FAMINE IN SOMALIA AND THEINTERNATIONAL RESPONSE:

COLLECTIVE FAILURE

byJEFFREY CLARK

NOVEMBER 1992

This paper will appear as part of a book to be published this spring by the Council on Foreign Relations in New YorkCity. We are grateful to the Council for giving us pernission to reprint the article in advance, and to disseminate it tothose working to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

Jeffrey Clark, a consultant to the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), visited Somalia in August 1992, on behalf ofUSCR. Clark has worked on Hom of Africa issues for much of the last decade. He served as director of Project Af-rica at the Carter Presidential Center, and served as the senior professional staff member for international issues at theHouse Select Committee on Hunger.

UN IN SOMALIA: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS

"The UN, in terms of its life after the Cold War, is a shambles. If you look at Somalia, what you see is an ill-equipped, ill-informed and uncoordinated response. The UN and the international community should haveacted months ago. Lack of attention and lack of planning have already cost thousands of lives."

Nicholas HintonDirector-General, Save the Children Fund, U.K.

(The Independent, August 8, 1992)

'The UN agencies have no excuses. The dithering in the Security Council need not have stopped them fromfollowing the lead of the Red Cross and starting humanitarian work...The money was there, but they chosenot to use it. While sitting on their hands in neighboring Kenya, they did not even draw up contingencyplans. Six months after the UN Secretary-General ordered the agencies back in, they are stillfar from aproper operational presence. A 'technical mission' of thirty-one 'experts' recently spent ten days flittingaround the country, refusing to consult with the staffs of the voluntary agencies that stayed in Somaliathrough the worst months offighting."

Rakiya OmaarExecutive Director, Africa Watch

(The Los Angeles Times, August 26, 1992)

It's so bad because we've let things simmer without paying proper attention. We've had inexperiencedpeople who don't know what they are seeing, who don't know what the implications are and didn't blow thewhistle! Because of the disorganization of the United Nations, less than a third of the food that is neededhas been delivered."

Trevor PaigeCountry Director (Somalia), UN World Food Programme

(The New York Times, August 16,1992)

"...we are a year and a half late."Mohamed Sahnoun, Secretary-General's Special Representative (Somalia)

(The Guardian, September 2, 1992)

"Somalia is the greatest failure of the United Nations in our time."Aryeh Neier

Executive Director, Human Rights Watch(The Washington Post, September 21, 1992)

FAMINE IN SOMALIA AND THEINTERNATIONAL RESPONSE:COLLECTIVE FAILURE

I. OVERVIEW/SUMMARY OF CONCLU-SIONS:

The Multi-Tiered Failure of Collective In-volvement in the Somali Crisis

A useful examination of the international inter-vention in the current horrific famine and ad-vanced anarchy of Somalia must center aroundthe troubling conclusion that the collective in-volvement to date has been fatally flawed atmultiple levels. First, the direct response to thehumanitarian crisis itself, particularly that ofUnited Nations relief agencies, has been sopoorly executed as to generate urgent demandsfor a comprehensive examination of the entireUN relief system with an eye towards drastic re-form. Second, the fumbling of the UN reliefagencies and the half-hearted response of themajor donor governments to the human catas-trophe unmasks in startling terms the conse-quences of delay in constructing the mandatesand procedures for intervention in internal con-flicts in the post-Cold War era. Mandates andprocedures without manifest political will be oflimited value in the abstract, however, and littlecollective will or leadership has been demon-strated in response to Somalia.

The response of the international com-munity to the Somali tragedy, again especiallyby the various arms of the United Nations, hasbeen so troubled as to prompt assertions by noless a participant than the UN Secretary-Generalof a double-standard approach to such crises.The collective involvement has been timid, re-

luctant and uneven to the point of arousing sus-picions of a general dismissal of Africa on thepart of the Western powers who may no longersee the continent as relevant to their politicaland economic strategies. Additionally, the re-sponse of the United States Government to theSomali crisis has exposed the ever-more polid-cal nature and manipulation of its bilateralemergency humanitarian programs.'

It is necessary to comprehend from thebeginning that the present violence and chaos ofSomalia are as much a consequence of the fail-ure of the international response as a cause, andthat various UN agencies and other players areusing security issues to shield their faulty per-formance from scrutiny. The unvarnished his-tory of the UN's role in Somalia is a tragic oneof opportunities missed and of strategic and op-erational blunders not justified by situational re-alities.

The catastrophe of Somalia today sim-ply cannot be explained or resolved without anacknowledgement that the collective response tothe crisis has been -- and continues to be -- anabject failure. We are, after all, looking at theprospects of one third of the Somali people per-ishing; we are witness already to the death bystarvation of over twenty-five percent of all So-mali children under five years of age.2 Televi-sion screens and newspapers around the worldcarry startling images of vast numbers of peopledying before our eyes as UN and donor govem-ment officials wring hands and offer excuses forprevious inaction -- implying that either theyhad not earlier known about the extreme nature

Famine in Somalia

The unvarnishedhistory of the

UN's role in So-malia is a tragic

one of opportuni-ties missed and ofstrategic and op-erational blun-

ders not justifedby situational

realities.

of the situation or that their noble response hasbeen blocked by violent warlords and armedthugs. The latter assertion is partially true, butonly partially, and the former is contrary to theestablished record. An accurate accounting ofthe collective intervention on behalf of those inneed in Somalia - and on behalf of humanitar-ian principles -- is more troubling and not asconvenient for those responsible, as detailed inthis paper.

Hundreds of thousands of Somalis havestarved to death to date in 1992, and severalhundred thousand more almost certainly will belost before the situation significantly improves.The violence surrounding the delivery of reliefcommodities has escalated to the point that theprovision of food to the hungry becomes in-creasingly risk-laden. The situation is one ofthe near-total destruction of Somalia as a coun-try and a society; the loss of a generation is athand.

Such harsh realities require stem andsober judgments and candid and urgent apprais-als of systems in need of drastic and immediateoverhaul. Accountability can be postponed no

longer.

II. THE CRISIS AT HAND: Context andExpectations

A. Historical/Political Background

How did Somalia come to its current unraveling?First, it is necessary to understand that So-

malis are not very similar to many of theirneighbors -- near or far. Sir Richard Burton de-scribed the Somali nomads as "a fierce and tur-bulent race of republicans" who do not readilysubmit to anyone's authority. The country haslong been molded by political decentralization.The basis for all political and societal structur-ing is genealogy -- manifested by a complexand rigid clan system that purportedly allowsmany children to recite the names of ancestorsback more than twenty generations.4

The Somalis are generally divided be-tween six major clans' and innumerable sub-clans. Traditionally, clan elders settled disputesby agreeing on compensation for slights and in-trusions, real and imagined. Such a systemworked considerably better for wandering no-mads feuding over grazing rights for camels

than it now does for hungry, angry young menarmed with automatic rifles. This fundamentalbasis for order in Somali society -- the authorityof the clan elders -- has been undermined by theprevalence of modem weapons, Somalia's mostsignificant legacy of superpower involvementduring the Cold War era. The restoration of theauthority of the elders will be a critical step in areturn to normalcy in Somalia.

The relevant historical starting point forcomprehending Somalia's current denouementmay be in the last decade of the 19th centurywhen the anny of Ethiopian Emperor MenelikII soundly defeated the Italians in battle (in1896) as Italy attempted to expand from itscolony in Eritrea to take over Ethiopia itself.Subsequent negotiations led to Great Britain --Italy's de facto sponsor in the colonization ofAfrica -- ceding control of the Ogaden toMenelik and the Ethiopian empire. The prob-lem was -- and is -- that the Ogaden is a hugearea populated by Somalis, and the decisiontriggered ongoing tension and bursts of warfarelasting through the present era.

The British subsequently colonized thenorthern regions of Somalia as Somaliland andthe Italians took the southern two-thirds. TheEuropeans remained in at least nominal controluntil 1960 when the two colonies were mergedinto an independent and relatively democraticSomalia.

The fragile but functioning democracysurvived for nine years until, in 1969, the So-mali army took control after the assassination ofthe president. The new government, headed byGeneral Mohammed Siad Barre, embarkedupon a concerted effort to erode the clan systemand diminish the authority of the elders, sym-bolized by Siad Barre conducting concocted fu-neral-like ceremonies to mark the burying of theclans.'

