fallacies of dmsms resolution

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Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution

Dan DeiszDirector of Design & TechnologyDecember 2015

Altera

Freescale

Broadcom

Atmel

Inventory Distribution

Product Manufacturing

Manufacturing Services


• Background & Definitions • Overview of Standards • The Big-3 Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution

• Commercial Traceability• AS6081• “Component Testing”

• Doing the Minimum• Doing it Right• Conclusions

Table of Contents


Background & DefinitionsSAE

StandardWIP or

Approved Description

AS6496 WIP

This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) identifies the requirements for mitigating counterfeit products in the Authorized Distribution supply chain by the Authorized Distributor. If not performing Authorized Distribution, such as an Authorized Reseller, Broker, or Independent Distributor, refer to another applicable SAE standard.

AS6174A Approved

This SAE Standard standardizes practices to: a. maximize availability of authentic materiel, b. procure materiel from reliable sources, c. assure authenticity and conformance of procured materiel, including methods such as certification, traceability, testing and inspection appropriate to the commodity/item in question, d. control materiel identified as fraudulent/counterfeit, e. and report suspect or confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit materiel to other potential users and Authority Having Jurisdiction.

AS5553A Approved

This standard is for use by organizations that procure and/or integrate electronic parts and/or assemblies containing such items. The requirements of this standard are generic and intended to be applied/flowed down through the supply chain to all organizations that procure electronic parts and/or assemblies, regardless of type, size and product provided. The mitigation of fraudulent/counterfeit EEE parts in this standard is risk-based and will vary depending on the desired performance or reliability of the equipment/hardware.

AS6462A Approved

This set of criteria shall be utilized by accredited Certification Bodies (CBs) to establish compliance, and grant certification to AS5553A, Aerospace Standard; Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition.

AIR6273 WIPThis document is to be used and cited as a standard reference by other SAE G-19 Committee documents that address the mitigation of Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts.

AS6081 Approved

This SAE Aerospace Standard standardizes practices to; a. identify reliable sources to procure parts, b. assess and mitigate risk of distributing fraudulent/counterfeit parts, c. control suspect or confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit parts, d. and report suspect and confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit parts to other potential users and Authority Having Jurisdiction.

AS6301 WIP

This set of criteria is intended for use by accredited Certification Bodies (CBs) to establish compliance, and grant certification to AS6081, Aerospace Standard; Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition-Distributors: It may also be used by others to assess compliance to AS6081 requirements.

ARP6178 Approved

This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice is applicable for all organizations that procure electronic components from sources other than the original component manufacturer. It is especially applicable for assessing distributors that sell electronic components without contractual authorization from the original component manufacturer.

AS6171 WIPThis document standardizes practices to detect suspect counterfeit electronic parts, to maximize the use of authentic parts, and to ensure consistency across the supply-chain for test techniques and requirements.

http://counterfeitparts.sae.org/standards/


A View of Standards

• Standards for Independent Suppliers– AS6081– AS6301 (WIP)– ARP6178– AS6171 (WIP)

• Standards for Authorized Suppliers– AS6496 (WIP)

• Standards for any Source of Semiconductor Product– AS5553A– AS6174A

• There are no standards for Commercial Traceability

You Can’t Invent Standards for Product That’s Already Inactive!


The Big-3 Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution• Commercial Traceability

– There is no standard for Commercial Traceability• Packing slips• Shipping records• Labels

– None of these may exist on inactive commercial product– No standard means they’re easily and often forged

– Traceability says nothing about storage and handling methodologies• Once you are out of the Authorized Channel, it’s no longer

Authorized Product– Neither Commercial Traceability or Authentication says anything

about Reliability– Commercially Traceable and Authentic product can fail

Reliability Testing

Commercial Traceability does not make a product Authorized or Reliable.


AS6081 – this isn’t a test standard, but an inspection standard

Clones have defeated this standard since introduction.

Level A: Mostly visual and external-based inspection of product

Below this line are optional levels typically not tested

The Big-3 Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution


• AS6081– Level A of this standard hopes to find old-fashioned visual defects in

board-pulled, used product– While this is a step in the right direction to document and

make visual methods consistent, it provided the playbook to the counterfeiters• Here is what they are looking for….

AS6081 (clones) combined with Commercial Traceability (forged or handling & reliability) do not keep out all Counterfeit

Silicon nor ensure Reliable Silicon.



• Component Testing– AS6171 is meant to address test but has been, and will be, a

WIP for some time.– Regardless of a standard; where do test programs come

from? Not the OCM!– OCM test programs are way beyond a datasheet and far

superior to any datasheet-oriented test program– Datasheet parameter testing is not Reliability Testing– Vast majority of Independents subcontract Testing

– Very little knowledge of what should be tested– Very cost-driven and cut corners if not explicitly directed

– Good component-level testing is done over full temperature and voltage ranges covering all datasheet parameters• Needs to be destructive for Reliability Testing

– Should be done per lot– Is expensive



• Component Testing– Room Temperature & Nominal Voltage testing will

confirm that many clones work just fine• Sentry desktop testing (done at room temp) provided the spec

Component Testing is difficult and expensive if done correctly. It’s not merely a checkbox item.

Case Study 2 from ABI’s website

“Our experiments show the diagnostic potential of the I-V characteristics comparison method. That method is not a replacement for parametric and functional tests.”



Example of Doing the Minimum

• Go to one Authorized Source (Arrow or Avnet) and find “no longer active” or “nothing available”.

• Go directly to Independent Sources– Stating compliance to AS6081

• Independent Sources contract with their test lab partner to “test product”– Under what conditions?– Testing what parameters?– With what test program?– Per lot of parts?– Price-driven?– Good parts?

Authorized Aftermarket should be on your AVL. Testing should be extensive and a very directed activity.


Example of Doing it Right

• Go to Authorized Sources including Authorized Aftermarket and find “no longer active” or “nothing available” or “this is a development item”.

• Go to Independent Sources if no Authorized Solution is acceptable– Stating compliance to AS6081 as a minimum

• OEM contracts with their fully vetted test lab partner to “test product”– For all datasheet parameters across temperature and voltage– For destructive Reliability screening across lots

Even this is not as good as buying an Authorized Solution.


Conclusions

• Approved Standards do not screen out Counterfeits• The Big-3 Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution are:

• Commercial Traceability• AS6081• Component Testing

• When done without explicit direction• There is no combination of Commercial Traceability, AS6081,

or Component Testing that equals Authorized Product• There is “Doing it Right” and there is “Doing the Minimum”