Famine, Affluence, and Morality

The Facts

There is a massive amount of suffering in the world due to lack of clean water, malnutrition and easily treated diseases.

The FactsStarvation (UN Report) 870 million people suffer from hunger and

malnutrition An estimated 23,468 people will die of hunger

today. An estimated 8.5 million will die of hunger this

year.

The Facts

Lack of Clean Water (Water.org) 780 million lack access to clean water 3.4 million die per year from a water related

disease

The FactsThe usual view of charity is that it is not obligatory (you don’t have to give) but it makes you a better person if you do.

Such actions are called supererogatory.

Singer’s PositionSinger argues that this view is false. That charitable giving is obligatory in many cases.

Moreover, most of us (even if we do give something) do not give nearly enough to meet this obligation.

Suffering is BadSuffering and death from lack of food, shelter, or proper medical care is bad.

Singer takes this for granted and does not argue for it.

It seems a fair assumption.

Singer’s ClaimWe ought to do something to prevent morally bad states of affairs if: Doing it does not prevent something better

from happening. Doing it does not bring about something

morally worse. Doing it does not involve doing something

morally wrong in itself.

For Next Time

Read Descartes’ “Meditation 1” (82-83)

Read Russell: Ch. 1 from Problems of Philosophy (87-91)

Singer’s Claim

Singer’s ClaimIf it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance then we ought (morally speaking) to do it.

Positive ObligationsIt is sometimes argued that we do not have these kinds of positive obligations to most people.

I have obligations to refrain from doing things to people (e.g. murder, torture, theft) but no obligations to do anything for other people.

Positive Obligations

Suppose there is a baby lying face down in a puddle. It will drown without aid. Can you permissibly refrain from helping it?

Positive ObligationsIt seems we do have some positive obligations to others.

If so, Singer’s claim that we are obligated to prevent suffering when there is not a morally significant downside seems plausible.

What are its implications?

Implication #1Distance is morally irrelevant:

It makes no difference if the suffering is right in front of you, or halfway around the world you are obligated to try to limit it.

If a child is far away, does it mean that her suffering is less morally bad?

Implication #1Objection: It makes a difference to whether or not we will help someone (empathy, immediacy and so on).

There is no reason to think that what we will do lines up with what we ought to do.

Implication #1Objection: Distance makes a difference to whether we can effectively help someone.

But given modern technology, global charitable organizations, etc. It is simply false.

Implication #2It makes no difference whether I am the only one that can help, or whether there are millions of others who could help. I am obligated to limit suffering.

I may feel less guilty if others fail to be moral in the same way as me, but this does not absolve me.

Implication #2Consider this argument:(1) If everyone in the world in my circumstances

gave $20 to Charity: Water then this would eliminate the water crisis.

(2) I am not obligated to give more than anyone else.

(3) Therefore, I am only obligated to give $20.

Implication #2This argument is invalid.

All that follows from the premises is if everyone gives $20, I am not obligated to give more than $20.

It establishes nothing about the actual case in which not everyone gives!

Implication #2In reality: There is substantial suffering. I cannot expect everyone to help. Therefore, I am obligated to give more than I

would have to if everyone were to be moral.

Implication #3Most acts ordinarily considered charitable are in fact morally obligatory.

Many of our actions or lack thereof will turn out to be morally impermissible.

Implication #3

“The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned. Peopled do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving to famine relief. This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified…

Implication #3We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starving…we ought to give money away rather than spend it on clothes we do not need to keep us warm. To do so is not charitable or generous…On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.” (164)

Implication #3What is the morally relevant difference between these two cases:Case 1:

There is a baby drowning in front of you. In order to save the baby you must wade into a puddle ruining a pair of brand new shoes.

Case 2:

You buy a new pair of shoes online knowing that by going to a different webpage you could donate that same money to a charity that would use it to save a child’s life.

Objection 1This is too drastic a revision to our moral judgments.

If Singer is correct his argument shows that our ordinary moral judgments about charity are false.

If his argument is sound it entails that we should change our moral judgments about such matters.

Objection 2Singer’s standards are too demanding

They seem to entail that we ought to be working tirelessly to end suffering in the world and giving the vast majority of our money to such causes.

But no one will, or should be expected to, meet such standards.

Objection 2Singer accepts this consequence of his view:

“Given the present conditions in many parts of the world, however, it does follow from my argument that we ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other disasters…This conclusion is one which we may be reluctant to face. I cannot see, though, why it should be regarded as a criticism of the position for which I have argued, rather than a criticism of our ordinary standards of behavior.” (167)

Objection 2

I think we need not follow him this far. There are things of genuine moral significance that would be sacrificed by such extreme measures.

If this is so, then Singer’s principle wouldn’t apply.

Objection 2Recall that Singer claimed that we must prevent suffering unless: Doing it does not prevent something better

from happening. Doing it does not bring about something

morally worse. Doing it does not involve doing something

morally wrong in itself.

Objection 2If we accept Singer’s extreme diagnosis then it may conflict with: The ability to pursue one’s legitimate ends The preservation of one’s emotional well-being The ability to guarantee the future prospects of

one’s children and family.

Objection 2

It is a morally bad state of affairs that everyone in the world does not have access to such things.

Objection 2

But sacrificing things of this nature that it is our good fortune to have seems to be giving up something of genuine moral significance.

If it is bad that everyone does not have such opportunities, it would seem to be bad if no one did.

Not Out of the Woods

Even taking into account the restrictions we have discussed, if Singer is right, then most of us are falling well short of meeting our moral obligations.

Not Out of the WoodsStill impermissible would be: Most (if not all) purchasing of luxury items (e.g.

clothes one doesn’t need, iPhones, iPads, video games, perfume, makeup, etc.)

Most (if not all) expensive leisure activities Living in a house that is larger than one needs. Eating expensive food when cheaper food is just as

nutritious. Etc.

Not Out of the Woods

Even on the more restricted version of Singer’s argument, most of us are systematically immoral.