,atatimewhentheywerelosingtheirlocalstrongholdsofpowertotheNazis.ThelastpartofChapterSevenanalyzesthedissolutionoftheDNVP,whiletheEpilogueoffersanexaminationoftherelationshipbetweenGermanconservatismandNationalSocialisminalargerhistoricalcontext.Asoutlinedabove,thisstudypresentstheperiodoftheseizureofpowerina

newlight.Here,forthefirsttime,thecomplexandcontradictoryrelationshipbetweenNationalSocialism,ontheonehand,andtheDNVPandtheconservativeBürgertum,ontheother,isexaminedwithinalargerpolitical

context,inallofitsmultifacetednuances.Theoriginalityofthebook'ssixmainchaptersliesinthefollowingpoints:(I)thedepictionofNationalSocialism'schangingself-portrayalduringtheseizureofpowerasananti-bourgeois,revolutionarymovement,markedbytheNazis'attempttodiscreditandunderminetheBürgertumandbourgeoisformsoflife;(II)thecomprehensivedocumentationofthecountlessattacksonGermanNationalorganizations,meetings,officeholders,andmembersofthebourgeoisieingeneral;(III)theanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenGermanNationalsandtheJewishcommunity,highlightingtheequivocationoftheDNVPasitsdisparatemembershipgroupsreactedtothe“Jewishquestion”;(IV)theexaminationoftheNazis'usurpationoftheheritageofaconservativePrussianpastandtheirintenttosupplantconservativesasguardiansofthenationalhistory,aphenomenonthatgoesoverandbeyondtheDayofPotsdam;(V)thefocusonthepoliticalclimateoftheagethatclearlyfacilitatedaspeedyNaziarrogationofpowerandexertedsuchpowerfulpressurethatGermanNationalssuccumbedtoit,inpartbyimitatingthestyleoftheirmorepowerfulandsuccessfulally.Ifoneagreeswiththeargumentspresentedhere—theanti-bourgeoisthrustof

NationalSocialism,thecontinuousviolenceagainstallrealandperceivedobstaclesthatcharacterizedtheNazirevolution,theemphasisontheZeitgeistasacatalystofrevolutionaryfervorandpoliticalchange—ourimageoftheMachtergreifungwillrequiremodification.ForaproperunderstandingoftheperiodbetweenHitler'saccessiontotheChancellorshipattheendofJanuary1933andtheestablishmentoftheone-partystateinmidJuly,anappreciationnotonlyofthe“behavioroftheelite,”butalsoofthespecificatmosphereandofpeople's“immenseresentment,...feelings,traditions,hopes,desperation,andhumiliations,”asFritzSternonceputit,77isimperative.TheintentionhereistocapturethismoodasviewedthroughthelensofthetroubledalliancebetweenconservativesandNazis.

1.HenryA.Turner,Hitler'sThirtyDaystoPower.January1933(Harlow,1996)offersthemostdetailedaccount;seealsoMartinBroszat,DieMachtergreifung.DerAufstiegderNSDAPunddieZerstörungderWeimarerRepublik,5thed.(Munich,1994).

2.SeeJohnA.Leopold,AlfredHugenberg.TheRadicalNationalistCampaignagainsttheWeimarRepublic(NewHavenandLondon,1977);DenisP.Walker,AlfredHugenbergandtheDeutschnationaleVolkspartei1918to1930(D.Phil.,Cambridge,1976);HeidrunHolzbach,Das“SystemHugenberg”(Stuttgart,1981);KlausWerneckeandPeterHeller,DervergesseneFührerAlfredHugenberg.PressemachtundNationalsozialismus(Hamburg,1982);RüdigerStutz,DiepolitischeEntwicklungEduardStadtlersvon1918bis1933(Jena,1985).

3.WernerLiebe,DieDeutschnationaleVolkspartei,1918–1924(Düsseldorf,1956);ElisabethFriedenthal,VolksbegehrenundVolksentscheidüberdenYoungplanunddiedeutschnationaleSezession(Diss.Tübingen,1957);JanStriesow,DieDeutschnationaleVolksparteiunddieVölkisch-Radikalen1918–

1922,2vols.(Frankfurt,1981);LewisHertzman,DNVP.Right-wingOppositionintheWeimarRepublic,1918–1924(Lincoln,1963);ManfredDörr,DieDeutschnationaleVolkspartei1925–1928(Diss.Phil.,Marburg,1964);GisbertJ.Gemein,TheDNVPinDüsseldorf(Diss.,Cologne,1968);AnnelieseThimme,FluchtindenMythos.DieDeutschnationaleVolksparteiunddieNiederlagevon1918(Göttingen,1969);HerbertBlechschmidt,DieDeutschnationaleVolkspartei1918–1920(Diss.,Berlin/East,1970);ErikaSchwarz,RivalitätundBündnisindenBeziehungenderDNVPzurNSDAP:Sommer1929bis1933(Diss.,Berlin/East,1977);ReinhardBehrens,DieDeutschnationaleninHamburg1918–1933(Diss.,Hamburg,1973);DankwartGuratzsch,MachtdurchOrganisation.DieGrundlegungdesHugenbergschenPresseimperiums(Düsseldorf,1973);AmreiStupperich,VolksgemeinschaftoderArbeitersolidarität.StudienzurArbeitnehmerpolitikderDNVP,1918–1933(Göttingen,1982);WolfgangRuge,“DeutschnationaleVolkspartei1918–1933,”inDieterFrickeetal.,eds.,LexikonzurParteiengeschichte,vol.II(Köln,1983–1986),476–528;HermannWeißundPaulHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalenunddieZerstörungderWeimarerRepublik.AusdemTagebuchvonReinholdQuaatz1928–1933(Munich,1989);LarryE.Jones,“‘TheGreatestStupidityofMyLife:’AlfredHugenbergandtheFormationoftheHitlerCabinet,January1933,”JournalofContemporaryHistory,27(1992),63–87;ThomasMergel,“DasScheiterndesdeutschenTory-Konservatismus.DieUmformungderDNVPzueinerrechtsradikalenPartei1928–1932,”HistorischeZeitschrift,276(2003),323–368.

4.ThelongarticlebyFriedrichFreiherrHillervonGaertingen,closesttothepresentworkwithrespecttotopicandtimeframe,concentratesexclusivelyontheinternalhistoryanddevelopmentoftheDNVPbetween1928andthedissolutionofthepartyinJune1933,omittingtherelationshipbetweenGermanNationalsandNazis,aswellasthesurroundinghistoricalcontext.FriedrichFreiherrHillervonGaertingen,“DieDeutschnationaleVolkspartei”(hereafter“DNVP”),inErichMatthiasundRudolfMorsey,eds.,DasEndederParteien1933(Düsseldorf,1960),543–652.

5.GeorgBernhard,DiedeutscheTragödie.SelbstmordeinerRepublik(Prague,1933),25.6.ItgoeswithoutsayingthatleftistforcesinGermanyweresubjectedtoincomparablymoresevere

formsofpersecution;thedifferenceinthelevelandseverityoftheviolence,however,doesnotnegatethesignificanceofNaziattacksagainsttheirconservativecoalitionpartner.

7.StanleyPayne,Fascism:ComparisonandDefinition(Madison,1980),180.8.WolfgangWippermann,EuropäischerFaschismusimVergleich,1922–1982(Frankfurt,1983);

WolfgangWippermann,Faschismustheorien.ZumStanddergegenwärtigenForschung,5thed.(Darmstadt,1989);StanleyPayne,AHistoryofFascism,1914–1945(Madison,1995),441–496.

9.Karl-DietrichBracher,WolfgangSauer,GerhardSchulz,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,2nded.(KölnandOpladen,1962).

10.Karl-DietrichBracher,DiedeutscheDiktatur.Entstehung,Struktur,FolgendesNationalsozialismus,7thed.(Berlin,1997),282–335(firsted.1969;Englishtranslation1970).

11.Ibid.,289.12.Theimportanceofdisorderand“revolutionaryviolence”isconsistentlystressedinautobiographies

dealingwiththeperiod.TworecentexamplesareTheodorEschenburg,LetztenEndesmeineichdoch.Erinnerungen1933–1999(Berlin,2000)andSebastianHaffner,GeschichteeinesDeutschen.DieErinnerungen1914–1933,2nded.(Munich,2002).

13.ThepoliticalscientistinBracherwasinterestedinexplaininghowparliamentarydemocracygavewaytototalitariandictatorshiptothepointthattheunderlyingelementofplanninginNaziactionsappearstotakeprecedence,whichmightexplainBracher'slackofinterestinviolence.

14.MartinBroszat,DerStaatHitlers,7thed.(Munich,1978),82–173(firstpublished1969;Englishtranslation,TheHitlerState,1981).

15.HansMommsen,“ZurVerschränkungtraditionellerundfaschistischerFührungsgruppeninDeutschlandbeimÜbergangvonderBewegungs-zurSystemphase,”inWolfgangSchieder,ed.,FaschismusalssozialeBewegung,2nded.(Göttingen,1983),157–181(firstpublishedin1977).

16.Ibid.,158.Mommsenarguesthatthisallianceledto“paralysisofactionandpassivityoftheoldleadershipgroups.”

17.HansMommsen,“NationalSocialism:ContinuityandChange,”inMommsen,FromWeimartoAuschwitz(Princeton,1991),141–163,esp.145.

18.Mommsen,ibid.,152.AlanBullock,Hitler,AStudyinTyranny,rev.ed.(NewYork,1964)andJoachimFest,Hitler.EineBiographie(BerlinandFrankfurt,1973)stressedearlyontherevolutionaryaspectoftheNaziseizureofpower.

19.HansMommsen,“Nachwort,”inDavidSchoenbaum,DiebrauneRevolution(Munich,1980),352–368,esp.356.

20.KlausHildebrand,DasdritteReich,3rded.(Munich,1987),2.Firstpublishedin1979;Englishtranslation,TheThirdReich,1984.

21.Ibid.,108–109.22.Hildebrand,ibid.,165.HildebrandapprovinglyquotesJohnWeiss,TheFascistTradition.Radical

Right-wingExtremisminModernEurope(NewYork,1967),5:“Fascismwasnotthe‘lastgaspofmonopolycapitalism.’Ifanything,itwasthelastgaspofconservatism.”Hildebrandadds:“-ofaconservatismofspecificallyPrussian-Germanvintage,”thatlackedthereformistcapacityofEnglishToryism.

23.GotthardJasper,DiegescheiterteZähmung.WegezurMachtergreifungHitlers1930–1934(Frankfurt,1986);Hans-UlrichThamer,VerführungundGewalt.Deutschland1933–1945(Berlin,1986);NorbertFrei,DerFührerstaat.NationalsozialistischeHerrrschaft1933bis1945,6thed.(Munich,2001).ThefirstGermaneditionwaspublishedin1987;theEnglishtranslationin1993.

24.Amongothers:RichardBessel,PoliticalViolenceandtheRiseofNazism.TheStormTroopersinEasternGermany,1925–1934(NewHavenandLondon,1984);ConanJ.Fischer,Stormtroopers.ASocial,EconomicandIdeologicalAnalysis,1929–1935(London,1983);MathildeJamin,ZwischendenKlassen.ZurSozialstrukturderSA-Führerschaft(Wuppertal,1984);andPeterLongerich,DiebraunenBataillone.GeschichtederSA(Munich,1989).

25.Jasper,DiegescheiterteZähmung,138.SeealsoJasper'seditedcollection,VonWeimarzuHitler,1930–1934(CologneandBerlin,1968).

26.Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,186and232–310.TherevolutionaryelementisalsodiscussedinErnstNolte,“EuropäischeRevolutionendes20.Jahrhunderts.DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifungimhistorischenZusammenhang,”inWolfgangMichalka,ed.,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung(Paderborn,1984),395–410;MartinBroszatetal.,eds.,DeutschlandsWegindieDiktatur.InternationaleKonferenzzurnationalsozialistischenMachtübernahme(Berlin,1983),78–113.SeeparticularlythecontributionbyHorstMöller,whoarguesthattheterm“revolution”characterizestheestablishmentoftheNazidictatorshipbetterthan“Machtergreifung”(p.78).SeealsoHorstMöller,“DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung:KonterrevolutionoderRevolution?”VierteljahresheftefürZeitgeschichte,31(1983),25–51.

27.Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,232.ThamerdrawsattentiontotheimportantfunctionoftheCommunists,whoseveryexistenceandtheperceivedthreattheyrepresentedfrequentlyservedasanexcuseforNaziviolenceagainstallpoliticalopponents.Ibid.,248–253.

28.IanKershaw,TheNaziDictatorship.ProblemsandPerspectivesofInterpretation,4thed.(London,2000),73.StufenderMachtergreifung(Berlin,1974)isalsothetitleofthereprintofBracher'scontributiontoBracher,Sauer,Schulz,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung.

29.Ibid.,238.Thamerusestheword“Taumel,”thoughheunfortunatelydoesnotelaboratefurther.30.Ibid.,245,259.ThefunctionoftheSAisaptlycharacterizedasthatofthe“enginebehind

Gleichschaltung”(p.264).31.Frei,DerFührerstaat,59.32.Ibid.,59.FreiemphasizesthatthetraditionalRighthadalwaysshown“fearofthesocial

revolutionarypotential”oftheNazis(p.44).33.JostDüffler,NaziGermany1933–1945.FaithandAnnihilation(LondonandNewYork,1996;

Germanoriginalpublishedin1992);LudolfHerbst,DasnationalsozialistischeDeutschland,1933–1945.DieEntfesselungderGewalt:RassismusundKrieg(Frankfurt1996).

34.Düffler,NaziGermany,28and35.35.Ibid.,36–37,emphasisadded.36.Forasimilarlineofreasoning,seeDüffler,“DieMachtergreifungunddieRollederaltenElitenim

DrittenReich,”inMichalka,ed.,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,182–194.37.Herbst,DasnationalsozialistischeDeutschland,80–89.38.SaulFriedländer,NaziGermanyandtheJews.TheYearsofPersecution,1933–1939(NewYork,

1997),9–73;IanKershaw,Hitler.1889–1936:Hubris(NewYork,1999),429–483offersasplendidnarrativeaccount;MichaelBurleigh,TheThirdReich.ANewHistory(NewYork,2000),149–198and281–293,providesanextensiveexaminationofanti-Semiticviolence;andRichardJ.Evans,TheComingoftheThirdReich(NewYork,2004),309–390.

39.OnthefoundingoftheDNVPafterthedefeatof1918,seeThimme,FluchtindenMythos,61–107;Liebe,Volkspartei,7–42;Hertzman,DNVP;Peter-ChristianWitt,“EineDenkschriftOttoHoetzschsvom5.November1918,”inVierteljahresheftefürZeitgeschichte21(1973),337–353;PeterFritzsche,“BreakdownorBreakthrough?ConservativesandtheNovemberRevolution,”inLarryE.JonesandJamesN.Retallack,eds.,BetweenReform,ReactionandResistance.StudiesintheHistoryofGermanConservatismfrom1789to1945(Providence&Oxford,1993),299–329.

40.Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,65.41.HansBooms,DieDeutsch-KonservativePartei.PreußischerCharakter,Reichsauffassung,

Nationalbegriff(Düsseldorf,1954),7;EdgarHartwig,“KonservativePartei,”inDieterFrickeetal.,eds.,LexikonzurParteiengeschichte(Köln,1983–1986),vol.III,283–309;JamesRetallack,NotablesoftheRight.TheConservativePartyandPoliticalMobilizationinGermany,1876–1918(Boston,1988);HermannBeck,“TheChangingConcernsofPrussianConservatism,”inPhilipG.Dwyer,ed.,ModernPrussianHistory(London,2001),86–106,andErnst-OttoSchüddekopf,DiedeutscheInnenpolitikimletztenJahrhundertundderkonservativeGedanke(Braunschweig,1951).TheDKPcontinuedtoexistastheKonservativerHauptverein(ConservativeMainAssociation)insidetheDNVPafter1918.

42.Hans-JürgenPuhle,AgrarischeInteressenpolitikundpreußischerKonservatismusimwilhelminischenReich,1893–1914(Hannover,1966).

43.FrederickAandahl,TheRiseofGermanFreeConservatism(Ph.D.diss.Princeton,1955);ThomasNipperdey,DieOrganisationderdeutschenParteienvor1918(Düsseldorf,1961),241–265;MatthiasAlexander,DieFreikonservativePartei1890–1914.GemäßigterKonservatismusinderkonstitutionellenMonarchie(Düsseldorf,2000).TheFreeConservativeParty,which,incontrastto“OldPrussianConservatives”welcomedthecreationofthenewReich,wasalsoreferredtoastheReichsparteioutsidePrussia.

44.PeterPulzer,TheRiseofPoliticalAnti-SemitisminGermanyandAustria,rev.ed.(Cambridge,1988);WernerE.Mosse,ed.,JudenimWilhelminischenDeutschland(Tübingen,1974);HelmutBerding,ModernerAntisemitismusinDeutschland(Frankfurt,1988).OntheBildungsbürgertum,seeUffaJensen,GebildeteDoppelgänger.BürgerlicheJudenundProtestantenim19.Jahrhundert(Göttingen,2005).

45.SeeHelmutGerlach,VonRechtsnachLinks(Zürich,1937);WalterFrank,HofpredigerAdolfStoeckerunddiechristlichsozialeBewegung.2nded.(Hamburg,1935);Retallack,NotablesoftheRight,91–100.

46.RichardS.Levy,TheDownfalloftheAnti-SemiticPoliticalPartiesinImperialGermany(NewHavenandLondon,1975);Berding,ModernerAntisemitismus,86–110.

47.HeinzHagenlücke,DeutscheVaterlandspartei.DienationaleRechteamEndedesKaiserreiches(Düsseldorf,1997).

48.AmreiStupperich,VolksgemeinschaftoderArbeitersolidarität.StudienzurArbeitnehmerpolitikinderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,1918–1933(Göttingen,1982).AccordingtoStupperich,theDNVPreceived2.2millionworking-classvotesintheDecemberelections1924(ibid.,35).

49.Liebe,Volkspartei,16–18.AlmosthalfitsseatsintheNationalAssemblycamefromelectoralconstituenciesinthewest.

50.Puhle,AgrarischeInteressenpolitikundpreußischerKonservatismus;GeoffEley,Reshapingthe

GermanRight.RadicalNationalismandPoliticalChangeafterBismarck,2nded.(AnnArbor,1991).51.In1919,theDNVPhad35LandAssociations;between1924and1928,thenumberrosetoabout

45.Between1922and1928,thepartyhadabout600–700countyassociations(Kreisvereine).Partymembershipfluctuatedbetween300,000and400,000in1919,thenroseto700,000in1922and950,000in1923,beforedecliningto737,000in1924and696,000in1928.Ruge,“DeutschnationaleVolkspartei,”477.

52.RainerFattmann,BildungsbürgerinderDefensive.DieakademischeBeamtenschaftundder“ReichsbundderhöherenBeamten”inderWeimarerRepublik(Göttingen,2001);StephanMalinowski,VomKönigzumFührer.DeutscherAdelundNationalsozialismus,paperbacked.(Frankfurt,2004);DanielR.Borg,TheOld-PrussianChurchandtheWeimarRepublic.AStudyinPoliticalAdjustment,1917–1927(HanoverandLondon,1984),79–80;Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,11–14;Heinrich-AugustWinkler,Weimar,1918–1933.DieGeschichtedererstendeutschenDemokratie(München,1993),289–295.Winkler,inparticular,stressesthealienationofthemajorityoftheBildungsbürgertumfromtheRepublic.

53.Liebe,Volkspartei,15–18;ChristianF.Trippe,KonservativeVerfassungspolitik,1918–1923(Düsseldorf,1995),23–32;Stupperich,VolksgemeinschaftoderArbeitersolidarität;Dörr,“DieDeutschnationaleVolkspartei.”

54.On1January1921,theAgrarianLeaguefusedwiththeDeutscherLandbund(establishedin1919)toformtheReichslandbund(RuralLeague),whichhadaboutfivemillionmembersin1928.

55.Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,23–25;Ruge,“DeutschnationaleVolkspartei,”476–528.56.Ofthe3,121,479votestheDNVPreceivedintheelectionsfortheNationalAssembly,1,251,108

camefromprovinceseastoftheElbe;982,997fromcentralandwesternGermanywestoftheElbe;153,863fromHamburg,Lübeck,Bremen,Mecklenburg,Schleswig-Holstein,andtheRegierungsbezirkStade;and733,511fromsouthernGermany.Liebe,Volkspartei,17and78.

57.SeeJürgenFalter,etal.,WahlenundAbstimmungeninderWeimarerRepublik.MaterialienzumWahlverhalten,1919–1933(Munich,1986),228–229.

58.SeeTable1inAppendix.59.Karl-DietrichBracher,DieAuflösungderWeimarerRepublik,4thed.(Villingen,1964),93.60.Liebe,Volkspartei,130–131.61.Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,29–31.62.Ibid.,31–32.63.Thepercentageofthenobilityfellfrom37.7(1912)to9.1(1919);thatoflargelandownersfrom

49.3(1912)to11.4(1919).Thiswasareflectionofthefactthattheparty'ssocialbasiswascomprisedofawiderspectrumofoccupationalgroupsthanthatoftheprewarDKP.Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,26.

64.Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,26–29.TherewaslittledifferencewiththeDKPfactionwithrespecttodeputies'educationallevel.

65.Liebe,Volkspartei,78–79;deputieswhowerehighadministrativeofficialsandatthesametimelargelandownersarelistedtwice.Shortlybeforetheelections,theNationalLiberalUnionhadswitchedfromtheDVPtotheDNVPafterdisputeswithGustavStresemann.ItsmembersincludedthedeputiesReinholdQuaatz,MoritzKlönne,AlbertVögler,AlfredGildemeister,andJohannBecker.AsaquidproquofortheirpublicappealonbehalfoftheDNVP,KlönneandQuaatzwereassuredsafeseatsontheDNVPpartylistinReichstagelections.

66.HeinrichBrüningrepeatedlystressedthecamaraderieamongdeputieswhohadparticipatedinthewar;seeHeinrichBrüning,Memoiren1918–1934(Stuttgart,1970).

67.Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,28–29.68.Hans-UlrichWehler,DeutscheGesellschaftsgeschichte,1914–1949,vol.IV(Munich,2003),779.69.EberhardKolb,DieWeimarerRepublik,6thed.(Munich,2002),124.Kolbreferredtoitasa

modernIntegrationsparteiandasa“schichtenübergreifende,extremnationalistischeundantimarxistischeMobilisierungspartei”(ibid).

70.“NationalsozialismusistdasGegenteilvondemwasheuteist.”Inaspeechon20October1932;quotedinBracher,Auflösung,108.

71.AdolfHitler,MeinKampf,210thed.(Munich,1936),31,367,375,and595.72.Bundesarchiv(BA)Koblenz,ZSg103,SammlungLauterbach,no.795:NSDAPundBürgertum.73.Ruge,“DeutschnationaleVolkspartei,”476–528,esp.527.74.OnthegrowingimportanceoftheKampfstaffelninspringof1933,seeBAKoblenz,ZSg1,no.

4412,DerNationaleWille,6May1933,246,250;13May1933,264;20May1933,278;3June1933,313;10June1933,327.

75.BAKoblenz,ZSg.103,SammlungLauterbach,no.828:NSDAPandDNVP.AtthesametimeGoebbelswroteinhisAngriff(no.108)thathetookexceptiontobeingmentionedinthesamebreath“withthestinkingdungheapofrottingKlassenparteien,”aclearallusiontotheDNVP.Ibid.

76.“DieBilanzvonBoxheim,”BreisgauerZeitung,1December1931;seealsochapter1below.77.FritzSternasquotedinBroszatetal.,eds.,DeutschlandsWegindieDiktatur,141–142.

ChapterI

PRAGMATISTSVERSUSFUNDAMENTALISTS

TheDNVPintheWeimarRepublic,1918–1933

Fromitsinception,theGermanNationalPeople'sPartywasdividedbetweenprincipledoppositiontotheWeimarRepublic,ontheonehand,andthedesireforpracticalcooperationandparticipationingovernmentalcoalitions,ontheother—aconflictthatwasneverovercomeuntilHugenbergbecamepartychairmanin1928.ThreephasesintherelationshipbetweentheDNVPandtheWeimarRepubliccanbedistinguished:(I)uncompromisingoppositionandhopeforthedemiseoftheRepublicbefore1924,withtentativesignsofareluctantreadinessforcooperation;(II)participationincoalitiongovernmentsandpoliticalcooperationdespiteongoingoppositiontoGustavStresemann'sforeignpolicyduringWeimar's“goodyears”between1924and1928,theDNVP'spoliticallymostsuccessfulperiod;(III)increasinghostilitytowardtheRepublicwiththeaccessionofAlfredHugenbergtothechairmanshipofthepartyinOctober1928.TherejectionofallthatWeimarrepresentedbecameall-pervasive;thisweakenedthepartyanddivideditfurther,whilestrengtheningtheradicalforceswithinit.Inthefirstyearsafteritsformationin1918,theDNVPwasdominatedby

conservativeswhohadservedintheministerialbureaucracyoftheEmpire.DespitetheirprincipledoppositiontotheWeimarRepublic,theirexperienceingovernmentadministrationhadledthemtopursuepracticalsolutionstopoliticalproblems.Giventheirpersonalitiesandlifeexperiences,noneofthesemencouldremainintransigentintheiroppositiontotheRepublic;theythusprovedwillingtoparticipateintheWeimarpoliticalsystemuntilabettersolutioncouldbefound.TheinitialleadershipgroupoftheDNVP,despiteharboringdeepanimositytowardtheprinciplesonwhichWeimarwasbased,wasnonethelessmoderateinorientation,thoughattimesdeceptivelyso.Bycontrast,themembersoftheformerDeutsch-KonservativePartei(GermanConservative

PartyorDKP)whohadjoinedtheDNVP,suchastheparty'sformerparliamentaryfactionleaderKunoGrafvonWestarp,orthoseclosetothePan-GermanAssociation,suchasAlfredHugenberg,stubbornlyemphasizedtheirdisdainfortheRepublicandwerelesswillingtocompromisetheirprinciplesforthesakeofpracticalpolitics.Initially,theyremainedinthebackgroundbecausetheyhadbecometoodiscreditedbytheirexaggeratedannexationistdemandsduringthewar.Duringwartimetheirviewshadbeenconsideredtobeacommendablereflectionofnationalsentiment.Now,inthewakeofdefeat,theyhadbecomeanembarrassingmortgageofapastbestforgotten.Intheshadowofwartimedefeatandlessburdenedbythebaggageofpastannexationistclaims,formerFreeConservativesandChristianSocialsthusinitiallyexercisedgreaterinfluencewithinthepartythantheirrelativestrengthwarranted,especiallyinWeimar'sconstituentNationalAssemblyandintheformulationoftheDNVP'spoliticalprogram.Theleadershipteaminthisfirstphase,whichdeterminedtheparty'scourseintheimmediatepostwarperiod,consistedmainlyofImperialcivilservantssuchasOskarHergt(1869–1967),formerPrussianFinanceMinisterand,sinceDecember1918,thefirstchairmanoftheDNVP;ClemensvonDelbrück(1856–1921),formerFreeConservativeLordMayorofDanzig,PrussianMinisterofIndustryandCommerce,andlaterUndersecretaryofState(Staatssekretär)oftheInteriorfrom1909to1916,whobecameoneofthemajorexponentsoftheDNVPintheNationalAssemblyuntilhisdeathinDecember1921;1ArthurGrafvonPosadowsky-Wehner(1845–1932),DNVPparliamentaryfactionleaderintheNationalAssemblyandoneofDelbrück'spredecessorsasUndersecretaryofStateoftheInteriorfrom1897to1907,whohadmadeanameforhimselfasasocialreformerduringtheEmpire(helefttheDNVPaftertheKappPutschin1920);2andKarlHelfferich(1872–1924),anotherhigh-rankingbureaucrat,financialexpertandbanker,UndersecretaryofStateintheTreasuryDepartmentandtheMinistryoftheInteriorduringthewar,whohadhelpedfinancethewareffortthroughloansinsteadofraisingtaxes,andwhodiedanuntimelydeathinatrainaccidentin1924.3Finally,therewasAdalbertDühringer(1855–1924),judicialreformerofthelatenineteenthcentury,CouncilorattheSupremeCourt(Reichsgerichtsrat)inLeipzig(1902–1915),Baden'sMinisterofJusticein1917–1918,andthencofounderoftheDNVPinBadenin1919.DühringerlefttheDNVPinJuly1922inoppositiontothegrowinganti-SemitismoftheGermanNationalsduringtheso-called“Henning-Wulle”crisisandtheovertapprovalofForeignMinisterRathenau'smurderbyvölkischcircleswithintheparty.4Aftertheattritionthroughdeathorresignationofthisgroupofmoderate

bureaucrats,representativesofvariousinterestgroupsfromindustry,theRuralLeague(Reichslandbund),andtheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistantsbecameincreasinglyinfluentialwithintheDNVP.Thissecondphaseintheparty'shistorywasusheredinbytheelectionsof4Mayand7December1924inwhichthepartyreachedthezenithofitssuccessbygainingapproximatelyone-fifthofallvotescast.Subsequently,theDNVPparticipatedtwiceincoalitiongovernments,inwhichitsdeputiesheldanumberofministerialpositions.5Uponassumingthesegovernmentalposts,theDNVPMinisterswereobligedtotakeanoathtotheWeimarConstitution,therebytyingthepartymorecloselytotheRepublic.Despiteitscooperationineconomicandfinancialmatters,theDNVPprovedlessamenablewhenitcametoforeignpolicyandsabotagedStresemann'sconductofforeignaffairswheneverpossible,6inparticularsinceitsmembersconsidereditaselloutoftraditionalGermanintereststoeffectarapprochementwiththeWest.Followingthenot-unexpectedelectiondefeatof20May1928,inwhichtheDNVP'sshareofthevotefellfrom20.5percentto14.7(from6.206to4.381millionvotescast)anditsReichstagfactionshrankfrom103to73seats,KunoGrafvonWestarpwasforcedtoresignfromthepositionofpartychairman.HewasreplacedinOctober1928byAlfredHugenberg,whosecandidacywaschampionedbythePan-GermanAssociation,andwhowasstronglysupportedbytheDNVPLandAssociations(Landesverbände),whichhadalwaysbeenmorefundamentalistintheiroutlookthantheparliamentaryfactionintheReichstag,andoverwhichHugenbergexertedsomemeasureofcontrolthroughhisfinancialresourcesandgrowingascendancyoverthepartyapparatus.WithHugenberg'saccessiontotheleadership,thenationalisthotheadswithin

theDNVP,whohadalwaysopposedtheRepublicwithimplacablehostility,gainedtheupperhand.ModerateswithintheDNVP,mindfuloftheneedtocometotermswiththeRepublicinordertowieldatleastamodicumofpoliticalinfluence,wereincreasinglypushedtothefringes.ThisgrowinginfluenceoffundamentalistsattheexpenseofpragmatistswouldsoonleadtotwomajorschismsintheDNVPReichstagfactionandfurthercatastrophicelectiondefeats.After1929,theuncompromisinganti-RepublicancoursepursuedbyHugenberginexorablybroughttheDNVPintoclosercontactwithitsstrongerandmorevitalrival,theNaziparty.

TheDNVPduringtheEarlyRepublic(1920–1924)AlreadyduringtheKappPutschofMarch1920,theDNVPwasforcedtoshow

itstruecolorsandindicatewhetheritwaswillingtofollowuponitshostileattitudetotheRepublicwithcorrespondingdeeds.WolfgangKapp,theEastPrussianGenerallandschaftsdirektor,7sonofawell-knownrevolutionaryof1848,whohadmadeanameforhimselfasafounderoftheFatherlandPartyin1917,triedtooverthrowtheRepublicthroughamilitarycoupinMarch1920.ThecoupwassparkedbyAllieddemandsforareductionofReichswehrforcesandthedissolutionoftheFreikorps(FreeCorps),sincemanyrightistsfearedthatfulfillmentofthesedemandsmightexposeGermany'seasternprovincestoBolshevikinvasion.8SupportforKappwasconsequentlystrongestamongthepopulationsofSilesiaandEastPrussia,tothepointthateventheSocialDemocraticprovincialgovernor(Oberpräsident)ofEastPrussia,AugustWinnig,recognizedKapp'snewgovernment.9KunoGrafvonWestarpandothermembersoftheDNVP'srightwingknewaboutthepreparationsandwerereadytosupportthecoup.SinceGeneralWalthervonLüttwitz,themilitaryleaderoftherevolt,actedbeforeKapphadmadethenecessarypoliticalarrangements,manyofthosewhomighthaveparticipatedundermoreadvantageouscircumstancesnowexercisedrestraint,sothattheputschwasdoomedtofailurefromthestart.TheDNVPleadershipadvisedagainstparticipationintheputschfromthebeginning,whilethepartymanager,HansErdmannvonLindeiner-Wildau,wentsofarastoalertthePrussianofficialHerbertvonBergertotheincreasingunrestinsidetheReichswehron8March1920,awarningclearlyaimedatprovidingtheDNVPwithanalibiincasethecoupattemptfailed.10Thishadlittleeffectinitself,sincevonBergerhadalreadybeenapprisedofunrestinthearmyandchosetodonothingaboutit.11Insidetheparty,Lindeiner'sinitiativegaverisetosharpcriticism,sinceapartofthemembershipconsideredamilitarycoupagainsttheRepublic,accompaniedbyapossiblerestorationofthemonarchy,asanauspiciousnewbeginning.FormerFreeConservativesandChristianSocialssupportedpartychairmanOskarHergt'sattemptstoprevailuponGeneralLüttwitztoexercisecaution,whereasmostvölkischandformerDKPmembersconsideredanoverthrowoftheRepublicagoalworthfightingfor.12Sincefewleadingfiguresofitsrightwing,mostlyEastElbianestateowners,hadopenlysupportedtheKappPutsch,theDNVPasawholeoutwardlysucceededinavoidingtheimpressionofopencomplicityintheeventsofMarch1920.Ontheotherhand,WolfgangKapphimselfwasaDNVPmemberandwellconnectedinpartycirclesbyvirtueofhisactivitiesasfounderandchairmanoftheFatherlandParty.GottfriedTraub,forexample,amemberoftheDNVP'sexecutivecommittee,whohadbeenadeputyintheNationalAssemblyandhadalsoservedontheexecutiveboardoftheFatherlandParty,

hadbeenappointedMinisterofCultureduringtheputsch.13AfterthewretchedfailureofKapp'sattemptedcoupandthevirtually

unanimouspubliccondemnationoftheundertaking,Hergt(whohadpersonallybeenagainsttheputsch)andthepartyleadershiptookgreatpainstodistancethemselvesfromthewholeaffair.Amongthewiderpublic,however,theimpressionprevailedthatthepartyhadbeenmoredeeplyentangledthanitleton.IntheReichstagelectionsof6June1920,theDNVPwassubsequentlypunishedforitsputativeinvolvement,insofarasasubstantialsectionoftheelectoratethatvotedfortheGermanPeople'sParty(DVP)mightwellhaveoptedfortheDNVP,hadnotsuspicionoftheparty'scomplicityintheputschpreventedthemfromdoingso.14AcrimoniousintrapartyargumentsbetweenmoderateconservativesandthemoreradicalmembersoftheformerDKP,theanti-Semiticparties,andPan-Germansensued.Inthewakeoftheseconflicts,agroupofformerFreeConservatives,ledbySiegfriedvonKardorff,defectedtotheDVP.15AfterJune1920,weakWeimarcoalitiongovernmentsconfrontedanewly

rousedandincreasinglyactiverightistopposition,whichhadnoqualmsaboutopenlyshowingitscolors.InsidetheDNVP,fundamentalistradicalsweregaininggroundovermoderates,aprocessaidedbythegallopinginflationof1921and1922.Inparticularthevölkischwingbegantoconsolidateitsinfluenceduetotheinfluxofimpoverishedcraftsmen,farmers,white-collaremployees,andagrowingacademicproletariat.Supportersofprewaranti-Semiticparties,whohadfoundapoliticalhomeintheDNVP,nowpressedforfurtherradicalization.Thepartyleadership,however,wasdeterminednottoabandonthepathoflegality.JoltedbytheKappPutsch,itwasawareofthedangerofradicalizationandpreparedtocounteritbyallavailablemeans.Theinevitableinner-partycrisisoverthefuturecourseoftheDNVP,foughtoutin1922,resultedintheexpulsionoftheanti-Semiticwing.TheshowdownwastriggeredoffbyavenomousarticleaboutWaltherRathenaupublishedbytheDNVPReichstagdeputyWilhelmHenning,amemberoftheparty'svölkischwing.16ThepublicationofthisarticlevirtuallycoincidedwithRathenau'smurderon24June1922,whichpromptedChancellorJosephWirth(CenterParty)todemandthatHergtpurgetheDNVPofradicalelementstoavoidhavingthepartyasawholesuspectedofsanctioningpoliticalmurder.WhenHenning,supportedbyReinholdWulleandAlbrechtvonGraefe,respondedtopossibleexpulsionfromthepartywithasharpattackonthepartyleadership,anintrapartyconfrontationhadbecomeinevitable.TheDNVP's1920partyprogramincludedanexplicitlyanti-Semiticpassage,

andanti-Semiticattitudeswerewidespreadwithintheparty,especiallyintheLandAssociations.17Initiallyanti-SemitesintheDNVPwereintentondominatingtheentireparty,whereasthefoundationofaseparatevölkischpartywasenvisagedasalastresort.Toorganizeallthosewithvölkischconvictions,a“Germanvölkischstudygroup”wassetupwithintheDNVPinearlySeptember1922withthegoalof“forestallingtheimminentdangerofanexodusofvölkischelementstootherpoliticalparties.”18Aninterestingexampleofthecross-fertilizationbetweentheDNVPandthevölkischNazipartywastheelectionofWilhelmKube(wholaterbecamenotoriousasoneofthemoreinfamousNaziGauleiter)totheexecutiveboardofthis“Germanvölkischstudygroup.”19TheconflictprovokedbytheHenning-Wulleaffairnowcreatedawelcomeopportunityforthepartyleadershiptocutradicalanti-Semitesinthepartydowntosize,particularlysinceitwasobviousthattheirradicalismwasharmingtheDNVPasawhole.Thus,attheOctober1922Görlitzpartyconference,theconfrontationwithanti-Semiteswashighontheagenda.Theywerequicklythrownonthedefensive,sincepartychairmanHergtandothermoderatepartynotables,suchasOttoHoetzsch,20dominatedproceedingsattheconference.WhenGrafWestarpcamedownonthesideofthepartyleadership,thediewascast:Henning,Graefe,andWullelefttheDNVPandfoundedtheGermanVölkischFreedomPartyinDecember1922.Afterexpellingtheextremeanti-Semites,itappearedthattheDNVPasa

wholemightbeabletoplayamoreconstructiveroleinWeimarpolitics,despitetheprincipledoppositionofmanyofitsmemberstotheRepublic.Thisoppositionwouldcontinuetobubbletothesurface,however,whenitservedtheparty'sinteresttosidewithadefiantpublicovermattersofnationalsecurityandforeignpolicy.Thegreatcrisesof1923—theFrenchoccupationoftheRuhr,Germanpassiveresistancetotheoccupation,separatistmovementsinwesternGermany,inflation,thewidelypublicizedactivitiesofFrenchmilitarycourtsagainstGermanswhodefiedtheoccupier,communistunrest,andall-pervasivepoliticalinstability—thusreinforcedanti-RepublicantendencieswithintheDNVP.StrengthenedbyinternalconsolidationafterGörlitz,theDNVPadvocatedintensificationofresistanceintheRuhr,cessationofreparationpayments,andoppositiontotheterminationofpassiveresistanceadvocatedbytheStresemanngovernment.Yet,withinayear,politicalconditionsandthecompellingforceofeconomicinterestswouldenjointheDNVPtoabandonpoliciesdictatedpurelybyideologyandtofallinwiththepoliticalmainstream.

TheDawesPlanAfterthedisastersoftheinflation,theAlliedReparationsCommissiontriedtodeviseaplantoestablishafeasiblelevelofreparations,whilemakingsurethattheGermanbudgetremainedbalancedandthecurrencystabilized.TheDawesPlan,conceivedtoachievethesegoals,waspredicatedonGermany'seconomicrecoveryandthecountry'sactualabilitytopay.Paymentswouldbeginattherelativelylowlevelofonebillionmarks,anamountthatwouldbeincreasedto2.5billionafter1928.Inaddition,theDawesPlanpromisedtheissuingofanAmericanloandesignedtohelptheGermaneconomygetbackonitsfeet.21Theplan,announcedtothepublicatthebeginningofApril1924,providedacentralcampaignthemefortheMay1924elections.Fromtheverybeginning,theDNVPcameoutstronglyagainstthePlan,whichitlabeleda“secondVersailles,”objecting,inparticular,tothemortgagingoftheReichsbahn,thesurrenderofGermansovereigntyrights,andtheconcomitant“enslavementprocess.”TheDNVP'ssuccessintheelections(5.7millionvotesand95mandates)appearedtovindicatethiscampaignstrategy.22Subsequently,GermanNationalsdrewupa“Seven-PointProgram,”thefulfillmentofwhichwouldconstituteapreconditionfortheparty'sendorsementoftheplan.23EventhoughtheassentoftheSPD,Center,DDP,andDVPhadbeensecured,thepassingoftheDawesPlanrequiredatwo-thirdsmajorityofthosevotingintheReichstagbecausetheplanwouldalterthestatusoftheReichsbahn.TherequisitenumberofvotescouldnotbeattainedwithouttheDNVP.ButGermanNationalshadnailedtheircolorssofirmlytorejectionthatitwasnowimpossibleforthemtomodifytheirpositionwithoutlosingface.Shortlybeforethedecisivevoteon20August1924,thefaction'sforeignpolicyspokesmanOttoHoetzschreaffirmedtheparty'sdisapproval,sincenoneofthesevenpointshadbeenmetduringtheDawesPlandeliberationsattheLondonconference.Hisdeclarationwassupportedbythecategorical“no”oftheentireDNVPReichstagfaction,andfurtherbuttressedbytheequallyuncompromisingpositionofDNVPLandandKreis(county)Associations.24Itwasatthispoint,whenthefateoftheplanseemedvirtuallysealed,thattheinfluenceofindustrialandagriculturalpressuregroupsmadeitselffelt.BecauseofexpectedforeignloansresultingfromtheDawesPlan,bothRhenishindustryandtheReichslandbund,whichcouldexertdirectinfluenceonfifty-twoGermanNationaldeputies,pushedforacceptance.25AgriculturewasindesperateneedoffundsandRuralLeaguesintheoccupiedwesternterritoriespushedhardforacceptanceoftheLondon

agreement,whileEastElbianLeaguescontinuedtobidetheirtime.InordertogivethoseDNVPdeputiesorganizedintheReichslandbundthepossibilitytorepresentagriculturalinterests,thepartyleadershiprefrainedfromimposingpartydisciplineonthefactionandallowedafreevote,especiallysincetheChristianSocialwingoftheunionmovementandtheaffiliatedAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistantshademphaticallyrecommendedacceptance.Fearofmassunemploymentweighedmoreheavilythanadherencetoabstractprinciples.Atthesametime,PresidentFriedrichEbertleftnodoubtthathewoulddissolveparliamentandcallfornewelectionsiftheplanfailedtopass.ForGermanNationals,whowouldthenstandaccusedofsabotagingforeignloans,thismeantpossiblemassdesertionsoftheirurbanandruralelectorate.26TheDawesPlanvoteon29August1924was“oneofthemostdramatically

movingvoteseverexperiencedintheGermanReichstag,sincethefinalresultremaineduncertainuptotheverylastminute.”27TheambiguityandvacillationoftheDNVPfactionhadmeanwhilebecomegeneralknowledge,despiteallprotestationstothecontrary.SincethefateoftheDawesPlanwouldstandorfallwiththeGermanNationalvotes,tensionreacheditsheightatthebeginningoftheReichsbahnlawdiscussions,forwhichdeputieshadtodispensewithanonymityandvotebyname.28AstheVossischeZeitungreported,initiallyallthatcouldbeseenintheDNVPfactionwerered“no”ballots;itwasonlytowardtheendofthevotingprocessthatwhitecards(signalingassent)begantoappearinincreasingnumbers.Twohundredninety-four“yes”voteswereneededforatwo-thirdsmajority;alltold,314“yes”voteswereregistered.ThedivisionwithintheDNVPovertheDawesPlanvotemarkedaturning

pointinthehistoryoftheparty:fifty-twohadstucktotheir“no”vote,butforty-eightDNVPdeputiesvoted“yes”;threedeputies(amongthemAlfredHugenberg)werefurloughedduetoillness,andtwowereabsentwithoutleave.WhilethemajorityofdeputiesfromEastElbianregions(thestrongholdoftheformerDKP)heldfasttotheirunflinchinglynegativeattitude,andmostoftheturncoatscamefromwesternelectoraldistricts,prominentnamessuchasvonBismarck,OttoHoetzsch,vonKeudell,vonRichthofen,vonTirpitz,andMaxWallrafwereamongtherenegades.Themortificationoftheparliamentarygrouponaccountofmanydeputies'suddenchangeofheart,heightenedbythefactthatSocialist,Communist,andNaziparliamentariansfreelyheapedscornandmockingderisionupontheDNVP,wassurpassedbythedismayoftheDNVPpartyorganizationandrankandfilemembership.DNVPLandAssociationsinnorthernandeasternGermanypubliclyattackedthepartyleadershipandReichstagfaction,whileresignationletterstoEastElbianAssociationsarrivedin

droves,demandingthatthe“yesmen”resigntheirmandates.29ThereactionfromPan-Germans,whohadalwaysbeenintentonturningtheDNVPintoatowerofanti-Republicanstrength,wasespeciallyacrimonious.Theydeprecatedpoliticsbasedoneconomicinterestssincethiswouldrendercooperationwithpro-RepublicanpartiesinevitableandcorrupttheveryprinciplestheDNVPrepresented.30AfterthedisasteroftheDawesPlanvote,Pan-GermansthusdecidedtoconsolidatetheirinfluenceinLandandKreisAssociationsbymarshallingforcesbehindtheircandidateforthepartyleadership,AlfredHugenberg.31Thoughweakintermsofsheernumbers,theinfluentialPan-GermanAssociationhadmanifoldconnectionstooccupantsofkeypositionsinthedecentralizedpartyorganizationandcouldtherebyexerciseconsiderableleverageovertheselectionofReichstagdeputies.In1927thePan-Germanleader,Justizrat(judicialcouncilor)HeinrichClaß,bluntlyaffirmedthatitwashisintentiontomobilizetheDNVPpartyorganizationagainsttheparliamentaryfactiontomakesurethatonlythosewhohadtoedthepartylinewouldbesupportedintheparty'sselectionforits1928Reichstaglist.32ProtestfromtheranksofformerDKPmemberswasequallyvociferous:Westarp'sliterarybequestcontainslettersfromformerbrothers-in-armsthatcharacterizedeputieswhovotedfortheDawesPlanastraitorstothenation.33Theconflict,nascentwithintheDNVPsinceitsfoundation,betweenpragmatistsreadytoworkwithintheconfinesoftheRepublic(ifonlytosafeguardtheirowninterests)andfundamentalistswhoperseveredintheirprincipledoppositiontoWeimar(regardlessofwhatwasatstake)haderuptedovertheDawesPlanvote.AfterAugust1924itbecameevidentthattherewasanongoing(iflatent)battlebetweenthepartyorganizationandReichstagfaction,aswellasinsidetheDNVPReichstagfactionitself.Discordwouldcontinuetosmolderuntil,byappointingHugenbergpartychairmaninOctober1928,theissuewasfinallydecidedinfavorofuncompromisingoppositiontoWeimar.

FromtheDawesPlantoHugenberg(1924–1928)TheshocktotheconservativerankandfileoccasionedbyrenegadesvotingforDawesPlanacceptancemarkedaturningpointinthehistoryoftheDNVPsinceitgalvanizedtheparty'srightwingintoaction.Itsmembersweredeterminedtoavoidasecond“betrayal”ofprinciplesatanycost.CriticismatoncefocusedonHergt'sleadershipstyle:radicalforceswithintheparty,andtheinfluentialLandAssociationsofPomerania,EastPrussia,andSchleswig-Holstein,unitedindemandinghisresignation.34Atan18September1924meetingofDNVPLand

Associationchairmen(whodemandedhisresignation),HergtconsentedtorelinquishthepartyleadershipifnegotiationsoverDNVPparticipationingovernmentweretobreakdown.Whenthefailureofthesetalksbecameapparent,Hergtresignedon23October1924bothasDNVPchairmanandleaderoftheReichstagfaction.35InitiallyGrafWestarpwasconsideredthemostlikelysuccessor,givenhisstrongpositionamongformerEastElbianDKPmembers.Yet,sinceanimmediateelectionofanewpartychairmanprovedimpossible(therelevantpartyagencywasunabletomeetbeforetheendoftheyear),atemporarysolutionwasdecidedupon,andthechairmanofthePrussianLandtagparliamentaryfaction,FriedrichWinckler,wasappointedasinterimchairman.36Thishadtheadvantageofkeepingthepartyunitedfortheelectionsof7December1924andavoidingfurtherintrapartyclashes.FriedrichWincklerwasreconfirmedinhispositionaspartychairmanon21February1925andwassupersededbyWestarponlyon24March1926.37Inthecampaignleadinguptotheelectionsof7December1924,theDNVP

presenteditselfevenmoreradicallythanbefore,whilepreservingitsemphasisontraditionandthestatusquo:“Ourpartyremainsasitwas:monarchistandvölkisch,Christianandsocial.Ourgoalsremainthesameasourname:Germanandnational.Ourgloriouscolorsremainblack,white,andred;ourresolutionisfirmerthanever:tocreateaGermanyfreeofJewishcontrolandFrenchdomination,freefromparliamentaryintrigueandthepopulistruleofbigcapital.”38AsareactiontothevotingbehaviorintheDawesPlanballot,theinfluenceofmoderateelementswascurtailed,sincetheparty'srightwinginsistedonchoosingitsowncandidatesanddiditsbesttopreventthenominationofformer“yesmen”whendrawinguplistsofparliamentarycandidates.Theelectionresultsweresurprisinginthatexpectedlossesfailedtomaterialize.InabsolutenumberstheDNVPevengainedvotes(6.2millionintotal;and,inunionwiththeLandbund,111seats);relativetothestrengthofotherparties,however,theelectionwasasetback,sincetheSPDagainbecamethestrongestpoliticalforce(131seats).PartiesthathadsupportedtheDawesPlan,suchastheCenter,DVP,andDDP,gainedvotes,whilethosethathadopposedit(KPDandNazis)lostground.Aftertheelections,ChancellorWilhelmMarxwasreplacedbyHansLuther,

underwhoseleadershiptheGermanNationalsfinallysucceededinattainingtheirlong-covetedinclusionina“bourgeoisbloc”coalitiongovernment,comprisedoftheDNVP,DVP,CenterParty,andBayerischeVolkspartei(BavarianPeople'sParty,orBVP—theBavarianoffshootoftheCenterParty).39Participationingovernment,anissuethathadbeenthesubjectoffiercedebate

withinpartycircles,appearedtoanchortheDNVPmorefirmlyintheRepublic,sincegovernmentalparticipationimpliedatleasttacitendorsementofWeimar'spoliticalsystem.Realitywouldprovemorecomplex.ThoughtheDNVPmanagedtopushthroughpoliciesthatreflectedtheinterestsofthepartybase,tensionbetweenpragmatistsandfundamentalistsagaineruptedintoopenconflictwhennationalsecurityissueswereatstake.WhileparticipationingovernmentcompelledsomeDNVPmemberstoadoptamoremoderatestance,theinevitableneedtocompromiseonprinciplesinfuriatedfundamentalistswithintheparliamentaryfactionandLandAssociations.Duringtheirten-monthstintaspartofthecoalition,theDNVPassumedaleadingroleinsupportingprotectivetariffsforagricultureandintheallianceofindustrialinterestsdirectedagainstanyfurtherextensionofwelfarebenefits.40Thepartysuccessfullychampionedthereintroductionofagrariantariffs(basedonthe1902Bülowtariff),whichwererepresentedasanationalexigencytoprotectEastGermanagriculturefromcheapimportsfromSlaviccountries.41TheDNVPhadamoredifficulttimeadoptingastanceonforeignpolicyissuesthatwouldsatisfybothitscoalitionpartnersanditsrestivepartyorganization.Evenaspartofgovernment,theDNVPprovedunrelentinginitsstruggleagainstStresemann'sforeignpolicy,duetopressurefromitsLandAssociations.ControversyovertheLocarnoTreaty—inwhichtheReichrenouncedanyclaimsonAlsace-LorraineandagreedtorecognizethedemilitarizedstatusoftheRhineland—wasthusinevitable.NeverhadthechasmbetweenGermanNationalCabinetministers,whofavoredacceptanceofLocarno,andthepartyorganization,whichvehementlyrejectedit,beendeeper.On23October1925theDNVPexecutivecommitteeandchairmenofitsLandAssociationsdeclaredthattheLocarnoTreatywasunacceptable.ResistancefromtherankandfilemembershiptoLocarnowasenormous,andLandandKreisAssociationswereinundatedwiththreatsofiratepartymemberstoresign.ByratifyingtheTreaty,criticsargued,thegovernmentacquiescedinthe“robbery”ofGermanterritory.42TheDNVPReichstagfaction(againsttherecommendationofDNVPCabinetministers)hadalreadydecidedthatthepartyshouldwithdrawfromthecoalitionbecauseofLocarno,andattheendofOctober1925theDNVPresignedfromthebourgeoisblocgovernment.LocarnomadeitclearthatfundamentalistswithintheDNVPweregainingthe

upperhandoverproponentsofamorepragmaticapproach.IncontrasttotheDawesPlanfiasco,GermanNationalsthistimeweredeterminedtopreserveaunitedfronttotheoutside.43SincetheLocarnoTreatydidnotrequireconstitutionalchanges,theyweresparedthedilemmatheyhadfacedoverthe

DawesPlan:GermanNationalscouldvoteunanimouslyagainsttheTreatyandstillbecertainthatitwouldpass,sinceatwo-thirdsmajoritywasnotrequiredforacceptance.Thisbackandforthbattlebetweenfundamentalists,whohadprevailedoverLocarno,andpragmatists,whocontinuedtopushformoderation,wouldcontinuetohavereverberationsfortheDNVPandthenatureofpartypoliticsingeneral.OneimportantinterestgroupwithintheDNVPthathadopposedthedecisiontoleavethebourgeoisblocgovernmentinOctober1925wastheRuralLeague.SincetheDNVP'sresignationfromgovernmenthadbeenbasedsolelyonaforeignpolicyissue,manyclosetotheRuralLeagueconcludedthattheirinterestswerebeingneglectedandgraduallybegantodistancethemselves(albeitwithregionalvariations)fromtheDNVPbeforethe1928elections.44TheperceptionthatorganizedinterestswerelosinginfluenceindeterminingpolicywasfurtheredbythegrowingpowerwieldedbyAlfredHugenberg'smediaempire,whichhadprovedtobeofdecisiveimportanceintheagitationagainsttheLocarnoTreaty.WithHugenberg'shelp,apoliticsofpureideologyhadprevailedoverthepoweroforganizedinterests,whichhadstillbeendecisiveintheDawesPlanvote.LocarnothusmarkedafirstattemptbyfundamentaliststomoldthepartyintoanideologicallyconsistentblocaboveparticularinterestsandtocreateanewdominantpartylinethatmadeitobligatorytoconsiderintransigentoppositiontoRepublicangovernmentsanationalduty.InJanuary1927,theGermanNationalsre-enteredgovernmentwithfour

ministerialportfolios.45TheDNVP'sparticipationinthegoverningcoalitiondidnotgetofftoagoodstart,sincetheextensionoftheRepublikschutzgesetz(LawfortheProtectionoftheRepublic),duein1927,wasboundtobringtheDNVPintoconflictwithitsownprinciples.Thelawhadbeenadoptedoriginallyforafive-yearperiodasareactiontothemurderofWaltherRathenauandwasthusclearlydirectedagainstthepoliticalRight.Article23aofthelawalsoprohibitedthereturnoftheEmperortoGermany,aprovisionanexplicitlymonarchistpartymightfinddifficulttosquarewithitsarticlesoffaith—therestorationofthemonarchywas,afterall,acentraltenetoftheDNVP.Yet,whentheparliamentaryfactionvotedtoprolongthelawwithvirtuallynomajormodifications,itbecameclearthatasignificantpartofeventheparty'sEastElbiansupportersnolongerconsideredtherestorationofthemonarchyviable.46AtthenextpartycongressinKönigsberg,partychairmanGrafWestarpattemptedtoglossovercontradictionsbetweenGermanNationalprinciplesandthevotingbehaviorofsomeofitsmembers.47WestarpstressedthattheextensionoftheRepublikschutzgesetzinnowayconstitutedanendorsementof

therepublicanformofgovernment:nowasbefore,theDNVPwasopposedinprincipletotheRepublikschutzgesetz,butnonethelessconsidereditaneffectivemeasuretosuppresstheextremeLeft,especiallytheKPD.GrafWestarpwouldnotbeabletoplayhisprecariousbalancingactformuchlonger.InOctober1927,thestillextantbutnowfunctionlessDKP,whichcontinuedtoexistintheformofaKonservativerHauptvereinwithintheDNVP,issuedaresolutionthatdenouncedtheWeimarconstitutionasaproductofthebetrayaloffaithandtreasonagainstthenation.Westarpwascompelledtoreactandcomeoutclearlyfororagainsttheresolution.Inhiswrittenresponse,inwhichhedistancedhimselffromtheattacksagainsttheRepublic,Westarparguedthathistoricallyoutdated,ideologicalformulaswereoftenmajorobstaclestosuccessfulpolicies.Hestressedthattherealizationofpoliticalgoalsrequiredrealisticjudgmentsanddecriedthefactthatmanydoctrinaireconservativesinsistedonusingideologicalpronouncementsandprofessionsofintransigentprinciplesasasubstituteforthegive-and-takeofpracticalpolitics,whichresultedintheirinabilitytoappraisepolicymattersinadown-to-earth,realisticway.48Thesetensionsbetweenideologicalclaimsandpoliticalreality,underwhich

thepartylaboredduringthetwoperiodsitformedpartofaWeimargoverningcoalition,oftenmanifestedthemselvesincontradictorypoliciesandapublicimagethatlackedconsistency.Asaresult,GermanNationalshadalienatedmanyoftheirmiddle-classsupporters,towhomtheyowedelectoralsuccessin1924.Lossesinthenextelectionwerethereforewidelyanticipated.TheDNVP'sseesawingbetweentheirprofessedprinciples,ontheonehand,andpoliticalexpediency,ontheother,hadalsoincreaseddisaffectioninsidetheparty.Conflictsbetweenmostlyyoungerconservatives,whowerepreparedtocollaborateinWeimarpolitics,andPan-GermanandformerDKPmembers,whoconsideredtheirownunbendingoppositionalstanceasasourceofstrengthandrejectedparticipationingovernmentasdetrimentaltoGermanNationalinterests,hadintensifiedintheyearsafter1924.Intheelectionsof20May1928,theDNVPlostthirtyseatsandalmost2

millionvotes,adefeatthatdiscreditedWestarp'shalfheartedattemptstosteeracourseoflegalityandparticipateingoverningcoalitions.EventhoughpartymoderatesblamedtheexcessivenationalistrhetoricofthePan-Germansforelectoraldefeat,itwasclearthatnowthehouroftriumphforradicalelementswasathand.Since1924,Pan-GermanshadradicalizedpoliticaldiscoursewithintheDNVPandrenderedthepartyincreasinglyincapableofcompromise.AsineveryWeltanschauungsparteithatispervadedanddominatedby“politicalfaith”anddogma,itwaseasyforideologicaldiehardstovilifyrealistsas“lukewarm”andinjurioustopartyinterests.TheregionalDNVPLandAssociations,which

enjoyedconsiderableinfluenceonfinancialandorganizationalmattersbecauseoftheparty'sdecentralizedstructure,wereparticularlyunrelentingintheiroppositiontoparliamentarygovernmentandtheRepublic.Theirindependence(whichvariedbyregion)alwaysgainedinimportancewhenstrugglesovertheDNVP'spoliticaldirectionthreatenedpartyunity.SincetheDNVPwasdependentuponcontributionsfromindustrytomaintainthepartyapparatusandfinanceelectioncampaigns(membershipduesalonewereinsufficient),financialcontributorsexerciseddisproportionateleverage.49AlfredHugenbergcapitalizedonthisdependency.SincethemidtwentieshispressempirehadpromotedPan-Germaninfluence,andtheeffectivecampaignagainstLocarnohadalreadyprovidedaforetasteofhisinfluence.50Theconflictbetweentheparty'stwowings,simmeringforyearsandnow

intensifiedbyelectiondefeat,eruptedagaininJuly1928.Thedirectcausewasanarticleentitled“Monarchism,”writtenbyWalterLambach,aboardmemberoftheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistants,51whowassufficientlyprominenttooccupysecondplaceontheDNVP'sReichstaglist.52Inhisarticle,LambacharguedthatwithHindenburg'selevationtothepresidencyin1925,thequestionofarestorationofthemonarchyhadresolveditself,sinceHindenburg'slarger-than-lifefigurefaroutshonethatofanylivingHohenzollern.Intheeyesofthenation,itwasHindenburgwhooccupiedfirstplace(togetherwithFredericktheGreatandWilhelmI),nottheKaiser.TheDNVP'sdefeatintheMayelections,Lambachwrote,wasultimatelyadefeatfortheideaofmonarchism,theunpopularityofwhichhadbeenlongapparent.YoungvoterswouldcontinuetoshuntheDNVPaslongasitsupportedtherestorationofthemonarchy,which,inanyevent,couldnotberealizedintheforeseeablefuture.HecalledonbothmonarchistsandsupportersoftheRepublic,whoopposedareturntomonarchy,tojointheDNVP.53LambachcalledforafulltransformationoftheDNVP;herejectedtheideaofapartygearedtowardtherestorationofthemonarchy,andchampionedinsteadakindofconservativepeople'spartywithanewprogramandleadership.Hisinitiativeunleashedastormofindignation.ThePotsdamIILandAssociation(towhichLambachbelongedbyvirtueofhisresidency)expelledhimfromthepartyinJuly.54TheDNVPlegalcommitteesubsequentlyrescindedhisexpulsionfromthepartyandchosetoreprimandhiminstead.Ashorttimelater,inJuly1928,GrafWestarp,whoseleadershiphadcomeunderincreasinglyseverecriticismsincetheelectiondefeat,resignedaspartyleader.Duringhistimeinoffice,hehadneversucceededincontrollingtheparty'spowerbase—thecrucialLandAssociations.WhileWestarpretainedhispositionasReichstagfactionleader,itwasclearthat

hisstarwasonthewane.Inner-partydissent,thesteadystreamofdivisivelegislation,themoodwithinthecountry,andtheshiftingfoundationsofpowerwithintheparty,allconvergedtosetthestageforanewtypeofleadership.AlfredHugenberg'stimehadnowcome.AttheendofAugust1928,intheBerlinerLokalanzeiger,HugenbergoutlinedhisownconceptionoftheDNVP'sfuture,whichwasdiametricallyopposedtotheideasofLambach,andon20October1928Hugenbergwaselected(withnoopposingcandidates)thefourthchairmanoftheDNVP.55WithHugenberg'selection,fundamentalistshadwonanimportantvictoryovertheirmorepragmaticfellowDNVPmembers.Aswouldsoonbecomeapparent,itwasaportentousmomentbothfortheGermanNationalPeople'sPartyandthecountryasawhole,sinceHugenberg'selectionwouldchangenotonlythedirectionofthepartyitself,butalsothepoliticalfateofallofGermany.

TheEndofConservativeModerationHugenberg'spositioninthepartyowedlittletoextraordinarypersonalorrhetoricalabilities.AccordingtoErichEyck,hecameacrossmore“likeavexedsubordinateofficial”56thanthesuccessfulindustrialtycoonheactuallywas.Eyckadded,however,thatHugenbergwasrecognizedasanexemplaryorganizerandamanofgreatwillpowerwho,withobstinatetenacity,adheredtohisprinciples—avirtuethatwouldultimatelyhavedisastrousconsequencesfortheRepublic.HugenberghardlyeverspokeintheReichstag;hisrareappearancesasaspeakercauseduproarandlaughter.Despisedandridiculedbymany,andcondemnedasareactionarywithoutsubstancebythoseWeimarright-wingintellectualscommonlyassociatedwiththe“conservativerevolution,”hewaspraisedbyhisPan-Germanfriendsasavisionaryandtruestatesman.57Ontheonehand,hispolicieshelpedmakeHitlerChancellor;ontheother,hewastheonlyonewho,timeandagain,obstinatelycounteredHitlerinCabinetmeetingsofthe“governmentofnationalconsolidation.”58ThestudentofHugenberg'spoliticalmaneuveringscannothelpbutagreewithErichEyck'sdictumthatitwasultimatelyimpossibletocomprehendHugenberg'spoliciesaslogicalorcoherent.59Hugenberg'slongcareerwascharacterizedbythetransitionfrompostsinthe

highercivilservicetoleadingpositionsinindustry,amovenotuncommoninnineteenth-centuryPrussia.60Inthe1890sHugenbergwasoneofthecofoundersofthePan-GermanLeague,towhoseaimsheremainedcommittedevenasadeputyandchairmanoftheDNVP.61In1919,hewasamemberoftheWeimarNationalAssembly,andayearlaterbecameaDNVPReichstagdeputy.After1925,thePan-GermancirclearoundHeinrichClaß62repeatedlyurgedHugenbergtoseekthepartyleadership.Despitehisobviouslimitationsasapolitician,thesmallbutveryinfluentialPan-GermangroupsystematicallygarneredsupportforHugenbergintheDNVPLandAssociations,wherestrengthandsteadfastnessofpoliticalconvictionwereheldinhigheresteemthanpoliticalabilityorrhetoricalskill.DespiteallthecontradictionsandinconsistenciesinHugenberg'spolicies,two

fundamentaltrendscanbediscerned.First,evenduringhisalmostfiveyearsaspartyleader,heheldfasttotheunrealisticgoalsofoverseasexpansionandtherecoveryofGermancolonies.Secondly,Hugenbergwasconvincedthatamorecompact,self-containedpoliticalblocwouldhaveagreaterimpactthanalargeandheterogeneouspartythatwasdividedwithinitself,aviewheputforthinhis

article“PartyBlocorMush,”publishedshortlybeforehebecamepartyleader.63OverthecourseofthenexttwoyearsHugenbergwouldactonthisconviction,thusundermininghisownpartyandfacilitatingtheNazis'risetopower.HispoliciesresultedintwomajorpartysplitsandhalvedtheDNVP'sshareofthepopularvotebetween1928and1930.64InhisrejectionofWeimar'spoliticalsystemHugenbergwasequallyintransigent.Whenacceptingthepartyleadershipon28October1928hebluntlystatedthat“therefuseoftheWeimarsystem”wouldhavetobeshakenoff:“Wemustfreeourselvesfromthissystemofcommitteesandcommissions,fromthefruitlesswastingofallstrengthinspeechandcounter-speech.”65Endlessjabberinparliamentaryfactionmeetingswasawasteoftime;itwaspreferabletoconstructasolidblocthatembodiedthefundamentalprinciplesoftheparty.66ItsoonbecameobviousthatHugenberg'sobdurateintransigencewouldhaveconsequencesforthepartybyimpedingcooperationwithotherpoliticalforces,therebyalienatingfromthepartythosemoreamenabletocompromise.Yet,Hugenbergwasquitepreparedtosacrificeapartofhiselectorate(aswouldsoonbecomeclear,thelargerone)topromotehisownconceptionoftheDNVP.InapartycircularofJuly1931,hewentsofarastoarguethattheentirepartymighthavetobeputonthelinetoescapefromthequagmireofdemocraticcompromisestowhichtheDNVPhadsuccumbedbetween1924and1928.67Ashispoliciesduringthefollowingyearswouldshow,Hugenbergrarelydeviatedfromhisself-appointedtaskofleadingWeimardemocracyeverclosertothebrinkofruin.Withhisassumptionofthepartyleadership,Hugenbergdemandedgreater

influenceonDNVPpolicies,thusbringinghimintodirectconflictwiththeDNVPReichstagfaction.Evenin1928,theparliamentaryfactionstillharboredasignificantcontingentofmoderateconservatives.Toexpandtheleverageofthenewchairman,theparty'sexecutivecommitteeswererestructuredinDecember1928:thesmallestcommittee(theParteileitung)waseliminatedaltogether,whilethelargercommittees(theParteivorstandwithabout130membersandtheParteivertretungwith260)wereretained.Hugenbergalsodemandedstrictpartydiscipline,wherebyhewouldhavetheauthoritytomakebindingdecisionsfortheparliamentaryfactionwithoutconsultingdeputies.68AlthoughamajorityoftheReichstagfactioninitiallyopposedthisdemand,Hugenbergsucceededinpushingthemeasurethroughalittlelater.Hethusmadethemostimportantpoliticaldecisionofhispoliticalcareer—theDNVP'sparticipationinHitler's“Cabinetofnationalconsolidation”—withoutconsultingthedeputiesintheReichstagfaction.Hugenbergalsotookuponhimselftheauthoritytoinitiateexpulsionproceedingsagainstdeputieswhoopposedhim

andtostrikefromelectionliststhosewhoweresimplyunacceptabletohim.69ThefactthatHugenbergcouldexertpressureonthosedeputieswhodisagreedwithhispolicieswouldbecomesignificantinthetwobigcrisestheDNVPfacedin1929and1930.Thefirstcrucialtrialwastriggeredbytheparty'sreactiontotheYoungPlan;thesecondbyitsstanceonBrüning'spolicies.

TheYoungPlanTosatisfytheGermangovernment'sdesireforadefinitivereparationssettlementthatwouldlessenGermany'sfinancialburden(andguaranteeherabilitytopay),theAlliedreparationsagentGilbertParkerattemptedtowinoverAlliedgovernmentstoanew,long-termreparationsplanwithlowerannualpayments.70ThesuccessofthisschemewasdoubtfulfromthestartsinceGermanreparationpaymentsweretiedtoFrenchandBritishdebtswiththeUnitedStates,71andthenewAmericanpresidentHerbertHoover(electedon6November1928)rejecteddebtreduction.72Afterlonganddifficultnegotiations,thecommissionofexperts,whichalsoincludedGermans,finallysignedthe“YoungPlan”on7June1929.Accordingtothecommission'sreport,annualpaymentsweretostartat1,707.9millionmarks,increaseto2,428millionuntil1965–1966,andthencontinue,albeitinloweramounts,until1987–1988.73ForeigncontroloftheGermaneconomy,includingtheReichsbahnandReichsbank,whichconstitutedthemostcontroversialpartoftheDawesPlan,wouldend.Theso-called“prosperityindex,”byvirtueofwhichreparationscouldtheoreticallybeincreased,wasalsodropped.EventhoughannualpaymentswerelowerthanthosestipulatedundertheDawesPlan,thenewobligationtopayreparationsforalmostsixtyyearsprovidedplentyoffodderforthepoliticalRighttoagitatevociferouslyagainsttheYoungPlan.74ThereactionoftheRightwasnotlongdelayed.Hugenbergproposeda

nationalreferendumagainsttheYoungPlanand,withthisaiminview,establisheda“Reichsausschuß(committee)forthePeople'sRebellionagainsttheYoungPlan.”Whilenegotiationsoverthenewreparationsagreementmadeonlyslowprogress,theright-wingpressimmediatelyunleashedastormofindignationagainstthenew“enslavementtreaty,”comparingittoasecondVersaillesandemphasizingthelongdurationofthepaymentperiod.Theanti-YoungPlanstruggle,characterizedasarescueoperationagainstthesellingoutofGermanytotheWesternAllies,wasusedbyHugenbergtoconcentratetheforcesoftheentirepoliticalRightandpolarizeddomesticpoliticsalmosttothepointofcivilwar.75HisReichsausschußandhiscampaignforanationalreferendumthusamountedtoakindofnationalcounter-parliament.Theoldsloganofthe“nationalopposition”wasrevived,eventhoughtheDNVPhadpointedlyrenouncedthisconceptafterthemurderofRathenauin1922todistanceitselffromradicalgroups.ThesegroupswerenowincludedinthestruggleagainsttheYoungPlan.IntheReichsausschußtheNSDAPwas

representedasanequalpartner;HitlerthusstoodalongsideHugenberg,StahlhelmleaderFranzSeldte,andthePan-GermanClaßatitshead,and,withthehelpofHugenberg'spress,couldutilizethepoliticalagitationagainsttheYoungPlantomakehisnameknownthroughoutGermany.HitlerhadjoinedtheReichsausschußagainstoppositionfromtheleftwingofhisownparty,whichrefusedtomoderateitspolemicsagainstGermanNational“reactionaries.”76Naziparticipationwaschieflyresponsiblefortheuncompromisingtoneandunrealisticdemandsexpressedintheso-called“LawagainsttheEnslavementoftheGermanPeople,”referredtoasthe“FreedomLaw”bythepoliticalRight.77AnyGermanpoliticianwhosignedtheYoungPlan,forexample,wouldmakehimselfliableforpunishmentunderArticleIVofthislaw,PresidentvonHindenburg(whowasclosertotheGermanNationalsthantoanyotherparty)notexcepted.Notsurprisingly,ArticleIVofthe“FreedomLaw”soonbecamethesubjectof

fierceinternaldebateswithintheDNVP.ThesmolderingconflictbetweenmoderateconservativesandtheGermanNationalemployeewing,ontheonehand,andHugenbergandthePan-Germanwingontheother,eruptedonceagain,wherebyHugenberg'scooperationwiththeNazipartyconstitutedthemainboneofcontention.Hugenbergescalatedtheconflictbyaccentuatingdisagreements,sincehewaseagertounderminebothmoderatevoicesinthepartyandthestrongpositionofformerchairmanGrafWestarp,whoremainedleaderoftheparliamentaryfactionandhadcloseconnectionsthroughouttheentireparty.Confrontationhadnowbecomeinevitable.TherupturewithintheDNVPthatwouldusherinthedisintegrationofconservatismasacoherentpoliticalforcewasonlyamatteroftime.

TheFirstDivisionInSeptember1929fourprominentDNVPdeputiesopenlycameoutagainstacceptanceofthe“FreedomLaw”:formerInteriorMinisterWaltervonKeudell,MoritzKlönne(whohaddefectedfromtheDVPtotheDNVPin1924),thehistorianOttoHoetzsch,andformerpartymanagerHans-ErdmannvonLindeiner-Wildau.Inaddition,alargergroupwithintheReichstagfactionalsomobilizedagainstHugenberg'scourse.Westarp(whomthemoderatewingwouldhavepreferredaspartyleader)expressedhisreservationsaboutthe“People'sRebellion”beforetheReichstagfactioninearlyOctober1929,thoughhisattituderemainedambivalent.78Byandlarge,WestarpwasreluctanttorelenttopressurebythoseDNVPdeputieswhodemandedthatheprotestagainstHugenberg'stactics,sincehefearedthismightcreatenewfissureswithintheparty.Itwasthisreluctancetoact,sharedbyotherleadingDNVPdeputies,suchasOskarHergtandMartinSchiele,thatpromptedthegrouparoundLindeiner-Wildautothreatensecessionfromtheparty.79ThenowunavoidablesplitwithintheDNVPoccurredbetween27Novemberand4December1929.80AfterseparatemeetingsofthetwocampsaroundHugenbergandLindeiner,Hugenberg'ssupportersinsistedonpartydisciplineinthevoteonthe“FreedomLaw.”ThestalematewasfinallybrokenwhenanumberofdeputieshostiletoHugenbergcameoutwithpublicdeclarationsagainsttheirownpartyleader.81Theinitiationofpartyexpulsionproceedingsagainstthesedeputies,pushedthroughbyHugenbergintheDNVPexecutivecommittee,usheredindevelopmentsthatledtoafirstsplitintheparliamentaryfaction.AtthebeginningofDecember1929,GottfriedTreviranus,whohadnevermadeasecretofhisantipathyforHugenberg,announcedhisresignationfromtheDNVP.IncooperationwithHansvonSchlange-Schöningen,Treviranusbroughttogethertwelvedeputiestoformanindependent“GermanNationalStudyGroup.”82Theirresignationstatementsfromthepartyfollowedon4December1929.Asaresultoftheseresignations,WestarprelinquishedtheleadershipoftheReichstagfaction,sincehecouldnolongerclaimtorepresentthewillofitsmembers.83Thiswasyetanotherblowtopartymoderates,sinceitindicatedthatHugenbergremainedvictoriousallalongthelineintheongoingstrugglewithintheparty,eventhoughtherelativestrengthoftheReichstagfactionwasdiminishedasaresult.DespitethefactthatamuchlargernumberofdeputiesvotedagainstthecontroversialArticleIVofthe“FreedomLaw”attheendofNovember1929,theinitialsplitremainedlimitedtotwelvedeputies.84Still,the

influenceofthedeputieswhohadleftthepartywassignificant.The“employee”wing,forexample,wasgreatlyweakenedbytheresignationofReinhardMummandFranzBehrensoftheChristianSocialgroup;WalterLambachoftheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistants;EmilHartwig,theleaderoftheGermanNationalArbeiterbund,andthetradeunionsecretaryGustavHülser.85Fromtheentirelistofnames,onlyHansvonSchlange-SchöningenandTreviranushadvotedagainsttheacceptanceofthecontroversialReichsbahnLawintheDawesPlan.Withfewexceptions,then,mostdeputiesremainedconsistentintheirpoliticalbeliefs.ThoseclosesttotheChristianSocialwingjoinedtogetherinDecember1929withthesouthernGermanChristlicherVolksdiensttoformtheChristlich-SozialerVolksdienst,whichwouldlaterbeledmainlybyGustavHülser,EmilHartwig,WalterLambach,undReinhardMumm.86TheChristlich-SozialerVolksdienstdidnotconsideritselfabürgerlicheconservativepartyandcontinuallystressedthatitwasatvariancewithHugenberg'sDNVP.87HansvonSchlange-SchöningenjoinedtheChristianNationalPeasantandLandvolkParty,anagrariangroupfoundedin1928thatrepresentedpeasantsincentralandsouthwestGermany,whereastheDNVPpredominantlychampionedtheinterestsofthelargeestatesintheeast.DuringBrüning'sgovernment,otherGermanNationalsjoinedthisparty,mainlytosupportMartinSchiele,NutritionMinisterinBrüning'sCabinet.88Thosedeputieswhoremainedinthe“GermanNationalStudyGroup”founded

theVolkskonservativeVereinigungon28January1930,whichwassoontochangeitsnametoKonservativeVolkspartei(or“Volkskonservative”)afterthesecessionoftheWestarpgroupfromtheDNVPinJuly1930(seebelow).89TreviranusbecametheleaderoftheKonservativeVolkspartei,whichemergedasthemostimportantoftheconservativesplintergroups,andotherDNVPsecessionists,suchasLejeune-Jung,Hoetzsch,Lindeiner-Wildau,andWestarp,wouldallplayimportantrolesinit.TheKonservativeVolksparteiwassignificantinthatitsleadingpoliticianslaterexertedconsiderableinfluenceonHindenburg.Thistypeofpoliticalgroupmadeupofseniorcivilservants,diplomats,andconservativeintellectualswhowerepreparedtocompromisewithotherpartiesinordertohaveavoiceinpolitics,andwhorepudiatedHugenberg'sintransigentattitude,hadpoliticalpredecessorsinPrussianhistory.ItspolicieswerereminiscentoftheWochenblattparteiofthe1850sandtheFreikonservativeVereinigung,90whichcontinuedtosupportBismarckafter1866,whentheOldPrussianConservativeshadbrokenwithhim.91SiegmundNeumannemphasizessimilaritiesinthesociologicalstructure,partyprogram,andpoliticaloriginsofthethreeconservativegroups;giventhevastlydifferingpoliticalandsocial

conditionsbetweenthetimeofthe1850sand1860sandthelateryearsoftheWeimarRepublic,however,suchsimilaritiesarenaturallytobeviewedwithcaution.92WhiletherewasinitialhopethattheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistantswithitsmorethan400,000membersmightprovideamassbasisfortheVolkskonservativen,itbecameclearwiththeelectionsof14September1930thatmembersoftheAssociationtendedmoretowardtheNaziparty.93TheKonservativeVolksparteithuswonamerefourseatsintheelectionsofSeptember1930andhaddisintegratedalreadyinFebruary1931.94Hugenbergdidhisbesttostemthetideofpartyresignations,whichhad

spreadtotheLandparliamentsandmostlyaffecteddeputieswhorepresentedagriculturalandindustrialinterests.Nevertheless,itcouldnotbeavoidedthatalongsidetheDNVPthethreenewlyformedconservativegroupsenteredtheringfortheelectioncampaignofSeptember1930—theChristlich-SozialerVolksdienst,theLandvolkpartei,andtheKonservativeVolkspartei.Thevehemenceandfratricidalfervorwithwhichthevariousconservativegroupsfoughteachotherwasdownrightparadoxical:Hugenberg,forhispart,slanderedtheVolkskonservativenasWeimar-loving“Tory-Democrats”withoutgenuinevölkischormonarchicalbonds,andformerDNVPReichstagfactionleaderGrafWestarphadtostruggleagainstattemptedinterferencefromhecklerswhobelongedtotheStahlhelmthroughoutthecampaign.95Still,fromHugenberg'spointofview,theresignationoftwelveinfluentialdeputieshadanadvantageinsofarashehadnowcomeclosertorealizinghisgoalofamorehomogeneousconservativebloc.HehadpurgedtheDNVPofapartoftheoppositionthatwasdirectedmainlyagainsthimselfandhispolicies,therebyconsolidatinghispositionwithintheparty.96Inthenationalreferendumonthe“People'sRebellionagainsttheYoungPlan”of2December1929,only5.825millionvoteswerecastinfavorofthemotion,whereas21millionvoteswouldhavebeennecessaryfortheprotesttobeeffective.97Thiswasanexceedinglypoorresultgiventhatinthepreviousnationalreferendumof20June1926ontheexpropriation(withoutcompensation)ofthepropertyofGermanprinces,whichhadbeensupportedbytheKPDandSPD,asizeable15.5millionvotershadsupportedtheinitiativewiththeiraffirmativevote.98ThecolossalfussgeneratedbyHugenbergovertheYoungPlanproducedtwoconcreteresults:Hugenberg'spositioninsidethepartywassolidifiedand,onaccountoftheanti-YoungPlancampaign,Hitler'snameandpartyhadbecomehouseholdwordsthroughouttheentireReich.

TowardaMoreAuthoritarianRepublicAfteralongtugofwarintheReichstag,theYoungPlanwasfinallyacceptedon12March1930,byavoteof265to192withthreeabstentions.99Withthesigningofadefinitivesettlementofreparations,thelastcommondenominatorinHermannMüller'sGrandCoalitiongovernmenthaddisappeared.Thenextpoliticalproblemthegovernmentwouldconfront—thereformofunemploymentinsurance—wouldshatterthiscoalitiontopieces:alreadyon27March,barelytwoweeksaftertheYoungPlanvote,HermannMüllertenderedhisresignation.Withhimthelastgovernmentthatpossessedamajorityofthepopularvoteleftoffice;27March1930isthusunquestionablyaturningpointinthehistoryofWeimar.ThedetailsofMüller'sfailurearewellknown.Elaborateintriguesagainsthisgovernment,preparedmostlybyKurtvonSchleicherwho,inagreementwithHindenburg,hadendeavoredeversincetheautumnof1929toreplaceMüller'sCabinetwithanauthoritarianregimemoretotheirliking,certainlyplayedaroleinitsdownfall.ButultimatelyconflictswithintheGrandCoalitionweremoreresponsiblethanoutsidepressureforthefatalcollapseofthelastlegitimategovernment.100Thecrisesoftheprevioustwoyearshaderodedtrustinthegovernment'sabilitytofunction:thehagglingovertheconstructionof“BattleCruiserA”exposedthewidechasmbetweentheSocialDemocraticmembersofgovernmentandtheSPDReichstagfaction;streetbattlesintheBerlinScheunenviertelandtheworking-classdistrictsofWeddingundNeuköllnbetweencommunistsandtheBerlinpolice,whotookordersfromaSocialDemocraticmagistrate,broughttensionbetweentheSPDandKPDtoaboilingpoint,especiallysinceastateofemergencyhadtobedeclaredinentirecitydistrictstorestoreorder.101TheSklarekscandal,asaresultofwhichtheLordMayorofBerlinresigned,castfurtherdoubtuponthecredibilityoftheBerlinSPD.102In1929,aseriesofbombingsagainstadministrativeoffices(Landratsämter)inSchleswig-HolsteinandtaxofficesinthestateofOldenburg,aswellaswidespreadtaxstrikesinnorthernandcentralGermany,hadfocusedgeneralattentionontheplightofagriculture.103Thissurfeitofpoliticalproblemsandeconomiccrises(inthefaceofwhichthegovernmentappearedhelpless),alongwiththeunproductivehagglingovertheYoungPlan,lentweighttoawidelyheldviewthattheunstablecoalition,ledbythewell-meaningbutlacklusterandphlegmaticChancellorHermannMüller,wasnotuptothetaskofsolvingthenation'sproblems.104AtthispointintimethereverberationsoftheworldeconomiccrisishadbecomeevidentinGermanyaswell:inFebruary

1930unemploymentfiguresshotupto3.3million,105theentireagriculturalsector(notonlylargeEastElbianestates)founditselfmiredinproblems,andreduceddemand,aswellasageneralslumpinsalesandthethreateningfinancialruinofmanytowns,ledtomassdismissalsofemployeesintheeconomyandthelocalcivilservice.Thepositionofcivilservantsonalllevelshad,inanycase,beenweakenedbytheInflation,andeventheverysubstantialsalaryraisesofthepreviousyearshadbeenunabletoundoitsnefariousfinancialeffects.106OfficialshadalwaysplayedaformidableroleinGermanlifeandintheeconomyandadministrationofthecountry,sothattheirowninsecuritygreatlyenhancedthefeelingofgeneraluncertaintyandinstability.Thisseeminglyhopelesssituation,inwhichonesocialgroupblamedanother

foritsownmisery,107createdaclimateofopinioninwhichundemocratic,authoritarianmeasures,whichwerebelievedtofacilitatedecisiveandeffectivesolutions,gainedground.Evenmenknownandesteemedfortheirdemocraticconvictions,suchasTheodorWolff(1868–1943),journalist,editoroftheBerlinerTageblatt,andcofounderoftheDDP,andEmilLudwig(1881–1948),whosefamewasbasedonhisbiographiesofGoethe,Napoleon,andBismarck,wereoftheopinionthattheWeimarRepubliccouldwelltakesomelessonsfromfascistItaly.Bothmadeitclear,thoughatdifferentpointsintime,thattheRepublic'spoliticalcrisishadoccasionedafundamentalalterationintheirpoliticalbeliefs.Bothwereconvincedthat,giventhepoliticalsituationoftheearly1930s,thetemporaryestablishmentofanauthoritarianregime,basedonthemodeloffascistItaly,mightofferawayoutofGermany'spoliticalpredicament.108Giventhischangedclimateofopinionregardingmoreauthoritarianpolitical

solutions,HeinrichBrüning'sgovernment,whichwasbasedonHindenburg'semergencydecreesandnotonparliamentarymajorities,beganitstenureunderrelativelyfavorableauspices.Theformerfront-lineofficerwasascetic,personallyunassuming,andamanoffewwords.Hissuperbformaleducation(includingstudiesinphilology,jurisprudence,history,andeconomicsbeforereceivinghisdoctoratein1915),hisexpertiseineconomicandfinancialmatters,andthedoggedperseverancewithwhichhetranslatedplansintoaction,madehimoneofthemostexceptionalChancellorsoftheWeimarRepublic.ItwasBrüning'spatriotism,hisprofessionalcompetence,andthegeneralrespectaccordedtohimasfactionleaderoftheCenterPartythatrecommendedhimtothegrouparoundHindenburgandKurtvonSchleicher.ToSchleicher,whoheadedtheMinisteramtoftheReichswehrMinistry—apoliticalliaisonbetweenthearmedservicesandtheReichministries—Brüningseemedtherightchoiceto

presideoverapresidentialCabinetandtacklethegargantuantaskofputtingstatefinancesbackontheirfeet.109DuringBrüning'schancellorship,theexecutivewasnolongersubjecttoparliamentariancontrol.ThemorethantwoyearsofBrüning'sgovernmentthuswitnessedagradualerosionofparliamentarianrule:thenumberofdaystheReichstagwasinsessiondecreasedfrom94(1930)to42(1931),andthendownto13(1932).WhiletheReichstagmanagedtopass98lawsin1930,thatnumberfellto34in1931andamere5in1932.Ontheotherhand,thenumberoflawsenactedasemergencydecreesbyHindenburgrosefrom5in1930to44in1931,andfinallyto66in1932.110AfterBrüning'sappointment,theadministrativemachinerygainedgroundonallfrontsandtherelativeautonomyofthestateapparatusincreased,inturnenablingtheexecutivetopushthroughimportantdecisionseveniftheyrancountertothewishesofinfluentialpressuregroups.Inthe1950sand1960sthenatureofBrüning'sgovernmentbecamethesubjectofheateddebatebetweenWernerConzeandKarl-DietrichBracher:ConzearguedthatthecrisisoftheparliamentariansystemrenderedthetransitiontoanauthoritarianpresidentialCabinetvirtuallyinevitable,whileBrachercontendedthatevenundertheconditionsof1930amoredemocraticsolutioncouldhavebeenattempted.AccordingtoBracher,suchattemptswerenevermadebecausethecirclearoundHindenburghadpreparedthetransitiontoapresidentialCabinetwellbeforethecollapseoftheGrandCoalition.BracherthusassessedBrüning'stimeinofficeasafirstfatefulstageintheprocessofthedissolutionoftheRepublic,whereasConzejudgedBrüningmorefavorablyasthe“Chancellorabovepartystrife.”111

TheSecondDivisionBrüning'seconomicpoliciessoonledtoirreconcilabledifferencesofopinionintheDNVPReichstagfactionandtriggeredasecondwaveofintrapartysecession.Initially,Brüning'sminoritygovernmentthattookofficeon30March1930wassupportedbytheCenter,theBVP,DVP,andDDP.112ThoseresponsibleforplanningBrüning'spresidentialCabinethadcountedonsupportfromthemoderateandpragmaticforcesintheDNVP.Correspondingly,Brüning'snewCabinetmembershadmoreofaconservativethanaliberalbackground.InadditiontotheformerFreeConservativeJohannViktorBredtoftheEconomicParty(Wirtschaftspartei),theseincludedGottfriedTreviranusandMartinSchiele,theleaderoftheReichslandbund,wholaiddownhismandateasaDNVPdeputywhentakingupaCabinetpositionunderBrüning,aswellasthepoliticallyindependentWilhelmGroenerasReichswehrMinister.113EncouragedbyHindenburg,Schielesubmittedanambitiousagrarianprogram,designedespeciallytoaccommodateEastElbianestateowners,thatwasenthusiasticallywelcomedbytheagrarianwingoftheDNVP.ItwasthusclearfromtheverybeginningthatHugenberg'sintransigentstance,oneboundtoleadtoaconfrontationwithBrüning,wouldresultinafurthersplitintheDNVPReichstagfaction.Predictably,theSocialDemocratsvociferouslyopposedthepreferentialtreatmentaccordedtobiglandownersandrespondedtoBrüning'sinauguralspeech(Regierungserklärung)on1April1930bysponsoringamotionofnoconfidence.ThesuccessorfailureofthismotiondependedentirelyontheDNVPfaction,thusbringingHugenberg'spredicamenttotheforesoonerthanexpected.HugenberghimselfwashostiletoBrüning'sCabinetandhispressempirefreelygaveventtothisanimosity.ButsinceBrüning'sgovernmentpromisedurgentlyneededassistancetoEastElbianestateowners,HugenberghadgoodreasontofearthatmanydeputieswoulddeserthimifhebackedtheSPD'smotionofnoconfidence.Onceagain,Hugenberg'sactionsweremarkedbyself-defeatinginconsistency:inordertopreventafurtherfragmentationofhisparty,heopposedthevoteofnoconfidencebeforehisparliamentaryfaction(whichthankstotheDNVPwasrejectedbyavoteof253to187),butthenproceededtoattackBrüninginanexceedinglycriticalspeechthatstoodinmarkedcontrasttohisofficialposition.114ButHugenberg'scriticismofBrüningwasnotenoughtoappeasetheNazis,whoconsideredhisoppositiontothevoteofnoconfidenceasabetrayalofthenationalinterestandpromptlyrenegedontheirformercollaborationwiththeDNVPinthe“ReichCommitteeforthe

People'sRebellion.”On12April1930,theReichstagwascalledupontodecideonthedraft

appropriationsbillforthe1930Reichbudget,whichtheReichstaghadalreadyapprovedon24MarchduringtheMüllergovernment.Theagriculturalprogramthatwassoattractivetoestateownerswasnowtiedtotheappropriationsbillinapackagedeal.Bothcouldthuscomeintoeffectonlyintandem,astrategydesignedtoexertpressureonGermanNationaldeputiestoinduceatleastapartofthefactiontosupportBrüning.Subsequently,bothbillswereapprovedbyanarrowmajorityof217to206votes.Hugenberghadinsistedonrejectingthepackagedeal,butonlyaminorityoftwenty-threedeputieshadbeenpreparedtofollowhim.SixDNVPdeputiesdidnotvoteon12April,whilethirty-onedeputies,ledbyGrafWestarp,votedinfavorofthebudgetappropriationsbillandthushelpedthegovernmentattainitsslimmajority.ThesimmeringcrisisintheDNVPnowonceagainthreatenedtoerupt.Atits

meetingof25April,theDNVPexecutiveboard(Vorstand)camedownonthesideofHugenberg,thusmakingitclearthatintheeventofanotherdivision,controlofpartyfinancesandorganizationwouldremainwiththewingloyaltoHugenberg.TheexecutiveboardsharplycriticizedthosedeputieswhohadvotedinfavorofBrüning,demandedpartydisciplinebothinsidethepartyandparliamentaryfactionwhenitcametodecisivevotes,andcommittedthefuturecourseofthepartytofundamentaloppositiontoBrüning'spolicies.115ThisputanendtoWestarp'shopesforclosecooperationwithBrüning,justasitthwartedthehopeoftheChancellorandTreviranusofexpandingtheirsupportbasetotheright.Afurtherpartysplitnowappearedinevitable.Westarp'ssupporters,whorebelledagainstHugenberg'sdictatorialpartytactics,hadaninterestinbringingaboutabreakassoonaspossible,foritwasevidentthatBrüning'scontroversialprogramwouldsoonresultinthedissolutionoftheReichstagandnewelections.Ifthisweretohappen,theHugenberg-controlledpartyapparatuswouldundoubtedlyensurethatallthoseinimicaltothechairmanwouldnolongerbeputupascandidates.116TopreemptfurthersplitsandaconsolidationofthevariousgroupsofGermanNationalsthathadlefttheDNVP,HugenbergencouragedaspeedydissolutionoftheReichstag,especiallysincehewaswellawareoftheseethingdiscontentintheReichstagfactionandknewthatfurtherruptureswereonlyaquestionoftime.InmidJune1930,Brüning'sgovernmentwasmiredinitsfirstmajorcrisis.

