famine early warning and response: the missing link: margaret buchanan-smith and susanna davies...

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Book reviews 99 an analytical boost at the moment--from the availability of large data sets from household surveys and from the theory and estimation techniques around incentive compatibility. Would it not be worthwhile holding up a mir- ror to the researchers concerned? To what extent are their activities compatible with the reduction of poverty rather than the repro- duction of an academic and donor community that thrives upon it? This is not intended as a nihilistic, laissez faire dismissal of do-good- ers, but a comment on the sad direction being taken both by development studies and policy. Ben Fine Centre for Economic Policy for Southern Africa, School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, London WC1H OXG, UK Famine Early Warning and Response: The Missing Link Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Susanna Davies Intermediate Technology Publications, 228 pp, ISBN 1 85339 291, (1995) Famine and food crises caused by drought are, the authors argue, now rarely surprise events and are usually foreshadowed by early warn- ing signals. The problem in sub-Saharan Africa is no longer that of information, but who has the information and how it is used to shape decisions to prevent and ameliorate the impacts of drought and other disasters. In spite of clear warning signals indicating potential famine, case studies from the begin- ning of the decade paint a picture of relief assistance typically coming too little and too late and of avoidable problems of loss of livelihoods and distress. Is this, the authors ask, because there is a missing link between those who generate information and those who decide upon responses? The systems in five case study countries: Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mali and Turkana Dis- trict of Kenya have their origins in attempts to learn from food crises of the mid-1980s. By 1990 they were functioning reasonably effectively, even in Ethiopia under the Derg and, most surprisingly, conflict affected Sudan. Nevertheless, the way the information was used and responses to food crises were still found in most cases to be less than satis- factory. 'Early warning systems (EWS) are a neces- sary', as the authors convincingly argue, 'but not sufficient precondition for preventing fam- ine'. An effective early warning and response system should have the following character- istics: • it is not only capable of warning of large- scale famine but sensitive to changes in the food security situation before famine threa- tens and able to detect localized pockets of acute food stress; • responses should provide assistance early in the famine spiral before destitution is reached; and • interventions should protect livelihoods before lives are threatened--not only with food aid but also as part of a wider develop- mental response. The institutional analysis drawing on the five case studies identifies a number of salient issues. First, the ownership of information influences behaviour of both government and donors, with the latter having a strong prefer- ence for assessments that have been inter- nationally processed and certified by FAO and WFP. Furthermore, the quest for certainty and risk avoidance on the part of donors leads characteristically to late decisions. Inappropri- ate procedures also discourage decisions until there is a crisis. There is an unhelpful com- partmentalization in government and aid agencies of relief and development actions. Centralization of early warning and response typically makes for lack of sensitivity to local problems, and reflects a fundamental lack of accountability on the part of donors to those

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Book reviews 99

an analytical boost at the moment--from the availability of large data sets from household surveys and from the theory and estimation techniques around incentive compatibility. Would it not be worthwhile holding up a mir- ror to the researchers concerned? To what extent are their activities compatible with the reduction of poverty rather than the repro- duction of an academic and donor community that thrives upon it? This is not intended as a nihilistic, laissez faire dismissal of do-good- ers, but a comment on the sad direction being taken both by development studies and policy.

Ben Fine Centre for Economic Policy for Southern

Africa, School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, London WC1H OXG,

UK

Famine Early Warning and Response: The Missing Link Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Susanna Davies Intermediate Technology Publications, 228 pp, ISBN 1 85339 291, (1995)

Famine and food crises caused by drought are, the authors argue, now rarely surprise events and are usually foreshadowed by early warn- ing signals. The problem in sub-Saharan Africa is no longer that of information, but who has the information and how it is used to shape decisions to prevent and ameliorate the impacts of drought and other disasters. In spite of clear warning signals indicating potential famine, case studies from the begin- ning of the decade paint a picture of relief assistance typically coming too little and too late and of avoidable problems of loss of livelihoods and distress. Is this, the authors ask, because there is a missing link between those who generate information and those who decide upon responses?

The systems in five case study countries:

Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mali and Turkana Dis- trict of Kenya have their origins in attempts to learn from food crises of the mid-1980s. By 1990 they were functioning reasonably effectively, even in Ethiopia under the Derg and, most surprisingly, conflict affected Sudan. Nevertheless, the way the information was used and responses to food crises were still found in most cases to be less than satis- factory.

'Early warning systems (EWS) are a neces- sary', as the authors convincingly argue, 'but not sufficient precondition for preventing fam- ine'. An effective early warning and response system should have the following character- istics:

• it is not only capable of warning of large- scale famine but sensitive to changes in the food security situation before famine threa- tens and able to detect localized pockets of acute food stress;

• responses should provide assistance early in the famine spiral before destitution is reached; and

• interventions should protect livelihoods before lives are threatened--not only with food aid but also as part of a wider develop- mental response.

The institutional analysis drawing on the five case studies identifies a number of salient issues. First, the ownership of information influences behaviour of both government and donors, with the latter having a strong prefer- ence for assessments that have been inter- nationally processed and certified by FAO and WFP. Furthermore, the quest for certainty and risk avoidance on the part of donors leads characteristically to late decisions. Inappropri- ate procedures also discourage decisions until there is a crisis. There is an unhelpful com- partmentalization in government and aid agencies of relief and development actions. Centralization of early warning and response typically makes for lack of sensitivity to local problems, and reflects a fundamental lack of accountability on the part of donors to those

l O0 Book reviews

most affected, the food insecure and poor. Logistical constraints limit the speed of responses, particularly where food aid from Europe or North America is involved. Polit- ical constraints include political conditionality on the part of donors and the opportunistic behaviour of resource-poor self-serving regimes in affected countries that may be tempted to overstate the dimensions of a crisis. The authors conclude by stressing the need for a consensus on three issues:

• protecting livelihoods, (i.e., recognizing that drought and other natural disasters are an economic as well as a humanitarian issue);

• early warning systems that are jointly funded; and

• the need for phased responses when faced with initial assessments of a dynamic situ- ation.