The new government was instead ori-ented towards "scientific socialism" -- or at leasttowards military alliance with the Soviet Union.The president's son-in-law set up a national se-curity service under East German guidance.The huge influx of external weaponry and mili-tary advisors -- Soviet bloc at this time - thatwas to eventually undermine the Somali nationbegan.

In 1974, history repeated itself asevents unfolding in Ethiopia were again to dra-matically affect Somalia. Emperor Haile

a Famine in Somalia

The situation isone of the near-total destructionof Somalia as acountry and a

society; the lossof a generation

is at hand

Selassie was deposed that year by army officersfrustrated with the stagnation and repression ofhis latter years on the throne and the emperor'sfailure to respond to the famine then grippingthe country. The turmoil in Addis Ababa andthe intensifying war in Eritrea weakened theEthiopian grip over the Ogaden. Siad Barre, de-spite his suppression of the clan system, re-sponded to the agitation of his fellow clansmenand in fact to widespread intense nationalism torenew claims on the region. His moves on theOgaden enjoyed mass popularity.

An Ogadeni guerrilla campaign to drivethe Ethiopian army from the region led, in 1977,to full-scale war between Somalia and Ethiopiajust as Addis Ababa's long-standing relationshipwith the United States was being ruptured bythe Dergue government's embracing of Marx-ism. Simultaneously, the Soviets abandonedand betrayed their ally Siad Barre overnight andrushed military advisors and equipment to the(strategically more valuable and newly avail-able) Ethiopians under Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Soviet support enabled Mengistu tocrush the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, hu-miliate Siad Barre and send half a millionOgadeni refugees and guerrillas pouring acrossthe border into Somalia. Many brought withthem modem weapons -- the next installment ofguns in the rising flood.

The exit of the Soviets fromMogadishu set the stage for the first significantAmerican involvement in Somalia -- initially inthe form of a modest amount of defensiveweapons to check any potential Ethiopian re-prisal across the long border. (U.S. military aidto Somalia would eventually total over $200million; economic assistance was in the addi-tional hundreds of millions of dollars.)

The Ogaden disaster also unleashed thefirst wave of serious discontent with the rule ofSiad Barre. There was a coup attempt in 1978;its organizers escaped to Addis Ababa fromwhere, with Mengistu's encouragement, theystaged raids across the border. In London, in1981, a group of exiles formed the Somali Na-tional Movement (SNM), which was based onthe Isaaq clans of northern Somalia, the formerBritish Somaliland.

Resentment against Siad Bane's in-creasingly brutal and discriminatory rule wasthen building amongst the Issaq who felt theirregion was not being given its due in develop-

ment or education funding by the Mogadishugovernment. Siad's perceived support of theOgadeni refugees' intrusion on their traditionalgrazing lands and into their livestock exporting(to the Gulf states) business triggered hostility.The SNM began to raid government facilities,and Siad Barre's repression of the Isaaqs inten-sified again, in return.

By 1988, Siad Barre's fragile grip onthe reins of power in Somalia was paralleled byMengistu's desperate attempt to keep the upperhand in a series of civil wars that were goingbadly for him and threatening his bloodthirstyrule in Ethiopia. In that year, the two despotspredictably struck a deal to abandon support forinsurgent groups using their respective territo-ries for maneuvers against the other's regimes athome. Fearing forced isolation from the borderareas or even expulsion, the SNM enterednorthern Somalia en masse, engaging and ini-tially overwhelming Siad Barre's troops. -

The retribution was savage. The city ofHargeisa, the regional capital, was literally de-stroyed, thousands of Issaq civilians were killedin cold blood and hundreds of thousands (alongwith the SNM) were sent scurrying into Ethio-pia where the UN established a series of deplor-able refugee camps.' Siad Barre's air forcestrafed the fleeing Issaq, killing many thou-sands. (It is discouraging to note here that U.S.military aid to Siad Barre continued throughJune 1988 when Congressional action finallybrought American support to this regime to anend.)

The retaliation proved to be SiadBarre's undoing as the Issaq example and Siad'sproven weakness encouraged other clans to takeup arms to throw off the increasingly lethal dic-tatorship. The United Somali Congress (USC)came together as a force in the spring of 1989 asthe struggle against Siad Barre moved south.Siad controlled only Mogadishu by the end ofhis tenure, during which he frantically at-tempted to divide clan against clan. The lastthree months of his nmle, however, saw increas-ing military and political coordination amongsthis many enemies as civilians joined hands withthe USC for the final push. Siad Bane desper-ately launched a massive distribution of weap-ons and ammunition from his vast arsenals. Hispower had all but evaporated, however, whenSiad turned his army loose on Hawiye sectionsof the city, destroying much of the infrastructure

IFamine in Somalia

and provoking a violent and deadly uprising inthe process.

The destruction of his capital was SiadBarre's last major installment of terror on theSomali people; he was forced to flee Mogadishuin January of 1991. One million inhabitantsalso temporarily fled the destruction and vio-lence for the countryside.

The flight of Siad was, however, notthe end of the violence and chaos. To the con-trary, the situation only deteriorated. In thesouth, the USC forces split in two. Troops un-der General Mohamed Farah Aideed set off inpursuit of Siad Barre while others under AliMahdi Mohamed, a wealthy Mogadishu busi-nessman, remained in the capital and declaredthemselves leaders of a new government In thenorth, the Issaq clans, responding to Ali Mahdi'sself-appointment as president and his refusal tocall a conference on national reconciliation, de-clared their region, the foner BritishSomaliland, independent - as the SomalilandRepublic.' The SNM saw another Siad Barre inthe making in Ali Mahdi and wanted no part ofit. (Siad Barre himself fought on after fleeingMogadishu, taking advantage of the division be-tween his foes. In April of 1991, his forces ad-vanced to within about twenty miles of the capi-tal. But his efforts faltered, and Siad fled toNigeria in the summer of 1992; his followersare engaged in skirmishes to the present.)

There has been no functioning govern-ment in Somalia since January of 1991 (or ear-lier, depending upon the definition of function-ing government employed). Ali Mahdi's claimsto be president of Somalia are not recognizedbeyond his own followers - whose control isconfined to the northern sections of Mogadishu(now cordoned off from the rest of the city be-hind a Beirut-style green line). The various clanmilitia, once united in opposing Siad Barre,turned on one another and effectively dividedthe country into twelve different zones.

The struggle between Aideed, chairmanof the United Somali Congress, and Ali Mahdiintensified during 1991. Relations between thetwo factions and other groups worsened after aJuly 1991 Djibouti conference (boycotted by theSNM and repudiated by many others) that wasan attempt to agree on temporary governing ar-rangements. Participants at the conference con-firmed the self-appointment of Ali Mahdi as in-terim head of state -- further inflaming the

situation because Ali Mahdi was seen primarilyas a corrupt beneficiary of Siad Barre's dictator-ship. On November 17, a full-scale civil warerupted. That intense conflict persisted untilMarch 3 of this year when a cease-fire wasbrokered under the auspices of external players,primarily the UN. The fighting was so severe inMogadishu that most of the remaining infra-structure of the city was totally destroyed: vir-tually every building in the central city wasripped apart by artillery shelling and bridges,utility and water lines were blown up. Even un-derground utility lines were dug up for the cop-per wiring they contained.

An unparalleled number of guns andadvanced weapons flooded into Somalia duringthis period, some from the soldiers ofMengistu's crumbling anny and others capturedfrom Siad Barre's forces and arsenals. Theseweapons facilitated the destruction ofMogadishu and other cities and laid the founda-tion for the current looting hindering relief op-erations.

Complementing the 1988-91 struggleto oust Siad Barre and the subsequent civil warbetween Aideed and Ali Mahdi, a lingeringdrought drove additional people from their landin a futile search for food and exposing themeven more directly to the ongoing violence.Civil war and drought combined to trigger theacute famine now searing the land (though it iscertain that drought alone would not have pro-voked the onset of famine in Somalia).