FinancialdifficultieshadinducedFinanceMinisterPaulMoldenhauertofacereductionsincivilservants'salaries(ReichshilfederFestbesoldeten)againstvehementoppositionfromhisownparty,theDVP.117Becauseofthestubbornly

highlevelofunemployment,theappropriationsresolutionsofAprilwerenolongersufficienttosatisfytheReich'sfinancialneeds.Thedifficultyofrallyingaparliamentarymajorityforanamendedappropriationsbillsoonbecameobvious.Beforethedecisiveballotsof16and18July1930ithadalsotranspiredthatthegovernmenthadlittlehopeofwinningoverthelargerpartoftheDNVPfaction.118WithHindenburg'sannouncementon16JulythattheappropriationsprogramwouldbepushedthroughusingArticle48ifnecessary,itbecameclearthattheestablishmentofaregimebasedonemergencydecreescouldnolongerbeprevented.Inthecrucialballotof16July1930,thegovernmentwasclearlydefeatedbyavoteof193to256(withopposingvotesfromtheKPD,SPD,NSDAP,andamajorityofDNVPdeputies).Brüningrespondedbyimposinghisprogramusingemergencydecrees.Thefollowingday,theSPDinitiatedanothermotionofnoconfidenceagainsthisgovernment.SincediscussionsbetweenHugenbergandBrüningon17Julyfailedtoproducethedesiredresult—Hugenberg'spromisetosupportBrüning—theReichstagsessiononthefollowingdaywasthelastfortheparliamentarybodythathadbeenvotedinon20May1928.Inthatcriticalsessionof18July1930,thereneweddivisionintheDNVPbecameapparent:DNVPfactionleaderErnstOberfohrenvotedagainsttheBrüningprogram,whilehispredecessor,GrafWestarp,votedforBrüningandagainstthenoconfidencemotion.SinceamajorityofDNVPdeputiesvotedforthenoconfidencemeasure,however,itpassedbyarelativelynarrowmarginof236to222votes.Asaresult,BrüningproclaimedthedissolutionoftheReichstag,andreenacted(inmoresevereform)theemergencylegislationthathadjustbeenannulledbyaReichstagresolution,adecisionthatrendereditalltooplainthattheChancellorwasfullypreparedtoventureintohithertounexploredconstitutionalterritory.119Justbeforethedecisivevoteon18July,Westarpissuedastatementonbehalfoftwenty-fivedeputiesendorsingBrüning'semergencylegislation.120Theseconddivisionimpliedinthisannouncementwasformallyconfirmedon24Julybyaresolutionofthepartyexecutivecommittee,whichcondonedHugenberg'sattitudeandcondemnedthemembersoftheWestarpgroupforthewaytheyhadvoted.121ThosedeputiesexpelledfromtheDNVPforsupportingBrüningwerepartlyabsorbedbytheKonservativeVolkspartei,theChristlich-SozialerVolksdienst,andtheLandvolk.ThesesplinterpartiescontinuedtobackBrüning'sgovernment,thoughtheybecameevermoreworndown,marginalized,anddesertedbytheirvotersbecauseoftheincreasingradicalizationofthepoliticalstruggle.OnlytheVolksdienstwouldsurvivetheJuly1932election.ThedissolutionofthefourthReichstag,electedinMay1928,compelledBrüningtocallfornewelectionsthat

hadtobeheldwithin60days.ManyconsiderittragicthatBrüningfailedtocometoanunderstandingwiththeSPD,sincethemorefavorablemajorityratiosofthefourthReichstagmighthaveremainedinplaceuntilMay1932hadthedissolutionofparliamentbeenavoided.Thisview,however,doesnotsufficientlyaccountforthefactthat,becauseofHindenburg's(andBrüning's)biasagainsttheSPD,anagreementwiththeSocialDemocratswouldhardlyhavebeenfeasible.

TheDNVPandtheRiseofNazismTheelectionsof14September1930fundamentallychangedWeimar'spoliticallandscapeastheNSDAPsweptintothepositionofsecondstrongestpartyaftertheSPD.122Electionresultsevenhadinternationalrepercussions,asFrenchbankswithdrewtheirshort-termcreditfromGermanyinreactiontoNazisuccesses,leadingtoanaggravationoftheeconomiccrisisandshortagesofforeigncurrencyinGermanbanks.123TheDNVPwascutdownto7percentand41seats,whereastheNSDAPnowhad,with18.3percentofthevote,107seatsattheirdisposal.Thebalanceofpowerbetweenthetwopartieshadreverseditself—atrendthatwouldbecomeevenmoreaccentuatedincomingyears.ThestagnationoftheDNVPatalowlevel,eventuallyevenafurtherdecreaseto5.9percentand37seatsintheelectionsof31July1932,contrastedsharplywiththeapparentlyinexorableadvanceoftheNSDAPoverthenexttwoyears.124TheDNVPandNSDAPsharedanumberofimportantideologicalcommondenominators,fromextremenationalismtoanti-parliamentarianismandoppositiontotheRepublic,butatitscoretheDNVPremainedabürgerlichePartei,whiletheidentityoftheNazipartywasdistinctlyanti-bürgerlichandradical,withrevolutionaryovertonesinitspublicpronouncementsandpropaganda.HowdidHugenberg'sDNVPreacttotheascendantthreatonthepoliticalfarRight?AfterHugenberghadassumedthepartyleadershipandsucceededinexpelling

hismainopponentsfromthepartyorganizationandReichstagfaction,theDNVPmovedclosertotheNSDAP.Withitsrigorous“blockadepolitics”andconstantstonewalling,theDNVPnowappearedfullypreparedtoworktowardthecollapseoftheWeimarRepublic,therebyinchingclosertoHitler'spolicies.Yet,evenafterthedramaticreversaloffortuneattheballotbox,HugenbergcontinuedtotreattheNSDAPasajuniorpartnerthat,hebelieved,couldbeusedforhisownends,eventhoughNazipropagandizingagainstthe“Reaction”and“reactionaries”—bigcapitalandthebourgeoisestablishment(whichtheDNVP

represented)—continuedunabated.Seeminglyblindedtothedangers,HugenbergwouldcontinueunderestimatingthedynamicsinherentinNationalSocialismuntilitwastoolate.125Onthesurface,theyear1931appearedtobeatimeofincreasedcollaborationbetweenthetwopartiesofthefarright.WhentheReichstagvotedtoadoptproposalscurtailingexcessivepolitickinginparliamentbyNazisandcommunistsinFebruary1931,GermanNationaldeputieswalkedoutoftheReichstagbuildingtogetherwiththeirNSDAPcolleagues.TheDNVP's1931partyconferenceinStettin(19–20September)wasbuiltupasademonstrationofunity.TryingtoemulateNazisuccesses,theDNVPeagerlyimitatedNationalSocialismbydeclaringthatthepartywouldstrivetobecomea“Hugenbergmovement”andattemptingtointegratethe“leadershipprinciple”intoinner-partypractice.InavainefforttocreateitsownstormtroopersoratleastsomekindofsubstituteSA,theDNVPnowenlargedandexpandedthehitherto-neglectedKampfstaffeln(fightersquadrons)thathadgrownoutoftheBismarckbund.126DNVPmembers,whoadvocatedthetransitionfromapoliticalpartytoamovementlikeNationalSocialism,failedtoconsiderthatNazisuccessescouldnotbeeasilyreplicated.Inthespringof1931,anotherjointactionoftheRightbroughttogethertheDNVP,DVP,NSDAP,Wirtschaftspartei,andtheStahlhelm.ThiswastheorganizationofareferendumtobringaboutthedissolutionofthePrussianLandtag,thelaststrongholdoftheSPDandCenterParty.Thereferendumheldon9August1931failed,however,evenaftertheKPDhadjoinedintheattempt,sinceonly9.8millionvotes(36.9percentoftheelectorate;13.2millionvoteswereneeded)werecastinfavorofdissolution.127InPrussia,OttoBraun'sgovernmentthuswonalittlebreathingspaceuntilthenextregularlyscheduledelectionson24April1932.Perhapsthebest-knowncooperativeventureoftheRightwasthemeetingof

the“NationalFront”inBadHarzburgon10to11October1931.HeldatHugenberg'sinitiative,theHarzburgerFrontbroughttogethermostpoliticalforcesinimicaltotheRepublic(exceptfortheKPD),thoughitwasultimatelymoreanexpressionofwillandafaçadewithoutgreatpoliticalsignificance.BadHarzburginthenorthernGermanstateofBraunschweigwasintentionallyselectedasthemeetingplacesinceboththeDNVPandNSDAPwererepresentedinitsstategovernment,andWeimar'spoliticalopponentscouldsafelygatherthere,outofreachoftheclutchesofthePrussianpolice,whowereundertheauthorityofthehatedSocialDemocrats.OntheeveoftheHarzburgmeeting,PresidentvonHindenburgreceivedHitlerandGöringforthefirsttime,therebystrengtheningtheNSDAP'spositioninHarzburg.InadditiontoGermanNationalsandNazis,thegatheringincludedmonarchistsfromtheofficercorps

andthepatrioticleagues,membersoftheDVP,Pan-Germans,theleadershipoftheReichslandbund,retiredofficerssuchastheformerheadoftheReichswehr,HansvonSeeckt,andindustrialistsandfinancierssuchasFritzvonThyssenandHjalmarSchacht.128ThosepresenthadlittleincommonexceptfortheiranimositytowardtheRepublic.NationalSocialistsinattendancewereespeciallyintentonmaintainingtheirindependenceandpointedlysteeredtheirowncourse.Beforethebeginningofofficialfunctions,theNSDAPReichstagfactionheldaseparategathering,wherefactionleaderWilhelmFrickemphasizedthatanyalliancewiththeGermanNationalswouldbebasedonpurelytacticalmotivations.InhisBerlinnewspaperDerAngriff,Goebbelsequallymadenobonesaboutthefactthattacticalconsiderationsweredecisiveinthe(onlytemporaryandinstrumental)alliancewiththeGermanNationals,sincealegalassumptionofpowerwouldbepossibleonlythroughtheformationofacoalitiongovernment.129Asifconsciouslytryingtoprovokeindignation,HitlerverydemonstrativelylefttheVIPstandafterhisSAformationshadmarchedpast.130ThoughHugenbergpresidedovermostofthesessions,hemadeconcessionafterconcession,asBracherwrote,“withtheindulgencebornofassuredarrogancethatisfedbythecertaintyofbeingincommand.”131BythetimeBrüningresignedofficeon30May1932,merelyeightmonths

beforetheNaziseizureofpower,Weimar'spoliticallandscapehadfundamentallychanged:thepublicincreasinglyhadbecomeaccustomedtotheideaofauthoritariansolutions;thebureaucracyhadgainedinsignificanceastheexecutiveorganthatimplementedBrüning'semergencydecrees,theReichstaghadbeeneffectivelyeliminatedfrompoliticaldecisionmaking,andthearmyleadership,aswellasthepresident,hadcometoholdthekeypositions.IntheformationofthesuccessorgovernmenttoBrüning,FranzvonPapen's“CabinetofBarons,”Hugenbergwasostentatiouslypassedoverintheselectionofministerialposts.HisuncompromisingobduracyandsteadfastobstructionismhadlongbeenathorninHindenburg'sside,withtheresultthatotherconservativesreceivedministerialportfoliosinHugenberg'splace,suchasWilhelmFreiherrvonGaylasMinisteroftheInteriorandFranzGürtnerasMinisterofJustice.132Intheelectionsof31July1932,theDNVPwasreducedto5.9percentandthirty-sevenseats,itsworstshowingever.Giventheelectionresults,therenowexistedthetheoreticalpossibilityofacoalitionbetweenNazisandtheCenter/BavarianPeople'sParty,whichtogetherheldanabsolutemajorityof53percent.FollowingthebreakdownofnegotiationsbetweenHitler,PapenandSchleicheron13August1932overtheentryoftheNSDAPinPapen'scabinet,HitlercalledoffhistrucewithPapen.Afterthe—tooutward

appearances—grandiosesuccessintheJulyelections,inwhichtheNSDAPhadbecomethestrongestpartybyfarwithalmost38percentofthevote,Hitlerclaimed,amongotherthings,theofficeofChancellorforhimself.HefeltdupedbySchleicherandPapenwhenHindenburg(inwhatHitlerconsideredtobehumiliatingattendantcircumstances)pointedlyrefusedtoentrusttheofficetohiscare.133Asaresultofthe13Augustmeeting,HitlerandhispartyfoughttheDNVP,Papen'smainparliamentarysupporter,toothandnail.Hugenberg,infact,stakedeverythingonPapen's“NewState”—anauthoritarian,anti-parliamentarysystemthatwasclosertodictatorshipthandemocracy—andstressedhisparty'sroleasthe“politicalarmyoftheNewState.”134On12September1932,theNazipartysupportedacommunistno-confidencemotionagainstPapentooverthrowhisgovernment.DespitePapen'sattempttodissolvetheReichstagimmediately(hecarriedHindenburg'sdissolutionorderwithhim),HermannGöring,thenewlyelectedspeakerofhouse,overrodehimandwentaheadwiththevote.Theresultof512to42votesagainstPapen,whowassupportedonlybytheDNVPandDVP,wasdisastrousfortheChancellorinthatitlaidbaretheexceedinglyslimbasisonwhichhisgovernmentwasbuilt.Thesubsequentelectionsof6November,thoughincreasingthenumberofDNVPdeputiesbyfifteen,lefttheoverallpictureunaltered.135Thus,afterPapenagainhadvainlytriedtosecureNazisupportforhisgovernment,SchleicherforcedthePresident(whohadconceivedalikingforPapen)toactanddismisstheChancellorbydemonstratingthatPapen'sschemeofauthoritariangovernmentwithoutpopularbackingmightwellresultinacivilwarthatwouldbebeyondthecapacityofthepoliceandReichswehrtocontain.136Withextremereluctance,Hindenburgrelentedand,inatearfulinterview,partedfromhispreferredChancellor.On2December1932,SchleicheremergedfrombehindthescenesandassumedthepostofChancellorhimself.Intheautumnof1932,duringtherun-uptothe6NovemberReichstag

elections,therelationsbetweentheNazipartyandtheDNVPreachedtheirabsolutenadir.TheDNVPandthePapengovernmentbecametheprincipaltargetsofaNazipropagandamachineatitsmostslanderousandoffensive.GermanNationalsnotedindignantlythat“thepactwithushasbeentornapart,”whileGoebbels'sBerlinpaper,DerAngriff,calledfora“ReckoningwiththeHugenzwerg.”137TheNazipresspoureddisdainandderisionoverHugenberg,suggestingthathehadtobeamagician,sincehehopedtoturn“aninsignificantheapofreactionaries”intoapeople'smovement.InSeptember,NazisbrokeupGermanNationalelectionmeetingswithstinkbombsandteargas;theyaccusedtheprominentGermanNationaldeputyAxelvonFreytagh-Loringhovenof

beingatraitortothefatherland,sinceheallegedlyfoughtagainstGermanyasaczaristofficer;and,inthePrussianLandtag,NazideputiesheckledaGermanNationaldeputyandcalledhim“Jewboy,”asthesocialistVorwärtsgleefullyreported.138Andsoitcontinued.HeleneFreifrauvonWatter,aGermanNationaldeputyandphysicianbyprofession,wasthreatenedwithabeatingbyNSDAPdeputiesforcallingNazisinthePrussianLandtag“Schweine”;WilhelmKube,leaderoftheNSDAPfactioninthePrussianLandtagandhimselfaformermemberoftheDNVPfrom1919to1923,emphasizedtheneedto“fighttheDNVPtothedeath”;andon27September1932,NationalSocialists,inanattempttobreakupaGermanNationalmeetinginBreslau,seriouslyinjuredsevenpeople(mostlyStahlhelmmembers).Followingthisincident,anotherGermanNationalmeetingwasprohibitedbythepoliceforfearthatitmightbestormedbyNazis.139AttheendofSeptember1932,Goebbels'sAngriffaccusedHugenbergandtheGermanNationalsof“conceit,megalomania,andcastespirit,”andGoebbelsissuedapartyordernottoreadthe“bourgeoisnationalpress,”whereuponHugenbergandhisScherlpublishinghousesuedhim.Facedwithaninjunctiontopay300,000marks,serveasix-monthjailterm,orrescindtheban,Goebbelswasprevailedupontochoosethelatter.140Butevenafterthe6Novemberelections,whenacoalitionbetweenthe

NSDAPandtheCenter/BavarianPeople'sPartywouldnolongerresultinanabsolutemajority,relationsbetweenGermanNationalsandNationalSocialistsdidnotimprove.IntheReichstagsessionsof6–9December1932,forexample,NazideputiesstillmockedandderidedHugenbergopenly.TheleaderoftheDNVPhadbeennamedSchriftführer(recordingclerk)ofparliament.AteachmentionofHugenbergasthe“leader”(Führer)oftheGermanNationals,theNazideputiesbrokeoutintodeafeningheckling,yelling“Schriftführer!”141Itwasinthismutuallyhostile,poisoned,andbitterlyresentfulatmospherethatthefatefulalliancebetweentheGermanNationalPeople'sPartyandHitlercameintobeing.

GermanNationalAssessmentsofNazismbefore1933HowdidthebürgerlicheDNVPassesstheNazipartyinthetwoyearsaftertheNazibreakthroughatthepollsinSeptember1930?ThisrelationshipcanbestbeilluminatedfromstatementsintheGermanNationallocalpress,sincelocalpartynewspapersreactedmorebluntlytothepoliticalupheavalsofthedaythanthelargerBerlinconservativedailies,suchastheKreuzzeitungorDerTag.TheGermanNationalpressresponsetopoliticaleventsinwhichtheNazisshowed

theirtruecolors(andwhichalsoprovidedaforetasteofwhatwasinstoreforGermanyonceHitlerwasinpower)arerevealingwithregardtoGermanNationalattitudesabouttheirfuturecoalitionpartner.142Analyzedinthelocalcontext,GermanNationalreactionscanbedirectlycomparedwiththoseofotherbürgerlichepresses,namelyCenterPartypublicationsandliberalmainstreamurbanmasscirculationdailies.ThesouthernGermanuniversitytownofFreiburgimBreisgau,acitywithabout100,000inhabitantsandseveraldailypapersin1933,offersaproductivefieldofinvestigationinthisendeavor.143Thedailiesweremostlybürgerlichinorientation:theliberalFreiburgerZeitung(closetotheDVP)hadthehighestcirculationbyfar,followedbytheCenterPartynewspaper,FreiburgerTagespost,andtheGermanNationalBreisgauerZeitung.144InthelasttwoyearsoftheWeimarRepublictheNazismadefewbonesabout

theirultimategoalsand,onseveraloccasions,clearlyindicatedbytheiractionswhattheGermanpopulationcouldexpectintheeventofaNationalSocialisttakeover.Inthiscontext,the“Boxheimdocuments”offeredaforetasteofwhatwastocomeafterstirringthepublicinthewakeoftheNovember1931HessianLandelections,asdidthemurderintheSilesiantownofPotempaduringPapen'stenureinofficeon10August1932.TheBoxheimdocuments(namedafteramanorhouseinSouthernHessenearLampertheim),preparedbyWernerBest,legaladvisortotheHessianNSDAP,weredetailedcontingencyplansforaresponsetoananticipatedcommunistcoup.145Best'splanswereindeedastonishing:aftercrushingthecommunistrevolt(whichhypotheticallyhadresultedintheremovaloftraditionalstateauthorities),allpowerwastopassintothehandsoftheSA.AnynoncompliancewithSAorderswouldbemetwiththedeathpenalty.146Civilservantsandpublicemployeeswhorefusedtoresumetheirregulardutiesweretobeshot“withouttrial,onthespot.”Privatepropertywastobeabolisheduntilfurthernotice.Onlythosewhoperformedtheirdutybytakingpartinanationallaborservicewouldbeguaranteedfoodstamps.InBest'sconception,thosewhoweretobeexcludedfromlaborserviceandfoodstamps,suchas“non-Aryans,”werecondemnedtostarvation.AftertheBoxheimdocumentshadbeenmadepublic,itwasgenerallyexpectedthatdrasticmeasureswouldbetakentocurbNationalSocialistactivities.TheNazileadershipprotesteditsinnocence,assertingthatthedocumentsweredrawnupbyHessianNationalSocialistsaloneandthuswhollyunknowntothem.Besides,theyargued,theywerebasedonthepremisethatacommunistrebellionhadtakenplace,sothattheproposedmeasuresshouldbejudgedsolelyasareactiontosuchanevent.Theseexcusescarriedconsiderableweight:despitethe

insistenceofPrussianInteriorMinisterCarlSevering,theAttorneyGeneral(Oberreichsanwalt)refrainedfrominitiatingcriminalproceedingsbasedonthechargeof“hightreason”againsttheNazis.Nevertheless,attheendofNovember1931,thecaseoftheBoxheimdocumentsdominatedthefrontpagesofeverylargeandsmall(non-Nazi)paperintheReich.ThereactionoftheFreiburgliberalmainstreamandCenterPartypressranged

fromindignationtohorror.CommentatorsontheBoxheimdocumentsdenouncedtheintendedinfringementuponprivateproperty,drewcomparisonsbetweenNazisandCommunists,condemnedforcedlaborandotherpropositionsthatsmackedofdictatorship,andraisedtheburningissuethataNationalSocialistGermanymightresembletheblueprintsoclearlylaidoutinthedocuments.147TheGermanNationalBreisgauerZeitung,ontheotherhand,downplayedthewholeincidentbyarguingthat“aracketabouthightreasonwasartificiallystagedagainsttheRight”andbyappearingconvincedthattheNationalSocialistleadershiphadbeenoblivioustotheeventsinHesse.TheBreisgauerZeitungmerelycommented:“Somethingasimmatureasthisplayingaroundwithdictatorship(Diktaturspielerei)isabsolutelyinconceivable...”148AfterBoxheim,anyonecouldeasilyseetheclearwritingonthewallaboutthegoalsandmethodsoftheNaziparty.Yet,thispotentialwarningtobewareoffutureallianceswiththeNSDAPwasalltooquicklysweptunderthecarpetbytheGermanNationals.Thefactsareobvious:theBoxheimdocumentsdidindeedconstitutea“blueprint”ofafutureNazidictatorship,ablueprintthatwasdiscussedineverycorneroftheGermanReichinthelatefallof1931,sincecountlessdailypapersmadethedocumentstheobjectofintensereportinganddetailedcommentary.TherearetwopossibleexplanationsastowhytheBoxheimaffairwasnottakenmoreseriouslyasageneralwarningofthingstocome:theclaimthatresponsibilitylayonlywiththeHessianNationalSocialists,nottheNSDAPasawhole,and,perhapsmoresignificantly,thegeneralmiseryandall-pervasivecorrosionofsocialmoresandpoliticalculturethatcharacterizedthelastyearsoftheWeimarRepublic.Thisdeclinewasnotlimitedtopalpableproblems,suchascontinuallyclimbingunemploymentrates,lackofprospectsforthefuture,andrisingcrimeandsuiciderates.Alesstangible,butequallypotentdangerresultedfromtheerosionoflong-standingpoliticalpracticesandtraditions:electioncampaignsdominatedbymurderanddeadlybeatings;theunendingaccumulationofwell-publicizedpoliticalcorruptioncasesthatmadethepublicwaryoftheparliamentarysystem'sabilitytofunctionatall;and,finally,aninflationofoutrageousandradicalpoliticalopinionsofallkindsthatknewnobounds,totheextentthatnewspaperreaders

nolongertookwarningsofcomingcatastrophesveryseriously.Meanwhile,therewasnoshortageofwarnings.Thesummerof1932sawa

secondandequallyominousportentofthingstocomethatwasconnectedwiththeescalatingpoliticalviolence.StreetbattlesbetweenparamilitaryorganizationsoftheLeftandtheSAhadbecomeincreasinglyacrimoniousduringtheJuly1932electioncampaign.EspeciallyafterPapen'sgovernmentliftedthebanonuniforms(partofthepricePapenpaidfortheNSDAP'stolerationofhisCabinet),anatmosphereakintocivilwardescendeduponthestreetsofmanyPrussiancities.Themostnotoriousexamplewasthe“bloodySunday”inAltonawhere,onSunday,17July,theSA,marchingthroughaworking-classquarterofthecity,gotcaughtinacommunistambush.149Thestreetbattlethatfollowedclaimedmorethanfifteenlives.150Directlyfollowingtheelectionsof31July,theNazistookbloodyrevengeontheircommunistenemiesintheeastPrussiancapitalKönigsberg.Inordertoputastoptothespiralofever-intensifyingpoliticalviolence,Papen'sgovernmentissuedanordinanceon9August1932thatmade“deadlyassaults”uponpoliticalopponentspunishablebythedeathpenalty.Thesentencingofpoliticalcrimeswouldbeexecutedinsummarytrialsbyspecialcourts.151ThePotempamurderwasastellingastheBoxheimdocumentsinpredicting

futureNaziactions.Onthenightof10August1932,inthesmallupperSilesiantownofPotempa,fiveuniformedSAmenforcedtheirwayintothelodgingsofthecommunistlaborerPietrzuch,clubbedandtrampledhimtodeathinfrontofhismother'sveryeyes,andseverelyinjuredhisbrotherthroughsimilarabuse.Inaccordancewiththenewordinance,allfiveSAmenweresentencedtodeathbyaspecialcourtinBeuthenon22August.ThemurderinPotempacausedanimmensesensationinthepressthroughouttheReich.ThescandalwasfurtherintensifiedwhenitbecameknownthatHitlersentatelegramtothecondemnedSAmen,inwhichheassuredthemofhissolidaritywiththeiractionsanddeclared:“Mycomrades,facedwiththismostmonstrousbloodjudgmentIfindmyselfjoinedwithyouinunboundedloyalty.Fromthisday,yourfreedomhasbecomeaquestionofourhonor.”152IntheNaziVölkischerBeobachterHitlerturned,inthreateningposture,onPapen:“HerrvonPapen,Inowknowyourbloodyobjectivitywell....Wewillliberatetheconceptof‘national-mindedness’fromtheclutchesofan‘objectivity’whoseinneressencesetsthejudgmentofBeuthenagainstnationalistGermany.HerrvonPapenhastherebyengravedhisnamewiththebloodofnationalwarriorsonGermanhistory.”153ThisundisguisedpublicthreatmighthaveservedPapenandtheDNVPasanunmistakablewarningandoughttohaveconvincedthemtodoeverything

possibletopreventHitlerfromcomingtopower.InhisproclamationtoPapen,HitlerclearlyhintedatthedisdainforlegalpracticesinafutureNationalSocialistdictatorshipanddroppedthedeceptivemaskoflegalityhehadheretoforeobliginglyadopted.Freiburg'sCenterPartypressstruckupanunambiguouslyanti-Nazitone,

despitecoalitionnegotiationsbetweentheCenterPartyandtheNSDAP,andraisedgeneralconcernsaboutlegalpracticesinafutureNazistate,pointingtoHitler'sdoublestandardsandcomparingNazilegalpractice“totheBolshevikconceptoflawasonereducedtoamereservantofpoliticsinthetotalstate.”154TheliberalmainstreamFreiburgerZeitungcautiouslypointedtotheseverityofthesentenceforthis“bloodydeed,”arguingthatonewouldhave“togofarbackinGermanlegalhistorytofindacomparablecaseofmassexecution,”whiletheGermanNationalBreisgauerZeitungunapologeticallymentionedthatthe“deadmanofPotempa,”whoselifewas“nowtobeatonedforwithfivedeathsentences”hadafterall“foughtonthePolishsideasaninsurgentagainsthisfatherland.”155TheBreisgauerZeitungconspicuouslyheldbackcriticismandevenexpressedunderstandingfor“callingthistraitortothefatherlandtoaccount,”156despitethefactthatrelationsbetweentheDNVP(whichremainedthepoliticalpillarofPapen'sgovernment)andtheNaziswereatalowebbinthelatesummerof1932.GiventhatGermanNationalswerepreparedtomakeallowancesforNazi

murderandfreelycondoneotherbreachesofthelawatatimewhentheirrelationswerestrained,itwasunlikelythattheywouldexertaneffectivemoderatinginfluenceonNaziexcessesundertheverydifferentconditionsprevailingduringtheperiodoftheNaziseizureofpower,especiallyafterenteringaformalcoalitionwiththeNSDAP.ThefollowingsixchaptersfocusontherelationshipbetweentheDNVPandtheconservativeestablishmentitrepresented,ontheonehand,andtheNazis,ontheother,from30January1933—thedayHindenburgtransferredthechancellorshiptoHitler—tomidJulyofthatyearwhen,withabanonallpoliticalpartiesotherthantheNSDAP,thefirstphaseoftheNazirevolutioncametoanend.

1.Delbrück,whohadbeenmentionedasacandidateforpartyleadershipevenbeforeHergt,wasopposedbythePan-GermanAssociationduetohiscloserelationshipwithBethmann-Hollweg.SeeChristianF.Trippe,KonservativeVerfassungspolitik,1918–1923.DieDNVPalsOppositioninReichundLändern(Düsseldorf,1995).

2.SeeHans-UlrichWehler,DeutscheGesellschaftsgeschichte,1849–1914,vol.III(Munich,1995),1020–1022,1088–1090.

3.JohnG.Williamson,KarlHelfferich,1872–1924.Economist,Financier,Politician(Princeton,1971).

4.ThisreferstodeputiesWilhelmHenningandReinholdWulle,whopushedforamoreanti-SemiticstancewithintheDNVP.SeeJanStriesow,DieDeutschnationaleVolksparteiunddieVölkisch-Radikalen,1918–1922,twovols.(Frankfurt,1981);Trippe,KonservativeVerfassungspolitik,209.

5.IntheFirstLutherCabinet(January1925toJanuary1926)andtheFourthMarxCabinet(January1927toJune1928).MinisterialpostsheldincludedInterior,Justice,Finance,Economics,FoodandNutrition,andTransportation.

6.RobertGrathwol,StresemannandtheDNVP.ReconciliationorRevengeinGermanForeignPolicy,1924–1926(Lawrence,Kansas,1980);PeterKrüger,DieAußenpolitikderRepublikvonWeimar,2nded.(Darmstadt,1993);KlausHildebrand,DasvergangeneReich(Stuttgart,1995),383–560;GottfriedNiedhart,DieAußenpolitikderWeimarerRepublik(Munich,1999).

7.DirectorGeneraloftheEastPrussianAgriculturalCreditBank(1906–1916).Kappwasbornin1858inNewYork,wherehisfatherhadbeenforcedtoemigrate.HelaterbecameanestateownerandhighofficialinEastPrussia.Afterthefailedputsch,KappfledtoSwedenbutreturnedtoGermanyin1922toappearbeforetheReichSupremeCourtinLeipzigtofaceanindictmentonhightreason.Hediedtherewhileawaitingtrialon12June1922.

8.JohannesErger,DerKapp-LüttwitzPutsch.EinBeitragzurdeutschenInnenpolitik1919/1920(Düsseldorf,1967);DietrichOrlow,“PreußenundderKappPutsch,”VierteljahresheftefürZeitgeschichte26(1978),191–236;RaffaelScheck,AlfredvonTirpitzandGermanRight-WingPolitics,1914–1930(AtlanticHighlands,1998);Winkler,Weimar,120–126;ErichEyck,GeschichtederWeimarerRepublik,4thed.,vol.I(Zürich1972),202–208;HansMommsen,TheRiseandFallofWeimarDemocracy(ChapelHillandLondon,1996),81–88;HagenSchulze,Weimar.Deutschland,1917–1933(Berlin,1994),211–217.

9.Liebe,Volkspartei,57and153(note268).InEastPrussiathegovernorandthecommanderofitsmilitarydistrictplacedthemselvesatKapp'sdisposal.

10.Liebe,Volkspartei,150(notes237,238).InWestarp'sliterarybequest,whichLiebeexaminedindetail,thewarningwasinterpretedasaprecautionarymeasure,sinceanycomplicityinorknowledgeoftheplot(justasactiveparticipationinit)waspunishableashightreason.

11.HerbertPaulGeorgvonBerger(1881–1944),thePrussianStateCommissionerfortheMaintenanceofPublicOrder,asympathizeroftheright,hadconcealedhisknowledgeoftheimpendingcoupfromPrussianandReichauthorities.SeeWinkler,Weimar,121.

12.Liebe,Volkspartei,54.13.GottfriedTraub(1869–1956),initiallyaProgressivePeople'sPartydeputyinthePrussianLandtag,

wasoneofthecofoundersoftheFatherlandParty.Afterthefailureoftheputsch,TraubescapedarrestbyfleeingtoAustria.SeeHagenlücke,Vaterlandspartei,306–310;385–390;Trippe,KonservativeVerfassungspolitik,211.

14.Intheelectionsof6June1920theDVPtripledthenumberofitsvotersfrom1.345to3.919million,increasingitsReichstagseatsfrom19to65.GainsmadebytheDNVPweremoderatebycontrast—from3.121to4.249millionvotes(from44to71mandates).SeeKolb,DieWeimarerRepublik,308–309.GiventhattheDNVPwasthemostvociferouslyanti-Republicanparty,largergainshadbeenexpectedinviewofthepublicdisillusionmentwiththeRepublicthatfollowedtheVersaillesTreaty.

15.SiegfriedvonKardorff(1873–1945)wasthesonofWilhelmvonKardorff,thecofounderoftheFreeConservativeParty.HehadbeenaFreeConservativedeputyinthePrussianLandtaguntil1918,whenhelefthisparliamentaryfactionbecausehesupportedtheabolitionofPrussia'sthree-classvotingsystem.AsDVPdeputyhebecameVice-PresidentoftheReichstagfrom1928to1932.

16.“TheRealFaceoftheRapalloTreaty,”KonservativeMonatsschrift79(June1922).Inthisarticle,Henningarguedthat“theinternationalJewRathenau”hadsulliedGermanhonorbecausehehadfailedtomentionthemurderoftheGermanenvoyinMoscowduringtheRapallonegotiations(WilhelmGrafvonMirbach-Horffwasmurderedon6July1918).Henning'spolemicculminatedinthephrase,“GermanhonorisnotacommoditytobehaggledoverbyinternationalJews.”SeeHertzman,DNVP,124–165;Winkler,Weimar,173.

17.Anti-Semiticattitudesofpartymembersandleadersarediscussedinchapter5.WhentheDNVPwasfoundedinNovember1918,anti-Semitismdidnotplayaroleintheparty'sself-image.InthecausecélèbreoftheRepublic'searlyyears,AnnevonGierke,daughteroftheprominentlegalscholarOttovonGierke(whosewifewasJewish),whohadservedasaDNVPdeputyintheNationalAssemblyin1919,sawhernominationforaReichstagseatthwartedbytheobstructionismofanti-SemitesinDNVPLandAssociations,whereuponsheandherfatherlefttheparty.

18.Liebe,Volkspartei,66.19.WilhelmKube(1887–1943)hadbeenamemberofLiebermannvonSonnenberg'santi-Semitic

GermanSocialPartybefore1914,GeneralSecretaryoftheGermanConservativePartyinSilesiain1918,amemberoftheNSDAPsince1928,GauleiteroftheKurmark,andprovincialgovernor(Oberpräsident)oftheprovinceofBrandenburgsince1933.In1941,hewasappointed“GeneralCommissar”of“WhiteRuthenia”inMinsk,wherehewasassassinatedin1943.

20.OttoHoetzsch(1876–1946),awell-knownhistorianandexpertonRussia,professorinBerlinsince1913,memberofthePan-GermanAssociationandforeignpolicyanalystfortheKreuzzeitung(1914–1924);sinceDecember1918memberoftheDNVPandReichstagdeputysince1920.HoetzschbecameestrangedfromtheDNVPafterHugenbergbecamechairman.SeeGerdVoigt,OttoHoetzsch,1876–1946.WissenschaftundPolitikimLebeneinesdeutschenHistorikers(Berlin/East,1978).

21.Thiswasaloanof800millionmarkstosatisfyurgentdemandsforcapitalandtoactasacatalystforGermaneconomicrecovery.ThetotalamountofwarreparationswasnotfixedandtheconversionofGermanpaymentsintoforeigncurrencywasentrustedtoanAlliedReparationsAgent,whosedutyitwastosafeguardGermany'sabilitytomakepayments.Germany'snationalrailroadsystem(Reichsbahn)anditsnationalbank(Reichsbank)becamesubjecttointernationalsupervision.AlliedcontrolovertheReichsbahnandReichsbankinfringeduponGermansovereigntyrightsasdidcontroloverthepublicbudgetbytheReparationsAgent.Ontheotherhand,Germanindustryandagriculturewereinterestedinforeignloans,initialpaymentsweremoderate,andtheendoftheeconomicdivisionbetweentheoccupiedandunoccupiedareaswouldofferrelieftothepopulationoftheRhineland.

22.SincetheDNVPReichstagfactionformedapartnershipwiththeLandbund(10seats),theDNVPnowhadthelargestparliamentarygroupwith105seatsandwasinapositiontoappointthepresidentoftheReichstag(MaxWallrafreplacedPaulLöbebetweenMayandDecember1924,whentheSPDagainbecamethestrongestparty).AftertheMayelections,theweightofeconomicpressuregroupswithintheDNVPintensified.Itwasthisheightenedinfluenceofindustrialandcommercialcirclesthatpartiallydeterminedtheparty'spositionontheDawesPlan.

23.NationaleRundschau,24July1924,reprintedinLiebe,Volkspartei,165–166.TheDNVPdemandedthattheGermandelegationbetreatedasanequalpartner,thatthoseimprisonedduringtheoccupationoftheRuhrbesetfree,thatthoseexpelledberepatriated(morethan100,000),andthat“thecounter-factualadmissionofguilt”oftheVersaillesTreatyberevoked(i.e.,Article231).

24.Liebe,Volkspartei,81;Eyck,Geschichte,I,403–430.25.Liebe,Volkspartei,82.26.SeeBerlinerTageblatt406,27August1924;Liebe,Volkspartei,167.27.VossischeZeitung412,30August1924.28.CommunistsandNationalSocialistshaddemandedavotebynameonallbillsconnectedwiththe

DawesPlan;SocialDemocratsonlyfortheReichsbahnlaw.Liebe,Volkspartei,87.29.Hertzman,DNVP,204–239;Liebe,Volkspartei,88.30.RegardingtherelationshipbetweenPan-GermansandtheDNVP,seeMichaelStürmer,Koalition

undOppositioninderWeimarerRepublik(Düsseldorf,1967),190–196.31.AlfredKruck,GeschichtedesAlldeutschenVerbandes,1890–1939(Wiesbaden,1954).32.Stürmer,KoalitionundOpposition,193;Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,43;Claßmadeitplainthat

therewasnoplacefordeputieswhohadvotedfortheDawesPlan.33.ReprintedinLiebe,Volkspartei,171(note431).34.HergthimselfhadvotedagainsttheDawesPlanlaw,butherefusedtoimposepartydisciplineon

theReichstagfactionsincehewasawareofthelargenumberofpotentialdissenterswithintheparty.35.Winkler,Weimar,1918–1933,269.36.Acompromisesolutionwasadvisablesince,apartfromWestarp,othercandidateswereconsidered:

moderatesendeavoredtoputHergtinchargeagain;tootherstheReichstagpresident,MaxWallraf,aCatholic,seemedapromisingcandidate,whileagriculturalinterestgroupsfavoredMartinSchiele.

37.Liebe,Volkspartei,99.38.FromNationaleRundschau,22October1924,citedinLiebe,Volkspartei,95;Winkler,Weimar,

1918–1933,269.DNVPhandbillsexclaimed:“AnyonewhodoesnotvoteisJuda'sslave,France'scoolie,callsBolshevismintothecountry,sacrificeshischildren.”CitedinHeinrich-AugustWinkler,Mittelstand,Demokratie,undNationalsozialismus(Köln,1972),132.

39.TheDNVPreceivedseveralportfolios:MartinSchiele,arepresentativeoftheRuralLeague,becameMinisteroftheInterior;AlbertNeuhaus,aretiredseniorofficial,MinisterofEconomics;MinisterialDirectorOttovonSchliebenbecameMinisterofFinance;andtheEastPrussianestateownerGrafKanitz,whohadbeenamemberoftheDNVPuntilOctober1923andwasnowwithoutpartyaffiliation,becameMinisterofNutritionandAgriculture.GovernmentalparticipationlastedfromJanuaryuntil26October1925.Winkler,Weimar,1918–1933,266;Eyck,Geschichte,I,427.

40.MichaelStürmer,“DiekonservativeRechteinderWeimarerRepublik,”inOswaldHauser,ed.,PolitischeParteieninDeutschlandundFrankreich,1918–1939(Wiesbaden,1969),38–51,esp.45.

41.SeeStürmer,KoalitionundOpposition,98–107.42.AttilaChanady,“TheDisintegrationoftheGermanNationalPeople'sParty,1924–1930,”Journal

ofModernHistory39(1967),65–91,esp.74.TheTreatywassignedbyChancellorLutherandStresemannon16October1925;theDNVPministers'resignationfollowedon25October1925.

43.SeeAttilaChanady,“Disintegration,”74–75;WalterH.Kaufmann,MonarchismintheWeimarRepublic(NewYork,1953),153–156.Locarnowasapprovedon27November1925byavoteof300to174(againstthevotesofGermanNationals,NationalSocialists,Communists,andmembersoftheWirtschaftspartei).

44.Somefoundedtheirowninterestgroups,suchastheChristianNationalPeasantandLandvolkParty.Pureoppositionpolitics,theargumentran,wasdetrimentaltoagriculturalinterests.SeeStürmer,KoalitionundOpposition,190;Chanady,“Disintegration,”76.

45.TheFourthCabinetofWilhelmMarx,withformerpartyleaderOskarHergtasMinisterofJustice,WaltervonKeudellasMinisteroftheInterior,MartinSchieleasMinisterforNutrition,andWilhelmKochasMinisterforTransportation.

46.On27May1927theRepublikschutzgesetzwasextendedforonlytwoyears,whichmadeitmoreacceptabletotheDNVP.

47.Kaufmann,Monarchism,170–173.48.Stürmer,“DiekonservativeRechteinderWeimarerRepublik,”46.49.Liebe,Volkspartei,103.50.OnHugenberg'spressempire,seeHeidrunHolzbach,Das“SystemHugenberg:”DieOrganisation

bürgerlicherSammlungspolitikvordemAufstiegderNSDAP,1918–1928(Stuttgart,1981);ErichEyck,WeimarerRepublik,4thed.,Vol.II(Zürich1972),31–32.

51.WalterLambach,“Monarchismus,”PolitischeWochenschrift4,no.24,14June1928.ExcerptsinEnglishcanbefoundinKaufmann,Monarchism,182–185.SeealsoAmreiStupperich,VolksgemeinschaftoderArbeitersolidarität.StudienzurArbeitnehmerpolitikinderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,1918–1933(Göttingen,1982),140–146;LarryE.Jones,“BetweentheFronts:TheGermanNationalUnionofCommercialEmployeesfrom1928to1933,”JournalofModernHistory48(1976),462–482.

52.Eyck,Geschichte,II,215.TheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistantswasthelargestunionforwhite-collarworkers(Angestellte).Itwasconservative,nationalistic,andpartlyanti-Semitic.DuringtheWeimarRepublicitsmembershiprosefrom147,800(1918)to403,000(1932),anditsoonbecamearallyingpointforthoseinsidetheDNVPwhowerehostiletoHugenberg.SeeBracher,Auflösung,316.

53.“MonarchistsandRepublicans,joinourranks!Andwiththischangeinourattitudeconcerningthegovernment,wemustalsochangeourprogramandourpartyleadership.”Kaufmann,Monarchism,183–184.

54.SeealsoMommsen,TheRiseandFallofWeimarDemocracy,257–260;Eyck,Geschichte,II,215–216;Bracher,Auflösung,313–314.

55.SeeLeopold,AlfredHugenberg,45–55.56.Eyck,Geschichte,II,216.57.ArminMohler,DiekonservativeRevolutioninDeutschland,1918–1932,3rded.,2vols.

(Darmstadt,1990);KurtSontheimer,AntidemokratischesDenkeninderWeimarerRepublik,DTVpaperbacked.(Munich,1978).

58.Karl-HeinzMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei.DieRegierungHitler,vol.I(Boppard,1983).59.Eyck,Geschichte,II,436.60.AlfredHugenberg(1865–1951),borninHannover,beganhiscareerin1889asanofficial

(Assessor)inKassel;from1894–1899heworkedattheAnsiedlungskommissioninPosen;from1900to1903hewasdirectoroftheRaiffeisengenossenschaften,followingthatPrivyCounselorinthePrussianFinanceMinistry(until1907)and,from1909to1918,wasChairoftheBoardofDirectorsoftheKruppSteelWorks.Beginningin1916,hebuiltuphisowncompaniesandnewspaperandfilmenterprises.

61.OnthePan-Germans,seeRogerChickering,WeMenwhofeelmostGerman(Stanford,1982);Kruck,GeschichtedesAlldeutschenVerbandes;BarryJackisch,“NotaLarge,butaStrongRight:ThePan-GermanLeague,RadicalNationalism,andRightistPartyPoliticsinWeimarGermany,1918–1933”(Ph.D.Diss.,Buffalo,2000);RainerHering,KonstruierteNation.DerAlldeutscheVerband1890bis1939(Hamburg,2003).

62.HeinrichClaß(1868–1953),aformerstudentofHeinrichvonTreitschke,joinedthePan-Germansin1897andservedastheirleaderfrom1908untilthedissolutionoftheorganizationin1939.

63.“BlockoderBrei,”BerlinerLokalanzeiger,28August1928;Mommsen,TheRiseandFallofWeimarDemocracy,256–259.

64.From14.2percent(1928)to7.0(1930)downto5.9(1932).SeeKolb,WeimarerRepublik,308–309,andThomasMergel,“DasScheiterndesdeutschenTory-Konservatismus.DieUmformungderDNVPzueinerrechtsradikalenPartei1928–1931,”HistorischeZeitschrift276(2003),323–368.

65.Seethepartybulletin,UnserePartei,1928,340;HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”547.66.Schulze,Weimar,312.67.Bracher,Auflösung,397.68.TaschenbuchderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,publishedbytheDeutschnationale

Schriftenvertriebsstelle(Berlin,1929).FriedrichvonWinterfeld,leaderoftheparliamentaryfactioninthePrussianLandtagsince1928,andoneofHugenberg'smostloyalsupporters,demandedthisprivilegeforthepartychairmaninearly1929.

69.HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”548.70.Thishappenedinthefallof1928.UndertheDawesPlan,paymentsfor1928wereraisedto2.5

billionReichsmark,whichstrainedthecountry'sabilitytopay.71.SinceinitialstatementsfromFranceandGreatBritainwerenotencouraging,Stresemannatfirst

evenhesitatedtorecommendtheappointmentofareparationscommitteetotheReichstag.72.WernerLink,DieamerikanischeStabilisierungspolitikinDeutschland,1921–1931(Düsseldorf,

1970);Eyck,Geschichte,II,236–245.73.Theliabilitiesoftheinter-Allieddebts,whichGermanpaymentsweresupposedtocover,continued

until1987–1988.74.UndertheYoungPlantermstheso-called“transferprotection”(Transferschutz)wascancelled,

meaningthatreparationswouldhavetobepaidevenintimesofeconomichardship.75.SeeSchulze,Weimar,310;Mommsen,TheRiseandFallofWeimarDemocracy,278.76.OnattacksagainsttheDNVPinGoebbels'sDerAngriff,seeBracher,Auflösung,317(note124).On

theoppositiontotheYoungPlaningeneral,seeOtmarJung,“PlebiszitärerDurchbruch1929?Zur

BedeutungvonVolksbegehrenundVolksentscheidgegendenYoungPlanfürdieNSDAP,”GeschichteundGesellschaft15(1989),489–510.

77.FortheEnglishtext,seeJeremyNoakesandGeoffPridham,Nazism,1919–1945.ADocumentaryReader(Exeter,1996),vol.I,64–65.HugenbergcirculatedthetextamonghissupportersinthesummerandfinallypublisheditinSeptember1929.

78.Lindeiner-WildauwasHauptgeschäftsführeruntil1921and,until1925,politicalchargéofthepartyleader.OnWestarp'spolicies,seeBracher,whometiculouslyevaluatedWestarp'sliterarybequestregardingeventsin1929and1930,inAuflösung,309–22.

79.MartinSchielewasDNVPReichstagdeputyfrom1919untilheleftthepartyin1930;heheldministerialportfoliosin1925and1927–1928andwaspresidentoftheRuralLeaguefrom1928to1930.

80.SeeHansvonSchlange-Schöningen,AmTagedanach(Hamburg,1946);WeißandHoser,eds.,Deutschnationalen;DenisPaulWalker,“AlfredHugenbergandtheDeutschnationaleVolkspartei1918to1930,”(Diss.Cambridge,1976).

81.TheseincludedEmilHartwig,leaderoftheGermanNationalArbeiterbund;WalterLambach,whochairedtheDNVPReichsangestelltenausschuß;andtheTradeUnionSecretaryGustavHülser;allthreewerepartoftheChristianSocialwing.

82.OrDeutschnationaleArbeitsgemeinschaft.GottfriedReinholdTreviranus(1891–1971),formerofficerintheImperialNavy,DNVPReichstagdeputysince1924.OnTreviranusseeErasmusJonas,DieVolkskonservativen,1928–1933(Düsseldorf,1965).

83.Bracher,Auflösung,321.84.ArticleIVwastheinfamous“Zuchthausparagraph.”AccordingtoEyck,Geschichte,II,282,fifty-

fivedeputiesvoted“yes”;accordingtoWinkler,Weimar,355,thenumberwasfifty-three.TheDNVPreceivedseventy-threeseatsintheMay1928elections.

85.JustasprominentinthefactionwereHansvonSchlange-Schöningen,chairmanofthelargestLandAssociation(Pomerania);theCatholicPaulLejeune-Jung,thefactoryownerMoritzKlönne,Hans-ErdmannvonLindeiner-Wildau,WaltervonKeudell,OttoHoetzsch,andGottfriedTreviranus,whowouldsoonbecomechairmanoftheKonservativeVolkspartei.SeeBracher,Auflösung,322.

86.SiegmundNeumann,DieParteienderWeimarerRepublik,5thed.(Stuttgart,1986),70–72.87.Itsappeallayprimarilyinitsreligiouscharacter,althoughleftistelementsstronglystoodout:the

Volksdienstcombinedseeminglycontradictoryelements,suchastrenchantcriticismofcapitalismwithemphaticanti-revolutionaryattitudes;itrejectedtheclassstruggleandpointedlyrenounced,incontrasttomostotherWeimarparties,excessesinpoliticalpropaganda.AdolfStoecker'sChristianSocialMovementandFriedrichNaumann,toacertainextent,wereheldupasmodelstoemulate.SeeNeumann,Parteien,70–72.

88.Ibid.,65–66.89.TheKonservativeVolksparteiwasformedon23July1930.ApartfromCountWestarp,other

waywardDNVPmembersanddeputies,whorefusedtotoethepartyline,soonjoineditsranks.SeeJonas,DieVolkskonservativen;Bracher,Auflösung,347–349.

90.SeeMichaelBehnen,DasPolitischeWochenblatt,1851–1861.NationalkonservativePublizistikgegenStändestaatundPolizeistaat(Göttingen,1971).

91.SeeBeck,“TheChangingConcernsofPrussianConservatism,”86–106.92.Neumann,Parteien,68–70.93.IrisHamel,VölkischerVerbandundnationaleGewerkschaft.DerDeutschnationale

Handlungsgehilfenverband1893–1933(Frankfurt,1967);Jones,“BetweentheFronts,”462–482.94.TheirfourReichstagdeputieswereLambach,Lindeiner,Treviranus,andWestarp.95.Bracher,Auflösung,322;Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,49.96.ItsoonbecameobviousthatthebloodlettingtheDNVPexperiencedintheSeptemberelectionsof

1930didnotbenefittheVolkskonservativenorotherconservativegroups,butonlytheNSDAP.ThenumberofDNVPvotesfellfrom4.381to2.458million;itsnumberofseatsfrom73toonly41.

97.Thiscorrespondedtoonly14percentofthoseeligibletovote.Eyck,Geschichte,II,285;Schulze,

Weimar,311;Winkler,Weimar,356.98.UlrichSchüren,DerVolksentscheidzurFürstenenteignung1926(Düsseldorf,1978).99.Winkler,Weimar,368;Schulze,Weimar,315;Kaufmann,Monarchism,191–195;Jonas,Die

Volkskonservativen.100.HagenSchulze,forexample,wrotewithreferencetoSchleicher'smaneuvers:“Thesepreparations,

whichdidnotremainsecret,areuntilthisdaylinkedwithapersistentrepublicanlegend:thestabinthebackbyreactionariesandindustrialistshaddestroyedtheGrandCoalitionandbroughtaboutthedownfalloftheRepublic.Inreality,theeventssurroundingHindenburgplayednoroleinHermannMüller'sresignation;rather,hewasbroughtdownbyhisownparty.”Schulze,Weimar,315.InWinkler'sdetailedanalysis(Weimar,366–374)greaterweightisaccordedtotheroleofindustrialcirclesclosetotheDVP:“TheSocialDemocratswereclumsyenoughinthelastcrisisoftheGrandCoalitiontobeleftholdingthebag.Buttherealarchitectsofthechangeinpowersatontherightwingofthegovernmentbenchesorbelongedtotheextra-parliamentaryRight.”(Weimar,373).Yet,evenWinklerconcedesthatBrüning'sproposedcompromise,presentedliterallyatthelastminute(onthemorningof27March),wasrejectedbytheSPDfactionundertheinfluenceofLaborMinisterRudolfWissellandtheunionwingoftheSPD,whereasthemajorityoftheDVPfactionwasreadytoacceptthecompromise(Weimar,370–371);seeDavidE.Barclay,RudolfWissellalsSozialpolitiker1890–1933(Berlin,1978).

101.WiththeSixthWorldCongressoftheCominterninthesummerof1928,theunitedfrontofthetwoworkingclassparties(thatbeganin1924)cametoanend.TheKPDnolongercollaboratedwithlaborunionsandSocialDemocrats,whowerenowlabeled“socialfascists,”andjointMayDayparadeswerenolongerpermitted.SeeSiegfriedBahne,DieKPDunddasEndevonWeimar(Frankfurt,1976);OssipK.Flechtheim,DieKPDinderWeimarerRepublik(Frankfurt,1969).

102.ArthurRosenberg,GeschichtederWeimarerRepublik,newed.(Hamburg,1991),200–201.103.GerhardStoltenberg,DiepolitischenStrömungenimSchleswig-HolsteinischenLandvolk1918–

1933(Düsseldorf,1962),125–128;RudolfHeberle,LandbevölkerungundNationalsozialismus.EinesoziologischeUntersuchungderpolitischenWillensbildunginSchleswig-Holstein1918–1932(Stuttgart,1963),156–160;andHansFallada'snovel,Bauern,Bonzen,undBomben(Berlin,1931).

104.HermannMüller(1876–1931)sufferedfromliverandgallbladderdiseasesanddiedinMarch1931.OnMüller'sgovernment,seeMartinVogt,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei.DasKabinettMüllerII,2vols.(Boppard,1970–1971).

105.HaroldJames,DeutschlandinderWeltwirtschaftskrise,1924–1936(Stuttgart,1988),451,citesanunemploymentfigureof3.366millionforFebruary1930.

106.RainerFattmann,BildungsbürgerinderDefensive.DieakademischeBeamtenschaftundder‘ReichsbundderhöherenBeamten’inderWeimarerRepublik(Göttingen,2001).

107.ThispointismadebyHaroldJames,“EconomicReasonsfortheCollapseoftheWeimarRepublic,”inIanKershaw,ed.,Weimar:WhydidGermanDemocracyFail?(NewYork,1990),30–58.“InWeimarGermanyemployersbelievedthattheyhadbeenobstructedbyover-powerfultradeunions.Unionsbelievedthatemployershadembarkedonacombinationofeconomicallysenselessinvestmentprojectsandpoliticalcounter-revolution.Thestate'sfiscalcrisisledtofarmersthinkingthattheypaidhightaxestosubsidizeunemployed(andidle)workersandbankerswhoneededstatebailoutswhentheyfailedasaresultoftheirownmistakenpolicies.WorkersthoughtthattheirrealwagesweretoolowbecauseofthelimitlessgreedofGermanagriculture.”(Ibid.,46).

108.TheodorWolffandEmilLudwigoriginallycountedamongthecriticsoftheItaliandictator.Wolff'sinterviewwithMussolini(documentinghisownpoliticalchangeofheart)appearedon11May1930,andEmilLudwig'sbook,whichenjoyedeveninternationalsuccess,waspublishedin1932.BothdrewaclearlinebetweenMussolini'sfascismandthatofhisGermanemulators.SeeWolfgangSchieder,“DerFaschismusalsVorbildinderKrisederWeimarerRepublik,”HistorischeZeitschrift262(1996),73–125,esp.85–87;andWolfgangSchieder,“FatalAttraction:TheGermanRightandItalianFascism,”inHansMommsen,ed.,TheThirdReichbetweenVisionandReality.NewPerspectivesonGermanHistory1918–1945(Oxford&NewYork,2001),39–59,esp.43.

109.GordonCraig,ThePoliticsofthePrussianArmy,1640–1945(Oxford,1964),436–453.110.Kolb,DieWeimarerRepublik,135;Somehistorians,suchasArthurRosenberg,considered

Brüningan“unconstitutionaldictator”,GeschichtederWeimarerRepublik(Hamburg,1991),211.111.SeeWernerConze,“DieKrisedesParteienstaatesinDeutschland1929/30,”Historische

Zeitschrift178(1954),47–83;WernerConzeandHansRaupach,DieStaats-undWirtschaftskrisedesDeutschenReiches,1929–1933(Stuttgart,1967),176–252;Bracher,Auflösung;Bracher,“Parteienstaat,Präsidialsystem,Notstand,”inGotthardJasper,VonWeimarzuHitler1930–1933(KölnandBerlin,1968),58–72.ForConze,Brüning'spolicieswerealastattempttosavetheRepublic;seealsohis“BrüningsPolitikunterdemDruckdergroßenKrise,”HistorischeZeitschrift199(1964),529–550.ForBracher,bycontrast,thepresidentialCabinetsofBrüning,Papen,undSchleicherwereallpartoftheprehistoryoftheThirdReich.Brüning'sownvision,aspublishedinhisposthumousmemoirs,initiallyseemedtosupportBracher'spointofview,sinceBrüningportrayedhimselfasamonarchistandopponentoftheRepublic,whohopedforsupportfromtheanti-republicanright.Yetreservationsweresoonvoicedaboutthereliabilityofthememoirs;seeRudolfMorsey,ZurEntstehung,AuthentizitätundKritikvonBrünings“Memorien1918–1934”(Opladen,1975).ThequestionremainswhetherBrüning,countingonthesupportofmoderateconservativesandconvincedthatthePresidentwouldsupporthim,rejectedthepossibilityofcooperationwiththeSPDtooeasily.

112.IncontrasttoHermannMüller,whoneededfiveweekstoformhis“Cabinetofpersonalities,”Brüningformedhisgovernmentintwodays(Schulze,Weimar,305),afeatthatwasmadeeasierforhimsinceheretainedeightofthetwelveMinistersfromMüller'sCabinet.Bracher,Auflösung,326.

113.Winkler,Weimar,377;Bracher,Auflösung,326.114.AccordingtoErichEyck,Hugenberg'sspeechwasdrownedoutbylaughterintheReichstag

(Geschichte,II,324).Incourthearingsafter1945,Hugenberg,inconsistentasalways,claimedthathehadsavedBrüning'sCabinetinthevoteof3April1930byrejectingthemotionofnoconfidence.AsEyckpointsout,HugenbergwasprudentenoughnottoincludeacopyofhisReichstagspeech.SeealsoJosephBorchmeyer,ed.,HugenbergsRingenindeutschenSchicksalsstunden.2vols.(Detmold,1951),11;Eyck,Geschichte,II,324–326;Winkler,Weimar,377–378;Bracher,Auflösung,326.

115.Bracher,Auflösung,327.116.Westarpwaswellawareoftheweakpositioninwhichanewconservativepartywithoutaparty

organizationwouldfinditself.SeeBracher,Auflösung,329,note178.117.Heinrich-AugustWinkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe.ArbeiterundArbeiterbewegunginder

WeimarerRepublik1930bis1933(Berlin&Bonn,1987),123–187.118.Alreadyon7July,ErnstOberfohren,whohadtakenoverthepositionoffactionleaderfromGraf

WestarpinDecember1929,spokeoutagainstthegovernment'staxproposals.TheSPDalsorejectedthegovernment'staxprogram,albeitfordifferentreasons.SeeBracher,Auflösung,337–338;Winkler,Weimar,378–380;Winkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,123–187.

119.Inhisappropriationsbillforthereformofstatefinances,Brüningpursuedarigorousdeflationarypolicy:reductionofpublicspending;taxincreases,especiallyonhighincomes;andan“emergencycontribution”forthosewithguaranteedincomes(“NotopferderFestbesoldeten”).SinceBrüninghadapparentlycountedonobtainingasufficientnumberofvotesfromDNVPrenegades(accordingtoWinkler,Weimar,380,Brüningneededatleast39DNVPvotes),heeschewedthepossibilityofsoundingoutacompromisewiththeSPD,whichmighthavebeenaviableoption.(Kolb,Weimar,133–35).AccordingtoSPDdeputyWilhelmKeil,evenminormodificationsinBrüning'sspendingreductionprogramwouldhavesufficedtowinSPDsupport.SeeWilhelmKeil,ErlebnisseeinesSozialdemokaten,vol.II(Stuttgart,1948),335–337.

120.HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”552,mentionedthenumberoftwenty-fivedeputies.Inameetingontheeveningof17July,amajorityofthirty-fourtotwenty-onevoteswasestablishedfortheSPD'snoconfidencemotion(accordingtoWinkler,Weimar,380).

121.Bracher,Auflösung,349–351.Afterthesplit,GrafWestarpdefendedhisgroupofrenegadesbycastigatingHugenberg'sdictatorialleadershipstyle.Beginninginearly1929,Hugenberghadallegedlyused

pressureandthreatsofexpulsionfromthepartytokeepdeputiesinline.122.ThisdidnothappencompletelyunexpectedlysincetheNSDAPhadmadesubstantialgainsin

electionstoLandparliamentsin1929.WhereastheNSDAPhadattainedonly2.6percentintheReichstagvoteof20May1928(andonly1.8percentinthePrussianLandtagvoteonthesameday),theparty'selectorateroseto3.4percentinelectionsinLippeon6January1929;5.0percentinSaxonyon12May1929;4.1percentinMecklenburg-Schwerinon23June1929;7.0percentinBadenon27October1929;8.1percentinLübeckon10November1929;11.3percentinThuringiaon8December1929,andfinallyto14.4percentinasecondelectioninSaxonyon22June1930.

123.Eyck,Geschichte,II,354–355;Schulze,Weimar,346–347.124.IntheBremenelectionson30November1930:NSDAP25.4percent;DNVP5.7percent;in

Schaumburg-Lippeon3May1931:NSDAP27percent;DNVP10.1percent(in1928,theDNVPgained16.6percent);inOldenburgon17May1931:NSDAP37.2percent;DNVP4.8percent;inHamburgon27September1931:NSDAP26.2percent;DNVP5.6percent(in1928,theDNVPreceived13.7percent);finallyinHesseon15November1931:NSDAP37.1percent;DNVP1.4percent.SeeJürgenFalter,ThomasLindenberger,andSiegfriedSchumann,WahlenundAbstimmungeninderWeimarerRepublik.MaterialienzumWahlverhalten,1919–1933(Munich,1986),89–113.

125.Jones,“‘TheGreatestStupidityofMyLife,’”63–87.126.HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”553–556.Thenamevaried:theywerealsoreferredtoas

KampfgemeinschaftandKampfring.TheDNVPwasnotaloneinadoptingthe“leadershipprinciple.”MostconservativegroupsinthelateWeimarRepublicsubscribedtoitasaneffectivepoliticalstrategy.SeeKurtSontheimer,AntidemokratischesDenkeninderWeimarerRepublik(Munich,1978),214–24;KlemensvonKlemperer,Germany'sNewConservatism(Princeton,1957);ArminMohler,DieKonservativeRevolutioninDeutschland,1918–1932,3rded.(Darmstadt,1989).

127.Kolb,WeimarerRepublik,135.128.OntheHarzburgerFront,seeGerhardSchulz,VonBrüningzuHitler.ZwischenDemokratieund

Diktatur,vol.III(Berlin,NewYork,1992),554–560;Brüning,Memoiren,425–428;Bracher,Auflösung,407–415;Winkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,432–435.WinklernotedthatBrüning'ssharpestcriticsfromthecampofindustrialistsandemployersseemedtoholdback,andrepresentativesofheavyindustryandtheDVPturnedoutonlyinsmallnumbers(p.432).

129.“VonHarzburgnachBraunschweig,”DerAngriff,21October1931;“DienationaleOpposition,”DerAngriff,19December1931;andBracher,Auflösung,413.

130.TheodorDuesterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler(WolfenbüttelandHannover,1949).131.Bracherwrote:“mitderNachgiebigkeitdesführungsgewissenHochmuts.”InAuflösung,410–411.132.UlrikeHörster-Philipps,KonservativePolitikinderEndphasederWeimarerRepublik:Die

RegierungFranzvonPapen(Cologne,1982).133.JosefBecker,“PrälatKaasunddasProblemeinerRegierungsbeteiligungderNSDAP1930–1932,”

HistorischeZeitschrift196(1963),74–111.HitlerwasofferedmerelytheunattractivepostofVice-Chancellor,andHindenburgupbraidedhimlikeaschoolboyforhisrefusaltocontinuesupportingPapen'sgovernment.

134.Bracher,Auflösung,529–559.135.TheNSDAPlosttwomillionvotesandthirty-fourseats;theDNVPgainedabout800,000votes

andfifteenseats;theSPDandCenterhadslightlossesoftwelveandfiveseatsrespectively;andtheKPDbecamethethird-strongestpartyintheReichstagwithalmostsixmillionvotesandahundredseats.SeeKolb,WeimarerRepublik,308–309.

136.InawargamecommissionedbySchleicher,itwasconvincinglydemonstratedthatthegovernmentdidnothavesufficientforcesatitsdisposaltomastersuchacontingency.SeeThiloVogelsang,Reichswehr,StaatundNSDAP(Stuttgart,1962),316–317;Eyck,Geschichte,II,483–549;Winkler,Weimar,477–521;UlrikeHörster-Philipps,KonservativePolitikinderEndphasederWeimarerRepublik.DieRegierungFranzvonPapen(Cologne,1982);FranzvonPapen,DerWahrheiteineGasse(Munich,1952),215–253.

137.Aplayonwords:“Berg”meansmountain;“Zwerg”meansdwarf.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,NSDAPandDNVP,”R8034,II,no.9030,7–8.

138.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,”ibid.,9–10.AxelvonFreytagh-Loringhoven(1878–1942),amemberofaprominentBalticGermanfamilyand,thoughethnicallyGerman,aRussiansubject,wasaprofessorofconstitutionallawattheUniversityofDorpat(present-dayTartuinEstonia)duringthewarandwasexemptfrommilitaryservice.Before1911,hehadservedasacavalryofficerintheRussianarmy.Hewasknowntobeoneofthemoreanti-SemiticDNVPdeputies.

139.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,”ibid.,14–15,17,19.OntheBreslauincidentsee“StahlhelmpogrominBreslau.Stahlhelmerviehischmishandelt,”Vorwärts,28September1932;“NationalsozialistischerVersammlungsterrorinBreslau,”DeutscheAllgemeineZeitung,28September1932.

140.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,”ibid.,16,26.Seealso“EinJahrnachHarzburg.NationalsozialistischeStinkbombengegenDeutschnationale.‘AndenGalgenmitHugenberg,’”Morgenpost,29September1932;“HugenberggegenGoebbels,”Vorwärts,30September1932.

141.Meaning:Hemaybealeadingclerkbutno“leader.”SeeHillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”566.142.In1927therewere444DNVPnewspapers.Ofthese,341appearedsixtimesperweekandthirty-

nineevenhadaSundayeditionandappearedseventimesweekly.Amongthislattergroupcountedthelargeconservativedaily,DerTag,whichbelongedtoHugenberg'sScherlVerlagandhadacirculationofabout100,000.MaximilianMüller-Jabusch,HandbuchdesöffentlichenLebens,5thed.(Leipzig,1929),664.

143.EventhoughFreiburgwasdemographicallynottypicalfortheReichasawhole:two-thirdsofFreiburg'spopulationwasCatholic(asopposedto32.5percentforGermanyin1933)and,comparedwiththeReichaverage,FreiburghadalargerproportionateshareofcivilservantsandAngestellte(white-collaremployees)andfewerblue-collarworkers.Publicservice,trade,andcommercewereoverrepresented,theindustrialsectorunderrepresented.SeeStatistischesAmtFreiburg,ed.,“DiewichtigstenErgebnissederVolks-,Berufs-undBetriebszählungvom16.Juni1933inFreiburg,”BeiträgezurStatistikderStadtFreiburg7(Freiburg,1937),18,32,37,56,68,75.

144.OttoHaffner,“GeschichteundEntwicklungderFreiburgerTagespresse,”ZeitschriftfürGeschichtsforschungvonFreiburg34&35(Freiburg,1919–1920).OnthestructureoftheGermanpressbefore1933,seeOronHale,TheCaptivePressintheThirdReich(Princeton,1964),1–15.FormoreinformationonFreiburg'slocalpress,seeHermannBeck,“LokalpresseundAufstiegderNSDAP.EineStudieanhandbürgerlicherFreiburgerTageszeitungen,”M.A.thesis(Freiburg,1981).

145.Schulz,VonBrüningzuHitler,604–610;UlrichHerbert,Best:BiographischeStudienüberRadikalismus,WeltanschauungundVernunft1903–1989,2nded.(Bonn,1996),112–119;Bracher,Auflösung,431–435;Winkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,448–451.Forthetextofthedocument,seeWolfgangMichalkaandGottfriedNiedhart,eds.,DeutscheGeschichte1918–1933.DokumentezurInnen-undAussenpolitik(Frankfurt,1992),203–206.

146.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,WernerBestbecameReichskommissarforDenmark.Hewassentencedtodeathin1948,butthenpardonedin1951.SeeHerbert,Best,aswellasHermannWeiß,ed.,BiographischesLexikonzumDrittenReich,2nded.(Frankfurt,1998),39–41.

147.“NSDAPinHessen,”FreiburgerZeitung,27November1931;“DasBoxheimerDokument,”FreiburgerTagespost,30November1931;“ZumBoxheimerSkandal,”FreiburgerTagespost,2December1931.Onthewhole,theCenterPartypressdidnotreactassharplyasmayhavebeenexpected,becauseBrüninghopedtodriveawedgebetweentheDNVPandNSDAPaftertheHarzburgmeeting.

148.“DieBilanzvonBoxheim,”BreisgauerZeitung,1December1931.149.Onstreetviolencein1932,seeRichardBessel,PoliticalViolenceandtheRiseofNazism.The

StormTroopersinEasternGermany,1925–1934(NewHaven,1984);PeterMerkl,PoliticalViolenceundertheSwastika.581EarlyNazis(Princeton,1975);Wehler,Gesellschaftsgeschichte,1914–1949,vol.IV,495–588;Mommsen,RiseandFallofWeimarDemocracy,438–490;Winkler,Weimar,477–521;Schulze,Weimar,372–391.

150.AtthattimeAltonawaspartofthePrussianprovinceofSchleswig-Holstein.Papenusedtheeventsof17July1932asapretextforhis“Preußenschlag”of20July1932,whenhedeclaredastateofemergencyinPrussiaandremovedtheBraungovernment.Karl-HeinzMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei.DasKabinettvonPapen,Vol.I(Boppard,1989),248–316.

151.The9Augustdecreethreatenedthedeathpenaltyforthosewho“inthepassionofpoliticalstruggleundertookadeadlyattackontheiropponentsoutofangerandhatred,evenifnopremeditationwasinvolved.”SeeSchulz,VonBrüningzuHitler,958–961.

152.Eyck,Geschichte,II,515–516.153.Ibid.Hitlerknewwellenoughthathecouldjustifyhimselfbyreferringtothefactthatthe

murderedworkerPietrzuchhadfoughtonthePolishsidefortheinclusionofUpperSilesiaintoPolandafterWorldWarI.ThisbrandedhimasatraitortotheGermannationalcause.

154.“Sturmzeichen,”FreiburgerTagespost,25August1932.Thoseonthenationalistside,thepapercontinued,weretobespared,eveniftheycommittedheinouscrimes.

155.“GnadefürRecht,”FreiburgerZeitung,24August1932;“OhlauundBeuthen,”BreisgauerZeitung,24August1932.

156.“OhlauundBeuthen.”Inanotherarticle,“Wiederaufnahme”of25August,theBreisgauerZeitungwrotethatdifferentyardsticksappliedwhencrimesagainst“national-mindedGermans”werecommitted,indicatingthataretrialwasinorder.

ChapterII

UNEASYPARTNERSTheRelationshipbetweentheDNVPandtheNazis,30January–5

March

TheimmediateeventssurroundingHitler'sappointmenttotheChancellorshiphavebeenthesubjectofmuchdetailedrecentscholarshipsothat,inthecontextofthepresentstudy,itwillsufficetoemphasizeanumberofsalientpoints.1(1)ThetransientcharacterofSchleicher'sChancellorshipwasapparentfromthefirst,notleastbecauseSchleicherremainedintheMinistryofDefenseattheBendlerstrasse,whilePapenresidedincloseproximitytoHindenburgintheMinistryoftheInteriorandcontinuedtoenjoyprivilegedaccesstothepresident.ThefailureofSchleicher'sgranddesign—tocreateagovernmentbasedonthesupportoftradeunionsandtheleftwingoftheNaziparty—becameapparentafteronlyafewweeks.2(2)TheNazipartyrosetopoweratatimewhenitsfortunesseemedonthewane.NotonlyhadtheNSDAPlosttwomillionvotes,about15percentofitselectorate,intheNovemberelections,italsosufferedfurtherlossesatlocalelectionsinThuringia,thusreinforcingtheimpressionofanunstoppabledownwardtrend.3Atthebeginningofthenewyear,Weimar'sdemocraticpressrejoicedthattheNazimovementnowseemedinexorablyrelegatedtotherubbleheapofhistory.4AndthefeelingthatNazisupporthadpeakedoutwasnotconfinedtoHitler'sopponents.When,inearlyDecember1932,ontopofelectiondefeats,GregorStrasserresignedhispositionasNSDAPReichsorganisationsleiter(partymanager),panicspreadthroughouttheentireparty:theopportunemomentforgainingafootholdingovernmentseemedtohavebeenmissed,arealizationaccompaniedbymassdesertionsofmembersandvociferouscriticismbypartyveterans.Financiallythepartyseemedonthevergeofcollapse.(3)TherelationshipbetweenHugenberg'sDNVPandtheNazipartyhadreachedanadirintheautumnof1932.Ithadneverbeenfreeoftension,evenduringthephonyunityoftheHarzburgerFront.ThefactthatNazipropagandahadheapedabuseonthe“reactionaries”duringtheNovember

electioncampaignandconcentrateditsfoulinvectivesonHugenberg'sshortstature(“Hugenzwerg”)andembonpointdeepenedtherift.TheGermanNationalpressrespondedbyattackingtheNazisfortheirsocialism,streetviolence,andthe“economicexperiments”thatmightbeinstoreforGermanyifHitlercametopower.WhileHugenbergcouldnotbebroughttosupportSchleicher,partlybecauseoftheChancellor'sunwillingnesstoentrusthimwiththeMinistriesofAgricultureandEconomicsinPrussiaandtheReich,5hisfirstmeetingwithHitlerinthenewyear,on17January1933,remainedfrostydespitethefactthattheDNVPhadrefrainedfromattackingtheNazipartyduringtheelectionsinLippeon15January.6(4)When,on20January,thereopeningofparliamentwasscheduledforTuesday,31January,itbecameclearthatSchleichermightwellbefacedwithano-confidencemotionthatcouldresultinyetanotherdissolutionofparliament—accompaniedbyanewroundofelectionsorpossiblyanadjournmentsinedie.On23January,theChancellorhadtoadmittoHindenburgthathehadbeenunabletoprocureanyparliamentarybacking.Hesuggested,therefore,todissolvetheReichstagforlongerthanthesixty-daylimitstipulatedintheconstitution,ascenarioverymuchliketheonePapenhadpropoundedinNovember(andwhich,sinceitharboredthedangerofcivilwar,hadledtohisdownfall).HindenburggaveSchleichertounderstandthathewasunwillingtoenvisageanybreachoftheconstitution.(5)PapenhadbeenincontactwithHitlereversincetheir4JanuarymeetinginthehouseoftheColognebankerKurtvonSchröder.ToovercomeHindenburg'scontinuedstrongreluctancetoacceptapresidentialCabinetunderHitler'sleadership,7PapennowtriedtowinovertheDNVPandtheex-servicemen'sorganizationStahlhelm(withcloseto500,000membersincludingaffiliatedorganizations).TheStahlhelmleader,FranzSeldte,waseasilypersuaded,buthisco-leaderTheodorDuesterberg,acandidateinthefirstroundofthe1932presidentialelectionswhoknewNazimethodsfrombitterpersonalexperience,balkedattheidea.Hugenbergwasinitiallyequallyintransigent.NotonlydidhedemandforhimselftheMinistriesofAgricultureandEconomics,whichSchleicherhadalreadyrefusedhim,buthealsoadamantlyopposedtheideaofentrustingHitlerwiththepositionofReichCommissarforPrussia,sincethiswouldmeanputtingtheNazisinchargeofthePrussianpolice.8WhenHitlerhimselfspokewithHugenbergonFriday,27January,theinterviewendedinanéclatandHitler,whofeltthathemightagainbefobbedoffwithlessthanhisdue,hadtobetalkedoutofreturningtoMunich.Atthispoint,HindenburgwasstillnotwonovertotheplanofappointingHitlerasChancellorinapresidentialCabinet,whilehisadvisors—hissonandMeissner—alreadyseemedreconciledtotheidea.(6)Onthemorningof

Saturday,28January,amerethreedaysbeforetheopeningoftheReichstag,Papen,togetherwithMeissnerandOskarvonHindenburg,finallysucceededindispellingthelingeringdoubtsoftheoldPresident,explainingthatthesuccessfulformationofanewgovernmentdependedonHitlerbecomingChancellor.Atnoon,followingHindenburg'smeetingwithPapen,SchleichersubmittedtheresignationofhisCabinet.Intheearlyafternoonofthatday,inyetanothermeetingwithPapen(MeissnerandOskarvonHindenburgwerealsopresent),thePresidentfinallygavehisreluctantconsenttoappointHitler.9(7)AfterdebatesbetweenPapen,Göring,andHitler,thelatterwasreconciledtotheideaofhavingPapenappointedasCommissarforPrussia(withGöringasMinisteroftheInteriorandthusinchargeofthepolice)andhandingovertheMinistriesofAgricultureandEconomicsinPrussiaandtheReichtoHugenberg.PapenwascarefulnottomentiontoHugenbergthatHitlerinsistedonnewelections,sincehecorrectlyanticipatedthatHugenbergwouldrejectthisoutright.(8)Withallobstaclesseeminglyovercome,thedesignatedCabinetmetinMeissner'sofficeonthemorningofMonday,30JanuarytobesworninbyHindenburg(theceremonywasscheduledfor11a.m.),whenHugenberg,nowfinallyacquaintedwithHitler'sdemandfornewelections,gotintoanargumentwiththeChancellor-designatethatputtheformationofthenewgovernmentinjeopardy.EvenHitler's“wordofhonor”toleavethecompositionofthegovernmentunchanged,nomatterwhattheoutcomeoftheelections,didnotplacateHugenberg.AccordingtoHenryTurner,Papen,whohadbecomefearfulthathisgrandschememightfallapart,indignantlyconfrontedHugenbergastohowhecouldpossiblydoubtthe“solemnlygivenwordofhonorofaGermanman.”10ButHugenberg,whoseacumenforoncewasnotatfault,remainedunyielding.ItwasonlyMeissner'sbreathlessexhortationat11:15a.m.thatHindenburgcouldnolongerbekeptwaitingthatbroughtHugenbergbackintoline.Lessthanhalfanhourlater,HitlerwasmadeChancelloroftheReich.PapenwasclearlythedrivingforcebehindtheformationofthenewCabinet,

eventhoughheinitiallymeanttoreplaceSchleicherwithagovernmentledbyhimselfandbuttressedbyNazisupport.Ironically,amongthoseinvolvedinformingthegovernmentorparticipatinginit—Papen,Hugenberg,andtheStahlhelmleaderSeldte—noonewantedHitlerasChancellor,andHindenburg'saversiontothe“Bohemiancorporal”waslegendary.11FromwithintheDNVP,HugenbergwasstronglyadvisedtogivepreferencetoaPapengovernment,a“KampfkabinettPapen-Hugenberg,”butifheweretoenteraCabinetunderHitler'sleadership,hewasurgedtoascertainthatneitherthePrussianpolicenortheReichswehrweretofallunderNazicommand.12Eventhough,ashis

biographerJohnA.Leopoldstressed,“Hugenbergwasnotincludedinallofthemeetingsandschemesthatwentoninthebackground,”hewas,inprinciple,preparedtoaccept“aHitlerChancellorship,butnotaNazidictatorship.”13WhenEwaldvonKleist-Schmenzin,themostdiehardopponentofNazismamongGermanNationals,triedtoprevailuponHugenbergtodenyrumorsthathewasreadytobepartofaHitlergovernment,Hugenbergrefused,claimingthatthismightbethelastopportunitytoremedyGermany'splight.14WasitambitionorrathertheconvictionthathecoulddecisivelyinfluenceGermany'seconomicfateina“governmentofnationalconsolidation”thatmadehimshoveasidescruplesandactagainstwhatmusthavebeenhisbetterjudgmentthatapactwithHitlerwasboundtohavefatefulimplications?Inthefinalanalysis,itisimpossibletoascertaintheprecisefactorsthatmadeHugenbergswallowhisprideanddisregardthepersonalattacks,insults,andinvectivestheNazipresshadpouredoverhimsoliberally.HillervonGaertingenarguedthatitmayhavebeenacombinationoffearthataHitlerCabinetcouldbeformedwithouthim,andthebeliefthathealonewascapableofsalvagingtheeconomyandtheagriculturalsector.15On30Januaryhegotallhewanted:theReichMinistriesofAgricultureandEconomics,coupledwiththePrussianMinistriesofAgricultureandCommerce,aswellasthepostofReichCommissarforEasternRelief(Osthilfe)andtheDepartmentofSocialPolicyandLaborthathadbeentransferredfromtheMinistryofLabortohisresponsibility.16ButalreadyonthedayaftertheswearinginofthenewCabinet,HugenbergconfessedtoCarlGoerdeler,OberbürgermeisterofLeipzigandaleadingconservativepolitician:“Ihavejustcommittedthegreateststupidityofmylife;Ihavealliedmyselfwiththegreatestdemagogueinworldhistory.”17Yet,asLarryJonescorrectlypointsout,ifHugenberg“hadindeedcommitted‘thegreateststupidity’ofhislifebyjoiningtheHitlerCabineton30January1933,thenthiswastheresultofastrategythathehadconscientiouslypursuedeversincehiselectiontotheDNVPpartychairmanshipinOctober1928....TheaimofthisstrategywasnothinglessthanthedestructionofWeimardemocracyandtheestablishmentofanewsystemofrulethatnolongerresteduponthewillofthepeople,butsoughttorestorethedominanceofGermany'straditionalelites...”18Thesetraditionaleliteswouldsoonbeinforarudeawakening,foron30January1933theywouldgetsomethingfardifferentthantheyhadbargainedfor.

TheImpactof30JanuaryIncontrasttoeveryothersignificantdateinGermanhistory,30January1933

wouldhaveaprofoundimpactonthelifeofeveryGerman.Otherimportanthistoricalevents,nomatterhowfar-reachinganddramatic,usuallylefttheprivatesphereoflifeintact.SebastianHaffnerillustratedthisvividly:“Wegainedexperience,acquiredconvictions,butremainedbasicallythesamepeople.However,noonewhohas,willinglyorreluctantly,beencaughtupinthemachineryoftheThirdReichcanhonestlysaythatofhimself.”19Haffnernotesthathistoricaleventsencompassvaryingdegreesofintensity.Anhistoriceventcanleavethelivesofprivateindividualsvirtuallyuntouchedoritcanwreaksuchhavocthatnothingisleftstanding:“Theusualwayinwhichhistoryiswrittenfailstorevealthis.‘1890:WilhelmIIdismissesBismarck.’Certainly,akeyeventinGermanhistory,butscarcelyaneventatallinthebiographyofanyGermanoutsidehissmallcircleofprotagonists.Lifewentonasbefore.Nofamilywastornapart,nofriendshipbrokeup,andnoonefledhiscountry.Notevenarendezvouswasmissedoranoperaperformancecancelled.Thoseinlove,whetherhappilyornot,remainedso;thepoorremainedpoor,therichremainedrich.Nowcomparethatwith‘1933:HindenburgsendsforHitler.’Anearthquakeshatters66millionlives.”20Inthefirstdaysafter30January1933,thetremendousimpactthisdatewould

indeedhaveonthelifeofeveryGermanwasnotapparenttoeveryone.TheBonntheologianKarlBarth,21memberoftheSPDsince1931andforcedtoleaveGermanyin1935afterrefusingtotaketherequiredoathofallegiancetoHitler,wroteon1February1933thathedidnotthinkHitler'sappointmentwouldchangemuchofanything,sincehewasconvincedthat“theGermanbodypoliticistooinert,bothindomesticandforeignaffairs”andthatit“hastoolittleofthatélanvitalanddynamismthatisrequiredtoestablisheitheraregimelikeMussolini'sorengageinacounterrevolution.”22TheodorEschenburg,latertoachieveprominenceasapoliticalscientist,whohadharboredtheworstfearswhenHitlerwasappointedChancellor,characterizedthegeneralmoodinearlyFebruaryasfollows:“Thecourseofeventsseemedtoprovemewrong.Forthemoment,nothingchanged.Rather,acertaincalmsetin.IntheirMondayeditionsnewspapersnolongerreportedthenumberofdeadandwoundedofthestreetbattlesfromtheweekend.Atmost,peopleshooktheirheadsovertheseeminglyinaneexultationoftheNazis.”23Ontheleft,fearswereallayedbythecomfortingthoughtthatthe

conservativesintheCabinetultimatelysetthetoneandthatHugenbergandPapenhadeffectivelycontainedHitlerandusedhimfortheirownpurposes.On7February,thepacifisteditoroftheWeltbühne,CarlvonOssietzky,24wrotethatitwastheGermanNationalswhowouldreapbenefitsfortheirpeople,whereas

“theNationalSocialistswillreapnothingbuthatred.”25KurtSchumacher,SPDReichstagdeputyandthechairmanandmoralconscienceoftheWestGermanSPDaftertheSecondWorldWar,amanwhowouldspendseveralyearsofhislifeinconcentrationcampslikeOssietzky,wasevenmoreblindedbyideologicalconsiderations.26InaspeechinAugsburgon4February1933,SchumacherclaimedthatHitlerwasmerelya“decorationpiece”:27“TheCabinethasHitler'snameonthemasthead,butinrealitytheCabinetisAlfredHugenberg.AdolfHitlermaymakethespeeches,butHugenbergwillact.”SchumachermockinglynotedthatHitlerwasthefirstChancellorwhohadtobeaccompaniedbyhisvice-ChancellorwhenmeetingwiththePresident.Andwhere,Schumacheraddedsarcastically,wasthepromisedterror:“Thesepeoplehavebeeninpowerforfivetimes24hours,butthelongknivesstillremainsheathed.”RealitywasverydifferentfromthesefirstfleetingimpressionsofNaziruleintheearlydaysofFebruary,afactthatwouldbecomeobviousalltoosoon.Themorepessimisticmoodamongconservativegroupsreflectedmore

accuratelytheactualpoliticalsituation.Hugenberg'slongtimeconfidant,theDNVPdeputyReinholdQuaatz,whohadcrossedthefloorfromtheDVPtotheDNVPin1924,notedinhisdiaryon1February:“Hugenberg,whonormallyphonesdailyorarrangestohavemefetched,hasbeensilentsincethenightbeforelast.”28QuaatznotedwithanxiousconcernthattheDNVPwasboundtoloseitsflexibilityandcloutiftheCenterPartyweretoenterintoacoalitionagreementwiththeNazis.29ThetrainedpoliticalobserverQuaatzimmediatelynotedthefactthatHitlerhad“occupiedallkeypositionswithhisownpeople—theInteriorMinistriesinbothPrussiaandtheReich,thepolice,schools,universities,wirelessstations.Weareinchargeoftheeconomy,forwhichthesixty-eightyearoldHugenbergissolelyresponsible.”30QuaatzsoonrealizedthatHugenbergwasnotuptothejob.Hindenburg'sStaatssekretärOttoMeissnervoicedconcernalreadyon7FebruarythatHugenberghadtakenontoomuch.31On9and10February,vociferousprotesteruptedacrosstheentirepartybecauseHugenberg,followingasuggestionfromPapen,insistedthattheDNVPshouldenterthecampaignfortheupcomingelections,scheduledfor5March1933,jointlywithPapenandtheStahlhelmundertheprogrammaticnameoftheoldImperialcolors“BattlefrontBlack-White-Red.”ErnstOberfohren,GrafWestarp'ssuccessorasDNVPReichstagfactionleader,formerlyoneofHugenberg'sclosestallies,nowdisagreedwiththedirectionhispartyhadtakensinceitsalliancewiththeNSDAP,andsubsequentlywhippedupinner-partyoppositiontoHugenberg.UltimatelythisprovedunsuccessfulandwouldlaterdestroyOberfohrenandnotHugenberg.32AsQuaatzreported,negative

assessmentsofHugenbergbegantoaccumulate:“Inthecountryheisnotpopular.SinceIamconsideredhisintimate,mostpeopleavoidtalkingabouthimtome.Whatonedoeshearisunfavorable.Helackscharisma.MostworrisomeistheconcernvoicedearlierbyMeissner:Willhebeabletocopewiththemanifoldburdenshehastakenon?”33ByearlyMarch,Quaatzfearedthat“HugenbergislosinggroundnotonlytoHitlerandGöring,butalsotoPapen”andthattheconsistentburdenofworkwastakingitstoll:“Ontopofeverythingtherearehealthproblems.Inadditiontotheflu,hesuffersfromrenalcolic.Heneedsrest,especiallysincehehasalreadycomethroughtwoboutsofpneumonia.”34Somuchforthe“Leader”oftheGermanNationalPeople'sParty,thetitlehehaddonnedwithpridesincethe1931Stettinpartyconference,andthemanmeanttostoptheNazisintheirtracksbyhelpingtopushHitler—tousePapen'sfamousphrase—“sofarintothecornerthathe'llsqueak.”35TheDNVPwasfaringalmostasbadlyasitsleader.SinceHugenbergwas

fullyoccupiedwithhisvariousministerialportfolios,thedeputypartychairman,FriedrichvonWinterfeld,whohadbeenamemberofthePrussianLandtagsince1921andchairmanoftheparliamentaryfactionofthePrussianDNVPsince1928,effectivelyassumedtheleadershipofthepartyanditsorganizations,ataskforwhichhewaswoefullyunprepared.36SoitwaswithoutmuchenthusiasmthatadefensiveWinterfeldpresentedhisreportonthemostrecentpoliticaldevelopmentstoaDNVPpartymeetingon5February1933.37EventhoughtheDNVPhadconsistentlyfoughttheparliamentarysystemsinceHugenberghadassumedthepartyleadership,theratioofpowerinthecoalitionbetweenDNVPandNSDAPnowpromptedWinterfeldtoassertthat“ultimatecontrolrestswithparliament.”Winterfeldwascaughtinaninescapablepredicament:hecouldnotcountenanceparliamentaryrule,yethewasunpreparedtothrowoverparliamentarycontrolaltogether.WhiletheDNVPconsidereditselfananti-parliamentarypartythatbelievedin“executiveauthority”andnotpartypolitics,Winterfeldwasawarethatsomemeasureofparliamentarycontrolcouldbeaprotectionagainstanoverbearingalliancepartner.AccordingtoWinterfeld,Hugenberg'sdecisiontojointheHitlerCabinetwasultimatelycorrect,sincethecountry“wasontheedgeofaprecipice.”Hethuspresentedtheformationofthe“governmentofnationalconsolidation”notasastrokeofgenius,butasanactofdesperationbornoutofdireneed:“Thereforenomoretimewastobelost,whichiswhywejoinedthegovernment.”38AtPapen'surgingbutagainststrongresistancefromwithintheDNVP,itwas

finallydecidedon8FebruaryafterlongdebatethattheDNVPwouldfighttheMarchelectioncampaigninalliancewithPapenandtheStahlhelmas

“BattlefrontBlack-White-Red.”39Manyonthenon-Nazirightwereobviouslyconvincedthataconcentrationofallconservativeforceswouldconstituteamoreeffectivepoliticalcheckontheincreasinglyimperiousandhigh-handedNazimovement.IntheDNVP,ontheotherhand,longtimememberswerereluctanttoendorsesuchaunitedconservativefrontforfearthatthepartymightloseitsidentity.InhislettertoHugenberg,Papenjustifiedhisdemandbyarguingthat“thepartyshacklesofpre-warGermany”mustbebroken,fortheyhadbecometooconfiningforanation“weldedtogetherinthefirestormoftheWorldWar.”40PapenclaimedfurtherthattheCatholicsegmentofthepopulationwouldfinditslegitimateinterestsrepresentedinthe“BattlefrontBlack-White-Red,”therebyimplyingthatthememoryoftheoldImperialcolorsconjuredupbythename“Black-White-Red”wouldexertastrongappealtothoseCatholicswhomightotherwisebeturnedoffbytheprimarilyProtestantcharacteroftheDNVP.TheNationalSocialistpress,foritspart,wasaffrontedthattheGermanNationalsclaimedtheheritageofImperialGermanytobetheirsalone.Afewdaysaftertheofficialproclamationofthe“Battlefront”on11February,theNazipressemphasizedthat“theflagofBismarck'sReich”shouldnotbeturnedintoa“partybanner”:“ThespiritoffrontlinesoldiersandBlack-White-Redareaboveparties...onemustnotsignelectoralpactswiththebloodoftwomilliondead.”41Goebbels,ontheotherhand,expressedlittleconcern.On11February,henotedinhisdiary:“Hugenberg,Papen,andSeldtespeakontheradio.Theyhavesetupabattle-blocBlack-White-Red,butthisiscertainlyonlyafleetingphenomenon.”42Meanwhile,Hugenbergwasanxioustoevoketheunityofthenationalistfront.

