fair burden sharing: the possible role of the greenhouse development rights framework
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Fair burden sharing: The possible role of the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. Dr. Paul Baer Assistant Professor School of Public Policy Georgia Institute of Technology Co-founder, EcoEquity. Australia National University, Canberra 1 July, 2011. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Fair burden sharing:The possible role of the Greenhouse
Development Rights Framework
Dr. Paul BaerAssistant Professor
School of Public Policy Georgia Institute of Technology
Co-founder, EcoEquity
Australia National University, Canberra1 July, 2011
The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework
AuthorsPaul Baer (EcoEquity)Tom Athansiou (EcoEquity)Sivan Kartha (Stockholm Environment Institute)Eric Kemp-Benedict (SEI)
Key Supporters have includedChristian Aid (UK)Oxfam (International)European APRODEV Network The Heinrich Böll Foundation (Germany) MISTRA Foundation CLIPORE Programme (Sweden)Stockholm Environment Institute (International)Rockefeller Brothers Fund (USA)Town Creek Foundation (USA)
www.GreenhouseDevelopmentRights.org
GDRs: roots
• Authors were originally supporters of equal per capita allocations/contraction and convergence– Basis of founding of EcoEquity in 2000, book “Dead Heat”
• Following the CAN “Bali Equity Summit” in 2002, we tried to develop “per capita plus” – per capita modified to take account of national circumstances
• This turned out to be impractical, so we returned to the “right to development”
• First presented in 2004, reached maturity with publication of first edition in 2007
The climate challenge: in three steps
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Per capita emissions allocated according to “contraction and convergence” (2030 convergence year) under an emissions pathway (based on Den Elzen et al. 2007) designed to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-equivalent.
Greenhouse Development Rights overview
• A global climate policy framework for “burden sharing”• Assigns obligations to countries based on aggregating the
wealth and GHG emissions of their citizens– “Capacity” (ability to pay)– and “responsibility” (contribution to the problem)– Combined “Responsibility and Capacity Indicator” (RCI)
• Excludes from consideration the wealth and emissions of poor individuals, below a “development threshold”
• Rich individuals are treated equally (have obligations) wherever they live
• In principle, an individually-based “right to development”
The ethical basis of GDRs• Based on cosmopolitan egalitarianism
– Individuals not countries are bearers of rights and obligations (in theory)
– Countries are treated as aggregates of individuals– Individuals treated the same regardless of where they are born
• An idealist/constructivist account of politics and international relations– Ideas matter– Individual action matters– Countries act out of normative beliefs as well as self interest
(and self-interest is subject to “construction”)
Defining and measuring capacity
• Capacity is a moral term: “resources that can be contributed without undue sacrifice”
• This raises the classic question of the “efficiency” with which resources are converted to welfare
• Historically captured by ideas of “basic needs”, luxuries, etc.
• Makes sense at an individual level• Our definition: per capita income over $7500
“development threshold”
Defining and measuring responsibility
• Responsibility is an ambiguous term– Moral responsibility is not the same as causal
responsibility– Collective (e.g., national) responsibility is
problematic in many ways• Nonetheless, “polluter pays” and other
versions of responsibility have strong support• Our definition: cumulative CO2 emissions from
fossil fuels (and cement) since 1990
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Income and Capacity income distributions (relative to a “development threshold”)
Emissions and Responsibility fossil CO2 (since 1990) (showing portion defined as
“responsibility”)
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Population (% of global)
Income($US / capita)
Capacity (% of global)
Responsibility (% of global)
RCI(% of global)
United States 4.6% 44,706 35.6% 30.9% 33.3%
EU 27 7.3% 24,175 28.1% 20.8% 24.4%
- EU 15 5.8% 28,573 26.7% 18.3% 22.5%
Australia 0.3% 33,880 1.4% 2.0% 1.7%
Japan 1.8% 48,065 14.3% 5.9% 10.1%
Russia 2.0% 3,566 0.9% 6.0% 3.4%
China 19.6% 2,683 2.9% 4.0% 3.4%
India 17.6% 860 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
South Africa 0.7% 4,541 0.3% 1.0% 0.7%
Brazil 2.8% 5,119 1.5% 5.4% 3.4%
LDCs 11.4% 453 0.0% 0.4% 0.2%
Annex I 19% 27,617 84.6% 71.2% 77.9%
Non-Annex I 81.4% 2,353 15.4% 28.8% 22.1%
World 1 7,061 100% 100% 100%
National obligations based on national “capacity” and
“responsibility”
National obligations (based on “responsibility” and “capacity”) over
time2010 2020 2030
Population (% of global)
Income($US / capita)
Capacity (% of global)
Responsibility (% of global)
RCI(% of
global)
RCI (% of
global)
RCI (% of
global)
EU 27 7.3% 24,175 28.1% 20.8% 24.4% 22.1% 18.7%
- EU 15 5.8% 28,573 26.7% 18.3% 22.5% 20.0% 16.6%
- EU +12 1.5% 7,074 1.3% 2.5% 1.9% 2.1% 2.1%
United States 4.6% 44,706 35.6% 30.9% 33.3% 30.0% 25.6%
Japan 1.8% 48,065 14.3% 5.9% 10.1% 8.5% 6.5%
Russia 2.0% 3,566 0.9% 6.0% 3.4% 3.6% 3.9%
China 19.6% 2,683 2.9% 4.0% 3.4% 7.9% 13.5%
India 17.6% 860 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 1.2%
South Africa 0.7% 4,541 0.3% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9%
Brazil 2.8% 5,119 1.5% 5.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.8%
LDCs 11.4% 453 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
Annex I 19% 27,617 84.6% 71.2% 77.9% 70.5% 60.7%
Non-Annex I 81.4% 2,353 15.4% 28.8% 22.1% 29.5% 39.3%
World 1 7,061 100% 100% 100% 100% 100.0%
Allocating global mitigation obligationsamong countries according to responsibility & capacity
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Implications for United States
US mitigation obligation amounts to a reduction target exceeding 100% after ~2025 (“negative emission allocation”).