B. Famine/Violence/Anarchy

It is virtually impossible to quantify the dimen-sions of the current Somali famine. It has accu-rately been described as "the greatest humani-tarian emergency in the world,"o by AndrewNatsios, director of the U.S. Government's in-temational humanitarian assistance efforts. Itdoes not seem an exaggeration to state that theSomali tragedy is by some measurements worsethan the Ethiopian famine of 1984/85 -- the uni-versal bench mark for incomprehensible humansuffering. One million Ethiopians may haveperished during the earlier famine, as may thatnumber (or more) of Somalis now. Ethiopia,however, has seven or eight times the popula-tion of Somalia, and the 1984/85 famine wassomewhat limited to specific geographic pock-ets. In contrast, the International Committee of

a Famine in Somalia

It does not seeman exaggerationto state that the

Somali tragedy isby some mea-

surements worsethan the Ethio-pian famine of1984/85 -- the

universal benchmark for incom-prehensible hu-man suffering.

the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates that ninety-fivepercent of the people in the country suffer frommalnutrition -- and that perhaps seventy percentendure severe malnutrition. It would be virtu-ally impossible to cite comparable figures forany national population in modem times.

The famine in Somalia engulfs vast re-gions of the country and of course affectsMogadishu (famines seldom reach capital cit-ies). The ICRC estimates that 1.5 million indi-viduals face imminent starvation; three timesthat many are totally dependent on external foodassistance. There are reportedly "500,000 veryseverely malnourished people in the areabounded by Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayu"alone." Hundreds of thousands of people haveperished from severe malnutrition and its asso-ciated diseases year to date. Well over 900,000Somalis refugees have fled to squalid reliefcamps in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti and Yemenand there are another 150,000 Somalis in SaudiArabia. Internally, untold thousands of Somaliswander with increasing desperation across vasttracks of arid land as rumors of food deliveries(frequently false) spread. For many, of course,it is a journey never completed. In Baidoa andother locations, thousands of silent, gaunt fig-ures slowly await death -- seemingly beyondcaring and, in many cases, beyond saving.'2

The news media reports daily on theagony and suffering as parents bury childrenand husbands bury wives lost to starvation.

Relief officials facing the enormoushurdle of moving a minimally required 60,000metric tons of emergency food rations13 into acountry with a destroyed infrastructure and nofunctioning government confront the most in-tensive looting ever to plague any relief opera-tion. News stories broadcast details of reliefcommodities stolen at gunpoint; shots are firedat planes ferrying food; drivers and relief work-ers have been shot, some fatally, as various mili-tia and less organized bands of hoodlums appro-priate relief commodities. The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross has, for the firsttime in its long history, been forced to employarmed guards to deliver relief. An ICRC expa-triate staff member has been killed (contrary tothe popular assumption, the only foreign reliefworker to lose his life); a high number of So-mali relief workers have perished over the pastfew months.

The food is stolen for a number of rea-

sons, but all are related to the fact that food nowserves as the currency of the land. Food equalsmoney and it equals power. Food is stolen forcommercial resale by merchants who hoard it tokeep the cost high. It is taken by warlords want-ing to feed their armies. It is taken by hungryindividuals possessing a loaded automatic rifle -- and there are lots of hungry individuals withguns.

Food is also being stolen in Somalia aspart of a crude but ultimately comprehensibleeffort on the part of some clans and sub-clans toguarantee their members what is seen as a morefair share of the most urgently required com-modity. That is, the chaos and the overall short-age of supplies available to relief groups has re-sulted in a haphazard and uneven distribution offood amongst clans and part of the looting is inpart a violent and dangerous redistribution ef-fort. Some veteran relief workers privately ad-mit that, from a certain perspective, they can un-derstand if not condone some of this forcedredistribution.14

Famine wracks huge regions of thecountry, threatening ever-expanding segmentsof the population. The anarchy and chaos di-minish the prospects of any relief effort, no mat-ter how intense, from being effective in thenear-term. Indeed, the suffering is certain toworsen before it lessens. The dislocation of thepopulation accelerates, both internally andacross international borders. The prospects ofadditional relief workers being injured or killedby the violence associated with the delivery ofrelief commodities will increase before the de-sired "flooding the country with food" 5 ap-proach has the necessary impact. As the physi-cal condition of people continues to deteriorate,so does the fabric of Somali society. The psy-chological trauma of human deprivation andrule by gun places national reconciliation everfurther beyond reach. In a country where not achild has been to school for over two years andthe values being most successfully demon-strated are those imposed by brute force, a wayout of the nightmare seems ever more elusive.

There are, of course, a high number ofSomali doctors, nurses, clan elders and othersstriving heroically to bring both relief and peaceto their country; their efforts are essentially ig-nored by the news media and in tum by many ofthe external players using security concerns ascover for inaction.

a Famine in Somalia

The food is stolenfor a number ofreasons, but all

are related to thefact that food nowserves as the cur-rency of the land.

Food equalsmoney and itequals power.

This is the situation in Somalia today --a perilous one with few applicable comparisons.And the external response to Somalia's agonyexposes the policies, mechanisms and capabilityof the United Nations and donor governmentsbeing utterly lacking in credibility for the col-lective intervention mandated by its severity.

C. External Players: Expectations ofInvolvement

The perpetrators of Somalia's misery are So-mali. The passive accomplices, however, areUN, other multilateral organization and majorpower government officials who have contrib-uted to that misery by neglect, denial, evasion ofresponsibility and by bungling relief operationsand peacemaking initiatives launched withoutcoherent strategy. The sad story of Somalia to-day is- a long saga of missed opportunities tohelp at least some people avoid the pain andsuffering, the death and destruction, and of notmoving to reinforce the positive elementswithin Somali society still functioning. Too manyexternal players in position to influence events inSomalia failed to move to contain the famine be-fore the glare of media attention and public scrutinyforced their hands.

The roots of the problem have to dowith both with competence and dedication in de-livering relief assistance despite serious baniersand with the broader failure to define modalities ofcollective intervention in internal chaos.

The level of failure is made more difficultto explain given the cunent history of external in-tervention in countering the cycle of famine andmayhem in the Hom of Africa - certainly suchconsiderable involvement as to significantly frameexpectations for intervention in Somalia. Fam-ine in the region, as we know, is hardly a new orremote phenomenon. The UN, the UnitedStates and the other donors have had intensiveexperience in overcoming the barriers inherentin providing relief assistance in areas of conflictthroughout the region. Cross border feeding op-erations, moving food across contested lines ofcontrol, maneuvering around the barrierserected by various hostile governments andrebel annies have been at the very heart of ex-ternal interventions in its humanitarian crises.

"Operation Lifeline Sudan"1" was, ofcourse, the apex of collective, external intervention

- an intervention that offered much guidance forthe Somali situation.

Thee is, thus, all too much experienceover the past two decades in confronting themassive dislocation of hungry people fleeingdrought and/or warfare in the Hom. Untold bil-lions of dollars have been spent on relief pro-grams, since 1984 in particular. Bitter lessonshave been learned from the failures and suc-cesses in responding to the plight of millions ofvictims of drought, repression and civil conflict.Invaluable, often painful, experience has beenlogged by disaster assistance officials, diplo-mats and politicians struggling to meet thepublic's expectations for swift, generous and ef-fective relief for the hungry and displaced. Aseries of "special representatives" of the UNSecretary-General have acted as powerful coor-dinators of external relief. (The UN special rep-resentatives have, at least in some instances,hammered out delicate agreements with govem-ments and guerrilla groups that served to protectthe relief operations not just of the UN but ofthe other donors.) The investment in various"early warning systems" has been considerable;the general investment in keeping people fromgoing over the edge has been vast.

The lessons learned have been politicalas well as operational. Recriminations againstthe slowness of both the UN, the United StatesGovernment and the other Western donor gov-ernments (not to mention the Ethiopian govern-ment) to respond to the early and certain indica-tors of famine in Ethiopia in 1983/841" led to adiscernable determination to avoid repeatingthat costly error. President Ronald Reagan, inreference to Ethiopia, declared that "a hungrychild knows no politics," expressing the will ofthe American public that the U.S. respond ac-cording to human need, not to the political ori-entation of governing regimes. Reagan's state-ment, however tardy in being applied during the1984/85 crisis, reverberated in 1987 whenEthiopia was again struck by a drought-trig-gered food emergency. The United States re-sponded quickly and generously, spurring on theUN and other donors, and the emergency wascontained; there was no famine. The emotional,somewhat accusatory, confrontation betweenCongressional and executive branch officialsthat marked the 1984/85 period was avoided."