InhisopeningspeechfortheReichstagelectioncampaignonSaturday,11Februarybeforea“jam-packed”(accordingtotheDNVPpress)BerlinerSportpalast,heheraldedtheascendancyofGermany.43Hugenberg'sspeechwasreminiscentofaGermanicepic:“Onceuponatimethereexistedagreat,richandnoblepeople.Thendisasterhappeneduponthem.Theirneighborshadforcedwaruponthem.Standingunited,theykepttheircountlessenemiesfarawayfromtheirborders.Butthenthepeoplesuccumbedtohunger.Theybecamedividedintopartyfactionsandfellvictimtointernaldiscord...”Nowthatdomesticstrifehadbeentranscendedbytheformationofa“governmentofnationalconsolidation,”Hugenbergcontended,theresurrectionofthenationcouldbeginanew,thougheverythingdependedonallpartnerslivinguptothespiritofthe“PactofTrustandFaith”thatnationalistforceshadconcludedon30January1933.Therewasnoneedtobemoreexplicit.Hugenberg'saudienceknewalltoowellexactlywhichofthetwopartnersmightnotliveuptothespirit

ofthePact.Correspondingly,hewasquicktopointoutthatanybreachoffaithwouldresultin“chaos”and“GermanBolshevism”;insum,Germany'sdestruction.Hugenbergadmittedthat,althoughhehadbeenopposedtocallingforyetanotherroundofnationalelections,healsohadbeendeterminednottolettheelectionissuedestroytheformationofthe“governmentofnationalconsolidation.”Finally,heavowedthatfromthispointon,hewouldconcentrateprimarilyonhisdutiesasCabinetminister,sinceitwasnowmoreimportant“towork,ratherthanspeakandcampaign.”WhileHugenbergemphaticallyconjuredupaunitywhosevalidityhemust

havedoubtedhimself,theoppositionpressdiditsbesttoaccentuatepotentialareasofconflictandcontradictionsinherentinthepactoftheunequalpartners.TheSPDpaperVorwärtspublishedalistofpastandpresentdisagreementsbetweenDNVPandNSDAPundertheheadline“MemoriesofHarzburg,”44highlightingthemurderofStahlhelmmembersbyNazistormtroopersandGoebbels'spersonalabuseofHugenberg.AslewofarticlesconcentratedonNaziattemptstounderminethelegitimacyoftheGermanNationals.45Reportsaboutfissuresinthealliancewerewell-founded,asevidencedbyaletterfromMajorHansNagel,DNVPexecutiveboardmemberinchargeofpartyaffairs,toHansHeinrichLammers,UndersecretaryofState(Staatssekretär)inHitler'sChancellery,inwhichNagelpassedonacomplaintfromDr.PaulBang,DNVPStaatssekretärintheReichEconomicsMinistry.NSDAPReichstagdeputySchraderhadallegedlythreatenedthataftertheelections,HugenbergwouldhavetodisassociatehimselffromhisGermanNationalUndersecretariesofStateRohrandBang,“otherwisehewillbethrownoutaswell.”Inhisresponse,LammerspromisedtobringthecomplainttoHitler'sattentionandexpressedhisconvictionthat“theReichChancellorwillsurelydisapproveofthis.”46Thefreedomofthepresstocriticizeandderidethegovernmentwouldsoon

becomeathingofthepast.AsareactiontotheKPD'scallforageneralstrikeon31January1933,Hindenburgwasprevailedupontoenacttheemergencyordinance“FortheProtectionoftheGermanPeople,”whichfacilitatedthebanningofnewspapersandpublicmeetingsthat“abused,ortreatedwithcontempt,organs,institutions,authoritiesorleadingofficialsofthestate.”Thisdecree,whichhadalreadybeendraftedbyHitler'spredecessorsintheChancellor'sofficeduringtheturbulentfinalphaseoftheWeimarRepublic,furnishedthegovernmentwithfar-reachingpowerstosilencetheoppositionpress.EventhoughitwastheoreticallypossibletolodgeacomplaintwiththeReichSupremeCourtinLeipzig,thelikelihoodofasuccessfulappealhadvanishedbytheendofFebruary.47Thus,FrederickM.Sackett,theAmerican

AmbassadortoBerlinfrom1930toApril1933,reportedtoSecretaryofStateStimsonon27February1933:“Inthecourseofthismonth,approximately150newspapershavebeensuppressed,mostofwhichareSocial-DemocraticorCommunistorgans,thoughalargenumberofCentristorganshavealsobeensuppressedforpublishinganelectionappealbyleadingCatholicassociations....TheprohibitionofmanyLeftjournalsinPrussiaisbeingdailyrescindedbytheSupremeCourt,buttheworkofsuppressioncontinuesunabated.AccuratedescriptionsofexistingconditionsinGermanyappearonlyintheforeignpress.”48ThefamedPrussianRechtsstaat,thatis,governmentandadministrationbased

ontheruleoflaw,hadceasedtofunctionlongbeforetheelections.49IncontrasttoleftistandCenterPartypressorgans,whichwereviewedasantagonistictothegovernment,DNVPnewspaperscontinuedtoappearfreely.Inthefirststagesoftheelectioncampaign,theDNVPportrayeditselfasthe“strongcentralpillarofanewphalanx,ononesideofwhichstandsStahlhelmleaderMinisterofLaborSeldte,withthelargestGermanex-servicemen'sorganization,andontheotherViceChancellorPapenasfigureheadofallindependentconservativeforces.”50DuringtheDNVPpartycongressof11to12February1933,Hugenbergwasportrayedasthegreatcharismaticleaderof“toughWestphalianstock,”whomadeonefeelthat“thismanismadeofgranite,”thoughwith“awarmheartbeatinginhisbreast.”51Withtheircampaignrhetoricclearlyborrowedfromthewell-testedstyleoftheNazis,GermanNationalsstrenuouslytriedtoemulatetheatmosphereofsomberandheroicgravitytheyhadcometoadmireinNaziassemblies.Inpractice,DNVPrhetoricwasevenmorebereftofsubstancethanthatoftheNazis.Inanageofmassunemploymentandwidespreadmisery,nationalistplatitudes,suchas“JustasBismarckcreatedtheReichofourFathers,somustwecreatetheNation,”52soundedunconvincinganddevoidofemotionalappealwhenpromulgatedbyapartythatrepresentedtheestablishment.TodistinguishthemselvesfromtheNazis,GermanNationalscontinuallywarnedof“socialistexperiments”andemployedsloganssuchas“Socialyes—Socialistno.”TheycontendedthatstrongGermanNationalinfluencewithinthegovernmentwasessentialtofortifytheethosofChristianconservatism,protecttheGermanpeoplefromsocialistexperiments,re-establishanincorruptiblestate,reininfactionalismandpartisanship,and,finally,providethenecessarybackingforHugenberg.53GermanNationalpropagandadesperatelytriedtorepresentHugenbergas“social”:Hugenberg'struegoalasMinisterofEconomicsandAgriculture,electionpamphletsemphasized,was“tomastertheeconomiccrisisandeliminatethehardshipsofunemployment.”54Itwassheer

calumnytobrandHugenberga“socialreactionary,”toclaimthathewasa“representativeofcapital,”andtoassertthathehadnoheartforthecommonman.Inreality,theoppositewastrue:Hugenberghadadistinctsocialprogram,hefoughtagainstthe“arbitrarinessofunsocialentrepreneurs,”andwasinterestedinpreserving,notdismantling,socialinsurance.Hugenbergfavoredthe“ruthlesselimination”ofinternationalcapital,andnothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruththanhiswish“toaccumulateriches.”55Theseargumentsdidnotconvincemanyvoters.Theintroverted,awkwardHugenberg,generallyintroducedtothepublicas“PrivyCouncilor”(Geheimrat),wasknown,afterall,astheexceedinglyprosperousownerofpublishingandfilminterests,aformerdirectoroftheKruppsteelworks,andamanwithmanifoldconnectionsinindustrialandbusinesscircles.Itwouldhavebeenverydifficultforeventhemostadroitofpropagandiststosellhimasapoliticianwithasocialconscience.EventhoughtheDNVPleadership(Parteivertretung)hadformallyapproved

Hugenberg'sdecisiontojointheHitlerCabinetatthebeginningofthepartycongresson11February,cracksinthecarefullypreservedfacadeofunitysoonbecameapparent,especiallysinceitwasobviousthatlittleexcepttheircommonenmityforthe“system”ofWeimarheldtheDNVPandNSDAPtogether.EwaldvonKleist-Schmenzin,56since1928chairmanoftheKonservativerHauptvereinthatsawitselfcarryingonthetraditionoftheoldGermanConservativeParty,announcedhisresignationfromtheDNVPon13February.InadetailedlettertoHugenberg,Kleistdeclaredthathedidnotwanttoseeonekindofpartyrulesubstitutedbyanother.57HearguedthatwhilemostpeoplemighthavetheimpressionthattheDNVPandNSDAPwerebasicallyinagreement,Hugenbergmusthaveknownonlytoowellthatthiswasnotthecase:drivenbyfearthattheformationofarightistgovernmentmightfail,frankdiscussionsaboutthetruegoalsofbothpartieshadbeenconsciouslyavoided.AccordingtoKleist,thenational-mindedpartofthepopulationhadagenuinedesireforinternalunity,andoncetheybecameawareofthedeceit,theresultingdisillusionmentwouldbeterrible:“Whenourfollowers,whohavebeenallowedtolosethemselvesinunderstandableeuphoria,realizethegroundlessnessoftheirjoy,theymighteasilylosetrustintheirentirecurrentleadership.”58KleistbluntlytoldHugenbergthattheDNVPandtheNaziswerenomoreunitedon30Januarythantheyhadbeeninthefallof1932.Toformagovernmentinthesecircumstances,Kleistcharged,amountedtonothingbutadishonesttruceandwasthereforeafraudcommittedagainstnational-mindedvoters.ManynationalistvotersfromtheranksoftheBürgertum,liketheHamburg

teacherLuiseSolmitz,indeedrodehighonawaveofeuphoria.59Atthe

beginningofFebruary,Solmitzwasoverjoyedthatthe“fratricidalstrifethatcausedussomuchdistress”hadfinallybeensettled.NowthemoodwasreminiscentoftheenormousupsurgeinnationalunitythatcharacterizedAugust1914.60SolmitzenthusiasticallywelcomedHitler'sprogrammaticspeechintheBerlinSportpalaston10February,inwhichHitlerexpressedthebeliefthat“evenifmillionsstillcurseusnow,theywillbemarchingbehindusoneday.”61Andon14FebruaryshewholeheartedlyendorsedGöring's“cleansingactions”oftheupperechelonsofthePrussianbureaucracy,whosevictimsincludednumerouspolicepresidentsandprovincialgovernors:“TheironbroomcleaningoutPrussia!Finally.”62ThereactionoftheshrunkenremaindersoftheliberaldemocraticBürgertum

wasverydifferent.ArepresentativeexampleoftheliberalhautebourgeoisiethatwouldsoonbeextinctistheauthorErichEbermayer,sonofthejudicialscholarandAttorneyGeneralattheSupremeCourtinLeipzig,OberreichsanwaltLudwigEbermayer,whointerpretedHitler'sSportpalastspeechverydifferently:“Themanvisiblygrowswiththetaskprofferedtohim.Towardtheendheseemstobeginprayingandcloseswiththeword‘Amen.’Justtherightmixforhisaudience:brutality,threats,swankingmuscle-mananticsandthenagainhumilitybeforethemuchquoted‘Almighty.’”63EbermayerknewhisbourgeoisworldwellandsensedinstinctivelythehaplessnessofitsrarifiedcultureinopposingtheNazis'all-inclusivearrogationofpowerthat,asHitler'sspeechintimated,encompassedtheentirenation.AtaneveningsoiréeatthehouseofMaxBrockhaus,thechairmanoftheLeipzigGewandhaus-Society,whichwasattendedby“agoodpartofLeipzig'sintellectualandmusicalelite,”Ebermayerregistereda“certainironicreservetowardthenewage”andnotedthatpeopleweredetermined“tobraveanyculturalrevolutioninLeipzig.”64Atthesametime,however,hebecameconsciousthatthoseinattendancewerenotentirelydissatisfiedwiththenewregime:“Resurgence,theriseofthenation,aneconomicboom,thestruggleagainstcommunismand,withinreason,alsoagainstEasternJews—allthisseemsquitepalatabletoLeipzigpatricians.”Ontheotherhand,itwastheprevailingopinionatthesoiréethat“theanti-SemitisminHitler'sprogram,shoulditbeimplementedatall,wouldcertainlyexemptthegreatartisticandintellectualpersonages,andbeitonlytoavoidembarrassmentabroad.”65Thisassumptionthatthe“unreasonable”elementsoftheNaziprogramwouldbetemperedbybourgeoissensibilitiesshowedalltooclearlythatthetraditionalBürgerfailedtounderstandtheNazimindset.Itwasreasonableinthecontextofabourgeoismodederaisonnementnottoalienate,letaloneexpel,themost

prominentcitizensofone'scountry,whowererespectedthroughouttheworld.ThemajorityofthehautebourgeoisiepresentcouldnotcomprehendthatanapparentlydeeplypatrioticNazimovementwasquitepreparedtoinjuretheinterestsofthefatherlandandwasresolvedtopursueitsgoalsatanycost,eventothedetrimentofGermany.ThoselearnedandsophisticatedmembersofthebourgeoisiecouldnotfathomthatNationalSocialistideasandactionswerebasedonassumptionsandgoalsinimicaltotheirownpragmatism,thattheywereineffectdrivenbyanuncompromisingideologythathadlittleconnectionwithreality.ThemindsetoftheremainingremnantsofthehautebourgeoisiewastoodifferentfromthatoftheNazistoappreciatethetruemonstrosityofwhatwasactuallytheirownbitterestenemy,andnot,asmanythought,theirfellownationalistally.Fourdaysafterthatsoirée,Ebermayernotedresignedlyinhisdiary:“Doallthesepeoplereallyunderstandthatthisisthedawningofatrulynewera,onethat,withthevictor'ssneeringgrin,willtriumphantlytrampleunderfoottheirvestedandinviolablerights?”66

OppositiontoNaziRepressionandIncreasingTerrorEvenifoneignoredNazithreatsabouttheestablishmentofadictatorship,utteredlongbeforetheiraccessiontopower,informedpoliticalobserversmusthavebeenawarebymidFebruarythatafundamentalbreakwithWeimarwasunderway.GermanNationalshadrepeatedlyemphasizedthat,asfarastheywereconcerned,theMarchelectionsweretobethelastforyearstocome,thusindicatingtheirpreferenceforalong-termauthoritarianpresidentialCabinet,andHitlerhimself,whileprofessingtoattainpowerlegally,hadmadenobonesaboutthefactthat,oncehewasatthehelm,theWeimar“system”withitsmorethanthirtypartieswouldberuthlesslycastaside.Göring'smerciless“cleansing”ofthePrussianadministration,higherpoliceforce,andupperranksofthecivilservicethatbeganinFebruarymadeitalltooplainthatanewforcewasatworkandthat,asLuiseSolmitzhadputit,an“ironbroom”wasnowsweepingoutallofPrussia.67AfterfailingtodissolvethePrussianLandtagbyregularmeans,PrussianReichCommissarPapenobtainedanemergencyordinancefromHindenburgon6February“toestablishawell-orderedgovernmentinPrussia,”68bytransferringallpowerandauthoritystillvestedinOttoBraun'sformergovernmenttoPapenandGöring.69NownothingstoodinthewayofcallingnewelectionsinPrussia,whichwerescheduledtogetherwiththegeneralelectionson5March1933.Thedissolutionofprovincial,county,andcommunitylegislatures,aswellasotherlocalrepresentativebodies,hadalready

beenorderedon5February,andnewelectionssetfor12March.70FollowinghisPreußenschlag,thecoupd'étatof20July1932,PapenhadbeguntopurgethePrussianadministration:theCommissionerofBerlinpoliceAlbertGrzesinski71wasdismissedfromhispostandpersonnelchangeswereeffectedonalllevels,particularlyamongprovincialanddistrictgovernors(OberpräsidentenandRegierungspräsidenten),wherebythevictimswereprimarilySocialDemocrats.72Göringenergeticallycontinuedthispurge,whichnowalsoaffectedmembersofotherdemocraticparties.73InFebruary1933alone,fourteenpolicecommissionersoflargerPrussiancitiesaswellasotherseniorofficeholders,includingdistrictgovernors(Regierungspräsidenten)andLandräte(inchargeofcounties),aswellastheprovincialgovernorofWestfalia(whowasamemberoftheCenterParty),wereforcedintoretirement.Mostofthemwerereplacedbyconservativelandowners,formerofficersorindustrialmanagerswhowerepoliticallyclosetotheDNVP,apracticeFranzBrachthadfollowedalreadyafter20July1932.74ConservativeprofessionalexpertswerechosenbecauseNationalSocialistcandidateslackedthenecessaryqualifications.75SSGruppenführerKurtDaluegewasempoweredas“commissarforspecialtasks”todedicatehimselftothepoliticalpurgingofthePrussianpoliceinFebruaryandMarch1933beforehewasappointedtoheadthepolicedepartmentinthePrussianInteriorMinistryinApril1933.76AllthesemeasureshadbeeninitiatedbyGöringinhiscapacityasprovisionaryMinisteroftheInterior.Hisblunt,directlanguage,hisinnateunscrupulousness,andthefactthat—asheonceboasted—hismeasures“werenotemasculatedbyundueconcernsforlegality,”77madehimaneffectivehatchetmanforHitlerineliminatingpotentialenemiesoftheNazicause.Inhis“shootingorder”of17February,GöringinstructedthePrussianpoliceinunambiguouslanguagetobelenienttowardmembersofnationalistassociations,suchastheSA,SS,andStahlhelm,andavoidprosecutingthemfortheiroffenses,buttousestrongmeasuresincounteringtheactionsof“subversive”organizations,includingthe“unsparingresorttofirearms.”78UndoubtedlyGöring'sorderweighedheavilyonPrussianpoliceofficers,especiallyasitwasaccompaniedbypalpablethreatstoprosecutethoseofficerswhofailedtocarryouttheirdutieswiththerequiredseverity.Fewhigh-rankingpoliceofficerswithlargefamilieswouldhavedaredtocountermandoropposethoseinstructions.ItthuscameasnosurprisethatthePrussianpoliceremainedlargelyinactivewhenconfrontedwiththeoutragesofNazistormtroopers,suchastheseverewoundingoftheprominentCenterpartypoliticianAdamStegerwaldbytheSAinKrefeld,asreportedbytheappalledAmerican

Ambassador.79Inanotherdecreedated22February,SA,SS,andStahlhelmmemberswereentrustedwiththefunctionofauxiliarypolice,thoughonlyone-fifthofthesecouldberecruitedfromtheranksoftheStahlhelm;theSAcontributedmorethanone-half,andtheSStheremainingthird.80Fromnowon,itwouldbecomeincreasinglydangeroustotakeastandagainsttherisingtideofNazipower.Nonetheless,inthesecondhalfofFebruarytherewerestillinstancesof

vociferousprotestagainstarbitraryNazimeasures,thoughprotestsofnon-MarxistpartiesremainedconfinedtotheCatholicCenterandtheremnantsoftheformerDDP(nowStaatspartei).A17FebruaryelectionappealbyCatholicorganizationswarnedagainstHitler'srulebyreferringtopoliticaldevelopmentssinceHindenburg'sre-electionasa“nationaldisaster.”81Thegovernmentwasaccusedof“substitutingarbitrarinessandpartisanshipfortheruleoflawandspecialinterestsforthecommonweal”andofcreating“Bolshevisminanationalistcloak.”82ThelanguagewassouncompromisingthatapartoftheCatholicpressinBaden,fearfultheirpapersmightbebanned,publishedtheappealonlyinexcerpts.83InhisspeechinWürzburgon18FebruaryformerReichChancellorBrüningupbraidedthegovernmentforbanningCenterPartypapersandurgedthatnewspaperbansandotherundemocraticmeasuresbemetwithvigorousresistance.84On23FebruarytheCenterPartypoliticianandpresidentofthePrussianStateCouncil(Staatsrat,therepresentativebodyofthePrussianprovinces),KonradAdenauer,lodgedaprotestinthenameofthisbodyagainstGöring'semergencydecreesasincompatiblewiththeReichConstitutionandpetitionedHindenburgtorescindalldecreesenactedsince4February.85Adenauer'soppositiontoNazismwentsofarthat,ontheoccasionofacampaignstopHitlermadeinCologneon19February,hearrangedtohavethelightsalongtheRhineRiverturnedoffandswastikaflagsremoved.ThereactionoftheNazipressleftnodoubtthat,infuture,Adenauerwouldhavetopayforsuchactions.86Ontheotherhand,nooppositionwastobeexpectedfromtheDNVP.

Göring'spurgeofthepoliceandhigherPrussianadministrationwasintheGermanNationals'owninterest,sincetheyprofitedbyfillingsomepositionswiththeirowncandidates.87Theverypartiesnowunderattackas“systemparties”—SocialDemocrats,Center,andtheformerDemocraticParty—hadbeentheenemiesoftheDNVP,sothatGermanNationalscouldonlywelcomethreatstotheirexistence.RegardingterroragainstCommunists,protestfromtheranksofGermanNationalscouldhardlybeexpected,sincetheyconsidered

themselvesasstaunchlyanti-communistastheNazisthemselves.Initially,theDNVPthusevincedlittleconcernforNaziactsofterrorthatweregatheringmomentuminthesecondhalfofFebruary,sincepoliticalviolencewasdirectedalmostexclusivelyagainsttheirpoliticalenemies.ThiswouldchangeabruptlyinthesecondhalfofMarch1933,astheGermanNationalsthemselvesbecamevictimsofNaziattacks.Withhindsight,itisbarelycomprehensiblehowblindlyGermanNationalsrushedheadlongintoruin.TheviolentovertonesofNazipropagandaandtheattacksdirectedagainsttheDNVPintheautumnof1932,aswellasstreetfightsbetweentheSAandmembersoftheStahlhelm,shouldhaveservedasareliableindicatorofwhatwasinstoreforthem.ThewaytheNazisconductedtheirelectioncampaignagainsttheSPD,

Center,andtheliberalpartieswasfarfrompeaceful.AsBrüningrecounted,88CenterPartymeetingswereregularlydisruptedandinjurieswerenotuncommon.InsouthernGermany,theNazisbrokeupcampaignralliesoftheWürttembergDDPanditschairman,ReinholdMeier,tothepointwheretheDDPcomplainedinatelegramtoHindenburgthattheNazisrantheircampaignlikean“opencivilwar.”89WhenitcametotheSPD,disruptionsweresomassivethatevenseasonedpoliticiansliketheformerPrussianInteriorMinisterandPresidentoftheBerlinpolice,AlbertGrzesinski,simplygaveup.InalettertoSPDpartysecretariesofnorthernandwesternGermancities,Grzesinskicomplainedthatseveralofhiscampaignrallieshadbeenbrutallybrokenupandmanyparticipantssufferedmajorinjuries.WithoutsufficientpoliceprotectionhewascompletelyatthemercyoftheSAandSS,andthereforeaskedpartyofficialstobeexcusedfromstaginganymorecampaignrallies.90GrzesinskimentionedthattheNaziswereoutforhisbloodbecauseinaFebruary1932speechinLeipzighehaddemandedthatHitlerbedrivenoutofGermanywithahorsewhip.Duringtheelectioncampaign,violentattacksbygangsofSAmenoninnocentbystanders,theliberaluseoffirearms,andbreachesofthepeacebymembersofNaziorganizationsbecamecommonplace.TheperpetratorsjustifiedtheiruseofviolencebyclaimingthatitsultimategoalwastheextirpationofMarxism.91ThedecisiveanddramaticchangeinGermany'spoliticalclimatecameinthe

wakeoftheReichstagfireduringthenightof27to28February,oneweekbeforetheelectionsof5March.TheNazisusedtheReichstagfireasacovetedopportunitytoseizethepoliticalinitiativeonceandforall.“ThefirsteventthatsentchillingfrightthroughourboneswastheReichstagfire.ApremonitionwentthroughGermany:Nowthingsaregettingdangerous,”TheodorEschenburgwroteinhismemoirs.92ErichEbermayeralsosensedthedawning

ofaneweraandhadsimilarforebodings:“Justnow,lastnight,therevolutionhasbeguninearnest.”93Onthemorningfollowingthefire,EschenburgtraveledbytrainfromBerlintoHamburgtogetherwithadistantrelativeanddiscussedwithhim“thebrownplague.”Hiscompanion“turnedaroundwithaworriedglanceatthecompartmentdoor.ThiswasthefirsttimeIsawthe‘Germangaze.’”94Regardlessofwhowasultimatelyresponsibleforthefire,itprovidedtheNaziswithawelcomeexcusetosuspendpartsoftheconstitutionanddeclareastateofemergency,bothofwhichtheyusedtobreakanyrealandpotentialoppositiontotheirrule.Goebbels'sdiaryentries,thememoirsofFranzvonPapenandOttoMeissner,andtheNurembergprotocolsofGöring'sinterrogationallindicatethattherulersthemselvesweresurprisedbythefire,thoughpost-factumjustificationsandmanipulationsoftheevidencewerenaturallyintheirownbestinterest.95Göringconcededthatarrestlistshadbeencompiledforlateruse,andquiteindependentlyofthefire,thetimingofwhichhadbeenhighlyinconvenientsince,onaccountofHitler'sinsistencethatarrestsbemadewithoutdelay,hewasforcedtoactinhastebeforepreparationshadbeencompleted.HansMommsenalsoemphasizesthiselementofsurprise.96TheNazipressdepictedtheReichstagfirenotastheactofanindividual(the

DutchcommunistMarinusvanderLubbe,whomadeafullconfessionafterbeingarrestedonReichstagpremises),butasawidespreadcommunistconspiracyinwhichSocialDemocratshadalsoparticipated.Theinnatesenselessnessoftheact,andtheimplausibilityofanycollaborationbetweenthedeeplyhostilecampsofCommunistsandSocialDemocrats,contributedtothewidespreadassumptionofthebetterpartoftheFrench,British,andAmericanpressthatultimatelytheNazisweretoblameforthefire.ThispresuppositionbecameevenmoreconvincingwhentheNazisquicklyproceededtoexploittheprofferedopportunitybyrespondingwithanunprecedentedspateofarrests.97ThePrussianpolicehadalreadyransackedtheKPD'sBerlinheadquarters,theKarlLiebknechtHaus,on23and24February,thoughtheannouncedreleaseandpublicationofevidenceindicatinghightreason,ostensiblyunearthedduringthesearch,nevermaterialized.98TheNazisweretheprincipalbeneficiariesoftheReichstagfire,fornotonlydiditprovidethemwithalong-covetedpretextfortheeliminationoftheKPD,butitalsofurnishedacompellingthemefortheremainderoftheelectioncampaign:thedreadedspecterofanimminentCommunisttake-over.InhiscomprehensivestudyoftheReichstagfirepublishedintheearly1960s,FritzTobiasprovidesavastamountofevidencethatvanderLubbewasthesoleperpetrator,thustriggeringacontroversythatcontinuestothisday.99Despitetheclarificationofamultitudeofdetails,itis

unlikelythathistorianswillevercomeupwithanexplanationthatwillsatisfyeveryone.AtHitler'sdirection,GöringorderedthearrestofallKPDdeputiesandother

leadingCommunistfunctionariesduringtheverynightoftheReichstagfire.Thiswasfollowedbyanimmediatebanontheentirecommunistpress.100AfterpreliminarydiscussionsinthePrussianInteriorMinistryandtwoshortdebatesintheCabinet,Hindenburgsignedtheemergencydecreeon“TheProtectionofthePeopleandtheState,”whichhadbeendraftedbyNaziInteriorMinisterWilhelmFrick(whousedpartsofanolderdraftordinanceofJuly1932),on28February.101Thisquicklycobbled-togetherprovisionaryarrangementbecametheunacknowledged“basiclaw”oftheThirdReich.ThedecreeterminatedanumberoffundamentalrightsthatweresubjecttotemporarysuspensionunderArticle48.102Inaddition,theReichgovernmentwasauthorizedtousurpthepowerandrightsofindividualLandgovernments,ifthesefailedtotakemeasuresnecessaryforthe“Re-establishmentofPublicOrderandSafety.”103Whatwasmore,theDecreeontheProtectionofthePeopleandtheStatewasnotaccompaniedbydetailedguidelinesfromtheInteriorMinistrythatspecifiedhowexactlythelawwastobeapplied,aswastheusuallegalpractice.TheactualinterpretationandenactmentofthedecreethusremainedwithinthepurviewofthedifferentLänder.Accordingly,itwasinterpretedandimplementeddifferentlyinPrussiathaninthoseLänderwheretheNazipartywasnotyetpartofthegoverningcoalition.PerhapsthegreatestbenefittheNazisreapedfromtheReichstagfirewasofa

psychologicalnature,fortheysucceededinspreadingawaveoffearandresentmentagainstcommunisminallsocialclasses,withtheexceptionoftheurbanproletariat.Since1918,newspapers,journals,andtheentiremultifacetedprintmediaoftheWeimarRepublichadbeenpublishingdetailedreportsofhorrorsperpetratedintheSovietUnionsincetheRevolution,reportsthatwereconfirmedbytalesofRussianemigrantswhohadfoundtemporaryexileinBerlinandotherGermancities.104AsfarasaverageGermanswereconcerned,anythingwaspreferabletoCommunistruleintheirowncountry.Whatmadethecommunistdangerreal,palpable,andeminentlybelievablewasthefactthattheKPDhadgreatlyimproveditselectoralstandingon6November1932tobecomethethirdstrongestparty.Withonehundreddeputiesandalmost17percentofthevote,itwasstillbehindtheNSDAPandSPD,butfaraheadoftheCenterandtheDNVP.ItwasgenerallyknownthattheKPDwascontrolledanddirectedbyMoscowandthatitsultimategoalwastheestablishmentofacommunistregimethatwouldbringthedreadedconditionsprevailingintheSovietUnionto

Germany.AftertheReichstagfire,tomanyGermansonlyonepartyanditsleadingpoliticianseemedwillingandabletotakethedrasticmeasuresrequiredtoavertthismortaldanger—HitlerandtheNSDAP.TheBürgertumwasparticularlyapprehensive.ThedeeplypatrioticLuise

Solmitz,whotooktheNazis'exaggeratedfearmongeringaboutthecommunistthreatatfacevalue,epitomizedbourgeoisreactionsandconsideredHitlertobetheonlyprotectionagainstmortaldanger.105Solmitzblindlyswallowedthetalesofimpendingcommunistputschesandcoupattempts,thoughsheconcededthat“itwouldsoundlikeacock-and-bullstory,wereitnotforRussia,whichhasexperiencedAsiaticmethodsoftortureandorgiesofviolence...”Governmentpressreportsaboutcommunistplansforanimminentoverthrow,asrelatedbySolmitz,soundfarfetched:“Hostagesfromthebourgeoisie,wivesandchildrenofpoliceofficersashumanshields,destructionofallculturalvaluesasinRussia:castles,museums,churches....Theywantedtosendarmedmobsintovillagestocommitmurderandplunder,whileterrorwastotakepossessionofthelargercities,denudedofpolice,inthemeantime.Poison,boilingwater,everythingfromthemostsophisticatedtothemostprimitivetoolwastobeturnedintoaweapon.”106Itwouldbewrongtoassumethatcredulityandblindfaithingovernmentpropagandawereconfinedtocertainsectionsofthepopulation.Evenmembersofthepoliticalandculturalelitebelievedthatthecommunistdangerwasreal.InaconversationwithCardinalMichaelFaulhaberon1March1933,anaccountofwhichwaswrittenupbytheCardinal,PapenreportedonthepoliceraidofthecommunistLiebknechthausandrecountedsimilarstories,whichheobviouslybelievedhimself:thatcommunistrevolutionarieshadrelinquishedtheirformerpracticeofstorminggovernmentbuildings,butwerenowintentonwearingdownthepeoplebysettingfiretofarmsteads,rippinguprailroadtracks,kidnappingthechildrenofofficialsontheirwayhomefromschooltousethemashumanshieldsinstrikes,poisonfood,breakintohousesandshootthedoormanandthestaff,andsoon.Faulhaberseemedtohaveconsideredtheinformationreliableandentereditintohisfilesaccordingly.107GermanNationalpropagandawasalsomodifiedintheremainingdays

betweentheReichstagfireandthe5Marchelection,thoughitavoidedthehystericaltoneoftheNazis.Theofficialpartybulletinwiththeheadline“SavethePeopleandtheFatherland,”publishedafterthefire,leftnodoubtwhereitstood:“Bolshevismanditsbreedinggrounds”hadtobe“annihilatedrootandbranch”tomakeroomforanew“Christianconservativestateethos.”108Inhislastimportantspeechbeforetheelection,Hugenbergarguedinthesamevein

that“thefirebrandthatBolshevismhadthrownintotheGermanReichstag”constituteda“declarationofwarbyCommunists”andtheirSocialDemocraticaccomplices.Hespokeofthenecessityof“draconianmeasures”anduseofthedeathpenalty.109Still,Hugenberg'slanguageismoremeasuredthanGöring's,whoseemedtohaveconvincedhimselfoftheimminenceofthecommunistdangerandworkedhimselfupintoaragewhenshouting:“HereIdonothavetopracticejustice;hereIonlyhavetodestroyandexterminate,nothingelse.”110Ultimately,suchhate-filledpassionmadehisrhetoricmoreeffective,ashisaudienceundoubtedlyperceiveditasadeeplyfeltangeraboutapoliticalsituationthatprofoundlyaffectedthem.Undertheseconditions,ErichEbermayernotedresignedly,therewouldbe“aresoundingvictoryfortheNazisandtheBattlefrontBlack-White-Red.Thebourgeoisie,which,forawhile,hadbeenvacillatingandrepelledbytheroughnessandlackofpolishoftheNazis,havenowbeenfrightenedandwonoverbytheReichstagfire.”111ForEbermayer,theBürgertum'sabdicationofresponsibilityisthemosthumiliatingandshamefulfactoftheperiod.TheNazis,heargued,couldnotbeblamedforcapitalizingontheirvictory;theywere,afterall,an“anti-bürgerliche,revolutionaryparty”andhadnevermadeanybonesaboutthatfact:112“Weak,cowardly,andinclinedtoanybetrayalandcompromiseisalwaysonlytheBürgertum—thatis,my,oursocialclass.ThatpartoftheBürgertumthatnowhelpstheNazistoachievetotalpowerandassiststheminthe‘legal’implementationoftheirrevolution,bearstherealguiltforeverythingthatmayyethappentous.”113

1.Turner,Hitler'sThirtyDaystoPoweroffersthemostup-to-dateanddetailedaccount.TheGermantranslationofTurner'sstudy,Hitler'sWegzurMacht.DerJanuar1933(Munich,1996),containsthe“MoscowDocument,”Schleicher'sthoughtsontheoccasionofadinneron13January1933.SeealsoBroszat,DieMachtergreifung;Eyck,Geschichte,II,549–597;GordonCraig,Germany1866–1945(Oxford,1978),565–569;Winkler,Weimar,557–594.OntheroleoftheDNVPseeOttoSchmidt-Hannover,UmdenkenoderAnarchie(Göttingen,1958),317–343;HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”567–576;Leopold,AlfredHugenberg,127–139;WeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen;LarryE.Jones,“‘TheGreatestStupidityofMyLife,’”63–87;andLarryE.Jones,“Nazis,Conservatives,andtheEstablishmentoftheThirdReich,1932–34,”TelAviverJahrbuchfürDeutscheGeschichte:NationalsozialismusausheutigerPerspektive(1994),41–64.

2.GregorStrasser,whofavoredNaziparticipationingovernment,wassoonforcedtoabandonthisscheme.Heresignedfromhispartyofficeswithoutevenmakinganattempttodividetheparty,whiletradeunionleaders,afterfirstwelcomingSchleicher'sinitiative,weresoonwarnedbymembersoftheSPDleadership(Breitscheid)nottotrustSchleicher,whohadacquiredareputationforduplicity.SeeCraig,Germany,565–569;Winkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,810–857;VolkerHentschel,WeimarsletzteMonate.HitlerundderUntergangderRepublik(Düsseldorf,1978).

3.Broszat,DieMachtergreifung,156.4.Turner,Hitler'sThirtyDaystoPower,1–2.

5.Broszat,DieMachtergreifung,165.6.There,theNazisgained39,064of99,812votescast,whichexceededtheirperformanceinNovember

andthusmarkedanendtothedownwardtrend,butstillfellshortoftheirJuly1932results.7.Hindenburg'sclosestadvisors,hisUndersecretaryofStateOttoMeissnerandhissonOskarvon

Hindenburg,hadmetHitlerinRibbentrop'svillaon22January,whenHindenburg'ssonhadalongconversationwithHitler,afterwhichheseemedmoreamenabletotheideaofaHitlerCabinet.

8.DuringPapen'sChancellorship,thePrussiangovernmenthadbeentakenoverbytheReichunderthepretextthatitwasunabletomaintainorderonitsterritory(seechapter1).

9.OneofHindenburg'soldJunkerfriends,ElardvonOldenburg-Januschau,hadurgedHindenburginthesamedirection.FranzvonPapenwouldserveasVice-Chancellor,andmembersofSchleicher'sCabinet,ForeignMinisterKonstantinvonNeurath,MinisterofFinanceLutzGrafSchwerinvonKrosigk,MinisterofJusticeFranzGürtner,andPostalandTransportationMinisterPaulvonEltz-Rübenach,wouldstayonunderHitler.TheStahlhelmleaderFranzSeldtewasputinchargeoftheMinistryofLabor,andHugenbergobtainedthecovetedportfoliosofEconomicsand“AgricultureandNutrition”forboththeReichandPrussia.GeneralWernervonBlomberg,Hindenburg'sownchoice,wouldbeinchargeoftheReichswehr.

10.Turner,HitlersWegzurMacht,206–209.11.WeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,226.12.WeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,227,note16;ThiloVogelsang,Reichswehr,Staat

undNSDAP,376–380.13.Leopold,AlfredHugenberg,135.14.HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”571.15.Ibid.,570–571.This,HillervonGaertingencontinues,mightexplain“whyintheendhemadea

decision,withouthavingtheconsentofanyGermanNationalweknowof.”Ibid.,571.16.Jones,“‘TheGreatestStupidityofMyLife,’”63–87.17.Jones,“‘TheGreatestStupidityofMyLife,’”63;andGerhardRitter,CarlGoerdelerunddie

deutscheWiderstandsbewegung,DTVpaperbacked.(Munich,1964),65–66.18.Jones,“‘TheGreatestStupidityofMyLife,’”79.Jonesalsopointsoutthat“ahandfulof

Hugenberg'sowncolleaguesdesperatelytriedtosabotagethenegotiationswithHitler,”(ibid.,80)butthateventshadassumedamomentumoftheirownthatcouldnotbehalted.JonesrightlyemphasizedthedivisionswithintheGermanrightontheeveoftheNaziassumptionofpower:“ItwouldbeaseriousmisreadingofeventsthatledtotheformationoftheHitlerCabinetinJanuary1933toassumethatHugenberg'sgambitenjoyedthefullorunequivocalsupportofevenoneofhisknownsupporters.”Ibid.

19.Haffner,GeschichteeinesDeutschen,12;Englishtranslation:DefyingHitler(NewYork,2003),6.20.Haffner,GeschichteeinesDeutschen,12–13;DefyingHitler,7.21.KarlBarth(1886–1968),oneofthemostinfluentialProtestanttheologiansofthetwentiethcentury,

joinedtheSPDtodemonstratehisoppositiontoNationalSocialism.HewasProfessorofTheologyinBonnfrom1930–1935;thereafterinBaseluntil1962.

22.KlausScholder,DieKirchenunddasDritteReich,vol.I(Frankfurt,Berlin,1977),280.23.Eschenburg,LetztenEndesmeineichdoch,11.24.CarlvonOssietzky(1889–1938).TheleftistweeklyWeltbühnewascriticalofthemilitaristand

nationalisttendenciesintheWeimarRepublic.From1933to1936,Ossietzkywasimprisonedinvariousconcentrationcamps;in1936hewasawardedtheNobelPeacePriceinabsentia.Ossietzkydiedin1938asaresultofhisconfinement.

25.CarlvonOssietzky,“KavaliereundRundköpfe,”SämtlicheSchriften,VI(Hamburg,1994),468.26.KurtSchumacher(1895–1952)spentmorethantenyearsinNaziconcentrationcamps.SeeWilly

Albrecht,KurtSchumacher.EinLebenfürdendemokratischenSozialismus(Bonn,1985).27.QuotedinJosefandRuthBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung.DokumentevomMachtantritt

Hitlers30.Januar1933biszurBesiegelungdesEinparteienstaates14.Juli1933,2ndrev.ed(Munich,1992),45–49,esp.45.

28.WeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,231.

29.Quaatz,diaryentryof1February1933,ibid.,231.Evenafter30January,therewasachanceofrenewedtalksbetweentheNSDAPandCenter,butthiswassoonnippedinthebudbyHitler.Alreadyinthesummerandearlyfallof1932,theNSDAPandCenter/BavarianPeople'sPartywereengagedincoalitiontalksthatwereanxiouslymonitoredbytheDNVP.

30.Ibid,231–232.TheformerlycloserelationshipbetweenQuaatzandHugenberghadbecomestrainedbecauseHugenberghadseeminglybeenunable(orunwilling)toobtainagovernmentpostforQuaatz.

31.Quaatz,diaryentryof7February1933,ibid.,233.32.Quaatz,diaryentriesof8to10February1933,ibid.,233;seealsochapter6below.33.Quaatz,diaryentry17February1933,ibid.,235:“Everybodyjustshrugstheirshouldersaboutthis

experiment:attemptingtomanagefiveministries,oneparty,andafilmandpublishinghouse.”34.Quaatz,diaryentryof4March1933,ibid.,237.Despitecriticalcomments,HugenbergandQuaatz

remainedonafamiliarfooting,andQuaatzcontinuedtakinganintenseinterestinpartymatters.35.Craig,Germany1866–1945,570.Inhismemoirs,TheodorEschenburgrecountedtheshort,but

telling,impressionhereceivedofHugenberg.Lookingforafreecornerseatwhiletravelingonatrain,Eschenburgpassedacompartmentwithasinglepassenger:“IhadalmostpassedhimwhenIsuddenlythought:‘Howdoesthisvillageschoolteachergetintofirstclass?’Butthefacelookedsomehowfamiliar.OnlyafterIhadfoundaseat,Isuddenlyremembered:itwasHugenberg,whomIknewfromphotographs.Helookedsoutterlyinsignificantwithhiscrewcutandtwirledmoustache,totallyunprepossessingandpettybourgeoisinappearance,alittlelikearetiredporter.”Eschenburg,LetztenEndesmeineichdoch,9.

36.InearlyFebruaryWinterfeldbecame“permanentdeputyleader”(ständigerVertreter)ofthepartyleader,sinceHugenbergwithdrewfromparty-relatedworkafterenteringtheHitlerCabinet.

37.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPParteitage,”R8034II(formerly61REI)no.4334,53;MitteilungenderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,7February1933.

38.Ibid.39.Quaatz,diaryentryof8February,inWeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,233:“Inthe

afternoon,hour-longdiscussionsabout,andthenwith,Papen.AsheisafraidofHindenburg,hedeclinestobeadirectcandidatewithusanddemandsthatwechangeournameforhimandgotogetherwithmoremoderateforcestoblendintosomemish-mashcombinationparty.”

40.“ViceChancellorvonPapentoReichsministerHugenberg,”Kreuzzeitung,13February1933;andHillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”635.

41.14February1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,ParteilebenDeutschland:NationalsozialismusundDNVP,”R8034II,no.9030,172.ThePreußischerPressedienstderNSDAPtookexceptiontothenamechangeoftheDNVPpamphletUnsereParteitoDernationaleWille,arguingthatthewillofthenationrancountertothatoftheDNVP.Seeibid.,169.

42.JosefGoebbels,VomKaiserhofzurReichskanzlei.EinehistorischeDarstellunginTagebuchblättern,Januar1932biszumMai1933(Munich,1940),261.

43.See“KampffrontSchwarzweißrotmarschiert,”DerTag,12February1933,forthecompletetextofthespeech.

44.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,ParteilebenDeutschland,”R8034II,no.9030,170;“HarzburgerErinnerungen.Wiesiesichlieben,”Vorwärts,1February1933.

45.“Maulwurfskrieg,”Vorwärts,7February1933;“FrankIIgegenHugenberg,”Vorwärts,3February1933.ThelatterfocusedonaNazispeechthatvilifiedthenational-mindedbourgeoisie:“Thebourgeoisie,whichtodayshakestheFührer'shand,betrayedGermanytoMarxismin1918.”

46.3March1933“NageltoLammers,”4March1933“LammerstoNagel,”inBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP:PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,170–171.

47.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,88;Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,239;Karl-DietrichBracher,DieStufenderMachtergreifung(Tübingen,1974),92–93.

48.27February1933:“SacketttotheSecretaryofState,”inForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,vol.II(Washington,1949),199.

49.Alreadyon1FebruaryHindenburghadagreedtoHitler'srequesttodissolvetheReichstag(somethinghehadpreviouslyrefusedtoSchleicher),whichindicatedthatGermanywouldcontinuetobegovernedbyemergencydecrees.

50.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPParteitage,”R8034II,no.4334,3.ThemilitantcampaignrhetoricoftheGermanNationals(“phalanx,”“campaignbattle”)waspartlyasignofthetimes,partlyareflectionoftheacrimonyoftheelectioncampaign.

51.Ibid.,4.52.Ibid.,4;seealsoRichardE.Frankel,Bismarck'sShadow.TheCultofLeadershipandthe

TransformationoftheGermanRight,1898–1945(Oxford,NewYork,2005).53.DerNationaleWille,11February1933,69–70;HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”580.54.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPParteitage,”R8034II,no.4334,

“HugenbergsSozialprogramm,”inMitteilungenderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,1–2.55.Ibid.,1–2.56.EwaldvonKleist-Schmenzin(1880–1945)rejectedHugenberg'spoliciesofcooperationwiththe

Nazipartyfromthestart.In1932hehadpublishedapamphletwiththeprogrammatictitle“NationalSocialism–aDanger,”andinJanuary1933hehaddonehisutmosttopreventHitler'sappointmentasChancellorandtowinoverHindenburg,Papen,andHugenbergforarightistCabinetwithoutHitler.HewasexecutedinApril1945becauseofhisclosecontactstoGoerdeler.

57.13February1933:“EwaldvonKleist-SchmenzinanReichsministerHugenberg,”reprintedasdocumentno.9inHillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”635–637.

58.Ibid.,636.59.ThediaryofLuiseSolmitz(born1889)waspublishedinextractsinWernerJochmann,

NationalsozialismusundRevolution.UrsprungundGeschichtederNSDAPinHamburg,1922–1933(Frankfurt,1963),400–433.AccordingtoJochmann,thediaryepitomizesthe“mood,hopesandfearsofapartoftheGermanBürgertum.”Ibid.,x–xi.

60.Entryof6February1933,Jochmann,NationalsozialismusundRevolution,422–423.61.Jochmann,NationalsozialismusundRevolution,424–425.SolmitzwasimpressedwithHitler's

claimthatallgreatmenofGermanhistorywouldsupporthismovementinspirit.62.Jochmann,ibid.,425.63.ErichEbermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland.PersönlichesundpolitischesTagebuch.Von

derMachtergreifungbiszum31.Dezember1935(Hamburg,Vienna,1959),21–22;diaryentryof11February1933.

64.Entryof13February,Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,23.InadditiontoMaxBrockhaus,thosepresentincludedLeipzig'sLordMayorCarlGoerdeler,thePresidentoftheReichSupremeCourtDr.Bumke,andDetlefSierck,“thehighlytalentedyoungdirectorofthemunicipaltheater”(ofHollywoodfameandbetterknownbyhisAmericannameDouglasSirk).

65.Ibid.,24.ThispointwasmadewhenthediscussiontoucheduponBrunoWalter,thefamousconductoroftheGewandhausorchestra.Everyoneexpected(wrongly,asithappened)thatBrunoWalterwouldremaininLeipzig.

66.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,diaryentryof17February,26.67.EventhoughPapen,asReichCommissar,wasnominallyinchargeofPrussia,thePrussianpolice

cameunderGöring'sjurisdictionaskommissarischer(temporarilyappointed)MinisteroftheInterior.PrussiawasfarandawayGermany'slargeststate:inthebordersof1933,Germanyhad468,799.58squarekilometers;Prussia's292,771.65km2accountedfor62.54percentofGermanterritory.Outofapopulationof65,335,879(16June1933),Prussia's39,958,073amountedto61.15percent.SeeStatistischesReichsamt,ed.,StatistischesJahrbuchfürdasDeutscheReich,52(Berlin,1933),5.

68.SeeBroszat,DerStaatHitlers,88–97.AmotionbytheNaziparliamentaryfactionforself-dissolutionoftheLandtaghadbeenrejectedbyparliamentarymajority.

69.Papen'scoupd'étatagainstthePrussiangovernmentof20July1932hadnotbeencompletely

successfulsince—inresponsetoacomplaintoftheunseatedBraungovernment—theSupremeCourtruledon25October1932thatwhilethePresidenthadtheauthoritytoappointaReichCommissar,theBraungovernmentwouldbeallowedtoretainsomevestigesofgovernmentalauthorityandtherighttorepresentPrussiaintheReichsrat(statehouse).

70.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,89;443–444.71.AlbertGrzesinski(1879–1947)wasCommissonerofBerlinpolicein1925–1926and1930–1932,

andservedasPrussianMinisteroftheInteriorfrom1926to1930.Inthispositionheadvancedthedemocratizationofadministrationandpolice,favoringSPDmembersforhighadministrativeposts.

72.SeeWolfgangRunge,PolitikundBeamtentumimParteienstaat.DieDemokratisierungderpolitischenBeamteninPreußenzwischen1918und1932(Stuttgart,1965),237–240;Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,90.FranzBracht,theReichCommissarappointedbyPapen,replacedfiveOberpräsidenten,eightRegierungspräsidentenand,byconsolidatingcounties,seventyLandräte.

73.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,90–91;Bracher,StufenderMachtergreifung,90–97.74.FranzBracht(1877–1933),amemberoftheCenterparty'srightwing,beganhiscareerasapublic

prosecutorbeforebecomingahighadministrativeofficial.In1923–1924hewasStaatssekretärintheReichChancellery;from1924to1932LordMayorofEssen;andafterPapen'scoupd'état,deputyReichCommissarandkommissarischerMinisteroftheInterior(theidenticalpositionlateroccupiedbyGöring).InSchleicher'sshort-livedCabinetheheldthepostofInteriorMinister.

75.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,91.76.KurtDaluege(1897–1946)joinedtheNSDAPin1923aftermeetingHitlerandcofoundedthe

BerlinSA.In1928hetransferredtotheSS;afterHeydrich'sassassinationin1942,hebecamedeputyReichProtectorforBohemiaandMoraviaandwasresponsiblefortheLidicemassacreandotherexecutions.Hewashimselfexecutedon23October1946afterbeingsentencedbyacourtinPrague.

77.InaspeechinFrankfurtamMainon3March1933.SeeHermannGöring,RedenundAufsätze,ed.byErichGritzbach,8thed.(Munich1943),27.InthefirstphaseoftheMachtergreifung,Göring,notReichInteriorMinisterFrick,wastherealenginebehindthe“NationalSocialistrevolution.”Bracher,Machtergreifung,117.

78.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,93;Bracher,Machtergreifung,90–119;Bracher,DiedeutscheDiktatur,295–315;Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,232–258;Evans,TheComingoftheThirdReich,310–328.

79.ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates.DiplomaticPapers1933,vol.II(Washington,1949),198;Goebbels,VomKaiserhofzurReichskanzlei,entryofFebruary13.

80.Bracher,StufenderMachtergreifung,116–117.Theseauxiliarypolicewereequippedwithpistolsandrubbertruncheons.

81.BernhardStasiewski,ed.,AktendeutscherBischöfeüberdieLagederKirche1933–1945,vol.I(Mainz,1968),3–6.

82.Ibid,3–4.83.HugoStehkumper,ed.,DerNachlaßdesReichskanzlersWilhelmMarx,I(Cologne,1968),150.84.BeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,75–79.Brüninghimselfwrote:“Formyspeech

inWürzburgon18February,Iwasalreadyunderstrongpoliceprotection.Themoodwasstillverypugnacious—morethanIhadexpected.”Brüning,Memoiren,650.

85.CunoHorkenbach,ed.,DasDeutscheReichvon1918bisheute,vol.IV(Berlin,1935),68;BeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,93–94.KonradAdenauer(1876–1967),WestGermanChancellorfrom1949to1963,wasOberbürgermeisterofColognefrom1917to1933andpresidentofthePrussianStateCouncilfrom1921to1933.

86.“AdenauerundderNationalsozialismus,”WestdeutscherBeobachter,21February1933;reprintedinBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,86–87.

87.MartinBroszatmaintainedthatconservativesprofitedgreatlyfromthepurgessincenewpositionswereoftenfilledbyGermanNationalexperts,which,inturn,preventedamorethoroughnazificationofthePrussianbureaucracy.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,91.

88.Brüning,Memoiren,1918–1934,651.DuringoneofBrüning'scampaignmeetingson20February,

forexample,shotsrangthroughthehall.AccordingtoBrüning,complaintslodgedwithHindenburgweretonoavail.Brüningconstantlyneededpoliceprotectionforfearofviolentattacks,andhefrequentlyhadtotakedetourstoreachappointedcampaignstops.

89.WaldemarBesson,WürttembergunddiedeutscheStaatskrise1928–1933.EineStudiezurAuflösungderWeimarerRepublik(Stuttgart,1959),335.ReinholdMeier(1889–1971)hadbeenchairmanoftheDDPinStuttgartsince1924,andin1930MinisterofEconomicsinEugenBolz'sCenterParty-ledgovernment.TheWürttembergDDPretaineditsoldnameevenafterthefoundingoftheStaatspartei.Afterthewar,MeierbecamethefirstMinisterpräsidentofthenewlycreatedstateofBaden-Württemberg;from1957to1960hewaschairmanoftheFreeDemocraticParty(FDP).

90.24February1933:“GrzesinskitopartysecretariesFranzKlupsch(Dortmund),PaulRöhle(Frankfurt/Main),PaulBugdahn(Altona)andRichardHansen(Kiel),”inMatthiasandMorsey,DasEndederParteien,234–235.

91.26February1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,“RichardMoeller,Staatsministera.D.anHindenburg,”20.MoelleralsopointsoutthatmanyNazipartymembershad,untilrecently,beenmembersofcommunistorganizations;seealso23February1933atForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,vol.II(Washington,1949),198.

92.Eschenburg,LetztenEndesmeineichdoch,13.93.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,33.94.Eschenburg,LetztenEndesmeineichdoch,13.Eschenburgusedtheterm“dendeutschenBlick.”95.OnGöring'sinterrogation,seeBracher,StufenderMachtergreifung,516–517.96.HansMommsen,“TheReichstagFireanditsPoliticalConsequences,”inH.W.Koch,Aspectsofthe

ThirdReich(NewYork,1985),62–96.97.ExtensivepreparationshadbeenmadetocrackdownontheKPDaftertheelections.Broszat

estimatedthatinPrussiaaloneatleasttenthousandpeopleweretakenintocustodyby15March.Reportsfromtwenty-four(ofthirty-four)PrussianRegierungsbezirke(administrativedistricts)cite7,784arrestsby15MarchbasedontheReichstagfiredecree(Broszat,StaatHitlers,101–102).Alreadyon31January,Goebbelsconfidedtohisdiary(publishedduringtheThirdReich):“IndiscussionswiththeFührer,weestablishguidelinesforthefightagainsttheRedterror...TheBolshevikattemptatrevolutionneedstoflareupfirst.Wewillthencrushthemattherightmoment.”SeeGoebbels,VomKaiserhofzurReichskanzlei.EinehistorischeDarstellunginTagebuchblättern(Munich,1940),254.

98.Reportsmentioned“manyhundredweightsoftreasonablematerial.”Bracher,StufenderMachtergreifung,123–124.

99.FritzTobias,DerReichstagsbrand.LegendeundWirklichkeit(Rastatt,1962);UweBrackesetal.,Reichstagsbrand:AufklärungeinerhistorischenLegende(Munich,1986);UlrichvonHehl,“DieKontroverseumdenReichstagsbrand,”VierteljahresheftefürZeitgeschichte36(1988),259–280;JürgenSchmädecke,AlexanderBahar,andWilfriedKugel,“DerReichstagsbrandinneuemLicht,”HistorischeZeitschrift269(1999),603–651.ManydoubtedthatthefirewastheloneactofMarinusvanderLubbe,giventhedifferentsourcesoftheblaze—fromthegroundfloortothecupolaoftheReichstagbuilding—whichlentweighttotheassumptionthatseveralarsonistswereinvolved.AconnectiontotheKPDleadershipcouldneverbeproved,andthetrialattheSupremeCourtinLeipziginDecember1933endedwiththeacquittalofthefourcommunistcodefendantsforlackofevidence.SeealsoWolfgangBenz,ed.,Legenden,Lügen,Vorurteile,2nded.(Munich,1992),177–179.

100.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,100.101.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,128–131.Göringevenorderedthetemporaryclosureof

museumsandcastlesinPrussia.AccordingtoFrick,thisdecreewasbasedona20July1932DecreeontheRe-establishmentofPublicOrderandSafetyinGreater-BerlinandBrandenburg.Thereweretwoshortdebatesaboutthelawat11a.m.andat4:15p.m.on28February;Hugenbergwasabsentonbothoccasions.

102.AccordingtoArticle48oftheWeimarConstitution,thefundamentalrightssetoutinArticles114(personalfreedom);115(inviolabilityofthehome);117(confidentialityofpostalandtelegraphservice);118(freedomofspeech);123(freedomofassembly);124(freedomofassociation);and153(inviolability

ofpersonalproperty)couldbetemporarilysuspended.103.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,132.Papen'slast-minuteefforttomodifytheordinancein

suchawaythatHindenburgwouldhavetomakethedecisionwhetherornottosendaReichCommissartoaparticularLandwasblocked(byMinisterofDefenseBlomberg,amongothers).

104.OronHale,TheCaptivePressintheThirdReich(Princeton,1964).HalehashighpraisefortheGermanprintmediaoftheWeimaryears:“Duringthe1920s,7,000periodicalsinallfieldsofinterestandknowledge,approximately4,000dailyandweeklynewspapers,and30,000bookswerepublishedannuallyinGermany”(ibid.,1).HestressedthefactthattheGermanpresswasdecentralizedandarguedthat“theGermanpresssurpassedthatofanyothercountryasaneducationalandculturalmedium...Intheamountofprintedmaterialsofferedtosubscribers,theGermanjournalsoutdidallothers”(2).In1932,therewere4,703dailyandweeklynewspapers;“52%ofthesewereclassifiedasindependentornon-partisan.”Ibid.,4.

105.ReprintedinJochmann,NationalsozialismusundRevolution;entryof28February1933,426:“AllthinkingandfeelingofmostGermansisdominatedbyHitler,hisfamerisestothestars,andheisthesaviorinanevil,sadGermanworld.”

106.Jochmann,NationalsozialismusundRevolution;entryof1March,427–428.107.LudwigVolk,ed.,AktenKardinalMichaelFaulhabers1917–1945,vol.I(Mainz,1975),651–

653;reprintedinBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,113–114.108.“RettetVolkundVaterland,”MitteilungenderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,4,atBABerlin-

Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPParteitage,”R8034II,no.4334,64a.109.“Hugenberg–Papen–SeldteimEndkampfumdieEntscheidungfürdieNation,”Süddeutsche

Zeitung,2March1933.110.Göring,RedenundAufsätze,27–28.111.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,34,entryof5March.112.Ibid.,34.113.Ibid.,35.

ChapterIII

CONSERVATIVESANDTHENSDAPDURINGTHE“NATIONAL

REVOLUTION”OFMARCH1933

AftertheReichstagfireandthe5March1933elections,the“NationaleErhebung”(nationalawakening)turnedintothe“nationalrevolution.”1Intheministerialdiscussionsof7March,HitlerdeclaredbeforehisCabinetthatheconsidered“theeventsof5March...[tobe]arevolution.”2Andon8March,Goebbelsnotedinhisdiary:“TheGermanrevolutionmarchessteadfastlyonandcannotandwillnotbehalted.”3ThejournalDieHilfeusedtheterm“cataclysmicchangeofpower”todescribepost-electionevents:after5MarchtheNazisusurpedpowerinthoseGermanstatesnotyetruledbyNationalSocialistgovernments.Ministers,mayors,andhighofficialswereforciblyremovedfromtheirpositions,personallyhumiliated,andinsomecasesevenphysicallymanhandled.Thecentralcharacteristicfeatureoftheperiodbetween5and20Marchwastheboundless,willful,andunevenlydistributedviolenceagainsteverythingandeverybodythatstoodinthepathoftheNazitakeover.Veryfewdaredtoresistactively.InsomeregionsofGermany,openlyconfrontingtheSAcouldbetantamounttosuicide.RandomNaziviolencewasoftenaccompaniedbythesettlingofoldscores.SomeofthoseconsideredathorninthesideoflocalNazifunctionariesortheSA,orthosewhohadoncerunafouloftheminthepast,weremurderedoutright.4Eventhough,onthewhole,nodetailed“masterplan”existed,theviolencewasnotalwaysspontaneous;theBerlinSA,forinstance,hadcompiledlistswithnamesoftheirCommunistadversarieswellbefore28February.ViolentbehaviorandaggressiontowardpoliticalenemiesvariedregionallyandalsodependedonthelocalSA,Nazipartyofficials,andtheheadsofthelocalpolice.WhileinthethreeEastPrussiaRegierungsbezirke(governmentaldistricts)ofKönigsberg,Gumbinnen,andAllensteinatotalof421personsweretakeninto“protectivecustody”inMarchandApril1933,thenumberwasalmosttentimesashigh

(3,818)intheDüsseldorfRegierungsbezirkintheRhineprovince,whereSSGruppenführerWeitzelwasactingpolicecommissioner(Polizeipräsident);theTrierRegierungsbezirk,incontrast,reportedonlyseventy-eightcasesofprotectivecustodyforthesameperiod.5Thesenumbersdonotincludeallthoseprisonerslanguishinginthetorturecellarsandso-called“wild”(extra-judicial)concentrationcampsoftheSAthataresovividlydescribedbyRudolfDiels,thefirstheadoftheGestapo.6Theviolenceofthe“nationalrevolution”exemptedabsolutelynoone:social

position,politicalprominence,internationalreputation,servicesrenderedtothenation,scientificachievements,orliteraryprominenceofferednoprotection.AllGermanswerepotentialvictimsofhousesearchesandconfinementtoconcentrationcamps.On21March1933,forexample,theBritishAmbassadorreportedonsearchesatthehouseofSiegfriedvonKardorff,aprominentformerFreeConservativedeputyinthePrussianLandtagbetween1909and1918,lateraDVPReichstagdeputyandReichstagVicePresidentfrom1928to1932.7TheNazissearchedthehouseofthewidowofFriedrichEbert(Hindenburg'spredecessorasReichPresident)forrepublicanflagsandransackedAlbertEinstein'shome,lookingforexplosives.8Intheirfervortoeliminatethemovement'simagined,potential,andrealenemies,membersoftheSAandotherNaziorganizationsshunnedanyformofrationalthoughtorutilitariancalculationofwhatwasinGermany'sbestshort-andlong-terminterests.IndifferenttotheharmdonetoGermany'sreputationabroadandtotheimmenselossesinallspheresofart,scienceandtechnicalexpertise,theNazisthreatened,andmanytimespersecuted,thosewhohadoncebeenoutspokenintheircriticismofNazismorwhonowseemedlikelytoswelltheranksofpotentialenemies.TheconstantfeargeneratedbyhousesearchesandarreststhathunglikeaDamoclesswordoverthepopulationprovedtobeaneffectivedeterrent:peoplewereafraidtospeaktheirminds,letaloneresistNaziaggressionactively.UntoldnumbersmayhavefeltlikeTheodorEschenburg,whoaddressedtheissueinhismemoirs:“Idonotrecallanypersonalacquaintanceswhowereinconcentrationcamps,butoneoftenheardofbeatingswithcanesandtruncheonsorofwhippings,mistreatmentbypunchingandkicking,deprivationoffoodorsleep.Torturewascommittedbehindcloseddoors,butitwascorrectlycalculatedthatrumorswouldmaketheroundsandsetpeople'stongueswagging,toinstillfearandtherebyensuresubmissionandobedience.Ipersonallywasalwaysinfearofthetortureandcorporalpunishmentthathadpermeatedourconsciousness.”9TheNazis'violentusurpationofpowerinGermany'sremainingLänder,andthefeargeneratedbytheirsometimesarbitrary,sometimes

systematicviolenceillustratedbeyondtheshadowofadoubtthatafter5March1933anewerahaddawneduponGermany.Thisdidnotmean,however,thatthewholecountrydescendedintochaosorcompletelawlessness.Infact,onedefiningcharacteristicofthisperiodwasthecoexistenceoflegalityandillegality.UnbridledSAviolenceandterroroftenwenthandinhandwiththecontinuedsmoothfunctioningoftheruleoflawincertainspheresofpubliclife.SinceNaziaggressiontookplacewithintheconfinesofsomeformofestablishedlegalorder(thoughregionaldifferencesweresignificant),manyGermanslearnedtolivewiththeviolenceandassumedthatonlythosewhoactivelyopposedtherisingfortunesofNationalSocialismhadanythingtofearfromthemovement'sthugs.SinceGermanshadbecomeunwillinglyaccustomedtopoliticalviolencefromtheelectioncampaignsoftheearly1930s,duringthecourseofwhichhundredswerekilledandthousandsseriouslyinjured,largesectionsofthemiddleclassesmaygenuinelyhaveperceivedtheseizureofpowerasalesstumultuousperiodthanthelastyearsoftheWeimarRepublic,inparticularsincethe“patriotic”majoritylargelyendorsedthebrutalsuppressionoftheLeftandchosetoignoreNazilawlessness.Infact,tomany,Naziterrorappearedlessasaninstrumentofrepressionthananunconventional,butwelcome,meanstorestoreorder.Thecombinationofviolenceandlegalityledtovastlydifferentinterpretationsofthe“revolution”:opponentsvieweditasaviolent,illegaloverthrowofanunstablebutconstitutionalpoliticalsystem;supporterssawitasanorderly,systematic,andthoroughlylegaltakeoverofpowertosavethenationfromtheresultsofwhattheyconsideredthedisastrouspoliticalexperimentofWeimar.

BecomingObsolete:TheOutcomeoftheMarchElections

GiventheadvantagestheNSDAPandtheDNVPhadenjoyedovertheiropponentsduringtheelectioncampaign,theelectoralsuccessofthegoverningcoalitionwaslessthanoverwhelming,10andhardlyareasonfortheloudlyprofessedenthusiasmofNazileaders.11Despiteitstemporarynamechangeinto“BattlefrontBlack-White-Red,”designedtoappealtoawidercrosssectionofpatrioticGermansintheMarchelections,theDNVPbarelymatchedthe8percentofthevoteitreceivedinthe6November1932elections.Theanticipatedinfluxofnational-mindedCatholicvoterstowhomtheall-inclusivelabel“Black-White-Red,”intentionallyreminiscentoftheoldImperialcolors,wasmeanttoappealdidnotmaterialize.IntheelectionsforthePrussianLandtag,

alsoheldon5March1933,theDNVPgainedapproximately2percentcomparedtotheirpoorshowingon24April1932.12TheNSDAP,ontheotherhand,managedtoimproveitsresultsfrom33.1percentto43.9percent,againof92seats(from196to288)inanelectionwithavoterturnoutof88.8%.13Theintangiblefactorintheoutcomewastheelementofintimidationandthepsychologicalpressureonvoterstomark“Liste1”andvotefortheNSDAP,especiallyinsmalltownsrifewithrumorsthattheconfidentialityofthevotemightnotbeguaranteed.Otherwisetherewerenomajorfluctuationsfromthepatternestablishedby

recentelections.TherelativestrengthoftheCatholicpartiesremainedmostlyunchanged:theCentergainedfourseatsandobtainedseventy-fourmandates,thoughitspercentagesharefellfrom11.9percentto11.2percent,whiletheBavarianPeople'sPartylosttwoseatsforatotalofeighteenseatswithitspercentagesharefallingfrom3.1percentto2.7percent;thesmallbürgerlicheandliberalpartiesdisappearedalmostentirely,sothattheDVPwasleftwithameretwoseats,theChristlich-SozialerVolksdienstwithfour,andtheStaatsparteiwithfiveseatsand0.9percentofthepopularvote.AmongtheleftistpartiestheSPDsufferedonlyslightlossesfrom121to120seatsand20.4percentto18.3percentofthepopularvote,whiletheCommunistsheldonto81seatswith12.3percentofthepopularvote,thoughallCommunistmandatesweresubsequentlyrepealedandtheparty'sdeputiesarrested.Since,therefore,only566oftheelected647delegateswouldtaketheirseatsinthenewReichstag,theNSDAPaloneenjoyedanabsolutemajoritywithits288deputies.GermanNationaldeputieswerenownolongerneededtoobtainsimplemajorities,afactthatwasnotwithoutrepercussionsontheNazis'comportmentandtheirtenorofdiscoursetowardwhatnowseemedanincreasinglydispensablealliancepartner.ItisdifficulttodeterminethepreciseimpactoftheReichstagfireandits

aftermathontheoutcomeoftheelections,sincethereisnowayofknowingwhattheresultswouldhavebeenwithoutit.Butitisclearthatthefireanditsconsequenceshadasignificantimpact,astheFrenchAmbassadorAndré-François-Poncet14aptlyexplained:“Theunassuming,naïvemassesintheprovincessawinthiseventthefullconfirmationofthechargethatorderandsecurityinthecountrywerethreatenednotjustbyBolshevikconspiracies,butingeneralbythepoliticsofleftistparties,whowereattheleastguiltyofweaknessandblindness.Afeelingoffearandloathingspreadamongthepeople,coupledwithfeelingsofgratitudeandenthusiasmforthosewhohaddemonstratedsuchenergyandsavedGermany,thankstotheboldnessoftheirdecisionsandthe

steadfastnessoftheiractions.”15IntheeyesofmanyGermans,thisenergyandresolvehadoftenbeenmissingduringthefourteenyearsoftheWeimarRepublic.Frequently,duringthecrisis-riddenearlyyearsandespeciallyduringthepermanentinstabilityfollowing1929,widesectionsofthepopulationlongedforpoliticianswiththeruthlessresolvetotakedrasticactionandtomakesometimesunpopulardecisions.Sincethepoliticalleftwasblamedformostdomesticproblems,itishardlysurprisingthatthebulkofthemiddleclassesdidnotobjectto“settlingthescorewithMarxism,”evenifthisinvolvedunfetteredviolence.ThesuppressionoftheKPDwas,forthemostpart,generallywelcomed.ThiswasespeciallytrueforHitler'sGermanNationalcoalitionpartners:Infact,HugenberghimselfhadfirstproposedageneralbanontheKPDduringthefirstCabinetmeetingoftheHitlergovernmenton30January1933,insistingthatabanwaspreferabletonewelections.HehadtoberestrainedbyHitlerandotherCabinetmembers,whopointedoutthatthetimehadnotyetcomeforsuchastep.16ThemomentumtheNazisreceivedfromtheReichstagfire,theresulting

emergencylegislation,andthecompleteeliminationoftheirmostobdurateopponent,theKPD,togetherwiththeparty'ssuccessinthe5March1933electionswerenowallputtogooduseinthetakeoverofthosestategovernmentsthatstilleludedNazicontrol.Intherelativelyshortperiodbetween30January,whenHitlerbecameChancellor,and14July,whentheNSDAPwasdeclaredtobethesolelegitimateparty,thespeedyandvirtuallyunobstructedtakeoverofthosenon-PrussianstatesnotyetinNazihandsmaywellhaveconstitutedthesinglemostsignificantsuccessontheroadtoestablishingdictatorialrule.Twoelementsgreatlyfacilitatedthistakeover:(1)TheNazirankandfileplayedacentralroleintheconquestofthenon-PrussianLänderbyapplyingpressurefrombelowthroughassembliesandmarchesandvirtuallysettingitselfupasheraldofthepeople'swill.Thestategovernmentshadnochoicebuttoreacttotheensuing“disorder”which,inturn,gaveBerlintheopportunitytostepin,sincetheDecreeontheProtectionofthePeopleandtheState,passedaftertheReichstagfire,permittedthetakeoverofstatesiftheyprovedunabletomaintainlawandorder.LocalNaziauthoritiesthentookoverthepoliceforcesoastocompletelycontrolthestateexecutive.(2)AlreadyduringthelastdaysofFebruarytheveryrealthreatofhavinga“Reichskommissar”imposedonthemhoveredstarklyoverseveralLänder,sincethestategovernmentsofBavaria,Württemberg,Hesse,Saxony,andHamburghadonlyactingminoritygovernments,sothatitcouldbeclaimedwithsomejustificationthattheywereinherentlyunstable.17TheNazisthussucceededintheirbidtousurpLänder

governmentsbyacombinationofself-engendered“populistsupport”andstrong-armtacticstoseizeandmaintainpowerthatwaspartlybackedupbytheemergencylegislationof28February.Rifewithsymbolism,thetakeoverofthestategovernmentsbeganwitha“flag

war.”On5March,theNationalSocialistsamongHamburgpolicedepartmentofficialsraisedtheswastikaflagonpolicebarracksandbuildingstoforcethesurrenderofthepolicedepartmenttoaNazichiefofpolice.ThegovernmentoftheHanseaticcity,theHamburgSenate,hadalreadybeenweakenedbytheresignationofthreeSocialDemocraticsenators,includingHamburg'schiefofpolice,PolizeisenatorSchönfelder,on3March.TheLordMayorofthecity-state,Dr.CarlPetersen,aprominentmemberoftheStaatsparteiwhohadlongandsuccessfullyservedasmayorofhisnativecity,thereuponofferedhisresignation.Atthispoint,thenowleaderlessrumpSenateshowedcharacteristicreluctancetoorderitsmostlynon-Nazipoliceofficersandsquads,thevastmajorityofwhomwereloyaltotheHamburggovernment,totakedowntheswastikaflags.Inthemeantime,NaziInteriorMinisterWilhelmFrick,apprisedofeventsbytheNaziGauleitunginHamburg,tookadvantageoftheindecisionoftheSenate.CitingtheReichstagfireemergencylegislation,heorderedtheappointmentofaprovisionalheadoftheHamburgpoliceontheeveningof5March,assertingthat“publicsafety”intheHanseaticcitycouldnotbeguaranteed.18Thetakeoverofthepoliticalapparatusinthecity-stateofBremenon6Marchfollowedmuchthesamepattern.Heretoo,whenconfrontedwiththehoistingoftheswastikaflagthatsoostentatiouslyflewinthefaceofthelegallyelecteddemocraticgovernment,theSenatecouldnotbringitselftoutilizeitsownpolicetoforcetheNazisbackintoline.Instead,toprotesttheNaziaction,allSPDsenatorsresigned.Asimilarsystemofwrestingpowerfromnon-NazigovernmentswaspracticedinotherLänderaswell,inparticularinthestatecapitalsofDarmstadt,Stuttgart,andMunich,where“victorymarches”ofNazisupportersorganizedinrevolutionaryprocessions,togetherwithmilitary-likethreateningparadesandostentatiousmarchesbytheSAandSS,didtheirbittoexertpressureontherespectiveLandgovernmentstohandoverpowertotheNSDAP.Inallofthis,theraisingoftheswastikaflagattownhallsandotherpublicbuildingsheraldedtheimminenceoftheNazitakeoverandoftentriggeredoffunrest.19Thus,inthefewdaysbetween5and9March1933,theNazissucceededinimposingNationalSocialistReichCommissarsnotonlyonHamburgandBremen,butalsoonLübeck,Schaumburg-Lippe,Hesse,Baden,Württemberg,Saxony,andBavaria;thiswasquicklyfollowedbytheformationofNationalSocialistgovernmentsinthosestates.Thecombinedpopulationof

thoseLänderinwhichtheNazishadusurpedpowerbetween5and9March1933exceeded21million.20ThesetremendousNazisuccessesfoundnoequivalentincomparableGermanNationalpoliticalgains.Onthecontrary,theNazicoalitionpartnerhadhardlybeengivendueconsiderationwhenitcametodividingupthepoliticalspoilsthataccruedasaresultoftheswifttakeovers.21DuringthecourseofMarch,GermanNationalslookedonpowerlesslyastheNazisfilledthepostsofprovincialgovernors(Oberpräsidenten)inPrussia(withtheexceptionofthewesternprovinces)withtheirownGauleiterorwithSAGruppenführer.22Protestsweretonoavail,thoughtheDNVPleadershipexpresseditsconcernthat,contrarytoHitler'sprofessions,NationalSocialistshadconsistentlyfilledOberpräsidentenpositionswithuntrainedpersonnel,andnotcivilservantswithprofessionalexpertise.23ThisalmosteffortlesstakeoverofGermany'snon-NationalSocialistLänder

clearlyshowedthatthefateofWeimardemocracywassealedandthatthebattlehadbeenfoughtandwonbytheNazis.On9MarchtheAmericanAmbassadorsummeduptheprevailingsentimentinhisreporttoSecretaryofStateHull:“DemocracyinGermanyhasreceivedablowfromwhichitmayneverrecover.GermanyhasbeensubmergedunderahugeNaziwave.ThemuchheraldedThirdReichhasbecomeareality.”24Theopposition,inparticulartheleadersoftheSPD,realizedthattheyhadmissedthetimeandopportunityforresistance.25Atthesametime,SPDmembersbegantoleavethepartyindroves,especiallycivilservantswhofearedfortheircareers.26NationalSocialists,ontheotherhand,couldbarelyfendoffthestreamofnewapplicants.Nazismhadsucceededinputtingitselfforwardascapableofofferingabetteralternativeforthefuture,justaspotentialpoliticalopponentstoNazismfalteredandcavedinwithoutresistanceordefectedtotheNazisoutofopportunism,fear,or—quiteoften—genuineconviction.Inpublicperception(asinreality)the“nationalrevolution”ofMarch1933hadbeenpushedthroughsolelybytheNazipartyanditsorganizations,withoutanymeaningfulparticipationonthepartoftheirDNVPcoalitionpartner.IncontrasttotheNationalSocialistpartybase,theaverageDNVPmemberhadnotparticipatedinthemassivepoliticalchangesthatsweptthroughGermanyinMarch1933.SoonmanyGermanNationalswouldbeforcedintotheroleeitherofvictims,andthusactualtargetsofattack,ordisbelievingonlookerswithnoresourcesattheirdisposalotherthanindignantlettersofprotesttoPapen'sViceChancellery(soontobeknownastheReichComplaintsOffice)27andtheDNVPheadquartersinBerlin.BothofficeswerenaturalcontactpointsforvoicesofprotestagainstNaziviolationsofthelaw,thoughbothwereineffectconnectedwiththegovernment.Still,intheeyesof

many,theseweretwooftheremainingpoliticalofficeswhosememberstriedtosalvageremnantsoftheswiftlyfadingRechtsstaat.ThefloodsofcorrespondencearrivingattheofficesoftheViceChancellery

andtheDNVPpartyheadquartersborevividtestimonytothedeepbewildermentofconservativeGermans,whoinitiallyhadenthusiasticallyembracedtheHitlergovernmentandwerenowleftdumbfoundedbythedailyupheavals.Thistumultuouscourseofeventswasnothowtheyhadenvisionedthelonged-fornationalawakening.WalterBaerwolff,28partymanageroftheBavarianDNVP,wroteadetailedletterofprotesttoPapenalongtheselineson10March1933.TheeventsinMunichonthenightbetween9and10March,hereported,couldbecomparedonlywiththoseoftherevolutionof1918:“ForcibleliberationofSAmemberswhowereincarceratedundersuspicionofarsonandwhosetrialsareimpending,arbitraryarrestandmaltreatmentoftheleaderoftheJewishreligiouscommunity,thenofInteriorMinisterDr.Stützelandafurther500people;someofthesearrestsarepersonalactsofrevengebyindividualSAtroopers.”29Inthesecircumstances,Baerwolffargued,cooperationbetweentheDNVPandNSDAPwasabsolutelyimpossibleinBavaria.GiventheseNaziactions,heurgedPapentoensurethatpowerinPrussiabeapportionedfairlyinordertosafeguardthe“endangeredauthorityoftheReichPresident.”30AsimilarletterarrivedfromRegensburgon10March,reportingSAoutragesandterrorinthatcityandurgingPapentomakesurethat“justiceandtheruleoflaw”berestoredinRegensburg.31Theconservativeestablishmentsensedhowpowerwasinexorablyslippingfromitshands.GiventhemorethanmodestresultstheDNVPattainedintheMarchelections,

andthesimpletruththatthepartywasnolongerneededtoobtainaparliamentarymajority,theNaziparty'streatmentofitssmallcoalitionpartnernowchangedapace.Afterall,theelectionshadadded5,540,000votestotheNationalSocialists'total,whiletheDNVPhadgainedamere177,000votes,despitethefactthat3,896,000morevotershadgonetothepolls.32Referringtotheelectionresults,theNationalSocialistSchlesischeTageszeitungcommentedunequivocallyon6March:“TheGermanpeoplelookstothefuture,notthepast.ItstandsbehindAdolfHitlerandhisvisionandnotbehindtheforcesofreactionthatarepersonifiedinHugenberg.”33Anincidenton10March1933clearlydemonstratedthatevenestablishedconservativepoliticianssuchasDüsseldorfLordMayorRobertLehrweretotallyatthemercyoftheNaziswhenconfrontedwithNationalSocialistviolence.34Onthatday,agroupofNaziruffiansforcedtheirwayintotheofficeofthemayor,whowasinconferencewiththemunicipalcouncilorDr.Haas.Inthecourseoftheensuingaltercation,Haaswasrepeatedly

hitinthefacewithaleatherwhip,whilethemayorandothercouncilorswereforciblypreventedfromrenderingassistance.35EventhoughHaaswaspoliticallyaffiliatedwiththenationalistRight,NazisaccusedhimoffailingtoresistFrenchpressureenergeticallyenoughduringtheoccupationoftheRuhrin1923andofsupportingtheseparatisttendenciesencouragedbytheFrench.Thoughthiswasdemonstrablyfalse,MayorLehrwascompelledtofurloughHaas.36Nowfinallyinpower,Naziscouldatrandomdoleout“retribution”whereverandwhenevertheysawfit,evenfor“offenses”longpast.ConsideringthatevenaGermanNationalmayorinthecapitalcityofPrussia'smostpopulousprovincehadtostandbyhelplesslyasNaziruffiansransackedhisofficesandthreatenedcityofficials,onemightaskhowtheaverageGermancoulddefendhimselforlendassistancetootherswhenconfrontedwithSAterror.37

CrusadesagainstBourgeoisCorruptionandSpecialInterests

IncidentsofNaziterrorandtheensuingfutileandenragedindignationofconservativeandnational-mindedGermans,whohadinitiallywelcomedtheDNVP-NSDAPcoalitiongovernment,werelegionandreportsofthemaboundinthefiles.InlettersofprotestsenttotheDNVP'sBerlinheadquartersthatwereaddressedtoHugenberg'sdeputy,FriedrichvonWinterfeld,orthepartymanager,MajorHansNagel,conservativecitizensventedtheirdismayandconsternation.38ItnowgraduallydawnedupontheaveragerankandfilememberoftheDNVPthat,duetoNaziascendancyinallspheresofpolitics,theirtraditionalwayoflifewasabouttochangefundamentally.TheyseethedwithimpotentfuryovertheimpertinenceandlackofrespectshownbygangsofyoungNazithugs,whodisplayedflippantindifferenceanddraggedeverythingthatwasdeartothemthroughthemud:publicorder,awellregulatedlife,morals,decencyanddecorum,experience,thesanctityofproperty,respectforachievedrank,reputation,Bildung,andtraditionallifestyles.DNVPmemberKarlHoffmann,chairmanoftheKriegerverein(warrior'sleague)inthesmalltownofSchlichtingsheimintheGrenzmarkPosen-Westpreußen,lodgedavehementprotestoveraNationalSocialistrallyheldonFriday10March,wherespeakersinsultedthemiddle-classcitizenry(Bürgerschaft)andaccusedHoffmannof“embezzlingwelfarefunds.”39“Youngthugs”hadabusedfemaleGermanNationaldelegatesnominatedforthetowncouncilina“particularlyvilemanner”andthreatenedtodeposetheGermanNationalmayorwithouttheleastcause.40Likemostothercomplaints,Hoffmann'sappealtotheDNVPleadership

hadnoeffectwhatsoever.TherewasanunderlyingpurposebehindNaziaccusationsofmisappropriation

offunds,embezzlement,andcorruption.Thesewerefrequentlyusedandveryeffectivetoolstoincriminatethebourgeoisie,especiallysincetherewasoftentruthintheaccusationthatmembersoftheBürgertumengagedinspecial-interestpolitics.ThisverysuspicionofcomplicityinabusingclassprivilegesarousedbytheNazipressandinpartyrallieswasusuallysufficienttodiscreditthebourgeoisieanditsbürgerlicheInteressenpolitikandfeedintopopularresentmentofentrenchedinterests.Amongtheranksofthebourgeoisie,ithadlongbeenatraditionalcustomtopasscontractstoeachother,apracticefromwhichthesociallylessprominentNaziswereexcluded.Intheeconomiccosmosofsmallandmedium-sizedtowns,thepublicsector,dominatedbytraditional“bourgeois”sensibilities,hadanimportantroletoplayingrantingcontractstoprivatefirms.Inthismilieu,nepotism,cronyism,and“irregularities”ofallkindswerenothingunusual.TherewasaninexorablelinkbetweenthiseconomicallyadvantageouspositionoftheconservativemiddleclassesinthesmalltownsofPomerania,EastPrussia,andinpartsofBrandenburgandSilesia,andtheirstrongpoliticalinfluencethatpredominateduntil1933.41Byallegingmisuseofeconomicprivileges,theNazisdirectedthelimelightto,andtherebycastaspersionson,thepoliticalrepresentativesofthesupposedlyprivilegedBürgertum—includingtheirowncoalitionpartner—hopingtoshatterthenexusofpoliticalandeconomicpower.Heretwointerestinggeneralpointsemerge:(1)NationalSocialistpropagandausedanti-bourgeoisattackstogainpopulistsupport,andthisstrategyprovedverysuccessful.Theattacksonthebourgeoisieweresoldtothepublicasakindofrebellionagainstclassprivileges,whichnaturallyresonatedwiththeaveragesimplecitizen,whowasexcludedfromthetightcircleofspecialbourgeoisinterests.Thesuccessofthisstrategyexplainsinpartthe“positive”supportforNazismduringtheMachtergreifung,asopposedtothe“negative”supportthatarosefromtheNationalSocialists'morecoercivetactics.(2)TheNazisusedtheirattacksontheBürger42todemonstratethatthebourgeoisieand,aftertheinexorabledeclineoftheliberalparties,theirlastremainingpoliticalrepresentative,theDNVP,triedtoprotectspecialinterests,whiletheNazisstoodfor“universal”valuesandvowedtofightfortheuniversalinterestsofthenationalcommunityasopposedtotheparticularinterestsofaprivilegedclass.AcaseinpointisanincidentinthePomeraniandistricttownofKöslin,where

GermanNationalsweresubjectedtoacrimoniousNaziattacksduringtheweekfollowingtheelectionsof5March.43InaNazirallyforthelocalelectionstobe

heldon12March,NationalSocialistspeakersbluntlydeclaredthatthe(Imperial)“Black-White-Red”flagshouldnotbea“flagforacliqueofspecialinterests.”44NaziLandtagdeputyCzirnick,whohadtraveledfromtheprovincialcapitalStettinforthepurpose,fiercelyattackedGermanNationals,shoutingthat“theselfishspecialinterestpoliticsofindividualoccupationalgroups”mustfinallybebroughttoanendandcallingforacleansweepamongthe“uppertenthousand.”Infuture,nocitycouncilorshouldeverbeabletoprocurecontractswithouttenderingpublicbids.ThiswasaclearallusiontopracticesamongGermanNationalcouncilors,whohadbeentoofreewiththepublicpurse.45Czirnickfurtherrailedagainstthe“corruptionmentality”oftheBürgertumandtheirnepotism,cronyism,back-scratching,andinterlacingofpoliticalandbusinessinterests,ofwhichtheGermanNationalshadalsobeenguilty.46TheNSDAP,mostofwhosemembershadthemselvesbeenexcludedfromtheprivilegesenjoyedbytheentrenchedPomeranianBürgertum,naturallyhadaneconomicinterestineliminatingtheconservativeBürgertum'sdominanceovereconomiclife.Thisalsoservedtheirpoliticalinterestsbyunderminingthepoliticalrepresentativesofbourgeoiseconomicpower.Asacounterpointtobourgeoisselfishinterestpoliticsandcorruption,theNazisartfullycasttheirownsubjectiveeconomicandpoliticalinterestsasfurtheringthecollectiveinterestandcommongoodoftheGermannation.InthePomeranianpartyrally,Czirnickcontrastedthe“corruption”and“specialinterestpolitics”oftheGermanNationals(whomheaccusedofbetrayingStein'sidealofself-government)withtheNazis'“organiccommunity”andtheir“positivevalues,”suchas“servingthecommongoodandthewholeofthenation.”Inthelastelections,hecontinued,NationalSocialismhad,afterall,ralliedthemassesofthepeoplebehindthem,while“they[theGermanNationals]achievednothing.”47NationalSocialists,whohadheretoforebeeninvestedinlocalpoliticstoonlyalimiteddegree,couldthusofferthemselvesasanunspent,fresh,anduncorruptedforcethatwouldendbourgeoissleazeandfraudandactdisinterestedlyfortheentireGermannation.48

NaziAttacksPreparetheTakeoverAlreadyinthefirstfewweeksaftertheelection,detailedreportsofNationalSocialistviolationsofthelaw,variousandsundrytransgressions,andnotleastphysicalattacks,weresenttotheDNVPheadquartersfromallregionsoftheReich.Onthemorningof9March,forexample,theSAraidedthepolicedepartmentofHohenstein-ErnstthalinSaxonyanddeposedtheGermanNationalmayor,whowasreplacedbyanSAleader.49ArmedSAmen,whowerenotwearingauxiliarypolicearmbands,searchedthepremisesofacaféoppositetheGedächtniskircheinthecenterofBerlinclosetomidnighton10Marchwithoutbotheringtoidentifythemselves.Thepowerlessproprietorandguestswatchedtheillegalsearchwithuneasyanxiety.50Earlieronthatday,NationalSocialistruffianshadblockedtheentrancetooneofBerlin'slargedepartmentstores,theKaufhausdesWestensattheWittenbergplatzinthewesternsectionofthedowntown,andbulliedpedestrians.51Concurrently,theReichChancellerywasfloodedwithcomplaintsthatgavetestimonytotheimmensenumberofinfringementsperpetratedbyNationalSocialistorganizations.52InspiteofHitler'srepeatedexhortationstomaintainpeaceandorder,andtocontrol“provocativeelements...[thatoperate]underthecloakoftheparty,”sothatGermany'sreputationabroadwouldnotbeharmed,theattacksdidnotabate.53Archivalfilesreflectthehugenumberofillegalactsandprovocations,aswellasthechaosandlawlessnessoftheweeksfollowing5March1933.Thismultitudeofinfringementscanbedividedintoroughlythreecategories.