Donors are criticized particularly in three regards. First, their overall risk-avoiding behaviour reflects a lack of accountability to those affected. Secondly, they continue to think in terms of responses solely with relief food aid for free distribution. This, in turn, reflects an apparent lack of enthusiasm for supporting preparedness and developmental solutions. Thirdly, case studies show the value of even relatively small emergency food stocks in landlocked countries such as Chad, Mali and Ethiopia, as well as western regions of Sudan. Nevertheless, donors are unenthusi- astic about supporting these because of con- tinuing commitments and agreeing on con- ditions for their management.

Some conclusions that the authors draw from their case studies are perhaps less gen- eral than is implied. The special difficulties of the Horn and Sahel, where political relation- ships between government and donors are part of the problematic, is underscored by these studies. As the authors concede, 'it is tempt- ing to argue that good political relations between government and donors are the essential prerequisite for effectively early

warning and response' (p. 211). This con- clusion is supported by some interesting aspects of their case studies. The early warn- ing and response system seems to have worked relatively well in Mali where the problem of food security was handled as part of a wider framework of government and donor relationships on agricultural sector lib- eralization. A local crisis in Turkana District in 1990 was well-managed, but when there was a wider crisis in Kenya in 1992/3 and the government's relationships with donors had severely deteriorated, the district's require- ments were handled far less satisfactorily.

To what extent do more recent experiences, in particular the responses to the southern African drought, support the authors' con- clusions? First, the relatively successful responses to these major droughts in 1992/3 and again in 1994/5 underline the importance of the wider economic policy framework. The processes of economic reform in effect pro- vided a parallel government~ionor monitor- ing system linked to adjustment programmes in countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, as in Mali in 1990. Secondly, large-scale com- mercial and concessional credit imports of cereals do not feature in this book at all, but these played a major role in managing the food security impacts of the major southern African droughts. These imports were also partially funded by bilateral programme aid and with borrowings from international fin- ancial institutions. Thirdly, there was too much rather than too little relief aid, but it still arrived too late. Fourthly, even with a rela- tively effective regional early-warning system that monitored crop performance and markets, there were still problems of effectively tar- geting relief on localized pockets and groups most acutely affected by drought.

The authors' choice of case studies reflects a focus on f amine rather than food security more widely. They are concerned more with problems of warning and response in the more difficult circumstances of less effective government, of internal social conflict and

Book reviews 101

where there are frequently relatively poorer relationships between government and donors. Other experience indicates that more circum- stance-specific and flexible responses are required and are possible.

This book is a useful contribution to an understanding of the ways in which infor- mation on food insecurity is being collected as part of early warning systems and how it is used within African governments and donor agencies. Those less familiar with this subject will find the book an accessible and informa- tive overview of the issues. There are, how- ever, few surprises or new insights for those intimately involved in food security research and policy. The authors' analysis and pre- scriptions are more relevant to the still diffi- cult cases in the Horn of Africa. But, where a process of economic liberalization is pro- ceeding and there are reasonably well-func- tioning markets and internal logistics, a mar- ket-based drought management strategy is likely to be effective. In these circumstances, socio-economic early warning systems still have an important role in assisting drought- preparedness and targeting responses on especially vulnerable groups and areas.

Edward Clay Overseas Development Institute

Portland House London SW1E 5DP, UK

World Agriculture: Towards 2010 (an FAO study) edited by Nikos Alexandratos FAO and John Wiley & Sons, 488 pp, (1995)

concentrated many minds this year on the question of just what are the longer-term (15- 25 years) prospects for world food supplies.

This book is one of four useful recent ~ sys- tematic analyses which try to answer this question on a global-scale. 2 While they vary in important detail, their conclusions are broadly mutually consistent: 'There appear to be no unsurmountable resource and tech- nology constraints at the global level that would stand in the way of increasing world food supplies by as much as required by the growth of effective demand' (FAO, p. 32), although the studies vary in the degree of their technological optimism. The FAO study goes on: 'And, on balance, there is scope for such growth in production to be achieved while taking measures to shift agriculture on to a more sustainable production path'.

The book qualifies these generally upbeat conclusions:

• In the first place, there are sharp differences in the supply-demand prospects of differ- ent geographical regions, with those of Africa being particularly unfavourable as population growth and urbanization con- tinue rapidly and agriculture lags.

• Second, developments on world markets that are favourable from a food security perspective will not happen automatically, but will require sustained clarity of vision and commitment on the part of govern- ments. While we need not be depressed about world food market prospects, com- placency is the real danger. Aversion to spending should not lead governments to abandon their responsibility for some of the

Current volatile grain prices on world mar- kets, and Lester Brown's recent gloomy pre- dictions of the impact on global markets of rocketing use of grain in China, together with active preparations by governments for the November 1996 World Food Summit, have

~This book updates and expands FAO's 1993 publication Agriculture: Towards 2010. "-The others are Population and Food: Global Trends and Future Prospects, by Tim Dyson, Global Environmental Change Programme and Routledge, 1996; IFPRI's Global Food Projections to 2020; and the World Bank's Food Outlook to 2010. The data and arguments are reviewed in Global Cereal Markets and Food Security, by this reviewer and others, FSG, Oxford University, 1996.