Thus it was that when famine began tostalk the people of Somalia in 1990, a number

a Famine in Somalia

The perpetrators ofSomalia's miseryare Somali. Thepassive accom-

plices, however, areUN, other multilat-eral organizations,and major powergovernment offi-

cials who have con-tributed to that mis-

ery by neglect,denial, evasion ofresponsibility andby bungling relief

operations andpeacemaking ini-tiatives launchedwithout coherent

strategy.

of major external players had established expec-tations for their involvements. The United Na-tions had assumed increasing responsibility overa number of years for coordinating relief assis-tance for millions of people at risk, primarilyfrom political turmoil, in the region. Such re-sponsibility had by necessity included imple-menting the diplomatic and political strategiesrequired for the relief to be delivered to andthrough zones of conflict.

The United States had demonstrated re-sourcefulness, generosity and determination ingetting more assistance to more individuals inthe Hom than any other donor. And the U.S.was considered by some to shoulder a particularmoral and political responsibility given its longsupport of the Siad Barre dictatorship and theinfusion of American military and economic as-sistance to Somalia and the arguable contribu-tion of that support to Somalia's descent intochaos. (The burnt and looted remains of theAmerican embassy compound in Mogadishu --the largest U.S. embassy facility ever erected inAfrica -- stands today as a bleak monument tothe U.S. role in Somalia during the Siad Baneera.) The United States Government further es-tablished expectations by its high profile, ener-getic and highly successful role in negotiatingan end to neighboring Ethiopia's civil wars andthe demise of the Mengistu dictatorship duringthe spring months of 1991.

Britain and Italy as well were seen tohave obligations residual from the colonial eraand, especially in the case of Italy, serious busi-ness links and ties to Somali political factions.

All of the major donors had, of course,established certain expectations for involvementby their response via the UN Security Councilin the Kurdish situation in northern Iraq follow-ing Operation Desert Storm"and by their con-current attention to the internal chaos in thefractionizing Yugoslav republics.

Regionally, assumptions for any Orga-nization of African Unity response to Somalia'sdeterioration were (and remain) more theoreti-cal, given the OAU's history on sovereignty andnon-interference questions and its crippling in-stitutional weaknesses. But those assumptionshad perhaps been boosted slightly by the rela-tive vigor of the current OAU leadership and itsstated interest in improving internal conflictresolution mechanisms.2 Such expanded inter-est led to an OAU role in negotiating a cease

fire in the Rwanda conflict, for example. What-ever might have been expected from either theArab League or the Organization of the IslamicConference in response to the Somali crisis,their roles have remained minor, if not abstrac-tions.

But internationally, as famine condi-tions evolved in Somalia, the expectations ofand for external involvement had been clearlylaid over most of the preceding decade by a hostof players at the diplomatic, political and opera-tional levels and by global events. The extent ofthe investment of energy and resources into So-malia and the region by the UN, by the UnitedStates and by the other major donor govern-ments make the subsequent response consider-ably more difficult to justify.

II. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TOTHE SOMALI CRISIS

A. The United Nations

A fair and accurate summary of the UN re-sponse to the Somalia crisis is a frustrating exer-cise, in part because that response has been sofractious and uneven and in part because the in-escapable conclusions reached about the UN in-volvement are so troubling. (And of course indrawing useful conclusions, it is necessary todistinguish between meaningful activity andthat which is merely a substitute for serious en-gagement.)

It is fair to conclude, however, that bothhumanitarian and diplomatic initiatives of theUnited Nations surrounding Somalia have beengravely inadequate. Its humanitarian operationshave been grossly incompetent. Its undisciplinedand unfocused approach to peacemaking andnational reconciliation in Somalia has at timesbordered on the incoherent. The failure on bothfronts raises disturbing questions in regards notjust to Somalia but as well to institutional ca-pacity. If the system that permitted such a want-ing response to the dangers of Somalia is notradically overhauled, then repetition is all butguaranteed.

What, specifically, supports such an as-sessment of the UN role in Somalia?

Damning assessments of the UN role inSomalia emanate from relief workers directlyengaged in the Somali crisis, from professionals

A Famine in Somalia

If the system thatpermitted such awanting responseto the dangers ofSomalia is notradically over-

haule4, then rep-etition is all but

guaranteed.

in the humanitarian assistance community andfrom the more candid UN officials involve. Thewords of other well placed and experienced ob-servers and participants from a range of per-spectives are no more positive. The pronounce-ments stem from a series of UN blunders andtheir basic failure to seriously engage in effortsto deal with the crisis when such engagementmight have diffused its intensity.

Most egregiously, the UN has been es-sentially absent from Somalia.

The UN withdrew from Mogadishushortly before the flight of Siad Barre, transfer-ring its staff to Nairobi and staying away untilAugust of 1991. A security incident in earlySeptember resulted in the re-evacuation of theskeleton staff which had returned three weeksearlier. Increasing international criticism led toUNICEF reestablishing Mogadishu offices inlate December, but the UN has continued to suf-fer from the absence of senior, qualified person-nel being present. There has been no overalland consistent coordination of the UN effort inthe country by a "special representative" under-taking the role played earlier by Kurt Jansson orMichael Priestley in Ethiopia or the Sudan.21

(Undersecretary-General MohamedSahnoun is now a non-resident special represen-tative taking on diplomatic initiatives for Mr.Boutros-Ghali. Ambassador Sahnoun's ap-pointment and service has been significant in re-storing hope for the UN's effectiveness in So-malia. His resourcefulness and candor stand inmarked contrast to the performance of his col-leagues. Ambassador Sahnoun, for example,publicly questioned how it could be that Savethe Children (UK), a relatively small private re-lief agency, had delivered more food to Somaliain 1992 than had UNICEF.W

The absence of country expertise di-rectly resulted in the debacle of then-AssistantSecretary-General James Jonah's January mis-sion to Mogadishu. (Mr. Jonah has subse-quently been promoted to an undersecretary po-sition.)

The UN, responding to growing accu-sations of the neglect of Somalia, began fonnu-lating plans for a diplomatic initiative in De-cember of 1991. The International Committeeof the Red Cross, in particular, had created a stirby highly unusual public criticisms of the UN'sperformance in Somalia.' Mr. Jonah was dis-patched to Mogadishu, apparently to demon-

strate UN resolve, on January 3-5. His agendawas to meet with General Aideed and with AliMahdi for the purpose of negotiating a ceasefire in the civil war and the safe passage of reliefcommodities. Two clans neutral in the Aideed/Ali Mahdi clash (the Hawadle and theMurasade) offered to meet Mr. Jonah at the air-port, to escort him to both Aideed and AliMahdi headquarters and to serve as local peace-keepers. Mr. Jonah, apparently unaware of theexistence of neutral elements in Mogadishu,made no arrangements to accept the offer. Hethen fell into a trap set by General Aideed.

Aideed's forces shelled the airport toprevent Jonah's UN plane from landing and hadit diverted to an airstrip at Balidogley under hiscontrol, where Mr. Jonah was met by the gen-eral. Manipulating Mr. Jonah's itinerary,Aideed then took him on highly visible and ex-tensive tours of territory under his control.When the Jonah party neared the planned pointof crossing into Ali Mahdi's northern section ofMogadishu, an angry Ali Mahdi opened an artil-lery barrage. Mr. Jonah returned to Nairobi.The next morning, however, he flew to northernMogadishu to briefly visit Ali Mahdi; he thenpublicly announced that Ali Mahdi had agreedto UN intervention in the crisis and that GeneralAideed stood as the obstacle.

Ali Mahdi immediately seconded Mr.Jonah's comments, seeing them as underscoringthe legitimacy of his interim presidency. Aideedpredictably became angry and more distrustful -- and more violent.

The immediate results of the JamesJonah visit were that the airport was shut for tendays (blocking the delivery of food) and theneutral position of the Murasade clan was un-dermined. The Murasade were soon engaged inthe savage fighting. Most significantly, theUN's particular advantage of being a neutralbroker had been severely eroded. The war con-tinued for another two months.