Firsttherewasawholehostofattacksagainstforeigncitizensandforeignembassies.On7March,forexample,agroupofNazithugsforcedtheirwayintothePolishlegationandraisedtheswastikaflagwithoutpermission;54thiswasfollowedbyrepeatedharassmentandbullyingofAmerican,British,Indian,andYugoslavcitizensaswellasthemistreatmentofaFrenchofficial.ReichChancelleryfilesaboundwithcomplaintsfromtheBritish,Italian,andDutchembassiesandlegationsconcerningattacksontheircitizens,55andForeignMinisterNeurathhimselfprovidedacomprehensivelistoftheseincidents.56Thesecondcategoryofcomplaintsrelatedtothedisruptionoftheeconomy,suchastheforcedclosureofretailshopsandharassmentoftheirowners,57ortheSA'sthreattoshutdowntheBerlinStockExchange,asreportedbytheappalledStaatssekretärPaulBang,whofearedthatanyinterferencewiththestockmarketmightjeopardizethenascenteconomicupswing.58Thethirdcategoryofattacks

referredtoanti-Semiticattacks,suchastheMagdeburgSA'sraidonaJewishrestaurant,inwhichtheSwisscitizenWillyGuggenheimerwasinjured.59FrequentlytheSAfocusedtheirattacksonPolish,American,orCzechJewslivinginGermany;theseincidentsmadetheirwayintothefilesthroughthedetailedcomplaintsregisteredbytheirrespectivediplomaticmissions.60Inthecourseofoneoftheseanti-SemiticattacksinDresdenontheeveningof18March,thepoliceofficerssummonedtothesceneassertedthat“policedutiesdonotincludetheprotectionofJews.”61InadditiontoSAattacks,whichweremarkedbysuchextremeviolencethatvictimsoftenhadtobehospitalized,therewasalsowantondestructionofvaluablesandpropertyonaconsiderablescale.62ThesheernumberofattacksonforeignJewsaloneindicatesthattheremaywellhavebeenacomparablenumberofattacksonGermanJewsthatwentunrecorded,sinceGermancitizenswereinnopositiontoseekprotectionfromforeignmissionsandmayhavebeenveryreluctanttocallinthepolice.Forthemostpart,DNVPmembersandleadersweremereonlookersinallofthis;theywatcheduneasilyfromthesidelines,butdarednotinterfere,partlybecausetheyfelttoodeeplycompromisedbytheircoalitionwithHitler.63BymidMarch1933,politicallifehadchangedtosuchanextentthatthe

GermanRechtsstaatwasathingofthepast.Thoughlargelyunregulated,chaotic,andofteninoppositiontothedirectivesoftheReichgovernment,theuncheckedviolenceoftheSA,withitscountlessaccompanyingillegalactions,wasnotwhollyunwelcometotheNazileadership.Inacertainsense,the“revolutionaryanarchy”ofMarchandApril1933provedtobeindirectlybeneficialtotheirultimategoals,sinceitbecameincreasinglyobvioustopotentialopponentsthateveryonewhoresistedtheadvanceofNationalSocialism—inspeech,action,orwriting—puttheirownlivesatrisk.ToomanyhadalreadyvanishedinthetorturecellarsoftheSAforthepassiveopponentofNazismtocontemplateopenoppositionlightly.NazileadersquicklydiscoveredhowtochannelthewidespreadfearfosteredbywantonSAactsofviolenceintoatoolof“revolutionary”changebeneficialtotheirneeds.March1933wasalsoatimewhenoldaccountsweresettledwithoutanyconsiderationoflegalorsocialproprieties.Thepolitician,journalist,orprivatecitizenwhohadinthepastbeentoooutspokeninhisoppositiontoHitler,nowhadreasontobeconcernedaboutmorethansimplyhiscareer.ThetradesmanwhohadbeenamemberoftheSPDmightseehisshopcloseddownfromonedaytothenext,andwiththeenactmentoftheLawontheRestorationofaProfessionalCivilServiceof7April,eventhosedeemedformerlyuntouchable,suchasGermancivilservants,becamevictimsofNaziretribution.FrommidMarchonwards,asthearchival

evidencemakesveryclear,64conservativesofallshades,includingtheNazis'ownGermanNationalcoalitionpartner,werenextinline.Theconservatives,stilllegalisticintheirthinking,wouldhavefounditimpossibletoanswerviolencespontaneouslywithcounterviolence,eveniftherelativeratioofphysicalpower(whichwasheavilyweighedagainstthem)hadmadesuchactionfeasible.Inanycase,theyandotherslikethemcouldnolongerappealtohigherjudicialauthorities,asthesehadceasedtoexist:thepolicechosetoignoreNaziattacks,theReichInteriorMinistryfailedtofollowuponcomplaints,andyoungNazijudgessoongainedascendancyoverthecourtsystem.65

ConservativeBastionsunderAttackThefilescontainingtheDNVP'spoliticalcorrespondenceforthemonthsofMarchtoMay1933constitutearepositoryforthefloodofcomplaintsfromallregionsoftheReichaboutattacksagainsttheirownmembersandorganizations.Thedistinctivenessofthesecomplaintsliesinthefactthatthebulkofthemoriginatedfromconservative,extremelynational-mindedGermans(manyofwhomweremembersoftheDNVP),whoatfirsthadenthusiasticallywelcomedtheadventofthecoalitiongovernmentbetweentheDNVPandtheNaziparty.Mostofthemhadinitiallyembracedtheformationofalong-awaited“national”government,inwhichtheDNVPwouldplayacentralrole,eventhoughithadcomeatthepriceofanalliancewithHitler.ConfrontednowwithNaziterrororactsofsheerrevengedirectedagainst“upright”conservativeandpatrioticDNVPmembers,aswellasuninvolvedthirdparties,theyreactedwithbewilderment,indignation,andhaplessfury.Astheirletterstestify,theysawthemselvesluredintocomplicityandnowensnaredinatrap,withtheirearliercollusionrenderingprotestdifficult,ifnotimpossible.Nohigherconstitutionalauthorityremainedtohearappeals,forthelegalsafeguardsoftheOldPrussianandImperialRechtsstaathadbeendestroyedandGermanNationalsthemselveshadhadahelpinghandindestroyingit.ThesolerecourseleftwastolodgeprotestswiththeDNVPpartyleadership,sinceitwasknownthatHugenbergwastoopreoccupiedwithhisministerialpoststolendsuccor.Ifthiswastonoavail,theycouldturntotheReichChancelleryinthevaguehopethatHitlermightinterfereorcomplaintoPapen'sViceChancellery.66Bythelatewinterandearlyspringof1933,theDNVPhadthusbeguntoreap

thefruitsofwhatithadsown,and—incountlesslocalincidences—thepartyanditsmembersbegantoturnfromthevictorsof30JanuaryintothepowerlessvictimsorbewilderedbystandersofMarch.InthecourseofthePrussianelectionsforthedistrictandprovincialparliamentsof12March,forexample,theSAconfiscated3,000DNVPcampaignleafletsandlaterreprintsofthesameleafletsinthesmalltownofZüllichau(countyofSchwiebusintheNeumark).ProtestsaddressedtotheOberpräsident(governor)oftheprovincehadnoeffect.67Duringthesamecampaign,thespeakerfortheNazipartyinDelitzsch,atowninthePrussianprovinceofSaxony,utteredtheplainthreatthatHugenbergandPapenwouldbethrownoutofthegovernmentatthenextbestopportunity.68FromMunichtheprominentformerDNVPdeputyGottfriedTraub,oneofthefoundersoftheVaterlandspartei,aparticipantintheKapp

Putsch,andnowpublisheroftheHugenberg-ownedpaperMünchen-AugsburgerAbendzeitung,reportedonthechaosandmultitudeofNaziattacksandvoicedhisfearsthatGermanNationalswouldsoonnolongerbeneededthere,sincetheNazismightformacoalitiongovernmentwiththeBayerischeVolkspartei.69Becauseoftheseapprehensions,heindicatedhiswillingnesstooverlooktheNazis'worstexcessesandtotrytorepaircracksinthealliancebycontinuingtocooperatewiththem.On17March,thechairmanoftheDNVP'slocalchapterinBerlin-Wilhelmshagen,Dr.Schulze,complainedaboutaNationalSocialistcitycouncilor,whohadpubliclylabeledHugenbergatraitorandStahlhelmleaderFranzSeldteamegalomaniac,anddemandedthatbothofthembegottenridof.70TheoverallmoodwithintheWilhelmshagenNSDAP,Schulzelamented,was,asfarashecouldtell,verymuchinkeepingwithsuchstatements.Complaintsaboundedabouttheinactivityandpowerlessnessofthepolice,aswellastheiravoidanceofconflictswiththeSA.ReportscameinfromMagdeburgon18MarchthatthepolicehadliterallystoodasideandwatchedastheSAdemolishedthefurnishingsoftheMagdeburgerVolksstimme,anSPDnewspaper,andthencontinuedtospreadterrorinthestreets:“ThepolicedidnotintervenebecausetheywerephysicallythreatenedbytheSA.”71InadispatchfromBreslau,bankmanagerWaldemarWadsackrecountedhisarreston17Marchonthebaselesschargethathehadbeenamemberofthe“BlackFront”andhissubsequentconveyancetoSAheadquarters,whereSAmenlashedhimwithhorsewhips,cruellymanhandledhimforhours,andfinallyconfiscatedhisproperty.Thoughtryingtobehelpful,thepolicehadbeenunabletorecoverhisproperty,despitealltheirefforts.72FromtheWaldeckdistrictinKurhessendispatchesreachedDNVPheadquartersthattheSAhadarrestedapproximatelyonehundredpeople,mostlyJewsandmembersoftheLeft,through25March.Theyhadbeeninterrogatedandthensubmitted“toprolongedandmonstrousbeatings”thatwereadministered“withbestialbrutality”inadarksideroom.73Thevictimswerethenunceremoniouslythrownout,somebeingforcedtoseekmedicalassistanceataKasselhospital.ThereportstressedthattheentirepopulationoftheWaldeckdistrictwasinastateofgreatagitationandconsternationsincenoonecouldhenceforthfeelsafefrommistreatment;evenStahlhelmleaders,whoweredislikedbytheSA,consideredthemselvestobeindanger.74InReichenbachinlowerSilesiatheSAstormedtheDienstwohnung(officialresidence)ofthemayorat11:30p.m.,rousedhimfrombed,andconductedasearchofthepremisesonthedayfollowingthe12Marchlocalelections.Noincriminatingmaterialswerefoundinthehomeofthe“politicallycentristmayor”whowas,accordingtothereportoftheDNVPLowerSilesian

LandAssociation,a“soundandexperiencedlocalpolitician,”though“thementalstrainoftheattacklefthimwithanervousbreakdown.Heisnowgravelyillandbedridden.”75Thechaos,mayhem,anddisorderofMarch1933weresoall-encompassing

thattherewereevenclashesinthecampofthevictor,thatis,amongNaziorganizationsthemselves.AsreportedbytheDNVPHannover-SouthLandAssociation(thesouthernpartofpresent-dayLowerSaxony),therewereopenconflictsbetweentheNSDAP'spoliticalleadershipandtheSA.InHameln,forexample,theNSDAPcountyleaderandtopcandidateinthelocalelectionwas“grosslyabusedandmolestedbyhisownpeople.”76ButdiscordandclashesamongNaziorganizationswerebynomeanstantamounttoareprievefortheGermanNationals:“IncursionsandencroachmentsbytheNationalSocialistsincreasehourbyhour.ThereseemstobeamethodinhowtheyburntheirbridgestotheDNVP,”reportedtheDNVPPosen-WestpreußenLandAssociationinSchneidemühl77toDNVPheadquarterson1April;anominousprognosticationfollowed:“Weareheregettingeverclosertoanarchy.Noadministrativeorgovernmentalbodyseemstohavethecouragetoconfronttheterrorinthestreet.”Nazihoodlumsvigorouslypursuedtheirowngoalsand,inthewordsoftheSchneidemühlDNVP:“[U]nlesstheseundisciplinedandraginghordesaredisarmedimmediately,wewillhavehereunadulteratedRussiansconditions...,”78referringtothefactthatseveralofthemostviolentNazishadoncebeennotoriousCommunists.BrawlsbetweentheSAandtheGermanNationalKampfringewerealreadyadailyoccurrence.79ThesecomplaintsfromtheGrenzmarkPosen-WestpreußenintheReich'seasternregionswerematchedwiththosefromthewest.InadispatchfromVerdenanderAllerintheprovinceofHannover,forexample,itwasreportedthattheNSDAPintendedtomarginalizetheGermanNationalstothepointthatinvitationstotheVaterländischeVereineweresentonlytotheStahlhelmandassiduouslyignoredtheGermanNationals.Disillusioned,theHannover-EastLandAssociationchairmanwrotetoBerlinon29March:“ThetendencytoeliminatetheDNVPappearstobeprevalenteverywhere.”80Alreadyon10March,WalterBaerwolff,thepartymanageroftheBavarianDNVP,hadmaintainedthattheNaziparty'sbrutalattacksrenderedanycollaborationbetweentheNSDAPandDNVPimpossible,comparingNazilawlessnesswith“theeventsduringtherevolutionof1918.”81Buteventhiscomparisondidnotgofarenough,foritsoonbecameclearthattheeventsofMarch1933wouldhavefarmoredebilitatingrepercussionsforGermanconservativesthanthoseofNovember1918.ViolentclasheswithNaziorganizations,suchasthosedescribedabove,

greatlyaffectedthespiritoftheDNVP'sleadershipandrankandfilealike—bothbecameincreasinglyawareoftheirownpowerlessness.SincecomplaintsaboutNaziencroachmentshadbeendirectedmostlytotheDNVPcentralofficeinBerlin,partyleadersanddeputiesknewofthemultitudeofattacks.Buteventhosewhowerenotfamiliarwiththedetailshadexperiencedthemomentoustransformationofpoliticalclimateinallitsramifications,firstinthedaysfollowingtheReichstagfireandthenintheweeksaftertheelections.TheyallwerekeenlyawarethattheDNVPwashardlyinapositiontostopthetriumphalmarchofNazismorchannelitintodifferentdirections.AlreadyontheeveoftheopeningofthenewReichstag,theso-calledDayofPotsdamon21March,andthepassingoftheEnablingActtwodayslater,theDNVPpartyorganizationandmemberswere,toacertainextent,broken.Theyhadcertainlylostmuchoftheirformerconfidence.TherankandfilemembershipthroughouttheReichhadalsoexperiencedtheseeminglyunstoppableupswingofNationalSocialismwithallitsattendantconsequences:nowthewindofrevolutionwasblowingintheirfacesandnotattheirbacks.Theyhadbeenstunnedattheeaseandrapiditywithwhichtheirowninveteratefoes,theKPDandSPDandalltheirorganizations,haddisappearedfromthestreets,wererepressed,andrenderedmute.WithintheDNVPitself,voicesurgingthatthepartymergewiththeNSDAP,whileitwasstilltakenseriouslyasapoliticalforce,grewlouder.82HugenbergandmostofthepartyleadershipdidtheirbesttosteeranindependentcourseandpreservetheDNVP'sautonomy,thoughtheyknewalltoowellthatcallswithinthepartytofusewiththeNSDAP,alongwiththeincreasingdominanceandpopularityofNazism,wereboundtounderminetheirownposition.Thepoliticaldevelopmentsofthenextfewmonthscannotbeunderstoodwithouttakingintoaccountthechangedclimateofpolitics,theenormouspopularitythatNazismandsomeNazileaders,especiallyHitler,hadacquiredwiththeirseeminglyresoluteactionsfollowingtheReichstagfire,theseventeenmillionvotescastfortheNSDAPon5March,theeffortlesstakeoveroftheLänder,andtheever-swellingarmyofMärzgefallenen—the“casualtiesofMarch”—whonowclamoredtojointheNazipartywhileitwasstillacceptingapplicants.Giventhenewdistributionofpower,whichwasbasedmoreonthewidespreadpopularsensethateverythingandeveryonewascontributingtothesteadilygrowingtorrentofNazismthanontheNSDAP'sactualparliamentarystrength,theDNVPleadershipbelievedithadnoalternativebuttoputagoodfaceuponeventsandgoalongwithNazipolicies.CertainlynoonehadexpectedthattheDNVPwouldrunoutofviablepoliticalalternativeslessthantwomonthsafterHitlerbecameChancellorofGermany.

TheLastHurdle:PotsdamandtheEnablingActTheimmensespectacleatPotsdamontheoccasionofthenewReichstagwas,toalloutwardappearances,asignificantsteptowardtherevivalofatraditional,conservativeGermany—andthusoftheDNVP—sinceitseemedasifHitlerostentatiouslytriedtomergehisNationalSocialistmovementwiththetraditionofPrussiansimplicity,decency,andorder.Hemadesuretopaydeferentialrespecttotheoldfieldmarshal,PresidentHindenburg,whoembodiedallofthesequalities.83Inimmenseposters,NazipropagandahadpostulatedanimplicitlineofdescentfromFredericktheGreatontoBismarck,Hindenburg,andthenHitler.84TheimagespenetrateddeeplyintotheconsciousnessofmillionsofGermans,wholongedforaradicallychangedfutureaslongasitwasanchoredfirmlyintheachievementsofthepast.Viewedsuperficially,theNazismpresentedatPotsdamgavetheimpressionofbeingtamed,seeminglyverifyingtheoldelite'scalculationsthattheattempttodomesticateHitlerandhismovementhadsucceededafterall.Nothingcouldhavebeenfurtherfromthetruth.Theactualimpactofthe“DayofPotsdam”wasverydifferent—asitwasintendedtobe.TheNazissetouttoco-optthetraditionalsymbolsofPrussianconservatismfortheirownradicalends.TheyhadnointentionofsupportingthegoalsofGermanconservatism,butonlyusedGermanconservatismasameanstoestablishafootholdinpower.Oncetheirplacewassecure,theNaziscoulddispensewiththepretenseofallyingwiththeGermanNationalsasnational-mindedbrothers-in-arms.TheirsuccessfulfusionofPrussianandNationalSocialistsymbolsofpowerandnationalpride,aswellastheseamlessinclusionofHitlerintoanunbrokenchainofPrussian-Germanhistoricalcontinuity,wouldsoonrendertheDNVPsuperfluousastheexclusiverepresentativeofGermannationalhistoryandtraditionalvalues.Withtheiringeniouslystage-manageddisplayofnationalunityinPotsdam,theNazisscoredaclearvictoryovertheGermanNationalsintheirongoingstruggleoverwhowouldbetherightfulheirtothenationalheritage.Theconflicthadpreviouslyeruptedontheoccasionoflocalfestivities,suchasthe120thanniversaryoftheonsetoftheWarsofLiberationagainstNapoleon.85Nowitwaselevatedtothenationalstage,wheretheseeminglysuccessfulsymbiosisoftraditionalPrussianconservatismandNationalSocialismmanifestedareconstitutednationalunityandavigorthatappealednotonlytosympathizersofNationalSocialism,butinsomewayseventothosewhovieweditverycritically.ErichEbermayer,whohadsupportedtheDDPduringtheRepublicandremainedconsistentlycriticaloftheNazisevenduringtheheightof“nationalawakening”inMarch1933,wroteinhisdiary:

Whatmasterfulmise-en-scènebythestagemanagerGoebbels!TheprocessionofHindenburg,

Whatmasterfulmise-en-scènebythestagemanagerGoebbels!TheprocessionofHindenburg,themembersofthegovernmentandthedeputiespassesfromBerlintoPotsdamthroughtightlypackedrowsofjubilantmillions.ToutBerlinseemstobeinthestreet.MembersofgovernmentanddeputieswalkfromtheNikolaitotheGarnisonchurch.Ringingofbellsandfiringofcanons.HindenburgenterstheGarnisonchurchsidebysidewithHitler.Theradioannouncer'svoicesuffusedwithemotion.ThenHindenburgreadshismessage.Astraightforward,strongmessage,emanatingfromasimpleheartandthusappealingtosimplehearts.JustthefactthathereisamanwhounitesgenerationsofGermanhistoryinhisownperson,whotookpartinthefightingin1866,waspresentattheImperialcoronationatVersaillesin‘71androsetobecomethenationalheroof1914–18;whosepopularitywithourstrangepeopleremainsundiminishedbyanylostbattleorlostWorldWar,whosestature,onthecontrary,grewindefeatintomythicalproportions,andwhothen,asoctogenarian,tookthehelmoftheReichforasecondtime;notoutofvanityorlustforpower,butdoubtlessfromaPrussiansenseofduty—andnowhere,onlystepsawayfromhisgrave,heexecutesthefusionofhisworldwiththenewlyrisingonethatisrepresentedbytheAustriancorporal.

ThenHitlerspeaks.Nousedenying:hehasgrown.Thedemagogueandpartyleader,thefanaticandrabble-rouserseemstobedeveloping—tothepuzzlementofhisopponents—intothetruestatesman.Ageniusafterall,whosemysteriousandunknownsoulharborsanunsuspectedandimmensepotential?....HindenburglaysdownwreathsatthetombsofPrussiankings.TothelancecorporaloftheWorldWartheagedfieldmarshalholdsouthishand.Thelancecorporalinclineshisheaddeeplyoverthehandofthefieldmarshal.CannonthunderoverPotsdam—overGermany.Noonecanhidehisemotion.Evenfatherisdeeplyimpressed.Motherismovedtotears.86

Ifthepoliticallyawareandliberal-mindedEbermayercouldbesoaffectedbythesymbolismofthemoment,whatcouldnowpreventalargepartofthenational-mindedbourgeoisiefromsupportingthedynamicleaderofalargeVolksparteiratherthanthepedanticandlacklusterHugenberg?ThewidespreadenthusiasmgeneratedbyPotsdam,wheretheNaziParty

affectedasymbiosisbetweentheyouthfulenergyoftheirNationalSocialistmovementandthegrandeurofthePrussianpast,producedanauspiciousatmospherefortheintroductionoftheEnablingAct.TwodaysafterthePotsdamspectacle,whentheReichstagassembledinBerlin'sKrollOperahouse(directlyacrossfromthefire-damagedReichstagbuilding),itwasclearfromthestartthattheDNVPwouldvotefortheEnablingAct,especiallysincethepartyhadalsobeeninstrumentalinbringingthe“LawonRelievingtheSufferingofNationandReich”totheReichstagfloor.87FormerChancellorHeinrichBrüningclaimedthatsomeDNVPmembershadapproachedhimtodraftanamendmenttotheEnablingActthatwould“guaranteecivicandpoliticalfreedoms.”AccordingtoBrüning,thisissueoflegalsafeguardshadbeendiscussedinHugenberg'shomeontheeveningof21March,whenitwasagreedthatfortacticalreasonstheDNVPshouldbringthisamendmenttotheReichstagfloor.Justbeforethesecondreadingofthebill,DNVPdeputyOttoSchmidt-HannoverpassedBrüningand,inatenseatmosphereandringedbySAandSStroopers,managed

towhispertohim:“Wehavebeentakenforaride.”88Onthefollowingday,Brüningdiscoveredthatanintrapartyrebellionoftwenty-twoDNVPdeputies,ledbyMartinSpahnandEduardStadtler,hadallegedlysabotagedtheamendmentbythreateningtoleavetheDNVPandjointheNazipartyifitwereputforward.89Brüning'svariousversionsofthisincidentaresoriddledwithinconsistenciesandcontradictionsthatthemassivecriticismofhisaccountbyothercontemporarypoliticalactorshardlycomesasasurprise.90Whateverthecase,thepassingoftheEnablingActcompletelyfreedHitlerfromanyrestrictionsthatHindenburg,asPresident,mighthaveimposeduponhim,sincepresidentialapprovalwasnownolongerrequiredtopasslegislation.Infact,theEnablingActonlygaveofficialsanctiontoanalreadyextantpoliticalreality,sincethe“party-revolutionfrombelow”hadlongsincerevolutionizedthedistributionofpoweratthetop.91TheaffirmativevotesoftheCenter,BVP,Staatspartei,DVP,andothersplinterpartieshavetobeseeninthislight.EvenmembersoftheSPD,whoseremainingninety-fourdeputiesweretheonlyonestovote“no,”concededafterthewarthatano-votefromtheCenterPartywouldultimatelyhavebeentonoavail,eventhoughitwouldhavethwartedHitler'sdeterminationtoconsolidatehisholdonpowerthroughlegalmeans.92Mostofthedeputiesoftheabove-mentionedpartieslaterjustifiedtheiraffirmativevotebyarguingthatnon-acceptancewouldonlyhaveledtoanoutbreakoffurtherNaziviolenceandbloodyanarchy.93Thethousandsofarmed,threatening,leeringandjeeringSAandSStroopersoutsideaswellasinsidethemeetinghalladdedaveryvisibleelementofthreatandcoercion,despitethepresenceofforeigndiplomats.94Thisaspectofsheerphysicalmenacewasnotwithouteffect.AmongtheparliamentaryfactionoftheSPD,someofwhosedeputieshadalreadybeenarrested,itwasdebatedpriortothemeetingwhetheritmightbebetternottoattendatall.IttookthemoraloutrageoftheseeminglymorefearlessfemaleSPDdeputies,suchasLuiseSchröder,andtheinsistenceofOttoWelsandKurtSchumacherfortheotherstoattendtheReichstagsession,despitethreatstolifeandlimb.95Inadditiontophysicalthreatsandthefactthatano-votemightwellhaveprovenfutile,anotherpowerfulfactorthatcompelleddeputiesoftheCenterandliberalsplinterpartiestovoteaffirmativelywastheforcefulcurrentinthepopularmoodduringthesecondhalfofMarch1933thatpracticallydemandedconsent.Afterthewar,fewofthosewhohadvoted“yes”daredtoownuptotheintangiblepressureexertedbythevoxpopuli,thoughitoccasionallyappearsthroughthecracksintheirstatements.TheWürttembergCenterPartydeputyJohannesGroßadmittedin1947that“...thepeoplehadgrowntiredofbickeringamongthepartiesintheReichstag....Thingshadto

change.This,Ishouldsay,playedarolewitheveryonebackthen.IalsohaveneverbeenattackedbecauseofmyaffirmativevotetotheErmächtigungsgesetz,inanypoliticalassembly.”96HermannDietrichoftheStaatsparteiputitevenmorebluntly:“Ihavesufferedmanydiscomfortsandshoulderedunpopulardutiesinmylife,difficultiesofallkinds;Ihavebeenscoldedandpraised.ButinmywholelifeIhaveneverexperiencedsuchostentatiousmanifestationsofconsent,especiallyinwriting,asontheoccasionofthisvote,theEnablingAct...”97Intheimmediatepostwarclimate,whenpeoplestillrememberedthepopularmoodofspring1933,itwasprobablyeasiertospellouttheplaintruththatavastmajorityofGermanswantedtheEnablingAct,evenmanyofthosewhohadvotedfortheCenterandtheStaatspartei.YetthistruthhadbecometoounpleasanttoutterafterasecondWorldWar,thegenocidalmurderofmillionscarriedoutonthebasisofabstractprinciples,andtherealizationthatthosewhovotedfortheEnablingActhadfacilitatedHitler'sassumptionoftotalpower,andthusindirectlywarandtheHolocaust.Thus,inlaterstatementsthiselementofactinginaccordancewiththepopularmood(evenagainstone'sbetterjudgment)isnotablymissing.Afterthevirtuallycompleteeliminationoftheleftistoppositionandthe

willingnessoftheCenterPartytocollaboratewiththeNSDAP,awillingnessfurtherunderlinedbythepro-governmentdeclarationofCatholicbishopson28March,98NationalSocialismcouldevenmorefreelyshowitstruefaceandturnagainstwhatitperceivedtobeanotherdangerousopponent:theconservativebourgeoisie.ThisantagonismbetweenNazismandwhatwasleftoftheBürgertumanditswayoflifeisoftenoverlookedinthehistoryoftheNaziseizureofpower.AsHitlerhadominouslycalledoutinhisrejoindertothespeechoftheSPDleaderOttoWels:“DonotmistakeusforthebürgerlicheWelt,”99aclarioncallthatseemedtoheraldareckoningtocome.ThefollowingchapteraddressestheconflictbetweenthisbürgerlicheWeltandNationalSocialism,asthedayofreckoningdrewinevitablycloser.

1.ThepoliticaljournalDieHilfewroteon18March1933:“Theoristsofrevolutionmaydebatewhetheranelectioncanconstitutea‘revolution’orbelongstothesphereof‘evolution.’Thattheconcomitantphenomenaofthecataclysmicchangeofpower[Machtumwälzung]presentapicturetypicalofrevolutionaryactions,aswewellrememberfromthewinterofunrest1918/19,iscleartoeverybody.”InDieHilfe39(1933),165;seealsoBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,146.

2.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,160.3.Diaryentryof8March1933,inJosephGoebbels,VomKaiserhofzurReichskanzlei.Einehistorische

DarstellunginTagebuchblättern(Munich,1940),277.4.See,forexample,MartinBroszat,ElkeFröhlich,FalkWiesemann,eds.,BayerninderNS-Zeit.

SozialeLageundpolitischesVerhaltenderBevölkerungimSpiegelvertraulicherBerichte(Munichand

Vienna,1977),vol.I,432.5.MartinBroszat“NationalsozialistischeKonzentrationslager1933–1945,”inMartinBroszat,Hans-

AdolfJacobsenandHelmutKrausnick,AnatomiedesSS-Staates,vol.II,5thed.(Munich,1989),21.FritzWeitzel(1904–1940),originallyactiveintheSocialistYouthMovement,amemberoftheSSsince1926,andSSGruppenführersince1931;hebecamecommissioneroftheDüsseldorfpoliceattheageof29.SeeWeiß,ed.,BiographischesLexikonzumDrittenReich,484.

6.RudolfDiels,LuciferantePortas.EssprichtderersteChefderGestapo(Stuttgart,1950);seeespeciallythechapter“PrügelstättenundKonzentrationslager,”187–197:“Iwasnowabletoenterthetorturechamberwithpolicesquads.Therethefloorsofafewemptyroomsusedbythetorturerswerecoveredwithstraw.Thevictimsweencounteredwereclosetodeathbystarvation.Fordaystheyhad,instandingposition,beenlockedintonarrowclosetstoextort‘confessions.’‘Interrogations’hadbegunandendedwithbeatings,wherebyadozenruffiansbatteredvictimswithironbars,rubbertruncheonsandwhipsathourlyintervals.Thesufferingwasevidencedbyknocked-outteethandbrokenbones.Asweentered,theselivingskeletonslaythereinrowswithfestering,suppuratingwoundsonrottingstraw.Therewasnotonewhosebodywasnotcoveredfromheadtofootwithblue,yellow,andgreenbruisesthatborewitnesstotheinhumanthrashingvisiteduponthem.”

7.SiegfriedvonKardorff(1873–1945).FreeConservativePartydeputyinPrussia(1909–1918),thendeputyfortheDNVPin1919;crossedthefloorfromtheDNVPtotheDVPaftertheKappPutsch;Vice-PresidentoftheReichstagfrom1928–1932.

8.DocumentsonBritishForeignPolicy,1919–1939,2ndseries,vol.IV(London,1950),472.9.Eschenburg,LetztenEndesmeineichdoch,16.10.TheFrenchAmbassadorAndréFrançois-Poncetnotedthatapartfromtheprohibitionofopposition

newspapers,“thepublicwassubjecttosystematicpressure...intimidationand...akindofhypnosis.Thispressurewasevidentinthedismissalofofficials,throughinstancesofindividualviolence,theuseofradiosolelyonbehalfofthegovernment...throughtheelevationofbrown-shirtstotheranksofregularpolice.”BeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,127.

11.Hitlerinterpretedtheelectionresultas“arevolution,”andGoebbels,inhispublisheddiary,waxesequallyenthusiastic:“Thenthefirstresultscomein.Onevictoryfollowedbyanother,fantasticandunbelievable.AswereturnedtotheReichChancelleryaftertheperformance,theglorioustriumphhasbecomereality,morestunninginitsmagnitudethananyofuswouldhavedaredtohope.”Goebbels,VomKaiserhofzurReichskanzlei,entryof5March1933,275.

12.EdgarJ.Feuchtwanger,FromWeimartoHitler.Germany1918–1933,2nded.(NewYork,1995),329;Falter,etal.,WahlenundAbstimmungeninderWeimarerRepublik,101.IncomparisontotheApril1932elections,theDNVPgained600,000votesinPrussiaandimproveditsshowingfrom6.9percentto8.8percent,orthirty-onetoforty-threeseats.

13.Thiswasthehighestvoterturnoutsince1919,andanincreaseofalmostfivepercentovertheJuly1932elections(84.1percent).ThevoterturnoutforReichstagelectionshadbeenhighthroughouttheRepublic,neverfallingbelow75percent.Thelowestvoterturnoutwasregisteredfortheelectionsof20May1928(75.6percent),while83percentturnedoutfortheelectionstotheNationalAssemblyinJanuary1919,and82percentforthedecisiveelectionsof14September1930.Kolb,WeimarerRepublik,308–309.

14.AndréFrançois-Poncet,1887–1978,FrenchAmbassadorinBerlin1931–1938,Rome1938–1940,and,afterthewar,firstAlliedHighCommissionerinWestGermany,1949–1953,AmbassadorinBonn,1953–1955.

15.DocumentsDiplomatiquesFrançais1932–1939.PremièreSérie,Vol.II(Paris,1966),744–745;reprintedinBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,127–128.

16.SeeMinuth,ed.,DieRegierungHitler,2–4.17.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,132.18.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,130–140;KarlDietrichBracher,StufenderMachtergreifung,190–202;

HenningTimpke,ed.,DokumentezurGleichschaltungdesLandesHamburg(Frankfurt,1964);Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,258–265.

19.MartinBroszat,DerStaatHitlers,135.20.SeeTable2inAppendix.21.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,140.22.SeeTable3inAppendix.23.PeterThiele,“NSDAPundallgemeineinnereStaatsverwaltung.UntersuchungenzumVerhältnis

vonParteiundStaatinDrittenReich.”Diss.Phil.,(Munich,1967);seealsoBroszat,DerStaatHitlers,445.24.ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates.DiplomaticPapers1933,Vol.2(Washington,1949),209.25.HagenSchulze,ed.,AnpassungoderWiderstand?AusdenAktendesParteivorstandesder

DeutschenSozialdemokratie1932–1933(BonnandBad-Godesberg,1975),161–180.InhisGermany:Jekyll&Hyde(Berlin,1996),abookoriginallywrittenonlysevenyearsaftertheseevents,SebastianHaffnerarguedthatthepotentialandthewilltoresistdidexistinthemassorganizationsofthoseGermanswhoinitiallyopposedtheNazis,butthattheirleadersfearedtoshouldertheresponsibilitytoinitiatesuchamomentousstepandbasicallylefttheirfollowersinthelurch.

26.ForrevealingexamplesofresignationstatementsseeErichMatthias,“DieSozialdemokratischeParteiDeutschlands,”inMatthiasandMorsey,eds.,DasEndederParteien1933(Bonn,1960),101–278,esp.239–241.Atypicalresignationstatementof10March1933readasfollows:“Duetoprevailingpoliticalconditions,Iseemyselfcompelled,inconsiderationofmyfamily'swell-being,todeclaremyresignationfromtheparty.Iampresentlyunabletoprovideadditionalreasons.W.L.,(Stadtbaumeister).”Ibid.,240.

27.ThetermReichsbeschwerdestelleisusedby(amongothers)NorbertFrei,DerFührerstaat.NationalsozialistischeHerrschaft1933–1945,6thed.(Munich,2003),26.

28.WalterBaerwolff(born1896);ChairmanoftheBavarianDNVP1920–1933;memberoftheBavarianStateParliament1924–1932,andtheReichstag1932–1933.SeeWeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,246;and,formoredetailsonhiscorrespondence,“InstitutfürZeitgeschichte,”Munich,“DNVPinBayern,1921–1934,”ED714/1-2.

29.10March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.71“AllgemeinePolitischeAngelegenheiten,”115.

30.Ibid.,116.31.Ibid.,134.32.NumbersofNazivotesrosefrom11,737,000to17,277,000;thoseoftheDNVPfrom2,959,000to

3,136,000,correspondingtoarisefrom33.1percentto43.9percentfortheNSDAP,whiletheDNVPdeclined(duetohighervoterturnout)from8.3percentto8.0percent.On6November1932atotalof35,758,000validvoteshadbeencast;on5March1933thetotalwas39,654,000.Kolb,WeimarerRepublik,308–309.

33.6March1933inSchlesischeTageszeitungatBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,167.

34.RobertLehr(1883–1956),GermanNationalmayorofDüsseldorf,1924–1933.35.Repeatedreferencewasmadetothisincidentinthefiles;seeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,

PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,165–166;and“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP”R43,II,no.1195,“TelegrammvonLehranHitler,”55.

36.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP:PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,165.37.In1933,Düsseldorfhadapopulationof498,600.NazivotersintheMarchelectionsinthis

industrialandoverwhelminglyCatholiccityaccountedforonly29percent.TheRhineprovincehad7,627,117inhabitantsin1933,morethananyoftheotherGermanstates,includingBavaria.Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,258,andStatistischesJahrbuchfürdasDeutscheReich,5.

38.FriedrichvonWinterfeld(1875–1949)wasamemberofthePrussianLandtagfrom1921to1933andChairmanoftheparliamentaryfactionoftheDNVP(1928–1933);then“permanentdeputy”ofthepartyleadersinceFebruary1933.

39.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP:PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,159.AccordingtoHoffmann'sletterof31March,thesechargeswerefabrications,andhelodgedacomplaintwiththepublic

prosecutor'sofficeagainstslander.40.Ibid.,159–160.Hoffmannwasespeciallyindignantthatsuchyoungloutswoulddareto“throwdirt

atnational-mindedGermanwomen”withoutbeingpunishedforit.HoffmannthoughtthatHugenbergshouldreporttheseincidentsdirectlytoHitler,sincetheReichChancellor“sofirmlyespousedproprietyinpubliclife.”

41.SeeTable4inAppendix.42.IntheGermancontext,thetermreferstoamemberoftheentrenchedmiddleclasses;itishere

equatedwith“bourgeois,”though“bourgeois,”intheoriginalFrenchandtraditionalMarxistmeaningoftheterm,referstothehautebourgeoisie(Großbürgertum),whereastheBürgertumalsoincludescertainsectionsofthepetitebourgeoisie,suchasmastercraftsmenandmiddle-rankingofficials.

43.Köslin,populationof28,812(1925);StatistischesJahrbuch,52(Berlin,1933),12.44.11March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.

19,146–153,esp.148.45.TheNationalSocialistKreisleiterofKöslinpointedtofinancialirregularitiesbetweenthetown

bankandtheDNVPtowncouncilorKrauseandaccusedcouncilorsofusingfreetramticketstogosailinginGrossmöllen(onthenearbyBaltic).GermanNationalcitycouncilors(andbusinesspeople)werealsosaidtohaveenrichedthemselvesthroughcontractswithpublicauthorities.

46.11March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,148and151.InPomerania,theDNVP,asthestrongestpartyduringthe1920s,hadbeenthemainrivaloftheNSDAP.ThecampaignrallywasthusdirectedmainlyagainsttheDNVP.

47.Ibid.,152.48.OntheenormousextentofNationalSocialistcorruption,seeFrankBajohr,Parvenüsund

Profiteure:KorruptioninderNS-Zeit(Frankfurt,2001).49.10March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,

163–164.50.13March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”156–157.51.10March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”158.52.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195;seealsochapter5.53.“ErmahnungendesReichskanzlers,”inBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,

no.1195,13(of22February1933)and61–62(of11March1933).Hitler'sappealtotheSAandSSof11March1933readasfollows:“Partymembers,SAandSSmen:Germanyhasundergoneanimmensecataclysm.Itistheresultofthemostacrimoniousbattles,themosttenaciousperseverance,butalsoofthehighestdiscipline.Unscrupulouselements,mostlycommunistspies,aretryingtocompromisethepartythroughisolatedactionsthatbearnorelationtothegreatfeatofthenationalawakening,butinsteadbesmirchanddebaseourstruggle.Inparticular,byharassingforeignersincarsflyingforeignflags,theyattempttobringthePartyandGermanyintoconflictwithforeignpowers.SAandSSmen!Youmuststopanddetainsuchcreaturesimmediatelyandcallthemtoaccount.Handthemovertothepoliceimmediately,nomatterwhotheymaybe.”

54.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,23–24.55.Ibid.,24;30–53,withnumerouscaseslisted,and67–79.56.Ibid.,30–60.57.13March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,82.58.9March1933,BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,88.Dr.Paul

Bang,born1879;Oberfinanzrat,leadingmemberoftheAlldeutscherVerbandandrabidanti-Semite;DNVPReichstagdeputy,1928–1933;fromFebruarytoJune1933StaatssekretärintheReichEconomicsMinistry.

59.11March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,67–70.60.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,99–112.61.Ibid.,201.62.Ibid.,203.Inanopen-airmarketinHamhorn,forexample,anunknownoffenderknockedovera

basketwithfivehundredeggsfornoapparentreason.63.OntheDNVP'sreactiontoanti-Semiticviolence,seechapter5.64.After5March,numerouscomplaintstotheReichChancellerywereconcernedwithattackson

membersoftheDNVPortheirparamilitaryorganization,theKampfringe;BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,207,213–231;233–235.

65.ForavividdescriptionofyoungNazijudgesinthecourts,seeHaffner,DefyingHitler.66.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19;“Aktender

Reichskanzlei,”R43IIno.1195“NSDAP”(onmicrofilm);“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53.

67.11MarchatBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,145.TheNSDAPfoughttheelectioncampaignmainlyagainstitsowncoalitionpartner.

68.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,141–143.InTorgau,NazispeakersmadeitclearthattheGermanNationalswouldhavetoberemovedassoonaspossible.

69.13March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP:PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,136–139.DeaththreatshadalsobeenmadeagainstthechiefRabbiofMunich'sJewishcommunity.

70.17March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,130.

71.18March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,131–133,esp.131.

72.28March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,126–128.The“BlackFront”wasamilitantgroupofrevolutionaryNationalSocialistsledbyOttoStrasserthatunitedremnantsoftheabortiveSAStennesrevoltwithdisillusionedNationalSocialistsandCommunistsinthesummerof1931,whenitadoptedthename“BlackFront.”Thisgroupofvölkischconservativeswithsocialrevolutionaryideasnevercountedmorethanfivethousandmembers;bannedinFebruary1933,itsmembersweredepictedasdangerousterroristsbyNazipropaganda.

73.28March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,120–121.

74.Ibid.,121.75.13March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.

19,140.Inthelocalelectionsof12MarchtheNSDAPattainedanabsolutemajorityofvotesinReichenbach.

76.15March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,144.Inoppositiontopartyorders,theSAoccupiedthetownhallon14MarchandcloseddownallJewishshops.TheNSDAPpartyleadershipnotedthatthiswasthehandiworkoflowerSAleaders.

77.Schneidemühl,intheGrenzmarkPosen-Westpreußen,hadapopulationof37,520(1925).78.1April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,

104–104verso.Here,too,thecommentismade:“...butthepolicedonotdaretointervene.”79.31March1933,“AnrufvonHerrnKrämer,Schneidemühl,”atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,

PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,105.DuetotheSA'svastlysuperiornumbers,membersoftheGermanNationalKampfringeregularlycameoffworse.

80.29March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,108–109.

81.10March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterderReichskanzlei,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.71,115–116.

82.SomepartsoftheDNVPwerepreparedtomergewiththeNazisasearlyasMarch;seechapter6.83.Thedateoftheopeningcoincidedsymbolicallywiththeanniversaryofthefirstopeningofthe

ReichstagoftheSecondReichon21March1871.SeealsoBracher,Sauer,Schulz,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,144–152;WernerFreitag,“MartinLuther,FriedrichIIundAdolfHitler—derTagvonPotsdamimneuenLicht,”inVolkshochschule“AlbertEinstein,”ed.,PreußenundderNationalsozialismus.DasLandBrandenburgunddasErbePreußens(brochure),(Potsdam,1992),15–33.

84.PostcardsthatshowedFredericktheGreat,Bismarck,andHitlernexttoeachotherhadexistedsince1931(Hindenburgwasthenleftout);seealsoManfredSchlenke,“Das‘PreußischeBeispiel’inPropagandaundPolitikdesNationalsozialismus,”AusPolitikundZeitgeschichte27(1968),16–23;ManfredSchlenke,“NationalsozialismusundPreußen/Preußentum,”inOttoBüsch,ed.,DasPreußenbildinderGeschichte(Berlin,1981),247–264;WolfgangWippermann,“NationalsozialismusundPreußentum,”AusPolitikundZeitgeschichte52/53(1981),13–22.

85.SeeChapterVIbelow.86.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,46–47.Ebermayer'sfather,Dr.Ludwig

Ebermayer,aneminentlegalscholar,wasOberreichsanwalt(thehighestprosecutoroftheReich)duringtheWeimarRepublic,andanobdurateopponentoftheNazis.Hediedon30June1933.

87.InthethreeparliamentarydeliberationsofthisGesetzzurBehebungderNotvonVolkundReichtheSpeaker(Reichstagspräsident)oftheReichstag,HermannGöring,referredtoitasthemotionputforwardbytheNSDAPandDNVPparliamentaryfactionleaders(“...BeratungdesvondenAbgeordnetenDr.Frick,Dr.Oberfohrenu.Gen.eingebrachtenEntwurfs...”).SeeRudolfMorsey,DasErmächtigungsgestzvom24.März1933.QuellenzurGeschichteundInterpretationdes‘GesetzeszurBehebungderNotvonVolkundReich.’(Düsseldorf,1992),55,64.

88.“Wirsindhereingelegtworden.”SeeMorsey,DasErmächtigungsgesetz,142,note3.89.Inaletterof20August1946toHansBerndGisevius,BrüningwrotethatErnstOberfohren(who

wasthenstillDNVPparliamentaryfactionleader)andOttoSchmidt-Hannover(whowouldsoonbecomehissuccessor)organizedameetingbetweenBrüningandHugenberg“onthedayaftertheopeningoftheReichstag”(22March),inwhichlegalsafeguardsagainsttheEnablingActwerediscussed.Inanotherletter,publishedintheDeutscheRundschauin1947,thatmeetinghadbeenmovedto21March.Inhismemoirs,wheretheeventssurroundingthepassingoftheEnablingActarediscussedindetail[Brüning,Memoiren,652–662],themeetingdategivenisagain21March.Intheaccountsof1946and1947,BrüningmentionedthathewasapproachedbyErnstOberfohren,whosuggestedthathemeetwithHugenberg.GiventhatOberfohrenandHugenbergwereonverybadtermsjustthen,tothepointthatOberfohrenwasactivelyplottingagainstHugenberg(seechapter6below),thisisextremelyunlikely.EvenlessplausibleisBrüning'sclaiminhis1946accountthatHugenbergwasgoingtoapproachHindenburgtobringabout“thereleaseofarrestedSPDmembers.”GivenHugenberg'sintensedislikeoftheSPD,hewasthelastpersontoworktowardtheirrelease.Therearefurther,albeitminor,respectsinwhichthethreeaccountsdonottally.Thelettersfrom1946and1947arereprinted(withminoromissions)inMorsey,DasErmächtigungsgesetz,138–144;quotations138,139.

90.WhenhefirstheardofBrüning'sletterin1947,ThomasEsser,formerCenterPartydeputyandVice-PresidentoftheReichstag(deputyspeaker),flatlyrefusedtobelieveintheexistenceofsuchadocumentand,inalettertotheeditoroftheDeutscheRundschau,freelyspokeof“...thefairytaleoftheallegedlyagreed-uponamendmentwithHugenbergthatwasneverputforward...”Whenhewasforcedtoconcedetheauthenticityoftheletter,Esseradmittedthatitdestroyed“muchofthehalostillsurroundingBrüning'spersonality”(reprintedinMorsey,Ermächtigungsgesetz,144).DNVPdeputyEdmundForschbach,writingin1978,castdoubtonbothHugenberg'sparticipationinadvancingsuchanamendmentandSpahn'sandStadtler'sthreattodefectwithotherdeputiestotheNSDAP.SincebothdidindeedleavetheDNVPfortheNazipartylaterinthespring—apreludetothefinaldownfalloftheparty(seechapter7below)—ForschbachsurmisedthatBrüningconfusedthedateoftheirrebellion.Forschbach'sstatementisreprintedinMorsey,Ermächtigungsgesetz,177–180.

91.Theterm“partyrevolutionfrombelow”isusedinBroszat,DerStaatHitlers,108.92.WilhelmHoegner,DerschwierigeAußenseiter(Munich,1959),93–94.Thegovernmentneededa

two-thirdsmajorityforthelawtopass,whichwaspossibleonlyiftheCenterPartyvotedinfavoroftheAct.

93.See,forexample,the1947statementsofCenterPartydeputiesJosephErsingandFranzWiedemeierbeforeaninvestigativecommitteeoftheWürttemberg-BadenLandtag,reprintedinMorsey,Ermächtigungsgesetz,129–130.

94.Theseobserversdulynotedthethreats.SeetheobservationsoftheFrenchambassadorAndréFrançois-PoncetinMorsey,Ermächtigungsgesetz,184–185.

95.SeethestatementofSPDdeputyJosefFelderinMorsey,Ermächtigungsgesetz,172–175.96.StatementreprintedinMorsey,Ermächtigungsgesetz,130.97.LiketheCenterPartydeputiesJosephErsingandFranzWiedemeier,HermannDietrichalsospoke

beforeaninvestigativecommitteeoftheWürttemberg-BadenLandtaginahearingheldbetween5Februaryand27March1947,morethantwoyearsbeforethefoundationoftheWestGermanstate.

98.Seechapter7below.99.ThesignificanceofthisshortsentenceintherapidlydeliveredtorrentofHitler'sseeminglyex

temporeripostetoWels,oneofhisgreatestrhetoricaltriumphs,wasnotlostonErichEbermayer.SeeDennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,48.

ChapterIV

THENAZISANDTHECONSERVATIVEBÜRGERTUM

AClashofWorlds

Aftertheelectionsof5MarchandespeciallyaftertheEnablingActof23March,theNazismadenobonesaboutthefactthattheirconservativealliancepartnerhadbecomecompletelyexpendable.TheroleoftheDNVPasthestirrupholderfortheNazishadplayeditselfout.Alreadyinthecourseofthetakeoverofstategovernments,violentattacksagainstconservativedignitarieshadbecomesoprevalentthattheBavarianDNVPdeputyWalterBaerwolff,indignantlyandwithgreatdismay,equatedNaziiniquitiesandlaw-breakingwith“...theeventsduringtherevolutionof1918.”1Fortheconservativeestablishment,however,theeventsofwinterandspring1933wouldproveevenmore“revolutionary”thanthoseof1918,sooftenconjuredupbyconservativesasthenightmarishturningpointinGermany'sfortunes.The“revolution”proclaimedbyHitleraftertheelectionsuccessof5March(eventhoughitfellpitifullyshortoftheexpectationsofNazileaders)carriedinitswakesweepingandall-encompassingtransformationswhosesocialimpactwasgreaterthananythingthatcameinthewakeof1918.2Thefloodofconservatives'complaintsabouttheiralliancepartnerwas

initiallytemperedbythehopethatthecountlessviolentNaziattacksofthewinterandspringof1933wereexceptionsratherthantherule.Therewas,afterall,onegreatcommondenominatorsharedbyconservativesandNationalSocialiststhattranscendedtheirmanifolddifferences:extremenationalism.BothwereunitedintheircategoricalrejectionoftheVersaillesTreatyandtheiradamantoppositiontothe“warguiltlie,”andbothhadfoughtsidebysideinthe“People'sRebellion”againsttheYoungPlan.Withrespecttoforeignpolicy,bothpromotedanuncompromisinglyextremistcourse,placingthegreatestpriorityontheresurgenceofGermany'sformerpoliticalmightandmilitaryglory.BothrejectedtheRepublic,vowingtoreplaceitwithamoreauthoritarianformofgovernment,andbothstoodunitedintheirhatredofdemocracy,parliamentarypolitics,andthepoliticalLeft.Thesecommonalitieshadbroughttogethertheunequalpartnersinthe(albeittenuous)HarzburgerFrontofOctober1931,andhelpedspawntheHitlerCabinetofJanuary1933.InBadHarzburg,aswellason30January1933,HugenbergandhisDNVPhadhopedtoharnessthevastmassmovementofNationalSocialismfortheirown

conservativeends.FortheNazis,ontheotherhand,thealliancewiththeDNVPservedastheirbadlyneededpassporttorespectablesociety.ThepactconferredrespectabilitytoNationalSocialism.Hiddenunderthecloakofunitylurkedbarelyveiledconflicts.Themost

fundamentalandirreconcilableoftheserevolvedaroundtheirrespectivevisionsofsociety.Despiteinflation,itsconcomitantimpoverishment,theworldeconomiccrisis,andthesharpdeclineinnationalincomethatcameinitswake,3theDNVPremainedthepartyoftheconservativemiddleandupperclasses,theProtestantnotablesinsmalltownsinnorthernandeasternGermany(eventhoughtheywerebutashadowoftheirformerselveseconomically),theEastElbianaristocracy,theupperechelonsofthebureaucracy,andoftheever-dwindlingremnantsoftheBildungsbürgertum.PoliticallyitwastheDNVP,morethananyotherparty,thatrepresentedallthoseremnantsofBürgerlichkeit,thefragilerelicsofabourgeoislifestyleweakenedbytheprivationsofwar,inflation,andtheGreatDepression.After1928,thevotersoftheonceinfluentialworkers'wingoftheDNVPhadturnedtootherparties,andtheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistants,withitsmorethan400,000members,haddefected,forthemostpart,totheNazicamp.4DuetoHugenberg'suncompromisingpoliciessince1929andanever-deepeningeconomiccrisis,theDNVPhadincreasinglybecomethepartyoftheEstablishment,moresothanithadbeenatanytimeduringthe1920s.Before1933,membersofNaziorganizations,notablytheSA,whichhadbeen

responsibleforthebulkofviolentattacks,werebycontrastoftenoflowerandlowermiddleclassbackground.5SincecivilservantshadbeenbannedfromjoiningtheNazipartyinPrussia,thepartylackedanysignificantfollowinginthebureaucracybeforetheNaziseizureofpower.6Aftertheeliminationoftheleftistparties,manyNazis,whofeltdisadvantaged,turnedtheirspiteagainsttheDNVP.Inthewordsofawell-knownNazisong,theconservativeswerethe“brittlebones”ofalifelessworld,the“Reaktion”thathadpromulgatedareactionarypoliticsofinterestandrepressedtheyoungergenerationandtheirnewideas.InNazieyes,theDNVPwastheembodimentofthebürgerlicheworld(astheyunderstoodit),adespisedcosmosofrulesandconventionsthatexcludedthosewhohadnotimbibedthemwiththeirmothers'milk;auniverseofentitlement(Berechtigungsscheine,astheNazipressdisparaginglycalledit)thatrequiredformaleducation,standardizedtests,andschooling—MittlereReife,Abitur,anduniversitystudies—aspreconditionsforsocialadvancement.7ItrunscountertotheoftenimpliedcommunityofinterestsbetweenNazisandtheirconservativealliesthatNazis—stormtroopersandintellectualsalike—hatedthe

conservativebourgeoisiewithconsumingpassion.TheNazisevincedavenomoushatredfortheBürgerandhiswayoflife,continuallyattackedthetraditionalhierarchicalorderupheldbyconservatives(whoprofitedbyitsexistence),andemployedrevolutionaryrhetoricwithitsthreatofa“second”revolutionaccompaniedbymenacingviolence,whichconservativeswereill-equippedtocounter.Inpoliticalpropaganda,theconservativeestablishmentwasexecratedasthestandard-bearerofGermany'sclass-riddensociety,brandedasindecisive,lukewarm,andatleastpartiallytoblameforGermany'smisfortunessince1918.Inthechargedatmosphereofthelatewinterandspringof1933,permeatedbywidespreadactsofviolence,amultitudeofclashesoccurredthatusheredinfar-reaching,radicalupheavals,wreakinghavoconthetraditionalworldoftheGermanbourgeoisiebyerodinghithertoacceptednormsofpoliticalandsocialbehavior.

Nazi“RevolutionaryFervor”inActionAnincidentcharacteristicofthesocialupheavalsoccurredon8March1933inthePrussianMinistryofFinance,anagency(Behörde)that,likeallPrussianministries,wascharacterizedbyitsrigidhierarchicalstructure.Ministerial-Amtsgehilfe(officeassistant)Blume,alow-rankingcivilservantwhoseofficialpositionclearlyplacedhimonthelowerendoftheofficialhierarchyandoneoftheveryfewNazisintheministry,raisedtheswastikaflagontheMinistryofFinancebuilding.ThehoistingoftheswastikaflaghadbeenanalmostdailyoccurrenceduringtheNazitakeoversofthenon-NationalSocialistLändergovernments(suchasHamburg,Bremen,andBavaria),whichfollowedtheelectionof5Marchandusuallypassedunchallenged.TheheadofthePrussianFinanceMinistry,JohannesPopitz,aright-wingconservativeandmonarchist,8immediatelyorderedthattheflagbetakendown,whereupon,accordingtoofficialrecords,thelowlyofficeassistantBlumeretorted:“No—theflagstaysraised.”9ItwasonlyafteranotherprominentNationalSocialistinthePrussianInteriorMinistryinstructedhim“nottomakeanaffairofStateoutofthisissue”thatBlumeagreedtolowertheflag.10OnthefollowingdayPopitzissuedawrittenordertoBlume,“effectiveimmediately,”requiringthattheofficeassistantbesuspendedandleavetheMinistrythatsameday.11Giventheimmenseaudacityoftheincident—namely,thatamereofficeassistanthadthenervetocounterhisMinisterdirectly—itisastonishingthatPopitz'soverallreactionwasexceptionallyforbearing.Inhisexpulsionletter,Popitzshowedhimselfdisinclinedtoimposethe(bythestandardsofPrussianofficialdom)

well-deserveddisciplinarymeasuresagainsttheofficeassistant,andevenpromisedtoensureBlume'stransferaltoacomparablepositioninanotherMinistry.TheconservativeMinisterclearlymeanttopre-emptacounterreactiononthepartoftheNaziswhenhetriedtorationalizetheunauthorizedhoistingoftheflaginhislettertoBlume:“Yourunderstandableenthusiasmoverthefactthatthenationalmovementwhichyouhaveservedhaswonagreatvictoryintheelectionsmayrenderyourbehaviorinpartexcusable.”Paradoxically,Popitz'sletteremphasizedextenuatingcircumstancesinBlume'stransgression:“Ifullytakeintoaccountthatyouhavesufferedduringthewarandmorethandoneyourdutyforthefatherland.”12Nevertheless,thecounterreactionwasnotlongincoming.On9March1933,theverydateofPopitz'slettertoBlume,thesecretary-

treasureroftheNationalSocialistfactionintheReichstagwhowasalsoinchargeofcivilservice-relatedmatters,Dr.Hans-EugenFabrizius,sentalettertoHermannGöring(inearlyMarchstillprovisionalheadofthePrussianInteriorMinistry)inwhichhelodgedacomplaintagainsttheFinanceMinister.Fabriziusrequestedthatthedisciplinaryactionagainsttheofficeassistantberescinded,especiallysinceBlumewasoneofthe“mostfaithfulandactiveNationalSocialistcivilservantsinPrussia”whohadhad“thecouragetodeclarehissupportforNationalSocialismatatimewhenPrussiancivilservantswerebannedfromjoiningtheNSDAP.”13SinceGöring,asprovisionalInteriorMinister,washardlyinapositiontoissueinstructionstohisoppositenumberintheFinanceMinistry,thecasewasreferredtotheReichChancellery.TheFinanceMinister,amanundoubtedlywell-versedinthepowerrelationsofthePrussiancivilservice,havingheldleadingpositionsintheMinistryofFinanceformorethanadecade,musthavereceivedanindelibleimpressionofchangeswithinthepowerstructurewhen,inthesecondhalfofMarch,aletterfromtheReichChancelleryreachedhisdesk.Init,theChiefofStaffofHitler'sChancellery,StaatssekretärHansHeinrichLammers,letPopitzknowinnouncertainterms(ifcouchedinpolitelanguage)thatheshouldrefrainfromtakingany“well-foundeddisciplinaryaction”againstBlume.14Lammers'sotherwiserespectfullywordedletterconcludedwithanopenthreat:“IhavenotyethadtheopportunitytoreportthepresentcasetotheReichChancellor,”though,hewenton,therecouldbenodoubtthatHitler“wouldexpressthedesiretoignoreagaffeborneoutofthefirstblushofenthusiasmoverthesuccessofthenationaluprisingandthegeneralexcitementofthetimes.”15ConfrontedwithLammers'sthreattoinvolveHitlerinthematterdirectly,Popitzhadnoalternativebuttocomply.WithLammers'sletter,thelinesofauthorityhadbeenmadeclearand

thecasewasclosed.ItislikelythatneverbeforeinPrussianhistoryhadasimpleofficeassistantcausedsuchtroubletoaMinisterofFinance.PerhapsalreadyherewefindtherootsofPopitz'sdisillusionmentwiththeNationalSocialiststate.16Eventuallythiswouldleadhimintoactiveoppositionduringthewar.TheextenttowhichtheNazis—inthehierarchicallystructuredPrussianworld—lookedaftertheirownpeopleremainsastonishing.Anditwasentirelynovelthatmembersofallsocialclasses—providedtheyweremembersoftheNaziParty—feltfreetolodgecomplaintsagainsttheauthorities.Inalandof“statusformalization,”asRalfDahrendorfoncecharacterizedGermany,17itwasvirtuallyunheardofforanofficeassistanttoturntoanelectedrepresentativeforhelpinamatterrelatingtohisownbureaucraticdepartment,andunthinkabletoappealtotheheadofgovernmentinamatterastriflingasthetransferofalow-rankingcivilservant.The“revolution”ofMarchandApril1933upsetallnormsthathadhitherto

governedpubliclife.AcharacteristicexampleofthisisthecaseofOberschulrat(ChiefSchoolsInspector)Dr.TheodorBohnert,ahighministerialofficialwhosupervisedsecondaryschools,whoseverylivelihoodwasthreatenedbyanunavoidableprofessionaldifferenceofopinion(amatterofasimplegrade)withamemberoftheNazimovement.AsBohnert'scasemadeamplyclear,anyonewhohadoncedaredtocrossswordswithamemberoftheNSDAP,regardlessofhissocialclass,nowhadcauseforconcern.On16March1933ChiefSchoolsInspectorDr.Bohnertappealedtoformer

ChancellorFranzvonPapen,nowVice-ChancellorandReichCommissarforPrussia,whosepersonalacquaintancehehadoncemadeasamemberoftheDDPinthePrussianLandtag.18Bohnertreportedthatin1930hehad“tointerveneinhiscapacityasChiefSchoolsInspectorinanAbiturexaminationwhichresultedinacomplaintthatwaspoliticallymotivated.”19Confrontedwiththiscomplaint,theSchoolsInspectornowsawhisfamily'slivelihoodputinjeopardyandfeared“expulsionfromapositioninwhichIhavehonestlyendeavoredtogivemybest.”20On24February1933NaziPartymemberWernerRepke,Abiturclassof1930andemployedasaPostaushelfer(postalassistant),wrotetotheReichCommissarforthePrussianMinistryofCulture,BernhardRust,demandingthatRustexactjustice“inamatterthathashithertoovershadowed—nay,devastated—mywholelife.”21Inaself-absorbedletterpervadedbywoundedprideandperceivedinjustice,Repkerevealedthefollowingfacts:the“democraticallyoriented”(closetotheDDP)SchoolsInspectorDr.BohnerthadruinedRepke'sAbiturwithabadgradeinGerman.Anotherteacher,alsoamemberoftheleft-liberalDDP,haddenouncedRepkeas

aNazi.Whatwasmore,Repkeclaimedthathehadnotbeentheonlyvictimofpoliticalintrigue.TheteacherLindemann,apoliticalconservativewhotaughtGermanliterature,hadbeentemporarilysuspendedfromhispositionbecauseofhis“right-wingradicalismandconvictionsinimicaltothestate.”Lindemann,suspendedforhisnationalistviews,wasanothermartyrforthenationalcauseandhadalsosufferedbecauseofBohnert'spoliticalpreferences.22Seeninperspective,Repke'scomplaintlackedfirmgrounding:hisoverallAbiturgradeswerelow,barelyabovepassinglevel,reflectingthefactthathehadbeenapoorstudentallalong.23This,inturn,madeitpossibleforBohnerttoarguethatRepke'slackofprofessionalsuccesswasduenottohisbadgradeinGermanbuttohispooroverallAbiturperformance.TheconservativeteacherLindemannhadhimselfassignedalowgradetoRepke'sAbituressay,sothat,inthefinalanalysis,theonlychargetheNaziRepkecouldlevelagainsttheSchoolsInspectorwasthatBohnertwasademocrat.Repke'sdemandthatBohnertbechasedfromofficeforbeing“unsuitedtoserveasamodeltostudents,letaloneteachers,becauseoftheinsufficientmoralqualitieshehadexhibited,”24couldthusbegroundedonlyinpolitical,notprofessional,considerations.AnoverviewofthecorrespondenceleadstotheobviousconclusionthatRepkehadusedtheNaziseizureofpowertobetterhisAbiturgradesandtakerevengeonanAutoritätspersonwhosepoliticalconvictionsgavehimawelcomepretextfortakingaction.Bohnert'snine-pageletterinhisowndefensestrikesthemodernreaderasawkward,especiallytheclumsyefforttostresshisnationalistcredentialsandpatrioticconvictions.25AsconcernstheactualgroundsforRepke'sbadGermangrade,Bohnert'sargumentsareconvincing.26Inanycase,Bohnert'slong-windedletterofjustificationcorroboratesthefactthat,ontheeveoftheThirdReich,evensecondaryschoolsinGermanywerepoliticizedtothepointthattheideologicalorientationsoftheteacherswerewidelyknown.ToRepke,thisstateofaffairswasself-evident(ifonlyintuitively),inducinghimtotakeadvantageoftheNaziseizureofpowerforhisown,verypersonal,ends.TheincidentwiththeSchoolsInspectorillustratedtheerosionoftraditional

authorityinthewakeoftheNaziseizureofpower.Aftertheelectionsof5March(alreadyviewedbycontemporariesasthedecisivecaesuraitwouldcometorepresentinpoliticalhistory),anotherdikehadbroken,andthosewhofeltshortchangedinlifecouldnowtakeadvantageofthisall-pervasivepoliticizationtofurthertheirownends.Indoingsotheycalledintoquestionthetraditionalsocialorder.Bythestandardsoftheage,theideathataChiefSchoolsInspectorhadtofearforhispositionbecauseofone(perfectlyjustifiable)Abiturgradejustsoaformerstudent,seekingrevengeforaputativepoliticallymotivated

injustice,couldbetterhisgradeandhiscurrentlowlypositionasa“postalassistant,”wasdifficulttocomprehend.

TraditionalHierarchiesandConservativeValuesontheLineTheNationalSocialistdrivetochallengeexistinghierarchies,andtoholdaccountablethoseinpositionsofinfluence,wasunderstandablesince,uptothispoint,mostmembersoftheNazimovementhadlargelybeenpreventedfrompartakinginthespoilsofpower.Intheupperechelonsofthecivilservice,wherepoliticalpreferencesusuallylaywiththeGermanNationals,thischallengegaverisetoadeep-seateduncertainty,sincetheauthorityofcivilservants,asrepresentativesofthestate,wascalledintoquestion.27TheNazis'endeavortodestroytraditionalhierarchieswouldgraduallycometopervadeallspheresoflife,evenconservativestrongholds.AninterestingcaseinpointwasacomplaintoftheOsnabrückDNVPtothe

party'sBerlinHeadOfficeon12April1933.AttheOsnabrückLand-undAmtsgericht(DistrictCourt),accordingtothecharge,“threelowlyemployees,standingunderaswastikaflag,hadheldforthontheestablishmentofaNationalSocialistcomplaintsofficewhereanycivilservantwouldbeinapositiontolodgeacomplaintagainstjudgesandothersuperiors.”28AllmittlereBeamte(middle-rankingofficials)attheOsnabrückDistrictCourthadbeenrequestedtoattendthespeechandwerethusencouragedtoexertameasureofcontrolovertheirownsuperiors.Quiteobviously,theseparticularNazisweretryingtotapintofeelingsofjealousyorevenhatredtowardhigher-ups,andclearlycountedonlow-andmiddle-rankingbureaucratsprovingmorereceptivetoNaziideasthanthoseintheupperranksofthecivilservice,whowereconsiderednaturalsupportersoftheDNVP.29Thestrikingphenomenonhere,characteristicforthesocialchangeoftheperiod,wasthefactthat“threelow-rankingofficials”consideredthemselvesinapositiontoissueinstructionstotheirmiddle-levelsuperiors.AndOsnabrückwasnoexception.AsimilarincidentwasreportedbytheVicePresidentoftheFrankfurtOberlandesgericht(CircuitCourt)totheDNVPBerlinHeadOfficeon3April1933.Accordingtothereport,thenotoriousNazijudgeRolandFreislerhaddelivered“arabble-rousingspeechtoallofthe1,500officialsandemployees”oftheFrankfurtlawcourts:“HeemphasizedthatfromnowonwardsnomoredistinctionswouldbemadebetweenhigherandlowerrankingcourtofficialsandthatlawcourtswouldnolongermeteoutjusticeaccordingtoobjectivestandardsbuttoservicetheneedsoftheGermanpeople(whichcanonlymeantheneedsoftheNSDAP).”30

ThissocialandideologicalstruggleagainstconservativestrongholdswasrelentlesslypursuedinallregionsoftheReich.AsaconcernedreportfromtheDNVPofficeinLiegnitz(LowerSilesia)relatedon23March1933,localNazishadmadeitunambiguouslyclearthat“thenationalrevolutionwillbefollowedbytheNationalSocialistrevolutionand,concurrently,thestruggleagainst‘Reaction’.”31ThereporthighlightedthespeechbytheLiegnitzKreisleiter(Nazicountyleader)Klieber,whoopenlythreatenedthat“nooneshouldmaketheattempttosteerourNationalSocialistrevolutionintobourgeoiswaters”;otherwise,theNaziswouldmakesurethat“thenationalrevolutionwillfinditsnaturalconclusionintheNationalSocialistrevolution.”32Thisanti-bourgeoisthrust,observableinNazibehaviorthroughouttheReichinthespringof1933,isoftenbuttressedbytheopenthreat:“Thosewhobelievetheycandisruptourworkofreconstructionwillbecartedofftoconcentrationcamps,wheretheycanponderourradicalism.”33TheunabashedthreattouseopenviolencefewerthaneightweeksaftertheNaziseizureofpowerremainsastounding.TheconcentrationcampatDachauhadbeenopenedon20Marchwithsomefanfare;theexistenceofanumberofso-called“wild”concentrationcampsandtorturecellarsoftheSAwaswidelyknown,aswasthefactthatneitherpolicenorlawcourtscouldofferprotection.EveryGermancitizen,regardlessofsocialposition,foundhimselfatthemercyoftheterroroftheSA.JustdaysaftertheReichstagFireDecree,attheverylatestaftertheelectionsof5March,Germancitizenswerenolongerprotectedbytheruleoflaw.EvenprominentGermanswithreputableconservativeandnationalistpedigreescouldhardlyhopetobesparediftheyopenlyvoicedtheirdispleasurewiththeregime.ThebandsofSAthugswouldbestoppedbyneithernamenorrank,allthemoresosincetheyknewonlytoowellthattheircriminalactswouldgounpunished.Violentdailyattacks,evenonuninvolvedbystandersandrespectablecitizens,oftennippedinthebudanycriticismsofNaziactions.Attimes,attackshadnoapparentpoliticalfoundation;rather,revenge,robbery,pillaging,looting,andthewishforpersonalenrichmentlayattheheartofNationalSocialistassaults.34Butthese,too,servedthepurposeofinducingfearandstiflingcriticism.Thequestionremains,ofcourse,whetheritwassolelythethreatofphysicalviolence,thatis,theveryrealdangerofbeingattackedbybandsofSAthugsorlandinginaconcentrationcampthataccountedfortheabsenceofsignificantprotest.AslongasthemainvictimsofNaziviolenceremainedconfinedtomembers

ofthepoliticalLeft,GermanNationalsintuitivelycountenancedNaziaggression,asitsuitedtheirpurposetoseetheirinveteratepoliticalfoesfinallyhumiliatedandbroken.ThistacitcollusionintheNaziterroragainsttheLeftunderminedthepositionofconservativeswhenpoliticalviolencelatercameto

underminedthepositionofconservativeswhenpoliticalviolencelatercametobetraineduponthem.TheprotectiononceofferedbytheRechtsstaatofWeimar,whichhadremainedtheoreticallyinplacethroughoutFebruary,brokedownwiththeReichstagFireDecree.Politicalviolence,oreventhemerethreatofit,playedakeyroleinthesocialupheavalsofthewinterandspringof1933.Ifpossible,thevictimsavoidedspeakingaboutviolentencroachments,partlyforfearofreprisalsandpartlybecausetheveryfactofvictimizationwashumiliatinginitself.Inaddition,thesteadystreamofdailydegradations,suchasbandsofSAmenrattlingtheircollectionboxesunderthenosesofpassersby,hadtheirinevitablenumbingeffect.AndwhowouldvoluntarilyownuptothrowingmoneyintothecoffersoftheSAbecausehefeltintimidatedbyitsmembers'threateningbehavior?Mostvictimsremainedquietandsoughtrefugeinahaplessrage.Aftertheelectionsof5March1933hadrenderedtheDNVPredundantasally

andcoalitionpartner,NationalSocialistsemployedrevolutionaryrhetoricwiththeveryconsciousintentofunderminingthepositionofGermanNationals.Atypicalexampleoftheanti-conservativeandanti-bourgeoisthrustofNazipropagandaisanappealof20MarchintheOberlausitzerFrühpost,publishedinGörlitz.35Thelanguageinthisappealto“Germanpeoples'comrades”wasblunt:“ThenationalrevolutionwillandmustbefollowedbytheNationalSocialistrevolution!Ourcomrades-in-armshavenotdiedfortheresurrectionofareactionarynationalism,ourstormtroopershavenotgottenthemselvesbloodiedandcrippledforthereturnofeconomicconservatism;theyhavestruggledandsufferedforthecreationofatrueNationalSocialism.”TheNazipaperpredictedthatthisNationalSocialistrevolutionwouldbepushedthrough“withoutallies”sincetheGermanNationalswereboundtoconsiderasecondrevolutiontobe“directedagainsttheirowninterestsandthusunnecessary.”TheOberlausitzerFrühpostfurtheradmonisheditsreaders“toseethereactionaryevilbehindthesmilingmask”36andremindedthemthat“nationalisticreactionaries”ultimatelyconstituted“obstaclesandrecalcitrantopponents,”who“wouldhavegladlysnuffedthelifeoutofourmovementduringitsdifficultyears.”WhatasecondrevolutionmighthavemeantfortheeconomyisreflectedinacomplaintbyFriedrichWilhelmDiegse,VicePresidentoftheReichsbankDirectorate.37AccordingtoDiegse'sreport,aNationalSocialistReichsbankemployeenamedTönnieshaddemandedtobeappointedtotheExecutiveBoardoftheDresdnerBank.TheBoardofDirectors,whilerefusingtobowtothisdemand,had—toaccommodateTönnies—createdaplaceforhimontheBörsenvorstand,theExecutiveBoardofthestockmarket,byarrangingforthewithdrawalofanothercandidate.38Tönnies,nevertheless,continuedtoinsistonhisimmediate

inclusionontheBank'sExecutiveBoard,andeventhreatenedtoforceadmissionbyviolentmeanswiththehelpoftheSA.EventhoughtherecordsindicatethatTönnieswassubsequentlyreprimandedand“expelledfromtheparty,”39thisapparentlyminorincidentistellingbecauseoftheanxietycausedbyTönnies'sotherwiselaughabledemands,andthedesperateeffortstoappeasehim.Prussia'straditionalsocialorder,whosehierarchicalstructurehadevolvedovergenerations,hadbecomebrittleandbegantodisintegratewithinthecourseofafewmonthsafter30January.Thesecracksinthetraditionalsocialedificeweredeepenedbypressurefromthestreet,sincemanyNazis,inebriatedbytheeaseandcompletenessoftheirvictory,delightedinmakingsportofthedesecrationofallthatwassacredandinviolabletoconservatives.AtypicalexampleofsuchprovocativedebasingofconservativevaluesoccurredinahotelinGlauchau(Saxony)inthemiddleofApril1933.40Accordingtothereportoftheincident,localNazisclaimedthatthe“nationalrevolution”hadinrealitybeena“socialist”revolution,thattheKaiser“wasacowardwhohadfurtivelyabscondedinthemiddleofthenight,”andthatitwasfoolishtodreamofthereturnoftheHohenzollern,becauseitwouldonlymeanthatonceagain“afirstbornidiotwouldtakethethrone.”41MembersandsupportersoftheDNVP,ontheotherhand,clungtothevision

ofunitywiththeiroverbearingalliancepartner.InAprilandMay1933,theGermanNationalswentsofarastoconjureupexternaldangersandathreateningstrangleholdofhostilepowersaroundtheReichtostresstheneedfordomesticunityandinternalcohesionintheirincreasinglytenuouscoalitionwiththeNazis.42Instyleandcontent,GermanNationalsfeverishlyattemptedtobringtheirpartyinlinewiththemoresuccessfulNSDAP:GermanNationalcombatsquadronswerestructuredalongthelinesoftheSA,the“GermanNationalPeople'sParty”wasrenamedthe“GermanNationalFront”atthebeginningofMay,therewasincreasedemphasisontheleadershipprinciple,andGermanNationalsdidnotevenshyawayfromapingtheNazisalute,turning“HeilHitler!”into“FrontHeil”and“HeilDeutschland.”43Tothisunreflectiveimitationoftheirownstyle,theNazisrespondedwithscornandderision,allthemoresosincetheyincreasinglysetthemselvesapartfromtheGermanNationalsintheirownpropagandaandpublicself-portrayal.AftertheKPDhadbeendeclaredillegal,theSPDneutralized,theCenterwillingtocooperatewiththeNazisintheEnablingAct(ifonlyoutofpoliticalcalculationandfear),andtheliberalpartiesreducedtoutterinsignificance,ithadbecomeclearthattheDNVPwastheonlypartythatstoodbetweentheNazisandabsolutepower.AfterthepassingoftheEnablingActon23March1933,itwasnextinline.

Anti-BourgeoisIdeologyandRhetoricInNazieyes,GermanNationalswerestillafactortobereckonedwithgiventhatDNVPmembersandsympathizersstillheldcentralpositionsintheeconomy,administration,andlocalpolitics,andalsoparticipatedinthegovernmentsofPrussiaandtheReich.Theincreasinglyanti-bourgeoisslantofNazipropaganda,therefore,canbeexplainedpartiallywithreferencetoexpediency.ThroughoutAprilandMaytheNazisunleashedastreamofcriticismdirectedattheconservativeestablishmentthathighlightedtheallegedmoralweaknessofthebourgeoisieandemphasizeditsinherentcorruption,therebybuttressingtheclaimthatGermanNationalshadforfeitedtheirshareinpower.Anti-bourgeoisepithets,overandabovetheiruseintheheatedatmosphereofdailypolitics,hadalongtraditionwithNationalSocialists.Theanti-bourgeoisundertoneofNazipropagandahaddevelopedduringtheWeimarRepublic,whenGermanNationalswereoftencombattedasrivalsattheelectionbox.IntheideologicalmouthpieceoftheNSDAP,theNationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,44inwhichmostlyissuesofprincipleswerediscussed,ErnstGrafvonReventlowdisparagedthebourgeoisieanditslifestyleasearlyas1930.45Reventlow,whowasheldinhighesteeminpartycirclesbecausehehadbroughtnorthGermanvölkischgroupsintotheNSDAP,wasoneofthefewNaziswithanimpeccableupper-classpedigree.46AccordingtoReventlow,thebourgeoisiehadforsakenitsinitiallyliberalpoliticalorientationandappropriatedconservativepolitics,sothat“conservatisminGermanyincreasinglyfellpreytoembourgeoisement.”47Reventlowbelievedthatthebourgeoisie“byvirtueofitsverynaturecouldnevercomprehendthatlifepresentsmanwithanuncompromising‘either-or’.”48Thisreproachofpoliticalvacillation,indecision,andopportunismpervadedNaziassessmentsofthebourgeoisie.Reventlowendedhisdiatribewiththecharacteristicwish:“TheBürgerandthebourgeoisieinitspastandpresentformwillandmustnotbeallowedtoreturn.Maybothdisappearasquicklyaspossible,[tobe]ruinedbymoney—theirfalsegod—aswellasbytheirirresoluteness,lackofstrength,andtheinsipidnessoftheirself-satisfiedphilosophyoflife.”49InthatsameissueoftheNationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,Goebbels,inanarticleonthe“patrioticbourgeoisie,”usesevenmorepointedlanguage.50LikeReventlow,hefoundfaultwiththeBürger'sall-too-readywillingnesstocompromiseandhislackoffightingspirit:“Helacksthatkindofexclusivitythatcovetssomethingeithercompletelyornotatall.”51TheGermanNationalshadcompromisedtheveryideaofconservatisminthemindsofthepeople,sincetheycontentedthemselves“toconservewhatalready

exists,irrespectiveofitsvalueandofwhetheritshouldbepreservedordiscarded.”52ThatiswhytheGermanNationalscouldonlybeconsidered“reactionary,”sincetheybalkedatanyimperativeprogressinthelifebloodofGermanpolitics.53Goebbelsbecamequitespecific:“Thethree-classfranchiseclassifyingvotersalongpropertylines,the‘pittance’legislation[socialwelfare],the‘beschränkterUntertanenverstand’[limitedcomprehensionofthesubject],the‘lord-of-themanor’wayofthinking,theindustrialcapitalisticfirebrands—allofthesearetypicalfabricationsofconservativereactionarieswho,beingfullyalivetotheirownincompetenceandinabilitytofostercreativity,enviouslysuppressachievementandprogressbyothers...”WithcontemporaryGermanNationalsthe“trueconservativeelement”hadthusshrunktocompleteinsignificance,asallpoliticalactivityhadbeendwarfedbyeconomicconcerns.54ExpressionsofsharedinterestwiththeGermanNationalsshouldthusbetakenwithagrainofsalt,andtemporaryalliancesconsideredbutmarriagesofconvenience:“Therecanbeabsolutelynodoubtthatadeepideologicalchasmyawnsbetweenusandthem,afactthatneedstobepointedoutallthemoreclearly,themoreoftenwearecompelledtoformallianceswithbourgeoisforcesinordertoattainourtacticalgoals.Theyarecaptivesoftheirownbourgeoismindset.”55TheNazi“mindset”wasclearlydifferent.Longbefore30January,NationalSocialiststhusemphasizeddeep-seated

differencesinideologyandreasoningbetweenthemselvesandGermanNationals.After30January1933,thisphilosophical-ideologicalchasmbecamedeeper.Theprogrammaticarticle“OurCommitmenttoGermanSocialism,”byWaltherSchmitt,isrevealingwithrespecttothedistinctanti-bourgeoisslantoftheNSDAPimmediatelyfollowingtheMachtergreifung.56SchmittarguedthatforNationalSocialismthecatastropheof1918hardlyhadthesamemeaningasitdidforthe“reactionaries,”57whowere,afterall,asmuchtoblameforthedownfallofGermanyastheMarxists.IthadbeenmainlythebeliefintheemergenceofanewGermanythatrenderedbearabletheuntoldsacrificesanddeprivationsofthewarformillionsofGermansoldiers,notthewaraimsof“patriciansandpatrioticprivycouncilors.”58ThesacrificialdeathofsomanyhundredsofthousandsofloyalGermansimposeduponNationalSocialiststheobligationofconstructinganewGermanybasedontheprincipleofa“German”socialism.Themostgrievousoffenseofthebourgeoisepochwasitslegacyofadeepsocialdivide,“whichdefraudedtheGermanstateofmillionsofitsbestpeople,”59who,alienatedfromtheirnationalcommunity,weredrivenintothecampoftheMarxistparties.Forthisreason,the“brownbattalionsoftheswastika”wereequallyopposedto“thecastespiritandconceitoftheBürgeras

to“therabble-rousingclass-orientedpropagandaofMarxism.”TheauthormadenodistinctionbetweenMarxists(andleftistsofallpersuasions),ontheonehand,andtheconservativebourgeoisie,ontheother,astheundisputedenemiesofNationalSocialism.Neithertheleftnortheconservativebourgeoisie,Schmittemphasized,belongedinthenewGermany.Inthefinalanalysis,Schmittargued,thecentralissuewasnotthereorganizationoftheGermanstatebutthecreationofanewGermanMensch(man).60Tobringthisoff,theBürgerhadtobetranscended,forthenewGermanmanofthefuturehadtobefreeofsnobbery,conceit,andclasshatred.Schmittusedunambiguouslanguagetocharacterizethepoliticalsituationinthewinterof1933:“EventodaythisnewGermangenerationfindsitselfinastruggleforsurvivalsinceitmustalsofightagainstthosemembersofthebourgeoisiewhohavechosentheNSDAPastheirpoliticalmouthpiece.Intherevolutionaryconflictbetweengenerations,itisinevitablethatpeopleoftheoldorderseektomakethenewageservetheirownpurposestosafeguardtheirownposition.Temporarily,theymayevenattainleadershippositions,butthedynamicstrengthofthemovement'syoungwarriorswillsoonsweepthemaway.”61Putplainly,evenifconservativesmanagedtoattainpositionsofpowerbydintoftheiralliancewithHitler,theywouldsoonbecastasidebytherevolutionarydynamicoftheNazimovement.Anotherconcernoftheauthor—andacentralthemeofNazipropagandainthe

monthsafter30January—wastheeliminationofthe“Berechtigungswesen(entitlementcharacter)ofthebourgeoisstate.”62ThiswasanattackonthebarriersandlimitationsestablishedbytheGermaneducationalsystemthathadtobeovercomeforacceptanceinto“goodsociety”andwhichimplicitlydiscriminatedagainstthelowerandlower-middleclasses:withoutthenine-yearstintataGymnasium,therewasnoAbitur;withouttheAbiturtherewasnopossibilityforuniversitystudy,andwithoutauniversitydegreetherewasnochancetoenterthehighercivilservice.Tocounterthisinjustice,the“entitlementcharacter”ofbourgeoissocietythushadtobeabolishedinordertopromote“thesocialriseofnaturalleaders,eveniftheywerethesonsofpeasantsandworkers.”63HeretheattackontheBürgerandhislifestyleturnedintoafullyfledged

assaultonbourgeoissocietyanditsclassbarriers,whichpreventedoutsidersfromjoiningtheranksoftheuppercrustandpartakingofitsprivileges.Needlesstosay,inFebruary1933amajorityofNaziswerestilloutsiders.Thepropellingforcebehindthislevelingandequalizinganti-bourgeoisinstinctwastheunderstandabledesiretodestroybourgeoisclass-riddensociety(which,afterall,blockedNaziambitions),evenifthisdesirewascloakedintheveilofhigh-

mindedidealism—forexample,thattheBürgerhadbetrayedGermany.Butintheend,veryconcreteinterestslaybehindtheanti-bourgeoispostureofNationalSocialism,whichwasfurtheraccentuatedbythenewcomer'sspitefortheestablishment.Duringtheearlymonthsof1933,thenecessityoftearingdownclassbarrierswasstressedtimeandagain,evenbytheNationalSocialistInteriorMinisterWilhelmFrickhimself.The“meaningofourAge,”wroteFrick,lies“inthesurmountingofdifferencesbetweenclassesandestates,”aswellas“intheincorporationofthefourthestate—theGermanworker—intothestateasacitizenwithequalrights.”64Thesecondcentraltheme,onealreadytoucheduponinWaltherSchmitt'sarticleabout“GermanSocialism”—thesimultaneousstruggleagainsttheconservativebourgeoisieandtheconceptofclassstruggleinherentinMarxistideology—alsobecamealeitmotifofNazipropagandaafter30January.InJune1933,Goebbelsthusbemoanedthe“giantburdenofanunprecedentedpoliticaltwo-frontwar”againstthe“conceitoftheRight”andthe“classconsciousnessoftheLeft.”65Eventhehierarchyofvaluesdrawnupforthe(yettobecreated)newmanofNationalSocialism,withthecharacteristictitle“MoralRequirementsofNationalSocialism,”implicitlypassedjudgmentontheconservativebourgeoisie.66Thisbecameespeciallyclearwhen“CondemnationofSelf-Interest”waselevatedtothelevelofamoralimperative.Thecontemporaryreaderwasthusinstinctivelyremindedofthecorruptionscandalsofthewinterandspringof1933,whichimplicatedleadingrepresentativesofthebourgeoisieandwhichwereheraldedwithgreatgleeandfanfareintheNationalSocialistpress.InlightofthecountlessviolentNaziattacksinthewinterandspringof1933,itisironicthat“RespectfortheIndividual,”the“ImperativeofTruthfulness,”and“ReadinesstoLendSuccor”occupyprideofplaceintheranksofthepromulgatedcardinalvirtues.67

The“Demise”oftheBürgerThemoretheGermanNationals,intheirpowerlessnessandimpotence,triedtobluralldifferencesbetweenthemselvesandtheNazis(whileparadoxicallyinsistingontheautonomyoftheirparty),themoreNationalSocialistsemphasizedthedifferencesbetweenthemselvesandthe“reactionaries,”whomtheydismissedwithcontempt.NazispeakersandtheNazipressaccentuatedthediscrepanciesinvaluesandconceptionsofsocietybetweenthemselvesandtheGermanNationals,tothepointwherethecontemporaryreadercouldnothelpbutgettheimpressionthatthesharpestdividinglineintheGermanpartysystemranbetweentheNazisandGermanNationals—ratherthanbetweeneitherof

themandtheLeft.TheNazisconcentratedtheirfiremostdirectlyontheconservatives'outmodedconceptionofsociety.So,forexample,anofficialoftheNationalSocialistFactoryCellsarguedinaspeechonthebasicprinciplesofNationalSocialismentitled“TheGermanNationalsandUs”:68“InGermany,classconceitisthefundamentalevil.InAdolfHitler'sGermanworkers'stateitisofnoconsequencewhethersomebodyisastreetcleanerorachiefexecutive.Wewillseetoitthatinthefuturebrainsandnotbagsofmoneywillbedecisive.”Atthesametime,itwasmadeclearinnouncertaintermsthattheconservativeswerenolongerregardedasaseriousopponent.ReactingtocriticalremarksoftheGermanNationalsduringtheDanzigelectioncampaign,theNazipresswasquicktopointoutthat“therevolutionhasbeenstrongenoughtoexercisegenerositywhereappropriate,butitwillalsobestrongenough—ontheroadtowardbuildingGermanSocialism—toshoveasidethesmolderingheapofrubblethatcallsitselfthenationalbourgeoisie.”69HeretheNazispresentedthemselvesasamovementofprotestandrebellionagainsttheentirebourgeoiswayoflife(whichseemed,inanycase,anachronisticinanageofeconomicdepressionandmassunemployment),therebydistancingthemselvesmarkedlyfromtheirconservativealliancepartner.IntheNazipartyanditsorganizationsthis“anti-bourgeois”ideologywas

widespreadandall-pervasive.TheNationalSocialistStudents'Association,forexample,whichhadwonabsolutemajoritiesinelectionsamongGermanuniversitystudentslongbefore1933,wereimbuedwithadeep-seated,vociferous,andalmostviolentanti-bourgeoisattitude.TheBürgerepitomizedtheenemyperse:“Weseehimasthateternalelementofdecompositionthatisresponsibleforournationalmiseryanddomesticstrife.Wewanttogivehimthenamehedeserves.Wewanttolabelhimandbrandhimforalltime;wewanttothrowallourboundlesscontemptanddisgustintothisoneword:“Bürger.”70HerethevenomouslanguagemakesitplainthatmanyNazisrebelledagainstwhattheyconsideredtheself-satisfiedandcomplacentbourgeoislifestylethatwasblamedforGermany'smisfortunes.Thisdeep-seatedaversiontothebourgeoisiewasalsofoundinthepressofstudentorganizations,whosemembers,aspiringtosuccessfulcareers,mightbeexpectedtoadmireandemulateratherthantodisparagebourgeoislifestyles.HeretheBürgerischaracterizedasthe“epitomeofthespiritlessman,lackinginrevolutionaryfervor—insipid,lackluster,hidebound,andmediocre.”Heisviewedas“conventionalandefficient,butbynomeansheroic,forthecouragetofacetheabsoluteisalientoaBürger,whoseraisond'êtreliesinthesafetyofhisownmaterialsecurity.”71InNationalSocialistStudentAssociations,theseanti-

bourgeoisandanti-capitalisttendencieswenthand-in-handwitharejectionofthetraditionsassociatedwiththeBildungsbürgertum,aparadoxicalsentimentinthosewhowouldcometoembodytheeducationalelite.AformerfunctionaryoftheNationalSocialistGermanStudentAssociation,JoachimHaupt,gaveamuch-quotedspeechonthisverythemeinSeptember1933,72inwhichhedifferentiatedbetweena“tedious”andan“interesting”NationalSocialism:73“The‘tedious’NationalSocialism,whichispresentlygaininggroundinGermany,endeavorstorestorethegoodoldways:indecentbooksareagainbanned,nightclubsareagainclosed,andonceagainpeopleobservetraditionalproprieties.The‘tedious’NationalSocialismistantamounttotherestorationofbourgeoismorals.”AccordingtoHaupt,anessentialelementofthenew,“interesting”(andnot“tedious”)NationalSocialismwastherejectionof“WestEuropeancivilization,”especially“theabsolutedisdainforso-calledBildung.”Hauptmaintainedthat“[a]nyonewhoistakeninbythehollowclaptrapofBildungwillneverbereceptivetotheideasofNationalSocialism.”74Abarrageofall-embracingaccusationsagainstthebourgeoisieappearedin

theNazipressuponthedeathofErnstOberfohren,theformerheadoftheGermanNationalparliamentaryfaction,whohadopposedthealliancewithHitlerafter30January,andwhofinallyresignedhispartypositionsattheendofMarch.75Oberfohrenwasfoundshottodeathinhishomeon7May1933.Theofficialcauseofdeath—suicide—wasquicklycalledintoquestion,thoughitwasneverconclusivelyprovedthatmurderhadactuallybeencommitted.76Underthecharacteristictitle“TheEndoftheBürger,”theNazisportrayedOberfohren'sdeathassymptomaticof“theseriouspoliticalcrisisinwhichthebourgeoisiehasfounditselfformanyyears.”77Foralongtime,theauthorofthearticleargued,thebourgeoisiehadbeenunabletokeeppacewiththeoveralldevelopmentofsociety,tothepointwherethebourgeoiswayoflifehadlostitslegitimacy:“PastageshaveplacedtheBürgeratthecenterofevents,haveupheldbourgeoisrespectabilityastheaimofalldesirestowardwhicheveryonestrovebutwhichonlyfewcouldattain.Betweenstartandfinish,barriershadbeenerected,wallsputup,andditchesdugthatcouldbeovercomeonlybythosewho,byvirtueofbirth,propertyoreducation,hadthetoolsattheirdisposalnecessarytosurmounttheseobstacles.”78ThebourgeoisiewaslargelyblamedforthepoliticalmiseryandfailureoftheRepublic:“TheBürgerhasfailedpolitically.Notonlydidhenolongerpossessthestrengthtopreventchaoticdevelopments,butratherhepromotedandabetted...chaos.”79Asillustratedbyastringofcorruptionscandals,noweventhelastbastionofthebourgeoisiehadcollapsed—“absoluteuprightnessandintegrity,thecleanescutcheonwithoutablot,thestainless

reputation.”Inthisconnection,bourgeoisdignitariesweresingledout—LordMayorswhohadallegedlylinedtheirpocketsbydefraudingthepublicpurse,aswellasconservativescaughtin(atleastpartiallyfabricated)corruptionscandals.Inthebourgeoisage,nowrelegatedtothepast,“toomuchwasmadeoftechnicalexpertise,specializedknowledgeandoutwardform,butpeoplefailedtorealizethatintheenditwaspersonalityandcharacterthatmatteredmost.These,ofcourse,weretraitsonecouldnotacquirefrombooksoretiquettemanuals.Peoplehadfocusedtooexclusivelyonoutwardappearances,devotedalltheirenergiestowardmasteringformalities,sothatnotimewaslefttocultivateone'sconscience,one'shonor,andone'scharacter.”80

TheAnti-BourgeoisThrustoftheNaziSocialRevolution

DuringtheMachtergreifungszeittherewasnoconfluenceofnational-bourgeoisandNationalSocialistvaluesandinterests.AsGoebbelshadwritten,theNaziswerefighting“anunprecedentedpoliticaltwo-frontwar”anditremainsastonishinghowNationalSocialism,fightingagainstsomanypoliticalfactionsinsociety,couldsucceedatall.Violentoppositiontocommunismandsocialismhadbeenthemainstayoftheirprogramfromearlyon,andvociferousoppositiontopoliticalCatholicismemergedinthestrugglesofthelateWeimarRepublic.Buttheirpassionateloathingoftheconservativebourgeoisieanditswaysfullycametotheforeonlyaftertheseizureofpower.Onlythendidthebreakwiththepast—theextenttowhichtheyabominatedtheoldImperialGermany—becomefullyevident.Thegulfthatdividedthemfromaconservativebourgeoisieaccusedofvacillation,thedebasementofconservativevalues,indecision,opportunism,andthelackoftheuncompromisingfightingspiritrequiredbythenewage,nowopenedwide.The“newman”ofNationalSocialismwhorefusedtoacknowledgeclassbarriersandwasbentonstampingoutthebourgeoisBerechtigungswesen—themanifoldhurdlesfromeducationalprerequisitestobehavioralcodes—consideredtheBürgerhismainenemy.Thecatalogueofvaluesforthis“newman”passedjudgmentontheBürgerandfoundhimwanting;thespecterofa“secondrevolution”threatenedtoundercuthisverylivelihood.Concreteinterestsclearlylaybehindthisanti-bourgeoispostureofNational

Socialism:thecampaignagainst“classconceit,”theridiculingofbourgeoisformsoflife,andtheattempttounderminehierarchicalstructureswasfedbytheoutsider'sproverbialresentmentagainstthoseinpower.Theimmensesocial

dynamismoftheperiodaftertheMarchelectionswasdirectedagainsttheoldelites,especiallytheconservativebourgeoisie.Themembersoftheconservativeestablishment,whohadfacilitatedHitler'srisetopower,wereamongthemainsocialvictimsofhisrapidsuccess.Thisanti-bourgeoisthrustofNazism,thoughundoubtedlyeffectiveasapoliticaldevice,wasalsoagenuineandsincereexpressionofpersonaldisgust.Theveryfactthatitwasheartfelt,thatitgaveventtodeeplyheldbeliefsinunaffectedlanguage,rendereditallthemoreeffectiveasapropagandaweapon.Thisdynamicofpent-upresentmentdirectedagainsttraditionalauthorities,values,andbeliefswasboundtohavedramaticconsequences.KarlDietrichBracherspokeinthiscontextofa“verbalsocialrevolution,”81butwhathappenedinthelatewinterandspringof1933wasmorethanthat.Astheevidenceshows,theimmensepoliticalupheavalthatfollowed30Januarycarriedwrenchingsocialandpsychologicalreverberationsinitswake.ThealmostobsequiousletterofaPrussianMinistertryingtoexcusetheunauthorizedflag-raisingofan“auxiliary”officialintheMinistry,followedbyblatantinsubordinationandtheopenrefusaltoobeyhisMinister'sordertolowertheflag,isabanalincidentinitself,butitrevealsarevolutionintheworldofPrussianofficialdom—andonethat,tobesure,wouldalsobeunthinkableincontemporaryBritishorFrenchMinistries.ThepalpablefearofaChiefSchoolsInspector,ahighofficialwhosupervisedPrussianGymnasien,resultingfromtheflakovera—toallintentsandpurposeswelljustified—Abiturgradehehadgiventoastudent,speakstotherapiderosionoftime-testedstandardsofsocialauthority.InWeimarGermany,themereideathatastudentcomplaintmightpossiblybecauseforconcerntoaSchulratwouldhavebeenpreposterous.TheNaziattempttoinstitutea“ComplaintsOffice”againsthigh-rankingjudicialofficialsattheOsnabrückandFrankfurtlawcourts,impossibleintheWeimarRepublic,illustratestherebellionofunderlingsagainsttheentrenchedpositionsoftheirformerlyunassailablesuperiors.82Timeshadnowchanged.Allthoseinpositionsofdependency,providedtheycouldclaimaffiliationwiththeNaziParty,weresuddenlyinapositiontoexertameasureofcontrolthattheyhadnotpossessedbefore.83Inanoddsense,then,theNazistatepromisedtobemore“democratic”forthosewhosupporteditthantheWeimarRepublichadeverbeen.Undoubtedly,thiscontributedinnosmallmeasuretothepopularityoftheregime:amoodofanewawakening,offundamentalchange,hungintheair.Aradicallynewdepartureseemedimminent,onethatpromisedabetterfuture,moreintunewiththespiritofthecrisis-riddenage,andonethatseemedpreparedforaradicalbreakwiththedustybourgeoisworldthatwaspervadedbythefoulsmellofunrepentantfailure.