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Implications for United States
Here, physical domestic reductions (~25% below 1990 by 2020) are only part of the total US obligation. The rest would be met internationally.
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Implications for China中国的测算结果
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A fraction of China's reduction, (and most of the reductions in the South) are driven by industrialized country reduction commitments.
Implications for China中国的测算结果
National Obligations in 2020 (for climate costs = 1% of GWP)
Per capitaIncome
($/capita)
NationalCapacity(Billion $)
NationalObligation(Billion $)
NationalObligation(% GDP)
Ave. climate cost per
person above dev threshold
EU 27 $38,385 $15,563 $ 216 1.12% $436
- EU 15 $41,424 $13,723 $ 188 1.12% $468
- EU +12 $25,981 $ 1,840 $ 28 1.09% $300
United States $53,671 $15,661 $ 275 1.51% $841
Japan $40,771 $ 4,139 $ 62 1.23% $504
Russia $22,052 $ 1,927 $ 41 1.40% $326
China $9,468 $ 5,932 $ 98 0.73% $169
India $4,374 $ 972 $ 11 0.19% $58
South Africa $14,010 $ 422 $ 10 1.42% $395
Mexico $14,642 $ 1,009 $ 15 0.84% $207
LDCs $1,567 $ 82 $ 1 0.06% $58
Annex I $38,425 $40,722 $ 652 1.29% $529
Non-Annex I $6,998 $18,667 $ 292 0.66% $180
High Income $44,365 $40,993 $ 655 1.33% $602
Middle Income $8,797 $18,190 $ 286 0.69% $149
Low Income $2,022 $ 206 $ 3 0.08% $51
World $12,415 $59,388 $ 944 1.00% $330
Climate obligations, imagined as a (mildly progressive) tax
Total global costs (mitigation and adaptation)
0.5% of GWP 1.0% of GWP 2.0% of GWP
Country incomemarginal tax rate
average tax rate
annual tax
marginal tax rate
average tax rate
annual tax
marginal tax rate
average
tax rateannual
taxUS $7,500 0.00% 0.00% $0 0.00% 0.00% $0 0.00% 0.00% $0 US $15,000 0.88% 0.44% $65 1.75% 0.87% $131 3.50% 1.74% $261 US $30,000 0.88% 0.66% $197 1.75% 1.31% $393 3.50% 2.62% $786 US $60,000 0.88% 0.77% $459 1.75% 1.53% $918 3.50% 3.06% $1,836
US $120,00
0 0.88% 0.82% $978 1.75% 1.63% $1,956 3.50% 3.26% $3,912 Ireland $7,500 0.00% 0.00% $0 0.00% 0.00% $0 0.00% 0.00% $0 Ireland $15,000 0.66% 0.33% $50 1.33% 0.66% $100 2.65% 1.33% $199 Ireland $30,000 0.66% 0.50% $149 1.33% 1.00% $299 2.65% 1.99% $597 Ireland $60,000 0.66% 0.58% $348 1.33% 1.16% $697 2.65% 2.32% $1,393
Ireland$120,00
0 0.66% 0.62% $747 1.33% 1.24% $1,493 2.65% 2.49% $2,986 Sweden $7,500 0.00% 0.00% $0 0.00% 0.00% $0 0.00% 0.00% $0 Sweden $15,000 0.58% 0.29% $43 1.15% 0.58% $87 2.30% 1.15% $173 Sweden $30,000 0.58% 0.44% $131 1.15% 0.87% $261 2.30% 1.74% $522 Sweden $60,000 0.58% 0.51% $303 1.15% 1.01% $606 2.30% 2.02% $1,212
Sweden$120,00
0 0.58% 0.54% $648 1.15% 1.08% $1,296 2.30% 2.16% $2,592 Note that EC effort-sharing proposal imagines global mitigation costs of €175 billion, or about ¼% of the EC’s projected 2020 Gross World Product
GDRs: Strengths• It is by some standards relatively simple• It is specific and complete: it can actually be used to produce
numbers. • In theory it actually does protect the right to development - the
necessary costs for each country are borne only by the “already developed”
• Compared to resource sharing proposals, it actually addresses adaptation costs
• By assigning obligations to rich people in poor countries, it answers a primary criticism of Annex-based proposals
• It has been developed organically by a team that is closely integrated with both civil society networks (CAN) and academic and policy networks
GDRs: Weaknesses• It is by some standards relatively complex• Even the numbers it produces are subject to a wide range of
“uncertainties” (e.g., baselines)• It doesn’t directly account for variation in national abatement
cost curves• It produces unbelievably large obligations for developed
countries• The individual approach to “the right to development” is
problematic– much of what is required for “development” are collective (public
goods)– GDRs offers no guarantee that national policies will reflect
underlying principles
GDRs: political usefulness?
• It could, in theory, form the basis of a global treaty– Hah!
• In a “pledge and review” world, it can be used to measure national pledges against an equity benchmark– Requires some belief that its numbers are defensibly
fair• It could provide the basis for domestic campaigns
to increase national ambition
GDRs: Questions
• Does our overall method produce a result that is defensibly fair?
• Is there a better way to define capacity?• Is there a better way to define responsibility? • Is there a better way to combine them?• Do our models of application (tons, dollars) make sense? • Does one make more sense than another?• How can our proposal be politically useful? • What problems are generic to any equity framework,
and what are specific to GDRs?