No lessons had apparently been ab-sorbed by the UN hierarchy on the finer pointsof negotiating in Mogadishu's internecinebattles when their next high profile delegationarrived February 5, this time headed by SpecialCoordinator Brian Wannop. No clan leaders orelders were invited to discussions with Aideedand Ali Mahdi about proposed peace talks inNew York. This lack of perceived standingmade it easier for Ali Mahdi to launch attacks

a Famine in Somalia

The immediateresults of the

James Jonah visitwere that the air-port was shutforten days (blocking

the delivery offood) and the neu-tral position of the

Murasade clanwas undermined.

against the smaller clans, which he did the dayafter the UN issued invitations to the peacetalks.

Yet another James Jonah mission toMogadishu in February finally led to a tentativeagreement for representatives of Aideed and AliMahdi to convene under the auspices of theUnited Nations, the Islamic Conference, theOAU and the Arab League, which they did atUN headquarters on February 12 and 13. Al-though the New York meetings were character-ized by lack of preparation and the naive exclu-sion of relevant players," the principles of acease-fire were set out. The Somali parties re-turned to Mogadishu where the details, such asthey were, were hammered out and agreed to byMarch 3. While there have been violations, thebasic cease-fire between Aideed and Ali Mahdihas more or less held since early March.

One of the most ironic aspects of theUN's performance in Somalia is the failure totake advantage of the March cease-fire -- a UN-brokered cease-fire that has basically held. Thisfailure rests at the very center of the flawed ex-temal involvement in the crisis and mirrors nu-merous other opportunities missed. Had theopening been seized, it is conceivable the fam-ine would have been less severe and certain theUN's reputation would have been enhanced, nottarnished. It is clear that its effectiveness on theground could only have improved.

The floundering of the UN's senior dip-lomats in the field during this period was paral-leled by the Security Council's dithering and itsrelief agencies' squandering of valuable timeand opportunities.

The Security Council was receivingand issuing a series of reports and adopting thefirst in a series of resolutions. The Council's at-tention to Somalia, however, was notable mostfor its lack of resolve and lack of consistencywith its actions regarding both the Kurdish situ-ation in northern Iraq or the concurrent Yugosla-vian crisis. The big power reluctance to focuson Somalia was also notable: Cape Verde had amore ambitious Somali agenda for the Councilthan did the United States of America.

The Security Council got stuck on a se-ries of points which ultimately led to an exas-perated outburst from new the Secretary-Gen-eral, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who accusedthe Council of operating on a double standard.The Secretary-General publicly charged that the

Council was devoting excessive resources to"the rich man's warfin Yugoslavia at the ex-pense of Somalia. The problem for the Councilwith his charges were that they were highly ac-curate and there was no denial available. Theembarrassment stemming from the July outburstled directly to the current UN and major donorgovernment mobilization on the Somali famine,including the launching of airlifts and the arrivalof peacekeeping forces -- some seven monthsafter initial consideration by the Security Coun-cil.

UNICEF and the other UN relief agen-cies were doing no better in the field. Repeatedrequests to UNICEF from the private reliefagencies operating in Mogadishu and elsewherefor medicines and medical supplies went un-heeded. Relief commodities were delivered toarbitrary locations without consultation withother agencies, creating false expectations in theprocess as desperate people gathered to awaitfurther deliveries that never materialized.2

The United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), the traditional coordinatorof UN relief and development agencies, mean-time left $68 million budgeted for Somalia un-tapped for some nine monthsfor lack of a signa-ture from the non-existent Somali govemment?2Efforts to obtain a waiver on the signature re-quirement apparently commenced only afterstinging criticism of the UN Somali relief op-erations from the director of Save the Chil-dren Fund (United Kingdom) were reportedin the press.

The UNHCR (High Commissioner forRefugees) and the World Food Programme(WFP) were engaged, from January throughApril, 1992, in a dispute over the particulars of acontract to truck food from the port in Djiboutito camps for Somali refugees in the Harargheregion of Ethiopia, while more than fifty ofthose refugees were perishing from malnutritioneach day.

The UN's endless negotiations withGeneral Aideed and Ali Mahdi during 1992over the placement of UN peacekeepers to pro-tect relief shipments came at the expense of animmediate opportunity -- that of hiring andtraining some of the militia as police guards, aninitiative that potentially would have weakenedthe position of the two warlords in the processof getting more food moving.

As crisis turned to catastrophe in Soma-

I Famine in Somclia

The flounderingof the UN's se-

nior diplomats inthe field duringthis period was

paralleled by theSecurity

Council's dither-ing and its reliefagencies' squan-dering of valu-able time andopportunities.

lia, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairswas largely unengaged in these fitful efforts.Prior to the recent mobilization and the initialSeptember visit of Undersecretary Jan Eliasson,this UN unit had no discemable role in mount-ing an effective response to the famine. It had,of course been formed early this year in re-sponse to outrage at the chronic blundering,uncoordinated performance of the UN humani-tarian agencies to prevent just such responses asthe one it passively watched unfold in Soma-lia.x

The UN record, then, is a saga of mis-steps and opportunities missed. The record isclear and need not be belabored here as all theevidence required to reach judgment lies beforeus in Somalia today.

B. The Response of the United States Gov-ernment/Donor Governments

The response of the United States Governmentto the Somali catastrophe has been schizo-phrenic. Official U.S. relief agencies 9 and theirsenior officers have a record of response to thecrisis unmatched by UN or other donor govern-ment counterparts. Their operational achieve-ments, however, have not been supported withdetermination or political commitment at higherlevels of government.

While disaster assistance officials werecommitting significant USG resources" to theICRC and the private relief agencies and pres-suring the United Nations to move aggressivelyin Somalia," the State Department's Interna-tional Organization Bureau, the U.S. Mission tothe UN and the National Security Council werekeeping Somalia a low priority on the SecurityCouncil agenda and avoiding commitments formultilateral action.

State Department officials indicate thatthe lack of attention given to the famine in So-malia by Washington (prior to July 1992)stemmed from a lack of media attention (priorto July 1992) and from a system overloaded byconcurrent humanitarian crises in Yugoslavia,Iraq and elsewhere (including a non-existentemergency in the former Soviet Union). Ananonymous Department source stated thatState's Africa Bureau tried but failed to put So-malia on then-Secretary James Baker's agendaand bring the crisis to the attention of the WhiteHouse. Senior administration officials, the

source reasoned, react to headlines and mediaattention. "There are certain things that arenews, others that are not news. For manymonths, Somalia was not news,"32the official la-mented.

The adoption of a Senate resolution in-troduced by Senators Paul Simon and NancyKassebaum in April which called for "activeU.S. initiatives" and encouraging UN and OAUmobilization in response to Somalia was greetedwith little interest by the Bush Administration,as had earlier entreaties from within State's Af-rica Bureau. Indeed, press reports3 3 refer to Ad-ministration rejection of proposals to put Soma-lia on the Security Council agenda. TheCouncil did, on January 23, discuss the Somalicrisis at the instigation of Cape Verde. TheUnited States delegation, though, insisted uponchanging the language of the Cape Verde reso-lution. The original wording of "to ensure their(the fighting Somali factions) commitment tothe cessation of hostilities and promote a ceasefire" was altered to "seeking" such a commit-ment.3 The signal was clear: the U.S. sought alow level UN investment in the crisis.

Observers from Capitol Hill and withinthe Administration indicate that at least part ofthe rationale for not pressuring the UN to domore was a loathing of any potential financialobligations for UN peacekeeping for the U.S.,not just for Somalia but for other locations thatsuch a precedent might imply.

Thus, while AID funding was primaryin enabling the ICRC to devote an unprec-edented fifty percent of its worldwide emer-gency budget to Somalia, the lack of resolve ofthe United States in the Security Council con-tributed to the UN balking at both humanitarianand peacekeeping opportunities.

The contradictory response of the U.S.continued until mid-July when media coverageand an emotional cable from the American am-bassador in Kenya concerning the famine fol-lowing a visit to Somali refugee camps werebrought to the attention of President GeorgeBush. The president reportedly reacted stronglyto the stark reports of hunger and starvation andindicated he "wanted something done."3

Something was done, of course, andwithin a few days the situation was recognizedas "the Somalia crisis" by the Departments ofState and Defense and the National SecurityCouncil. The dramatic U.S. military airlift of

a Famine in Somalia

Official U.S. reliefagencies and their

senior officershave a record of

response to the cri-sis unmatched byUN or other donorgovernment coun-terparts. Their op-erational achieve-ments, however,

have not been sup-ported with deter-mination orpoliti-cal commitment at

higher levels ofgovernment.

food commodities into Somalia and northernKenya was ordered and the U.S. was readyingplans for UN resolutions on additional reliefand national reconciliation conferences. OnAugust 13, the White House announced that theU.S. would provide air transport for the Paki-stani troops who were to be the first contingentof 500 UN peacekeepers in Somalia. (TheUnited States had earlier in the year forced theauthorized level of UN peacekeepers for Soma-lia down to fifty from the proposed 500; the Se-curity Council is currently discussing dispatch-ing up to 3,500 peacekeepers; AmbassadorSahnoun has requested 7,000.)