Sincetheoldbourgeoisorderwasdisparagedbythenewgovernment,discreditedandquestioned“fromabove,”thatis,withofficialsanction,thesocialconsequenceswereimmediate.Itcannotbedeniedthattheomnipresentthreatofviolence,theveryrealpossibilityofbeingthrownintoaconcentrationcamp,andtheunabasheduseofterroracceleratedpoliticalandsocialchange.84Whetheronereferstothisasasocialrevolution,likeRalfDahrendorforDavidSchoenbauminthemid1960s,85asa“verbalsocialrevolution”likeKarlDietrichBracher,86orasaprocessbywhich“theoldeliteswerepushedaside,”likeThomasNipperdey,87thefactremainsthatevenbeforethewarasocialrestructuringandpsychologicalrevolutionwithrespecttosocialclasstookplace.Itwas,ofcourse,onlyapartialdisplacementoftheoldelitesandnottheircompletedispossession.AfterthedissolutionoftheGermanNationalFronton27June1933,andespeciallyafterHitlerhadmadeitclearthatheconsideredtherevolutionended—firston6Julyandthenagainon14July1933—hedidhisbesttosecuretheactivesupportofGermany'sconservativeelitesinordertopursuesharedgoalsintherealmsofeconomicandforeignpolicy.Butthefactthattheveryfoundationsoftheirlifestylewerecalledintoquestion,togetherwiththeir“character”andintegrity,madeitclearthatfrom1933onwards,eveniftheyremainedinpositionsofpower,theywouldhavetoplaythegamebytherulesofthenewmasters.

1.10March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterderReichskanzlei,KanzleivonPapen,”Rep.53,no.71,115.

2.Onsocialchangeafter1933,seeWehler,DeutscheGesellschaftsgeschichte,vol.IV,771–781;DieterZiegler,ed.,GroßbürgerundUnternehmer(Göttingen,2000);TimMason,SocialPolicyintheThirdReich(OxfordandNewYork,1993);ThomasSaunders,“NazismandSocialRevolution,”inGordonMartel,ed.,ModernGermanyReconsidered,1870–1945(LondonandNewYork,1992),159–178;JeremyNoakes,“NazismandRevolution,”inNoelO'Sullivan,ed.,RevolutionaryTheoryandPoliticalReality(London,1983),73–100;DavidSchoenbaum,Hitler'sSocialRevolution.ClassandStatusinNaziGermany,1933–1939,2nded.(NewYorkandLondon,1980).

3.Between1929and1933thegrossnationalproductfellonaverage7.2percentperannum;overthetwelve-yearperiodfrom1913to1925ithaddecreasedslightlyby0.4percentp.a.Between1928and1932nationalincomehadfallensharplyfrom75.373millionReichsmarkto45.175millionReichsmarkandtheunemploymentrate(1932)stoodat29.9percent.SeeDieterPetzina,WernerAbelshauser,andAnselmFaust,SozialgeschichtlichesArbeitsbuchIII.MaterialienzurStatistikdesDeutschenReiches1914–1945(Munich,1978),78,102,119.

4.AmreiStupperich,VolksgemeinschaftoderArbeitersolidarität.StudienzurArbeitnehmerpolitikderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,1918–1933(Göttingen,1982).

5.PeterLongerich,GeschichtederSA(Munich,1989);RichardBessel,PoliticalViolenceandtheRiseofNazism;ConanFischer,Stormtroopers;HildeJamin,ZwischendenKlassen.ZurSozialstrukturderSA-Führerschaft;MichaelKater,“ZumgegenseitigenVerhältnisvonSAundSSinderSozialgeschichtedesNationalsozialismusvon1925bis1939,”VierteljahresschriftfürSozial-undWirtschaftsgeschichte62(1975),339–379.Yetbeginningin1932,partsoftheuppermiddleclassesinthewealthiersuburbsof

Germany'slargercitiesincreasinglyvotedforHitler,asRichardF.Hamilton,WhoVotedforHitler?(Princeton,1982),pointsout.

6.Inparticularamonghigherechelonsofthebureaucracy.Bythemid1930sthesocialcompositionoftheNSDAPhadundergoneaprofoundchangesinceprofessionalsandmembersofthecivilservicehadjoinedthepartyinlargenumbers(especiallybetweenFebruaryand1May1933).

7.Ofcentralimportanceinthethree-tieredGermanschoolsystemwastheAbitur(whichrequirednineyearsofGymnasium)asaprerequisiteforadmissiontouniversitystudies.ThedifferentclassesoftheGermancivilservicewerestructuredaccordingtoeducation:forentryintothehöhereDienstofthecivilservice,acompletedcourseofstudyataGermanuniversitywasindispensable.

8.JohannesPopitz(1884–1945),ahigh-leveladministrator,hadworkedsince1919intheReichFinanceMinistry,wherehebecameMinisterialCouncilor(Ministerialrat)in1921.InSchleicher'sCabinethewasMinisterwithoutportfolioandprovisionaryheadofthePrussianMinistryofFinance;on21April1933hewasofficiallyappointedPrussianMinisterofFinance.Theresignationfromthispost,whichhesubmittedin1938,wasnotacceptedsince,asaleadingspecialistinfinancialmatters,hewasconsideredindispensable.HelaterbecameactiveasamemberoftheoppositionagainstHitler.

9.9March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,136.10.Ibid.,136.BlumespokewithhisfellowNazipartymember,SSGruppenführerKurtDaluege,the

futureheadofpoliceinthePrussianInteriorMinistry.11.Ibid.,138.12.Ibid.,138.Blumehadbeenwoundedandpartiallydisabledduringthewar.13.Ibid.,136verso.Inasecondletteron11MarchFabriziusclaimed“thatinthePrussianMinistryof

FinanceoneisintentonkeepingtheNationalSocialistsoutorcastingaspersionsonthem”(141).14.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,144–144verso;dateillegible

(either20or25March).HansHeinrichLammers(1879–1962)wasajudgebeforeenteringtheReichMinistryoftheInterior.In1931,disciplinaryproceedingswereinitiatedagainsthimforhisparticipationintheHarzburgerFront.InFebruary1932,helefttheDNVPtojointheNaziparty.On30January,hebecameSecretaryofStateandChiefofHitler'sReichChancellery.

15.Ibid.,144–144verso.16.Popitz,whowasheldinhighesteemasafinancialexpertthroughouttheentireReich,playedan

importantroleintheMittwochs-Gesellschaft(“WednesdaySociety”),foundedbyJohannGustavDroysenin1863,whichbroughttogethersixteenillustriouspersonalitiesfromthescientific,administrative,cultural,andmilitarycommunitieswhometeverysecondWednesday.OthermembersoftheconservativeoppositionwhobelongedtotheMittwochs-GesellschaftincludedthediplomatUlrichvonHasselandLudwigBeck,ChiefoftheGermanGeneralStaff.SeeKlausScholder,ed.,DieMittwochs-Gesellschaft.ProtokolleausdemgeistigenDeutschland1932–1944(Berlin,1982).

17.Ontheconceptof“Statusformalisierung,”seeRalfDahrendorf,GesellschaftundDemokratieinDeutschland(Munich,1968;firstpublishedin1965),86–107.

18.FranzvonPapen(1879–1969).BeforebecomingChancellor,PapenhadbeenamemberofthePrussianLandtagfrom1920to1928andfrom1930-May1932fortheright(andmonarchist)wingoftheCenterParty;seeLarryE.Jones,“FranzvonPapen,theGermanCenterParty,andtheFailureofCatholicConservatismintheWeimarRepublic,”CentralEuropeanHistory38(2005),191–217.

19.16MarchatBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.71,182–182verso.

20.Ibid.,182verso.ThisisreminiscentofthepredicamentofthefictionalDirectorofBerlin'sKöniginLuiseGymnasium,AlfredFrançois,inLionFeuchtwanger'snovel,TheOppermanns.

21.“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,”R53,no.71,192–195,esp.192.BernhardRust(1883–1945)becameCommissarforthePrussianMinistryofCultureon4February1933.

22.RepkementionedLindemann'ssuspension,wellknowingthatthiswasboundtoprejudiceRustagainstthedemocraticSchoolsInspector.

23.Ibid.,187.

24.Ibid.,194.25.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.71,183–

191.BohnertstressedthefactthathehadbeenprincipaloftheGermanSchoolinRomeforsevenyearsandthathisentirefamily“hadwornitselfoutintheserviceofGermanslivingabroad—hisfatherinCameroonandhisbrothersatJapaneseuniversities.”Bohnert,inhisexaltedpositionasOberschulrat,washardlyaccustomedtohavingtodefendhimselfinthematterofasimpleAbiturgrade.Inhishaplessness,thegoodRepublicaninhimcomplainsaboutthewidespreadanti-RepublicanmoodatRepke'sGymnasium,whichcouldbeconstruedtolendweighttoRepke'schargethatthelowAbiturgradewaspoliticallymotivated.

26.ItwouldhavebeeneasyforBohnerttoletRepkefailtheAbituraltogetherduetooveralllowgrades.BohnertdidnotwanttofailRepkebecauseofthelatter'sdisadvantagedsocialbackground.

27.Onthecivilservice,seeRainerFattmann,BildungsbürgerinderDefensive.DieakademischeBeamtenschaftundder“ReichsbundderhöherenBeamten”inderWeimarerRepublik(Göttingen,2001).

28.12April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PolitischerSchriftwechsel,DNVP,”R8005,no.19,6.29.ItwascharacteristicoftheuncertaintiesofthetimethattheOsnabrückGermanNationalshadno

ideawhetheranofficialdecreeestablishinga“NationalSocialistComplaintsOffice”hadbeenissuedorwhetheritwasallbasedonaninitiativeofthelocalNaziparty.

30.3April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PolitischerSchriftwechsel,DNVP,”R8005,no.19,63v.31.23March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PolitischerSchriftwechsel,DNVP,”R8005,no.19,

122.Thereportstressedtheeconomicconsequences:“TheprospectofanimpendingsecondrevolutionwithcompletelyunforeseeableeconomicresultshasexertedsuchaparalyzingeffectthatvirtuallyallsectorsoftheeconomyofLowerSilesiaareaffectedbyit.”(ibid.,122).

32.Ibid.,123.TheKreisleiter'sspeechwasreprintedintheLiegnitzerTageblatton23March1933.33.Ibid.,123.34.OneexampleofmanyatBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,Kanzleivon

Papen,”R53,no.184,“ÜberfallinKöln.”35.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PolitischerSchriftwechsel,DNVP,”R8005,no.19,125.Görlitzinthe

provinceofLowerSilesia,91,702inhabitants(1926).SeeStatistischesJahrbuchfürdasDeutscheReich1933,11.Thisappealisrepresentativeofcountlesssimilarproclamations.

36.Ibid.,125.NazisupporterswereinstructedtosubscribesolelytoNationalSocialist(andnottoright-wingbourgeois,nationalist)paperstoavoidwateringdownthemovement.

37.5May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,296.Givenitsurgency,Diegse'scomplaintwassubmittedbytelephone.

38.Ibid.,296.39.Ibid.(Thiswasdone“byorderoftheReichChancellor.”)40.12April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PolitischerSchriftwechsel,DNVP,”R8005,no.19,8.

Glauchau,intheRegierungsbezirkChemnitzinSaxony,wasatownwith29,135inhabitants(1925).41.Ibid.42.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“ReichslandbundPressearchiv,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.

9021,9.Conservativepaperswarnedthatinviewofexternalenemies,“wenationalparties”hadbettersticktogether.

43.ManyletterstotheDNVPBerlinheadofficeweresigned“FrontHeil”or“HeilDeutschland,”asasignofthewriters'solidaritywiththeGermanNationalcause.

44.TheNationalsozialistischeMonatsheftewasfrequentlyusedtoholdforthuponideologicalissuesthatwentbeyondthemoremundaneissuesofday-to-daypolitics.

45.ErnstGrafvonReventlow,“NemesisüberdemBürgertum,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,1.Jahrgang(1930),5–11.

46.ErnstGrafvonReventlow(1869–1943),aformernavalofficeranddescendantoftheSchleswig-Holsteinnobility,wasoneofthefewoutwardlyrespectablefiguresoftheNSDAPinthe1920s.BeforetheFirstWorldWar,hehadattractedattentionasanuncompromisingcriticofWilhelmineGermany.IntheRepublic,hebecameachampionofvölkischideasand,forawhile,evenofaunitedvölkisch-communist

front.In1927,hewentovertotheNSDAPandtookthegreaterpartofthe“German-VölkischFreedomParty”withhim.SeeOtto-ErnstSchüddekopf,LinkeLeutevonrechts.DienationalrevolutionärenMinderheitenundderKommunismusinderWeimarerRepublik(Stuttgart,1960);StephanMalinowski,VomKönigzumFührer.DeutscherAdelundNationalsozialismus(Berlin,2003).

47.Reventlow,“NemesisüberdemBürgertum,”8.48.Ibid.,10(asexemplifiedbythe“attitudeoftheGermanNationalstowardtheDawesPlan”).49.Reventlow,“NemesisüberdemBürgertum,”11.50.JosephGoebbels,“DaspatriotischeBürgertum,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,1.Jahrgang

(1930),221–229.51.Ibid.,222.Giventheirraisond'être,bourgeoispartieswereboundtoopposeNationalSocialism:

“Asabsurdasthismaysound,thefrontthatopposesusstretchesfromWestarptoThälmann[conservativestocommunists];whatliesinbetweendiffersonlyinnuance,notinessence.”(225).

52.Ibid.,225.Thetrueconservative,bycontrast,woulddefend“theeternalvaluesofbloodandVolk”intheinterestofhispeopleand,ifheconsideredthesevaluesinjeopardy,wouldturnintoarebeloutofa“conservativesenseofduty.”(225).

53.Ibid.,225.Goebbelsfreelygaveventtohishatredfortheconservativebourgeoisie,basedonthechargethatinNovember1918,theyhadabandonedGermanyto“internationaladventurers,”therebyleaving“thefateofthenationcompletelytochance.”(226).

54.Ibid.,226.55.Ibid.,226–227.AccordingtoGoebbels,theconceptof“bourgeoisie”asaremnantofaclass-based

wayofthinkinghadnowbeenovercome.56.WaltherSchmitt,“UnserWillezumdeutschenSozialismus,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,

Heft35(Februar1933),82–86.57.Ibid.,82.58.Ibid.,83.59.Ibid.,84.60.Thecreationofthis“newGermanman”wasindispensable,sincethelegacyoftherevolutioncould

besafeguardedonlybyreorientingthevaluesandexpectationsofeveryindividual.61.Ibid.,85.62.Ibid.63.Ibid.64.WilhelmFrick,“DerSinnunsererZeit,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,Heft39(June1933),

245–246.65.JosephGoebbels,“DiedeutscheRevolution,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,Heft39(June

1933),247–248.The“GermanRevolution,”asGoebbelsreferredtotheNaziseizureofpowerinthewinterandspringof1933,hadbeenthe“leastbloodyrevolutioninworldhistory.”(248).

66.F.O.Bilse,“DiesittlicheForderungimNationalsozialismus,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,Heft39(June1933),263–276.

67.The“moralimperatives”ofNationalSocialismwere:“Self-interestasaCurse,”“RespectfortheIndividual,”“TheImperativeofTruthfulness,”“ASenseofHonorableBehavior,”“ASenseofDuty,”“PreparednesstoHelpOthers,”and“TheFührerastheModel.”

68.1June1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,”R8034II,no.9030,“ParteilebenDeutschland:NationalsozialistenundDNVP,”185.

69.Ibid.“UnsereGeduldistamEnde.FrontgegendeutschnationaleAngriffe.”IntheDanzigelectionof24May1933,theNSDAPreceived50.03percentofthevoteand38of72seatsintheDanzigparliament,theVolksrat.SeeEckhardJesse,“HermannRauschning—DerfragwürdigeKronzeuge,”inRonaldSmelser,EnricoSyring,andRainerZitelmann,eds.,DiebrauneEliteII(Darmstadt,1993),193–206;esp.194.

70.Quotedfrom“SchlagtdieReaktion,woihrsietrefft,”DerHeidelbergerStudent,no.3(June22,1934),1,citedinMichaelGrüttner,StudentenimDrittenReich(Paderborn,1995),248.SeealsoGeoffrey

Giles,StudentsandNationalSocialisminGermany(Princeton,1985).71.“NationalsozialistischeKulturpolitik,”DerTurnerschaftler50(1933/34),167,citedinMichael

Grüttner,Studenten,249.Hereagain,therootsofanti-bourgeoisrevulsionaretracedbacktotheFirstWorldWar:“IntheWorldWarweseetheinitialimpetusandintheNationalSocialistrevolutionthefinalimplementationoftheliquidationofthebourgeoisie”(Ibid.).

72.JoachimHaupt,bornin1900,NSDAPmembersince1922,1927–1928leaderoftheKielStudentAssociation;after1928,teacherinKielandothertownsinSchleswig-Holstein;dismissedfromstateemploymentin1931becauseofhispro-Naziactivities;1932–1933NSDAPdeputyinthePrussianLandtag;1933–1935MinisterialratinthePrussianMinistryofCulture(seeGrüttner,Studenten,508).

73.“The‘interesting’NationalSocialismincludesallitssocialistelements,thenationalizationofbanks,sportsaspartofmilitarytraining(Wehrsport),andmuchelsebesides.”InJoachimHaupt,“DieErziehungderStudentenschaft,”DeutscheStudentenschaft,9October1933,2–3,citedinGrüttner,Studenten,249.

74.Ibid.,andGrüttner,Studenten,250.75.OnErnstOberfohren,seeNeueDeutscheBiographie19(Berlin,1999),384,andchapter6below.76.Formoredetails,seechapter6below.77.9May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,”R8034II,no.9030,

“ParteilebenDeutschland,NationalsozialismusundDNVP,”183.78.Ibid.IncontrasttotheGermanNationals,theNazisalsorejectedtheSecondEmpireasawhole.79.Ibid.80.Ibid.Hereagainthe“moralimperatives”ofNationalSocialismaresharplycontrastedwiththe

lukewarmneutralismofthebourgeoisie,who,itwasalleged,lackedmoralfiber.81.SeeBracher,DiedeutscheDiktatur,483.Inmyopinion,Bracherputstoomuchemphasisonthe

elementofconsciousmanipulation:“Esvollzogsicheineverbale‘Sozialrevolution,’inderenZeichensowohlderalteAntikapitalismuswiedievielschichtigeneueAnhängerschaftmanipuliertwerdenkonnten.”Hegoesontoarguethattheregimehadcontributedto“dismantlingthestructuresofsocialconsciousness.”

82.Mostly,thesepoliticallymotivated“ComplaintsOffices”lednowhere,andNazisinthecivilserviceweresoonrelegatedtotheirinitialstationthough,forreasonsofopportunism,thepercentageofPartymembersamongofficialsrosedramaticallyafter1933.Overall,thesocialstatusofcivilservantsdeclinedafter1933;withinthebureaucracyoneobservesalevelingtrendasthedistancebetweendifferentgradesofofficialsshrank.SeealsoHansMommsen,BeamtentumimDrittenReich(Stuttgart,1966),20–22.

83.Tospeakinthiscontextof“modernization”withitsimpliedpositiveconnotation—as,forexample,MichaelPrinzandRainerZitelmann,eds.,NationalsozialismusundModernisierung(Darmstadt,1991)—maywellleadtomisunderstandingsbecauseitignorestheinhumanaspectoftheregime:anypotential“modernization”ofaregimebasedonterrorwithanachronisticaimscameatsuchahighpricethatitautomaticallyoutweighedany“modernizing”benefits.AsMichaelBurleighandWolfgangWippermannputit:“...theword‘modern’onlyfitstheThirdReichifonestripsitofallconnotationsof‘betterment’or‘improvement’toanextentwhichrendersitutterlymeaningless...”SeeMichaelBurleighandWolfgangWippermann,TheRacialState:Germany1933–1945(Cambridge,1991),2.Aslongastheterm“modern”isgovernedbythepositiveimplicationsitusuallycarriesintheliterature,itsapplicationtoNazismwillremainproblematic.Theliteratureontheissueisimmense;foranoverviewseeNorbertFrei,“WiemodernwarderNationalsozialismus,”GeschichteundGesellschaft19(1993),367–387;andHansMommsen,“Nocheinmal:NationalsozialismusundModernisierung,”GeschichteundGesellschaft21(1995),391–402.

84.Thelatent,butomnipresent,threatofterrorwasoneexplanationforwhytherewaslittleresistancetoNazismfromthebeginning.Tolaw-abidingGermanstherewerefewpossibilitiesofdefenseagainstNazithugs.Thepolicewereunwillingtoprotectcitizens,whoseabilityofself-defensewasfurthercurtailedbythefactthatSAthugswereobviouslyactinginthenameofthestate.

85.Dahrendorf,GesellschaftundDemokratieinDeutschland,415–432;DavidSchoenbaum,Hitler'sSocialRevolution.ClassandStatusinNaziGermany1933–1939(NewYork,London,1980,firstpublishedin1966).

86.Bracher,DiedeutscheDiktatur,483.BracherpointstotheparadoxicalfactthattheNazisspokeoftheequalityofall“VolksgenossenineinemAtemzugmiteinerscharfgegliedertenKommandostruktur,militärisch-aristokratischerArt...”Ibid.,485.

87.ThomasNipperdey,“ProblemederModernisierunginDeutschland,”inNipperdey,NachdenkenüberdiedeutscheGeschichte(Munich,1986),44–60,esp.57.Nipperdeyarguedthatthe“defacto”abdicationoftheoldeliteswasatruly“revolutionaryevent.”Germanfascism,heheld,“...hasleveledandequalizedGermansociety...”andheassertedemphaticallythat“a‘brownrevolution’hadreallytakenplace.”

ChapterV

BETWEENTHEDICTATESOFCONSCIENCEAND

POLITICALEXPEDIENCY

TheDNVPandAntiSemitism

ThescopeandintensityofNazianti-SemiticattacksduringthelastyearsoftheWeimarRepublichadmadeitclearthatthelivesofthe525,000GermanJews1wereboundtotakeaturnfortheworseafterthe85-year-oldPresidentPaulvonHindenburgappointedHitlerChancellor.Foryears,Hitlerandhislieutenantshadleviedbarragesofhate-filledchargesagainstJews,blamingthemforthedevastationoftheFirstWorldWar,thedebilitating1918armistice,theTreatyofVersailles,the1923inflation,Marxism,andworldcommunismasawhole.YetfewrecognizedtheurgencyoftheproblemduringthefirstdaysofHitler'srule,eventhoughpublicdiscriminationofGermanJewsbeganinFebruaryandtheSA'sviolentattacksstartedonalargescaleafterthe5March1933elections.RandomattacksturnedintomoresystematicabusewhentheNaziPartyorganizedanationwideboycottofJewish-ownedshopson1April.Thatmonth,aseriesoflawsexcludedGermanJewsfromtheupperechelonsofthecivilservice(7April),bannedlargenumbersofJewishjudges,publicprosecutors,andattorneysfrompracticinglaw(11April),excludedJewishdoctorsfromtheKrankenkassen,thenationalhealthinsuranceorganization(22April),andintroducedrigidquotasforJewishGymnasiumanduniversitystudents(25April).2ThelatterrestrictionwouldmakeitimpossibleformanyJewishstudentstoobtaintheirsecondary-schoolgraduationcertificate,theAbitur,aprerequisiteforattendingaGermanuniversity,andthusmeantthattheywouldbepreventedfromenteringtheprofessions.ThankstoHindenburg'sintervention,the“Aryanparagraph”intheAprillawsexcludedfromtheprohibitionsthoseGermanJewswhohadactivelyparticipatedintheFirstWorldWar,thosewhosefathersorsonshadbeenkilledinaction,andthosewhohadheldofficealreadyon1August1914.ThehighnumberofGermanJewswhoparticipatedinthewarreflectedthefactthatmorethan60percentofJewishlawyersand50percentofjudgesandprosecutorsinitiallyremainedinplace,thoughthemajorityofprofessionalsandhigh-rankingcivilservantswerestillsubjecttothehumiliatingandabusivemeasuresoftheAprillaws.3TowhichpoliticalforcescouldGermanJewsturnforhelpinthisdesperatesituation?Germany'sRechtsstaat,thestatebasedontheruleoflawanddueprocessthat

hadbeenfirmlyestablishedsincethelateeighteenthcentury,hadtraditionally

actedasacounterweighttoGermany'sweakdemocratictraditionbyprovidinglegalredresstoinstancesofabuse.4Inthepast,GermanJewswereabletoseekrestitutionforwrongscommittedagainstthembyappealingtocourtsorpoliticalpartiestoactintheirinterest,usingtheinstitutionsandprocessesoftheauthoritativeRechtsstaat.ThetwopartiesthathadoccasionallyintervenedonbehalfofGermanJewsduringtheWeimarRepublic,theDDPandtheSPD,werenow,however,powerless.5ThetransmutedDDPhad,inanycase,changeditsnametoStaatsparteiin1930,afterwhichitdevelopedanti-Semitictendencies,andtheSPDitselfbecamesubjecttosomuchNazipersecutionthatallitsenergiesweredevotedtoitsownsurvival.AfterJanuary1933,theonlypoliticalforceinanypositiontoupholdtheRechtsstaattraditioninthefaceofNazitransgressions,includingthepotentialpowertocounteranti-Semiticattacks,seemedtobeHitler'salliancepartner,theconservativeGermanNationalPeople'sParty.AspartofHitler'sgoverningcoalition,theDNVPwasthesolepoliticalforcethathadthepotentialtofightfortherightsofGermanJewsinthefaceofNaziattacks.Evenmonthsafter30January1933,prominentGermanJews,suchasGeorgBernhard,theformereditoroftheliberalVossischeZeitung,wereconvincedthat“inthelongrunGermanNationalsareboundtoconstituteanobstaclefortheimplementationofNazism'sracialidiocies.”6Yet,overall,thepartywasamostunlikelychampionofJewishinterests,giventheanti-Semiticbackgroundofsomeofthegroupsthatmadeupitscoreconstituency.TheDNVPwasimbuedwithbothatraditionofantiSemitismandaconservativeallegiancetotheruleoflaw.HowdidtheGermanNationalsreconcilethetensionbetweentheirownlatentantiSemitismandtheirtraditionofsupportingtheRechtsstaat?Moreimportantly,whatimplicationsdidthishaveforthehundredsofthousandsofGermanJewsunderNaziattack?

AContradictoryRecord:PreviousResearchontheDNVPandAntiSemitism

SomeoftheexistingliteratureontheDNVPaddressesthenatureoftheparty'santiSemitism(incontrasttothatoftheNazis)anditsrenunciationofterror.StudiesrefertotheDNVP's“moderate”antiSemitism,butofferlittlesystematicanalysisofwhatthismeans.MonographsthatdealwiththeDNVPintheWeimarRepubliceitherskirttheissueorexcludeitaltogetherbecausetheirfocusofinvestigationlieselsewhere.7StudiesonGermanantiSemitismtreattheDNVP'sroleinanequallycursoryfashion.WethusknowrelativelylittleaboutthepreciseattitudesandbehaviorofGermanNationalstowardJewsduringthe

WeimarRepublicandnexttonothingabouttheDNVP'spoliciesduringtheNaziseizureofpowerbetween30January1933andmidJuly1933,whenHitlerdeclaredthe“revolution”ended.ThischapterseekstohelpfillthevoidbyofferingevidenceoftheDNVP'spositiontowardGermanJewsandNazianti-Semiticmeasuresduringthissix-monthperiodasawaytoanalyzemoresubstantivelytheimplicationsoftheparty'srole.ThereisastrongtacitassumptionintheliteraturethattheDNVP,byvirtueof

itspositionastheNazis'coalitionpartner,exertedamoderating,evenrestraininginfluenceonHitlerandtheSA,theorganizationresponsibleformostoftheanti-Semiticoutragesduringthewinterandspringof1933.Bernd-JürgenWendt,forexample,assertsthatinitiallyNazishad“tocurtailtheirownurgeforaction”outofconsiderationfor,amongothers,“theirconservative-bourgeoiscoalitionpartner…”8Inthesamevein,KarlSchleunesmaintainsthatasofmidMarch1933Hitlerwasstillputtingabrakeonanti-Semiticmeasuressincehewasreluctant“todefyopenlythewishesofthecoalitionpartners.”9Theseassessments,aswillbeshowninthischapter,arebasedmoreonconjectureandlackofinformationthanhistoricalreality,sincetheNazis'conservativecoalitionpartnergavelittleevidenceofanymoderatingaction.ThefaultyassumptionabouttheDNVP'swillingnesstorestrainNaziexcessesmayderivefromthenatureoftheparty'santi-Semiticorientation,whichwas(usually)moretemperateandinconsistentthanthatoftheNSDAP.AgeneralconsensushasemergedinsurveysofWeimarandNaziGermany

(insofarastheissueismentionedatall)thattheDNVPstoodfor“amoderateantiSemitism,thoughinitstreatmentofthe‘Jewishquestion’itspolicieswerenotuniform.”10HelmutBerding,whilestressingtheinconsistenciesoftheDNVP'sideology,alsonotesthecontinuedexistenceofwhathereferstoasthe“Protestant-anti-Semiticelementoftraditionalconservatism.”11Berdingunderscorestheparty'srejectionofviolenceandterrorandspeculatesthat“…iftheDNVPhadevercometopoweritwouldhavepursuedasystemofapartheid,thoughnotapolicyofextermination.”12AvrahamBarkai'spassingreferencestotheDNVPinhisdetailedhistoryoftheCentralvereinsuggestanassessmentoftheparty'sbrandofantiSemitismthatisclosetoBerding'sinindicatingthattheDNVPmighthavepreferredseparation.TheDNVP,henotes,favoredtheZionistsbecausetheyadvocatedJewishemigrationtoPalestine.13WernerJochmannandGeorgeMosseprovidethemostdetailedinformation

onGermanNationalattitudestowardJewsintheirlongessaysfromthe1960sand1970s.14Focusingontheyearsbefore1923,Jochmannmaintainsthat,forreasonsofopportunism,theDNVPleadershipinitiallyavoidedtakingaclear

stanceonthe“so-calledJewishquestion”forfearofalienatingthevariousfactionswithinthepartythathadbeenfedbytributariesofformerFreeConservatives,GermanConservatives,ChristianSocial,andvölkischelements,thelatterthreeofwhichbroughtwiththematraditionofantiSemitism.15Indeed,theDNVP'santi-Semiticrecordiscontradictory.Ontheonehand,thepartybegantoexcludeJewsfrommembershipwhile,atthesametime,someofitsmoreprominentmembersprotestedagainstanti-Semiticpolicies.Intherun-uptothe1920elections,forexample,AnnavonGierke,DNVPdeputyanddaughterofthefamouslegalscholarOttovonGierke,wasnotrenominatedbyherlocalpartyorganizationonaccountofherJewishancestry,thusexcludinghercandidacy.16Eventheparty'sexpulsionofitsmostextremeanti-SemiticmembersafterthemurderofWaltherRathenaudidnotseemtoamounttoasignificantreorientationofitsoverallpolicy.17GeorgeMossealsostressestheincreasinginner-partyantiSemitismoftheDNVPduringtheWeimarRepublic.18Alreadyby1923,siximportantDNVPOrtsgruppen(localgroups)refusedmembershiptoJews.Thepartyleadershipwasreluctanttooverrulethelocalgroupsandby1929,accordingtotheDNVPpartymanual,Jewsweretobedeniedadmissiontothepartyaltogether.AsMossepointsout,throughouttheelectioncampaignsofthe1920s,localDNVPelectionpostersandpamphletsappealedtoanti-Semiticprejudices,especiallyasameanstoattacktheDDP.19Ontheotherhand,severalleadingGermanNationalsdecriedtheanti-Semiticstanceoftheirparty.PeterPulzerarguesthattheinitialDNVPleadershipgroupintheWeimarNationalAssembly,includingGrafArthurvonPosadowsky-Wehner,ClemensvonDelbrück,andAdalbertvonDühringer,allformerhigh-rankingcivilservants,were“aversetoalldemagogyandfoundantiSemitismdistasteful.”20SomeotherprominentGermanNationals,suchasFriedrichvonOppeln-Bronikowski,afrequentcontributortoDerNationaldeutscheJude,thepressorganoftheAssociationofNationalGermanJews,and,asMosseemphasizes,AlfredHugenberg,partyleadersince1928,whonevermadeananti-Semiticremarkinanyofhisspeeches,showedfewsignsofantiSemitism.21Ontheotherhand,Hugenberg'sStaatssekretärintheMinistryofEconomicsafter30January1933,PaulBang,wasarabidanti-Semiteandauthorofluridanti-Semitictracts.22Tosumup,theavailablesecondaryliteratureontheGermanNationalsand

antiSemitismhighlightstwomaindifferencesbetweentheirantiSemitismandthatoftheNaziParty:(I)Ideologically,DNVPantiSemitismneveracquiredtheall-encompassingpreeminenceithadfortheNSDAP.InSaulFriedländer's

terminology,theDNVP'santiSemitismwasthusnot“redemptive,”23butratheranextension,albeitaradicalizedone,oftraditionalconservativeantiSemitism.(II)TheDNVPremainedopposedtoanyformofpublicterrorinitsabstractcommitmenttotheRechtsstaat.AslateasMarch1933,thepartyproclaimedthatitopposed“inprincipleterrorizinganysegmentofthepopulation.”24Whattheexistingliteraturefailstotellusisthatinthecourseofthewinterandspring1933,itquicklybecameclearthatthisoppositionwaspurelytheoreticalanddidnotcompelthepartyleadershiptoopposeactivelyanti-Semiticactsofterror.Thisreluctancetointervene,combinedwiththefactthatdifferencesbetweentheGermanNationalandNazibrandsofantiSemitismhadlittleimpactonactualpolicies,helpedsealthefateofGermanJews.ThischapterinvestigatestheplightofGermanJewsduringtheNaziseizureof

powerin1933and,inparticular,howtheleadershipandmembersoftheDNVPreactedtoNazitransgressionsandviolence.Thefirstsectionsetsouttheproblem:theplethoraofviolentattacksonJewish-ownedbusinessesandindividualJewsfollowingthe5March1933electionsandthereactionoftheGermanauthorities.ThesecondsectiontracestherelationshipbetweenGermanconservativesandJews,inparticulartheconservatives'predicamentasupholdersoflawandorderontheonehand,andtheiranti-Semiticleaningsontheother.ThethirdsectionhighlightstheDNVP'sreactiontothedilemmaofnational-mindedGermanJews,alargenumberofwhomfoughtforGermanyintheFirstWorldWar.Despitetheoverallfaithfulnessofthesementotheconservativeidealofhownational-mindedGermansshouldbehaveinanhourofnationalcrisis,conservativeprotestagainstanti-Semiticmeasures,empathy,orhelpwererarelyforthcoming.Thefourthsectionexaminesthefewcasesofconservativeprotestandattemptedhelp,andthefifthsectionhighlightsthemorenumerouscasesofrejectionanddisapprobation.ThesixthsectiondisclosestheoftencontradictoryreactionsoflocalDNVPassociationsandtheheadofficeinBerlinwhenbaptizedJewsorhalf-Jewsappliedforpartymembership.Theconclusionreviewsthespectrumofinconsistent,conflicting,andattimesoutrightcontradictoryreactionsthattheDNVPdisplayedtowardGermanJewsduringtheNaziseizureofpower.Historyinthemakingisrarelyconsistent,logical,orlikelytofitintopreconceivedpatterns.ThisinvestigationrevealsthefullrangeofconservativereactionstotheinherentplightofGermanJewsinthewinterandspringof1933.Aswillbeshownbelow,theDNVPcompletelyfailedtoliveuptoitsprofessedideals,therebyunderminingtheveryprinciplestowhichitsmemberssotenaciouslyclungandsettingthestageforthefurthererosionoftherightsofGermanJews.

Anti-SemiticViolenceAnenormouswaveofviolence,emanatingfromSAtroopers(manywearingarmbandsoftheauxiliarypolice)andordinarymembersoftheNaziPartywhowantedtosettleoldscores,engulfedGermanyinthedaysandweeksaftertheelectionsof5March1933.25Thenumberofanti-Semiticattacksmultiplied.Theseattackswerenotorchestratedfromabove,officiallysanctioned,orelaboratelyplanned.Theyemergedfromakindof“grassroots”violencesurgingfromthelocallevel,mostlyfromlocalSAunitsandotherdiscontentedelementsofNaziorganizations.ReichChancelleryrecordsofMarch1933arefullofreportsfromBerlin'sforeigndelegationsthatcomplainofviolent,oftenbrutal,attacksperpetratedagainsttheircitizens.26AmongthesearereportsfromthePolish,French,Yugoslavian,Swiss,American,andSovietembassiesaboutactsofprovocationandviolence,directedmostlyagainstJewishcitizensofthesecountries.27Onthewhole,thesereportsconcernedJewsfromabroadwhohadeitherlivedinGermanyforsometimebecausetheyweremarriedtoGermans,orwhofoundthemselvesinthecountrytemporarilyonshortbusinesstrips.TheattacksincludedeventslikeraidsonJewishrestaurants(inMagdeburgoneSwissandsixItaliancitizenswereinjuredduringanincursion),thesmashingofshopwindowsofbusinessesownedbyPolishJews,andassaultsoncafes,whoseproprietorswereorderedtoshutdownoperationsunderthethreatofrepeatattacks.28In1933therewereanestimated150,000EasternJewsinGermany,manyofwhomhadbeeninthecountryfordecadeswithouthavingbeengivenGermancitizenship.29Themethodsusedintheattacksdifferedfromthoseofordinaryorganizedcrimeonlyinsofarastheywerecarriedoutmostlyinbroaddaylight.Destruction,extortion,andgang-relatedviolenceoftentookplaceinfullpublicview.Yetthisincreasedexposurehadlittleimpact,giventhepervasiveatmosphereoffearandintimidationthathadsetinimmediatelyaftertheReichstagFireDecree.Newspapers,forexample,failedtoreportmostoftheincidents.Conservativenewspapers(thoseleastindangerofbeingbanned)weresocowedthattheyreportedattacksontheirownmembers(whichbecamemorefrequentasthespringworeon)onlyinabridgedform.Attackswereso“public”thatpassersbyandneighbors,equallyintimidated,oftenconsciouslyavertedtheireyesinordernottobecomeunwittingeyewitnesses.AsecondcategoryofattackswasdirectedagainstforeignJewswhohadlived

foralongtimeintheReich,werewellknownintheirneighborhoods,andnowbecamevictimsofpersonalactsofrevenge.30GermanswhowereinvolvedwithforeignJewsinlawsuitsorwhoowedthemmoneynowusedthetriumphof

NationalSocialismtotakerevengeontheiradversariesorforcecancellationofdebts.31VictimswereusuallyattackedbygangsofSAmen,oftenbrutallybattered(totheextentthatsomerequiredalonghospitalstay)orrobbedintheirhomes.Entrywasforcedunderthepretextthat“thepolice”wereatthedoor32—andwhichlaw-abidingcitizenwoulddarerefusetocomplyinthesecircumstances?Cashandjewelryinvariablywentmissing.Intherarecasethatthepolicewerecalledinandactuallyshowedup,theytooknosubsequentaction.Ononeoccasion,fiveuniformedmenforcedtheirwayintotheapartmentofaPolishrabbiinDresdenandbeathimupwithrubbertruncheons.AccordingtothePolishEmbassyreport,policemensummonedtothesceneexplainedthat:“ItisnottheobligationofthepolicetoprotectJews.”33InanotherattackinDresdenthatinvolvedadirectthreat(armed,uniformedmenhadpreviously,onseveraloccasions,attemptedtoassaulttheproprietorofadraper'sshop),thepolicejustifiedtheirinactionbystatingthattheywere“notinapositiontoprovideanyhelp.”34AtthesceneofanotherattackonahotelinMagdeburgon8March,thepolice(accordingtoanotherreportofthePolishEmbassy)refused“...torecordtheincidentandtakedownthestatementsofPolishcitizens.”35Itwasthuscertainthatnoassistancecouldbeexpectedfromthepolice,reportsofwhichfacthaddoubtlessspreadfarandwidetovictimsandpotentialvictimsalike.Theattacks—criminalprovocationsthatsprangchieflyfrompersonalhatred,

vindictiveness,orthesearchforenrichment—werenotwelcomed,forthemostpart,bytheNSDAP-DNVPgovernment.ThisbecameclearwiththenumberofHitler'sappealstoputanendtothe“independentactions.”36FormalcomplaintsprovidingdetailsofwhathadactuallyoccurredweresentfromtheembassiesmostlytotheForeignOffice.Fromthere,theconcernedForeignMinisterKonstantinvonNeurath(whohadgoodreasontofearthepotentialdamageoftheseattacksonthereputationoftheReich)circulatedthecomplaintstoReichInteriorMinisterWilhelmFrick,PrussianMinisteroftheInteriorHermannGöring,andHeinrichLammers,Hitler'sStaatssekretärintheReichChancellery.Inthisway,vonNeurathwantedtoensurethatasmanyMinistriesaspossible,andespeciallytheReichChancellorhimself,wouldendeavortoputanimmediateendtothetransgressions.37HitlerrelentlesslyadmonishedhisSAandSStostoptheattacksandcatchtheguiltyparties,“nomatterwhomtheymaybe,”tocallthemtoaccount,and“deliverthemwithoutdelaytothepolice.”Inthisheseemedtobeentirelysincere,sincewidespreadrandomviolencecouldserveonlytounderminehisgovernment.38Frick,vonNeurath,andLammersalsomaderepeatedeffortstotackletheproblem.Despiteallthis,noone

succeededinflushingouttheperpetratorsoftheattacks.Thewallofsilenceremainedfirmlyinplace.On3May,almosttwomonthsaftertheonsetoftheattacks,StaatssekretärLammerssentanothercircular,reproachfulintone,totheCabinetministers.39InspiteoftheReichChancellor'sdesiretoresolvetheproblemoftheattacks,hehad“uptonowreceivednoreportwhatsoeverabouthandling,answering,orclearingupthefactsofthematter.”TheSA,SS,andauxiliarypoliceformationsthatwereimplicatedinthe

criminalactsclearlyknewhowtoobfuscatefactualfindingsandthusavertpunishmentfortheattacks.ThiswouldhardlyhavebeenpossiblewithoutthecollusionofseniorSAleaders.Hitler'sadmonitions,theeffortsofthebureaucracy,andeventhoseoftheNaziInteriorMinistertoshedlightontheincidentshadbeenfutile.Hereitshouldbetakenintoconsiderationthatattacksonforeigners,includingJews,non-Jews,andevendiplomats,inevitablycausedharmtotheforeignpolicyinterestsoftheReich.40The(carefullyedited)publishedselectionofReichChancelleryrecordslikewisecontainsalargenumberofdocumentspertainingtoviolentattacksonforeigndiplomats,membersofGermanNationalassociations,theDNVP,tradeunions,economicassociations,andmembersofotherbourgeoisparties.41Fromtheperspectiveoftheperpetrators,attacksonGermanJewsprobablycarriedanevensmallerriskthanthoseonforeignJewsandwereevenlesslikelytobeprosecutedbytheauthorities.Furthermore,potentialattackerscouldnothelpbutnoticethatthepress,forthemostpart,deliberatelyturnedablindeyetotheattacks.TheGermanNationalPartypress,whichcouldairitsviewswithrelativefreedom,asitwasleastaffectedbybansandsuppressions,containedfewdenunciationsofthenumerousanti-Semiticactsofviolence.Thisdidnotnecessarilysignalsympathywiththeperpetratorbutwasmorelikelyduetoself-interestedindifference,preoccupationwiththeparty'sownaffairs,orsimplythefearthatextensivereportsofcriminalprovocationsmightfallinthecategoryofGreuelpropaganda(basicallyunfoundedinflammatorypropaganda)andthusbeinterpretedasfoulingone'sownnest.GermanJewswerethuscaughtinaninescapablepredicament.Theycould

appealtothepolice,butnohelpwouldbeforthcoming.Evenavisceralphysicalreaction—self-defenseprovokedbythreattolifeandlimb—alreadynotverypromisinginlightofthesuperiornumericalstrengthoftheattackers,wasoutofthequestion.MostGermanJewswerefullyassimilatedGermancitizens(intheEmpire,theywerealreadystronglyrepresentedinthemiddleanduppermiddleclassesaswellasformingasmallwealthyelite),42and,likeotherGermans,theywereaccustomedtopayingheedtothestateauthoritiesandsubmittingtotheir

directives.Ifterrorwasexercisedinthenameofthestate(bywayofSAmembersinauxiliarypoliceuniforms)—evenifitprovedlife-threatening—Germans,Jewsandnon-Jewsalike,foundthemselvescaughtinahopelesspsychologicaldilemma,sincetherewasnoeffectivedefenseagainstanabuseofstatepower.Noonehadreckonedwiththepossibilitythat,practicallyovernight,thepoliceorthoseactingintheirnamewouldbetransformedfromashieldofprotectiontoaninstrumentofterror.43Intheirdistress,manyunprotectedandabandonedGermanJews,lefttothe

mercyoftheattackers,turnedtotheoneauthoritythatappearedtoretainatleastasemblanceofinfluenceinthefaceoftheall-pervasivedominationoftheNationalSocialists—theDNVP.Thiswasaproblematicchoice,sincethepartyitselfhadapasttingedwithantiSemitism.

ConservativesandAntiSemitismDuringtheGermanEmpire,theGermanConservativeParty(manyofwhosesupporterslaterjoinedtheDNVP)hadentertainedclosetiestotheChristianSocialPartyoftheanti-SemiticCourtChaplainAdolfStoeckerinhopesofgainingnewclassesofvotersandcreatingamassbaseintheurbanlowermiddleclasses.44AttheheightoftheChristianSocialParty'ssuccessintheearly1890s,antiSemitismevenfounditswayintothenewConservativePartyprogram,theso-called“TivoliProgram”of1892.Againsttheoppositionofinfluentialconservativecircles,theTivoliProgramrailedagainstthe“…aggressivelypushy,demoralizingandsubversiveJewishinfluenceonthelifeofourpeople.”45In1875,theConservativeParty'smainpressorgan,theKreuzzeitung,aimedatsettlingscoreswithBismarck'sliberalpoliciesofthe1870sintheso-called“ÄraArtikel,”anddenouncedthepoliciesoftheReichasJudenpolitikandthe“liberalismofJewish-ledbankers.”46AfterStoecker'sforcedresignationfromtheGermanConservativePartyin1896andthedeclineoftheChristianSocialParty,theAgrarianLeagueassumedthetwintasksofdevelopingamassbaseandmobilizingvotersfortheConservativeParty.Anti-Semiticrhetoricandideologyplayedasignificantroleinthisendeavor.47Ontheotherhand,itwasclearthatConservativePartydignitarieswereopposedtoanykindofrabble-rousingantiSemitism,thepopulist-revolutionaryelementsofwhichthreatenedtheirownposition.Stoecker'sfollowinghad,inanycase,beenfartoo“leftist”forconservativeEastElbianlandowners,especiallysincetheyfearedthatthesocialpolicyeffortsoftheChristianSocialpartymightcometoincludetheirownagriculturallaborers,anundertakingthatcouldprovequitecostly.48RadicalantiSemites,suchasthe“Hessianpeasantking”OttoBöckelorHermannAhlwardt,conductedtheirelectioncampaignswithsloganssuchas“AgainstJunkersandJews.”49This“radicalpopulist-democraticantiSemitism,”asNipperdeycallsit,withitssocialrevolutionary,egalitarian,andanti-elitistelementsandinvectivesagainst“Junkers,parsons,andJews,”wasdeeplysuspecttoConservatives.Asstaunchsupportersoflawandorder,theyabhorredthelawless,plebian,revolutionaryelementsofradicalantiSemitism,whichtheyconsidereddistastefulandpotentiallydangerous.TheConservativePartysanctionedantiSemitismasatoolofelectoralcampaigningbutopposeditasaninstrumentofdangeroussocialagitation.50Inshort:iftheConservativePartyopposedantiSemitism,itwasbecauseithadthepotentialtodisruptsocialorder,upsetthestatusquoofsocialorganization,andencouragepopulistfeelingsto

overtaketherationalfunctioningofsocialandpoliticalinstitutions.ThereisnoevidenceofanyconcernbytheConservativePartythatantiSemitismwaswronginitself—itsoppositiontoantiSemitismwasinstrumentalandnotbasedonmoralconsiderations.Fromitsinception,theDNVP,heirtotheconservativepartiesoftheEmpire

andvariousanti-Semiticsplintergroups,wasequallytaintedwiththebrushofantiSemitism.Initially,conciliatorytonesprevailedintheDNVP's“AppealtoReason”of27December1918:“Wedemandrespectandconsiderationforeverykindofreligiousfeeling,institution,andcommunity.”51By1920,whentheDNVPpublisheditsGrundsätze(principles),thishadchangedradically.Nowthereistalkofthestruggle“…againstanysubversive,un-Germanspirit,whetheritemanatesfromJewishorothercircles.WeemphaticallyopposetheincreasinglydisastrouspredominanceofJudaismingovernmentandpubliclife,whichhascometotheforesincetherevolution.”52Eventhoughtheextremeanti-SemiticwingwaspushedoutoftheDNVPatitsGörlitzpartyCongressinOctober1922,theparty'santiSemitismremainedinplaceduringthelifeoftheRepublic.53Atthesametime,itwascontinuallyinfluencedbycountervailingtraditions.ManyconservativeswererootedintheAltpreußentum,oldPrussianvalues,suchasthe“suumcuique”ofFrederickII(hisreligiouspoliciesthatwererelativelyfreeofprejudice),54andthesalonsofHenrietteHertzandRahelvonVarnhagenthatwerecentersandmeetingpointsofBerlinsociety.55Themostimportantthreadoftraditionalcontinuityinconservativementalitywasthe“lawandorder”principlethatoccupiedprideofplace.DuringtheEmpire,thePrussianstateapparatus,pervadedbyconservativevaluesandpolicyguidelines(anditselfnotfreefromanti-Semiticprejudices)hadonseveraloccasionstakenactiontosuppressanti-Semiticviolenceandusedthepoliceandmilitarytomaintainlawandorder.56WiththeNazitakeoveron30January,thesetraditions(atleastinthepublicimageputforthbytheDNVP)wereautomaticallygivengreatweight.AsguardiansandrepresentativesoftheState,asitsstandard-bearersintheupperechelonsofthebureaucracyandinpartsofthepropertiedbourgeoisieand,byextension,asrepresentativesoftheupperclassesperse,theconservativeswereunderanimplicitobligationtoopposeactivelytheviolentattacksofSAhordesandanti-Semiticboycotts.SinceconservativesconsideredthemselveskeepersandtrusteesoftheState,theyowedittotheiridentityandself-imagetomaintainatleastasemblanceoflegalityandtheruleoflaw.OnecouldhardlytakeprideinastateinwhichSAthugscontrolledthestreets,inwhichrandomviolencereigned,andwherevestedrightsweretrampledoverwithabandon.Woulditbeworthrepresentingastateorbeinginvolvedinits

administrationandgovernmentinwhichsuchbehaviorwasthenorm?Theraisond'êtreandsheerself-preservationofconservativesthusforcedtheobligationuponthemtoopposeopenlyanti-Semiticviolenceandtakeapublicstanceagainstit.Iftheyfailedinthis,theywouldforfeittheirself-proclaimedroleasguardiansofthestate,especiallysincethevastmajorityofGermanJewswere,aboveall,Germans,whosefamilieshadlivedinGermanyforgenerationsandwhotrustedintherestraininginfluenceoftheconservativeStateapparatustoprotectthemfromNaziviolence.57TheconductoftheGermanNationalPeople'sPartyinpower,asRegierungspartei,towardanti-SemitictransgressionsandthosewhosoughtprotectionfromNaziviolencewas,therefore,animportantlitmustestoftheidentityofthewholeparty,leadersandmembersalike.Theconservatives'dilemmaduringtheiruneasyalliancewiththeNazisfirst

becamemanifestintheirrelationshipwithnational-mindedGermanJews,manyofwhomhadriskedtheirlivesforGermanyintheFirstWorldWar,58andfoundthemselvesfacinganexternally-imposedidentitycrisisafter30January1933.InAugust1914,theoverwhelmingmajorityofGermanJewshaddemonstratedhowmuchtheyconsideredthemselvespartoftheGermannation.AmongamajorityofGermanJews,“…enthusiasticexpressionsofloyaltyandofobligationtofulfillone'sdutyasaGerman”weretherule,wherebyitwassignificantthatthedifferentpoliticalandreligiousgroupsofGermanJewsfocusedontheRussianEmpireastheir“natural”enemy.59Ofthe615,000GermanJewsin1910,over10,000volunteered,over100,000servedinthearmyandofthese,12,000werekilledinaction.60Thesenumberscorrespondtotherelativepercentageofthenon-JewishGermanpopulation61servinginthearmyandkilledinaction.ThisissurprisinggiventhefactthatGermanJewswereexcludedfromtheofficercorpsand(after1885)wereevenpreventedfrombecomingreserveofficers.62Thus,bydintofprejudiceandcustom,GermanJewswereexcludedfromparticipatinginthemilitaryestablishmentandoftenwereforcedtoserveinpositionsnotcommensuratewiththeleveloftheirtrainingorskill.Allthemoreemphasis,then,mustbeplacedontheirpatrioticcontribution.Inthefirstmonthsofthewar,thepatrioticspiritofGermanJews,theirwillingnesstosacrificethemselves,andtheatmosphereofBurgfriedenhadthedesiredeffect:discriminatorymeasureswereeasedandJewswerepromotedtoofficerranks.63Evendyed-in-the-woolantiSemites,suchasHoustonStewartChamberlain,hadwordsofpraiseforthewarcontributionofGermanJews:“…theyperformtheirdutyasGermansagainsttheenemyinthefieldofbattleorathome.”64AccordingtoareportoftheAssociationfortheDefenseagainstantiSemitismofNovember1915,fivethousandJewishGermansoldiershad

alreadybeenawardedtheIronCrossand650othershadbeenaccordedcomparabledecorations.65

NationaleJudenNational-mindedGermanJews,especiallythosewhohadactivelyfoughtontheGermanside,foundthemselvesinadifficultpositiononcetheNaziswereinpower.Lessthanfifteenyearsbefore,theyhadfoughtanddiedforGermany.Nowtheywereunwantedandostracized,labeledparasites,enemiesoftheGermanpeople,andadangertotheverycountrytheyhadservedalltheirlivesandwhosevaluesandguidingprincipleshadbecometheirown.AnopenletterpublishedattheendofMarch1933intheDeutscheAllgemeineZeitungundertheheadline“ProfessionsofaJewishFrontlineSoldier”characterizedtheinherentplightinwhichtheyfoundthemselvesin1933:66“Foralmostfour-and-a-halfyears,Iwasasoldieratthefront,IwasfightinginFlandersandFrance…andlostmyonlybrotherontheWesternFront.WhentodayIhearandreadthatJewsasawholearebeingcondemnedasun-German,Iconsiderthatthemostbitterofinjustices.ThenIgetoutmymilitarypapersandgooverthelargenumberofcampaignsandbattlesinwhichIhavetakenpartandfindtheassessments“verygood”and“excellent.”ThegoodoldIronCrossliesthereaswell….MustIlivefromnowonasasecond-ratecitizenintheHeimatofmyparentsandforefathers,forwhomIhavefoughtandsufferedliketheothers?ShouldIbetornfromtheworldofmyfriendssimplybecauseIamofJewishorigin?”67Thisopenletterreflectedthedilemmaoftensofthousandsofpeopleand,astheDNVPrecordsshow,becameatopicofintensedebateamongconservativeGermanJews.Inthesediscussionsopinionswerevoicedwhich,onlymonthslater,couldeithernolongerbeairedorwouldberenderedobsoletebytherapid,andseeminglyinexorable,consolidationofpowerbytheNazis.Inthiscontext,GerhardLissa,aJewishbusinessmanfromBerlin-Zehlendorf,

reportedaboutameetingofformerfrontlinesoldiers,“organizedbyanumberofex-servicemen'sleagues,suchastheStahlhelm,theSA,theKyffhäuserBund,andtheReichsbundjüdischerFrontsoldaten.”68Inthecourseofthismeeting,“manyshamefulthingsoccurred.Jewish[soldiers]crippledandblindedinthewarwereinsultedandabusedbyyoungrascals,whohadneverheardthewhistleofabullet.”69Lissa'sownpersonalandfinancialsituationappearedequallyhopeless.Lissawrote:“Afortuneaccumulatedbygrandfathersthroughdoggedworkwascompletelyinvestedinwarbondsandtherebydissipatedintothinair,…myunclesvoluntarilyparticipatedinthewarof1870,and…bothmyfamilyandIhaveforalongtimebeenspirituallyassimilatedintotheTeutonicworld.”Itisthushardlysurprisingthatwhenspeakingaboutit,hewasseizedby

“boundlessrageovertheinjustice”bywhich“everyJewisthrownintoapotwithswindlers,rogues,andtraitorstotheFatherland.”70National-mindedJews(whoincludednotonlytherelativelyfewconservative

andmostliberalGermanJews,butalsothemajorityofthelargenumberofwarveterans)werepsychologicallymostaffectedbytheprovocationsandboycotts,sincetheysharedfundamentalpoliticalprinciples,standardsofbehavior,andvalueswithnon-JewishGermans.71Allofthephysicalandfinancialsacrifices—grandchildren,sons,fathers,andsiblingskilledintheGreatWar,thefortunespainstakinglyamassedandlostthroughwarandinflation—hadnowbecomemeaninglessandfutile.Inadditiontopersonalpredicaments,impendingfinancialruinthreatenedLissa'sveryexistence,since“recentlypaymentsofbillshavebeenrefusedunderthejustificationthatonenolongerhastopayJewsbecauseanewdispensationofjusticewillsoonbeinplaceinGermany.”72Theentireworldorderhadbeenrenderedincomprehensible,andhelpwasnowhereinsight.Fromforeigncountries,suchasBritainandtheUSA,Germany'sformerWorldWarIadversaries,national-mindedJewsexpectedandwantednohelp.Lissa'sattitudetowardforeignerswascharacterizedbyapprehensionanddistrust:“Foreignvoicesareanuisanceandonlycreatemischief.HereweseethesameelementsatworkthatleveledinflammatorypropagandaandvilifiedGermansasbarbariansduringthewar.”73HowdidtheGermanconservativeparty,theleadershipandmembersofthe

DNVP,behavetowardnational-mindedJews?CouldtheseGermanJews,whohadservedinthewarandenduredsacrificesandprivationsforGermany,countonthehelpoftheDNVP(which,afterall,considereditselfthepartyofallnational-mindedGermans)?TheinternalconfidentialcorrespondenceoftheDNVPdisclosesthattherewasarangeofreactions.First,directrejection:militaryservice,pastsacrifices,evenanimpeccablenationalpedigreematteredlesswhenitcametoGermanswhowereJewish.ThepartyleadershipwasespeciallyadamantinrefusingtoaccommodateGermanJews.AcaseinpointisthatofDr.Vogel.TheDNVPFrankfurtamMaindistrictassociationwarmlyrecommendedVogel'sadmissioninalettertotheparty'sBerlinheadoffice,withcharacteristicwording:“HewasJewish;twoyearsago[he]wasbaptizedasaProtestant.74Accordingtothetestimonyofhisparson[hehas]beenabsolutelyun-JewishandalwaysorientedtowardtheRight….VogelhaslosthisfortuneintheInflationandisgenerallyconsideredtobeapoor,decent,anduprightman.”TherejectionofDr.Vogel'sapplicationfromBerlinwas,however,terseandpointed.Nowordswerewastedonhischaracter.75Evenamanwithwhatwereconsideredatthetimetobeimpeccablenationalcredentials,thejuristDr.Erich

Gisbert,wasdeemedworthyofonlyashort,veryformalacknowledgementwhenhesoughthelpinamatterthatconcernedhisveryexistence.Gisbert,aformermemberoftheDNVP,asignatoryoftheHugenberg-sponsored“People'sRebellionagainsttheYoungPlan,”relatedtoPrussiangeneralsthroughhismotherand,baptizedandconfirmedintheProtestantchurch,hadbeenforcedtoresignfromhispostintheChamberofCommerceandIndustryinBerlin.76Now,inordertofacilitatehisreinstatement,herequestedfromtheDNVPheadofficeconfirmationofhismembershipandparticipationintheanti-YoungPlanreferendumcampaign.77Hewas,however,onlypithilyandformallyreferredtohisformerDNVPLandandcountyassociations.78Notablylackingwereanywordsofsympathyorregret.Theentirepoliticalclimateofthewinterandspringof1933waspoisonedby

suspicionandmutualrecrimination.AcharacteristicexampleisthecaseofHeinrichandHansWassermeyer.ThechairmanoftheDNVPMittelrheinLandAssociation,JustizratHeinrichWassermeyer,79fearedthathisson,workinginAltonanearHamburg,mightrunintotroublewiththeNazis.WassermeyerthereforerequestedthattheDNVPchairmaninAltonalookafterhissonHans.80ItistellingthatthefatherfounditnecessaryinhisrequesttostresstheGermanNationalleaningsofhissonandtopointoutthathehadbeenafrontlinesoldierinthewarandhadlaterparticipatedinthestruggleagainstthecommunists.81Whentheson,Dr.HansWassermeyer,presentedhimselfattheDNVPAltonadistrictofficetoapplyforadmissionintotheparty,thechairmanoftheAltonaDNVPofficeexperiencedanunpleasantsurprise:“WewereastoundedtoseebyhisappearancethatweweredealingwithaJew;aftermakinginquirieswelearnedthathiswifewasalsofromawell-knownHamburgJewishfamily.”82Nowfullofmistrust,thechairmanoftheAltonaDNVPrequestedinformationfromBerlinaboutpèreWassermeyer,83“especiallywhetherheisaJewandassuchleaderofapartyorganization.”YettheconcernsoftheAltonachairmanwereprecipitate.Twodayslater,theDNVPMittelrheinLandAssociationreportedthatDr.HeinrichWassermeyerwas“notJewish.”84Rather,theWassermeyerfamilywas“anoldestablishedChristianBonnfamily.Dr.HansWassermeyer'smotherisalsodescendedfromanestablishedChristianfamily.ThesuppositionsconcerningtheJewishoriginsofDr.Wassermeyerarethusentirelyerroneous.”85Thiscaseshowedclearlythatafter30JanuaryeveryGermanwassubjecttoall-pervadingsuspicion.Theentiresociety,even“national”constituencies,includingthechairmanofaDNVPLandAssociation,wasaffected.Itsubsequentlytranspiredthatnoconfidentialitywasaccordedto

theinternalbackgroundcheckontheWassermeyerfamily,sothatthepublicationofthefactthattheson'swifewasJewishcastaspersionsontheentirefamily.86InanalyzingthemultitudeofreactionstoJewishapplicationsforadmissionto

theDNVP,anti-Semiticattacks,theboycottofJewishshopson1April1933,violenceagainstJews,dismissals,generaldiscrimination,anddiscriminatorylocallegislation,twobroadtypesofresponsesemerge:(1)isolatedprotestsfromindividualDNVPmembersagainstanti-Semiticmeasures(oftenintheformofletterstothepartyleadership)andevenattemptstolendsuccor,ontheonehand;and(2)disapprobation,rejection,resentment,prejudice,andapronouncedanti-Semiticpredisposition,ontheother.

Protest,Regret,andEffortstoHelpGermanNationals,whohadkeptclosecompanywithGermanJewsformanyyears,oftenperceivedthesweepingdiscriminationasextremelyunjust.VoicesofprotestwereraisedinparticularinFrankfurtamMain,87whereGermanJewshadbeenfirmlyensconcedforgenerations,prospered,andoftenacquiredareputationaspublicbenefactors.InFrankfurt,asinmostotherGermancities,thepercentageoftheJewishpopulationhadbeendecliningslightlysince1900.By1933,4.7percentofthe555,857inhabitantswereJewish,88givingFrankfurtthehighestpercentageofJewishinhabitantsofanyGermancity,wellaheadofBerlin(3.8percent)andBreslau(3.2percent).89Onenoteworthyexampleofprotestagainstanti-JewishdiscriminationwasanopenlettertoHugenbergabouttheboycottof1AprilwrittenbythelongtimeDNVPmemberAdeleKappusthatwasforwardedfromtheDNVPFrankfurtofficetoBerlin.90Itwouldbe“imprudentandunworthyofGermany,”accordingtoKappus,“tostarttreatingthecentury-longestablishedJewishpeopleaspariahs,peoplewhofeelGermanandwhohaveperformedvaluedservicestotheirFatherlandandChristiancompatriotsforhundredsofyears.”91InFrankfurt“theChristianandJewisheconomiesaresointerconnected”thatonecouldnotdamageonepartwithoutinjuringtheother.92Forthepastthirty-twoyears,sheherselfhadbeenanemployeeofalargeJewish-ownedantiquarianandexportbookdealershipthathadbeeninexistencefor148yearsandwhoseproprietors(who,duringtheFirstWorldWar,hadbeenstationedatthefrontforfouryears)hadtreatedherovertheyearswith“probity,generosity,andgoodwill.”93Nowthebusinessfacedbankruptcyandsheandhercolleagueshadreceivedtheirnotices.Kappusconcludedherletterinanundertoneofominousforeboding:“Ifthingscontinue

inthisvein,manywhohaveoncewholeheartedlywelcomedthenationalrevolutionwillturntheirbacksonitinanger.Makenomistakeaboutthemoodofthemasses,itispervadedbydisillusionmentandbitterness.”94TheresponsefromBerlincontainedmerelythegrudgingadmissionthat“themeasureshadbeenextraordinarilyharsh,andhadthustriggeredlegitimateresentment,”95alongwithstereotypical,apologeticformulasstressingthattheDNVPwasnotresponsiblefortheboycott.96Lacking,perhapsdeliberately,wereanywordsofsympathyorregretfortheblatantinjusticesufferedbysomanynational-mindedJews.ThereareanumberofexplanationsforthisextraordinarilytepidresponsefromtheDNVPleadershipinBerlin,rangingfromgenuineindifferenceandlackofempathytofearofappearingtoo“pro-Jewish”anduncertaintyastowhichpolicylinewouldemergetriumphant.Kappus'sletterhighlightedthetensionintheDNVP'sreactiontoanti-Semitictransgressions:indignantoppositioninducedbymoralorpatrioticconcernsvoicedbyDNVPmembersandlocalorganizations,ontheonehand,andtacitoroutrightsupportusedtofurthertheDNVPheadoffice'slargescalepoliticalstrategy,ontheother.ThemosturgentandcomprehensivechargesleveledagainsttheNaziterror

alsocamefromFrankfurt,straightfromtheofficeofthelocalDNVPdistrictassociation(writtenonDNVPletterhead)bytheVice-PresidentofFrankfurt'sOberlandesgericht(ProvincialHighCourtandCourtofAppeal).97Accordingtotheauthorofthecomplaint,Frankfurtwas“underthethumboftheNSDAPleadership,repressedmorebrutallythanduringthe1918revolution.Fearandpanichavegainedaholdoverallpublicandfamilylife,”98andRolandFreisler,MinisterialdirektorinthePrussianMinistryofJusticeinMarch1933,hadlashedout“inapublicharangueagainstJews,transmittedoverloudspeaker,whichmightresultinapogrombreakingoutanydaynow.”99TheVice-PresidentoftheOberlandesgerichtplainlyspelledoutthedebtofgratitudethatFrankfurt,inhisopinion,oweditsJewishpopulation:“ThemajorityoflocalJewshavebeenresidentsofFrankfurtamMainoritssurroundingsforcenturies.Amongthemarethecity'sgreatestpublicbenefactors,peopleresponsibleforalmostallpubliccharitywork.AlargenumberofJewshaveservedatthefrontorlosttheirsonsinthewar.Frankfurt'smagnificentculturalfacilitieswouldneverhavecomeintobeingwithoutJewishdonations.ThespiritthatprevailsintheseoldJewishfamiliesmust,forthemostpart,beconsideredasgenuinelyconservative.”100Unfortunately,hehadbeenunabletopreventterrorfrommakingitswayevenintotheOberlandesgericht.TheJewishjudges,amongwhomwere“themostcompetentmembersoftheLawCourts,”hadbeenforciblysuspended,and“theterroragainstJewishlawyers”wassodistressingthatthey“werevirtuallydriven

tosuicide.”101Theletterfurthermentions“theall-pervasiveterrorinpubliclife”102andthecriminalactscommittedwithimpunitybytheSA,which“thepolicenotonlytoleratebutevencountenanceandencourage.”103Thirty-fiveJewishbusinessmenhadbeenledwiththeirhandsheldhigh“throughthebusieststreetsofthecity”and“childrenofJewishfamilies,whohadlongceasedtobelongtotheworldofJudaismandhadbeenraisedasChristians,havebeenchasedoutoftheschools.”104Thesegoings-onwereinjurioustothereputationoftheDNVP,anditwashightimetoputastoptothem:“Desperationprevailsthroughoutthebourgeoisieofthecitytothepointthatitwillbedetrimentaltothedignityofourpartyifitdoesnotremedythesituationasquicklyaspossible.”105Thejudiciarynolongerdared“tocountertheterror”sinceitsmembershadceasedtobelieveintheautonomyofthejudicialbranch.TherewasstillsomehopethattheGermanNationalmembersoftheCabinetwouldsucceedinmakingsurethattheconstitutionallyguaranteedfoundationsoftheRechtsstaat“werenotencroachedupon,atleastforthetimebeing.”106Yet,onehadtoconcedethat“duetothecompletesilenceoftheseCabinetmembers…confidenceintheirinfluencewaswaningwitheachpassingday.”107ThisletteroftheVice-PresidentoftheFrankfurtProvincialHighCourtat

leastgivesventtoindignationoverNationalSocialistviolence,rageovercrimesperpetratedagainstFrankfurt'sJews,shameovertheimpotence,haplessness,andinactivityofhisownparty,anddismayattheerosionoftheRechtsstaat.Atthesametime,theauthorhadtheforebodingthatworsewasstilltocome:“EvenourFrankfurterPostdidnotriskpublishingmyexceedinglymoderatearticle,‘BacktoLawandOrder,’becausethepublisherfearedthattheSAmightsmashhisprintingplanttopieces.IwasadvisedbyfriendsnottosignmynametothisarticleasotherwiseImightbethreatenedwithprotectivecustody.”108TheFrankfurtjudge'slettermakestwothingsclear:(1)Thenumberandscaleofinfringementsandviolentactsinthewinterandspringof1933wereenormous;and(2)attacksandcrimesweresowellknown,occurringastheydidrightundereveryone'snoses,thatonehadtolookawaydeliberatelyinordernottoseethem.DNVPpartyofficesinparticularwerealertedtomanyofthesetransgressionssinceitwasnaturallyexpectedthattheNazis'conservativealliancepartnerstillwouldbeinapositiontointervene.Evenwhenthedeterminationandreadinesstohelpexisted(whichwasnotofteninthecaseofmostGermanNationals),theactualabilitytohelpwasfrequentlylimited.IftheGermanNationalVice-PresidentofanOberlandesgerichtwascurtailedinhiscapacitytointercede,howmuchmorehelplessmustothershavefelt.Therecordsthusindicatefewcasesofactivehelp.Notonlywasitdifficultto

lendsuccor—giventheclimateoffearandintimidationandthecorrespondingthreattooneselfandone'sfamily—butalsothewillandthereadinesstoofferassistancewasoftenlacking.Hugenberg,forexample,who(accordingtohisAmericanbiographer)cannotbeaccusedofbeingadyed-in-the-woolanti-Semite,109surroundedhimselfwiththeauraofabusyMinister,whosevitalministerialactivitiesdeterminedthehealthandwell-beingoftheGermaneconomy.SinceheevenneglectedhisdutiesaschairmanoftheDNVPtothepointthathisdeputy,FriedrichvonWinterfeld,hadtodohiswork,Hugenberghadaplausibleexcusefornothavingthetimetotackleother“problems.”110Instead,itwasPapen'sofficeintheViceChancellorytowhichmost

complaintsweredirected.EspeciallysincePapenhadresignedhispositionasReichskommissarforPrussiatomakewayforGöringinthefirsthalfofApril1933,hewasfreetotakeonotherresponsibilities.PapenlentactivesupportinthecaseofthehistorianLudwigDehio,ArchivistattheStateArchivesinBerlin-Dahlemwho,asaresultoftheLawontheRestorationofaProfessionalCivilServiceof7April,wasindangeroflosinghispost.111Afaultlessnationalpedigreeandaprominentname—DehiowasthesonofthefamousarthistorianGeorgDehio—workedtohisadvantage.112Dehioalsohadthegoodfortunetohavewell-connected,conservativefriendswhointercededonhisbehalf.Oneofthem,Dr.Wedepohl,wrotealonglettertoPapen,inwhichhepraisedDehio'snationalistbackground.113HehadmetDehioduringthewarasaninfantryofficer;knewthatasaboy,DehiohadalreadybeenreceivedinthehouseofPauldeLagarde(awellknownanti-Semite),114andthatDehio'sfatherhadbeen“foundworthyofthehighesthonorsoftheGermanReich.”InDehio'scaseatleast,theringofhisfamilynameandthepatrioticsignificanceofhisfather'sworkpromptedPapentointervene.AtWedepohl'ssuggestion,PapenturnedtoHindenburg'sStaatssekretärOttoMeissnerwiththerequestthatMeissnerapproachHindenburg,askinghimtousehisinfluenceonDehio'sbehalf.115Meissnerpromptlyreplied(inanunusuallyobligingtone)thathehadforwardedDehio'scasewithHindenburg'sspecialrecommendationtothePrussianMinisterofCulture,requesting“favorablereconsideration”ofthecase.Inhiscorrespondenceaboutthematter,MeissneremphasizedthatHindenburghadawardedDehio'sfathertheAdlerschildin1930“becauseofthepatrioticsignificanceofhiscreativework.”116Meissner'sinterventionhadsomeimpact:duringtheThirdReich,Dehiowasnolongerallowedtopublishhiswork,butatleasthewas“tolerated”asanarchivistintheHohenzollernscheHausarchiv.

RejectionandDisapprobationThecasescitedaboveweretheexceptionratherthantherule.Viewedasawhole,mostGermanNationalswerenotcriticsofNaziattacksorreluctantincriminatorsorpowerlessonlookersseizedbyfuryovertheattackstheywitnessed,orevenhelpersinthecrisis.Ashasbeenshown,awidecross-sectionofthepartyrankandfiledisapprovedofthelawlessnessofexcessesandthebrutalityoftheattacks.Some,likeAdeleKappus,werethemselvesadverselyaffectedbytheboycottandobjectedtothetreatmentoftheirJewishemployers;mostbelievedthatadividinglinehadtobedrawnbetweentheoldestablishedGermanJewsandthosewhohadcometoGermanysincethewar.SomecomplainedabouttheerosionoftheRechtsstaatandrealizedthatasectionofGermany'sbrightestandmosteducatedcitizensstoodindangerofbeingvictimized,drivenout,andpossiblydestroyed.YetthemainstreamconservativereactiontothemultitudeofNaziexcessesduringtheNaziseizureofpowerwascharacterizedlargelybytheresentmentandprejudicethathadtraditionallybeenacomponentoftheDNVP'santi-Semiticorientation.ConservativeshadalwaysconsideredGermanJewsthevanguardofanunwelcomemodernity,underminingtradition,customs,andthegoodoldways.Inadditiontothesetraditionalanti-Jewishmotifs,alreadypresentinGermanconservatismduringtheEmpire,twofurtherelementsfiguredprominentlyatthebeginningoftheThirdReich.First,conservativesdidnotwanttoletthemselvesbeoutdoneonanyissuebroughttotheforeinpubliclife;second,itwasbecomingincreasinglyclearthat,underthechangedconditionsthatprevailedafter30January,leadingDNVPmembersandfunctionariesdaredtoshowtheirtruecolorsandcameoutintotheopenwithvölkischideasthattheyhadlongharbored.ThevariousshadesofantiSemitismanditsdegreesofintensityreflecttheDNVP'sdisparateroots:fromthemoderateliberal-conservativeinfluencesoftheFreeConservativePartyoftheEmpirewhich,insomeways,hadbeencloserpoliticallytotheNationalLiberalsthantotheGermanConservativeParty,allthewaytotheextremelyanti-SemiticelementsoftheformerChristianSocialPartyandtheAssociationofGermanNationalShopAssistants.Thoughtheextremeanti-SemiticwinghadbeenpushedoutofthepartyattheGörlitzpartycongressof1922,individualinstancesofvölkischorientationlivedon,asillustratedbelow.Graphicexamplesoftheanti-Semiticorientationofpartyadministratorsand

bureaucratscanbefoundintheirattitudetowardtheboycottof1April1933.WhiletheNSDAPwaschieflyresponsibleforitsorganization,manylocalandregionalDNVPassociationsparticipatedintheboycott(incontrasttostatements

ofthepartyheadofficeinBerlin,which,asinitscorrespondencewithAdeleKappus,hadoftenflatlydeniedanyparticipationoftheDNVP).AseriesofdocumentsclearlyindicatesthatinstructionstojoinintheboycottweredistributedfromtheheadofficeinBerlin.ThePosen-WestpreußenLandAssociation,forexample,reportedtoBerlinon1April1933:“TelephonedinstructionstogettheKampfringreadyforthepropagandacampaignurgingthat‘GermansbuyonlyGermangoods’havebeenexecutedwithoutdelay.”117On28MarchtheDNVPheadofficehadalreadysentouttelegramstotwenty-fiveLandAssociations:“Arrangeprocessionsassoonaspossiblewithplacardssaying‘GermansbuyonlyGermangoodsandGermansbuyonlyfromGermans’andimmediatelysubmitphotographs.”118Transmissiondidnotalwaysproceedwithoutahitch.Inoneinstance,theDNVPLandesgeschäftsführerofBadenanxiouslycabledtoBerlinon1April:“Weneverreceivedanypropagandamaterialsagainstforeignmerchandise.”119TheinstructionsoftheheadofficetotheLandAssociationswerepassedontotheBezirksgruppen(districtgroups)which,inturn,senttheirperformancereportsaboutorganizedprocessionson1AprilbacktoBerlin.120Forthemostpart,theentireDNVP,fromtheleadershipinBerlin(Bundesvorstand)downtotheBezirksgruppenstrenuouslyendeavoredtoleaveitsmarkontheboycottof1April.Whenpartyorganizationsdidexcludethemselvesfromaction,theirreasonsfordoingsohadlittletodowithmoralscruplesorattachmenttohumanitarianprinciples.TheGothaBezirksgruppereported,forexample,thatitwouldnotallowanyplacardstobecarriedthroughthestreets:“TheNazishavealreadydonethatfordaysandifweweretoenterthearenanow,itwouldonlylooklikeapaleimitation,andwouldhaveabsolutelynoeffect.”121TheDNVPleadershipbrushedoffanddisregardedappealsbyDNVPmembersuponwhomtheseverityoftheboycottweighedheavily,evenifthevictimswerepatrioticJews.Onseveraloccasionsmemberstookexceptiontotheboycottandconcomitantdiscrimination.ADNVPmemberfromHattingenontheRuhr,forexample,complainedthatalocalJewishdentist,“astronglynational-mindedmanthrough-and-through,”who,duetohisnationalistconvictions“sufferedmuchatthehandsoftheLeft,”hadnowbeendeprivedofhispractice.ThesamemembercomplainedthataJewishfactoryowner,“abenefactorsuchasHattingenanditssurroundingshad,asfarasIknow,neverseenbefore”wasnowdiscriminatedagainstjustlikealltheotherJews.122TheanswerfromtheBerlinheadofficebasicallyrepudiatedthejustificationofthesegrievances,pointingoutthateventhoughnoteveryonewashappywith“theso-calledJudenaktion,”onehadtoconsider“thatweareinthemidstofarevolutionandthatthingsonewouldnotcountenanceinnormaltimes

havenowbecomeunavoidable.”123TheDNVPheadofficeherebyarticulatedapolicythatspoketotheinherentcontradictionintheDNVP'sapproachtowardGermanJews:oneshouldconsiderthatthe“positiononetakesontheJews[is],afterall,afundamentalonethatcannotdependonwhetherornotaparticularJewisadecenthumanbeingornot.”124Inthisparticularcase,thepositionoftheDNVPheadofficeisunequivocal:“ReligiouspointsofviewplaynorolewithregardtothepositiononJudaism;rather,therejectionofJewsissuesfrompoliticalconsiderations.”125Evenmoreanti-Semiticthanthepartyleadershiporbureaucracywasthetype

ofDNVPpartymemberwhoseoppositiontoJewswasbasednotsolelyonconsiderationsofpoliticalexpediencybutonvölkischracialconvictions.Howhighthepercentageofsuchdyed-in-the-woolvölkischantiSemiteswaswithintheDNVPattheendoftheRepublicandthebeginningoftheThirdReichisdifficulttogauge.Butthatthisverytypeofconservativeexistedisbeyondquestion.Aprimeexampleofonesuchextremenationalistandvölkisch-thinkingGermanNationalwastheWürttembergphysicianBubenhöfer,amemberoftheVorstand(executivecommittee)oftheWürttembergDNVP,wellacquaintedwithVice-ChancellorPapen,and(ashewroteabouthimselfinalettertoPapen)a“manknownforhisnationalistconvictionsinthewholeLandofWürttemberg.”126AlongletterBubenhöferwrotetoPapenon11April1933,accompaniedbyapoliticaldiscourseinwhichBubenhöferexpoundeduponhispoliticalideas,throwslightontheWeltanschauungofconservativevölkischantiSemites.127AsBubenhöferexplained,in1932hehadencouragedtheleadershipoftheWürttembergDNVPtomergetheirpartywiththeNazis,mainlyinordertoreinvigoratethenon-SocialistwingoftheNSDAPandthereby,asBubenhöferexpected,Hitler'spositionintheparty.BubenhöferknewhimselftobecompletelyinaccordwithHitler'spolicies;therewasnosignificantdifference“betweenhis[i.e.,Hitler's]resolutionofthesocialquestionandthatoftheGermanNationals….”128AstrongGermanNationalwingwithintheNaziPartywouldreinforcethe“Christianconservative”worldviewwithintheNSDAP.129AnindependentDNVPhad,inanycase,lostitsjustification.Bubenhöferwaxesenthusiasticaboutthe“dazzlinglydrasticmeasuressince5March,”andseeshimselfcompletelyinaccord“withsomanypointsoftheNSDAP.”130Byandlarge,however,“therevolution[hadbeen]…toobloodless,”131andtoolenienton“elementsofanalienrace,”132whichwasBubenhöfer'swayofreferringtothe“intellectualleadersofsocialism.”Theseleaders“mustbekilledonawidescale.Onlywhenthispoisoniseliminatedwill

weagainbeabletogetatthesouloftheGermanworker.”133ToBubenhöferitseemedthatthe“boycottagainstJudaismhasbeenwhollyinadequate,”sincehedidnotbelieve“thatarevolutionachievesitsendswithoutdeliberateterror.”134Germanswerefartoogood-naturedtotakevigorousaction,whereastheterroroftheRussianrevolutionhadpetrifiedthewholeworld:“And,whenallissaidanddone,who,afterall,werethefathersoftheRussianrevolution?Jews.IdonotsaythatweshouldimitatetheseJewishmethods,butwemust,throughcorrespondinglytoughconcertedactionagainstJewsinGermanyandtheirsupremacyinallfields,imbuetheirbloodrelationsthroughouttheworldwithaholyfear,otherwisetheywon'tbesilenced.WemustuseGermanJewsashostagesagainstJewishfinancialpower.Thiskindoftalktheywillunderstand.”135InthisandotherpointsBubenhöfer'spoliticalviewswereinnowaydifferentfromthoseofevenradicalNationalSocialists.TheprincipaldistinctionbetweenNationalSocialismandtheconservativeanti-SemiticphysicianBubenhöferliesparadoxicallyinthefactthatBubenhöferdisapprovedofpublichealthcareandothersocialpolicies.136Bubenhöfer'sviewsmaynothavebeenparticularlyexceptional;however,GermanNationalsoftheBubenhöferorientationwerecertainlynottypical.Insofarastheydidexist,theywerefoundmainlyintheBildungsbürgertumandamongtheEastElbianaristocracy.137

TheGermanNationalPredicamentInthefirstmonthsaftertheNaziseizureofpower,GermanNationalswereconcernedthattheymightberegardedastoojudenfreundlich(“Jew-friendly”)sincetheyfearedmakingtheDNVPunpopularwiththeirlargercoalitionpartner.IntheeyesofmostNazis,GermanNationalshadonlyreluctantlysupportedboycottmeasuresandhadbeen,allinall,toohalfheartedwhenitcametoanti-Semiticmeasures.Thisanxietyofbeingconsidered“lukewarm”wasmirroredinaninquirybytheGermanNationalAltenburgerLandes-ZeitungtotheDNVPheadoffice:“OneofourreadersdiscussedantiSemitismwithaNazi,whoaccusedGermanNationalsofprotectingJews,since40–50%ofthejournalistsinHugenberg'sScherlverlag[publishinghouse]areJewish.”138TheheadofficehastenedtoassuretheAltenburgerLandes-Zeitungthatamongtheapproximately100journaliststherewere“now,atmost,fourwhowouldfitthisdescription.”139IntheGermanNationalcamp,onewasobviouslyeagertoallaythesuspicionthatHugenbergemployedasignificantnumberofJewishjournalistsinhispublishinghouse.Ontheotherhand,theexistingantiSemitismofmoderateGermanNationalswasofadifferentnaturethanthatoftheNationalSocialists.TheNazistookprideintheirconspicuousantiSemitism,foritindicatedtheextenttowhichindividualNazipartymemberswerecommittedtothemovement.140Theconservatives,whilecertainlynotfreeofanti-Semiticprejudicesthemselves,consideredeachindividualcasecarefullyand,ifpossible,triedtohidebehindtheprovisionofexistinglawsandproceedaccordingly.Theroundaboutandtortuoustacticsemployedtoexcludehalf-JewsfromadmittanceintotheDNVPtestifiedtothefactthateventheDNVPleadershipfeltacertainembarrassmentaboutrejectingthem.GermanNationalcountyanddistrictboards,familiarwithparticularlocalcircumstancesandimpressedbytheimpeccablenational“credentials”ofJewish(orpartlyJewish)applicants,andbytheirgoodnameandpublicdonations,were,asarule,morereceptivetoadmittingapplicantsthantheDNVPheadofficeinBerlin.TheleadershipinBerlinwasdesperatelyatpainstoshowthatthepartycouldnotbeaccusedofbeingjudenfreundlichandwasthereforemoreinclinedtobedisapprovingandrejectapplicationsofGermanJews.Thecountyanddistrictboards,ontheotherhand,consideredeachindividualcasewithcare.Astrictlydefinedpolicypersedidnotexist.Thelateracasecameforward,thegreaterthechanceofrefusal.Whatwasstillsubjecttoalongdebateinthewinterof1933waslikelytobethrownoutwithoutmuchadoinAprilorMay.Thisrapidspreadofanti-Semitic

sentimentonthepartoftheDNVPleadershipreflectsthespeedofHitler'ssuccessfulconsolidationofpowerandtheDNVP'sacknowledgementofthatfact.Thepartyleadershipobviouslyfeltithadtojointhefrayorsufferthepotentiallydebilitatingpoliticalconsequences.Buttherewereexceptionseventothisruleofthumb.Inthewinterof1933,anycasethatappearedambiguouswasstilldisputedatlengthandproducedanextensivecorrespondence,inwhichcontradictoryopinionsclashed.Onecaseinparticular,thatofthepracticingphysicianDr.Behrendfrom

Pomerania,illustrateshowdeeplyantiSemitismwasrootedintheDNVPandhowmuchthepartymembershipwastornoverthisissue.InFebruaryandMarch1933theBehrendcasedividedtheentirePomeraniaLandAssociation,theparty'slargestandmostinfluentialregionalorganizationsincetheinceptionoftheDNVP.141Inmid-February1933aprominentmemberoftheDNVPKolbergOrtsgruppewrotealetterrequestingmediationfromtheLandAssociationintheprovincialcapitalofStettininamatterregardingDr.Behrend,whowascharacterizedas“thesonofaJewishfatherandaChristianmother.ThefatherconvertedtoChristianityuponhismarriage.”142AtthebehestofKolberg'slocalDNVPleader,Dr.Behrendandhisnon-Jewishwifehadjoinedtheparty.Thelettercontinued:“BehrenddidhisdutyinthewarandoccupiedapositionofconsiderableprominenceinKolberg,…frequentedthebestsocialcircles,”andpolitically“hadneverstoodoutbefore.”Eventhough“hissoleinherentdefect”consistedinthefact“thatheisthesonofaJewishfatherandthushalfJewish,”anumberofpartymembersraisedseriousobjectionstoBehrend'smembershipintheDNVP.143Ontheotherhand,agroupofmembersintercededonBehrend'sbehalfandinsistedthathebeallowedtoremainamember.TheyeventhreatenedtheirownwithdrawalifBehrendwereforcedtoleavetheparty.Inthisdifficultsituation,thelocalgrouphopedforhelpfromtheLandAssociation.144Behrend'sopponentsalsoturnedtotheLandAssociation.AcolleagueofBehrend,OberstabsarztDr.Haenisch,arguedthatBehrend'smembershipintheDNVPonlycausedthepartyharm,sinceitwould“leaveuswideopentoNaziattacks.”145Dr.Haenischopenlythreatened(justasBehrend'sdefendershadinmakingtheoppositecase)toresignfromthepartyshouldBehrendstayinit.HealsomadeitplainthathisopinionaboutBehrendwassharedbymany;therewereotherGermanNationalswho“stronglydisapproveofanyaffiliationwithJudaismfromavölkisch-racialstandpointandwhorefusetocollaboratecloselywithpeoplewhoaresothoroughlyJewishbyvirtueofblood[ties].”146FormerCaptainvonHertzberg,acousinofthePomeranianDNVPchairmanGeorgvonZitzewitz,147aprominentmemberoftheKolberg

DNVP,andastrictopponentofBehrend'sacceptance,claimedinhislettertoZitzewitzthattherewere“Freemasonsandhalf-JewswhocannotgototheNazis,becausetheyareontheirblacklist.TheynowseekadmissiontotheDNVPwhich,intheiropinion,isnotasvölkisch-oriented,andbecausetheyneedsomeformofreinsurance.”148VonHertzbergwarnedthattheDNVPstoodindangeroflosingalargenumberofitsbestmembersunlessindiscriminateadmissionintothepartywascurtailed.Then“inferiorscum”wouldgaintheupperhandintheparty.Therefore,thepartymustnotallowitself“tobeburdenedwithJewsandJewishriffraff”;itmust“bevölkischandjudenrein(freeofJews)oritwon'texistatall.”149VonHertzbergthreatened(likeothersbeforehim)toleavethepartyifBehrendweretoremainamember.TheDNVPPomeraniaLandAssociation,towhomalloftheseletterswere

directed,naturallyfounditselfinanawkwarddilemmasoshortlybeforethe5Marchelections.Itdidnotriskmakingarulingsince,regardlessofhowtheissuewasdecided,DNVPmembersweresuretobeoffendedonewayoranother.ThematterwaspassedontoBerlinwiththerecommendation:“Theaffairisnottobeconsideredasveryurgent.”Instead,dilatorytacticsweretobepursued:“WehaveadvisedtheKolberglocalassociationtoappealtothepartycourt,inordertodragthisthingout.”150ThefinalverdictnowrestedwithBerlin,wherethematterwasnottakenlightly.ThegeschäftsführendeVorstandsmitglied(manageroftheparty'sday-to-dayaffairs),MajorNagel,withwhomthedecisionrested,draftedacarefullywordedresponsetoStettin,whichhediligentlyrevisedbeforesendingthefinallettertotheStettinLandAssociationon23March.151Inthisletterheurgentlyadvised“torefrainfromanappealtothepartycourt,”sinceif“ageneraldecisionismade,thenthepartywillcertainlybeharmed.”152Nagelclearlyoutlinedtheparty'spredicament:“TheremaybedoubtastowhetherthestatutesaccordingtowhichJewsmaynotbecomemembersrefertoreligionorrace.”Ifnow,onthishighlysensitivequestionofacceptinghalf-Jewsasmembers,“afundamentaldecisionisissuedtotheeffect…thathalf-Jewscanbeadmitted,thiswouldcauseimmensedamageinvölkisch-orientedcirclesandprobablycostusagreatmanymembers.”153Thiswasallthemoretrue“intheextraordinarilychargedclimateofthepresentage”andprovided“NationalSocialistswithmaterialsagainstusthatcouldnotbemoreinjurious.”Inthepresentcase,Nagelcontinued,itwouldhavebeenbesttotellBehrendtowithdrawhisapplicationformembership.BythemiddleofMay,theDNVPhadlostmostofitslocalstrongholdstothe

moredynamicNaziparty,whosepredominancehadgrownconsistentlyafter5March.TherenamingoftheDNVPasthe“GermanNationalFront”atthe

beginningofMayhadbeenthesymbolicexpressionoftheparty'sincreasingalignmentwiththeNazis(andtheadoptionoftheirmethods).Bythespringof1933,conservativeshadthusbecomeexceedinglyanxioustoavoidanypoliticalmovethatmightbeconstruedasaprovocationtoitsmorepowerfulcoalitionpartner.InMay1933,theFrankfurtamMaincountyassociation,forexample,warmlyrecommended“theadmissionofagentlemanwhowasJewish.”Thisreferredto“GeneraldirektorProfessorDr.Salomon,[who]accordingtooneofourprominentleaders,[hasbeen]baptizedfor40years,”and“enjoysquiteagoodreputationhereinFrankfurt,”amanonecan“absolutelyrelyupon.”154Despitethisglowingintroduction,thisrequestmetwithanimmediaterefusalfromBerlin.155InthecaseoftheapparentlylesspromisingapplicationofthelawyerLedien,whohadappliedformembershiptotheDNVPMerseburgLandAssociationandwhoisdescribedasa“baptizedJew,butalsoaWorldWarIcombatant”whohadalwaysbeen“involvedinpatrioticendeavors,”156theBerlinOfficeprocrastinated,recommendingthat“thematterbedeferredforseveralmonths.”157TheunpredictabledecisionsofthecentralofficeinBerlinandtheuncertainty

theyproducedwereconnectedinpartwiththetumultuousnatureofday-to-daypolitics,thegrowinginsecurityandwaningstrengthoftheGermanNationals,andtheabsenceofaconsistentpolicyonthepartoftheDNVP.Effortsinthatdirectionlackedresoluteness.On27March1933,forexample,MajorHansNagelwrotetotheBerlinLandAssociation:“TheDNVPstatutesincludethepassagethatJewsarenotallowedtojointheparty.ThestatutesdonotcontainaprecisedefinitionofwhoisaJew.Inthecommitteesresponsibleforacceptingnewmemberstheopinionhas,however,gainedgroundthatpersonswhoarebornJewishandthenconverttoChristianitymustnotbeacceptedintotheparty.”158InmidMay,agoodsixweekslater,moredirectlanguagewasemployed.TheresponsetoaletterfromaDNVPmemberwho,onaccountofhisancestry,hadbeensuspendedfromhislocalbranch159wascouchedinnouncertainterms:“Accordingtopartystatutes,JewscannotbeacceptedintotheGermanNationalFront.Itisnotreligionbutethnicoriginthatisdecisiveinthecharacterizationof‘Jewish.’IfyouhavebeenacceptedintoourpartyandareamemberoftheJewishrace,itisonlybecausewewerenotawareofthatfact.Therefore,wecannotconsidertheexpulsionfromyourlocalgroupasunjustified.”160Wasthis,infact,afirststeptowardtheadoptionoftheracistantiSemitismoftheNazis?

ConclusionOnlyafewmonthsafterthedemiseofWeimardemocracy,therewasnoinstitutionorpartylefttowhichGermanJewscouldturnforeffectiveaid.Asalreadymentioned,duetotheinterventionoftheagedReichspräsidentPaulvonHindenburg,warveterans,relativesofsoldierskilledinaction,andthosewhohadlostsonsinthewargainedareprieveandweretemporarilyexemptedfromdiscriminatorylegislation.ButtheDNVP,thepartythat,morethananyother,hadbeenthestandard-beareroftheconservativeGermanestablishment,theembodimentofthevaluesoftheEmpire,thebureaucracy,andthetraditionsoftheoldPrussianRechtsstaat,hadfailedabysmallywhenputtothetest.Inthis,itwasnotalone.OtherpillarsoftheGermanestablishmentremainedinactiveeitherbecausetheyweredeeplydividedontheissueofantiSemitismandthenatureofNaziterror,aswiththeProtestantChurchhierarchy,ortheywereanti-Semiticthemselves,aswithsectionsoftheGermanForeignOffice.161TheDNVPhadalwaysspokenoutagainstrandomviolenceand,aslateasMarch1933,opposed“inprincipleterrorizinganysegmentofthepopulation.”162Butthiswasmererhetoric.Inpracticalterms,thisoppositionhadamountedtoverylittle.Inthefinalanalysis,itwasacombinationofpracticalobstacles(suchasthesheerfearofconfrontingtheNazis)andtheanti-SemiticconvictionsofDNVPmembersandleadersalikethatpreventedtheDNVPfromstandingupfortherightsoffellowGermancitizens,eveniftheyhadfoughtintheGreatWarandsufferedasaresultofGermandefeatandinflation.Theconservatives'antiSemitismwasmultifaceted:itsculturalaspectswerestronginthepredominantlyProtestantDNVPanditspoliticalovertonespowerfulinaright-wingpartythatassociatedJewswithopposingpoliticalcreedsfromleftliberalismtosocialismandcommunism.Finally,asBubenhöfer'sexampledemonstrated,evenvölkischorientationswereextantinapartythatcountedamongitsantecedentsremaindersofthevölkischsplintergroupsoftheEmpire,evenifmostofthosefoundamorenaturalhomeundertheroofoftheNSDAP.Onanindividuallevel,therewassomeprotest,empathy,andoccasionally

alsowillingnesstohelp.Thisevenincludedlocalpartyorganizations.ThedocumentshaverevealedsomecognitivedissonanceonthepartofmanyGermanNationals,whowereoftentornbetweentheirpositiveexperienceswithGermanJewsbasedonsharedprofessionalorpersonalbondsandthepoliticalexpedienciesgeneratedbythewaveofantiSemitismthataccompaniedtheNaziseizureofpower.TheDNVP'sBerlinheadoffice,meanwhile,wasdealingwithabstractpolicy,notwithneighborsindistress.DNVPpolicymakerswereready

abstractpolicy,notwithneighborsindistress.DNVPpolicymakerswereready(though,perhaps,withacertainreluctance)touseantiSemitismtoadvancetheirpoliticalposition,evenifthismeantabandoningothercentraltenets,suchasupholdingtheRechtsstaat,orrespectinganddefendingGermanJewsfortheirmeritsandsacrificesforthefatherland.DNVPpolicymakersknewtheywereplayingadangerousgame.BynotinterveningtostopNaziviolenceanddiscrimination,theyimplicitlysanctionedthem;bynotstandinguptoanall-pervasivecultureoffear,theyallowedanti-Semiticattackstogounpunished.Othercasualtieswerethemuch-vauntedPrussianbureaucratictradition,and,intheend,thoseveryprinciplesconservativestookpridein(thoughnolongerembodied),suchasdecency,theruleoflaw,andthemaintenanceofcivicorder.ThroughtheiralliancewiththeNazis,theythemselveshadhelpedtocreateanenvironmentthatdoomedtheveryworldordertheyprofessedtouphold.

1.Forfigures,seeFriedländer,NaziGermanyandtheJews,15,328.Friedländerestimatesthatabout25,000JewsleftGermanybetweenJanuaryandJune1933.Since1880,thepercentageofJewsintheGermanpopulationhadbeendecliningsteadily,duepartlytoalowerbirthratecomparedtotherestofGermanyandanongoingassimilationprocess.Thepercentagefigurefellfrom1.09percentin1880to0.76percentinJune1933.Between1925andJune1933therewasevenadeclineinabsolutefiguresfrom568,000toabout500,000.Formorestatisticalinformation,seeKarlA.Schleunes,TheTwistedRoadtoAuschwitz(ChicagoandLondon,1970),37–40;onanti-Semiticviolencebefore1933,seeDirkWalter,AntisemitischeKriminalitätundGewalt.JudenfeindschaftinderWeimarerRepublik(Bonn1999).

2.Ontheboycottof1AprilandtheAprillegislation,seeSchleunes,TwistedRoad,62–115;Friedländer,NaziGermanyandtheJews,17–73;UweDietrichAdam,JudenpolitikimDrittenReich(Düsseldorf,1972);andHerbst,DasnationalsozialistischeDeutschland,73–80.

3.SeeHerbst,DasnationalsozialistischeDeutschland,78.ForHitler'srevealingresponsetoHindenburg'sintercessionof4AprilregardingtheLawontheRestorationofaProfessionalCivilService,seeAktenzurDeutschenAuswärtigenPolitik,1918–1945,SerieC,1933–1937,vol.I,part1(Göttingen,1971),253–255.

4.MartinBroszatemphaticallystressesthispointinDerStaatHitlers,403.5.AccordingtoSaulFriedländer,whoreferstostudiesbyErnestHamburger,PeterPulzer,andArnold

Paucker,morethan80percentofJewishvoterssupportedeithertheSPDorDDP(Friedländer,NaziGermany,356,note87),andrepresentativesofbothpartiesalsospokeoutagainstantiSemitism.AftertheDDPturnedintotheStaatspartei,theSPDincreasinglyattractedJewishvotes.FordetailedinformationonvotingpatternsinelectoraldistrictsinBerlin,Hamburg,andFrankfurt,seePeterPulzer,JewsandtheGermanState.ThePoliticalHistoryofaMinority,1848–1933(Oxford,1992),291–324.

6.GeorgBernhard,DiedeutscheTragödie.DerSelbstmordeinerRepublik(Prague,1933),25.7.Thimme,FluchtindenMythos,referstoantiSemitismonlyinpassing.MainexceptionsareLiebe,

Volkspartei,61–74,andHertzman,DNVP,124–165,whodiscusstheparty'santiSemitisminsomedetail,sincebothdealwiththe1922Görlitzpartycongress,whentheextremeantiSemiteswereforcedoutoftheparty.Othermonographs,whereantiSemitismisoccasionallymentioned,includeDörr,“DieDeutschnationaleVolkspartei,”GisbertJ.Gemein,“DieDNVPinDüsseldorf1918–1933”(Ph.D.diss.,Cologne,1969);ReinhardBehrens,DieDeutschnationaleninHamburg1918–1933(Ph.D.diss.,Hamburg,1973);DenisP.Walker,“AlfredHugenbergandtheDNVP1918–1930”(D.Phil.,Cambridge,1976);Holzbach,Das“SystemHugenberg”;Leopold,AlfredHugenberg;Stupperich,VolksgemeinschaftoderArbeitersolidarität.

8.Bernd-JürgenWendt,Deutschland1933–1945.DasDritteReich(Hannover,1995),166.

9.Schleunes,TwistedRoad,76.10.Herbst,DasnationalsozialistischeDeutschland,53.11.HelmutBerding,ModernerAntisemitismusinDeutschland(Frankfurt,1988),213.Accordingto

Berding,itsexponentwasGottfriedTraub,amemberoftheparty'sexecutivecommitteeandDNVPReichstagdeputy,whocontinuedtheChristianSocialtraditionofAdolfStoecker.WehlerreiteratesthispointinthechapteronWeimarantiSemitism;seeDeutscheGesellschaftsgeschichte,IV,503.

12.Berding,ModernerAntisemitismus,214.Inthiscontext,BerdingcitesChristophDipper,“DerdeutscheWiderstandunddieJuden,”GeschichteundGesellschaft9(1983),349–380,thoughtheassumptionoriginallywentbacktoGeorgeMosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”inWernerMosse,ed.,Entscheidungsjahr1932.ZurJudenfrageinderEndphasederWeimarerRepublik,2ndrev.ed.(Tübingen,1966),227.Wehleradoptsitvirtuallyverbatim:“Ifoneweretospeculate,asrulersofthecountrytheGermanNationalswouldcertainlyhavebeencapableofinitiatingananti-Jewishpolicyofapartheid,thoughnotphysicalelimination.”GesellschaftsgeschichteIV,503–504.

13.AvrahamBarkai,‘WehrDich!’DerCentralvereindeutscherStaatsbürgerjüdischenGlaubens,1893–1938(Munich,2002),114–115;406,note29.BarkaimakesafewreferencestotheDNVPinhiscontributiontoMichaelMeyer,ed.,German-JewishHistoryinModernTimes.RenewalandDestruction,1918–1945,vol.IV(NewYork,1998),wherehepointsoutthat“asmallnumberofupperclassJewssupportedtheGermanPeople'sParty(DVP)...ayetsmallerminorityendorsedtheright-wingradicalviewsoftheanti-SemiticGermanNationalPeople'sParty(DNVP)...,”109.

14.WernerJochmann,“DieAusbreitungdesAntisemitismus,”inWernerMosse,ed.,DeutschesJudentuminKriegundRevolution,1916–1923(Tübingen,1971),409–511,esp.487–492;Mosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”183–247,esp.226–238.

15.Jochmann,“DieAusbreitungdesAntisemitismus,”487.16.Ibid.,489;Pulzer,JewsandtheGermanState,237.Subsequently,sheandherfatherlefttheparty.17.InJochmann'sestimationin“DieAusbreitungdesAntisemitismus,”492–493.ButJochmannalso

mentionsprotestsinDNVPpartycirclesagainstbothanti-Semitictransgressionsandthe“languageofswineherds”(Sauherdenton)usedinthevölkischgutterpress(491).DonaldL.Niewyk,TheJewsinWeimarGermany(BatonRougeandLondon,1980),49–51,alsoreferstoconflictingviewsonantiSemitismintheDNVP.

18.Mosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”227.Mosseassertedthatthe“historyoftheDNVPisoneofstimulusandresponsebetweentheoldconservativetraditionandtheradicalvölkischimpulse”andpointedtoaradicalizationofthepartyduringtheWeimarRepublic.

19.Mosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”229.Pulzer,inJewsandtheGermanState,237,alsostressesthatanti-SemiticthemeswereexplicitinGermanNationalattacksontheDDPinchargesthattheparty“wasledbyJewsanddependentonMarxism.”TheDNVPwasalsostronglyopposedtotheemigrationofEasternJewstoGermany,afeelingsharedbytheAssociationofNationalGermanJews,anorganizationthathadsomecommonpoliticalgroundwiththeDNVP.SeeCarlJ.Rheins,“TheVerbandNationaldeutscherJuden,1921–1933,”LeoBaeckInstituteYearbook,25(1980),243–268;Niewyk,TheJewsinWeimarGermany,165–178.

20.Pulzer,JewsandtheGermanState,216.21.CarlJ.Rheins,“TheVerbandNationaldeutscherJuden,1921–1933,”265–266;Mosse,“Die

deutscheRechteunddieJuden,”231–232.MossecharacterizesHugenberg'sviewpointas“pragmatic,”andmentionsthathe“heldhisprotectivehand”oversomemenwithJewishancestry,suchasReinholdQuaatzandStahlhelmleaderTheodorDuesterberg.

22.UnderthealiasofWilhelmMeister,Bangpublishedanobsceneanti-Semitictract,JudasSchuldbuch.EineDeutscheAbrechnung(Munich1919).SeeSaulFriedländer,“DiepolitischenVeränderungenderKriegszeitundihreAuswirkungenaufdieJudenfrage,”inWernerMosse,ed.,DeutschesJudentuminKriegundRevolution,65.

23.Friedländer,NaziGermanyandtheJews,73–113,esp.86–90.24.Mosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”227.TheevasiveGermanformulationusedwas

“irgendwelcherVolkskreise.”25.Seealsochapters3and6.OnSAviolenceingeneral,seeRichardBessel,PoliticalViolenceandthe

RiseofNazism.TheStormTroopersinEasternGermany,1925–1934(NewHavenandLondon,1984);EricReiche,TheDevelopmentoftheSAinNürnberg,1922–1934(Cambridge,1986);PeterLongerich,DiebraunenBataillone.GeschichtederSA(Munich,1989).

26.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195;seeespecially29–53;67–97;91–112;113–120;150–161;164–204.

27.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,ibid.,150–161.ApossibleexceptionwerethecomplaintsfromtheSovietembassy.Here,itwasmostlyhatredofcommunismandnotonlyantiSemitismthatlayattherootoftheattacksonSovietcitizens.

28.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,67–73;76–77.SwisscitizenWillyGuggenheimwasonabusinesstripinMagdeburg,wherehewasattackedinaJewishrestaurant(on8March);twoDutchJewswereorderedtoclosetheirfurshopinCharlottenburg.Thepolicedeclaredthattheycoulddonothingandwereunabletospareanypoliceofficersforprotection(ibid.,74–75;113–120).

29.Schleunes,TwistedRoad,110–111.AsSchleunespointedout,thedifficultiesofbecominganaturalizedGermanwereimmense,sinceeachstategovernmenthadtherighttovetoanyapplicationforcitizenship,sothatmostJewishrefugeesfromeasternEurope,eveniftheyhadraisedfamiliesinGermany,retainedthecitizenshipofthecountryfromwhichtheyhadfled.ThisdidnotchangesignificantlyduringtheWeimarRepublic.Thus,thousandsofJewswhosegrandparentshadsettledinGermanyremainedcitizensofforeignstates.SeealsoJackWertheimer,“‘TheUnwantedElement’—EastEuropeanJewsinImperialGermany,”LBIYB26(1981),23–46.

30.Forexample,aCzechoslovakianJewishcouple,theLeistners,wereattackedbyanSS-Commandointhestreeton11MarchinBerlin-Mariendorf.ThehusbandwasdraggedofftoanSAfacility.Eventhoughtheincidentwasreported,thepolicedidnothing.ItwassuspectedthattheassaultoriginatedwithaneighboroftheLeistnerswhohadlostacourtcasewiththehusbandandthreatenedrevenge.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,109.

31.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,170.Oftencriminalextortionwasused,asinthecaseoftheAmericanJulianFuchs(ibid.,96–98;106–107).

32.See,forexample,BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,99–101.On10March1933,uniformedmenforcedtheirwayintotheapartmentoftheKlauberfamilyinMunich.Whenthefamilyaskedthereasonforthisaction(FrauJeanKlauberwasanAmericancitizen)theyweretold:“Jews!Wehateyou!Wehavewaitedforthisforfourteenyearsandtonightwearegoingtostringupthelotofyou.”(100).Intherecords,onefrequentlyencounterssentencessuchas:“Theriotsquad,notifiedbyphone,failedtoappear”(e.g.,ibid.,108).Fornumerousothercasesofrobbery,seeibid.,113–120.

33.BALichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”ibid.,201.InthisreportfromthePolishlegation(199–204),incidentsfromthroughouttheReicharelisted.InHamborn,forexample,anunknownassailantoverturnedabasketwithfivehundredeggsbelongingtoaPolishgrocerandsworeathiminthe“middleofthemarketplace,”thatis,inaverypublicspot(203).Inthosecaseswherevictimsthemselveswenttothepolicetoreportattacks,theysoonhadtorealizethatnoactionwouldbetaken.

34.Ibid.,202.35.18March1933atibid.,173.Thisreport(165–174)coversincidentsfromthroughouttheReich.The

firstwaveofattackscoincidedwiththeNazitakeoverofthoseGermanstatesinwhichtheNaziswerenotalreadyingovernment(5–11March1933).In1900,7percentoftheJewsinGermanycamefromeasternEurope;by1933,thepercentageofOstjudenhadrisentoalmost20.TheywereconcentratedmostlyinthelargercitiesofcentralandeasternGermany:in1925,easternJewsrepresented25.4percentofBerlin'sJewishpopulation,60percentofDresden's,andmorethan80percentofLeipzig's.SeeFriedländer,NaziGermanyandtheJews,353;and,forfurtherdetails,EsraBennathan,“DiedemographischeundwirtschaftlicheStrukturderJuden,”inWernerMosse,ed.,Entscheidungsjahr1932,87–135.

36.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,61.SeealsotheBerlinerLokalanzeiger,11March1933:“HitlergegenEinzelaktionen”(ibid.,63).InCabinetmeetings,HitlermaintainedthattheattackshadbeencommittedmainlybycommunistsinSAuniforms(ibid.,84).

37.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,67,33,29–32,91–94.ReichInteriorMinisterFrickthereupondispatched“expressletters”tootherReichMinisters,inwhichheurgedtherecipients“intheinterestofpublicsecurityandorder...tocountertheseattacksmostvigorouslyandtotakethenecessarystepstodoso”(ibid.,82).Alreadyon3March,NeurathhadmadeapointofstressingtoLammersthattheuseoftheauxiliarypolicefortheprotectionofforeignmissionsandembassieswastobeavoided(ibid.,33).WhenviolenttransgressionsdidnotabatebythesecondhalfofMarch,NeurathexpandedthelistofrecipientsofhisexpressletterstoincludethepolicesuperintendentsoftheBerlindistricts.

38.Schleunes(amongothers)pointedoutthatifpartyradicalsandtheSAseemedtobegettingtheupperhand,Hitler'sownpositionmightbejeopardized.WhileHitlerwelcomedterroringeneralsinceitreducedthecapacityofhiscommunistandsocialistopponentstoorganize,ithadtobeclearthathewasfirmlyincontrol.Ifhisgraspongovernmentappearedtobetenuous,excessiveterrorbytheSAcouldonlybeharmfultohisownstanding.Schleunes,TwistedRoad,68–69.

39.3May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,177.40.Withrespecttothedamage,seetheexplanationsoftheStaatssekretärintheForeignMinistry,

BernhardvonBülow,concerningthedeteriorationofGerman-Sovietrelations,whichhadbeencausedprincipallybycountlessNaziattacks.VonBülowleftnodoubtthatheconsideredSovietcomplaintslegitimate.SeeMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,836–838.

41.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,191–193;195–197;207–208;260–261;395–398;563–564;593–595.

42.ThomasNipperdey,DeutscheGeschichte1866–1918,ArbeitsweltundBürgergeist(Munich,1990),396–414;esp.399.In1910,twenty-nineJewswereamongtheonehundredwealthiestmeninPrussia.Manywereconsideredpillarsofthecommunitywhomadegenerouspublicendowments,suchasspas,libraries,andhospitals.In1905,forexample,theJewishpopulationofBerlin,whichamountedto5.1percent,carried30.7percentofthetaxburden;inMannheimtheJewishpopulationof3.2percentpaid28.7percentofthetaxes;andinthesmallBadencityofBruchsaltheJewishpopulationof1.1percentpaid17.6percentofthetaxes(Nipperdey,DeutscheGeschichte,399).AccordingtoPeterPulzer,theaverageamountoftaxpaidbyJewswasseventimesashighasthatpaidbyCatholicGermansandthreeandahalftimesashighasthatpaidbyProtestants.AnimportantpopulationshiftduringtheEmpirewasfromthecountrysidetothecityandtheeast-westmigrationofGermanJews.In1933,over70percentofGermanJewslivedinlargecities;about160,000livedinBerlin,26,000inFrankfurt,20,000inBreslau,almost17,000inHamburg,15,000inCologne,11,500inLeipzig,andmorethan7,000inNuremberg.SeeThamer,VerführungundGewalt,258;Schleunes,TwistedRoad,39;PeterPulzer,“DiejüdischeBeteiligunganderPolitik”inWernerMosse,ed.,JudenimWilhelminischenDeutschland1890–1914,2nded.(Tübingen1998),143–241,esp.189.

43.EvenduringtheKaiserreich,theconservativePrussianstateapparatusconstitutedaprotectivebarrieragainst“rabble-rousingantiSemitism”(Radauantisemitismus).SeeGerhardHoffmann,WernerBergmann,andHelmutWalserSmith,eds.,ExclusionaryViolence(AnnArbor,2002);Berding,ModernerAntisemitismusinDeutschland.

44.Thisstrategywasnotnew.Inthe1860s,HermannWagenerhadattemptedasimilarstrategywithhis“PrussianVolksverein”withsomesuccess.Inthestruggleagainstfreedomoftrade(Gewerbefreiheit),Wagenerattemptedtowinovertheurbanlowermiddleclassestotheconservativecause.SeealsoWernerJochmann,“StrukturenundFunktiondesdeutschen.Antisemitismus,”inMosse,ed.,JudenimWilhelminischenDeutschland,389–479;PeterPulzer,TheRiseofPoliticalAntiSemitisminGermanyandAustria,rev.edition(Cambridge,Mass.,1988).

45.FelixSalomon,DieneuenParteiprogrammemitdenletztenderaltenParteienzusammengestellt,2nded.(Leipzig&Berlin,1919),23;Beck,“TheChangingConcernsofPrussianConservatism,1830–

1914,”86–106.The“TivoliProgram”supersededthe1876programandremainedinforceuntil1918.Despiteanti-Semiticprogrampoints,GermanJewsvotedoccasionallyforConservativePartycandidatesinrunoffelections,especiallyintheGerman-PolishprovinceofPosen,wheretheJewishcommunitygenerallysupportedtheGermansideinnationalityquestions.Inarunoffelectionin1908,forexample,thelargerpartoftheJewishpopulationofPosensupportedtheConservativePartycandidateKunoGrafvonWestarp(whohadassuredtheJewishcommunitythattheConservativePartywouldacknowledgetheirfullequality)againstacandidateoftheCatholicCenterparty,supportedlargelybythePolishpopulation.WiththehelpoftheJewishvote,Westarpcarriedtheelection.SeePeterPulzer,“DiejüdischeBeteiligunganderPolitik.”

46.SeeThomasNipperdey,“Antisemitismus:Entstehung,FunktionundGeschichteeinesBegriffs,”inNipperdey,Gesellschaft,Kultur,Theorie(Göttingen1976),113–133,esp.119.The“ÄraArtikel”referredtothe“eraofBleichröder-Delbrück-Camphausen,”blamingeconomiccrisis,materialism,andthedeclineofmoralandethicalstandardsonBismarck'salliancewithliberalJews.SeeFritzStern,GoldandIron:Bismarck,Bleichröder,andtheBuildingoftheGermanEmpire(NewYork,1977).

47.JamesRetallack,NotablesoftheRight.TheConservativePartyandPoliticalMobilizationinGermany,1876–1918(LondonandBoston,1988);GeoffEley,ReshapingtheGermanRight:RadicalNationalismandPoliticalChangeafterBismarck,2nded.(AnnArbor,1992);Puhle,AgrarischeInteressenpolitik;ThomasNipperdey,MachtstaatvorDemokratie.DeutscheGeschichte1866–1945,II(Munich,1992)536–541;Wehler,DeutscheGesellschaftsgeschichteIII,835–838;1060–1063;Hans-PeterUllmann,InteressenverbändeinDeutschland(Frankfurt,1988),85–94.

48.Nipperdey,MachtstaatvorDemokratie,336–337.49.Nipperdey,“Antisemitismus,”430,note81.OnBöckel(1859–1923)andAhlwardt(1846–1914),

seePulzer,TheRiseofPoliticalAntiSemitism.50.Nipperdey,MachtstaatvorDemokratie,289–311;esp.306–307.“ByraisingatamedantiSemitism

andnursingit,ConservativesalsopreparedthegroundforradicalantiSemitism.”Ibid.,307;andBerding,ModernerAntisemitismus,107.

51.WilhelmMommsenundGüntherFranz,eds.,DiedeutschenParteiprogramme1918–1930(LeipzigandBerlin,1931),20;thiswasalsodesignedtoincludeCatholics.

52.Mommsen,Parteiprogramme,86.AlsopublishedinMaxWeiß,ed.,DernationaleWille.WerdenundWirkenderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei1918–1928(Essen,1928),395;andMosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden”;DanielR.Borg,TheOld-PrussianChurchandtheWeimarRepublic.AStudyinPoliticalAdjustment,1917–1921(HanoverandLondon,1984),195–202.

53.TheDNVPneverofficiallysanctionedthevölkischantiSemitismofradicalWeimarsplinterparties,eventhoughGermanJewswerevirtuallyexcludedfrommembershipafter1924.ThecampaignfortheMay1924electionswasdominatedbyanti-Semiticslogans,evenifrenunciationofterrorandviolencehadbeenofficiallycondemnedsincethemurderofWalterRathenauin1922.

54.SeeDasPolitischeTestamentFriedrichsdesGroßenvon1752(Stuttgart,1971).55.DeborahHertz,JewishHighSocietyinOldRegimeBerlin(NewHaven,1988).56.InHinterpommernin1881(Wehler,Gesellschaftsgeschichte,III,930)and,themostnotoriouscase,

inKonitzinWestPrussia.SeeChristophNonn,EineStadtsuchteinenMörder.Gericht,GewaltundAntisemitismusimKaiserreich(Göttingen,2002);HelmutWalserSmith,DieGeschichtedesSchlachters.MordundAntisemitismusineinerdeutschenKleinstadt(Göttingen,2002).OntheprejudiceofthePrussianadministration,seeWernerAngress,“Prussia'sArmyandtheJewishReserveOfficerControversybeforeWorldWarI,”inJamesSheehan,ed.,ImperialGermany(NewYorkandLondon,1976),93–129.

57.RegardingtheassimilationofGermanJews,PeterGaycommentedonWilhelmineanGermany:“DasDeutschederjüdischenKulturjenerJahrzehnteistnichtalsVersuchderVerstellungzuverstehen.EshandeltesichnichtumSelbstverleugnung,sondernumdasGefühl,aneinerKulturAnteilzuhaben,dieaufrechteKosmopolitenwieSchillerundKantoderZierdendesmodernenHumanismuswieGoethehervorgebrachthatte,”and“WennDeutschlandsJudenindiesenJahrzehnten...sichpersönlichenBeleidigungenausgesetztsahen,soerlebtensiediesallesfolglichalsDeutsche.”SeePeterGay,“BegegnungmitderModerne—DeutscheJudeninderdeutschenKultur,”inMosse,ed.,Judenim

WilheminischenDeutschland,241–313,esp.243.58.MosheZimmermann,DieDeutschenJuden1914–1945(Munich,1997),2;Barkai,WehrDich,55–

100.59.Zimmermann,DieDeutschenJuden1914–1945,2–3.TheinitiallydominantimageofBurgfrieden

andsocialharmony—theSPDReichstagdeputyLudwigFranck,whovolunteeredforwarserviceandwaskilledinSeptember1914,isthebest-knownexample—didnotlastlong.Attheverylatest,itendedwiththe1916Judenzählungbythearmythathadbeenorderedbythemilitaryauthorities.SeeJochmann,“DieAusbreitungdesAntisemitismus,”409–510.In1914,Jewishorganizations,suchastheCentralvereinandtheVerbanddeutscherJuden,hadcalledupontheirmembersinajointstatementtodedicatealltheirenergytothefatherland,“overandaboveregularduty.”EventheZionistischeVereinigungfürDeutschlandexpressedthehopethatZionistyouth“willwithfieryheartsrushtothecolors.”Berding,ModernerAntisemitismus,165–178;EgmontZechlin,DiedeutschePolitikunddieJudenimErstenWeltkrieg(Göttingen,1969);Friedländer,“DiepolitischenVeränderungenderKriegszeit,”27–65.

60.Berding,Antisemitismus,166;Zimmermann,DiedeutschenJuden,2;Friedländer,“DiepolitischenVeränderungenderKriegszeit,”27–67,esp.38.

61.Nipperdey,ArbeitsweltundBürgergeist,412.AccordingtoNipperdey17.3percentofGermanJewshadservedinthewar(asopposedto18.7percentofnon-Jews);ofthose77percentwereatthefront(78percent);11–12percentofthosewerekilled(13–14percent).TheslightdeviationsareexplainedbythedifferentagestructureofGermanJews,urbanization,andtheexclusionofJewsfromtheofficercorps.

62.ExceptforminorexceptionsinBavaria.SeeNipperdey,ArbeitsweltundBürgergeist,401.Oftwenty-fivethousandone-yearvolunteers(the“EinjährigFreiwillige”)ofJewishorigin,whojoinedthearmyaspotentialofficercadetsbetween1885and1914,onlytwenty-onewereabletoadvancetotherankoflieutenantinthereserves;Wehler,Gesellschaftsgeschichte,III,1065–66.

63.Thirtythousandreceiveddecorationsforbravery;twothousandbecameofficers(Berding,Antisemitismus,166).

64.HoustonS.Chamberlain,Kriegsaufsätze(Munich,1915),46;alsoJochmann,“DieAusbreitungdesAntisemitismus,”409–511,esp.411.“GermanyhastentimesasmanyJews[asEngland]andwherearetheynow?Asifwipedawayfromthetremendouscataclysm;nolongerrecognizableasJews,fortheyperformtheirdutyasGermansbeforetheenemyorathome.”

65.Jochmann,“AusbreitungdesAntisemitismus,”421;Friedländer,“Veränderungen,”38.66.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,56.Theletterwas

dated21March1933.TheDeutscheAllgemeineZeitung(DAZ)wasoneoftheReich'smostimportantdailynewspapers.Duetoitsextensiveforeignreporting,thisnationalconservativenewspaperwascofinancedbytheGermanForeignOffice.Internationally,itwasoneofGermany'smostwidelyreadnewspapers.Fromthesummerof1932,theDAZadvocatedHitler'sparticipationingovernment.SeeNorbertFreiandJohannesSchmitz,JournalismusimDrittenReich,3rded.(Munich,1999),59–63.

67.Theauthoroftheletter,Dr.PaulRosenthal,endedwithanappealtoallex-comrades:“Donotforgetusinthesedays.Donotforsakeus;protectusfromhumiliatinggeneralizationsandstandupforus,sothatinthenational-mindedGermanyoftodayanoldfrontlinesoldiermayparticipateinthereconstruction,evenifhewasbornaJew.”BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,56.

68.27March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,“LissaanLindner,”57.In1921theDeutscheKriegerbund,foundedin1872,amalgamatedwiththeKyffhäuserbund,foundedin1898,tobecometheDeutscherReichskriegerbundKyffhäuser.In1930,ithadaboutthreemillionmembersorganizedintothirtythousandorganizations.

69.Ibid.70.Ibid.71.SeeJakobWassermann,MeinWegalsDeutscherundJude,2nded.(Munich,1999),48(first

publishedin1921).SeeinparticularwhatWassermannsaidabouthimselfandtheGermanlanguage.72.31March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19

“LissaanRohr,”52–54.73.Ibid.,58.74.18April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,

no.48,47.Intheappealsfromlocalorganizations,itwasconsistentlyemphasizedthateithertheapplicantsortheirparentshadconvertedtoChristianity.

75.5May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,46.“WeshouldliketowarnagainsttheadmissionofHerrDr.Vogel.ThestipulationinourstatutesthatprohibitstheadmissionofJewsdoesnotexclusivelyrefertoreligion.”

76.3April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,56–58.

77.Ibid.,54–55.78.Ibid.,53.79.TaschenbuchderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei(Berlin,1929),27.80.14March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,36.81.Ibid.82.29March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,35.83.Ibid.,35.“WeshallnotacceptHerrDr.WassermeyerJr.,particularlysincetwodoctorsfromthe

Altonahospital,whoaremembersofourparty,stronglycameoutagainsthim.”84.31March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,34.85.Ibid.86.PèreWassermeyerlosttrustinhisparty;hissonsufferedprofessionally.87.OntheJewishcommunityinFrankfurtandtheextenttowhichFrankfurtJewswereassimilated,see

LeoLöwenthal,Mitmachenwollteichnie(Frankfurt,1981).88.Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,258.In1905,7percentofFrankfurt'spopulationhadbeenJewish.

PeterPulzer,“DiejüdischeBeteiligung,”189.89.Thamer,VerführungundGewalt,258.90.12April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,

no.48,“OffenerBriefanHerrnGeheimratHugenberg,”63–64.ItwasgenerallyknownthatHugenberg'sfriendReinholdQuaatzwashalf-Jewish,andthatHugenberghadJewishemployeesinhispublishinghouse,theScherlverlag.OnHugenberg,seeMosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”183–249,whoemphasizedthat“therewasnomentionoftheJudenproblem”inanyofHugenberg'sspeeches(231).

91.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,64.92.Ibid.,63.Ontheeffectoftheboycott,AdeleKappusremarked:“Onehastheimpressionthatwith

theentireundertakingthearrowstrikesbackatthearcher.”93.Ibid.,63–64.94.Ibid.,64.TheDNVPFrankfurtcountyassociationforwardedAdeleKappus'slettertothehead

officeinBerlinwiththenot-very-hopefulquery,“Willtheselineshaveanyimpact?”(ibid.,62).95.26April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,

no.48,60.96.Ibid:“LetmepointoutthatitisneithertheDNVPnorthenationalgovernment,buttheNSDAP,

whichisresponsiblefortheboycottand,lastbutnotleast,thoseBürgerwhoflocktotheswastikabannerenmasseinsteadofvotingfortheKampffrontSchwarz-Weiß-Rot,nottomentiontheGermanPeople'sPartywhich,especiallyinFrankfurt,hadbeenverypopularwithJewishvoters.Ifwetakethislastfactintoaccount,yourformermasters,oratleasttheirfollowing,arenotwithoutguiltforthecurrentdevelopment.”

97.3April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,“Hehdermann[?namepartiallyillegible]anHergt,”63–64.

98.Ibid.,63.

99.Ibid.RolandFreisler(1893–1945)beganhiscareerasalawyerinKasselandlaterbecameadeputytotheprovincialDietofHessen-Nassau,whichexplainshisproximitytoFrankfurt.

100.Ibid.101.Ibid.,63verso.Amongthelawyersthereweremany“whoseirreproachablecharacterandflawless

managementhavebeenknowntomeforyears.”Therewasanatmosphereof“mostbitterdespairsinceonlyveryfewofthemareleftwithsomeproperty,”havinglostalltheirsavingsintheInflation.

102.Ibid.103.Ibid.,63–63verso.104.Ibid.,64.105.Ibid.106.Ibid.Now,thecomplaintcontinued,theywouldhavetodealwiththedireconsequence“that,with

theadoptionoftheEnablingAct,theconstitutionalfoundationsoftheRechtsstaathavebeenplacedatthewillanddiscretionofthecurrentgovernment.”

107.Ibid.108.Ibid.,63verso-64.“Protectivecustody”wasaeuphemismforcommittaltoaconcentrationcamp.

StartinginmidMarch1933,evenmembersoftheGermanelite(andwhosepositionappearedtobemoresecurethanthatofahigh-rankingGermanNationaljudge?)foundthemselvesthreatenedbythiskindof“protectivecustody,”whichoftenaccountedforthefactthatmanyremainedsilentinthefaceofNaziprovocation.

109.Leopold,AlfredHugenberg,22.LeopoldwritesofHugenberg's“pragmatic”attitudetowardantiSemitism:“HugenbergconsideredantiSemitismatoolwhichcouldbeexploitedanddiscarded;hehimselfmeasuredamanbyhisloyaltytothenationratherthanbythepurityofhisracialpedigree.”(22);“NationalistJewsplayedanimportantroleinhispressconcernandanevenmoreimportantoneintheUfa.Eveninpoliticallife,oneofthemenmostintimatelyassociatedwithHugenberg,ReinholdQuaatz,wasreportedlythecousinofLudwigHolländer,thechairmanoftheCentralAssociationofGermansoftheJewishFaith,”(185,note138).SeealsoMosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”183–249;esp.231–233.

110.Thenearly68-year-oldwasplaguedbyill-health,andthoseclosetohimhadorderstomakesurethathewasnotapproachedwithunwelcomepetitionsandrequests.SeeWeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,234–244.ForcomplaintsdirectedtoHugenberg,seeBAKoblenz,N1231,NachlaßHugenberg,no.89:“AusschreitungenderNSDAPgegenDNVPMitglieder.”

111.RegardingtheLawontheRestorationofaProfessionalCivilService,seeJosephWalk,DasSonderrechtfürdieJudenimNS-Staat,2nded.(Heidelberg,1996),12,andFriedländer,NaziGermanyandtheJews,27–46.

112.GeorgDehio(1850–1932)wastheorganizerandchiefcollaboratorintheHandbuchderdeutschenKunstdenkmäler(1905–1912),oftenreferredtoas“theDehio.”Dehio'sotherseminalworkwasGeschichtederdeutschenKunst(1919–1925).AsNipperdeyremarked,“Emphasisonthenationalelement”constitutedthecommondenominatorinDehio'swork(ArbeitsweltundBürgergeist,645).

113.Pfingsten1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.86,76–80.

114.Ibid.,77–78.PauldeLagarde(1827–1891),whoseoriginalnamewasPaulBötticher,becameknownasaculturalcriticandfamousOrientalist.SeeFritzStern,ThePoliticsofCulturalDespair(BerkeleyandLosAngeles,1972).

115.19June1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.86,82.

116.Ibid.,83.Thedecorationcarriedthededication,“ToGeorgDehio,thegreatteacherandhistoriographerofGermanart.”Papen'sofficeimmediatelynotifiedWedepohlon26June1933(ibid.,85).Theheartfelttoneoftheletterleadsonetoexpectapositiveoutcome.OnDehio,seeVolkerBerghahn,“LudwigDehio,”inHans-UlrichWehler,ed.,DeutscheHistoriker(Göttingen,1973),473–492;TheodorSchieder,“LudwigDehiozumGedächtnis,”HistorischeZeitschrift201(1965),1–12;ThomasBeckers,

AbkehrvonPreußen.LudwigDehiounddiedeutscheGeschichtswissenschaftnach1945(Aichach,2001).117.1April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,

no.48,104.Thereportcontinued:“Werepeatedlyhadtheplacardscarriedthroughtheentiretownandhaveachievedasatisfactorymobilizingeffect,especiallysincewehadbeenthefirsttodothis.”

118.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,106.Thecirculartelegramwassentto,amongothers,theDNVPLandAssociationsofNiederrhein,Westfalen-Ost,Arnsberg,Mittelrhein,Düsseldorf-Ost,Hannover-Süd,Braunschweig,Merseburg,Magdeburg,Dresden,andLeipzig.

119.1April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,105.

120.See,forexample,1April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,ibid.,“BerichtderBezirksgruppeSonneberginThüringen,”107.

121.30March1933,ibid.,108.Insteadtheyhad“putuptheappropriatepostersinourexhibitionwindows,aswellasinourdisplaycases.”

122.1April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,68–69.

123.Ibid.,67.124.Ibid.125.Ibid.Indefenseoftheirowninactivitytheletterendedwiththewords:“Incidentally,nowthatthe

boycottisover,furthermeasureswillhaveafirmlegalgrounding.”126.11April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”

R53,no.80,157verso.Bubenhöferwasknownmainlyasthefounderofa“Deutsch-VölkischerOrden”;seealsoWernerBraatz,“TheCounter-Revolutionin1933asviewedintwoDocumentsaddressedtoVice-ChancellorPapen,”InternationalReviewofSocialHistory19(1974),115–127.

127.Ibid.,158–162.128.Ibid.,158verso.129.Ibid.,158.130.Ibid.,159.131.Ibid.,159verso.132.Ibid.,160.133.Ibid.IthadbeenarecurringthemeoftheRight'saccusationssincetheFirstWorldWarthatJewish

leadershadsteeredtheGermanworkers'movementintoincreasinglyradicalwaters.SeeFriedländer,“DiepolitischenVeränderungenderKriegszeit,”27–67;WernerAngress,“JudenimpolitischenLebenderRevolutionszeit,”inMosse,ed.,DeutschesJudentuminKriegundRevolution,137–317;Friedländer,NaziGermanyandtheJews,73–113.

134.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.80,160.135.Ibid.ThisextremelanguageunderlinedBubenhöfer'saffinitytoNationalSocialism,afactfurther

highlightedbyhisstatementsoneugenics(160–162),wherehespeaksof“Aufnordung”(160)andthe“forciblesterilizationofallracially-inferiorelements”(160verso),aswellasoftheneedfor“gradualde-urbanization,”since“thelargecities...ultimatelymeanthedeathofapeople”(160verso).

136.Ibid.,160verso-161.So,forexample,whenhequotedinobviousaffirmation:“Itisnotthatwehavelostthewarinspiteofoursocialwelfarelegislation,butbecauseofit.”NationalSocialistswouldalsohardlyhavespokenofthe“futileandimmoralequal,direct,andsecretfranchise”(161).

137.Malinowski,VomKaiserzumFührer;HeikeStröhle-Bühler,StudentischerAntisemitismusinderWeimarerRepublik(Frankfurt,1991);andHelmaBrunck,DiedeutschenBurschenschafteninderWeimarerRepublikundimNationalsozialismus(Munich,1999).OntheantiSemitismoftheWeimarBildungsbürgertumseeMommsen,TheRiseandFallofWeimarDemocracy,304–305;andWinkler,Weimar1918–1933,293–294.

138.11April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,52.AltenburginThuringiahad42,570inhabitantsin1925;seeStatistischesJahrbuchfürdas

DeutscheReich,52(Berlin1933),11.139.3May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,

no.48,51:“Inthemeantime,thenumbermayhavedecreasedfurther.Totalelimination,however,canbeachievedonlygradually.”

140.SebastianHaffner,Germany:Jekyll&Hyde.1939—Deutschlandvoninnenbetrachtet(Berlin,1996).ThebookwasoriginallywritteninwartimeEnglandin1939–1940.Haffneremphasizedthe“fundamentalimportanceofantiSemitismfortheNazis,”whichhadthefunctionofweldingthemtogether“throughanironchain”ofjointlycommittedcrimes:“DerAntisemitismusdientwiebestimmteMut-undBewährungsproben,dievorderAufnahmevonKandidatenindiealtenRitterordenoderdiemodernenGeheimbündezurFeststellungderVerschwiegenheitunddesGehorsamsangewendetwurden,derAusleseundPrüfung.DiePrüfungzurFeststellungderEignungalsNaziistjedochkeineMutprobe,sonderndientdemNachweisderSkrupellosigkeit”(70).

141.Traditionally,theDNVPhadbeenmostsuccessfulinPomerania.IntheelectionsfortheprovincialDiet,thepartyattainedthefollowingresults:48.5percentin1925,40.8percentin1929and,evenin1933,18.4percentofthevote.SeeFalteretal.,eds.,WahlenundAbstimmungen,104.

142.14February1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,147.

143.Ibid.,147verso.144.Ibid.145.21February1933atibid.,146–146verso.Anumberofyearspriorto1933,Behrendhadremarked

totheKolbergStahlhelmleaderthat“...withmynoseandmyancestrynoonecanexpectmetobeaGermanNational”(146).

146.Ibid.,146verso.147.GeorgvonZitzewitz,bornin1892,memberofthePrussianLandtag1932–1933,DNVPReichstag

deputyin1924and1933.148.21February1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,142.149.Ibid.VonHertzbergwroteaboutBehrendthathewasblacklistedbytheNazis“becauseheisa

half-JewandalsobehavedlikeaJew,”andwantedtousetheDNVP“inordertoprotecthimself.”150.2March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,141.151.Ibid.,140–140verso.Inhisdraft,Nagelwrotethatinthecaseofageneraldecisionagainstthe

acceptanceofhalf-Jews“inalllikelihoodagreatmanyveryvaluablemembersmightbelosttous.”Heomittedthissentence,whichmightwellbeinterpretedas“pro-Jewish,”fromthefinaltextoftheletter.Eveninintrapartycorrespondence,fearofappearingtoofavorablydisposedtowardwhatnowhadbecomethe“nationalenemy”wasall-pervasive.

152.23March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,136.

153.Ibid.154.2May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,

no.48,29.155.10May1933atibid.,28.Heretheapplicantisrejectedwithreferencetothestatutes.156.12May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,17.157.26May1933atibid.,16.Thesestallingtacticsarefrequentlyemployed.Onecaseinpointisthat

oftheGelsenkirchenphysicianDr.Block,whowrotetotheDNVPheadofficeon1March,askingwhethertheDNVPwouldacceptJews.Herequestedanimmediateanswer“sinceSundayiselectionday.”Thenegativeresponsefollowedonlyon5April,thatis,amonthaftertheelections.SeeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R8005,no.48,93–94.

158.27March1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,125.Thelargenumberofapplicationsformembershipisexplainedbythe(erroneous)beliefthatmembershipintheDNVPwouldofferprotectionfromNaziviolence.

159.Ibid.,26–27.160.14May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,Kirchen-undReligionsangelegenheiten,”R

8005,no.48,25.161.Scholder,DieKirchenunddasDritteReich,364–401;DonaldM.McKale,“FromWeimarto

Nazism:AbteilungIIIoftheGermanForeignOfficeandtheSupportofAntiSemitism,1931–1935,”LBIYB32(1987),297–308.

162.Mosse,“DiedeutscheRechteunddieJuden,”note24.

ChapterVI

REBELLIONAGAINSTTHEINEVITABLETheTribulationsofSpring1933

AtthebeginningofApril1933,MajorHansNagel,thegeschäftsführendesVorstandsmitglied(partymanager)oftheDNVPinBerlin,receivedalongregisteredletterfromtheDNVPKonstanzdistrictassociation(onLakeConstance),whichreflectedthemoodamongthatdistrict'spartymembers.1AtafunctionorganizedbytheKonstanzchapteroftheconservativeBerlinHerrenclub2on18March,aGermanNationalspeakerfromBerlinhadarguedthattheDNVPReichstagfactionwascurrentlydividedintothreegroups:thefirstwasmadeupofHugenbergandhisfollowers,thoughHugenbergconcentratedalmostexclusivelyonhisvariousministerialoffices;thesecondandpresumablylargestincludedthosewho“advocatedimmediatefusionwithHitlerandtheNationalSocialists”;andthethirdhadformedarounddeputychairmanFriedrichvonWinterfeld,whowantedtocarrythepartyforwardasanindependentforce“inthespiritofOldPrussia.”3Givencurrenttensionsandcontradictions,thespeakermaintained,itwasbutamatteroftimebeforetheDNVPwouldbewhollyabsorbedbyNationalSocialism.4Astheletterwriterreported,thisspeechofaDNVPrepresentativefromthecapitalcausedimmenseconsternationamongGermanNationalsinKonstanz.TheKonstanzdistrictassociationstronglyurgedthattheDNVPbepreservedasacounterweighttoNationalSocialism,forotherwisethedangerofaNazidictatorshipwouldbecomeveryreal,eventhough“thehighlydevelopedGermanVolkinitsintellectual,cultural,ethnic,andfinally,politicaldiversitywouldnevercountenanceafascistregimeandone-partydictatorship,nomatterhowthingsappearedatthemoment.WearenotItalians.”5TheunrestcausedinKonstanzbythisspeechwasheightened“bythesurprisingresignationofDr.Oberfohren,”chairmanoftheDNVPReichstagfactionandHugenberg'slongtimeconfidant.6TheunlawfulsearchoftheDNVPfactionleader'sofficeandhouse,followed

byhisresignationattheendofMarchandfinallyhisdeathon7May—the

circumstancesofwhichwereneverfullyclarified—inauguratedthebeginningofthelastchapterintheparty'shistory.ErnstOberfohren,borninMühlheim/Ruhrin1881andaGymnasiumteacherbyprofession,joinedtheDNVPshortlyafteritsfoundation,thenservedasamemberoftheNationalAssemblyandbecameDNVPReichstagdeputyforSchleswig-Holsteinin1920.7Intheintra-partystrifethatfollowedlossesintheMay1928Reichstagelection,OberfohrensidedwithHugenberg.AsHugenberg'sconfidant,hesucceededKunoGrafvonWestarpasReichstagfactionleaderinDecember1929.UntilHitler'saccessiontopower,OberfohrenwasknownasHugenberg'sintimateadvisorandclosecomrade-in-arms.Initially,despitereservations,healsoseemedtohavesupportedthealliancewiththeNSDAP,whichhesawasanopportunityfortheDNVPtoattaingoverningpoweratlonglast.8ThealliancewiththeNSDAP,however,musthavebeendifficultforOberfohrentoswallow,sincehehadbeeninvolvedinacrimoniousdisagreementswiththeNSDAPinSchleswig-Holsteinin1931and1932.AftertheReichstagelectionsofMayandDecember1924,theDNVPhadbecomethestrongestpartytherewith33percentofthevote,wellaheadofeventheSPD.9After1928,Oberfohren,muchtohischagrin,wasapowerlessonlookerastheNSDAPrapidlyunderminedthepositionofhisparty.IntheJuly1932Reichstagelections,theNSDAPgained51percentofthevoteinSchleswig-Holstein,whiletheDNVPwasreducedtoamere6.6percent.10OberfohrenalsohadtheopportunitytolearnfirsthandaboutNazi

machinations,giventhattheneighboringFreistaatOldenburghadhadaNationalSocialistgovernmentsinceMay1932.Dr.ErnstEvers,DNVPleaderfortheLübeckregion,whichatthattimewaspartofOldenburg(todaycomparableapproximatelytotheEutindistrict),gaveseveralspeecheswarningoftheviolentmeasuresusedbytheNazisinSchleswig-Holstein.11SincetheLübeck-EutindistrictoftheOldenburgterritorywassurroundedbySchleswig-Holstein,OberfohrenhadampleopportunitytobecomeacquaintedwiththerealityofNazirulewellbefore1933.TheruthlessnesswithwhichtheNazisexercisedtheirpowerinOldenburginthesummerandautumnof1932shouldhaveservedasaclearwarningtoallGermanNationals,sinceitexposedonlytooplainlytheunlawfulnatureofNationalSocialistrule.ThevindictivenessoftheNazigovernmentinOldenburgandOberfohren'stenserelationshipwiththeSchleswig-HolsteinGauleiterHinrichLohseservedtoincreasehismistrusttowardNationalSocialismanditsadherents.12ItisdifficulttodiscernwhichfactorwasmoreimportantinOberfohren'sdecisiontoagreeinitiallytohisparty'salliancewiththeNSDAP:hisloyaltytoHugenberg,towhomhewasbeholdenforhispositionwithintheparty,orthechancefortheDNVPto

participateingoverningthecountry.Itiscertainthatverysoonafter30January1933OberfohrenrealizedthatithadbeenamistaketotietheDNVPtotheNaziparty,andbymidFebruaryhealreadystartedtoopposeHugenberg'scourseandarguedvehementlyagainstatightalliancewithHitler.On10February,ReinholdQuaatznotedinhisdiary:“Fourhourlongfactionsession.StrongsentimentagainstHugenbergwhippedupbyOberfohren.”13On12February,OberfohrenopenlyexpressedhisoppositiontoHugenberg'spoliticalcourseinaconversationwithQuaatz.ThiswaspromptedbyHugenberg'sdemandthatallDNVPdeputiescommittoasolemndeclarationthatwouldcompelthemtosupportunreservedlyallCabinetdecisions.AccordingtoQuaatz,Oberfohrensaidthat“thiswouldbethedesiredwayoutforhim,”thatis,thefinalreasontobreakwithHugenberg.14ThedeclarationwasindeeddesignedtogiveHugenbergcarteblanche:“IherebygivemywordofhonortotheleaderoftheDNVPthat,inthecaseofmyelectiontotheReichstag,IshallunreservedlysupportthosemeasuresoftheCabinetofthegovernmentofnationalconsolidationdesignatedbyhim.”15Withthisdeclaration,Hugenbergobviouslywantedtoimposepartydiscipline:whoeverdidnotcomplywouldnolongerbeputontheparty'selectorallist.On7March,QuaatznotedthatOberfohrenseemedtobegainingsupporterswithinthepartyagainstHugenberg16andon12March,Hugenberg,nowfullyawareofthetreacherousbehaviorofhisfactionchairman,confidedtoQuaatz:“Oberfohrenwillnotagainbeelectedfactionchair.”17DespitehisstrongresistancetoHugenberg'spolicies,Oberfohren'sownviewswerejustasantiparliamentarianandopposedtoWeimardemocracyasHugenberg's.Atanelectionrallyon17February,forexample,hedeclared:“Oncewehavegainedamajority[on5March],wewillnotplaytheparliamentarygame.ThenanEnablingActwillbedrawnupandtheReichstagwillbesenthomeforoneortwoyears.”18Furtherdisagreementbrokeoutduringatumultuousfactionmeetingon20March:“Hugenberggaveaveryclumsyreport.Oberfohrenstirreduptrouble,”whileinanothermeetingtwodayslater,whichtookplacewithoutHugenberg,Oberfohrengot“thefactiontocomeoutinsupportofhim.”19Thisseemssurprising,giventhattensionmusthavearisenbetweenOberfohrenandtheDNVPparliamentaryfactionjustbefore22March,asformerchancellorHeinrichBrüningoftheCenterPartyreportedinhismemoirs.OnthebustriptotheceremonialopeningoftheReichstaginPotsdamon21March,“OberfohrenoftheGermanNationalfactiondidnotsitwithhisownfactionintheirbus,butinsteadsatbyhimselfinoneofours.”20Duringthenextfactionmeetingon24March,openconflicteruptedbetweenHugenbergandOberfohren,inthecourseofwhichHugenbergapparently

succeededingettingthefactiontosidewithhim.21Inthemeantime,ithadnotescapedtheNationalSocialiststhattheDNVPfactionchairmanhadbecomeadangerousopponent,whoagitatedagainstthemwithinhisparty.Oberfohren'sdisagreementswithHugenbergwerewellknownand,inthetenseatmosphereofMarch1933,whenNazisurveillanceoftheiropponentswastheorderoftheday,itwaspracticallytobeexpectedthatOberfohren'stelephonecallswouldbemonitored.22ThePrussianpolice,nowledbyaNationalSocialistasactingInteriorMinister(HermannGöring),werethusinformedofOberfohren'sactivitiesdowntothelastdetail.BeforehisreturntohisnativeKiel,OberfohrenhadalongphoneconversationwithhisBerlinsecretaryon26MarchtogiveherinstructionsaboutthecopyingandpossibledistributionoflettersdirectedagainstHugenbergfromhisopponentsinsidetheparty.23GöringimmediatelyorderedsearchesofOberfohren'sBerlinofficeandKielhouse;thesetookplaceon26and27March.24SeveraloftheletterswereseizedinearlyApril,andtheNazipaperBraunschweigerLandeszeitungpublishedexcerptsfromthemwithpiquant,unflatteringdetailsaboutHugenberg.DespitetheblatantbreachofOberfohren'simmunityasaReichstagdeputy,hisownpartyfailedtoprotesttheunlawfulactionsofthepolice.Nodoubtintimidatedbythisruthlessemploymentofstatepower,compromisedbytheletters,whichattheveryleastindicatedhisdisloyaltytowardHugenberg—anindelibleblotonone'sescutcheonamongconservativeswhoconstantlymouthedtheidealofNibelungentreue—andtotallydesertedbyhisparty,Oberfohrenbecameresignedtohispoliticalfate.AttheendofMarch,herelinquishedhisReichstagseatandwithdrewembitteredtoKiel.25WhenpressreportsaboutOberfohren'sresignationappearedon30and31March,therewasgreatsurpriseamongthegeneralpublic,especiallysinceon23March(followingtheDNVPfactionmeetingthathadgoneinOberfohren'sfavor)prematurereportsofhisre-electionasDNVPfactionchairhadappeared.26SpeculationastothereasonsbehindOberfohren'ssurprisingstepinitiallyledtoafutileguessinggame.27SincetheaccountsoftheBraunschweigerLandeszeitungregardingtheletterscriticalofHugenbergwerereprintedbyotherNationalSocialistnewspapers(especiallyinSchleswig-Holstein),HugenbergwascompelledtomakeapublicannouncementabouttheOberfohrenmatterataDNVPfactionmeetingon12April.Afterall,inlettersnowmadepublictherewastalktotheeffectthatHugenberg“wasuselessasaminister”andthathehadto“disappear.”28Presscoverageontheissuewasextensive,especiallyintheBerlinpress—theBerlinerTageblatt,the12UhrBlatt,andtheDeutscheZeitung—andmadethefrontpages.29Accordingto

extensive,mutuallycorroboratingnewspaperreports,whichreproducedHugenberg'sexplanationtotheDNVPfaction,OberfohrenwasdissatisfiedwiththepoliciesHugenberghadadoptedsinceHitlercametopowerandfreelygaveventtothesefeelingsduringhislastfactionmeetingof24March.DuringthesearchofOberfohren'soffice,anonymouscircularshadbeenunearthedthat,accordingtothesworntestimonyofOberfohren'ssecretary,hadbeendictatedbyOberfohrenhimselfandpreparedbyhimfordistribution.AccordingtoHugenberg,whoemphasizedthatthesearcheshadtakenplacewithouthisknowledge,Oberfohren'ssuddenresignationhadtobetakenasconfirmationofhissecretary'sstatementand,ineffect,asanadmissionofguilt.Theveryfactthatthechairmanoftheparliamentaryfactionhadconspiredagainsthim,Hugenbergcontended,madeitimpossibletoundertakeanylegalstepsregardingthe“doubtlesslyillegal”searches.30Inhispostasfactionchair,OberfohrenwassucceededbyOttoSchmidt-Hannover,31formerWorldWarIofficer,memberoftheDNVPReichstagfactionsince1924,andacloseassociateofHugenberg.Hugenberg'stacitadmissionthatpersonalanimositiesweremoreimportanttohimthanconstitutionalprinciplesisindeedrevealing.Sincehisformercomrade-in-armswasevidentlyintheprocessofbetrayinghim,Hugenberghadaready-madealibiforhisinaction:dueprocesscouldbedispensedwithinthecaseofbetrayal.Ontheotherhand,onemightarguethathewassimplyafraidtochallengeGöring,especiallysinceOberfohren'scareerhadendedanyway.32OnMonday8May,scarcelyamonthaftertheseevents,thepressreportedthat

theformerDNVPfactionchairman,Dr.ErnstOberfohren,hadshothimselfinhisKielapartmentanddied.33Murderasthecauseofdeathseemedmorelikelythansuicide,givenrecenthistory:Oberfohren'sknownaversiontoNationalSocialism,hishostilitytowardtheSchleswig-HolsteinGauleiterHinrichLohse,thecontinuouscampaignagainstOberfohrenintheNazipress,andtheever-spreadingNazidespotismandreignofterrorthathadalsoclaimednumerouscasualtiesinSchleswig-Holstein.34Toaddtoallthis,theentireSchleswig-HolsteinSAheldralliesinKielatwhichexplicitthreatsagainstopponentsoftheregimeweremade.35InDNVPcirclespeoplewereequallyreluctanttosubscribetothesuicideversion.Hugenberg,forexample,cautionedthepartyexecutiveboardduringtheDNVP'slastmeetingbeforeitsdissolution:“IfanyreportshouldbecirculatedinthenearfuturethatIwassaidtohavecommittedsuicide,pleasebeassuredthatthiswillnotbethetruth.”36ThetheorythatOberfohrenwasmurderedemergedinpassingafterthe

SecondWorldWarinmemoirsandhistoricalaccounts,whoseauthorsusuallymadereferencestoaquestionablesuicide.Inthesummerof1933theKPDhad

publishedaBraunbuchabouttheReichstagfireinwhichtheNaziswereaccusedofbeingthearsonists.Includedwastheso-called“OberfohrenMemorandum”thatallegedlyidentifiedNationalSocialistsastheperpetrators.AccordingtotheBraunbuch,Oberfohrenhadcollectedincriminatingevidenceinhiscapacityasthefactionchairofoneofthetwogoverningparties.Thisevidence,summarizedinhismemorandum,supposedlysealedhisfate,andasanopponentofNationalSocialismandabothersomewitnesstotheiractions,accordingtotheBraunbuch,hewaskilledbytheNazis.Duetoitscommunistauthorship,contemporariesdiscountedtheBraunbuchallegations,especiallysinceOberfohrenwasthennolongeralivetosetmattersstraight.In1962FritzTobiasfinallyrelegatedtheseandothercontentionstotherealmoflegend.37TodaythegeneralassumptionisthatOberfohrendidindeedcommitsuicide,aviewbolsteredbythetestimonyofOberfohren'swidow,whocategoricallyruledoutmurder.38ItstillremainsunclearwhenexactlyOberfohrenturnedagainstHugenberg,inwhatpoliticaldirectionhewouldhavesteeredtheDNVPfaction,whatactionshemighthavetakenagainsttheDNVP'spowerfulcoalitionpartner,andwhat,intheend,wasthedirectcauseofhisdeath—or—thereasonsforhissuicide.

“FalseFriends”:NazisTurnTheir“RevolutionaryFervor”againstGermanNationals

Oberfohren'sdeath,whichtheNationalSocialistpressunanimouslyinterpretedasasuicide,wasnaturallyexploitedforpropagandapurposes.Oberfohren,havingstudiedatseveraluniversities,epitomizedinmanywaysthetraditionalBildungsbürgerandthevaluesoftheintellectualelite,theBildungsbürgertum.IntheNazipresshewasnowportrayedasarelicofabygoneera,whosedemisewaslongoverdue,andhisdeathpresentedasasymptomofthedeepcrisisinwhichthebourgeoisiewasmired.Theageofabourgeoiswayoflife,includingbourgeoisbehavior,manners,andelitisteducation—themainpurposeofwhichwastoestablishandperpetuateclassbarriers—wasnow,sotheargumentwent,over.TheyouthofthenewGermanyrejectedthebourgeoisie,withitsoutmodedformalitiesandvalues,andlookeddownuponitsmembersasinferiorincharacterandpersonality.TriumphantlytheNazipressproclaimedthattheepochofbourgeoisarrogance,superciliousness,formalizededucation,ostentatiouswealth,andclassconceitwasnowconsignedtothepast.39InAprilandMay1933,theNationalSocialiststurnedtheirattentiontothe

DNVPasthemainimpedimentontheroadtocompletepowerandaccordingly

foughtthemateveryturn.Thisbattletookplaceinfullpublicview.Nazileadersmadenobonesaboutthefactthattheeliminationof“dieReaktion”—andbythattheymeanttheconservativeestablishment—wastheirnextobjective.“Everywhereamongthepeopleonespeaksofasecondrevolutionthatisabouttooccur,”JosephGoebbelsnotedinhisdiaryon18April:“Thismeansnothingelsethanthatthefirstrevolutionhasnotyetcometoaproperconclusion.WewillnowsoonhavetodealwiththeReaction.Therevolutionmuststopnowhere.”40Naziattacksagainsttheconservative“Reaktion”tookplaceonmultiplefronts,astheysimultaneouslyattemptedtoreplacetheGermanNationalPeople'sPartyasthepartythatrepresentedGermanconservativevaluesandtraditions,toremoveGermanNationalofficialsfrompoliticalandadministrativepositions,aswellaspostsinprofessionalassociations,andtointimidateorterrorizemembersoftheDNVPanditsaffiliatedorganizations.Inthefratricidalstruggleofnationalistforces,NationalSocialistsincreasingly

treaduponthetime-honoredturfofGermanNationalsandbegantopreemptnationalsymbolstraditionallyclaimedbyconservatives.ThegoalwastosupplanttheGermanNationalsasthemainstandard-bearersoftraditionalnationalsymbols,ofnationalism,andofaPrussianpastthatstoodformilitarymightandsuccess.ThoughtheNazisvehementlyattackedbourgeois,conservativevalues,theymadeeveryefforttoco-optsymbolsoftheGermanpastthathadcustomarilybeenassociatedwithconservatives.InSilesia,aformerstrongholdoftheGermanNationalsthatwasnowfirmlyinNazihands,theNSDAPemployeditspoliticsofsymbolstocontesttheDNVP'sclaimtobeheirtothetraditionofthewarsofliberationagainstFrancein1813.41AtthebeginningofApril1933,NationalSocialistscelebratedthe120thanniversaryoftheswearinginoftheLützowerFreikorpswithgreatpageantryandexploitedtheoccasionbyproclaimingthatthesamemartialspiritofrevolutionaryawakeningthathadanimatedLützow'svolunteercorps120yearsbeforenowpervadedtheNationalSocialistmovement.42In1813,asin1933,SilesiawasproclaimedtobethebirthplaceoftheGermannation.GermanNationals,whoattendedthecelebration,musthavebeenstruckbytheperversecombinationofsymbols:Luther'schorale“NundanketalleGott,”thehymnparexcellenceofpatrioticPrussians,wasfollowedbythe“HorstWesselLied,”theSAmarchingsongandNazihymn.TheNationalSocialistSilesianGauleiterandOberpräsidentofLowerSilesia,HelmuthBrückner,crownedtheparadoxicalspectaclebyendingtheceremonywithawarningagainst“false”friends.Theopenenemies,hesaid,hadbeentakencareof;nowitwastheturnofthefalsefriend,whomustbefoughtwiththesameruthlessness.43Thiswasanunmistakablereferencetothe

GermanNationals.FortheNazis,appropriatingnationalsymbolsandcelebrationswasameanstobolstertheirownlegitimacyandwasnecessarilydirectedagainsttheirownpoliticalally.Brückner'swordswerenohollowthreat.Inthespring,theDNVPBerlinheadquarters,othercentralpartyoffices,and

DNVPdeputiesfoundthemselvesswampedwithafloodofcomplaintsaboutNaziattacksfromallcornersoftheReich.Thistestifiedtothefactthatallwasnotwellbetweentheunequalcoalitionpartners.FriedrichvonWinterfeld,thedeputypartychairman,receivedalarmingreportsfromWiesbaden,accordingtowhichtheNSDAPhadinstigatedlocalcoupattemptsinthePrussianprovinceofHessen-NassautoremovetheincumbentLandräte(theheadsofcountyadministrations)andtakeovertheiradministrativeoffices.TheDNVPGauverbandWiesbaden,painfullyawareoftheimpotenceofitsownparty,requestedthatWinterfeldcontactPapenandaskforhisassistance.44Atthesametime,acomplaintwasdeliveredfromneighboringFrankfurttotheeffectthattheDNVPwaspassedoverasvacantmunicipalpostswerebeingfilled,eventhoughtheGermanNationalshadcompetentexperts,whowere“understandably”missingamongtheNazis:“Wehardlyhavethefeelingherethatwehaveabrotherpartynexttous,aswearesimplybeingpushedagainstthewall...”45TheDNVPHannoverEastLandAssociationinLüneburgreportedthatGermanNationalmayorsofruralcommunitiesmightdefecttotheNSDAPjusttobeconfirmedintheiroffices.Inseveralinstancesthishadalreadyhappened.Andatthehigherappellatecourt(Oberlandesgericht)inCelle,aGermanNationaljudgewasabouttobereplacedwithamemberoftheNaziparty.Unlessthesituationwasquicklyremedied,GermanNationalofficialswouldsoonbeoustedfromallinfluentialpositions.46FromMagdeburgcamethealarmingcommunicationthattheNaziGauleiterofMagdeburg-Anhalt,WilhelmLoeper,hadcirculatedallegationsinthelocalNazipressthattheSPDandDNVPwerevotingeachotherontomunicipalcouncilstokeepNationalSocialistsout.Loeperthreatenedthat“potentialtraitorstotheideaofthenationalrevolutionwouldbetaughtotherwise,”awarningaimeddirectlyattheGermanNationals.47FromBerlin,aDNVPdeputyofthePrussianparliamentreportedthatmanyteachersandothercivilservants,whohadtraditionallyleanedtothepoliticalleftbutsuddenlyswitchedallegiancetobecomenewlymintedNSDAPmembers,werenowgivenpreferenceoverexperiencedconservativecivilservantsintheappointmenttonewposts.Asaresult,theconservative,national-mindedelectoratefeltabandonedandhopedthatasolidlegalbasisforthe“nationalawakening”couldsoonbeestablished.48FurthercomplaintsarrivedfromThuringia,whereNationalSocialistsunderthedirectionofGauleiterFritz

Sauckelkeptgatheringsoftheex-servicemen'sorganizationStahlhelmunderclosesurveillance,allegedlytoforestalltheadmissionofMarxists.49InadisquietingdispatchfromEastPrussiaitwasmentionedthatNazistherewerewantonlytakingadvantageoftheiruncheckedpower,notpayingheedtotheordersfromthecountyanddistrictcouncilor(LandratandRegierungspräsident).DNVPmembershadthusbecomedefenselessprey50andfeltvirtuallyoutlawed.IntheNeumark(DNVPFrankfurt/OderLandAssociation),theadministrativeheadsofsmallcommunitieswerepracticallyforcedtoabandontheDNVPfortheNSDAPtokeeptheirposts,andmanyGermanNationalsjoinedtheNSDAPpurelyforfearofbeingdiscriminatedagainst.DNVPmemberstherenowseemedalmostcompletelybarredfromholdingpostsinmunicipaladministrations,51whileitwasalltooapparentthatlocalNazileadersopenlydisregardeddirectivesfromthepartyleadershipinBerlinthatwereaimedatmaintainingatrucebetweentheNSDAPandDNVP.FromthetownofArendseeintheAltmark,forexample,cameapleafor

assistancefromaGermanNationalmayor,who,fearingthelossofhispositionandpension,aswellastheinstigationofdisciplinaryproceedings,soughtprotectionfromthelocalNSDAP.52FromReichenbachintheSilesianErzgebirgecamethecomplaintthattheNSDAPwastryingtoplace“itsinexperiencedanduneducatedfunctionaries”intopositionseverywhere,while“national-minded,patrioticmenwerebeingmorefiercelyopposedthanMarxists.53Proteststhat“national-minded,patriotic”citizens,andnolongeronlyMarxists,hadnowbecometheprimetargetofattackswerevoicedfrequently.Thediscouragingrealizationthatnohelpcouldbeexpectedfromthepolice,whowouldnotevenfollowuponcomplaints,becamewidespread.54TheDNVPheadoffice,towhichmostcomplaintsweredirected,washardlyinapositiontoprovidehelp.Buteventhoughlittlecouldbedonetobringthereportedassaultsundercontrol,theywereatleastdocumented,andHugenbergcouldraisethismatterduringCabinetmeetings.SPDandCenterPartymembers,bycontrast,hadfarfewervenuestoairgrievancesorlodgecomplaints,andvirtuallynoopportunitytopublicizetheassaultsmadeagainstthem.Duringthemonthsoftheseizureofpower,especiallyinthespringof1933,manycrimesthusremainednotonlyunpunished,butalsocompletelyundocumented.

LossofInfluenceinEconomicandProfessionalOrganizations

Besidesanobviouslossofinfluenceinlocalpolitics,wheretheconservative

Bürgertumhadtraditionallybeenwellrepresented,GermanNationalswereevenoustedfromtheirtraditionalbastions—economicorganizationsandprofessionalandcivilserviceassociations.Asearlyas4April,atameetingintheReichChancellery,Hugenbergcomplainedthat“recentlySAmenhadarrestedleadersandaffiliatesofCommercialChambers,whowereregisteredmembersoftheDNVP.”HermannGöring,whoasprovisionalPrussianInteriorMinisterwasultimatelyresponsiblefortheseincursions,counteredthatthearrestsweremade“attheinstigationoftheresponsiblepublicprosecutor”(whichwasclearlynottrue)andthat,inanycase,thecompositionoftheChambersofCommerceinnowayreflected“currentpoliticalconditions,”sothatitwas“notpossibleforhimtorestraintheSA.”55GöringknewonlytoowellthatpracticallyallsuchactionshadtheirrootsindeliberateprovocationsbythelocalSA,andthatthemajorityofthearrestswerecarriedoutwithoutwarrants.Alltold,however,Hugenberg'sprotestsdidhavesomesuccess.AtaCabinetmeetingon22April,HitlerandGöringpromisedtotakethenecessarymeasurestostopinterferencewithbusinessassociationsandpublicauthorities.56Withimmediateeffect,subordinatebureausofNazipartyorganizationswerethereuponprohibitedfromappointingcommissioners,whomighttakeoverbusinesscorporations,banks,orprofessionalorganizationsandthusdisrupteconomicandpoliticallife.57Nevertheless,complaintsandcallsforhelpcontinuedthroughoutApriland

May.TheFrankfurtchairmanoftheReichsverbandDeutscherDentisten,AlexStein,forexample,complainedinalettertoHugenbergaboutNationalSocialistincursions.Inarecentmeetingofhisorganization,aspeciallydispatchedNazileaderhadannouncedthat,justasinparliaments,NationalSocialistsmustinthefuturecomprise51percentoftheexecutiveboardsofGermandentalassociations,58whichrequiredtheremovalofthecurrentGermanNationalchairman.Steinlamentedthatthewayinwhich“bigbrotherbulliesusaround”wasnolongerbearable.59Everyonewasafraid“tosuffereconomicharmiftheydidnotsidewithNationalSocialism.”60SteinconsequentlyrequestedthatHugenbergusehisinfluenceinsidethegovernmenttoensurethat“nomoreviolentintrusionsinprofessionalassociationsoccur...”61Anotherdentalassociation,theReichsverbandderZahnärzte,whichwasalsotobebroughtinlinewithNazipolicies,lodgedasimilarcomplaint.WhentheLübeckdentistKarlMausswaselectedexecutivechairmanofthedistrictchapterofthisassociation,attendingNazimembersrejectedtheoutcomewiththeargumentthatonlyanNSDAPmembercouldbeelectedexecutivechairman.Mausscomplainedabouttheabsurdityofdemandingsuchabiasedparty-politicalconnectionforarepresentativeofaprofessionalbody,especiallysincethere

wereonlyafewNazipartymembersamonghiscolleagues,andmostofthemhadjoinedonlyrecently.62Thesecaseswererepresentativeofamoregeneralphenomenon.DNVPmembersvoicedtheconcernthat“GermanNationalchairmenofcommercialandbusinessassociations,whoarenotexactlyfightersbynature,arelettingthemselvesberemovedfromofficetothedetrimentoftheGermanNationalcause.”63Andon12ApriltheLeipzigerNeuesteNachrichtenrananarticleundertheheadline,“TheBringingintoLineofCivilServiceOrganizations,”reportingthatanofficialannouncementhadbeenissuedintheLeipzigdistrictdeclaringthatprofessionalassociationsofindustry,commerce,andtradenowcouldbeheadedonlybymenwho“belongtotheNSDAPandtheDNVP,underthedirectionofNationalSocialists.”64Civilservantshadasmuchreasonforconcernasmembersoftheprofessions.TheleadersoftheDeutschnationalerLehrerbund(GermanNationalTeachersAssociation),forexample,complainedtoHindenburginearlyMaythatintheformationofthenewall-encompassingGermanErziehungsgemeinschaft(educationalcommunity),teacherswerenotallowedtobelongtoanypartyotherthantheNSDAP,andthatthoseteacherswhorefusedtojoinwouldlosetheirpositions.65EnclosedwiththecomplaintwasastatementofobligationtotheNSTeachersAssociation,whichallteachershadtojoin.66Butbynow,demandsofGermanNationalsforequaltreatmenthadbecomefutile.TheveryfactthatcomplainantsaddressedtheirappealstoHindenburgandnottoHugenberg—thechairmanoftheDNVP—wasclearevidenceofthepowerlessnessoftheparty.

PhysicalViolenceandtheThreatofArrestFear—andnotmerelyofdiscrimination—waswidespreadamongconservativesinthespringof1933.Thefearwaswellgrounded,sincethreatsofphysicalviolencehadbecomeadailyevent.NationalSocialists,forexample,vehementlyopposedtheformationofGermanNational“factorycells,”akindofworkers'committee,inpublicenterprises.TothwarttheformationofsuchcellswithinBerlin'sgreatpublictransportationcompany,theBVG,NationalSocialiststhreatenedGermanNationalworkersthattheywould“smashtopieceseveryboneintheirbodies.”67AnothercomplaintchargedthatNaziscounteredtheformationofGermanNationalfactorycellswithmeasuresthatsmackedofterror.68Infact,thecharacterizationofNazimeasuresasterroristinnaturewasnotinappropriate,asdocumentedinatwenty-fivepageletterfromHugenbergtoHitlerregardingamultitudeofviolentSAandSSattacksagainstmembersoftheDNVPanditsaffiliatedorganizations.69Amongotherthings,thisletter

recountedarrestsofGermanNationalKampfringmembersbytheSAandSSinMunich,arbitraryarrestsofDNVPmembersintheirprivateresidenceswithoutarrestwarrants,andtheexclusionofGermanNationalsfromprofessionalassociations.Manyoftheattacksweremarkedbyextraordinaryandgratuitousbrutality,suchastheassaultbytwenty-fiveSAmenonanelderlycoupleintheirhomeinLippe.70Assaultsoftengrewoutofpersonalanimosities.Muchpent-uphatredand

bitternesshadaccumulatedduringtheKampfzeit,the“yearsofstruggle,”whenNSDAPmembersandorganizationswereoftensuppressedandsubjectedtodiscrimination.Buttimeshadradicallychanged.71NowthattheNazimovementhadprevailedagainstalltheoddsandtriumphedoveritsadversaries,withitsleaderelevatedtothechancellorshipandholdinginhishandsplenipotentiarypowersthankstotheReichstagFireDecreeandtheEnablingAct,thetimeforrevengehadcome.WiththeKPDandSPDlargelyemasculated,theirleadersarrestedordrivenintoemigration,andtheCenterParty—astheEnablingActhadshown—amenabletocooperation,theprincipalremainingobstaclethatstoodbetweentheNazisandtotalpowerwastheDNVPand,morebroadly,theconservativeBürgertum,withitsfirmlyanchoredpowerbasisinlocalpolitics,themunicipalities,andinlocalanddistrictadministrations.TothesimpleSAman—uneducated,barredfrom“good”society,andfilledwithresentment,destructivefury,aparanoidfearofconspiracy,andhatredagainst“thoseupthere”—theconservativeBürgertumhadalwaysbeensuspect.Thecommunist“Rotfront”oftheHorstWesselLiedwasthenaturalenemy,buttheGermanNationalsandthosetheyrepresented—aconservativeBürgertum72thathadalwayslookeddownwithscornontheordinaryNationalSocialist—wereexecratedwiththegreatestofpassionbytheaverageSAtrooper.TheNazissuccessfullytappedintothisclassresentment:thevisceralhatredonthepartofthosepettybourgeoisoralreadyproletarianGermanswhofearedfurthersocialdeclinethatwasdirectedagainsttheestablishedBürgertum,eventhoughthatclasshadalsosufferedaprecipitouseconomicdeclinefollowingwar,inflation,anddepression.Theircommonnationalistorientation—thebondthatseemedtouniteNazisandtheconservativeBürgertum—paledbycomparisontotheseclass-basedanimosities.Now,inAprilandMay1933,membersoftheNSDAPandotherNaziorganizationscouldfinallydischargetheirpent-uphatredwithimpunityandcompleteabandoninthecertaintyoftheirnewlygainedstrengthandunassailability.TheNazileadership,forthemostpart,wouldhavepreferredtokeepalidontheseanimositiesuntiltheywereevenmorefirmlyensconcedinpower,buttheycouldnotalwayscontrolspontaneousoutbreaksoflocal

hostilitiesagainstGermanNationalsandtheirorganizations.EventhoughlittleappearedinthepressoreveninDNVPpartypublications,thenumberofincidentscontainedinthefileswaslegion.SincethevictimsoftheseviolentassaultswereGermanNationals,whosepartywasstillinagoverningalliancewiththeNSDAP,theruthlessnessandbrutalitywithwhichtheperpetratorsproceededisalmostbeyondbelief.AccordingtoareportbytheDNVPpartymanagerofEast-Saxony,forexample,fourmembersoftheGermanNationalKampfringweretakenintocustodybyNationalSocialistson22Aprilandthen“...putupagainstthewallandinterrogatedindividually,intheprocessofwhicheveryoneofthemwasfloggedwithlargewhipssothatallfourbearthemarkstothisday.”73Beatingswithrubbertruncheonsfollowed.OneofthefourwasconsignedtoHohnstein,arecentlyopenedconcentrationcampneartheFestungKönigstein,wherethebeatingcontinued;anothersufferedabursteardrumduringtheabuse,andathird,aseverelydisabledwarveteran,hadanervousshock.Thereportconcluded:“ConditionsintheDresdnerVolkshaus,andinHohnstein...andprobablyinotherplacesaswell,aresuchthattheyarecomparabletowhatweknowofCHEKAruleinRussia.”74Inhisrejoindertotheseaccusations,theNazipolicecommissionerofDresden,SAGruppenführerGeorgvonDetten,explained,notveryplausibly,thatthefourmembersoftheGermanNationalKampfringhadbeenexpelledfromtheSAbecauseof“irregularities,”andthatsomeofthemhadseveralpreviousconvictions,sothatthe“useofforcewasafterallunderstandable.”75Astoconcentrationcamps,nocomplaintshadbeenleviedsofar:“Wereceivedonthecontraryalargenumberofthankyoulettersofformerprotectivedetainees,whopraisedtheexemplarytreatmenttheyreceivedandespeciallycommendedtheexcellenteducationalworkperformedbytheguardsonduty.”76Detten'sreportwaspassedontoLammers,StaatssekretärintheReichChancellery,andtotheofficeoftheReichpresident.77VonDettenknewfullwellthathecouldgetawaywithsuchassertions.HedidnothavetoconvinceanyoneandcouldrelyonautomaticacceptanceofhisNaziphraseologyregardingthe“excellenteducationalworkoftheguards”—liesthatwerefedtothepublic.TheassaultonthefourGermanNationalKampfringmembersturnedouttobeunusualonlyinthatitcausedquiteastirand,throughthestatesecretariesLammersandMeissner,wasbroughttoHitler'sandHindenburg'sattention.78Evenpoliticalprominencedidnotprotectagainstassaults.Inaletterto

Hindenburg,PrussianLandtagdeputyPaulRüffer,oneofthefoundersandleadersoftheGermanNationalworkersmovement,complainedthathewasviolentlyattackedatarallyinHolsteinon11May,duringthecourseofwhich

hewasknockeddownbyyoungNazisandalmostthrowndownaflightofstairs.Since1918hehadspokenatnumerousrallies,oftensurroundedbyopponents,butnobodyhadeverdaredtolayahanduponhim.Now,asasixty-year-oldman,hehadtoundergothehumiliatingexperienceofgettingknockeddownby“young,immaturethugs.”79Theironythatmembersofhisparty'sownallyhadmetedoutthistreatmenttohimdidnotescapehisattention,thoughassaultsonGermanNationalswerenotinfrequent,forhehadnoticed“thatUnterführeroftheNSDAPsimplydonotfollowgovernmentalinstructions,butinsteadmadepoliticsofftheirownbat.”80HehadcontactedHindenburgdirectlysinceitwaswellknownthattheInteriorMinistrydidnotfollowuponcomplaintsregardingviolentattacks.81ThebrutalityofNaziattacksagainstGermanNationalsappearstomatchthat

usedagainstCommunistsandSocialDemocratspriortoApril1933.ByAprilandMay1933,whentheRepublicanpartiesandtheirorganizationshaddisappearedfromthestreets,itsleadersarrested,goneintohiding,oremigrated,theSAcouldtrainallitsaggressionontheGermanNationalsandtheirpoliticalmeetings.AtthebeginningofMay1933,forexample,theSAdisruptedaDNVPgatheringinBerlinthatwasguardedbyGermanNationalKampfstaffeln.Thepolice,calledintoprovideprotectionagainstthethreateninglygatheringSA,greetedthestormtrooperswith“HeilHitler”andleftthescene.82Momentslater,twohundredSAmenarmedwithpistols,blackjacks,brassknuckles,andotherweaponsstormedtheassembly.InthecourseoftheensuingbrawlwiththeunarmedKampfstaffelmembers,morethantwentyGermanNationalswoundupwithsevereinjuries—theSAevenbeatupthefirst-aidattendantsandambulancedrivers,whotriedtoremovethecasualties.Inadditiontoknockedoutteethandsevereinjuriestotheheadandabdomen,therewerealsoanumberofbulletwounds.83EventhoughtheGermanNationalsimmediatelyfiledchargesagainsttheSA,therewerefewillusionsthatthesewouldbeactedupon,letalonehaveseriousconsequencesfortheattackers.Suchincidentsnaturallygaverisetoall-pervasivefearandinsecurity.There

wasamplegroundforthis,giventhattheslightestcriticismofNazimeasuresoroppositiontotheiractionscouldresultinarrest.ThedeputychairmanoftheDNVPOrtsgruppeintheBerlinsuburbofBernauandStudiendirektoratthelocalGymnasium,Wullenweber,forexample,wasarrestedbecauseheallegedlyforbadehispupilstocollectmoneyforaHitlerportrait.Soonafterthearrest,however,itemergedthatWullenweberhadmerelyaskedafemalecolleaguenottocollectmoney,inordertoavoidtheunnecessaryexpenseforparents;insteadhewouldattendtotheHitlerportraithimself.WhentheDNVPpartymanager

MajorNagelwenttoBernautogetWullenweberreleased,thepoliceinformedhimthattheyhadinstructionstofollowNSDAPdirectives.84ThefactthataseeminglyinconsequentialincidentaboutaHitlerportrait,whichhadobviouslybeenbasedonamisunderstanding,couldleadtothearrestofan“upstandingpatrioticman,”aDNVPmemberwhohadasoundreputationasalocalGymnasiumteacher,musthavemadetheGermanNationalsacutelyawareoftheirprecariouspositioninapubliclifethatwasincreasinglymonopolizedbytheNazis.FortheGermanNationalsitwouldhavebeendifficult,ifnotimpossible,to

answerviolencewithviolence.Germany'sRechtsstaattradition,especiallyasemblazonedinthelegalisticthinkingoftraditionalconservatives,madeitdifficulttocounterviolentattacksdirectly,becausecountermeasuresrequiredlegalsanction.ForapartythatclaimedtorepresenttheBürgertumandtheconservativeupperclasses,civicpeace,order,andtheruleoflawweretoppriorities.Violencecouldnotspontaneouslybeansweredbycounterviolence,eveniftheopportunitypresenteditself.TheNationalSocialists,ontheotherhand,werenotrestrainedintheirconductbyanyscruples.ThecountlesslawlessactionsoflocalNazis,eventhoughrarelysanctionedbyanydirectivesfromBerlin,andoftenoriginatingfromthevindictivenessandpersonalambitionsoflocalNazileaders,furtheredthecauseoftheNazitakeover,sincetheyhadtheeffectofdrivingGermanNationalsfrompoliticalandeconomicpositionsofpower.Onthelocalandregionallevel,themonthsofAprilandMay1933thuswitnessedadramaticchangeintheactualbalanceofpower.AreporttoHugenbergfromKarlsruhe,thecapitalofBaden,vividlysummarizedtherealityontheground:“InBadenitisanalmostdailyoccurrencethatmayorsandmunicipalofficials—inmanycasesGermanNationals—aredeposedorarrestedbylocalNSDAPformations.SomeonefromtheranksoftheSAorSS,usuallywithoutamandate,arrivesatCityHallwithafewarmedfollowersandwithoutmuchadodeposesorarreststhemayor.Inquirieswiththedistrictofficerevealthatnoorderforsuchanactionwasissued.Onourappeal,mostofthosearrestedwerethenagainreleased,often,however,onlyafterdays.”85SimilarincidentsandacomparablemodusoperandiwerereportedfromallregionsoftheReich.SincetheGermanNationalswerealltooawareoftheembarrassingfactthattheyhadhelpedconjureuptheevilspirits,whichtheywerenowunabletoexorcise,somereportsareaccompaniedby(possiblyunconscious)excusesforNazibehavior,suchasthecommentthat“duringtimesofrevolution,someviolenttransgressionsareunavoidable.”86Tocountertheincreasingerosionofhispowerbase,HugenbergemphasizedinaspeechtotheDNVPReichstag

factionon11AprilthattheGermanNationalswere“fully-fledgedandself-confidentco-combatants”inthenationalrevolution:“WedonotbelongtothekindofpatheticBürgertumthatcowardlyretreatsfromthepositionentrustedtoitindifficultandturbulenttimes.”TheGermanNationals,heproclaimed,wereneededforGermany'sfuture:“Allrevolutionscarrywithinthemselvesthedangerthattheygooverboardandovershoottheirmark,thattheyendinradicalism,severancefromtheirhistory,andthusinspiritualandmaterialdestruction.”TheGermanNationals,Hugenbergargued,guaranteedthemaintenanceoforder,theruleoflaw,andthetransformationofthe“revolutionof1933”intoatruly“Germanresurrection.”87Yet,HugenbergrefusedtorecognizethatGermanNationalshadnopowertodeterminethecourseofthe“revolutionof1933,”whichwouldultimatelyturnagainstboththemandtheentireconservativeBürgertum.