The deployment of the U.S. military tomove relief commodities to hungry Somaliswas so rapid as to cause serious concernsamong private relief agency workers inside So-malia, who feared increased security threats,and a diplomatic incident with the Kenyan gov-ernment (the airlift is based in Mombasa),which chose to portray the arrival of the U.S.armed forces as "an invasion." The timing ofthe announcement -- on the eve of the Republi-can National Convention and on the heels of theincreased press coverage but over six monthsafter the March cease-fire and nine months afterrelief chief Natsios had described the famine asthe world's greatest humanitarian emergency --was greeted with a high degree of cynicism bymany observers.

Regardless of the various motivationsthat may have spurred the sudden activism, thehigh profile U.S. attention to the Somalia fam-ine changed the dynamics of the internationalresponse. It forced the European and other do-nor governments to follow suit and embarrassedthe UN into taking a more serious approach.Today, the first UN peacekeepers are on theground and the planes are delivering food (how-ever partial these measures are in resolving thefundamental crisis). The UN has crafted a"next 100 day" strategy that contains some pro-posals of considerable merit and sophistication.Somalia is on the world's agenda.

The belated mobilization of the UnitedStates Government on the Somali crisis illus-trates several critical points. Most glaringly, itunderscores the highly political nature of U.S.humanitarian assistance programs. At the pre-cise moment the upper echelons of the StateDepartment and the National Security Councilwere deflecting the pleas for more attention on

Somalia, they were busy orchestrating a veryhigh profile and very expensive humanitarianassistance operation in Russia and the otherformer Soviet republics. From Februarythrough June of this year, sums approaching athird of a billion dollars were spent on these "re-lief' operations. Fortunately for the residents ofthe former Soviet Union but unfortunately forU.S. credibility, there was no emergency situa-tion present to warrant such an operation. 6 Itsobjectives were purely political, not humanitar-ian (especially following sharp criticism of theAdministration's stance regarding the formerSoviet republics from former President RichardNixon).

Further, the initial U.S. position in theSecurity Council underscored a willingness tonakedly calculate political benefits/requirementsin relationship to financial costs of multilateralhumanitarian operations. Until the Secretary-General's tirade and news media focus forced achange in policy, the U.S. supported minimalUN response to Somalia because no one waschallenging such an approach -- despite not be-cause of the conditions on the ground in Soma-lia. At the time the airlift was announced, con-ditions were no more or less safe withinSomalia than they had been for six months, nei-ther political factors nor logistics had altered, nosignificant new information had become avail-able. The only difference was that the situationhad deteriorated due in large part to inaction onthe part of the international community. And...there were more hungry people.

Additionally, the dichotomous U.S. re-action to the Somali famine illuminates the lackof accountability of the U.S. Government's in-ternational humanitarian assistance programs -- which of course is precisely the problem at theUnited Nations as well. Due to weak Congres-sional oversight and no meaningful input fromthe private humanitarian community, humanitar-ian assistance policies and programs are proneto political manipulation by the executivebranch. There are no standards, no criteria, noguidelines being violated when huge sums arepumped through "humanitarian" channels forother reasons, such as to the former Soviet re-publics, at the expense of genuine catastropheslike Somalia.

The response to Somalia of the othertraditional Western donor govemments basicallymirrors that of the United States. The United

i Famine in Somalia

The belated mobi-lization of the

United States Gov-ernment on the

Somali crisis illus-trates several criti-cal points. Most

glaringly, it under-scores the highly

political nature ofU.S. humanitar-ian assistance

programs.

Kingdom and Sweden were initially a littlemore generous than some others. The EuropeanCommunity is active in the emergency airlifts(and many EC governments and Canada wereflying in food before the United States). But allof the donors have done too little, too late fortoo many Somalis and none has particularlydemonstrated political will or leadership, repli-cating the policy -- and moral -- deficit that

mars the U.S. record.

C. The OAU, Regional Organizations andthe Somali Crisis

However minimal were the expectations orhopes for an effective response to Somalia'sagony by the Organization of African Unity, theorganization has proven itself to be totally irrel-evant as tragedy has unfolded a few hundredmiles from its Addis Ababa headquarters. Twoyears into the turmoil, the OAU has yet to makea significant statement to the international com-munity about humanitarian needs, national rec-onciliation processes or peacekeeping in Soma-lia. The OAU Secretary-General has not visitedSomalia; no delegation of respected African el-ders has been dispatched to attempt a dialoguebetween conflicting factions; no conceited cam-paign has been launched to place or keep Soma-lia on the Security Council agenda.

Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU Secre-tary-General, issued a press release in mid-De-cember of 1991 condemning the killing of civil-ians in the Somali civil war and offering hisoffices to the warring parties for negotiations.The OAU then basically went silent on the sub-ject of Somalia, taking no part in the criticalJanuary Security Council deliberations when theUnited States was acting to limit UN interven-tion. The OAU was one of the sponsors of theFebruary/March cease-fire talks, but then againwent mute.

Through the present, neither the OAUnor the African leaders who comprise the orga-nization have any profile on the Somali crisis.Its principals are not included among the politi-cal leaders and public figures who have trav-elled to Baido, Belet Huen or Mogadishu to reg-ister concern and demand a greater response.U.S. Senator Nancy Kassebaum has been to So-malia; the president of Ireland, Mary Robinson,has gone; actress Audrey Hepburn has visitedthe feeding centers. Not a single OAU repre-

sentative has followed the lead of French presi-dent Francois Mitterand, whose visit to war-tomBosnia sent such a signal of concern and interestto the victims of that calamity.

State Department officials privatelycomplain of not being able to rouse the OAU ormany of its members to issue statements at theUnited Nations or otherwise join the (belated)attention now given Somalia in New York.Boutros Boutros-Ghali has said much the same,referring to daily telephone calls from Europeanleaders on the Bosnian crisis while the linesfrom African capitals remain silent

OAU officials, when pressed on theirlack of resolve on Somalia, refer to financiallimitations as if money was a prerequisite forpolitical will or expressions of compassion. Itmay not be realistic to talk of a major Africanhumanitarian assistance program for Somalia; itis not unrealistic, however, to talk of the OAUchallenging the conscience of the world as thepeople of one of its member states expire by thehundreds of thousands.'

Those within the UN inclined to avoidany commitment in Somalia predictably haveexploited the OAU's position -- or lack of one.Senior officials made statements in televisioninterviews during the Somali civil war periodthat cited the lack of any OAU action as justifi-cation and explanation for the UN's own remotestance (indicating a belief, apparently, thatmoral leadership requires political pressure).

The only situation in which an Africanmultilateral group has seriously involved itselfin any of the continent's civil wars was theECOWAS/ECOMOG intervention in Liberia --a situation in which a number of nationals fromthe intervening states faced death and detention.There is no comparable regional organization inthe Hom of Africa, the citizens of no othercountry are directly affected in Somalia's fam-ine and the OAU, despite the faint indications ofa re-thinking of the traditional barriers to "inter-nal interference" has simply not responded tothe needs in Somalia. (Exactly how it could beconstrued that the OAU or its members wouldbe violating Somalia's "sovereignty" in thissituation by promoting a national reconciliationprocess is not clear in any case.)

Indeed, the OAU's most direct address-ing of the Somali crisis may be its rejection of aplan for intervening proposed by the Eritreanson the basis of Eritrea's lack of membership in

A Famine in Somalia

The OAU then ba-sically went silenton the subject of

Somalia, taking nopart in the criticalJanuary SecurityCouncil delibera-

tions when theUnited States wasacting to limit UN

intervention.

the OAU. The Eritreans, unlike the OAU, hadsent a delegation to Mogadishu during lastwinter's warfare.