TheVainStruggletoSurvive:GermanNationalsImitateNaziStyles

DuetoincessantNaziattacksandactsofviolenceagainstDNVPmembers;theNazis'successfulappropriationofGermantraditions;andtheerosionoftheDNVP'straditionalpowerbaseinsociety,localpolitics,andprofessionalorganizations,theidentityoftheconservativepartywasshakentoitsveryfoundations.AstheMarchelectionresultshadindicatedandassubsequentdevelopmentsfromthetakeoveroftheLändergovernmentstotheEnablingActhadmadecrystalcleartoeveryGermanNational,theNazipartyanditsorganizationswerethesingleenginedrivingthenationalrevolution.TheDNVPappearedtohavebecomepoliticallysuperfluous,especiallysincetheNSDAPnolongerneededconservativevotestoobtainamajorityintheReichstagaftertheKPDhadbeenbanned.TheNazishadsurpassedtheGermanNationalsinallareasofpoliticalcompetition,perhapsmostsignificantlyintheareaofsymbolicpolitics,thatis,inthemaintenanceandrespectfornationaltraditionsandfestivals,whichtheNazisstage-managedadroitlyandwithenormouspomp.ThegrandiosespectacleinPotsdam,withitsemphasisonthesymbiosisofformergrandeurandthenewspiritofthe“awakening”nation,hadshownthattheNaziswantedtocultivatethelegacyofthePrussianpast,appropriateit,andmanipulateittowardtheirownends.88UbiquitouspostersshowingFredericktheGreat,Bismarck,Hindenburg,andHitlernexttoeachotherintimatedahistoricalcontinuity,suggestingthatthesimplesoldieroftheWorldWarwastherightfulheirtothelegacyofthePrussianking,theIronChancellor,andtheField

Marshal.NationalSocialistpropagandanevertiredofevokingthecontinuitybetweenthe“new”GermanyandthePrussianpastandofstressingthemovement'sboundendutytoliveuptothePrussianheritage.Inanageofeconomicdepression,unemployment,andwidespreaduncertainty,allofwhichcontributedtodiscreditingtraditionalbürgerlichevalues,itisquiteplausiblethat—ifoneturnedablindeyetothecriminalbehaviorofitsmembers—theNazimovementappearedasamoretimelysuccessortoausterePrussiantraditionsthantheself-satisfiedandstolidhautebourgeoisie,whoseworldseemeddestinedtocrumbleinanycase.Inthespringof1933,politicallyguilelessandunsophisticatedindividualsmaywellhavebelievedinthepossibilityofblendingOldPrussiantraditionswithNationalSocialistideals.Marginalizedbythesuccessofthisstrategy,GermanNationalsdesperatelyfoughttojustifytheirlegitimacy.Theonlyrecourselefttothepartywastostressitsownpoliticalindispensability,eventhoughmanyofitsmembershadbeguntodoubtitthemselves.TheDNVPtriedtoproveitspoliticalvalueandpreserveitsidentityinthree

differentways.First,GermanNationalsstrenuouslypointedoutthattheEnablingActdependedonthecurrentcompositionoftheReichgovernmentandarguedthatwithouttheDNVPascoalitionpartner,theEnablingActwouldceasebeingvalid.89Thisassertionwasquestionablefromalegalstandpoint,sincetheconstitutionalscholarCarlSchmitthadalreadypointedoutthatevenwithHugenberg'sresignationfromthegovernmentthelawwouldnotautomaticallyloseitsvalidity.90Inthenon-GermanNationalpressitwasthusgenerallynotedthatHugenberg'sviewswere“constitutionallynottenable,”since“twoconstitutionalauthorities,CarlSchmittandKoellreutter,pointoutthatinthiscasethepresentgovernmentwouldberepresentedsolelybytheleaderoftheNationalSocialistmovement,AdolfHitler.”91Puttingasidelegalinterpretations,politicalrealitywouldsoonunmasktheabsurdityofHugenberg'shopesthattheDNVPcouldremainpoliticallysignificant.92Atthispoint,theNazishardlyrequiredlegaljustificationstosubstantiatetheirclaimtopower.BythebeginningofMay,aftertheenormouslysuccessfulMayDaycelebrationsandthecrushingofthetradeunionsthatfollowedthenextday,itbecameveryclearthattheNaziswouldneverallowanylegalconsiderationstoforcethemoutofthepositionstheyhadsosuccessfullyusurped.Asasecond,almostinstinctivemeansofunderscoringthenecessityoftheir

participationingovernment,GermanNationalpoliticiansstressedthedangerofforeignencirclement.InApril1933theyrepeatedlycalledforthedomesticunityofnational-mindedforcesinthefaceofforeignthreats.Thisreferencetoforeign

affairsthrewintotheforefrontthegreatcommondenominatorofthe“nationalfront”—thedemandfortherevisionoftheTreatyofVersaillesandtheregainingofGermanmight—whileemphasizingtheneedfordomesticpeace,anendtoNaziattacks,andthedecelerationof“therevolution”:93“Thetempoofdomesticreformshouldalsobelimitedinconsiderationofthedangerousforeignsituation.DesirestoorganizeandpropagandizemustbeofsecondaryimportancewhencomparedtothegreatgoaloftherevisionofVersailles,therecoveryoftheGermanrighttobeadequatelyarmed,andtherescueofthebleedingOstmark.”94Foreignencirclement,conjuredupbythe“callofradicalFrenchandPolishcirclesforapreventivewar”andan“Anglo-French-Americanunitedfront,”madedomesticunityofallnational-mindedandpatrioticforcesimperative.95ThenewDNVPfactionchair,OttoSchmidt-Hannover,inparticular,nevertiredofevokingthespecterofan“externalpoliticalthreattoGermany,”warningthat“French-Polishpolitics...aredesperatelylookingfortheopportunitytointerveneinGermandomesticdevelopments.”96Thisalsogavehimthechancetocallforafurtherbuildupofmilitaryarmaments,ademandthatsawhiminfullagreementwithhiscoalitionpartner.Thirdly,inthehopeofsharinginthesuccessofNationalSocialism,the

DNVPfranticallyattemptedtoconformtothenewZeitgeistbyalteringitsorganizationalstructureandrevitalizingitspresentationalstyle.InthecourseoftheMarchelectioncampaignithadbecomepainfullyapparentthattheDNVPhadlittletoofferthosewhoweregrippedbyferventexcitementoverthenationaluprising.IncontrasttotheNaziparty,theDNVPwasfarfrombeinganysortof“communityofstruggle”(theconceptofKampfgemeinschaftwasfrequentlyevoked),anditcouldalsohardlybedescribedasa“modernactivistcommunalmovement,”intowhichGermanNationalssuchasEduardStadtlerwantedtomoldit.97Hugenberg'smuch-vauntedFührertumlackedcharismaandwasunabletoinspirethecommitmentandspiritofsacrificethatwassocommonamongNationalSocialists.98TheDNVPnowtriedtocompensateforitslackofdynamismwithorganizationalstrengths.AtthebeginningofApril1933,newGermanNationalprofessionalorganizationswerecalledintolifethatweremodeledonthoseoftheNSDAPordirectlycopiedfromtheNazioriginals.Thiswasmorethananefforttoorganizeparty-dependentprofessionalassociations.InthefinalinstanceitwasnothinglessthantheendeavortotransformtheDNVPfromatraditionalpoliticalpartyintoamovement,onewithanall-encompassingworldviewinthemanneroftheSocialDemocratsortheNationalSocialists.99On4April,theReichAssociationofGermanNationalJuristswasformed,

andfourdayslatertheUnionofGermanNationalEconomists;thiswasfollowedbytheReichAllianceofGermanNationalPhysiciansandtheAssociationofGermanNationalVeterinarians.100Inaddition,theDNVPalsoinstitutedtheNationalSocialistleadershipprinciple.101Adecreepasseddownbythepartyleadershipon18Aprilorderedthat,fromthispointon,currentchairmenofDNVPLandAssociationsandcountyandlocalgroupswouldnolongerbeelected,butappointedbythe“leader”ofthenexthigherorganizationallevel.Theyalsocouldberemovedfromtheirpostatanytime.CloselyfollowingtheNazimodel,theirofficialdesignationswerechangedto“Landesführer,KreisführerundOrtsgruppenführer.”102TheboardsofLandAssociations,county,andlocalgroupswerechangedtoadvisorycommittees(Beiräte):“TheBeirätearetogivecounsel;theFührerwillmakethedecisions.”103FortheDNVP,thiswasmorethanjustabreakwithpartypractice;itwasabetrayalofalongstandingPrussiantradition.Evenintheheydayofitsrule,inthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury,thesupposedlystaunchlyauthoritarianPrussianbureaucracyhadalwayspracticedthe“collegiate”principle:104itwasnottheleaderofthecollegiatebody,theRegierungspräsident,whomadethedecision(aswasthecaseintheFrenchprefecturesystem),butthemajorityinthecollegeofcouncilors.The“Führer”principlewascontrarytoPrussianpoliticaltraditionsand,infact,deeplyun-Prussian.Insomeinstances,GermanNationaladaptationtoNationalSocialistways

wentfurtherthanorganizationalchanges;itincludedconversionsinlanguageandpatternsofthought.On8May1933,forexample,theDNVPReichenbachdistrictassociationinSilesia105senta“resolution,”thatis,aprogrammaticstatement,toVolkskanzlerHitlerthatcondemnedclasshatred,alongwiththementalityofclassstruggleand“classconceit,”whileaccentuatingNationalSocialist“values,”suchas“personality”andthe“performanceprinciple.”106TheultimategoalofthismissivetoHitlerwastounderscorethedemandforequalitywiththe“brothers-in-armsoftheNSDAP,”somethingthathadlongsinceceasedtobeself-evident,andtoemphasizethatGermanNationalsnolongerlingeredin“reactionary”modesofbehaviorandthought.TheGermanNationalsfromReichenbachhopedtoattainequaltreatmentbyprofferingassuranceofunquestioningloyaltyintheiralliancewiththeNSDAP,wherebytheirself-denialwentsofarastoextolvaluesandemploywordsthatwerestrikinglysimilartothosepropagatedbyNationalSocialism.Yet,despitealladversitiesandattemptstoadapttoNazimethods,eveninthe

springof1933theDNVPstillhadnotentirelylostitswilltoself-assertionand,insomeinstances,evenresistancetoitsoverpoweringally.InmidApril,ina

loudlyadvertisedreckoningwiththeirownpast,GermanNationalsboastedthattheyhadnowstreamlinedtheirorganizationandstillremainedlegitimatebearersofthenationalidea.107ClearlineswerealsothendrawnbetweentheDNVPanditsally:thepartyhadneverbeensimplyabiginterestgroupbut,fromthestart,ithadbeencommittedtothesupreme“idealsofnationalismandthenationalcommunity.”Forthisreason,theDNVPsawnoneedtopayanyheedtothe“callowrascals”oftheNSDAP,youngthugswhohadrecentlyjoinedtheNazipartyandnowindulgedinanoverzealousnationalism.WithouttheDNVP,“withoutitsstruggle,withoutitsparliamentaryventures,everythingthattodayistakenforgranted,everythingthattodayasuspiciousflag-wavingchauvinism,shoutingitselfhoarse,canfreelyexpress,mightbecompletelysilencedandforgotteninGermany.”108AslateasearlyMay1933,theheadofthePomeranianLandAssociation,GeorgvonZitzewitz,sharplydistancedhimselffromNationalSocialism.AtagatheringofPomeraniancountyleaders(Kreisführer)inStettin,heassertedthatthe“PrussianconservativeMensch”wasbound“totheGod-givenorderofthestateinLutheranfreedom.”109Onthesegroundsalone,hewasobligedtoreject“collectivism”and“levelingtendencies”—aclearimplicitcritiqueofcollectiviststreaksinNaziideology.VonZitzewitzclaimedthatbecauseoftheirlongstandingaffiliationwiththenationalmovement,GermanNationalsperceivedanyviolationofequalityasaflagrantinjustice.110Butsuchcriticalvoiceswereintheminority.AtameetingoftheDNVPleadershipon3May,participantsagreedtochangetheirparty'snametoDeutschnationaleFront(DNForGermanNationalFront),whichamountedtoafurtherconcessiontotheNazimovementandafinalrenunciationofthemultipartystate.111ThegroundsprovidedforthisactionwerethattothosewhohadbandedtogetherintheDNVPto“fightagainsttherepublican-democraticsystem...thepartywasneveranendinitself,butinsteadanecessarymeasuretosurviveonthebattlefieldoftheparliamentarystate.”112Atthesametime,DNVPleaderstriumphantlyproclaimedthat“thedemocraticparliamentarysystemofWeimarisdead.”113Themoreprescientmembersofthenow-renamedDNFmusthaverecognizedbythispointthatthecompletedemiseofthe“system”ofWeimarwasnotnecessarilyadvantageoustotheirfateortothatoftheirGermanNationalFront.InthefirsthalfofMay,theNazipress,sensingtheinnateweaknessofthe

GermanNationals,initiatedamajoroffensiveagainstHugenbergpersonally,throwingaspersionsonhisprofessionalcompetenceasagovernmentminister,coupledwithdemandsthathebereplacedbyaNationalSocialist.On9May1933,forexample,theNationalSocialistOberbürgermeisterofHagenin

WestphaliasentatelegramtotheReichGovernmentthatwaswidelycirculatedintheGermanpress,inwhichhedemandedHugenberg'sdismissalfromthegovernment,allegingthathenolongerenjoyedthesupportofworkingGermans.114WhetherthisdemandreallyarosespontaneouslyfromwithintheHagenNSDAP,astheOberbürgermeisterclaimed,orwhetheritwas“ordered”bytheNazileadershipremainsopentointerpretation.TheHagenincidentattractednationwideattentionandwasbynomeanstheonlyoneofitskind.TheGermanNationalFrontansweredsuchattacksbyinsistingthatHugenbergwasindispensableasaFachminister(departmentalminister)whoenjoyedthefulltrustofReichChancellorHitler,andbyrevertingtotheusualspecterofexternalthreats.Internaldiscordhadtobeavoidedatallcost,theargumentran,sincethecurrentpoliticalsituation“wasofthegreatestconcern,”giventhat“Germany'ssituationisdeadlyserious.Atthemoment,ittolerateslessthaneverincitationofthemasses.”115TheincreasingattacksontheGermanNational“leader”wereanswered,inthesecondhalfofMay,withafloodofdeclarationsaffirmingsteadfastsolidaritywithHugenberg.116AsapracticaldefensemeasureagainstNaziattacks,GermanNationalsorganizedassembliesinvariouspartsoftheReichatwhichparticipantssolemnlypledged“unswervingallegiancetoHugenberg.”117AcharacteristicincantationcamefromtheGermanNationalcountygroupofNiederbarnim:“FacedwiththemightygoalanddifficulttaskoftheprotectionofGermany'sbordersandGermanstates,allinternalconflictmustcease.”118Alltheseaffirmationsandtestimonialsofsolidarity,loyaltyoaths,and

demandsforequalitywerealaststandagainstanendthatwasdrawinginexorablycloser.AspeechbyJosephGoebbelson19MayinBerlinregardingthe“currentstateoftheGermanrevolution”illustratesjusthowhopelesstheDNVP'soverallpositionhadbecomebythesecondhalfofMay.119GoebbelsbarelymentionedtheNSDAP'sGermanNationalcoalitionpartner,butinsteadmaintainedthat“theNationalSocialistmovementhasbecometheStateitself.”120TheinnerrationaleunderwhichtheNSDAPoperatedheretoforewouldnowbeappliedtothe“entirestructureoftheStateandthepeople,”andthiswasadevelopmentthatcouldnaturallybebroughttoitssuccessfulconclusiononlybyNationalSocialists.121Goebbelscontinuedthattheremustneverbeanydoubt“thatthisnewStatehasbeenhard-wonbyaminority,”whichnowintendedtorealizethefruitsofitslabor.WhileNationalSocialistsdidnotwant“toexcludeanyonefromtheVolkatlarge,”theyalonehadtherighttodeterminehowtheStateshouldbe“constitutedinternallyandexternally.”122

GoebbelsaimedhisspeechsolelyathisNaziaudience—theGermanNationalFront,stilltheNSDAP'scoalitionpartner,wasnotmentioned.Theomissionwasareflectionoftheparty'sincreasinglyominoussituation.Butthen,bythesecondhalfofMay,theNazishadalreadybeguntoinitiatebansagainstDNFmeetings,andanumberofprominentGermanNationalshaddefectedtotheNSDAP.ThedemiseoftheDNF,andthetraditionoftheGermanNationalbrandofconservatismithadcarriedwithit,wasnowwellwithinsight.

1.MajorHansNagel,born1872,retiredarmymajor.2.TherewerebranchesoftheHerrenclubthroughouttheReich.Mostlyconservativeinorientation,the

clubsoughttobringtogethernotonlypartymembersbutalso“personalitiesfrombusiness,politics,artsandsciences,publicadministrationandthemilitary.”Forageneralcharacterization,seeFritzGünthervonTschirschky,ErinnerungeneinesHochverräters(Stuttgart,1972),56–60.

3.4April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,KriseninderPartei,”R8005,no.11,6–11.ThespeechwasgivenbyaDr.SieversataclosedmeetingoftheKonstanzbranchoftheHerrenclub.

4.Ibid.,8.5.Ibid.,10.6.Ibid.,8.7.PeterWulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVPamEndederWeimarerRepublik,”inErichHoffmann

andPeterWulf,eds.,WirbauendasReich.AufstiegundersteHerrschaftsjahredesNationalsozialismusinSchleswig-Holstein(Neumünster,1983),165–187.

8.Ibid.,179.9.JürgenFalteretal.,eds.,WahlenundAbstimmungeninderWeimarerRepublik.Materialienzum

Wahlverhalten1919–1933(Munich,1986),70.IntheelectionstotheNationalAssembly,theSPDhadobtained45.7percent,asopposedto7.7fortheDNVP;inMay1924,theDNVPhadsurpassedtheSPD,by31to24.9percent;inDecember1924theratiowas33to30.3.Ibid.,67–70.

10.Ibid.,71–75.WhereastheNSDAPobtainedonly4percentinSchleswig-Holsteinin1928(comparedwith23fortheDNVP),itattained27percentinSeptember1930(DNVP6.1)and51percentinJuly1932(DNVP6.6).ThatthesamevoterssupportedthetwopartiesbecameapparentintheNovember1932elections,whentheNSDAPdroppedto45.7percentwhiletheDNVPincreaseditsshareto10.3.

11.LawrenceD.Stokes,“ConservativeOppositiontoNazisminEutin,Schleswig-Holstein,1932–1933,”inFrancisR.NicosiaandLawrenceD.Stokes,eds.,GermansagainstNazism.EssaysinHonorofPeterHoffmann(NewYorkandOxford,1990),37–57.

12.SeeWulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP.”HinrichLohse(1896–1964),whohadbeenGauleiterinSchleswig-Holsteinsince1925,becameOberpräsidentoftheprovinceon29March1933;later,fromNovember1941to1944,hewasReichCommissarfortheBalticcountriesandBelarussia(ReichskommissariatOstland).SeeHermannWeiß,ed.,BiographischesLexikonzumDrittenReich,2nded.(Frankfurt,1998),304–305;RobertS.Wistrich,Who'sWhoinNaziGermany(LondonandNewYork,1995),159.

13.WeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,233.14.Ibid.,diaryentryof12February1933,234.15.Ibid.,244,note50.16.Ibid.,diaryentryof7March1933,229.17.Ibid.,diaryentryof12March1933,241.18.FrankfurterZeitung,Nr.133,18February1933,citedinMorsey,“Das‘Ermächtigungsgesetz’vom

24.März1933,”25,note1.19.Quaatz,diaryentryof22March,inWeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,243–244.Even

thoughOberfohrenandQuaatzhadfewcommonpointsofreference,Brüningmentionsbothinthesamebreathinhismemoirs,praisingthemasindependentfinancialexperts:“FormensuchasOberfohrenandQuaatz,aswellasHilferdingandHertzoftheSPD,itwasultimatelynotsoimportantwhichpartiesformedthegovernment.Whatmatteredtothemwasattainingaguaranteeofloyalcooperationandaresponsiblefiscalpolicy.”HeinrichBrüning,Memoiren1918–1934(Stuttgart,1970),115.

20.Brüning,Memoiren,657.Sincespecialbuseshadbeenrentedforeachparty,Oberfohren'sactionwashighlyunusual.

21.Wulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP,”182.22.FritzTobias,DerReichstagsbrand.LegendeundWirklichkeit(Rastatt,1962),174–175.23.ThesewerelettersfromDNVPmemberscriticalofHugenberg,whichOberfohrenhadcollectedfor

furtherdistribution.SeeWulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP,”182–184.24.Ibid.,183–184.HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”596,datesthehousesearches29and30March.

Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,121,andHans-UllrichThamer,VerführungundGewalt.Deutschland1933–1945(Berlin,1986),286,alsodatetheofficesearchon29March.ThesurveysbyBroszatandThamerpresumablyfollowedHillervonGaertingen,whereasWulfcarriedouthisownarchivalresearchinSchleswig-Holsteinandmaythereforebeconsideredthemostreliablesource.AccordingtoWulf,thesearchinOberfohren'sBerlinofficealreadytookplaceon26March,thatofhisKielapartmentonthemorningof27March;seeWulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP,”183.

25.Wulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP,”184.26.See,forexample,“Dr.OberfohrenwiederVorsitzenderderdeutschnationalenReichstagsfraktion,”

PommerscheTagespost,23MarchatBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,6.

27.See,forexample,“MandatsniederlegungdesdeutschnationalenFraktionsführersDr.Oberfohren,”DeutscheZeitung,30March1933;“UnsereMeinung,”DeutscheAllgemeineZeitung,31March,atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,”R8034II,no.9021,ibid.

28.Wulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP,”184,note84.29.ThesearticlesarecollectedinBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVP

Parteitage,”R8034II,no.4334,65–66;and“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,7–9.OntheOberfohrencase,seealsoLeopold,AlfredHugenberg,148–150andHillervonGaertingen,“DieDeutschnationaleVolkspartei,”596–597.Karl-DietrichBracher,StufenderMachtergreifung(Berlin,1974),291,merelystatesthatOberfohrenhadbeen“replaced”byOttoSchmidt-Hannoveron11April1933anddoesnotmentionthatheresignedhismandate.

30.Accordingtoidenticalreportsof12Aprilinthe12UhrBlatt,theDeutscheZeitung,DerTag,andtheMünchen-AugsburgerAbendzeitung,Oberfohrendisputedthechargeofwritingthecircularshimself.SeeLeopold,AlfredHugenberg,255,note64.

31.OttoSchmidt-Hannover(fromtheelectoraldistrictHannover),born1888(therewasanotherSchmidtintheDNVPfactionwhohailedfromNeukölln).AccordingtoSchmidt-Hannover'smemoirs,UmdenkenoderAnarchie(Göttingen,1959),349,Oberfohrensuffereda“mentalandphysicalcollapse”on22March,whichseemshardlylikely,sinceOberfohrenparticipatedinthepartyfactionmeetingof24March.Schmidt-HannoveralsoarguedthatOberfohrenblamedHugenbergforremaininginthegovernmentaftertheReichstagfiresincehebelievedthatNazishadsettheblaze.

32.On11AprilHitlerappointedGöringtotheofficeofdeputyReichCommissarandMinisterPresidentofPrussiaafterFranzvonPapenhadresignedasPrussianReichCommissaron7April.InhisnumerousproteststoHitlerandGöringaboutNaziattacks,HugenberghadalwaysbeenconcernedsolelywithDNVPmembers.Heneverprotestedtheprincipleoftheseattacks,thatis,heneverdefendedtheabstractideaoftheRechtsstaat,eventhoughitwasgenerallyexpectedthattheDNVPwouldupholdrechtsstaatlicheGrundsätze.

33.SeeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,30.Oberfohren'sbodywasdiscoveredbythemaid,sincehiswifewasawayfromhomeatthetime.OnOberfohren'sdeath,seealsoFritzTobias,TheReichstagFire(NewYork,1964),104–109.

34.SeealsoSchmidt-Hannover,UmdenkenoderAnarchie,350,whoarguesthatsuicidewouldnothavebeencompatiblewithOberfohren'sreligiousbeliefs.

35.Wulf,“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP,”186;Schmidt-Hannover,UmdenkenoderAnarchie,350;HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”606.

36.Schmidt-Hannover,UmdenkenoderAnarchie,354.37.FritzTobias,DerReichstagsbrand.LegendeundWirklichkeit(Rastatt,1962),171–192;Wulf,

“ErnstOberfohrenunddieDNVP,”166.FortheEnglishtextofthe“OberfohrenMemorandum,”seeFritzTobias,TheReichstagFire(NewYork,1964),293–312.FirsthintsoftheexistenceofaconfidentialnotethatchargedtheNaziswithsettingfiretotheReichstagappeared(withoutnamingnames)intwoarticlesintheManchesterGuardian.TobiasminutelyspecifiestextualcontradictionsandinconsistenciesandshowsthattheawkwardstyleofthememorandumcannotbereconciledwithOberfohren'sexcellentformaleducation.(“Infact,theGermantextoftheMemorandumwaswrittenbyanuneducatedhackandcouldnotpossiblyhavestemmedfromthepenofDr.Oberfohren,whohadstudiedattheUniversitiesofBerlin,BonnandKiel.”Tobias,ReichstagFire,110).

38.DerSpiegel,no.48(1959),49;HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”606,note7.Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,121,writesofthe“mysterioussuicide”ofOberfohren.Tobiasreferstothewidow'sletter:“MyhusbandwasnotkilledbytheNazis;however,hefelthehadbecometheobjectofacampaignofpersecutionand,realizingthattheNazidictatorshipwasboundtoleadtodisasterforGermanyandherpeople,hecommittedsuicideinblackdespair.”Tobias,TheReichstagFire,109.On3May,Oberfohrenalreadyhadmentionedsuicidetoajournalistandspokenofthecountlessthreatsmadeagainsthim.InalettertoHugenberg,publishedbytheGermanNationalpressserviceadayafterOberfohren'sdeath,Oberfohrenhadspokenofhisinneranguish(“Imyselfhavesufferedalmostsuperhumanagoniesduringthelastfewweeks...”Tobias,ibid.,108–109).

39.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivdesReichslandbundes,NationalsozialistenundDNVP,”Vol.II,16September1932–13July1933,”R8034II,no.9030,183;“DasEndedesBürgers.ZumSelbstmordDr.Oberfohrens,”9May1933.

40.JosephGoebbels,VomKaiserhofzurReichskanzlei.EinehistorischeDarstellunginTagebuchblättern(Munich,1940),300.

41.InprovincialdistrictelectionsinLowerSilesia,theDNVPgained26percentofthevotein1925,22in1929,and9in1933;theNSDAPobtainedamere5.2percentin1929,but51.7in1933.SeeFalter,“WahlenundAbstimmungeninderWeimarerRepublik,”105.

42.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,43.TheFreikorpsofAdolfFreiherrvonLützow(1782–1834)wasasymbolofmassrebellionagainstNapoleon,thoughitisdebatablewhethermassrevoltsevertookplace.Knownasthe“BlackBand”becauseofitsuniforms,itattractedmanystudentsandoftenoperatedbehindenemylines.See“120-JahrFeierderVereidigungdesLützowerFreikorps,”SchlesischerVolksbote,no.79,3April1933.

43.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,43.HelmuthBrückner,born1896inPeilau/Silesia,diedinaSovietcamp,probablyin1954.OfficerintheFirstWorldWar;laterparticipatedinUpperSilesianborderskirmishes.NSDAPReichstagdeputysinceSeptember1930,from25March1933OberpräsidentofLowerSilesia;expelledfromthepartyinDecember1934inthewakeofeventssurroundingtheRöhmputsch.

44.8April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,61–61verso.“GauverbandWiesbadenanDr.v.Winterfeld.”

45.8April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,62–62verso,“CarlHillanExzellenzHergt.”

46.5April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,65–68.

47.7April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,87.“AnrufFischerMagdeburg.”SeealsotheMagdeburgerTageszeitungof9April.TheSPDwasoutlawedon22June1933.Inhisappealtohis“partycomrades,”Loeperwrote:“Sincethiskindofbetrayal

ofthenationisdirectedagainstthenationalrevolution,Iaskyoutotakethenecessaryrevolutionarymeasuresthatwillteachalessontopotentialtraitorsofthenationalrevolution.”WilhelmLoeper(1883–1935),aprofessionalofficer,forcedtoresignfromtheReichswehrafterhisparticipationintheBeerHallputschin1923.HebecameGauleiterofMagdeburg-Anhaltin1928.

48.4April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,88.49.4April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,90–

92.FritzSauckel,1894–1946,GauleiterofThuringiasince1927;PrimeMinisterandMinisteroftheInteriorofThuringiasince26August1932;appointedReichsstatthalter(ReichGovernor)on5May1933.ForhisroleinthedeportationandexploitationofmillionsofforcedlaborershewassentencedtodeathinNurembergon1October1946.

50.7April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,“LandesverbandOstpreußenanParteizentrale,”94–95verso(thetermusedwas“vogelfrei”).

51.1April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,101–103.

52.3April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,44–45.

53.Ibid.,42.54.Thisisemphasized,forexample,inaletterof7ApriladdressedtoDNVPheadquarters:“We

encloseherewithacomplaintaboutaNationalSocialistencroachment.Forwellknownreasonswerefrainedfromforwardingthistopoliceheadquarters”(ibid.,“PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”40).ThePrussianpoliceweredirectlysubordinatetoGöringand,assuch,boundbyhisdirectives.FollowingthetakeoveroftheremaininggovernmentsbymidMarch,thesituationtherehadbecomesimilartothatinPrussia.SincethelivelihoodoftheordinarypolicemanandhisfamilydependedentirelyonwhetherheobeyedtheordersofhisNazisuperiors,itwouldbeunrealistictoexpectnoncompliance.

55.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,207–208,“AuszugausderNiederschriftüberdieSitzungdesReichsministeriums”of4April1933;reprintedinKarl-HeinzMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,293–294;seealsoBAKoblenz,NachlaßHugenberg,N1231,no.89,“AusschreitungenderNSDAPgegenDNVPMitglieder.”

56.SeeMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,365.ItwouldbewrongtoassumethattheNazileadershipwantedtomollifyHugenberg,whilelowerrankswerecarryingoutattacksagainstGermanNationals.ItwasintheinterestofNazileaderstogivetheimpressionthatlawandorderprevailedinGermanyinordertopacifypublicopinioninsidethecountryandabroad.InAprilandMay,theytookthedangerofforeigninterventionveryseriously.

57.SeealsoHillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”600.58.1April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,

233–235,esp.234.59.Ibid.,234.60.Ibid.,235.61.Ibid.,235.HugenbergforwardedareportofthisincidenttogetherwithothercomplaintstoHitleron

12April;seeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,211–212.62.8April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”R8005,no.19,18–

19.ComplaintswerealsosenttotheArbeitsausschußdeutschnationalerIndustriellerregardingrumors“thatboardsofallnon-politicalbusinessassociationswouldneeda51percentmajorityofNationalSocialists.”See“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel,”12April1933,1–3,esp.2.

63.12April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”3.64.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PolitischerSchriftwechsel,DNVP,”5.“Gleichschaltungvon

Beamtenorganisationen.”65.6May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,DNVP,”R43I,no.2655,235–

237,esp.235.66.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,DNVP,”I,no.2655,239,241;“Aufnahme-

Erklärung”oftheNationalSocialistTeachersAssociationand“RundschreibendesKreisleitersdesNSLB.”EspeciallynoticeableisthethreateningtoneoftheKreisleiter'sletter:“ItmustbeexpresslybroughttotheattentionoftheassociationsthattheirdistancingthemselvesfromtheNSLBisevidenceoftheirattitudetowardsthestate.Thoseconcernedhavetobeartheensuingconsequences.”Ibid.,241.

67.5April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,35–37.

68.2April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“DNVP,PolitischerSchriftwechsel1933,”R8005,no.19,7.

69.12April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R34,II,no.1195,211–235.Hugenberg'sletterwassentsimultaneouslytoReichInteriorMinisterWilhelmFrickandtheprovisionalPrussianInteriorMinister(andsince11AprilMinisterPresident)HermannGöring.TheincidentsreportedbyHugenbergalltookplaceinearlyApril.FormorecasesofviolentattacksonDNVPmembersseeBAKoblenz,NachlaßHugenberg,N1231,no.89,“AusschreitungenderNSDAPgegenDNVPMitglieder.”

70.Ibid.,BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”226–227.71.SeetheautobiographiesofindividualNazisgatheredintheAbelCollectionattheHoover

InstitutiononWar,RevolutionandPeace,Stanford,California(Boxes1–8);TheodorAbel,WhyHitlerCameintoPower(Cambridge,Mass.,1986);PeterMerkl,PoliticalViolenceundertheSwastika:581EarlyNazis(Princeton,1975).

72.IntheHorstWesselLiedtheyfiguredasthe“Reaktion.”73.25April1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,

282–285,“BerichtdesLandesgeschäftsführers,LandesverbandOst-Sachsen.”ThisreportisreprintedinMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,396–398.

74.Ibid.,BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,NSDAP,”285.Itwasalsomentionedthat“GermanNationalpersonalitieshadrepeatedlybeenarrestedarbitrarily”andthat“intheformationsoftheNSDAP,whicharemostlycomprisedofyoungermen,...Bolshevikelementssetthetone.”

75.18May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,323.TheKampfring,orKampfgemeinschaftjungerDeutschnationaler,wasreorganizedin1931outoftheKampfstaffelnoftheDNVP.SeeGisbertJ.Gemein,“DieDNVPinDüsseldorf1918–1933”(Ph.D.diss.,Cologne,1969),131–133.

76.Ibid.,BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,”323verso.GeorgvonDetten(1887–1934),headofthepoliticalofficeoftheSA;PoliceCommissionerandleaderoftheDresdenSA,killedduringtheRöhmputsch.

77.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,395.78.Ibid.,395–398.SeealsovonDetten'sreportsof8May1933and18May1933atBABerlin-

Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,323–23verso;324–324verso.79.12May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“RüfferanHindenburg,”in“AktenderReichskanzlei,

NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,354–357.80.Ibid.,356.81.InordertoprotecthimselfinthefaceofgrowingNaziinfluence,RüfferwrotealettertoHitleron

thefollowingday,inwhichheassuredtheReichChancellor—inthemostcharmingtone—ofhisloyalty.13MayatBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43,II,no.1195,351–353.

82.Seethedetaileddescriptionoftheincidentinthe“MitteilungenderDeutschnationalenFront,”12May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivdesReichslandbundes,NationalsozialistenundDNVP,”R8034II,no.9030,184.

83.Ibid.,184.Thisincidentrevealsmuchaboutthetension-riddenalliancebetweenNazisandGermanNationals;itwasthoroughlydescribedinaninternalDNVPpartypublication,butbarelymentionedinthepress.ForfurtherinstancesofattacksonmembersoftheKampfstaffelnseeBAKoblenz,NachlaßHugenberg,N1231,no.89,“AusschreitungenderNSDAPgegenDNVPMitglieder,”5.

84.SeereportsinthePommerscheTagespostof22AprilandintheDeutscheZeitungof23April,at

BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichslandbund,Pressearchiv,NationalsozialistenundDNVP,”R8034II,no.9030,”176.WhenMajorNageltriedtocontacttheStaatssekretärinthePrussianInteriorMinistry,LudwigGrauert,hewasthreatenedwitharresthimself.

85.5AprilatBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,244.Itwasalsomentionedthatpersonalquarrelsweresettledwiththehelpofstateauthorities.“ItcannotbereconciledwiththeconceptofaRechtsstaatthat,asunfortunatelyoftenhappens,personalfeudsoroldenmitiesaresettledwiththehelpofindividualgroupsoreventheorgansofstate,i.e.statepower.”

86.Ibid.,244verso.87.“ImKampffürDeutschland,”DerTag,12April1933,atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Pressearchiv

Reichslandbund,DNVPParteitage,”R8034II,no.4334,66.88.AndréFrançois-PoncetprovidesaninsightfuldescriptionofthePotsdamceremonyinTheFateful

Years.MemoirsofaFrenchAmbassadorinBerlin1931–1938(NewYork,1949),60–65,asdoesDüsterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler,48–51.

89.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“ReichslandbundPressearchiv,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,9;“Wiewiressehen.HugenbergsErklärung,”and“StraffeOrganisationderDNVP,”DeutscheZeitung,12April1933.

90.On1April;seeCarlSchmitt,“DasGesetzzurBehebungderNotvonVolkundReich,”DeutscheJuristenzeitung38(1933),456–458.AcollectionoflegalassessmentsofthevalidityoftheActcanbefoundinMorsey,Ermächtigungsgesetz,91–99.OttoSchmidt-Hannover,inhisUmdenkenoderAnarchie,351–352,emphasizedthattheEnablingActconferred“specialauthorityonlyonthe‘presentgovernment.’”Eventhoughhemusthaveknownbetter,Schmidt-HannoverarguedthatHugenbergcouldhave“invokedakindofvetorightbythreatofresignationoractualresignation.”

91.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,14;TäglicheRundschau,27April1933.Hugenberg'sdesiretoassertthepoliticalrelevanceoftheDNVPwasthusdashedbytherealitiesofconstitutionallawwhich,inthiscase,theNaziswillinglyrecognized.

92.Inaspeechon20April,Hugenbergtriedtoquellrumorsaccordingtowhich“thecontinuedpresenceofGermanNationalsintheReichgovernmentwasaquestionofbutafewmoredaysorweeks.”Hugenbergemphasizedthesolemn“confirmationofthisgovernmentbytheReichPresident”andthe“circumstancethattheEnablingActwaspredicatedonthecontinuanceofthepresentReichgovernment.”SeeDerNationaleWille,22April1933,no.17,213;alsoGaertingen,“DNVP,”646.

93.Theconceptof“revolution”hadbecomecommonplaceduringthespringandsummerof1933tocharacterizetheradicalpoliticalandsocialchangesthathadtakenplace.ItwasatermalsousedbyNaziopponents.On1August1933,forexample,MaxPlanckwrotetoFritzHaber:“Theonethingthatgivesmesomereliefinthisfeelingofwretchedforlornnessisthethoughtthatwearelivingincatastrophictimes,whicheveryrevolutionbringsinitswake,andthatmuchofwhathappenswemustbearlikeanaturaldisasterwithoutworryingwhetherthingsmightbedifferent.”QuotedinFritzStern,DasfeineSchweigen(Munich,1999),57.

94.“StraffeOrganisationderDNVP,”DeutscheZeitung,12April1933,”atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8934II,no.9021,9.

95.“StraffeOrganisationderDNVP,”DeutscheZeitung,12April1933,atibid.96.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”ibid.,11;

“ForderungenderDNVPzurWehrfrage,”DeutscheZeitung13April1933;“EntscheidendeFragen,”DerTag,28April1933;“HugenbergsprichtvorseinerPartei,”TäglicheRundschau,29April1933.

97.Forexample,inaspeechattheStettinpartycongressinSeptember1931:“...theGermanNationalPartyhasdefinitivelychangeditsorganizationalfacetowardsthemovementcharacterofamodernactivistcommunalmovement;ithasturnedintothepurebodyofadherentsofaself-confident,creativepersonalitythathasbecomeamanifestationofpoliticalleadership.Inaword,theGermanNationalPartyhasbecomeaHugenberg-movement.”InUnserePartei,1October1931,nos.18/19,221;andGaertingen,“DNVP,”625.EduardStadtler,born1886,defectedtotheNSDAPinMay1933,justweeksbeforethedissolutionofhis

ownparty.98.Forthebestexamplesfortheprevalenceof“Opferbereitschaft”(readinesstosacrificeoneself)

amongNazifollowers,seethe593biographiesintheAbelCollectionattheHooverInstitutiononWar,RevolutionandPeace,Stanford,California(Boxes1–8).

99.Inpoliticalscienceliterature,apoliticalmovement,asopposedtoatraditionalpoliticalparty,hasthefollowingcharacteristics:1)anall-encompassingworldviewandanemphasisonvalues,notjustspecificinterests;2)anattempttoorganizewide-rangingsocialgroupsofalltypesaffiliatedwithandresponsibletothepartyorganization;3)anattempttocapturesupportoutsidetheparty'straditionalvoterbase.

100.Followingtheaboveorder:ReichsbunddeutschnationalerJuristen;BunddeutschnationalerVolkswirte;ReichsverbanddeutschnationalerÄrzte;BunddeutschnationalerTierärzte.Evennon-academicswereincluded,suchasanorganizationfortradesmen,theDeutschnationalerBunddesgewerblichenMittelstandes;seealsoHillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”598.

101.“KampfbewegungstattPartei.DerFührergedankeimAufbauderDeutschnationalenVolkspartei,”DerTag,19April1933.

102.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,11;“BekanntmachungüberdieEintragungdesFührerprinzipsinderDNVP,”DerNationaleWille,22April1933,no.17,222.

103.“KampfbewegungstattPartei,”DerTag,19April1933.104.AsThomasNipperdeyhaspointedout,thePrussianadministrationwasa“diskutierende

Verwaltung,”anadministrationinwhosecouncils,boards,andcommitteesfreediscussionsreignedsupreme,atleastatthehigherlevels.SeeNipperdey,DeutscheGeschichte,1800–1866(Munich,1983),333.StrongholdsofcollegialdebateweretheRegierungen,thebodyofcouncilorsinadistrict,chairedbyaRegierungspräsident,whowasonlyaprimusinterparesamonghigherofficials.InPrussia,theprincipalofcollectiveresponsibilityandcompetenceprevailedovertheFrenchprefectsystem;thishadtheadvantagethatdecisionswerejointlyreached,whereastheprefectsystemvestedthepresidentofanadministrativebodywiththesoleresponsibility.SeeHermannBeck,TheOriginsoftheAuthoritarianWelfareStateinPrussia.Conservatives,BureaucracyandtheSocialQuestion,1815–1870(AnnArbor,1995),128–129,and“TheSocialPoliciesofPrussianOfficials:TheBureaucracyinaNewLight.”TheJournalofModernHistory64(1992),263–298.

105.ReichenbachintheRegierungsbezirkBreslauhadapopulationof16,342(1925).106.8May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,DNVP,”R43I,no.2655,255–

255verso.107.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.

9021,10a,“DerdeutschnationaleWeg,”ParlamentarischeBeilage,13April1933.Hereitwasemphasizedthatthepartyhadcastoffallelementsofdoubtfulloyaltyandeconomicopportunists,whohadvotedfortheDawesPlanorbeensympathetictoLocarno.

108.Ibid.,“DerdeutschnationaleWeg,”10a,sheet2.109.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPParteitage,”R8034II,no.4334,

73,“KonservativerStaatsglaube,”PommerscheTagespost,7May1933.110.Ibid.VonZitzewitzmentionedthattheGermanNationalshadbeenfightingagainstMarxismsince

1918,whereasNationalSocialistswererelativenewcomersinthisstruggle.ThefactthatGermanNationalswerenotacceptedasequalsmeantthattheywereunappreciatedintheir“nationaldevotion”andinwhattheyhad“accomplishedinforcefullypreparingthegroundforthenationalstate.”

111.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPParteitage,”R8034II,no.4334,72.“DeutschnationaleFront,”DeutscheZeitung,4May1933,and“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,24–26.

112.“DeutschnationaleFront,”DeutscheZeitung,4May1933.113.Ibid.Thepartyleadershipfurtheremphasizedthe“camaraderieof30January,”the“self-evident

assertionoffullequality,”therestitutionofa“firmlegalorder,”the“integrityofanincorruptiblecivil

service,”and“aneconomyprotectedfromexperimentsandwantoninterference.”Thesedemands,however,fellondeafears,sincenorealpowercouldbemarshaledtosupportthem.

114.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,30a;“DieDeutschnationaleFrontgegendenHagenerOberbürgermeister,”MitteilungenderDeutschnationalenFront,19May1933.HageninWestphaliahadapopulationof147,052in1933;seeStatistischesJahrbuchfürdasDeutscheReich,52(1933),7.

115.Ibid.116.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.

9021,31–33;MitteilungenderDeutschnationalenFront,19May1933.117.MitteilungenderDeutschnationalenFront,32a.118.Ibid.,32a.DeclarationsofsolidaritywithHugenbergcamefromtheentireReich,coupledwiththe

demandfor“equaltreatmentofourmemberspolitically,professionallyandeconomically.”119.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“AktenderReichskanzlei,NSDAP,”R43II,no.1195,327–333;“Dr.

GoebbelsüberdenStandderdeutschenRevolution,”Wolff'sTelegraphischesBüro,84.Jahrgang,no1212.Goebbelswasnamed“MinisterofPropagandaandPublicEnlightenment”on13March.HebecamethefourthNaziintheCabinet.

120.Ibid.,327verso.121.Ibid.,“...eithertheGermanyoffuturegenerationswilloperateonthelegalbasis(Gesetzlichkeit)

thathascharacterizedthelifeofthisparty[i.e.,theNSDAP],orGermanywillhavenofutureatall.”122.Ibid.,327verso.TheNationalSocialistswillleadthewaytothefuture“astheavantgardeofthe

Germanrevolution,”andtheywill“ensurethatnothingwilleverstopthisrevolution.”Ibid.,328.

ChapterVII

IGNOMINIOUSDEMISEDefections,Prohibitions,andFinalDissolution

AChangeinClimateAnunderstandingofthecontemporaryZeitgeistisnecessarytoexplaintherapiddisappearanceofoldestablishedpartiessuchastheliberalparties,Center,andSPD(whoserootsreachedbacktotheVormärz)fromthepoliticalstagewithoutalast-ditchstand,andtheignominiousendoftheDNVP,whichresembledameltingawaymorethanalastconvulsivestruggle.BetweentheendofMarchandtheendofJune,duringthelongspringof1933,dramaticchangestookplacenotonlyinthepoliticalclimateandpublicmood,butalsointheconsciousnessofamajorityofthepopulation.WithoutproperappreciationofthespiritoftheageitisdifficulttoascertainhowtheNationalSocialistscouldmakesucheasygameoftheircoalitionpartnerandwhytheconservativeedificecollapsedlikeahouseofcards.AstheNazisbegantoeliminatetheirpoliticalopponents,theyconcurrentlystrovetounderminetraditionalpoliticalallegiances.UndertheimpetusofNazicoercion,traditionalpoliticaltiesstartedbreakingdown,andinterestgroupsandassociationssoughtneworganizationallinksbywhichtheycouldcontinuetooperateunderthewatchfuleyeofastatethatwasincreasinglydominatedbytheNazis.Interestgroups,professionalassociations,andpoliticalpartiesthathadnotyetsufferedthedirectwrathoftheNSDAPhadtostrategizeinthefaceofwhatseemedtobetheinevitableconsolidationofNazipower.WhenitbecameclearthattheycouldnotopposetheNazisandcontinuetosurvive,manyattemptedtoaccommodatethemselvestoNazirule.TheyeitherbegantojoinNS-sanctionedorganizationsortoacceptNazirestrictionsontheirown.MembersofbanishedorganizationsfrequentlyturnedtotheDNVPortoassociationsclosetoit,suchastheStahlhelm,astheonlyorganizationaloutletfortheiractivities(orshelterforpersonalsafety)inthenewpoliticalclimate.TheresultingincreaseofSPDandReichsbannermembersintheGermanNationalPeople'sPartyanditsorganizationswould,ontheotherhand,soonprovidetheNaziswithanexcusetoturnagainsttheirowncoalitionpartnerwiththechargethattheyhadbeeninfiltratedbyleftistelementsandthushadtobedissolved.Threebriefexamplesillustratetheaccommodationmadetothegrowing

dominanceofNationalSocialistpower.TheunionswereamongthefirsttobeginassessingtheirlimitedoptionsunderNazirule.EvenbeforetheEnablingAct,theGeneralAssociationofGermanTradeUnions(ADGB),undertheleadershipofTheodorLeipart,1publiclydistanceditselffromtheSPDandsignaleditswillingnessforsocialandeconomiccooperation“regardlesswhich

typeofregimecontrolsthestate.”2Quiteobviously,countlessNaziattacks,the“arbitrarinessofNazimeasures,”andthe“uncertaintyoflegalconditions,”whichhadcompelledLeiparttosendapleaforhelptoHindenburgon10March,hadapparentlyallhadthedesiredeffect.3Yet,theaccommodationshownbytheADGBprovedtobeinvain,asisevidencedbyanotherletterofprotesttoHindenburgdated5April1933,inwhichfurthercomplaintsweremadeaboutthe“monstrousterror”directedagainstunionfunctionaries.4TheCatholicChurch,afterfirstrecoilingfromNazism,eventuallysoughtwaystoprotectitsinstitutionalanddoctrinalautonomy.AnothermilestonewasthusthedeclarationbyCatholicbishopson28MarchthatdroppedpreviousprohibitionsandwarningsagainstNationalSocialismandinsteadurgedloyaltytowardlawfulauthoritiesandconscientiousfulfillmentofcivicduties.5ButitwastheaccommodationofpoliticalpartiesthatpavedthewayfortheultimatedominationofNationalSocialism.TheCenterandliberalparties'approvaloftheEnablingActwasoneofthefirstominoussignsofamomentouschangeinthepoliticalclimateandcannotbeexplainedsolelyasacombinationofthereadinesstocooperatewithHitlerandfearofreprisals.Italsoindicatedthatpartyleadershipanddeputieswereincapableofresistingthetideofpublicfeeling,whichpracticallydemandedacceptanceoftheAct.6AfurtherunmistakablesignofthetimeswasthatcountlessSocialDemocrats,Communists,andmembersoftherepublicanReichsbannersoughtrefugeaftertheMarchelectionswithnationalistorganizations,suchastheDNVPKampfstaffelnandtheStahlhelm.TheDNVPitselfalsosawanartificialboostinpopularity,asmanydefectorsfromtheleftistcampjoineditsranks.Formany,themotivationforjoiningwasnotsomuchopportunismasafearofretributionbytheSAandabasicneedforsecurity.On15April,theunionleadershipwelcomedthegovernment'sdeclarationthatthefirstofMaywastobecomea“legalholidayinhonorofnationallabor,”7andfourdayslatertheADGB'snationalexecutivecommittee(Bundesausschuß)issuedinstructions“totakepartsolemnlyintheofficialcelebrations.”8Thankstothewillingcollaborationoftheunions,the“DayofNationalLabor”turnedintoamonumentalpropagandasuccessfortheNationalSocialists,somethingthatevenopponentsoftheregime,suchastheFrenchAmbassadorAndréFrançois-PoncetandtheauthorErichEbermayer,weregrudginglyforcedtoacknowledge.9ThenewsonthefollowingdaythatunionhallsandbuildingsthroughouttheentireReichhadbeenoccupiedbymembersofNaziorganizationsreceivedlessattentioninlightofthesuccessofthe1Mayholiday.10EventheSocialDemocratsnolongerseemedtotake

excessiveumbrageagainsttheregimefortheseattacks.Hitler'sconciliatoryforeignpolicyspeechduringtheReichstagsessionof17May,11attendedbyabouthalfoftheSPDReichstagfactionandapplaudedbythosepresent,blurredthefavorableimpressionofstaunchprotestagainstNazirepressionthathadbeencreatedbytheSPD'srejectionoftheEnablingAct.Thesessionwasstagedinsuchawaythatalldeputiesroseattheendofthespeech(whichindeedgavelittlecauseforobjection)—includingtheSPDdeputies.This,inturn,createdthemisleadingimpressionthatallofGermanyhadclosedrankswiththeregime.12Thespeakerofparliament,HermannGöring,wasthusinapositiontoclosethesessionwiththewords:“Theworldhasseen:theGermanpeopleareunitedwhentheirdestinyisatstake.”13Theoverbearingpropaganda,solicitation,andpublicityfortheHitler

governmentwentsofarthatevenGoebbelscameoutagainst“nationalistkitsch,”aphenomenonthatEbermayerdescribedinsomedetail:“AllthelowestinstinctsoftasteseemtohavebeenunleashedbytheNationalSocialistmovementanditsvictory.BustsoftheFührermadeoutoflardaretheleastofit.Toiletpaper:“wecrackdown”isnotbadeither.Andthepostcardindustry!”14

InpetitionstotheReichChancellery,15coffeehouseownersaskedpermissiontonametheirshopsafterHitler,rosegrowerstheirroses,andmayorsofvillagesrequestednamechangesinto“Hitlershöhe”andthelike.Asdocumentedinthebimonthlyreportsofdistrictgovernors,theRegierungspräsidenten,agovernment-friendlymood,evenifitdidnotturnintoecstaticenthusiasm,generallyseemedtocatchoninthespringof1933.On20April1933,forexample,theRegierungspräsidentofUpperandMiddleFranconiarelatedreportsfromcountyoffices,accordingtowhich“thetakeoverisviewedmoresympathetically,evenamongcirclesnotpreviouslywelldisposedtowardtheNSDAP,andthereareindications,namelyinworkers'circles,thatpointtoacertainleaningtowardthenewgovernment.”16Thisdrifttowardthenewregime,evenbythosewhoformerlyopposed

NationalSocialism,wasoftenbasedonsupportforstrengtheningcentralpower.ThecentralizingmeasurestakenbytheNationalSocialists,suchasthetwolawsfortheGleichschaltungoftheLänderof31Marchand7April1933thatmoreorlessputanendtothecentury-oldsemi-sovereigntyoftheindividualstates,paradoxicallyweremorepopularwiththedeclaredopponentsofNationalSocialismthanwiththeNazis'conservativecoalitionpartner.17ConservativeshadtraditionallysupportedthepreservationofthepowerandrightsoftheindividualLänder;overall,theyfavoredthemaintenanceandperpetuationofregionalandparticularistpowersanddecentralizationingeneral,while

vociferouslyopposingadministrativeuniformity,standardization,andpoliticalcentralization.18ThepracticeofappointingReichGovernorsfromBerlinwasdiametricallyopposedtotheirconservativebeliefinthefederalprincipleandinregionalchecksandbalances,becausethenewpolicyabolishedtheautonomyoftheLänderandunderminedrestraintsoncentralizedpower.IntheearlyyearsoftheWeimarRepublic,MatthiasErzberger'stransferoftaxauthorityfromtheindividualstatestotheReichandtheestablishmentofauniformReichtaxboard“hadbeenvehementlyfoughtbytheentireRight.”19InApril1933,theliberalReichstagdeputyandfuturepresidentofWestGermany,TheodorHeuss,wrotethatHugoPreuß(theleftliberalfatheroftheWeimarConstitution)wouldhavebeengreatlypleasedbytheGleichschaltungsgesetze(the“coordinationlegislation”),notingthatNaziopponentsmorereadilyagreedwithNazicentralizingmeasuresandGleichschaltungpoliciesthan“thoseconservativeGermanpublicistswhohadservedasHitler'sintellectualvanguardamongtheso-callededucatedelite[and]whonowhavetoadmitthatthiswasnotexactlywhattheyhadenvisioned.”20Followingtheadoptionofthelaws,asurprisedThomasMannnotedinhisdiarythattheFrankfurterZeitung,apaperrenownedforitsliberalviews,celebrated“theradicalcentralizationoftheReichasagreathistoricdeed,despitethefactthatitmanifestedlittlerespectforhistorictraditionandlong-standingnationalidiosyncrasies,”musingthat“thethousandyearoldfragmentationofGermanswasbroughttoanendinonefellswoop.”21Possiblythemostimpressivephenomenonthatillustratedthesubjective

authenticityoftheenthusiasmfortheHitlermovementwasthelargenumberofgenuine,non-opportunisticconversionstoNationalSocialism.Alongsideanarmyofmanyhundredsofthousandsof“Märzgefallenen”22—opportunistswhostreamedintothepartyforpersonaladvancementortosafeguardthemselvesandtheirfamilies—werethousands,includingmanyfromtheranksofformeropponents,whobecameNationalSocialistsoutofconviction.Theirconversionwasattimescomparabletoareligiousexperience,onethattransformedthemintozealousNaziswithamission.ErichEbermayer,sonoftheliberalOberreichsanwalt(thehighestprosecutoroftheReich)LudwigEbermayer,23awell-knownauthor,someofwhosebookswererequiredreadinginupperlevelsofGymnasiumbeforetheywereeventuallybannedinMayandJune1933,providesimpressiveexamples—representative,eachinitsownway—fromdifferentspheresoflife.First,therewasthepresidentoftheGermanSupremeCourt,ReichsgerichtspräsidentErwinBumke,afriendoftheEbermayerfamily,“amanabovereproach,anythingbutaNazi,”24whowasorderedtomakehisinauguralvisittoHitleratthebeginningofMay:“Bumkewasinabadmood

andhadabsolutelynodesire,asahighofficialofthePrussianschool,toofferhishandtothispoliticalupstart.”25Yet,followinghisreturnfromBerlin,Bumkewasasiftransformed:26“Hereturnedasaconvert,oratleastalmostconverted…‘Onehasnosenseofthecharm,thewarmth,thepowerofthisleadership-personality,unlessonehaspersonallystoodinfrontofhim,’heexplainedtomyfather.AttheendoftheaudienceHitlerhadtightlygrippedhishands,lookedlonganddeepintohiseyes,andsaidwithhisresonantvoice,‘Helpme,Bumke.’Withthatthesoulcatcherhadmadehisscoreperfect.”ErichEbermayeralsofeltisolatedinhisownsurroundings,wherean

increasingnumberofclosefriendsprofessedallegiancetoNationalSocialism:“Amongmyyoungfriends,theverybestarecommittingthemselvesbodyandsoultoNationalSocialism…Onecannotdebatetheissuewiththembecausetheyjustbelieve.Andtherearenologicalargumentsagainstfaith.”ButEbermayerpersistedundaunted:“Whentoday…Iattemptedaconversationandventured—alreadyweakandpowerlessasonenowfeelswhenconfrontedwiththisyouthsoflushedwithvictory—tosaythatperhapsourentireoldculture,thecollectionofalltheintellectualandartisticpossessionsofthelastfivehundredyears,maywellbedrownedinthemaelstromofourage,thetriumphantknaveexclaimedwithnaïveimpertinence:‘Andsowhat,mydearman!Thatbitofcultureisnotreallysoimportant!BecauseaccordingtotheFührer,aThousandYearReichisnowcomingintobeingthatwillcreateitsownnewculture!’”27Inthespringof1933,politicscommandedallspheresoflife.LifelongfriendshipsbrokeapartbecauseofdisagreementsaboutthenatureofNationalSocialism.AsreportedbyEbermayeron28April:“Shortget-togetherwithmylongtimefriendH.W….Thedamnedpoliticswreakshavocevenhere.H.hasbecomeaNationalSocialist!Thenotorious‘tabloidcriticandJewhireling,’ashewouldbecalledtoday,hasbeenconverted!Notbefore,butaftertheMachtergreifung….ButinH.W.'scaseopportunismdoesnotplayarole.Hehassimplybeenbowledover,overawedbytheeventsoftheday…HepositivelyworshipsHitler.Hiseyesshinewhenhespeaksofthe“Führer.”28InmidMay1933,shortlyaftertheofficialannouncementoftheprohibitionofhisbooks,EbermayerwroteaboutaNationalSocialism“…thatwehavebeenabletoobserveforyears”andthathethoughthadbeendiscarded:“Ifnow,inthefrenzyofevents,itsuddenlyseemstoappearinadifferentlight,itwasnotinsightbuttemptationandbedazzlement.”29WhenrememberingH.W.,who“hadbeenmygoodloyalfriendthroughmanyyearsofmyyouth,”30Ebermayercommentedonthemoodinthespringof1933:“Howmurderouslypoliticsinterfereswitheverything!Howitseverstiesovernightthathadbeenconsideredunbreakable!Thecloser

thefriendship,themoreimpossibleappearsitscontinuationwhenitisunderminedbyanopposingviewoftheworld.”31Spring1933markedthefirsthighpointoftheregime'spopularity,comparable

withthemoodafterthefallofFranceinJune1940.In1933,hopesvestedintheregimeweregearedmainlytowarddomesticrenewalandunity;theroadtodictatorshipwasbeingpavedwithoutapparentawarenessthatthedictatorshipitselfwouldmarkthefinalmilestone.Inthespringof1933,thepopularityofNationalSocialismstillwasbasedontherestorationoforderandthefulfillmentoftheregime'spromiseofnationalunity.This,afterall,providedawelcomecontrasttothefragmentationandunpopularpartyinfightingoftheWeimarRepublic.Intheseearlymonths,evenmenwhowerelatertogainnotorietyasopponentsoftheregimeplacedtheirhopesinNationalSocialism.32OneofthemostglitteringandenigmaticpersonalitiestofallintothiscategorywasOttoDibelius,Generalsuperintendent(headoftheProtestantchurch)ofBrandenburgsince1925and,asKlausScholderwrote:“…withhis45yearstheyoungestGeneralsuperintendentofthePrussianChurchandwithoutdoubtthemostcapable.”33ThoughnosupporteroftheWeimarRepublicand,untilMarch1933,notunfavorablydisposedtowardNationalSocialism,DibeliussoondistancedhimselffromtheHitlerregimebecauseherejecteditsencroachmentuponchurchaffairs.RemovedfromhispostinJuneof1933andbrieflyarrestedin1937,hesoonbecameoneofthemostprominentfiguresoftheoppositionalGermanConfessionalChurchduringtheThirdReich34andoneoftheveryfewwhodaredtoprotestpublicly.EventhoughDibeliuswelcomedtheadventoftheHitlergovernmentanditselectoralsuccessof5March,heneverthelessadmonishedthepastorsofBrandenburginaconfidentialcircularon8Marchthat“thechurchmustremaintheconscienceofthestate.”35Evenhishigh-spiritedpatrioticsermoninthePotsdamNikolaiChurchon21March,the“DayofPotsdam,”wasnotfreeofcriticalovertones,thoughitfocusedonthethemeofdomesticunity—withDibeliusmakingcomparisonstotheReichstagopeningon4August1914,symbolofthemanifestationofGermanunityatthebeginningoftheFirstWorldWar.ItwasthusallthemoreastonishingwhenDibelius,inaradiobroadcaston4April,inwhichheaddressedtheAmericanpopulation,askedformoresympatheticunderstandingforthenewregimeanditsmethodsandclearlydownplayedviolentNaziattacks.36Inhisspeech,whichhighlightsthereasonsforthepopularityofNazism,Dibeliusdrewthepictureofapeoplewho,afteralonginnerstruggle,hadfinallyfoundthemselvesagain,despitetheburdensomehandicapoftheWeimarRepublic:“Fromtheinnerdecaytowhichweweredrivenduringthepast15years,wewanttoreturntoaChristianand

genuinelyGermanwayoflife.HaveconfidencethattheGermanpeopleareatthepointoffindingthemselvesagain.”ThemovementnowsweepingGermanymeant“areturntothegoodGermantraditions.”37Inhisradiobroadcast,Dibeliusevokedthedangerofacommunistrevolution—afearalltoorealformanyGermans—fedbyreportsofhorrorsfromBolshevikRussia,memoriesof“communistterror”inMunichin1919,andthe1921communistrevoltinThuringia.NationalSocialismappearedasasaviorfromthosedangers:“Withrisinganxietyweaskedourselves:whenwilltheBolshevikrevolutionbreakloose?….Well,nowithasturnedoutdifferentlythanwethoughtpossible.Therevolutionhasbeendefeatedwithoutstreetfightingorlossofblood.Thenewgovernmenthasremovedcommunistagitatorsandtheiralliesfrompubliclifewiththoroughgoinganddrasticmeasures.”38WhileDibelius,inhisPotsdamsermonof21March,madereferencestothefactthattheGermanswere“notyetaunitedpeople,”39heendedhisradiospeech—onlytwoweekslater—onaverydifferentnote:“TodaytheGermanReichisunitedandstronglyjoinedtogetherasneverbeforeinourhistory.MillionsofGermanheartsareimbuedwiththeimpassionedwishthattheGermannamewillagainstandpureandunblemishedbeforetheeyesoftheworld.”40Thisdesire,ashistoryhassadlydemonstrated,wouldremainunfulfilled.HadDibeliusventuredtosayopenlywhathehadseen,heard,andknownaboutNationalSocialismanditsmethodsbetween30JanuaryandearlyApril1933,hewouldhaverealizedthathishopeswereboundtobedashed.ButlikeDibelius,millionsreveledindeludingthemselves,thoughtheymust

haveknownotherwise.Underneaththesurface,dictatorshiphadalreadybecomereality.Apartfromthemultitudeofviolentattacksandtheestablishmentofconcentrationcamps,inthespringof1933thedictatorshipwasalreadyweavingitselfintothefabricofGermansocietyinallofitslayersandnuances.HandinhandwithatremendousupsurgeinthepopularityofNationalSocialismand—amongsomesectionsofthepopulation—agrowingfeelingofsolidarity,ofanascent“organic”nationalcommunityreminiscentofAugust1914,41theredevelopedaninsidious,all-encompassingrepressionthatalsoconstitutedanessentialcomponentofthechangedclimateofthespringof1933.InApril,theGermanpopulationwasinformedthroughitsdailypressthatthe“disseminationofunsubstantiatedrumorswasapunishableoffense.”Ifspreadingofrumorsresultedinseveredamage“totheReichoroneoftheLänder,”itwaspunishablebyaprisonterm.Punishmentfellunderthejurisdictionofspecialcourts,whichwouldrecognizeneitherprobationnorparole.42Thoughinsidiousintheirpotentiallytotalitarianimpact,thesemeasuresdidnotinitiallyaffectthemajority

ofGermans,sincethedisseminationofnegativerumorsor—inthejargonoftheday,“horrorpropaganda”—wasexpectedtoemanatesolelyfromCommunistsorSocialDemocrats,sothatthisregulationcouldbeexplainedawayas“selfprotection”oftheregime.Ofgreaterunderlyingdangerandincalculableinitsimpactwasadecreeof22June1933,initiallydirectedtowardtheadministrationofthePrussianInteriorMinistry,tocombattheso-called“Miesmachertum”(adefeatistattitudethatmanifesteditselfinveiledcriticism)insidetheMinistry.43Accordingtotheordinance,ithadbeenobservedthatcivilservantsandemployeesintheMinistry“hadmadecommentsintheirconversationswithotherpersonsthatweredesignedtogeneratedissatisfactionwiththemeasuresofthenationalgovernmentandthussowdistrust.”44Suchpersonscould“accuratelybedescribedwiththeterm‘Miesmacher’…”45InfuturesuchMiesmachertumwouldbeconsidered“aformofMarxistagitation,”andMiesmacherwerethus“viewedashiddenMarxistswhowerestillcontinuingtheirMarxistactivities.”46Inplainlanguage,thismeantthateventhemostbenigncriticalcomment,howeverjustified,byamemberofthePrussianadministrationwouldbeviewedas“Marxistagitation.”Thedecreethusnippedanycriticisminthebudinaparticularlydrasticfashion.Furthermore,“allcivilservants,employeesandworkers”wereorderedto“remainonthelook-outforsuchcasesinquestionandtoreportimmediatelyanypersonconcerned.”ThisagainbearsGöring'smark,astheformulationisreminiscentofhisdecreeof17February1933tothePrussianpolice.47Göringfurtherstressedthathewouldviewnon-observanceofthedutytoreportoffendersasa“declarationofsolidaritywithsuchrabble-rousersandagitators.”48ThisdecreebrokewithallthetraditionsofthePrussianadministration.Eveninthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury,whenmoststatesintheGermanConfederationeagerlyadoptedMetternich'spolicestatemethods,thePrussiancivilserviceremaineda“debatingadministration.”49WithGöring'sordinanceagainst“Miesmachertum,”Prussiancivilservants,fromthelowestemployeetotheOberpräsident,werefittedwithamuzzleandhadimplantedapairofscissorsintheirheadsthatcensoredeveryoriginalideaandcriticalthought,eliminatedconstructivecriticism,andfirmlyimplantedthevirusofthepolicestateineveryPrussiandistrict,county,andlocalauthority.Butbythelatespringof1933thiswasneithernewnorrevolutionary,sinceby

thenthesurveillancestatehadlongbecomeareality.BytheendofApril,theFrenchAmbassadorinBerlinreportedtohisForeignMinisterthatcorrespondenceandtelephonecallsofdiplomaticmissionsinBerlinwerebeingmonitored.HehimselfknewfromthesonofGermanForeignMinisterNeurath

thatevenofficialsintheGermanForeignOfficeweresubjectedtoclosepoliticalcontrol.AndacolleagueofFrançois-Poncet,uponenteringanSAoffice,hadchancedtooverheararecordingofatelephoneconversationthathehimselfhadconductedthatverymorning.50Inadditiontotheconstantandall-too-justifiedfearofeavesdroppers,theomnipresent“earagainstthewall,”anddenunciationbyneighborsandcolleaguesthatfromMarchonwardsspreadlikeaplague,inthespringof1933therewasunprecedentedcoerciontoproveone'snationalistorientationandopenlydemonstrateone'snationalistsensibilitiesbytakingpartinNationalSocialistcelebrationsandrites.Itsoonbecameobligatory,forexample,toraisetheswastikaflagondaysthatmarkedNationalSocialistfestiveoccasions,suchas20Apriland1May.Whoeverrefrainedfromparticipatingwouldbereported.Thiscoerciontotakepartandjoinin—withconcomitantsanctionsforoffenders—becameestablishedpolicyinthespringof1933.ErichEbermayer,forexample,reportedthatahordeofSAmenhadclimbedoverthegardenfenceofhisparents'houseinLeipzigand,withabattlecryof“theswinehaven'thungouttheflag,theyneedtobetaughtalesson,”demolishedtheentiregarden,simplybecausehismotherhadfailedtocomplywiththeobligatoryflagraising.51Andon14July1933ReichInteriorMinisterWilhelmFrickmadethe“HeilHitler”saluteobligatoryforallcivilservants;theHitlergrußthussoonservedtodifferentiatebetweenthosewhosympathizedwiththeNazisandthosewhoopposedthem.52Whoeverdidnotwanttocomeundersuspicionofadoptingacriticalstancetowardtheregimewaswelladvisedalwaystoshoutloudly“HeilHitler”astheestablishedpublicgreeting.Whoeverwantedtoexpressreservationsabouttheregimecouldsignalhisdefiancewithasimple“GutenTag.”Atthesametime,amentalandintellectualcensorshipsetinwhichCentral

andWesternEuropehadnotexperiencedsincetheInquisition.AttheendofApril,therewasalreadytalkofblackandwhitelists,ofproscribedandacceptableauthors.53Thewell-knownbookburningof10Maywasonlythepublicexpressionofanalreadypoisonedatmosphere,andtheauthorswhowerepubliclyoutlawedonthatdaybynomeansincludedallofthosewhoseworkswerebanned.54Asidefromthefactthattheoutlawedauthorwassoonavoidedliketheplague,eveninhisownfamiliarsurroundings,55thegeneralknowledgeaboutbannedbooksledtoreluctantself-censorship.Certainbookscouldnolongerbepurchasedandevenifoneownedacopy,onescarcelydaredtoreadsuchbooksinpublic,onaparkbench,orinthesubway.Bookcasesinthehomewerecensoredaccordingly:theworksofThomasandHeinrichMann,StefanZweig,ErichMariaRemarque,andother“undesirable”authorsvanishedtothe

backrow,coveredupbybooksofauthorstoleratedbytheregime.Asidefromtheencroachmentofpoliticsintotheprivatesphereoflife,thisinevitablyledtomistrustandcautionevenamongone'sfriendsandimposedrestrictionsonsocialdiscourse,becausepeopletookcaretoinviteintotheirhomesonlythosewhomtheycouldabsolutelytrust.Eventhissocialdevelopmentinthemicro-sphereofprivatelife—increaseddistrustthatunderminedexistingprivatecircles—wasultimatelygristforthemilloftheevolvingdictatorship.Itsomnipresentmenaceappearedevenmoreacuteanddangerous,becauseHindenburg,stillthesuperiorauthorityandlastsafeguardagainstNaziarbitrarinessanddespotism,becameincreasinglyinactive,sothatthedoortolawlessnesswasnowopenedwide.On23July,forexample,theAmericanchargéd'affaires,GeorgeA.Gordon,reportedtohisSecretaryofStatethatthePresidentevincednoreactionatallwhenSAunitstook“aggressiveactionagainstvarious[ofhis]Junkerneighbors”severaldaysearlier,eventhoughtheattack“couldonlybeinterpretedinthenatureofaveritablechallengeandofwantingtoseehowfartheycouldgo.”56Evenmoreaudacious,SAguardsreplacedtheStahlhelmguardatHindenburg'sestateinNeudeck,“withoutaskingthePresident'sleaveorconsentandwithout…hisdoinganythingaboutit.”57SinceHindenburghadbeenthelasteffectivesourceofappealandcheckonHitler'spower,therewerenownomorerestraintstoarbitraryactions.HugenbergandtheDNVP,thoughmuchwasexpectedofthem,58wereutterlypowerlessandunabletoprotecteventheirownmembers.ThepetitionsaddressedtoPapeninthespringof1933alreadyprovideanunmistakableforetasteofthecompleteabsenceoflegalprotectionfortheindividualintheThirdReichandthepowerlessnessofthirdpartiestointercede—eventheViceChancelloroftheReich.Thefollowingisonecasehistoryamongmany:inearlyJune1933theWestphals,aColognecoupleintheirmidsixties,reportedaraidbyanSSdetachmentofelevenarmedmenontheirfamilyhome.Theraidtookplaceatmidnightbetween24and25Aprilandinvolvedaprolonged,three-hour-longsearchoftheWestphal'shomeandtheSS'stheftofmoneyandothervaluables.Thecouple'sprotestsovertheconfiscationofthreesavingsbookswereansweredbythethreatofoneSStrooperto“shutyourtraporI'llsmackyouoneonyourmug.”Thepoliceandcityadministrationhadbehavedinexemplaryfashion,butwerepowerlessagainsttheSSintheirefforttohavethevaluablesrestored.59ThetheftinsurancecompanyrefusedpaymentonthegroundsthattheSScommandorepresentedlegitimatestateauthority.ThecouplethenpleadinglyturnedtoPapen,asthe“onewhopavedthewayfortheGermanrevolution,”withtherequesttobringtobearhisinfluenceontheGauleitung(NazipartyauthoritiesattheGaulevel)to

havethestolenitemsreturned.60AllPapenwasabletodo,however,wastoconveyhisregretthroughhisassistantCarl-FriedrichvonSavignythat“mistakesandtransgressionsarenotalwaysavoidableinsuchturbulenttimesastoday.”61Hewasunabletohelp.Bythespringof1933,everyGermanwasconsciousofthefactthattheciviladministrationcouldnolongerassertitselfagainsttheNazipartyanditsorganizations.Police,publicprosecutors,andcountycouncilsfeltpowerlessandremainedinactivewhenconfrontedwithopenbreachesofthelaw,wellawarethattheywereinnopositiontocounterinjustices.62Withrespecttounwarrantedarrests,publicprosecutors'officescouldmerelyascertainthatnogroundsexistedforanarrest,buttheywereunabletointerveneormakerestitution.Theprofessionalmoraleofcivilservantsandtheciviladministrationsufferedaccordingly.Failuretoactunderminedtheprofessionalethosofindividualofficialsandoftheciviladministrationasawhole.Asaformofself-defenseortohaveanalibifortheirowninactivity,manyofficials(as,infact,theGermanpopulationasawhole)tendedtoglossoverinfractionsandattacksandshrugthemoffasunavoidableside-effectsofthe“revolution.”Itwasthisclimateofnationalistecstasyandlawlessness,ofeuphoriaandwantonarbitrariness,ofhopeandtightsurveillance,thatsetthestageforthefinalactinthehistoryoftheDNVP.

Prohibitions,Desertions,andDissolutionsThefirstmajorprohibitionsthatledtotemporarybansoforganizationsclosetotheDNVP,suchastheStahlhelm,beganalreadyattheendofMarchinthesmallnorthernGermanstateofBraunschweig,whereNationalSocialistshadparticipatedingovernmentsince1931.63Infact,itwasBraunschweig'sNationalSocialistInteriorMinister(andlaterMinisterpräsident)DietrichKlaggeswhohadmadeitpossibleforHitlertoobtainGermancitizenshipinFebruary1932,therebyenablinghimtostandasacandidateinthepresidentialelectionsofMarchandApril1932.64TheDVP,DNVP,andSPDhadtraditionallybeenstronglyrepresentedinBraunschweig,sothatacrimoniouspoliticalconflictswereinevitable.65Since1931BraunschweigwasthusatestinggroundfortheNSDAPand,inVolkerBerghahn'swords,“akindofpocket-bookeditionofthe‘ThirdReich’.”66FollowingtheMachtergreifung,theBraunschweigStahlhelmhadhelpedcurbtheinfluenceoftheSPDandwasprominentinactionsagainstlargelySocialDemocraticcommunitiesanddistricts.After5March,theBraunschweigStahlhelmitselfbecameatargetofSAattacks.67On20March,theBraunschweigStahlhelmleaderErnstSchradercomplainedtoTheodor

Duesterberg,68oneofthetwonationalleadersoftheorganization,abouttheNaziattacks,sinceDuesterberg'sreservationsaboutNationalSocialismweregenerallyknown.TostrengthenthepositionoftheBraunschweigStahlhelmandaugmentitsmembership,Schraderdecidedtoacceptalargeinfluxofnewmembersfromnow-bannedorganizations,suchastherepublicanReichsbanner,whowereeithernotwelcomeintheSAorpreferrednon-Naziorganizations.ForthispurposetheBraunschweigStahlhelmdecideduponanagreementwithaBraunschweigReichsbannerleaderthatprovidedfortheacceptanceof150ofitsmembers.69Thus,on27MarchtheBraunschweigStahlhelmofficewasswampedbyahordeofhundredsofapplicantsthatkeptgrowingduringthecourseoftheday.Theconfusion,thejostlingofthecrowd,andtheongoing,verypublicrecruitmentofformerSocialDemocratsandsomeCommunistsprovidedNaziInteriorMinisterKlaggeswiththeexcusetointerveneunderthepretextthataStahlhelminstigatedcoupwasunderway.SAauxiliarypoliceandtheSSsubsequentlyarrestedtwothousandStahlhelmmembersandabout1,200“Marxists,”manyofwhomwereseriouslyinjuredintheprocess.70TheBraunschweigStahlhelmwasimmediatelydisbanded,thoughtheheadnationalleaderoftheorganization,FranzSeldte,whohadfoundedtheStahlhelmin1918andwasnowMinisterofLabor(Reichsarbeitsminister)intheHitlerCabinet,managedtogetthebanrescindedon1April1933.Asapreconditionforliftingtheban,SeldtehadpromisedtoinitiatedisciplinarymeasuresagainsttheBraunschweigStahlhelmleadership.AtthispointitwasinSeldte'saswellasinHitler'sinteresttodownplay,minimize,andresolvetheBraunschweigincidentasquicklyaspossible,sinceithadattractedmuchunfavorableattentionthroughouttheReichbyhighlightingthetensionbetweenNazisandGermanNationals.DuringaCabinetmeetingon29March,Hitlerthushastenedtoconfirmthat“thesituationhadbeencompletelyclearedup”andthatthereremained“notraceofill-willbetweentheMinisterofLaborandtheNationalSocialistmembersoftheReichCabinet.”71WhileHitlertriedtopacifyhisCabinetcolleaguesovertheStahlhelmaffair,

hewasdeterminedtoremoveStahlhelmleaderTheodorDuesterberg,whohadbeentheDNVPpresidentialcandidateinMarch1932,andwhomHitlersecretlysuspectedofbeingbehindtheBraunschweigincident.72ItwasnotwithoutreasonthattheNazisconsideredDuesterberganobstacleintheireffortstoeliminatetheStahlhelmasanindependentpoliticalforce.73DuesterberghadputStahlhelmtroopersonalertbetween3–6MarchtopreventNaziriotingandattacksbeforeandafterthe5Marchelections.Onthewhole,however,theStahlhelm'srolewasambiguoustosaytheleast,andmorehelpthanhindranceto

theNazis,especiallysincetheorganizationactivelyparticipated,oftentogetherwiththeSA,inGleichschaltungmeasuresandineliminatingtheopposition,evenifthismeantresortingtoforce.InhispublicpronouncementsDuesterbergsupportedtheNationalSocialistgovernment,74whilehispersonalexperiencesandimpliedcriticismshadmarkedhimasanenemyoftheNazis.Asacandidateinthe1932presidentialelections,hehadbeenmockedandscornedbytheNazipressonaccountofhisJewishgrandfather,andhisownveiledcriticism75—when,forexample,hepointedoutthatamongSocialistsandCatholicstherewerealsohundredsofthousandsofhonorablefrontlinesoldiers—indicatedthathisallegiancecouldnotbereliedupon.SeldtewasquicktoperceivethatDuesterberghadtobeforcedfromhis

positiontoensurethesurvivaloftheStahlhelmasanindependentorganization.AfterDuesterberghadshownnointerestinbecomingOberpräsidentoftheGrenzmark,apositionofferedtohimbyPapenandMeissner,andalsoturneddownanextendedholidayproposedbySeldte(ayearlongworldtour),Seldteknewhehadtotakeaction.76Thiswouldprovedifficult,sinceamajorityoftheStahlhelm'stwenty-threeLandesverbandsführer(LandAssociationleaders),whoseconsentwasneededforalawfuldischarge,supportedDuesterberg.Thus,atthemeetingoftheStahlhelm'snationalcouncilon1April1933,SeldtewascompelledtowithdrawtheletterinwhichhehadcalledonDuesterbergtoresign,duetopressurefromthemajorityoftheotherStahlhelmleaders.Atthismeeting,Duesterbergwasevenelevatedto“ActingBundesführer,”sinceSeldtewasfullyoccupiedwithhisministerialpost.77InthefirsthalfofAprilitbecameincreasinglyclearthatDuesterberg'scontinuedpresenceinhispositionwasdetrimentaltotheorganizationasawholebut,inasessionon20April,Seldte'srenewedattempttoforceDuesterberg'sdismissalagainfailedtogainthesupportofamajorityofStahlhelmleaders.Duesterberg,ontheotherhand,waspreparedtoabdicatevoluntarily,providedthatthecontinuityandequalstandingoftheStahlhelmwouldbeguaranteedbythisstep.SinceitwascleartoSeldtethatHitlerwouldneveragreetoanyrealautonomyoftheStahlhelm,andthatitwouldalsobeimpossibletodismissDuesterbergbydintofavote,hefinallyoptedforcoercion.78On26April,Seldte'sally,theStahlhelmleaderofGreaterBerlin,MajorFranzvonStephani,stormedDuesterberg'sBerlinoffice,armedandescorted,topresentDuesterbergthenewsofhisdismissal.Inhismemoirs,DuesterbergemphasizedthathebowedtoforceonlyaftervonStephanihadgivenhimhiswordofhonorthatHindenburghadalsodemandedhisresignation.This,however,soonturnedouttobeuntrue.79ItisstrikingthatinthecaseofDuesterberg'sdismissal,Naziorganizationsdid

notevenhavetomakeanappearancetoeliminatetheirrival.BytheendofApril1933,thepoliticalclimatehadchangedtosuchanextentthatmanywereeagertoremoveobstaclesfromthepathofthevictoriousmovementsoastosparethemselves.SeldtejoinedtheNSDAPon26AprilandplacedtheStahlhelmundertheleadershipofHitler,whowasalsothehighest-rankingleaderoftheSA.80ThiswasdoneinthehopeofpreservingtheStahlhelmasanindependentorganizationfortheforeseeablefuture.AtaconventionofallStahlhelmleaderson30April,thesuccessofSeldte'sstrategywasconfirmed,sinceonlyaminorityofthoseattendingprotestedagainsttheStahlhelmnowfallingunderHitler'sauthority.WithhisdefectiontotheNazicamp,Seldtehadcorrectlyassessedthemoodofthetimes.81InthesecondhalfofAprilthefirstsignsofdisintegrationappearedwithinthe

DNVP.On24April1933theleadershipoftheBraunschweigDNVPdecided,byavoteof22to2,toswitchoverenmassetotheNSDAP,whichwasanothermanifestationofnationalisteuphoriaandpro-NaziecstasythatepitomizedthecontemporaryZeitgeist.TheGermanNationalpartychairmaninBraunschweig,StudienratBaumann,hadalreadycalledfor“unconditionaljoyouscollaborationwiththeNationalSocialiststate”inhisspeechcelebratingHitler'sbirthdayon20April.82SinceallfourLandtagdeputiesoftheBattlefrontBlack-White-Redwereamongthedefectors,theBraunschweigLandtagwasthefirstrepresentativebodyofaGermanLandthatwascomprisedsolelyofNationalSocialists.83TheNazipressmademuchoftheincidentandwidelycirculatedtheexplanationputforthbytheBraunschweigGermanNationals:“ThemembersoftheexecutivecommitteeoftheBraunschweigLandAssociationdonotconsiderthemselvestobechangingonepartyforanother,becausethepartysystemisdeadandwedonotwishtoseeitrevived.Germany'sfatecallsforunifiedleadership…Rivalrybetweenorganizationsstrivingtowardthesamegoals,whentheheartsoftheirmembersarefilledwiththesamenationalistardor,isunacceptabletousinlightofGermany'sgravepoliticalsituation.”84ThedeputychairmanoftheBraunschweigDNVPpubliclyurgedHugenbergtoincorporatetheentireDNVPintotheNaziparty,arguingthatHugenberg'sknowledgeandexpertisecouldbestservethenationalgovernmentifhemergedhispartyintothe“Germanfreedommovement.”85Hugenberg,resolvedtoupholdtheindependenceoftheDNVP,immediatelyappointedanewLandAssociationleaderforBraunschweig,sothatthepartycontinuedtoexistevenifdefectionsofitsmemberstotheNSDAPcontinuedunabated.86EventhoughGermanNationalsplayeddownthedefectionsasbesttheycouldandHugenbergtenaciouslystayedhiscoursetopreservetheintegrityoftheDNVP,thislatestincidentnevertheless

gaverisetofundamentalcriticismregardingthepoliciesandstrategypursuedbytheGermanNationals.EvenvoicessympathetictothepartyconsideredBraunschweigtobeonlythetipoftheiceberg.TheReichsbote,apaperof“Protestant-nationalist”persuasion,wrote,forexample,thatthedefectionoftheBraunschweigLandAssociationwasa“symptomoftheinnerdisintegrationoftheGermanNationalleadership…whohidbehindtheenclosureofadepartmentalizedcivilserviceandabureaucraticpartymachine…”87Hugenbergwasaccusedofhavingisolatedhimselffromthepublicbyshuttinghimselfawayinhisministerialoffices,andtheGermanNationalswereblamedforneglectingpoliticalpropaganda,havingmadearmchairdecisions“fromabureaucraticivorytower.”AccordingtotheReichsbote,theBraunschweigdefectionwasunlikelytoremainanisolatedoccurrence,sincetheGermanNationalscouldnolongerexemptthemselvesfromthepowerfuldrivetowardtheunificationofpeopleandstate.88AsaresultoftheBraunschweigDNVP'sdefection,widelyinterpretedasanindicationofthingstocome,thepressrepeatedlyraisedthequestionofwhetheritwasnothightimefortheGermanNationalstomergewithNationalSocialism,sincetheDNVPhadclearlylostitslegitimacyasan“autonomousnationalforce.”89Throughoutthespring,theNazishadalreadymadeaconcertedeffortto

discreditandprosecuteanumberofconservativepersonalitieswhohadbecomebothersomeandinconvenient.Dr.GüntherGereke(1893–1970),forexample,theReichCommissarforJobCreation,whohadalsobeenamemberofSchleicher'sCabinet,wasarrestedon24Marchonachargeofembezzlementandwasdismissedfromhisposton27March.90TheGermanNationalOberbürgermeisterofDüsseldorf,RobertLehr(1883–1956),wasdetainedinmidApril1933onsuspicionofcorruption,andtheconservativechairmanoftheReichslandbund,EberhardGrafvonKalckreuth(1881–1941),whoseorganizationhadsupportedHitlerevenbefore30January,wasaccusedofspeculationinthegraintradeandillegalpersonalenrichmentinearlyMay.91HispostwasfilledbyaNationalSocialist.GiventherapidaccumulationofeventsunfavorabletotheDNVP—

Oberfohren'spublicresignationasleaderoftheparliamentaryfaction,thevastnumberofNaziattacksontheDNVPanditsorganizations,Duesterberg'sremovalandtheStahlhelm'ssubjugationtoHitler'sauthority,andfinallythedefectionoftheDNVP'sBraunschweigexecutivecommittee—itseemedindeedasifthetimehadcomefortheGermanNationalstoheedthefreelygiven(thoughunsolicited)advicetomergetheirorganizationsintotheNationalSocialistmovementaslongasthiswasstillpossible.Hitlerapparentlyarrivedat

thesameconclusionataroundthebeginningofMaywhen,inanuncharacteristicallygraciousmanner,heproposedthatHugenbergunitetheDNVPwiththeNSDAP,anofferthatHugenbergrejectedinanequallyfriendly,butfirm,manner.92HugenbergmusthaverealizedthatHitler'sgenialapproachhadtobetakenwithagrainofsalt,asitwasameretestingofthepoliticalwatersandlikelytobefollowedupwithfurther,lessgenialinvitations.On3May,atasessionoftheDNVPpartyexecutivethatincludedGerman

NationalReichstagandLandtagdeputiesinordertogiveitsdecisionsmoreweight,93participantsplacedrenewedemphasisonparitywiththeNSDAP,despiteafundamentallyalteredsituation.Thiscontinuedinsistenceonequalitypossiblywasmeantonlyasademonstrationoftheparty'sownrighttoexist.94Consideringthecircumstances,thegestureseemedhollowgiventhatGermanNationaldefectionscontinuedonalocalbasisinMay.95IntheNationalSocialistpress,thenegativecoverageofHugenbergrecommencedinthesecondhalfofMay,combinedwithrenewedcallsforhisresignation.96DeclarationsofsolidaritybyGermanNationalorganizationsthatexpressedtheir“trust”inHugenbergdidlittletoimprovehisstanding,fortheysmackedtoomuchofhavingbeen“madetoorder.”97TheinherentweaknessoftheirpositionwasbroughthometotheGermanNationalswhenthreeoftheirprominentrepresentatives,EmilBerndt,AxelFreiherrvonFreytagh-Loringhoven,andHorstvonRestorff,metwithHitleron30Maytogiveventtovariousconcernsanddiscusspressingproblemsoftheday.98Bythen,ithadbecomeclearthattheNaziswouldwelcomeanyopportunityto

chargeGermanNationalsortheiraffiliatedorganizationswithpromotinginfiltrationbysocialistsorcommunists,whichcouldthenbeusedasapretextforfurtherbans.TheyfoundsuchanopportunityattheendofMaywiththeGermanNationalparamilitaryorganizations,theKampfstaffeln,whichhadbecomeacatch-allvesselforbannedleftistparamilitarygroups,suchastherepublicanReichsbanner,andaccordinglybegantoswellinnumbers.HitlerwantedtheKampfstaffelndissolvedandmadeitplaintothedelegationthathewouldnolongertoleratetheexistenceoftheGermanNationaldefenseorganization.99WhenEmilBerndt,thespokesmanofthedelegation,rejecteddissolution,theGermanNationaldeputationwastreatedtooneofHitler'shystericaltantrums,inthecourseofwhichhethreatenedto“thensimplylethisSAbeginshootingandstartathreedaybloodbath,untilnothingwasleft.”100SincetheKampfstaffeln,despitegrowingnumbers,whichbyMay1933hadreachedalmost100,000,werehopelesslyinferiortotheSA,thedelegationsilentlyenduredHitler's

outburst.Hitler'sfitofangerwasconnectedwithanincidentinHamburg,whereon29Maythe“KampfringofyoungGermanNationals”hadbeenbannedonthebasisoftheReichstagFireDecree.AsthepresidentoftheHamburgpoliceexplainedinhislettertoStaatssekretärfortheInteriorHansPfundtner,theKampfringhadacceptedformerReichsbannermemberswith“badreputations”and“onoccasionevencommunists.”101ThestrengthoftheHamburgKampfringhadrisenfromfiftymembersattheendofJanuarytoacurrentmembershipoffourhundred,withtheincreasecomingmainly“fromMarxistcircles.”EventhoughReichskampfringleaderHerbertvonBismarckregularlyissueddirectivestodeletefromthemembershiplistsallthosewhohadjoinedafter30January1933buthadformerlybeenmembersoftheKPD,theSPD,andtheReichsbanneranditsaffiliatedorganizations,andwhohadbeenactiveinthoseorganizationsafter1January1932,KampfringeallovertheReichsawasignificantinflux“fromMarxistcircles.”102Newprohibitionswerethusclearlyintheoffingandonlyamatteroftimeincoming.Infact,thenextNazibanonaKampfringorganizationwouldfollowon15JuneinDortmund.103Butalreadybeforethen,attheverybeginningofJune,theDNFwasshaken

byyetanotherscandal,whentwoprominentGermanNationals,EduardStadtlerandMartinSpahn,leftthepartytojointheNSDAP.104Stadlerhadbecomewell-knowninextremeright-wingcirclesafter1918.In1919hehadpromulgatedtheideaofa“nationalsocialism”that,tohim,ashewrotein1935,encompassedthereconciliationofPrussianmilitarismandsocialism.105Spahn,whohadbeenaprominentAlsacianCenterPartypolitician,switchedtotheDNVPin1921becauseofhisestrangementfromtheincreasinglyleftistorientation,ashesawit,oftheCenter.106Spahn'sswitchhelpedtheDNVP,withitsmostlyProtestantmembership,increaseitsCatholicelectoratebyabout6to8percent.107EvenbeforeHitlerbecameChancellor,StadtlerandSpahnwereatthecenter

ofthesmall,butveryinfluentialCatholiccirclewithintheDNVP.DespitetheirapparentclosenesstoHugenberg,theywerenotalwaysonhisside.108InDecember1932,ReinholdQuaatzrepeatedlyconfidedtohisdiarythatthe“groupStadtler-Spahn-Gisevius”pursuedsubversiveactivitiesagainstHugenberg.109Weeksafter30January,SpahnandStadtlerhadalreadygivenunambiguoussignalsthattheyweretoyingwiththeideaofswitchingtotheNSDAP.Accordingly,occasionalreferenceismadetothe“groupofrenegadesaroundStadtler.”ThreatsofdefectiontotheNazisdidnotremainwithoutpoliticalconsequences.AsHeinrichBrüningrelatesinhismemoirs,theproposalforrevisionstotheEnablingAct,whichheandHugenbergallegedly

contemplated,hadtoberelinquished,sincetwenty-twoDNVPReichstagdeputiesunderStadtler'sleadershiphadthreatenedtodefecttotheNSDAPshouldtheproposalbeactedupon.110ThedefectionofStadtlerandSpahntotheNSDAPwasthushardlysurprisingtopoliticalinsiders;itwaswellknownthatSpahnhadconsideredfusingtheDNFwiththeNazipartyforsometimeinordertocreateamoreforcefulRight.111Ina14MaylettertoHugenberg,SpahnrecommendedthedissolutionoftheDNFandtheincorporationofitsmembersintotheNSDAPinreturnforconcessionsfromHitler.AfterHugenbergrejectedthisproposalwithoutcomment,Spahn'sdecisiontoleavetheDNFbecamefinal.112InadditiontoSpahnandStadtler,WilhelmSchmidt,theGermanNationallaborleaderandchairmanoftheVaterländischeArbeitervereine,aswellasHans-BerndGiseviusandEdmundForschbach,alsodefectedtotheNSDAPatthebeginningofJune.113Thismatter,embarrassingasitwastotheGermanNationals,wasfurther

aggravatedbyallegationsleveledbySpahnandStadtleragainsttheirformerparty.StadtlerclaimedthattheDNFthreatenedtobecomeacounterrevolutionaryforce,sinceithadrecentlyturnedinto“agatheringpointforallthoseelementsdissatisfiedwithpoliticaldevelopments.”114SpahnandStadtlerevenalludedtosignsofdecayanddemoralizationwithintheDNFthatseemedtoheraldimminentcollapse.Goebbels'spaperDerAngriffpickeduponthiswidespreadmood:“TheGermanNationalFrontismovingeverclosertothatpointintimewhenitsundeniabletaskmustbeseenasfulfilledandcompleted.”115Here,thefocuswasonawiltingfromwithin,anincreasingweaknessand“bloodlessness,”on“thelackofanyidealisticpowerofGermanNationalthought,”anditwasallegedthatitwasnotenoughtobenational-mindedinthefaceofthe“revolutionaryresolveofthenationaluprising.”116TheDNFrespondedtosuchattacksbystressingitsraisond'êtreasthe“championofconservative,Christian,völkischandsocial-stateconcepts”andbycondemningthebehavioroftheReichstagdeputiesSpahn,Stadtler,andSchmidtbecausetheyhadabandonedtheDNFwithout“resigningtheirmandate,whichwasaviolationoftheirChristianwordofhonorandagrossdeceptionoftheirconstituency.”117

TheEndTheseprotestsdidlittletoreducethedamagecaused.BymidJune1933ithadbecomeclearthatanothermajoraffair,orperhapsjustaminorscandal,wouldspelldoomforthepartyandusherinitsinexorabledemise.Theendcame,asissooftenthecase,fromanunanticipatedquarter.Hugenberg,andwithhimhisparty,methisdownfallwhereheexpectedtriumph—atthe“politicallyall-decisiveLondonEconomicConference,”astheeventwashailedintheGermanNationalpresswhenitconveyeditsbestwishesto“ourleaderHugenberg”ontheeveofthemeeting.118Itwouldturnoutdifferently:Hugenberg'sbehaviorattheWorldEconomicConference,whichdecidedlittleandendedasanabjectfailure,markedthebeginningoftheendofbothHugenberg'spoliticalcareerandthatofhisparty.119InhisfunctionasWirtschaftsdiktator,holdingtheportfoliosfortheMinistries

ofEconomicsandAgricultureofPrussiaandtheReich,Hugenberghopedtostimulatethedomesticmarketbyincreasingthepurchasingpoweroffarmers,therebyrelievingtheeconomicdistressintownandcountry.120Bythesuccessofthesemeasuresheexpectedthat,as“thesaviorfromeconomicmisery,”hispositionintheCabinetwouldbecomeunassailable.Throughlegislationgrantingdebtrelieftotheagriculturalsectorandmeasuresfavorabletothemiddleclasses,hehopedtobesupportedbyamajorityofthepopulationasthepersonresponsibleforthecountry'seconomicrecovery.Atthispoint,influencingthepublicmoodinhisfavorthroughpalpableeconomicsuccessappearedtheonlywaytosavebothhispositionandhisparty.InHugenberg'sopinion,fewerrestrictionsontradeposedadangertotherecoveryoftheGermandomesticmarket.HewasthereforedeterminedtoavoidconcessionsonthismatterattheLondonsummitatallcost.ForeignMinistervonNeurathandHitler,ontheotherhand,haddifferentpriorities:mostnotably,toavoidthepotentiallythreateningisolationofGermany.AttheWorldEconomicSummit,heldinLondonbetween12Juneand27July

1933,Hugenbergpresentedtheeconomicforumwithamemorandumon16June,inwhichheofferedhisownanalysisoftheGreatDepressionandproposalsforovercomingit.Germany'srecovery,heasserted,wasintheinterestofallnations.TopromoteGermanrecoveryandstrengthenGermany'scapacitytomeetitsfinancialobligations,HugenbergthoughtitimperativethatGermanybegrantedpossessionofcolonies,whereitcouldcarryout“largeprojects”;hearguedthatthe“VolkohneRaum”shouldtherebygainaccesstoregionsin

whichnewsettlementscouldbedeveloped.121ItmusthavebeencleartoHugenbergthathewasboundtoalienateEnglandandFrancewiththisexpansiveventure,thattheSovietUnionwouldtakeoffenseatthedemandfornew“areasofsettlement,”andthat,regardlessoftheotherstates'reactions,hisentirememorandumblatantlycontradictedthecarefultacticsHitlerhadadoptedforthemoment,includinghis17Mayforeignpolicyspeech.OtherGermanconferenceparticipants,suchasFinanceMinisterSchwerinvonKrosigk,ReichsbankPresidentHjalmarSchacht,andtheForeignOffice'sChiefInterpreter,PaulSchmidt,wereunitedintheirjudgmentthatHugenberg'suntimelyandpoorlycoordinatedapproachwasharmfultohimselfandmadealaughingstockoftheentireGermandelegation.122ForeignMinistervonNeurath,theleaderoftheGermandelegation,thussawhimselfobligatedtotaketheundiplomaticstepofexplainingthatHugenberg'smemorandumrepresentedonlyhispersonalviewsandnottheofficialpositionoftheGermandelegation.HugenberghadobviouslyconsideredtheLondonEconomicConferenceanopportunitytoputforwarddemandsinwhichheandhisPan-Germanassociateshadlongbeeninterested,andnowseizedthechancetoprovetohisfollowersthathecouldadvancenationalistclaimsmoredecisivelythanevenHitler.123Hugenberg'sdesperateandalmostgrotesqueattemptstojustifyhisbehaviorshowedalltooplainlythathehadbeenperfectlyseriousaboutwhathewrote.124AlreadyonthecrossingtoEnglandfromVlissingentoHarwichhehadmadeitunmistakablyclearthathewasnotpreparedtosupportNeurath'sconciliatorycourse.HewasthustheonlymemberoftheGermandelegationwhotookexceptiontoonepassageinNeurath'sspeech:“TheNationalSocialistgovernmenthasshownthatitiswillingtoworktogetherwithothernations[Völkern]inthepoliticalarena.ItisinthisspiritthatitapproachestheWorldEconomicConference.”125Arguingthathehad“notcomehereforaharmoniousunderstanding,”126Hugenbergthreatenedtodepartatonceunlessthatsentencewasdeleted,sothatNeurathfeltobligedtorelentandremovethesentencefromhisspeech.ItwasnotlongbeforetheconsequencesofHugenberg'sill-conceived

behaviorcaughtupwithhim.TheGermanForeignMinistrysuppressedthepublicationofaninterviewHugenberghadgiveninLondon,andafterhisreturntoGermany,hefoundhimselfcompletelyisolatedintheCabinetonaccountofhisconduct.127Inthe23June1933Cabinetmeeting,Hugenberg,burstingwithrighteousindignation,complainedtoHitlerinfrontoftheassembledCabinetthatNeurathhadpubliclycompromisedanddisavowedhiminLondon.HitlerandNeurath,whohadnointerestinfurtherexpoundinguponanincidentthat

wasrepletewithembarrassmentforallinvolved,didtheirbesttopacifyHugenberg.ButwhenHugenbergdemandedthedismissaloftheexperiencedandrespectedMinisterialdirektorPosse,whocoordinatedtheeffortsoftheGermandelegationafterthedepartureoftheMinisters,Papen,Neurath,SchwerinvonKrosigk,Schacht,LaborMinisterFranzSeldte,andeventuallyHitlerturnedagainstHugenbergandarguedthatmajorchangesintheGermandelegationwouldbeimpolitic.128Duringthemeeting,“thegenerallynegativeopinionofGermanyattheConference”wasdiscussed,aswastheupsettingfactthatHugenberg'smemorandumhadgivenGermany'sadversariestheopportunityforagoodmanyderisiveandspitefulcomments.Amongotherthings,the“impertinenttoneoftheRussiannoteonHugenberg'smemorandum”wasalsoasubjectofdiscussion.129SovietForeignSecretaryLitvinovhadferventlyrejectedtheimplicationsofHugenberg'smemorandumanddeclaredthatsomecountries,whichhadfallenintoan“economicmorass,”sawtheirlasthope“inscatterbrainedschemes”andwereindangerofbecomingthe“laughingstockoftheentireworld.”130Afterbeingthusshownup,isolated,andleftwithnosupportintheReichCabinet,Hugenbergdecidedtoresignafterthemeeting,thoughheinitiallyendeavoredtokeephisdecisionsecret.131ThestanceofoutragedinnocenceandwoundedpridethatheadoptedduringtheCabinetmeetinghadmisfired,andhisforeignpolicyforayandattempttotrumpHitleronthenationalistfrontnotonlyfailedtobringhimanykudos,butalsoservedtobrandhimasaforeignpolicyembarrassmentandtroublemakerintheCabinet.Meanwhile,on20June,afteraprotractedelectioncampaignintheFreeCity

ofDanzigthatwassupervisedbytheLeagueofNations,theNSDAPandtheCenterPartyformedacoalitionundertheleadershipofHermannRauschning,aformerGermanNationalwhohadswitchedovertotheNSDAP.132TheGermanNationalsandtheNazipartyhadbitterlyfoughteachotherduringthecourseofthecampaign,withtheNazistrainingtheirdestructivepropagandaontheGermanNationalswho,fortheirpart,triedtopreventanabsolutemajorityfortheNSDAP.Infact,politicalstrifeinDanzigwasreminiscentoftheautumnof1932whenpoliticalantagonismandresentmentbetweenthetwo“national”partieshadburstforthwithequalvehemence.AftertheDanzigelections,Hitlerfeltsecureenoughtodropanyremainingconcernsabouthiscoalitionpartner,andheinitiatedadecisivemoveagainsttheGermanNationalKampfringethroughouttheentireReich.133EversincethebanontheHamburgKampfringeattheendofMay,thethreatofageneralprohibitionhadhoveredlikeaDamoclesswordovertheorganization.134ThemajorityofKampfringleadershadbeensummonedtoanationaltrainingandindoctrinationcourse

(Reichsschulungskurs)between17and23June,sothatitwasanopportunemomenttotakeruthlessactionagainsttheGermanNationalparamilitaryorganization.Onthemorningof21June,theKampfringeweredissolvedandtheirassetsconfiscatedonthepretextthatinvestigationshadprovedconclusivelythatcommunistelementshadbeenacceptedintotheorganizations.135DuringoperationsconductedbythepoliceandSA,anumberofDNFofficesthathadservedascoordinationpointsfortheKampfstaffelnwerealsosearched.Lettersofprotestagainstthesearches,includingthatofaDNFLandAssociationleader,weretonoavail,despitehisassurancethatthemembersofhisorganizationwerenotimplicatedinanycounterrevolutionaryendeavors,butonthecontrary,considereditastheirnoblestpurposetohelpbuild“thenewReichcreatedbythenationalrevolution.”136Atthesametime,youthorganizations,suchastheGroßdeutscheBund—theGreaterGermanAssociation,anumbrellaorganizationofthebündischyouthleagues,ledbyViceAdmiralAdolfvonTrotha—werebannedaswell(asapreludetotheirincorporationintotheHitlerYouth).Inhisfive-pageprotestlettertoHindenburg,Trotha,inaragefueledbyhisutterincapacitytofendofftheonslaught,rejectedchargesthattheBündewerereactionaryorwould“pitthemselvesagainsttherevolutionarywaveofyouth.”137WithanationalbanontheKampfringe,Hugenberg'sdays,aswellasthoseof

theGermanNationalFront,werenumbered.AsTheodorHeusswroteaftertheprohibitionofallpartiesinJuly1933,thedissolutionofparty-affiliatedassociations,suchastheKampfringofYoungGermanNationals,haddeeplyaffectedthemainpartiesatapsychological,emotional,andspirituallevelbecausetheir“fightingyouth”—theveryfutureandcoreofpoliticalparties—hadbeenwrestedfromthemand,worstofall,nobodyhaddaredtoresist.138Hugenberghaddecidedtosubmithisresignationimmediatelyafterthe23JuneCabinetmeeting,despitethefactthatHitlerandevenNeurath,whomHugenberghaddirectlyattacked,haddonetheirbesttodownplayHugenberg'sconductinLondon,hopingtoavoidaCabinetreshuffle.Initially,Hugenberginformedonlyasmallcircleofclosepersonalconfidantsofhisdecisionand,on26June,stillrefusedtomakehisintentiontoresignpublic.139GiventheongoingdefectionsoflocalDNForganizationstotheNSDAP,however,aswellasthedissolutionofmoreGermanNationalassociations,itwascleartothepartyleadershipthattheDNFcouldnolongerbesustainedasanindependentorganization.TheonepersonwhostillharboredillusionsandwantedtokeepthepartyalivewasHugenberghimself.SincehehadpaidlittleattentiontothepartyinrecentmonthsandhadpassedallhisauthoritytodeputychairmanFriedrichvon

Winterfeld,inthisfinalphaseoftheparty'sexistencetheinitiativepassedmoreandmoretotheleadingmembersofthepartyexecutive.TheyfinallyimplementedthedissolutionoftheDNFagainstHugenberg'swishes,butwiththeagreementofthevastmajorityofthepartyexecutive(nowrenamedFührerstab,orleadershipstaff).On26June,AlexandervonFreytagh-LoringhovenwasthusinstructedbythepartyexecutivetoascertainfromNaziInteriorMinisterWilhelmFricktheintendedplans,ifany,forthefutureexistenceoftheDNF,andeventuallytoenterintonegotiationswithFrickonthematter.140Meanwhile,Hugenberg'stenderofresignation,inaccordancewithhis

instructions,washandedtoHindenburg'sadjutantatthePresident'sEastPrussianestateinNeudeck,whereHindenburgwasinresidence.141Hugenberg'sletterofresignationlevelednoaccusationsorfundamentalmisgivingsaboutNationalSocialistmethods.142ItresembledmorealetterofcomplaintaboutallegedinjusticessufferedbyHugenberg:thetreatmentmetedouttohimattheWorldEconomicConference,unfulfilledrequestswithrespecttotheministriesinhischarge,andtheforcibledissolutionoftheGermanNationalKampfstaffeln.HementionedneitherthecontinuedvalidityoftheEnablingActnorthepotentialpoliticalreverberationsofhisresignation.PossiblyinrecognitionofthepoliticalimplicationsthathisLondonmemorandumbroughtinitswake,orofhisgeneralpoliticalfailure,Hugenbergclearlywantedtoresignasinconspicuouslyanduncontroversiallyaspossible.AntonRitthalersuggestedthatHugenberghadelectedtotakehisleaveinanagreeablewayinordertoavoidposinganydangertothecontinuedexistenceofthepartyandtoensurethatGermanNationalofficialswerenotsubjectedtoreprisals.143Hugenberg'sresignationwasacceptedwithoutanyattempttomakehimchangehismind.144Butthen,itmusthavebeencleartoHugenbergthathecouldnotexpectanyencouragementfromHindenburgtoextendhisstayinoffice.Hindenburg'sheartfeltemotionalappealstoHugenbergtocooperatewiththegovernmentduringBrüning'schancellorshiphadbeenrebuffedtoobrusquely.Sympathyfortheman,whomHindenburghadonlyeverexperiencedasuncooperative,wasinanyeventnonexistent,allthemoresoas,inthePresident'seyes,Hugenbergwasresponsiblefordivisionswithintheconservativepartyanditssubsequentinexorabledecline.ThecentraleventconnectedwithHugenberg'sresignationwashisdiscussion

withHitleron27June.Hitlerinitiallyappearedaccommodating,thoughfirmoncertainpoints:heaskedHugenbergtoreconsiderhisdecisionandfoundwordsofpraiseforhisministerialwork,butalsoemphasizedthatHugenberg's

UndersecretaryofState,Hans-JoachimvonRohr,whomHitlerpersonallydisapprovedof,wouldhavetobereplacedbyaNationalSocialist.TheGermanNationalFrontwouldhavetobedisbandedaswell,Hitlerwenton,becauseitscontinuedexistenceinconjunctionwithHugenberg'sresignationmightleadtotheemergenceofaconservativenationalistopposition.Hitlercouldaffordtotakeanaccommodatingstance,sincehehadalreadybeeninformedbyFrickabouttheInteriorMinister'sdiscussionwithFreytagh-LoringhovenandthusknewfullwellthattheGermanNationalswerereadytodisbandtheDNFoftheirownaccord.Hugenberg,ontheotherhand,didnotyetknowtheresultofthetalksbetweenFreytagh-LoringhovenandFrick.WhenHugenbergcontinuedtoinsistonhisresignation,categoricallyrejectedthedissolutionoftheDNF,andevensuggestedtoHitlertotakeactionagainst“leftistelements”inNationalSocialistorganizations,Hitlerabruptlychangedtack.HeutteredthreatstotheeffectthatthousandsofGermanNationalcivilservantswouldlosetheirpositions,thatabattlewouldflareupallalongtheline,whichwouldalsodevourHugenberg'spressandfilmEmpire,andthatallwouldbedecidedafterthreedays.145Despitethesethreats,HugenbergcontinuedtoinsistonhisresignationwhilerefusingtosanctionthedissolutionoftheDNF.146AfterhisdiscussionwithHugenberg,HitlercalledforFreytagh-LoringhovenandthreatenedreprisalsiftheDNFwerenotdissolved.If,however,thepartyweretodisbandvoluntarily,hewaspreparedtobegenerous:toreleaseallarrestedDNFmembersandprotectthemfromfurtherarrests,toprovideforpartyemployees,andtorecognizeGermanNationalsasequalfellow-combatantsinthestruggleforanationalistGermany.147Thus,whentheDNF'spartyleadershipandexecutiveboardreconvenedonthe

afternoonof27June,thechoiceforvoluntarydissolutionandagainstHugenberg'spreferencetomaintainthepartyasanindependentorganizationhadbeenmade.Oftheapproximatelysixtypartyrepresentativesattending,fourvotedforHugenbergandfifty-sixforvoluntarydissolution.TheDNFsubmitteda“friendshipagreement,”148inwhichitaffirmedthatitwoulddisbandinfullagreementwiththeReichChancellor,andHitlerputhisassurancesinwritingandmadethemofficialthatsameevening.Aswouldbecomeevidentinthefollowingyears,thiswasoneofthefewsetsofpromisesthatHitlerkeptwithastonishingreliability.149MostoftheDNFReichstagdeputieswereabsorbedintotheNSDAPfaction,andcivilservantsassociatedwiththeGermanNationalFrontwereprovidedfor.ThisdidnotmeanthatthedissolutionoftheDNFwasuncontroversial.Infact,theprocessofvoluntarydissolution,andtheconcretestepsthatledtoit,remainedaboneofcontentioninGermanNationalcirclesfor

yearstocome.150IntheCabinetsessionof30JunethatfollowedHugenberg'sresignation,

HitlerwelcomedHugenberg'ssuccessors:KurtSchmitt,anexecutivedirectoroftheAllianzInsuranceCompany,asMinisterofEconomics,andtheNationalSocialistRichardWaltherDarréasMinisterofAgricultureandNutrition.151HealsoexpressedhisregretsaboutHugenberg'sresignationandhisappreciationforHugenberg's“collaborationandlongtimeactivityforthenationalcause.”152InacommentaryonHugenberg'spoliticalachievements,theleadingNazipaper,VölkischerBeobachter,wrotethatHugenbergdeservedmuchcreditasaneconomicexpertandforhisstruggleagainsttheYoungPlan.Allinall,however,“Hugenbergneverhadany‘luck’andhadbecomeatragicpersonality.Withoutbeingpersonallytoblame,thecurseofthatbarren,depletedgenerationthatfolloweduponBismarckandthathadgambledawaytheReichhoveredabovehim.”153Hugenbergmusthaveexpectedthataverydifferentappraisalofhismeritswouldsumuphiswholelife'sworkwhen,on30January1933,hesteeredhispartyintothefatefulalliancewithHitler.

1.TheAllgemeinerDeutscherGewerkschaftsbund,foundedin1919,wasfirstledbyCarlLegien(1861–1920)andthenbyTheodorLeipart(1867–1947)from1921to1933.

2.GotthardJasper,DiegescheiterteZähmung,WegezurMachtergreifungHitlers1930–1934(Frankfurt,1986),166;Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,7thed.(Munich,1978),113;Winkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,89–98.

3.“DerBundesvorstanddesADGBandenReichspräsidenten,”10March1933,inMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,188–189.

4.Ibid.,189,note4.5.ThisdeclarationwasmadefollowingHitler'spublicannouncementconfirmingtheinviolabilityof

Catholicdoctrine.SeeKlausScholder,DieKirchenunddasDritteReich,Vol.I,VorgeschichteundZeitderIllusion1918–1934(Frankfurt,1977),300–322.On13March1933thePopealreadyhadpraisedtheanticommuniststanceofthenewgovernment.MunichCardinalRichardFaulhaber(1869–1952)reportedtotheBavarianbishopsafterhisreturnfromRomeon20April:“InRome,NationalSocialismandfascismarejudgedtobetheonlysalvationfromcommunismandBolshevism.TheHolyFatherviewsthisfromafar,seeingnottheconcomitantside-effects,butonlythelargergoal.”(Ibid.,307.)

6.Seechapter3above.7.Winkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,921,describesthisasanactofpublicsubmission.8.AndthisdespitecontinuingSAattacksagainstunionfunctionaries(Ibid.,922).9.François-Poncet,TheFatefulYears,66–74.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,72–73,

conveystheeuphoricatmosphere:“HindenburgandHitlerdrivethroughalineoftensofthousandsofpeopletothecastle.Incomparablestormsofjubilation!.….Later,workers'delegationsfromthroughouttheReicharrivebyairplaneatTempelhoftobegreetedbyGoebbels.TheytaketheirmiddaymealwithHitler...NowittrulyseemsasifthewholeofGermanlaborpayshomagetotheFührer.”

10.Ebermayercommented:“.…everyrealsuccess,whichgainsthemafewmillionmoreoftheformerlyundecided,isusuallyfollowedbysomekindofcompletelyunlawfulbrutalitywhich,inadvance,hasbeenlegitimatedbythesuccessandisdrownedoutbyitslingeringinebriationandeuphoria.”Ibid.,73.

11.Winklercharacterizedthespeechasthe“mostmeasuredandconciliatory[Hitler]hadevermade.”

SeeDerWegindieKatastrophe,935.12.SeeWinkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,932–937.TherewasintensedebatewithintheSPD

Reichstagfactionovertheparty'sparticipationinthesessionof17May.FollowingathreatbyNaziInteriorMinisterFrick,therewasreasontofearforthelivesofincarceratedSocialDemocratsunlessthepartyprovedcooperative,whichpromptedamajorityofthefactiontofavorparticipation.EvenEbermayerfoundwordsofpraiseforHitler'sReichstagspeech:“Bravo!Ifoneofushadsaidthatorweretosayit,hewouldalreadybeunderlockandkey.”DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,89.

13.Winkler,DerWegindieKatastrophe,936.14.Ebermayer,moreamusedthanoutraged,on18April1933inDennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,

65.15.SeeBeatriceandHelmutHeiber,eds.,DieRückseitedesHakenkreuzes.Absonderlichesausden

AktendesDrittenReiches,2nded.(Munich,1994),119–120.16.MartinBroszatetal.,eds.,BayerninderNSZeit.SozialeLageundpolitischesVerhaltender

BevölkerungimSpiegelvertraulicherBerichte(MunichandVienna,1977),vol.I,210;reprintedinJosefandRuthBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,2nded.(Munich,1992),248.

17.TheVorläufigesGesetzzurGleichschaltungderLändermitdemReich(ProvisionalLawontheCoordinationoftheLänderwiththeReich)of31March1933regulatedtheneworganizationofstateparliamentsandlocalrepresentativebodies.Theircompositionwasnowmadetoconformwiththeelectionresultsof5March.TheZweitesGesetzzurGleichschaltungderLändermitdemReichof7AprildecreedtheappointmentofReichGovernors.PapenresignedasReichCommissarforPrussiaon7April;HitlerreservedtheReichGovernorshipforPrussiaforhimselfand,on11April,appointedGöringasDeputyReichGovernorandMinisterPresidentofPrussia.ContemporariesconsideredtheselawsanattempttorestructuretherelationshipbetweenReichandLänder.On30January1934thefederallyorientedconstitutionalstructurewasfinallyannulledbytheGesetzüberdenNeuaufbaudesReiches(LawontheReorganizationoftheReich),thoughacomprehensivereformoftheReichwasneverimplemented.SeeMartinBroszat,DerStaatHitlers,151–162.

18.SeeBeck,“TheChangingConcernsofPrussianConservatism,1830–1914,”inPhillipDwyer,ed.,ModernPrussianHistory,1830–1947,Vol.II(London,2001),86–106.

19.LutzGrafSchwerinvonKrosigk,Memoiren(Stuttgart,1977),94.20.TheodorHeuss(1884–1963),“DasSchicksaldesReiches,”DieHilfe,no.39,22April1933,224–

227.Heuss,adeputyoftheDDPanditssuccessor,theStaatspartei,wasanexpertonconstitutionalissuesduringtheWeimaryearsandPresidentofWestGermanyfrom1949to1959.HugoPreuß(1860–1925)wasProfessorofConstitutionalLawandMinisteroftheInteriorintheScheidemannCabinetfromFebruarytoJune1919.HedrewupthefirstdraftoftheWeimarConstitution,whichgaverisetoprotestbytheLänderbecauseofitscentralistorientationandwassubsequentlyrevised.

21.ThomasMann,Tagebücher1933–1934,ed.byPeterdeMendelsohn(Frankfurt,1977),45–46.22.The“casualtiesofMarch”who,duetothechangeinpoliticalclimate,suddenlydiscoveredthatthey

hadbeenNazisallalongandnowrushedtojointhepartyanditsorganizations.TheywerealsocalledMärzveilchen(Marchviolets)bythe“OldFighters”—thosewhohadjoinedtheNSDAPearlyon.Whenthepartywasclosedtonewcomerson1May,morethan1.6millionnewmembershadjoinedsince30January(outofatotalof2.5million).Thiswaswhyone'smembershipnumberwasdeemedtoreflectone'sloyaltytothecause(thelowerthenumber,theearlieronehadjoined).

23.LudwigEbermayer(1858–1933)wasOberreichsanwaltfrom1921to1926.24.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,76,entryof9May1933.ErichBumke(1874–

1945)hadbeenPresidentoftheReichsgerichtinLeipzigsince1929.Since17December1932hewasalsoactingdeputyoftheReichspräsidentinhiscapacityaspresidentoftheSupremeCourt(Article51oftheWeimarConstitutionwasamendedaccordingly;beforethistheChancellorhadbeenthedesignateddeputy).In1939,HitlerextendedBumke'stermbeyondthelegalagelimitbydecree.WhenAmericantroopsenteredLeipzigon20April1945,Bumkecommittedsuicide.SeeWolfgangBenzandHermannGraml,eds.,BiographischesLexikonzurWeimarerRepublik(Munich,1988),50.

25.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,76.26.Ibid.,77.Ebermayercontinues:“Onthatday,withoutanyonerequestinghimtodoso,Dr.Bumke

hadtheoilpaintingofthefirstpresidentoftheSupremeCourt,Simson,aJewwhoconvertedtoChristianity,removedfromtheGreatFestivalHalloftheReichsgericht.”

27.Ibid.,75–76.28.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,69.Ebermayercontinuesresignedly:“Butitis

painful.AboveallwhenIconsiderthattherearenowmillionslikehiminGermanywhohavesuddenly‘seenthelight’.….Thesearepeopleendowedwithsightwhohavebeenblinded.”

29.Ebermayer,entryof15May1933,85.30.Ibid.,86–87.ThiswasinreactiontothewordsinoneofH.W.'sletters:“Itisquitetruethatpolitics

todaytakespriorityovereverythingelse,becauseGermanyhasgivenusthegeniusAdolfHitler.Iamashamedonlyofonething—thatwewereskepticalandlackedfaithfortoolonginthisleaderanddidnotrecognizehisgreatnessinthefullenormityanduniquenessofitspowermuchsooner.ThereforeInowfeelanevenstrongerdutyforblindandunquestioningallegiance.….”

31.Ibid.32.AprominentexampleisthemanwhospearheadedtheassassinationattemptonHitler,ClausGraf

vonStauffenberg.HehadsupportedHitlerascandidateforPresidentagainstHindenburgin1932.SeePeterHoffmann,Stauffenberg.AFamilyHistory,1905–1944(Cambridge,1995),69.

33.Scholder,inhisseminalstudyDieKirchenunddasDritteReich,42.34.OnDibelius,seeBenzandGraml,eds.,BiografischesLexikonzurWeimarerRepublik,59–60;

Weiß,ed.,BiografischesLexikonzumDrittenReich,83–84;RobertS.Wistrich,ed.,Who'sWhoinNaziGermany(LondonandNewYork,1995),38;KlausScholder,“OttoDibelius,”ZeitschriftfürTheologieundKirche78(1981),90–104.AfterthewarDibeliuswasaccusedofnotspeakingoutagainsttheNaziexterminationpolicy,eventhoughhehadknownaboutitfromKurtGerstein.

35.See“RundbriefdesGeneralsuperintendentenOttoDibelius,”inBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,129–132,esp.131.Dibeliuscriticized“pastorsgoingaroundtheircommunitiessportingpartybadgesandgreetingtheirparishionerswithHeilHitler.”Ibid.,132.Onaccountofthiscircular,DibeliusbecameinvolvedinadisputewiththeBrandenburgOberpräsident(provincialgovernor)andGauleiteroftheKurmark,WilhelmKube,whohadfoundedachurchpartyoutofwhichemergedthe“GermanChristians.”SeeScholder,Kirchen,277–300.

36.ReprintedinBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,207–211.Dibeliusdepictedtheanti-Semiticboycottof1Aprilasadefensivemeasure.Ontheotherhand,hewasspeakingtoaforeignaudience,tryingtoelicitunderstandingforGermany,andwasthusdisposedtodistortrealityandpaintarosypicture.

37.Ibid.,210–211.38.Ibid.,208.Dibeliuspresentedavividpictureofthenoticeablereliefthatwasthenbeingfeltall

acrossGermany.Heconcededthattherehadbeen“transgressions,”butmaintainedthatpubliclifeasawholeremaineda“pictureoforderanddiscipline.”

39.PartiallyreprintedinBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,156–157;GünthervanNorden,DerdeutscheProtestantismusimJahrdernationalsozialistischenMachtergreifung(Gütersloh,1979),52–55.

40.“RundfunkansprachedesGeneralsuperintendentenderKurmark,OttoDibeliusvom4.April,”inBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,207–211,esp.210.Dibelius'sspeechmadeitclearthatevenintheeyesofcriticalobservers,NationalSocialismcouldpointtotwoimportantsuccessesbythespringof1933:(1)IncontrasttoWeimar,thepeoplewerenotdividedintoalargenumberofparties,butseemedunitedasanation,inpublicperceptionpartiallybecauseofthecentralizationoftheReich;(2)“order”hadbeenreestablishedandtheCommunistdangerwaseliminated.ItwasalsoanimmenseassetfortheregimetohavemenofDibelius'sgreatmoralauthorityonitsside.

41.ForparallelsbetweentheNazitakeoverandAugust1914seePeterFritzsche,GermansintoNazis(Cambridge,Mass.,1998),148.“ForconservativesandStahlhelmers,for‘Tory’workersandrural

protesters,aswellasforHitler'svoters,longyearsofoppositiontotheWeimarRepublichadfinallyculminatedinthevictoryofJanuary1933,amomentwhichovercametheshameofNovember1918andrestoredthepromiseofAugust1914,whenGermanshadpulledtogetherforthenationalcause.Inotherwords,theNationalSocialiststappedintoamoregeneric‘nationalsocialist’consensusthatextendedwellbeyondHitler'spartyandhiselectorate.”

42.OtfriedBrügge,ed.,Hannoverwirdnationalsozialistisch.QuellenlesebuchzurMachtübernahme(Hannover,1981),33.Eventhecarelessrepetitionofrumors,thatis,withoutmaliciousintent,wastobepunishedwithathree-monthjailsentenceorafine,sothatevenharmlessgossipcouldhaveseriousconsequences.

43.“BekämpfungdessogenanntenMiesmachertums,”MinisterialblattfürdiepreußischeinnereVerwaltung,atGeheimesStaatsarchivPreußischerKulturbesitz,Berlin-Dahlem(GStAPK),“PreußischesStaatsministerium,”Rep.90,no.2326,222.Thedecreewasaddressedtoprovincialanddistrictgovernors,presidentsofpolice,countycouncilors(Landräte),andthecommunitiesandcommunalassociationsandwasthusboundtoreacheveryPrussianadministrativeofficial.

44.GStAPK,Ibid.,222.45.Theordinancedifferedsubstantiallyinitstonefromthelanguagetraditionallyusedincomparable

ordinances,asmaybeascertainedbythecolloquialexpression“Miesmacher,”whichwasregionallycoloredandnotatallcommoninsouthernGermany.SeealsoBroszat,DerStaatHitlers,145.

46.GStAPK,Ibid.,222.47.Hsi-HueyLiang,TheBerlinPoliceForceintheWeimarRepublic(BerkeleyandLosAngeles,

1970),171–172;Bracher,Sauer,Schulz,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,2nded.(KölnandOpladen,1962),72–74.

48.“BekämpfungdessogenanntenMiesmachertums,”atGeheimesStaatsarchivPreußischerKulturbesitz,Berlin-Dahlem,“PreußischesStaatsministerium,”Rep.90,no.2326,222.

49.ThomasNipperdey,DeutscheGeschichte(Munich,1983),333(seealsochapter6above).50.François-PoncettoPaulBoncour,24April1933,inDocumentsDiplomatiquesFrançais1932–

1939.PremièreSérie,vol.III(Paris,1966),312–313.(Therecordingwasmadeonaphonographicrecord.)51.Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,140.Theincidentoccurredontheoccasionof

Hitler'svisitinLeipziginmidJuly1933.ItwasreportedbyEbermayer'smotherinalettertoherson,whowasnotinLeipzigatthetime.AsEbermayernoted,hismotherwasluckythattheincidentdidnotculminateinahomeinvasion.

52.CunoHorkenbach,ed.,DasDeutscheReichvon1918bisheute,vol.4(Berlin,1935),284.53.OskarLoerke,Tagebücher1903–1939,ed.byHermannKasack,2nded.(Heidelbergand

Darmstadt,1955),272.54.ErichEbermayer'sname,forexample,wasinitiallynotonthelonglistofprohibitedauthorswhose

bookswerepubliclyburned,suchasStefanZweig,FranzWerfel,FritzvonUnruh,ErnstToller,ErichMariaRemarque,BertholdBrecht,HeinrichMann,WalterHasenclever,TheodorWolff,ArnoldZweig,andmanyothers.Reliefwasgreat,butofshortduration.Fourdayslater,Ebermayerfoundoutthathisnovelswerelikewiseprohibited;Ebermayer,DennheutegehörtunsDeutschland,79,83–84.

55.Ibid.,entryof16May1933,86.56.23June1933,“TheChargéinGermany(Gordon)totheActingSecretaryofState”Foreign

RelationsoftheUnitedStates.DiplomaticPapers,Vol.II,1933(Washington,1949),234.(Thechargéd'affairestransactsdiplomaticbusinessduringthetemporaryabsenceofanambassador.)BrüningandTreviranusmentionedthisincidenttoGordonontheoccasionofadinneron22June.

57.Ibid.,235.58.GeorgBernhard,theformereditoroftheliberalVossischeZeitung,isatellingexampleofhowthe

influenceoftheDNVPwasoverrated.Eveninthelatespringof1933,hewasconvincedthat“inthelongrunGermanNationalsareboundtoconstituteanobstaclefortheimplementationofNazism'sracialidiocies.”InGeorgBernhard,DiedeutscheTragödie.SelbstmordeinerRepublik(Prague,1933),25.chapter5abovetellsaverydifferentstory.

59.6June1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.184,74–75.

60.Ibid.,75.61.19June1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.184,76.VonSavigny,

wellawarethatthiswasonlyoneinfractionofmanythatwouldremainunatoned,wrotetotheWestphalsthat“aninterventioninpendingproceedingsis...onprincipleinadmissible.”

62.Thelawlessnessofthehalfyearfollowing30January1933wentsofarthattherewerealreadycasesofSippenhaft(inwhichentirefamilyclanswereheldliablefortheactionsofoneoftheirmembers).Thus,fiveofPhilippScheidemann'srelativeswereinternedinaconcentrationcampafterhehadpublishedanarticleintheNewYorkTimesthatwascriticaloftheNaziregime.Scheidemannmanagedtoobtainthereleaseofhisrelativesonlyafterapublicdisavowalofhisownarticle.Hewasexpatriatedon23August1933,andhispersonalpropertywasconfiscated.SeeBeckerandBecker,eds.,HitlersMachtergreifung,377;Bracheretal.,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,2nded.(Cologne,Opladen,1962),301.

63.Braunschweig,withanareaof3,672.05squarekilometers,wasonly6.6timesaslargeasLakeConstance.Ithadapopulationof518,736(16June1933),lessthanone-eighthofthatofBerlin.

64.OnBraunschweigpoliticsintheearly1930s,seeErnst-AugustRoloff,BürgertumundNationalsozialismus1930–1933.BraunschweigsWeginsDritteReich(Hannover,1961).TheauthoristhesonoftheformerDNVPparliamentaryfactionleaderintheBraunschweigLandtag.DietrichKlagges(1891–1971)hadbeenaNazipartymembersince1925.

65.IntheBraunschweigLandtagelectionsof7December1924,whichtookplaceconcurrentlywiththeReichstagelections,theDVPreceived17.2percentofthevote;theDNVP18.5;andtheSPD37.4(and46.2intheLandtagelectionof27November1927);Falter,WahlenundAbstimmungen,92.

66.VolkerBerghahn,DerStahlhelm.BundderFrontsoldaten1918–1945(Düsseldorf,1966),263.67.Roloff,BürgertumundNationalsozialismus,146–151;Bracher,StufenderMachtergreifung,288–

289;Berghahn,DerStahlhelm,263–266;TheodorDuesterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler,45–46.68.TheodorDuesterberg(1875–1950)wassecondBundesführeroftheStahlhelm,co-equalwithFranz

Seldte,whowasthefirstBundesführer(bothsince1924).69.SeeBerghahn,Stahlhelm,264;Roloff,Bürgertum,148–149.Thisagreementrancountertothe

previousconductoftheStahlhelm,whichhadfoughttheReichsbannerandSPDinBraunschweig.Inthecircumstances,itwasthusreasonabletoassumethattheactionwasaimedattheNazis.

70.Roloff,Bürgertum,149:“Ambulancestransportedthewoundedthewholedaywithoutabreak,thetracesofthehorriblebloodbathremainedvisibleforalongtimethereafter...largepuddlesofbloodtestifiedtothefactthattheStahlhelmerssufferedthesamefateatthesamehourintheVolksfreund-HausastheSocialDemocrats,whowerestillbeingbeatentodeaththere.”Duesterberg'saccount,DerStahlhelmundHitler,containsoccasionalinconsistenciesregardingtheorderofevents.

71.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,270.Contrarytowhatmightreasonablybeexpected,DNVPchairmanHugenbergrarelyparticipatedinCabinetdiscussionsabouttheseorotherdecisivepoliticalissues.HiscolleagueintheCabinet,MinisterofFinanceLutzGrafSchwerinvonKrosigk,noteddisapprovinglythatHugenbergevincednointerestingeneralpoliticalquestions“evenwhen,aswiththeEnablingActandthelawtopurgethebureaucracy,thesewereoftheutmostsignificance.”LutzGrafSchwerinvonKrosigk,EsgeschahinDeutschland(TübingenandStuttgart,1951),174.

72.Inhismemoirs,DerStahlhelmundHitler,46,DuesterbergreportedthatHitleraccostedhimangrilyatadiplomaticreceptionshortlyaftertheeventsofBraunschweig:“ItwasyouwhofirstgaveyourleaderSchradertheordertostageaputsch.Itisthereforeyourfault.”Ibid.

73.Ibid.,46–47;Berghahn,DerStahlhelm,251.74.Forexample,inaspeechinLeipzigon15March1933:“Weknowhowmuchthefrontlinefighters

GöringandHitleresteemtheoldcomradesfromtheWorldWarnowgatheredintheStahlhelmandhowclosecomradeSeldteistothemeninthecabinet.”CitedinBerghahn,DerStahlhelm,254.Asleaderofanorganizationthatwasofficiallyrepresentedinthegovernment,Duesterberghadtocondoneitsactions,whetherheagreedwiththemornot.

75.Berghahn,DerStahlhelm,250.Duesterberg'soccasionalcriticismofNazismwasnotfreeofcontradictions,sincehehimselfwasanti-democraticandhadalwaysrejectedtheWeimarRepublic.

76.Duesterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler,52–53.TheeventsthatledtoDuesterberg'sdismissalon26April1933aredescribedindetailin“DiegewaltsameAmtsenthebungdes2.B.F.Duesterberg,”atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.2,13–26.Thischronologicallyorganizedprotocolcorrespondstothechapter“DasProtokollüberdieFührerkriseimStahlhelm,”inDuesterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler,51–63,downtolinguisticidiosyncrasiesandincorrectdating,exceptthatthechapterinDuesterberg'smemoirsissupplementedwithhisownobservations.TheprotocolwasdraftedbyMajorEgonKriegeron23May1933.

77.Duesterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler,53.The“AktenderKanzleivonPapen,”BABerlin-Lichterfelde,R53,no.2,4–10,containaconfidentialcommentaryonDuesterberg'sremovalfromofficewiththeheading:“Am24.7.33anHerrnvonTschirschkyzurEinordnungindiegeheimenAktenübergeben.”Fritz-GünthervonTschirschkywasvonPapen'sassistant.SeeFritz-GünthervonTschirschky,ErinnerungeneinesHochverräters(Stuttgart,1972),95–121.Duesterberg'sownaccount,basedonEgonKrieger'schronologicalbreakdownofevents,issubjectivelycoloredandcondemnsSeldte'sactionsasopportunistic,disloyal,andevendishonest,whileBerghahn'sexamination(DerStahlhelm,245–263)alsoshedslightonSeldte'smotives,thusmakinghisactionsmoreunderstandable.

78.SeeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.2,20–24;Duesterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler,56–60;Berghahn,DerStahlhelm,258–261.Berghahnconcluded:“OnlyaftertheruinsoftheGermancatastrophedoesSeldte'sbehaviorappear‘fraudulent.’Inthespringof1933,itwasperfectlyinlinewithhisprinciples”(DerStahlhelm,258–259).

79.Duesterberg,DerStahlhelmundHitler,59–60.DuesterbergsuspectedthatMajorvonStephanihadbeendeceivedbySeldteaboutHindenburg'strueposition.Duesterbergemphasizedthaton28AprilHindenburgsenthim“averyappreciativeletterandalargeportraitofhimself”(60).

80.Berghahn,DerStahlhelm,265–267;Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,121–122;Hans-UlrichThamer,VerführungundGewalt.Deutschland1933–1945(Berlin,1986),288.

81.Berghahn,DerStahlhelm,262;266–274.AtameetingwithHitleron21June1933,SeldterelinquishedhiscommandovertheyoungerStahlhelmmembers;onlythoseolderthanthirty-fiveremainedunderhisauthority.Thosefromageeighteentothirty-fivewereintegratedintotheSAasWehrstahlhelm.

82.AGymnasiumteacherbyprofession,Baumannmaintainedthatpettycriticismandcomplainingnowhadtocease,sincethenationhadtobeimbuedwithoneunifiedwill;seeRoloff,Bürgertum,158–159.ForpressreportsontheincidentseeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPundNationalsozialismus,”R8034II,no.9030,177–180;and“OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,16–20.

83.TheKPDandSPDhadbeeneliminated,theCatholicCenterwasnotrepresentedintheLandtagofProtestantBraunschweig,andtheDVPhaddissolveditselfon26April;Roloff,Bürgertum,131–161.

84.“LandesverbandBraunschweigderDNVPzurNSDAPübergetreten,”VölkischerBeobachter,25April1933.

85.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPundNationalsoialismus,”R8034II,no.9030,179;“NichteinePartei,sondernDeutschland,”VölkischerBeobachter,26April1933.

86.Roloff,Bürgertum,159;BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPundNationalsozialismus,”no.9030,180–181,esp.“HugenbergssturerKampf,”DerJungdeutsche,28April1933;“DieBraunschweigerAustritte.ErklärungderDNVP,”BerlinerLokalAnzeiger,27April1933.Initsofficialexplanation,theDNVPemphasizedthatthemembersoftheBraunschweigexecutivecommitteewhohaddefectedhadpreviouslycomplainedabouttheNazisandsoughtprotectionfromtheGermanNationalpartyleadershipinBerlin.Theirdefection,therefore,appearedmorelikeaformofpoliticalsuicideordesperateself-defensethananactofpoliticalconviction.

87.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,17,“WielangenochHugenberg?”DerReichsbote.TageszeitungfürdasevangelischeDeutschland,26April1933.

88.AccordingtotheReichsbote,Hugenberg'stenureinofficewas“butamatterofweeksordays.”89.OneheadlineposedthequestionconcerningtheDNVP'sstatusas“Party,orLinkintheNational

Movement?”Forreportsonthisissue,alsofromthesemi-independentCenterPartyandliberalpress,seeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,18–20.

90.WolfgangSauermadeitclearthathedidnotconsiderthesechargesconclusive:“InMarch1933,he[i.e.,Gereke]wasoneofthefirsttodisappearinthemaelstromofNationalSocialistterror.”InBracher,Sauer,Schulz,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,660;alsoBrüning,Memoiren,660.GerekewaschargedwithhavingembezzledamillionReichsmark,partlyfromHindenburg'sreelectioncampaignfund.SeeMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,248;andGüntherGereke,Ichwarköniglich-preußischerLandrat(Berlin/East,1969).

91.WalterFörst,RobertLehralsOberbürgermeister.EinKapiteldeutscherKommunalpolitik(DüsseldorfandVienna,1962);Broszat,DerStaatHitlers,232.AccordingtoBrüning(Memoiren,654),Lehr,chargedwithenrichinghimselfwithpublicfunds,remainedimprisonedforayearandahalf.BracherarguesthatthechargesagainstKalckreuthwerebasedonpurefabrication.SeeBracher,DienationalsozialistischeMachtergreifung,188.

92.Borchmeyer,HugenbergsRingen,PartI,36and81.ThisapologeticallyformulatedtractfromHugenberg'sattorneycontainsmaterialsusedinHugenberg'sde-nazificationproceedings.SeealsoHillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”603.

93.Itwasalsoon3MaythatthedecisionwasmadetorenametheDNVPtheDeutschnationaleFront,DNF.

94.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,24–27.

95.AtthebeginningofMay,forexample,theDNVPchairmanintheBerlinsuburbofRudowdefectedtotheNSDAP.SeeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”no.9021,28a.

96.BABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,30a.97.Forexamplesofsuch“DeclarationsofSolidarity,”see“MitteilungenderdeutschnationalenFront,”

19May1933.98.Themeetinghadbeenarrangedwellbeforehand.EmilBerndt,Reichstagdeputy,1920–1933;Axel

FreiherrvonFreytagh-Loringhoven,Reichstagdeputy,1924–1933;HorstvonRestorff,chairmanoftheDNVPEastPrussianLandAssociation.

99.Borchmeyer,HugenbergsRingen,35.100.Borchmeyer,HugenbergsRingen,35;Schmidt-Hannover,UmdenkenoderAnarchie,353;Hiller

vonGaertingen,“DNVP,”606.101.31May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,DNVP,April1931-April1938,”R43I,

no.2655,249.Onthereactionofthepress,seeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,35,esp.“ZusammenbruchderParteien!DasEndedespolitischenBürgertums,”Generalanzeiger,31May1933;“ProtesteimHugenbergLager,”Rundschau,31May1933.HansPfundtner(1881–1945);asStaatssekretärintheReichInteriorMinistryheparticipatedinthedraftingoftheNurembergLaws;resignedhispostin1943,andcommittedsuicideon25April1945inBerlin.

102.31May1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,DNVP,April1931-April1938,”R43I,no.2655,249.BrawlsbetweentheSAandtheStahlhelmhadtakenplacebecausetheSAhadmistakenStahlhelmuniformsforthoseoftheKampfringe.Abanthusbecamenecessaryinthe“interestofgoodrelations”betweentheStahlhelmandtheSA.

103.HillervonGaertingen,“DasEndederDNVPimFrühjahr1933,”inGotthardJasper,ed.,VonWeimarzuHitler1930–1933(CologneandBerlin,1968),276;BerlinerLokalanzeigerof15June1933.

104.Fortheextensivepresscoverage,especiallyintheNazipress,seeBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”34–46;and“DNVPundNationalsozialismus,”

186and192.105.RüdigerStutz,“StetigkeitundWandlungeninderpolitischenKarriereeinesRechtsextremisten.

ZurEntwicklungEduardStadtlersvonderNovemberrevolutionbis1933,”ZeitschriftfürGeschichtswissenschaft34(1986),797–806.

106.SpahnhadbeenaProfessorofHistoryinStraßburgsince1901butleftthecityin1918whentheAlsaceagainbecameFrench.In1902,SpahnmarriedElisabethBracht,sisterofFranzBracht,futureReichCommissarforPrussiaandInteriorMinisterinSchleicher'sCabinet.OnSpahn,seeGabrieleClemens,MartinSpahnundderRechtskatholizismusinderWeimarerRepublik(Mainz,1983);foranoverview,seeLarryE.Jones,“FranzvonPapen,theGermanCenterParty,andtheFailureofCatholicConservatismintheWeimarRepublic,”CentralEuropeanHistory38(2005),191–217.

107.Clemens,MartinSpahn,173.AtthetimeofhischangeovertotheDNVP,SpahnwasjoinedbyasmallgroupofCatholicnoblemen,officers,andhigh-rankingofficials.

108.ReinholdQuaatz,inWeißandHoser,eds.,DieDeutschnationalen,214.Inhisentryof23November1932,Quaatznoted:“HugenbergvoiceshisconcernabouttheCatholicwing:Stadtler,Spahn,Borchmeyer(andGisevius),whomaketheirownpolicies.Suamaximaculpa!”WiththislastcommentQuaatzpresumablyreferredtothefactthatitwasHugenbergwhohadbroughtSpahnintotheparty.JosephBorchmeyeractedasHugenberg'sattorneyafterthewar;Hans-BerndGiseviusalsodefectedtotheNSDAPinearlyJune,butlaterjoinedtheresistanceagainstHitler.

109.Quaatz,ibid.,218–219.On16December1932Quaatzmentioneda“movebythegroupSpahn-Stadtler-Gisevius”againstHugenberg;on19Decemberhewrotethatthegroupwascarryingout“subversiveactivities”withintheDNVP.

110.Brüning,Memoiren1918–1934,652–656.EdmundForschbach,himselfoneofthosewhodefectedtotheNSDAPinJune1933,disputedBrüning'saccount.SeeMorsey,DasErmächtigungsgesetz,178,180.

111.Clemens,MartinSpahn,202.112.Ibid.,204.113.WilhelmSchmidt,born1878,chairmanoftheFatherlandLaborAssociation,deputyinthe

PrussianLandtag1924–1928,andReichstag1930–1932;Hans-BerndGisevius,born1904,GermanNationalYouthLeader,latermemberoftheAbwehr(counterintelligence)andoneofthefewmembersoftheresistancewhosurvivedthewar.Seehis—notalwaysreliable—account,Hans-BerndGisevius,TotheBitterEnd.ThePlottoKillHitler(NewYork,1998).OtherswholeftwereEdmundForschbach,whopublishedashortpieceontheDNVP'sdemise,“DieDeutschnationalen.VomEndeeinerPartei,”PolitischeMeinung5(1960),12–16,andStudienassessorFlume,oneofthefoundersoftheKampfringjungerDeutschnationaler.See“Raustreten,”KölnischeZeitung,10June1933.

114.“DiegegenrevolutionäreDNVP,”PreußischerPressedienst,10June1933,atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,DNVPundNS,”192a.

115.“DerWegzuHitler,”Angriff,10June1933.116.Ibid.Occasionallytermssuchas“endofthepoliticalbourgeoisie”wereemployedtodenotethe

demiseofthebourgeoiswayoflife.See“DasEndedespolitischenBürgertums,”SchlesischeTageszeitung,1June1933.

117.TheDNFadoptedthepositionthatReichstagmandatesbelongedtotheLandAssociationsandwouldautomaticallyrevertbacktothemifadeputycrossedthefloortoanotherparty.See“DiedeutschnationaleReichstagsfraktionzudenAustritten,”in“MitteilungenderDNF,”atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,49.ThattheGermanNationalspiritseemedunbrokenwasdocumentedbythefoundationofanewpaperforyoungerDNFmembers,DerjungeNationalist,astheconservativedailyDerTagreportedon13June1933.

118.“InTreuezuHugenberg,”WestfälischeVolkszeitung,13June1933,atBABerlin-Lichterfelde“PressearchivReichslandbund,OrganisiertesBürgertum,”R8034II,no.9021,47.

119.InhisclosingwordsonbehalfoftheGermandelegation,ReichsbankPresidentSchachtspokeofthe“failureofaninternationalagreement...”AccordingtoSchacht,the“wholeWorldEconomicConference...disbandedwithoutanypracticalresult.”SeeHjalmarSchacht,76JahremeinesLebens(Bad

Wörishofen,1953),395.120.AntonRitthaler,“EineEtappeaufHitlersWegzurungeteiltenMacht.HugenbergsRücktrittals

Reichsminister,”VierteljahrsheftefürZeitgeschichte8(1960),193–219;here196–197;andthe“UnterlagenAntonRitthaler,1920–1954”ED307,attheInstitutfürZeitgeschichte,Munich.

121.FortheEnglishtextofthememorandum,seeDocumentsonGermanForeignPolicy,SeriesC,Vol.I,562–567;fortheGermanoriginal,seeAktenzurDeutschenAuswärtigenPolitik1918–1945,SerieC,1933–1937,Vol.1,part2,557–562.Oninternationalreactions,seeAktenzurDeutschenAuswärtigenPolitik,SerieC,Vol.1,576–577;584–586.HugenbergmaintainedthattherevolutionandcivilwarinRussialayattherootoftheeconomiccrisis.SovietForeignMinisterLitvinov,whoreactedangrily,wasnotaloneinsuspectingthatHugenbergwrotethememorandumatthebehestoftheNazis.On19June,PravdapublishedaneditorialonHugenberg'smemorandumentitled“DonQuixotesofourAge,”whereitwasarguedthatHugenbergspelledoutwhatthepresentGermanleadershipsawasawayoutofthepresentcrisis:expansionintotheEast.SeeMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,574.

122.LutzGrafSchwerinvonKrosigk,EsgeschahinDeutschland.MenschenbilderunseresJahrhunderts(TübingenandStuttgart,1951),174–178;Schacht,76JahremeinesLebens,394–395.SchachtalsodrewadirectlinkbetweenHugenberg'sconductandhisresignationtendayslater.SeealsoPaulSchmidt,StatistaufdiplomatischerBühne1923–1945.ErlebnissedesChefdolmetschersimAuswärtigenAmtmitdenStaatsmännernEuropas(Bonn,1949),265–267.

123.WhenHugenberghadreadthememorandumtotheGermandelegation,Neurath,apparentlytoobserveproprieties,desistedfromcriticizinghimopenly.ButheadvisedHugenbergnottopresentthememorandumtotheEconomicForumandassumedthatHugenbergwouldfollowhisinstructions.SeeSchwerinvonKrosigk,EsgeschahinDeutschland,176.

124.“DenkschriftdesReichswirtschaftsministersüberverschiedeneVorgängeaufderLondonerWeltwirtschaftskonferenz,”21June1933,inMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,571–575.

125.Schmidt,Statist,266.126.Ibid.127.HugenberghadclaimedinthisinterviewthattheMarxistcamphaddisseminatedfalseinformation

abouttheGermandelegationintheEnglishpress.HealsoinsistedthattheideasexpressedinhismemorandumwereinlinewiththoseoftheReichgovernment.SeeLeopold,AlfredHugenberg,154.

128.MinisterialdirektorwastherankjustbelowthatofStaatssekretär.PosseremainedathispostfollowingHugenberg'sresignationandwaslaterpromotedtoStaatssekretärintheMinistryofEconomics.See“Ministerbesprechung,anschließendKabinettsitzungvom23.Juni,”inMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,577–589,esp.581–582;Krosigk,EsgeschahinDeutschland,175–177.

129.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,578.130.Ibid.,573,note8;andSovietDocumentsonForeignPolicy,Vol.III:1933–1941(London,New

York,1953),21–22.131.Thepoliticsofextremeeconomicself-sufficiencythatHugenberghadadvocatedintheCabinet

werealsorejectedbyNeurathandinitiallyevenbyHitler(wholaterembracedit)asprematureandthereforeimprudent.Leopold,AlfredHugenberg,153.LeopoldbelievesthatthiswasthereasonHitlerhadofferedNeuraththeleadershipofthedelegation.

132.SeetheCenterPartypaperGermaniaandtheconservativeDerTagof20June1933;andLeopold,AlfredHugenberg,157.

133.OnepretextforthiswastheclaimthatduringsearchesofSPDofficeson16June,incriminatingevidenceagainsttheKampfringehadbeenfound.HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”610.

134.ThebanhadbeenpromulgatedonthebasisofArticleIoftheReichstagsbrandverordnung,theDecreeontheProtectionofthePeopleandtheStateof28February1933.ThisarticlerenderednullandvoidbasicrightsthathadbeenguaranteedintheWeimarConstitution,suchasArticles114,115,117,118,123,124,and153,andcouldbeevokedundermanyconditions.

135.Thetruthoftheseassertionsisdifficulttoverify.EventhoughReichskampfringführerHerbertvonBismarckdideverythingpossibletoexcludeformercommunistsandReichsbannermembersfromthe

Kampfringe,inpracticeitwasnotalwayspossibletopreventGermanNationalorganizationsfrombecomingakindofreceptacleforbannedleftistorganizations,astheyrepresentedtheonlypossibilityforlegalpoliticalactivityoutsideoftheNSDAP.

136.21June1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,DNVP,1931–1938,”R43I,no.2655,263–265.

137.23June1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“StellvertreterdesReichskanzlers,KanzleivonPapen,”R53,no.86,9–13,esp.11;seealsoMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,592–595.TrothaalsocomplainedaboutNaziattacksandasearchofhisprivatequarters.

138.TheodorHeuss,“AusgangderParteien,”DieHilfe39(1933),361–366.139.SeeAntonRitthaler,“EineEtappe,”193–219;Borchmeyer,HugenbergsRingen,82–85;andthe

“UnterlagenAntonRitthaler,1920–1954”ED307,attheInstitutfürZeitgeschichte,Munich.140.Ritthaler,“EineEtappe,”216–219;Freytagh-Loringhovenhadbeenconferredfullauthoritybyhis

partytonegotiatewithFrick.WhenHugenbergheardaboutLoringhoven'sassignment,heinsistedthathisintentiontoresignwasnottobementionedtoFrick.HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”263.

141.AccordingtoLeopold,AlfredHugenberg,161,itwasHugenberg'spressspokesmanHansBrosiuswhotraveledtoNeudeck;accordingtoHillervonGaertingenitwasformerpartychairmanHergt.SeealsoRitthaler,“EineEtappeaufHitlersWegzurungeteiltenMacht,”193–219,Borchmeyer,HugenbergsRingen,82–85;andGaertingen,“DNVP,”612–616.

142.ReprintedinRitthaler,“EineEtappe,”193–219;seealsoBorchmeyer,HugenbergsRingen,82–85;Forschbach,“DieDeutschnationalen:VomEndeeinerPartei,”PolitischeMeinung5(1960),12–16;andLeopold,AlfredHugenberg,151–163.

143.Ritthaler,“EineEtappe.”SeealsoBorchmeyer,HugenbergsRingen,82–84.144.DocumentsonBritishForeignPolicy,Vol.5,387–388;AndreasDorpalen,Hindenburginder

GeschichtederWeimarerRepublik(Berlin,Frankfurt,1966),444.(ThisisaslightlyupdatedversionofDorpalen,HindenburgandtheWeimarRepublic,Princeton,1964.)

145.Ritthaler,“EineEtappe,”216–219;Leopold,AlfredHugenberg,161–162;HillervonGaertingen,“DNVP,”612–615.

146.Hugenberg'sreactionevidentlywrestedreluctantrespectfromHitler;seeFriedrichHoßbach,ZwischenWehrmachtundHitler1934–1938(WolfenbüttelandHannover1949),35–36.

147.GermanNationaldeputiesweretobeacceptedasguestsintheNationalSocialistReichstagfaction.

148.“FreundschaftsabkommenmitderNSDAP.DeutschnationaleAbgeordnetealsHospitanten,”DeutscheAllgemeineZeitung,28June1933.

149.See“ReichstelegrammFricksandenPreußischenMinisterdesInnerenunddieReichsstatthalter,”27June1933atBABerlin-Lichterfelde,“Reichskanzlei,DNVP,”R43I,no.2655,273.Frick'stelegramcontainedtheorderthatallDNFmemberswhohadbeenarrestedweretobereleased.MostofthethreehundredofficialsconnectedwiththeDNFobtainedcomparablepositionselsewhere.

150.GottfriedTraubcomplainedtoFreytag-Loringhovenaslateas1935thathismandatehadbeenlimitedtoascertainingtheintentionsoftheReichgovernmentvis-a-vistheDNFanddidnotincludeenteringintonegotiationsaboutconditionsthatwouldgovernaneventualdissolution.SeeRitthaler,“EineEtappeaufHitlersWegzurungeteiltenMacht,”216–217,note18.

151.KurtSchmitt(1886–1950),GeneraldirektorofAllianzInsuranceCompanysince1921,wasappointedHugenberg'ssuccessorasMinisterofEconomicson29June1933.HewasselectedinparttosilencemisgivingsfromtheindustrialandcommercialsectoraboutpossiblechangesintheeconomyafterHugenberg'sresignation.Schmitt,inturn,wasreplacedbyHjalmarSchachton30July1934.RichardWaltherDarré(1895–1953)studiedagricultureandbecameanNSDAPReichstagdeputyintheautumnof1932;hehadbeenleaderofthenationalpeasantry(Reichsbauernführer)since4April1933andHugenberg'ssuccessorasMinisterofAgricultureandNutritionsince29June1933.Hewassentencedtoaseven-yeartermatNurembergbutwaspardonedin1950.

152.Minuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,609–610.

153.QuotedinMinuth,ed.,AktenderReichskanzlei,610,note4.

EPILOGUE

Conservatism,NationalSocialism,andGermanHistoryDuringthewinterandspringof1933,theNazismadeastrenuousefforttopresentthemselvesasinharmonywithconservativeGermanandPrussiantraditions,orevenasthenaturalresultandoutgrowthofthesetraditions.TheNazismadetheconservativePrussianpastserviceabletotheirneedforpoliticallegitimationtoanextenthithertounprecedented.LongbeforetheSecondWorldWar,PrussianvaluesbecameNationalSocialistvalues,judgedtoepitomizetheGermancharacter,andheldupasmodelstoemulate:austerity,thrift,tenacityinthepursuitofone'sgoals,apreparednessforpersonalsacrifice,andawillingnesstolaydownone'slifeintheserviceofahighercausethatwouldwinoutintheend,eveninthefaceofoverwhelmingodds.Aboveall,therewastheconceptofduty;itwasimperativeto“fulfill”one'sdutytotheVolkandtheFatherland.Amongotherthings,NazipropagandamadethePrussianpastandthevaluesitimputedtoitpalpableintheformofgrandhistoricfilmsthatenjoyedmassaudiences.1ItwasalreadyduringtheperiodoftheseizureofpowerthatconservativeslosttheDeutungshoheit,thatis,theprerogativetointerpretthegreattraditionsandhistoricalfiguresofthepast,totheNazis.From1933onwards,theNazisactedasself-appointedguardiansofthenationalheritage.Andtheydidthiswithgreateraplomb,audacity,and—inmanyinstances—moreskillthanconservativepropagandistsduringtheWeimarRepublicbeforethem.ThepropositionthatHitler'sThirdReichseemedtobethelast—andmost

important—linkofaconservativechainofcontinuitywasalsoacceptedatthelevelofhistoricalscholarship.Therewere,afterall,someapparentlyrealcontinuities,wherebyNationalSocialismdidindeedseemtocarryonconservativetraditionsandbeliefs.Inaseriesofthoroughlyresearched,solidworksofscholarship,Germanhistoriansofthe1930sfavorablyreferredtoPrussianconservativetheoristsandpoliticianstoelucidatethepresent.ThiswasparticularlythecasewithrespecttoPrussia'ssocial-conservativetradition.ThesocialconservatismofJosefMariavonRadowitzandHermannWagenerofthe1840sthrough1860s,2whichhadbeenjudgedcriticallybyconservativecontemporariesasbeingtoo“modern,”wasresuscitatedandheldinhighesteem

duringtheThirdReich.IntheirconservativesocialthoughtRadowitzandWagenerhadadvocatedtheintegrationoftheproletariatintothestate:ina“socialkingdom”theruralandurbanlowerclasseswouldhelpbuttressthepowerofthemonarchy,andthisinturnwouldsupportthepoorandneedy.Wagenerevenenvisagedtheintroductionofuniversalmanhoodsuffrage(longbeforeitwasinplaceinEnglandandFrance)tostrengthenthepositionof—whatwerebelievedtobe—theinnatelypatrioticandmonarchisttendenciesoftheworkingclassesandthusalsoofthemonarchy.Theintegrationoftheworkingclass,the“FourthEstate,”intotheStatewasalsoacentralconcernoftheNazigovernment,3astheNationalistSocialistInteriorMinisterWilhelmFrickdemandedinJune1933.Conservativesocialconceptsthusbecameprototypesheldupasexamplesor,attheveryleast,asintellectualandpoliticalantecedents.ThatthePrussianconservativetraditionservedasanextendedprehistorytoNationalSocialistGermanyseemstohavebeenacceptedasfactbymany.InhisexaminationofHermannWagener'sinfluentialpoliticaljournalBerliner

Revue,forexample,thehistorianAdalbertHahnremarkedthatwhilehisstudywasoriginallymeantasacontributiontothehistoryoftheconservativepartyinthenineteenthcentury,“itbecameevidentinthecourseoftheinvestigationthatthe...ideasunderconsiderationhereconstitutedthefirstemergenceofNationalSocialistconceptsinGermanpolitics.”Hahnexpressedthehopethathismonographwouldhelp“topromotetheunderstandingofthisgreatGermanmovementoffreedomandrejuvenation[i.e.NationalSocialism].”4Hereanintellectualandpoliticallineageisclearlyestablished.AndHahnwasnotalone.InhisdetailedstudyonRadowitz,theyounghistorianWalterFrühdiscoveredsimilarroots.Frühcomparedthesocial-conservativeconceptsofRadowitzwith,asheputit,“presentdayGermansocialism,therevivaloftheirrational,organicforcesoftheVolksgemeinschaft...theendeavortorealizetherestructuringofthewholeofthepeoplealongständischlines,”whichgaverise“toarekindlingofinterestintheideasofGermanSocialConservativesfromtheearlycapitalistage.….”5Here,too,anintellectual-politicalancestryisascertained.InanalyzingtheideasofHermannWagener,AdolfRichter—inhis1935studyonBismarckandtheArbeiterfrageduringthePrussianconstitutionalconflict—maintainedinthesamevein:“IfwesurveyWagner'sideasasawhole,comparisonstothepresentdayvirtuallypressinuponus.”6ContinuitieswithsocialconservatismarealsounderlinedbyWalterFrank,aleadingNazihistorianandpresidentofthe“ReichInstitutefortheHistoryoftheNewGermany”inhisbookaboutAdolfStoeckerandtheChristianSocialMovement.Accordingtotheauthor's

owntestimony,hisbook“sprangfromtheexperienceoftheNationalSocialistmovementanditsleadingpersonality”andwasthusdedicatedtoHitlerpersonally.7Yettheseseeminglyself-evidentandundeniablecontinuitiesweredeceptiveandmoreorlesstenuous.Eveninthecaseofthesocial-conservativetraditioninPrussiatheycanbeonlypartiallyverified.ThenationalistthrustofNationalSocialism—namely,toregaintheinternational-mindedurbanproletariatforthenationalcause—wasabsentinbothRadowitzandWagener.EssentiallytheNationalSocialistcontentionthatNazismanditsleading

personalityrepresentedanaturalcontinuanceandculminationpointofGermanhistorywasuntrue.Itwasanextraordinarilysuccessfulfabrication,especiallysincethisspuriousclaim,whichinitiallyaddedgreatlytothepopularityoftheregime,wasbelievednotonlybymillionsofGermans,butalsobyNaziGermany'sWorldWarIIadversaries,towhomitprovidedanexplanationfortheotherwisepuzzlingdynamism,popularity,andsuccessofNazism.Infact,AlliedpropagandaduringtheSecondWorldWarwasbasedlargelyontheassumptionthatNazismwasamanifestationofthingsfundamentallyGerman.ThiswasnotsurprisinggiventhatthewidespreadpopularityoftheregimeandthepublicjubilationthatfolloweditsforeignpolicysuccessesandlateritsmilitaryconquestsseemedtoindicatethatanoverwhelmingmajorityofGermanscloselyidentifiedwithNationalSocialism.YetthoseGermanswhosesupportfortheregimewasbasedonabeliefinNazism'srootednessinGermanhistoryorinsomehistoricallycontinuousidentitywereasdeceivedasoutsideonlookers,fortheirbeliefswerebasedonfalsepremises.Asarguedhere,Nazism,thoughplacingitselfinthemainstreamofGermantraditionsforinstrumentalreasonswas,inmanyrespects,abreakwiththetraditional,conservativewayoflife.ThegiganticspectacleputonatPotsdamon21MarchhadbeenashamtoendowNazirulewiththemantleoflegitimacy.TheNazisabominatedtheEmpirewith—whattheyconsidered—itsstultifyingbourgeoisculture,itsclassdifferencesandself-satisfiedlacklusterbourgeoisiethat,sothechargewent,haddeliberatelyexcludedasizeablepartoftheGermanpeoplefromparticipationinthepubliclifeofthenation.AsGoebbelshadmadeclearinararemomentoftruthin1930:“ThefrontthatopposesusstretchesfromWestarptoThälmann.”AndhemadenobonesabouthisscornforthemorerecentImperialpastanditssupposedconservativeantecedents,despitetheEmpire'spathbreakingwelfarelegislation:“Thethree-classfranchiseclassifyingvotersalongpropertylines,thesocial‘pittance’legislation,the‘limitedcomprehensionofthesubject,’the‘lord-of-themanor’wayofthinking,theindustrialcapitalisticfirebrands—allofthesearetypicalfabricationsofconservativereactionarieswho,beingfullyalivetotheirownincompetenceandinabilitytofostercreativity,enviouslysuppress

achievementandprogressbyothers….”8Aswasmadeclearonthatoccasion,expressionsofsharedinterestwiththenationalistbourgeoisieandtheheritageoftheGermanpasthadtobetakenwithagrainofsalt:“Therecanbeabsolutelynodoubtthatadeepideologicalchasmyawnsbetweenusandthem,afactthatneedstobepointedoutallthemoreclearly,themoreoftenwearecompelledtoformallianceswithbourgeoisforcesinordertoattainourtacticalgoals.Theyarecaptivesoftheirownbourgeoismindset.”9Nazism's“newman”wouldhaveaverydifferentwayofthinking.Duringthespringof1933,theNazisconcentratedtheirfireonthe

conservativeestablishmentor—putdifferently—thetraditionalorderofthings.Whenevertraditionalstateauthorityclashedwiththedemandsoftherisingmovement,theconflictendedwiththevictoryofNazism.Traditionalhabitsandacceptednormswerediscardedormodifiedinordertoaccommodatethenewmasters,oftenoutofnakedfearofNaziretribution.APrussianFinanceMinisterfounditdifficulttofireahumbleofficeassistant,simplybecausethepersoninquestionhadforyearsbeenamemberoftheNaziparty,andaformerlyall-powerfulSchulrat(SchoolsInspector)hadtofearforhispositionbecauseofawell-deservedbadgradeheoncegavetoagraduatingstudent,whohappenedtobeaNationalSocialist.TheNazisattemptedtoequalizeandunderminetraditionalhierarchiesinvirtuallyallspheresoflife.Theanti-bourgeoisthrustofNazipropaganda,accentuatedaftermidMarch1933bytheinsistencethatthe“nationalrevolution”wouldnowbefollowedbya“NationalSocialistrevolution,”madeitclearthat“reactionaries”—Germanconservatives—wouldherebybebrandedasenemiesoftherevolutionitself.Nazisnevertiredofmockingconservativesymbolsandvalues,callingtheKaiseracowardforhavinglefthispost,andmakingitplainthattheylookedaskanceattheSecondEmpireasawhole.Theconservativebourgeoisie,theyargued,wasequallytoblameforthecatastropheof1918,andthemainlegacyofthebourgeoisagewasalastingsocialriftthathaddeprivedGermanyoftheloyaltyofmillionsofherbestcitizens.

NationalSocialismasanAnti-BourgeoisMovementTorevitalizeGermany,intheeyesofNationalSocialists,itwasnecessarynotonlytoreorganizetheGermanstate,buttoreplacetheBürgerwithadifferentkindofhumanbeing,a“newman,”fitforthestrugglesofthecomingage.Towardthatendthe“entitlementcharacter”ofthebourgeoisagehadtobeabolished,classdifferencesobliterated,andtheGermanworkerintegratedinto

theStateasacitizenwithequalrights.Inthespringof1933,Naziideologuesattackedthebourgeoiswayoflifeatitsverycorebypostulatinga“catalogueofvirtues,”thatis,characteristictraitsforthenewmanofNationalSocialism.DifferencesbetweenNazisandconservativesweresosharplyemphasizedthatthechasmbetweenthetwocampsseemedunbridgeable.Inthespringof1933,theNazispresentedthemselvesasaprotestmovementagainstabürgerlichwayoflifethatwascharacterizedasinherentlycorruptandinvestedwithclassconceitandsocialbarriersthatactedasafermentofdecompositionandvölkischdiscord.AlongwiththatwentthedenunciationofbürgerlicheBildung—theeducationalrefinementandcultivationtypicaloftheuniversity-trainededucatedbourgeoisie,theBildungsbürgertum,towhichGermanyoweditsreputationintechnicalexpertise,scholarship,andadministration.InGermanytheBildungsbürgertum,whichincludednotonlytheprofessionsbutalsothehighcivilservice,enjoyedgreatersocialprestigethanelsewhereinEuropeand—beforetheturmoilandinflationbroughtaboutbytheFirstWorldWar—aconsiderablemeasureofmaterialsecurityandcomfort.Imbuedwiththecertaintyofculturalandsocialsuperiority,theywereinitiallyunlikelypreyfortheNazimovement,whichtheyviewedwiththinlyveiledcontempt.InNazieyesthiseducatedbourgeoisieepitomizedBürgerlichkeitandbecameaprimeobjectofhate.Acentralresultofthisstudyisthusthelayingbareofthehithertomuch

neglectedbutdistinctlypronouncedanti-bourgeoisstreakofNationalSocialismthatsoprominentlycametotheforeduringtheperiodoftheNaziseizureofpower.Theanti-bourgeoistraitofNazismwasall-pervasive:itwasalreadyaprominentthemeinHitler'sMeinKampf,becameomnipresentinthepoliticalstrugglesofthelastphaseoftheWeimarRepublic,andprovidedafrequenttopicinHitler'swartimemonologues.10Historiansfrequentlyoverlookedthisanti-bourgeoisqualityofNationalSocialismbecauseitseemedpuzzlingandparadoxical:whywouldmillionswhoconsideredthemselves“bürgerlich”voteforanavowedlyanti-bourgeoisparty?Theanswercanonlybethatthey,likeothers,didnottaketheNazisatfacevalueanddismissedtheiranti-bourgeoistalkasvapidpropaganda.In1929,HitleraccusedbourgeoispartiesinhisVölkischerBeobachterof“politicalunreliability,lukewarmbehavior,cowardice,lackofprinciple,andindolence,”11pronouncementsthatgainedwidespreadnotorietysincetheywereavidlycirculatedbyNazism'spoliticalopponents.12GoebbelsfreelyventedhisangerintheAngriff,arguingthat“theeternalbourgeois[is]themortalenemyofnewlife,”andthatnegotiationswithbourgeoispartiescouldonlyservethepurposeof“beatingtheBürgerdownand

tramplinghimunderfoot”;heassertedthatNationalSocialistsconsidered“theBürgertumourmortalenemy,”thatthe“bourgeoisideal[had]todie,”andthattheBürgertumwasunwillingtosacrificeitsStandesdünkel(socialarrogance)onthealtarofatruepeople'scommunity.13Asearlyas1924,HitlerhadarguedinMeinKampfthat,bydintofitsshortsightedandegotisticalsocialpolicies,theBürgertumhadradicalizedtheworkingclasses,thatmembersofthebourgeoisiewereimbuedwithanarrowcastspirit,andthatthenationalismofthe“indolentandcowardlybourgeoisworld”lackedstrengthandconviction.14ThecentralandweightiestchargeinbothNazipropagandaandMeinKampfconcentratedonthebourgeoisie'sallegedfailuretostanduptoMarxismandtherevolutionariesof1918;inshort,thatthebourgeoisiehad“miserablycapitulatedbeforethepressureofthestreet.”15ThesechargesreappearinvariousmodificationsinHitler'stabletalk,wherehealsoassertedthatAkademiker(membersoftheBildungsbürgertum)hadnoinstinct,thatthebourgeoisiehadnosocialconscience,butwasprimarilyinterestedinitsownwell-being,andthateventhenational-mindedBürgertumwasincapableofspeakingthelanguageofthepeople,lackingastheydidthenecessaryspiritofsacrificeandwillingnesstoputthecommonwealbeforetheirown.16Inshort,HitlermadeitplainthattheBürgercouldnotbeusedforthepoliticalstruggleandthathehadnothingbutcontemptforallofthem.17Withhisfinelyhonedsensitivities,ThomasMann,whosebürgerlicheidentitywaswelldeveloped,wasamongthefewcontemporaryobserverswho,fromthedistanceofhisexileinSwitzerlandandFrance,discernedNazism'santi-bourgeoisqualityasoneofitsprincipalcharacteristics.Heexpressedhisindignationbyequatingthe“brownplague”with“badBolshevism,”bylabelingNazismthe“worstkindofBolshevism,”andbyconsideringNazileaders“moreBolshevist”thanthe“simple-mindedpartymembersofGermanCommunism.”18Incontrasttotheanti-communism,anti-socialism,andanti-liberalismofthe

Nazimovement,whichhaveallbeensufficientlyexamined,thepronouncedanti-conservatismofNationalSocialismhasnotyetbeenappreciatedtoitsfullextent.Ashasbeenshown,itvirulentlycametotheforeduringthefirstphaseoftheMachtergreifungduringthewinterandspringof1933.IncomparisontoItalianfascism,NationalSocialismsucceededinrenderingitsnational-conservativepartnerspowerlesswithinlessthanhalfayear.TheGermanconservativeelitethusquicklyceasedbeingtheNazis'equalpartners.Bythelatespringof1933,itsmembershadtobeawareofthepainfulfactthatindividually,ifnotasagroup,theyweredispensable.Thefactthatthefoundationforanyalliancebasedonequalityhadbeendestroyedduringthefirstfewmonthsafter

HitlerbecameChancellorwasnotself-evident,giventheemphasistheNaziregimeputoncustom,order,convention,andtraditionalvaluesinsomeofitspublicpronouncementsafterHitlerwasfirmlyensconcedinpower.IncontrasttoItalianfascism,theearlyeliminationofitsconservativepartnersenlargedNazism'sroomformaneuverandpermittedanearlyradicalismoftheregime.19Theanti-bourgeoischaracterofNazismthatsoprominentlycametotheforeinthewinterandspringof1933renderedNationalSocialismmoreattractivetothewidemassesofthepopulation,includingtheindustrializedworkingclassestowhomitsignifiedthattheThirdReichcouldalsobecometheirstate.Paradoxically,thespiritofmartialvigor,greatersocialequality,atightcommunityofallpeople'scomrades,andtheeliminationoftheentitlementcharacterofthebourgeoisworld,alsoappealedtovastsectionsofthebourgeoisiewho—aftertheturmoiloftheFirstWorldWaranditsaftermathofall-pervasivepoliticalinstability,inflation,andfinallyaGreatDepression,withtheunprecedentedmassunemploymentitbroughtinitswake—seemedtorealizethattheirbürgerlicheWeltlackedfirmfoundations.InpropagandaandpublicpresentationtherevolutionaryNazimovement

continuallyemphasizeddifferencesinworldviewandmentalitybetweenitselfandthetradition-mindedGermanNationals,sothatitwasclearfromthestartthattheiralliancewasbasedsolelyonexpediency.Giventheprominenceofthe“socialrevolutionary”elementofNazism,whichtraineditswrathontheconservativeestablishment,itwouldbewrongtomaintainthatanyBündnisderElitenremainedintactduringtheperiodoftheseizureofpower.20Inthespringof1933,theNazisalsousurpedtheplaceofconservativesasthemainguardiansofthenationalheritageandofnationaltraditions.NaziorganizationsnowlaidclaimtotheinheritanceofpatrioticPrussia,asillustratedbytheircelebrationoftheWarsofLiberation.GermanNationalsalsohadreasontofearfortheirtraditionalpositionsofpowerandinfluenceinlocalpoliticsandleadershippostsininterestgroupsandassociations.Thefilesarerepletewithcomplaintsbyconservativenotableswhofearedfortheirsocialandpoliticalstanding,andincreasinglyalsofortheirphysicalsafety.Still,thesheerbrutalityofNaziattacksonmembersandsupportersoftheirconservativeallyremainsastounding.Politicalprominenceofferednoprotectionfromattacks.GermanNationalswerepowerlesswhenconfrontedwiththis“revolutionary”violence,notonlybecausetheyfoundthemselvesoutnumberedbySAthugs,butbecausetheyweretrappedintheirlegalisticthinkingandthusreluctanttorepayviolenceinkind.ThechangingZeitgeistfacilitatedandprobablyacceleratedNazisuccesses.It

workedtothebenefitofthespeedyMachtergreifungintheLänderafter5MarchandthethoroughimplementationofthefirstphaseoftheNaziseizureofpowerthatendedon14July1933.Inthespringof1933,politicshadinfiltratedallspheresoflife,longtimefriendshipswerebrokenupoverpoliticaldisagreements,andwidespread,seeminglygenuineenthusiasmheldfastlargesectionsofthepopulationthatsuccumbedalltooreadilytothe“temptation”ofNationalSocialism.21Infact,thisearlyphaseoftheNaziregimesawafirsthigh-pointofitspopularity.ManywholaterachievedfameasopponentsoftheregimeinitiallysupportedNazism.AfterthelongfutilebattlesofWeimar,theGermanpeopleappearedtohavefoundthemselvesagain,sinceNationalSocialismseemedtoheraldareturntocherishedGermantraditions,claimedtohavesavedthenationfromtheall-too-realdangerofcommunism,andpromisedtounifythepeopleinanationalcommunitythatharkedbacktothehalcyondaysofAugust1914.Butcontemporariesoftenoverlookedthatallofthiswenthandinhandwithanewkindofperfectedrepression,fromconcentrationcampstoGesinnungsschnüffelei—akindof“mindpolice”andideologicalspyingthatpromoteddenunciations,madethedisseminationofrumorsapunishableoffense,andinitiatedcampaignsagainst“Miesmacher”—thosewhospreada“sourmood.”Pressuretodemonstrateone'sloyaltyinpublicthroughobligatoryflagraising,

theutteranceofpoliticallymotivatedgreetings(suchasaforcefullyexclaimed“HeilHitler”),theself-censorshipthatwentalongwiththeprohibitionofbooks,andtherepressionofhonestpersonalopinionsallworkedtodestroytraditionalGermansociability.Traditionalsocialinteractionwas,inanycase,renderedimpossibleonaccountoftheincreasingdangerofdenunciations.IntheeyesofmanyGermans,theworldtheyknew—theirtraditionalbourgeoisuniverse—endedin1945.Inrealityithadendedtwelveyearsearlier—onlytheyfailedtorealizeitatthetime.

1.SuchasDerChoralofLeuthen(1933),Fridericus(1937),andDergrosseKönig(1942).2.JosefMariavonRadowitz(1797–1853),conservativetheorist,closefriendandadvisorofFrederick

WilliamIV,andPrussianForeignMinister(1850);HermannWagener(1815–1889),conservativedeputy,editoroftheKreuzzeitung,andBismarck'sadvisoronsocialissues.

3.WilhelmFrick,“DerSinnunsererZeit,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte39(June1933),245–246:“Thesignificanceofourageliesinovercomingthedifferencesbetweenclassesandestates...andintheintegrationofthefourthestate,theGermanworker,intothestateasacitizenwithequalrights.”

4.AdalbertHahn,DieBerlinerRevue.EinBeitragzurGeschichtederkonservativenParteizwischen1855und1875(Berlin,1934),4.

5.WalterFrüh,RadowitzalsSozialpolitiker.SeineGesellschafts-undWirtschaftsauffassungunterbesondererBerücksichtigungdersozialenFrage(Diss.Berlin,1937),7.

6.AdolfRichter,BismarckunddieArbeiterfrageimpreußischenVerfassungskonflikt(Stuttgart,1935),

34.7.WalterFrank,HofpredigerAdolfStoeckerunddiechristlichsozialeBewegung,2nded.(Hamburg,

1934),9;seealsoHelmutHeiber,WalterFrankundseinReichsinstitutfürdieGeschichtedesneuenDeutschland(Stuttgart,1966).

8.JosephGoebbels,“DaspatriotischeBürgertum,”NationalsozialistischeMonatshefte,1.Jahrgang(1930),221–229;quotationson225and226.

9.Ibid.,226–227.10.SeeAdolfHitler,MeinKampf,210thed.(Munich,1936),47,110,190,367,409,450,538,548,

595,609,744;BAKoblenz,ZSg.103,SammlungLauterbach,no.795:NSDAPundBürgertum;HenryPicker,ed.,HitlersTischgesprächeimFührerhauptquartier(Stuttgart,1976),63,107;WernerJochmann,ed.,AdolfHitler.MonologeimFührerhauptquartier.AufgezeichnetvonHeinrichHeim(Munich,2000),51,123,143,156,160,220,228,250,328.

11.“WeristSieger?DasVersagendesBürgertumsimKampfgegendenMarxismus,”VölkischerBeobachter,20November,1929atBAKoblenz,ZSg.103,SammlungLauterbach,no.795:NSDAPundBürgertum.

12.“HitlerunddasdeutscheBürgertum,”HannoverscheLandeszeitung,29November,1929atBAKoblenz,ZSg.103,SammlungLauterbach,no.795:NSDAPundBürgertum.

13.SeeDerAngriffof20July1930,21August1930,and28March1931,atBAKoblenz,ZSg.103,SammlungLauterbach,no.795:NSDAPundBürgertum.

14.Hitler,MeinKampf,47–48,191,366–367,and409.15.Ibid.,594–595.16.Picker,ed.,HitlersTischgespräche,107,and63;Jochmann,ed.,AdolfHitler.Monologeim

Führerhauptquartier,65,143.ThereisalsotalkoftheBürgertum'sinnatecowardiceandlackofresolve.SeeJochmann,ed.,AdolfHitler.MonologeimFührerhauptquartier,145,156,328.

17.Hitler,MeinKampf,122.18.ThomasMann,Tagebücher1933–1934(Frankfurt,1977),128,8,14(entriesof6July,17March,

20March).19.SeealsoWolfgangSchieder,“Faschismus,”inRichardvonDülmen,ed.,FischerLexikon

Geschichte(Frankfurt,2003),199–221.20.FritzFischer,BündnisderEliten.ZurKontinuitätderMachtstruktureninDeutschland1871–1945

(Düsseldorf,1979).21.FritzStern,“NationalSocialismasTemptation,”inFritzStern,DreamsandDelusions.TheDrama

ofGermanHistory,rev.ed.(NewHaven,1999),147–191.

APPENDIX

Table1:FromMartinBroszat,HitlerandtheCollapseoftheWeimarRepublic(Oxford,1987),84–85.

EastPrussia PomeraniaMay1928 DNVP 312,000 373,000 (31.3%) (41.6%)NSDAP September1930 DNVP 205,000 242,000 (19.6%) (24.3%)NSDAP 236,000 237,000 (22.5%) (24.0%)July1932 DNVP 168,000

(15.8%)NSDAP 536,000

(47.1%)511,000(47.9%)

SincethecombinednumberofvotesfortheSPDandKPDremainedroughlythesameinbothprovinces,itcanbeassumedthatthebulkofDNVPvotersinEastPrussiaandPomeraniaswitchedovertotheNSDAP.TheDNVPalsolost70percentofitsformervotersinSchleswig-HolsteinandLowerSilesiaafter1930,mostofwhomlikewisewentovertotheNSDAP.

Table2:FromStatistischesJahrbuchfürdasDeutscheReich,52(Berlin,1933),5.

Localresidentpopulationasof16June1933:Prussia: 39,958,073Hamburg: 1,183,171Bremen: 366,425Lübeck: 136,469Schaumburg-Lippe: 50,469Hessen: 1,426,830Baden: 2,429,977Württemberg: 2,713,150Saxony: 5,196,386Bavaria: 7,732,003

Table3:FromStatistischesJahrbuchfürdasDeutscheReich52(1933),5.ThepopulationoftheseprovincesexceededthoseofmanyGermanstates.Populationasof16June1933:

Brandenburgprovince(GauleiterWilhelmKube) 2,747,520

1,596,811

Schleswig-Holstein(GauleiterHinrichLohse) 1,596,811

Silesia(total)(GauleiterHelmutBrückner) 4,716,251a.LowerSilesia 3,237,241b.UpperSilesia 1,479,010

Hannover(SAGruppenführerViktorLutze) 3,365,610Filledduringtheensuingmonths:

EastPrussia(GauleiterErichKoch) 2,356,938PrussianprovinceofSaxony(SA-GruppenführerCurtvonUlrich) 3,378,948Pomerania(GauleiterFranzSchwede) 1,942,367

Table4:FromFalter,etal.,WahlenundAbstimmungeninderWeimarerRepublik,104.

TheseprovinceshadtraditionallybeenthestrongholdofPrussianconservatism:theDKPbefore1918andtheDNVPthereafter.ThemajorityofDNVPvotersswitchedtotheNSDAPafter1930,thoughitisfairtoassumethattheoldestablishedBürgertumremainedfaithfultotheDNVP.

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HauptstaatsarchivStuttgartNachlaßReinholdMaier(Q1/8)NachlaßTheodorBäuerle(Q1/21)NachlaßEugenBolz(Q1/25)NachlaßAlfredBofinger(Q1/31)

StadtarchivStuttgartGemeinderatsprotokolle(nomeetingsbetween23Februaryand9May1933)NiederschriftenderinnerenAbteilungdesGemeinderates(3Januaryto28March1933)

NewspapersandtheContemporaryPeriodicalPressDerAngriffDieHilfe,HalbmonatsschriftBerlinerIllustrierteZeitungBerlinerIllustrierteNachtausgabeBerlinerBörsenZeitungBerlinerLokalanzeigerBerlinerTageblattBreisgauerZeitungDerJungdeutscheDerNationaleWilleDerReichsbote.TageszeitungfürdasevangelischeDeutschlandDerTagDeutscheAllgemeineZeitungDeutscheZeitungFrankfurterZeitungFränkischesVolksblattFreiburgerTagespostFreiburgerZeitungGermaniaHakenkreuzbannerHeidelbergerTageblattHeidelbergerNeuesteNachrichtenKölnischeZeitungNeuePreußische-undKreuzzeitungMagdeburgerTageszeitung

MagdeburgerTageszeitungMünchen-AugsburgerAbendzeitungNationaleRundschauNationalsozialistischeMonatshefteNeueMannheimerZeitungOstpreußischeZeitungPommerscheTagespostRundschauSaarbrückerZeitungSaarbrückerLandeszeitungSchlesischerVolksboteSchlesischeTageszeitungSchwäbischeVolkszeitungSüddeutscheZeitungTäglicheRundschauVölkischerBeobachterVolkswacht(Freiburgi.Breisgau)VorwärtsVossischeZeitungDieWeltbühneWestdeutscherBeobachterWestfälischeVolkszeitungWürzburgerGeneralanzeiger

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