Neither the Arab League nor the Orga-nization of the Islamic Conference have arecord more distinguished than that of the OAUin response to the disintegration of one of theirmember states.

D. The Non-Governmental Relief Organiza-tions Forced into the Fray

When the final history of the collective responseto the Somali crisis is written, the profiles incourage that will emerge are those of the profes-sional staff members of the International Com-mittee of the Red Cross and four private reliefagencies which stayed in Somalia during thedarkest days of civil war and anarchy to providehope and comfort to those in need. The fouragencies (the International Medical Corps, Savethe Children/U.K., Medecins Sans Frontiers,and SOS, an Austrian non-profit) and the ICRCbasically assumed the role expected of theUnited Nations in such situations and in the pro-cess saved untold thousands of lives.

Their professionalism in providing re-lief assistance under the most difficult and com-plex situations stands in stark contrast to thebungled efforts of the UN agencies. Further,their capacity to perform in such a setting ex-poses the hollowness (and hypocrisy) of the UNclaims that Somalia has simply been too danger-ous for their personnel. (As stated above, oneexpatriate relief worker has been killed in So-malia; a number of peacekeepers, relief workersand journalists have died in Bosnia as part of themultilateral intervention during the same periodwithout eroding the conviction that such inter-vention was mandatory.)

The ICRC has devoted fifty percent ofits entire worldwide emergency budget for theSomali relief effort and has orchestrated massfeeding programs, not a traditional role. It hasfurther set aside its hundred year plus policy ofrefusing armed escorts. The Red Cross hasadapted its posture so radically because to do sohas been required in Somalia. It has done whathas been necessary and possible within itsmeans to prevent the catastrophe from becom-ing even worse.

It is not possible in this paper to ad-equately describe the heroic performance of the

ICRC and the private relief agencies. It isobligatory to note, however, that people of con-science around the world are greatly in theirdebt

IV. QUESTIONS RAISED, ANSWERSELUSIVE

The UN as a whole and the SecurityCouncil members are now left with examining anumber of broad policy issues if the failure andfrustration encountered in Somalia and else-where are to be understood, their lessons ab-sorbed. A few are referenced below.

First, the question of double-standardshas to be probed. The soaring rhetoric em-ployed by Council members and the subsequentmobilization of resources for the Kurds innorthern Iraq and the victims of civil strife inthe former Yugoslavia stands in startling con-trast to Somalia. There is no intent to deny theseverity or urgency of either of the other crisesin saying that Somalia is simply more extremeif measured in genuine humanitarian terms. Thebold and relatively quick collective response tothe situation in Kurdistan's is well known, andthe capacity of the Security Council to constructthe authorization for involvement in Iraq's inter-nal affairs for humanitarian reasons is on record.The ongoing response to the crisis in theBalkans involves the deployment of some13,500 international peacekeepers and thedeputization of a former American secretary ofstate as chief negotiator. Resolutions and autho-rizations addressing the extemal intervention inthe crisis currently absorb much of theCouncil's energy.

There are more people at immediaterisk in Somalia than in Kurdistan and theYugoslav cases combined, however, and thelack of a functioning government in Mogadishuexpands the rationale for external involvement.

If humanitarian concerns form a legiti-mate basis for intervention in Iraq and in theformer Yugoslavia, they provide ample argu-ment for a more vigorous and determined rolein Somalia. If the former cases, however, arenot more than exercises in big power politicalinterests being served, then the Security Councilmust modify its language and the legal basis forsuch interventions to avoid hypocrisy.

Second, the question of cease-fires be-

Famine in Somalia

1$

When the final his-tory of the collectiveresponse to the So-

mali crisis is written,the profiles in cour-age that will emergeare those of the pro-fessional staff mem-bers of the Interna-tional Committee ofthe Red Cross andfour private relief

agencies whichstayed in Somaliaduring the darkest

days of civil war andanarchy to provide

hope and comfort tothose in need,

14

The argument canbe made that the

failure to move onthe opportunity tointroduce interna-tionalpeacekeep-ers into Somalia

last March has leddirectly to the cur-

rent level ofviolence.

ing in place before the introduction of UNpeacekeeping forces has to be examined as a ra-tional criterion. Such application gives anynumber of minor players potential veto powerover the UN and can block action required toassist vast numbers of non-participants in civilstrife situations. There are not two sides to theSomali violence; there are many. The argumentcan be made that the failure to move on the op-portunity to introduce international peacekeep-ers into Somalia last March has led directly tothe current level of violence -- deemed too dan-gerous by some for peacekeepers. The lines ofconflict are not neatly drawn in this situation.There are a number of self-appointed warlordsscrambling for power and position. The be-stowing of a veto upon such players simply en-hances their arbitrary authority, as the UN hasdone in the case of General Aideed and AliMahdi.

Additionally, the imposition of this cri-terion illustrates the cost of treating all of Soma-lia as if the extreme circumstances ofMogadishu were prevalent throughout the coun-try -- which simply has not been the case, butreflects the cost of institutional ignorance of asituation arising from no on-the-ground pres-ence. Opportunities to exploit positives--therelative lack of both violence and the food inse-curity in key areas -- that could have served asstaging grounds for containing the situationwere squandered. Linking initiatives on the hu-manitarian program front to concurrence toagreements on the positioning of peacekeepersin Somalia has been a major mistake with heavycosts.

Part of the Security Council's examina-tion process must be a focus on the budgetaryconstraints which hobble its peacekeeping op-tions.

Despite the moral and political impera-tives that require determined collective re-sponse, the budgetary constraints of the UnitedStates Government and the other donor govern-ments facing deficits and recession remain reali-ties. The Secretary-General states in "Agendafor Peace"" that "the financial foundations ofthe Organization daily grow weaker, debilitatingits political will and practical capacity to under-take new and essential activities." It is obviousthat without securing the resources, the UN canbe expected to do little and equally obvious thatthere are likely to be more Somalia-like situa-

a Famine in Somalia

tions arise. The long neglect of the United Na-tions by the U.S. and other powers has taken aheavy toll in the professionalism of its agencies.How is that professionalism to be rebuilt with-out funds? How can members states expect theorganization to accept additional responsibilitieswhen they are in arrears? In the Somali case,for example, the evidence is strong that reluc-tance to face potential assessments was a factorin the United States Government's determina-tion to give the famine low priority; other gov-ernments shared the reluctance. How will thegap be filled?

At the same time, however, the UNmust rightfully look towards internal reform torecapture both credibility and savings if its bud-getary woes are to be seriously addressed. Theextent of its ineptitude has been dramatically ex-posed by the bungled response to Somalia,"' andit is clear that Somalia is but one example of theUN failing to meet its obligations for reasonsother than financial constraints. The world pub-lic may not be as forgiving as in the past as theshortcomings of the institution are revealed.

The Security Council will need aswell to construct guidelines concerning theacceptable safety risks for UN personnel in-tervening in internal conflict. Much of theUN's problem in operating in Somaliastemmed from its lack of on-the-ground ex-pertise due to the evacuation of its staff andsafety was the stated reason for that evacua-tion. In truth, the UN has operated in moredangerous situations and the risk in Somaliawas seemingly an acceptable one -- one ac-cepted by the Red Cross, the small Interna-tional Medical Corps, Britain's Save theChildren Fund and others. The application ofthe safety question in Somalia strikes manyas being disingenuous and comments byUndersecretary Jonah citing the lack of "in-surance" for staff as a rationale for not hav-ing people in-country underscore the neces-sity of clear and reasonable guidelines in thisarea.4 1

Safety concerns served as an excusefor UN lack of resolve in the Somalia case.That does not imply that safety for staffmembers is not a legitimate issue that re-quires exploration and definition.

V. AFTERMATH: NO TIME TO WASTEIN SEEKING REFORMS

By any reasonable standard of judgment, thecollective response to the Somali crisis has beena failure -- and a collective one. The cost of thefailure has been extremely high. Now, in addi-tion to moving expeditiously on the humanitar-ian and national reconciliation fronts in Soma-lia, the international community is left with anexamination of what went wrong and what re-form measures are to be considered in the after-math.

A few of the specific issues for the Se-curity Council and the major powers whichguide the Council to examine are listedabove. These are but some of the troublingquestions without immediate answers thatstare us in the face as the modalities for col-lective involvement in internal conflicts arepondered. In addition to modalities and man-dates, the UN must as well tackle the issue ofthe lack of professional capability within itshumanitarian agencies. Those who failed sobadly in Somalia must answer for those fail-ures if confidence and credibility in the agen-cies are to be recaptured.

A public airing of all that went wrongwith the UN response to Somalia is both war-ranted and desirable if meaningful reform is toreplace floundering and double standard ap-proaches. The United States Governmentshould muster up the fortitude and vision re-quired to see to it that a serious and powerful

humanitarian assistance reform commission ortask force be impaneled at the United Nations.Concurrently at home, a 'blue ribbon commis-sion' should be convened to review bilateralprograms. Both of those bodies should becharged with mapping out a new set of policiesto guide programs now venturing into largelyunchartered waters.

Ultimately, the most important questionis the fundamental one of accountability. Towhom are the relief agencies of the United Na-tions accountable? Who determines when andhow the United States Government extends hu-manitarian assistance in the name of the Ameri-can public? What is the collective responsibilityto people in need who do not merit a special po-litical status or the sustained attention of the me-dia? What is the responsibility if the presidentis not reached by reports of starving children?

Accountability needs to be establishednow at the intemational level and in our bilat-eral program, which has such disproportionateimpact on the efforts of the UN and the otherplayers. Without such accountability, there is noreason to believe that the horrible lessons appar-ent from the current Somali catastrophe will beabsorbed. We will, instead, revisit the same sto-ries of neglect, evasion of responsibility andlack of determination leading to massive suffer-ing in Mozambique, Tajikistan, Zaire or otherlands not likely to make a smooth transition inthe post-Cold War era.

To fail to act now is a price too high.

a Famine in Somalia

The UN must aswell tackle the issueof the lack ofpro-

fessional capabilitywithin its humani-tarian agencies.

Those who failed sobadly in Somaliamust answer forthose failures ifconfidence andcredibility in the

agencies are to berecaptured.

Notes

' See "The U.S. Government, Humanitarian Assis-tance, and the New World Order A Call for a NewApproach" by Jeffrey Clark, U.S. Committee forRefugees, September, 1991.2 An estimate of the relief group Medecins SansFrontiers/France.I See Captain Sir Richard Francis Burton, by Ed-ward Rice, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York,1990.* See "In the Land of the Living Dead" by loanLewis in The Sunday Times, August 30,1992.1 The major Somali clans are the Rahanwein,theIssaq, the Darod, the Dir, the Digil and the Hawiye.

See loan Lewis, op. cit.According to the Congressional Research Service,

Library of Congress.8 For a critique of an earlier UN failure to meet itsobligations to suffering Somalis, see "Hell on Earth:A Trip to Dar Anagi" by Jeffrey Clark in WorldRefugee Survey, 1992, the U.S. Committee for Refu-gees, April, 1992.9 A government recognized by no other to date.* Statement of Mr. Andrew Natsios, Assistant Ad-ministrator for Food and Humanitarian Assistance,U.S. Agency for International Development, beforethe House Select Committee on Hunger, January 30,1992." See "Situation Report #12," issued September 1,1992, by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assis-tance, Agency for International Development,Washington, D.C..12 See "Journey to Hell" by Jeffrey Clark, the U.S.Committee for Refugees, September, 1992.1 The tonnage of food actually delivered into Soma-lia has, however, never approached the minimummonthly requirement.14 In conversations with the author on site in Soma-lia, August, 1992."1 Most relief experts concur in stressing the neces-sity of putting as much food into Somalia through allavailable channels, including commercial ones, as ittakes to diminish its value and the prospects of it be-ing taken at gunpoint.16 For a detailed discussion of the complex relief op-erations in the Sudan, see The Challenges of FamineRelief by Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear, TheBrookings Institution, 1992.17 The onset of the 1984/85 famine in Ethiopia wasdetected and reported from early 1983; many reportsfrom credible observers were largely ignored." The problem with President Reagan's declarationhas been its selective application, even in the Hornof Africa -- a politicizing that distorts the humanitar-ian assistance efforts of the United States throughthe present. When those most desperately in need of

relief assistance and political protection were thevictims of a ruthless and brutal persecution from agovernment traditionally allied with the U.S., as wasthe case in the Sudan in 1988/89, the American gov-ernment failed to register the shrill public proteststhat characterized its dealings with the neighboringMengistu regime in 1984 and 1985. WhenSomalia's children became hungry, the initial U.S.response was far less vigorous than the concurrenthigh profile, dramatic response to far less compel-ling requirements in Russia and the other former So-viet republics. Political calculations, alas, were notto prove irrelevant or even minor considerations asthe response to both situations was formulated.'1 See "Iraq's Repression of its Civilian Populationand the International Response: Past Steps and Fu-ture Challenges" by Jane E. Stromseth, Study Groupon Collective Involvement in Internal Conflicts,Council on Foreign Relations, June 10, 1992.* The OAU secretariat approached the Global Coa-lition for Africa in mid-1992 for assistance in con-sidering options for internal conflict resolutionmechanisms as it has the U.S. State Department.21 See The Ethiopian Famine by Kurt Jansson,Michael Harris and Angela Penrose, Zed BooksLtd., 1987.' See "No Easy Fix For Somalia: Inertia Is Abun-dant, But All Else Is Scarce" by Jane Perlez, TheNew York Times, September 7, 1992.2 "How come UNICEF-Somalia has thirteenpeople in Nairobi and no one in Somalia?" askedPierre Gassmann, Delegate-General for Africa,ICRC, in conversation with Jane Perlez, The NewYork Times, December 11, 1991. "In a situation ofwar, we don't operate," Marco Barsotti, UNDP Act-ing Resident Representative for Somalia, responded(op. ciL), angering many who pointed to the concur-rent UN presence in Yugoslavia and the Sudan.2 It seems logical to have included neutral Somaligroups and operational units of the UN in the talks;none were invited.I See "Aid to Somalia Stymied" by Trevor Rowe,The Washington Post, July 29, 1992.2 As reported to the author during an August 1992site visit; see "A Journey to Hell," op. sit.I See "UN's $68m Somali Aid Blunder" by JulieFlint, The Observer, September 6, 1992.' See "UN's Aid Supremo Post Goes to Swede" byLeonard Doyle, The Independent, February 14,1992, which begins: "A senior Swedish official is tobecome the new United Nations aid coordinator,taking charge of disaster relief operations world-wide, following the debacle of the slow UN re-sponse to the plight of the Kurds last year."29 The Agency for International Development's Hu-manitarian Assistance Bureau, primarily the Officeof U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) andFood for Peace operations.

A Famine in SomIali

3 AID figures indicate that combined FY 1991 and1992 relief assistance provided to suffering Somalistotaled some $148 million by the end of August1992." Andrew Natsios, AID's humanitarian chief, calledfor greater UN presence and leadership on the So-mali crisis in testimony before the House SelectCommittee on Hunger on January 30, 1992, as hehad earlier.' See "U.S. Took Slow Approach to Somali Crisis"by Don Oberdorfer, The Washington Post, August24, 1992.33See "Somalia Self-Destructs, and the World LooksOn" by Jane Perlez, The New York Times, December29, 1991.1 See "Somalia: A Fight to the Death?" by AfricaWatch, February 13, 1992.' See "U.S. Took Slow Approach to Somali Crisis,"op. sitI The analysis is the author's, who spent sevenweeks in the former Soviet Union in early 1992 as

head of a humanitarian needs assessment team forthe U.S. Government3' See "Time for Self-Help in Suffering Africa" byRakiya Omaar, The Observer, August 23, 1992." See Jane E. Stromseth, op. sit.39 See "An Agenda for Peace" by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, United Nations Secretary-General, July,1992.

4 See in particular "The UN Empire," a four part se-ries, The Washington Post, September 20, 21, 22and 23, 1992.41 See "In Africa, Lost Lives, Lost Dollars: Incom-petence, Negligence, Maladministration Among UNWoes" by Keith Richburg, The Washington Post,September 21, 1992, in which Mr. Jonah is quotedas saying: "The UN, as it is now, is not structuredfor emergency situations. How do you cover them(UN staff members) by insurance? It is very diffi-cult to find a credible insurance company to coverthem."

Famine in Somalia