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The Failed States IndexReviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Policy, No. 149 (Jul. - Aug., 2005), pp. 56-65Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC

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T

m m s A

I

A b o u t b i l l i o n

p e o p l e

l i v e c o u n t r i e s

t h a t a r e

d a n g e r o f

c o l l a p s e .

In

t h e f i r s t

a n n u a l F a i l e d

S t a t e s

I n d e x

F O R E I G N

P O L I C Y a n d

t h e

F u n d f o r

P e a c e

r a n k

t h e c o u n t r i e s

a b o u t

g o

o v e r t h e

b r i n k .

merica is now threatened less

by

con-

quering

states than

we are

by failing

ones."

That was the conclusion of the

2002 U.S. National

Security Strategy.

For a

country

whose

foreign policy

in

the 20th cen-

tury

was dominated

by

the

struggles against power-

ful states such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet

Union,

the U.S. assessment is

striking.

Nor is the

United States alone

in

diagnosing

the

problem.

U.N.

Secretary-General

ofi Annanhas warned hat

"ignor-

ing

failedstatescreates

problems

hat sometimes ome

back to bite us." French President

Jacques

Chirac

Copyright

005,

TheFund

or

Peaceandthe

Carnegie

ndow-

ment

for

International eace.All

rights

reserved. OREIGN

POLICYs a

registered

rademark wned

by

the

Carnegie

Endowment

or

International eace.

56

FOREIGN POLICY

m

1

Doinia

epbi

-itmla44

Veeul

Clmbi

E c u a d o

U

This content downloaded on Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:45:33 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions






Russia

B o n a

Belarus

Turkey

m

A z e r b a i j a n

-Uzbksa

u m

m1

Saudi

vArabia

Iran

)mllr

mE

m

a n g l a d e s h

U

P h l i p i e

N o r t h

K o r e a

J i

9

Gabi,;

I

GuineaNigeri

De.

Rp

fteI

og

z

Angola

II1

S o a i

K e n y a

R w a n

U

II;

has

spoken

of "the threat hat failed states

carry

or

the world's

equilibrium."

World leaders once wor-

ried about who

was

amassing power;

now

they

worry

about the absence of

it.

Failed states have made

a remarkable

odyssey

from the

periphery

o the

very

center of

global

pol-

itics.

During

the Cold War,state failurewas seen

through

the

prism

of

superpower

conflict and was

rarely

addressed

as a

danger

n

its own

right.

In

the

1990s,

"failed states" fell

largely

nto the

province

of humanitarians

and human

rights

activists,

although hey

did

begin

to consume

the attentionof

the world's sole

superpower,

which led

interven-

tions

in

Somalia,Haiti, Bosnia,

and

Kosovo. For so-

called

foreign-policy

realists, however,

these states

and the

problems

they

posed

were

a distraction

from

weightier

ssues of

geopolitics.

Now,

it

seems,

everybody

cares. The

dangerous

exports

of failed states-whether

international

terrorists,

drug

barons,

or

weapons

arsenals-are

the

subject

of endless discussion

and

concern.

For

all the newfound

attention, however,

there

is still

uncertainty

about the definition and

scope

of the

problem.

How do you know a failed state when

you

see one?

Of

course,

a

government

hat has lost

control of its

territory

or of the

monopoly

on the

legitimate

use

of force has earned the label. But

there can be more subtle

attributes of failure.

Some

regimes,

for

example,

lack the

authority

to

make collective decisions or the

capacity

to deliv-

er

public

services.

In

other

countries,

the

populace

may rely entirely

on the black

market,

fail to

pay

taxes,

or

engage

in

large-scale

civil disobedience.

Outside intervention can

be both a

symptom

of

JULY

I

UGUST

2005

57







The

Failed

States

Index

and

a

trigger

for state

collapse.

A failed

state

may

be

subject

to

involuntary

restrictions

of its sover-

eignty,

such as

political

or

economic

sanctions,

the

presence

of

foreign military

forces

on

its

soil,

or

other

military

constraints,

such

as a

no-fly

zone.

How manystates are at seriousriskof state fail-

ure? The World

Bank has

identified

about 30

"low-

income countries under

stress,"

whereas Britain's

Department

for

International

Development

has

named

46

"fragile"

tates

of

concern.

A

report

com-

missioned

by

the CIAhas

put

the number of

failing

states at about 20.

To

present

a

more

precise

picture

of

the

scope

and

implications

of the

problem,

the Fund

for

Peace,

an

independent

research

organization,

and

FOREIGN

POLICY

aveconducted

globalranking

of weak and

failing

states.

Using

12

social, economic, political,

and

military

ndicators,

we ranked

60

states

n order

of

their

vulnerability

o violent internalconflict.

(For

each

indicator,

he

Fund

for Peace

computed

scores

using

softwarethat

analyzed

data from tens of thou-

sands of international nd local media sources rom

the

last

half

of 2004. For

a

complete

discussion

of the

12

indicators,

leasego

to

www.ForeignPolicy.com

r

www.fundforpeace.org.)

he

resulting

ndex

provides

About billionftheworld'seopleiven

insecure

tates,

with

aryingegrees

f

vulnerability

o

widespread

ivil onflict.

a

profile

of

the new

world

disorderof the 21st cen-

tury

and

demonstrates hat the

problem

of

weak and

failing

states is far more serious

than

generally

thought.

About 2

billion

people

ive

in

insecure

tates,

with varyingdegreesof vulnerabilityo widespread

civil

conflict.

The

instability

hat the index

diagnoses

has

many

faces. In

the

Democratic

Republic

of the

Congo

or

Somalia,

state

failure

has been

apparent

for

years,

manifested

by

armed

conflict, famine,

disease out-

breaks,

and

refugee

flows.

In other

cases, however,

instability

s

more

elusive.

Often,

corrosiveelements

have

not

yet

triggered

open

hostilities,

and

pres-

sures

may

be

bubbling

ust

below

the

surface.

Large

stretches

of

lawless

territory

exist

in

many

countries

in the

index,

but

that

territory

has not

always

been

in

open

revolt

against

state

institutions.

R n

i g

I n t e t b e i h i h

2 p l t c l

Conflict

may

be concentrated

n local territories

seekingautonomy

or

secession

as

in

the

Philippines

and

Russia).

In other

countries,

nstability

akes

the

form of

episodic fighting,

drug

mafias,

or warlords

dominatingarge

waths

of

territory

as

n

Afghanistan,

Colombia,

and

Somalia).

State

collapse

sometimes

happens uddenly,

but

often the demise

of

the state

s

a slow and

steady

deterioration f socialand

political

institutions

Zimbabwe

and Guineaare

good

exam-

ples).

Some countries

emerging

rom conflict

may

be

on the mend but in

danger

of

backsliding

(Sierra

Leone

and

Angola).

The World Bank found

that,

within

five

years,

half

of

all countries

merging

rom

civil unrest

all back nto conflict n a

cycle

of

collapse

(Haiti

and

Liberia).

The 10 most at-riskcountries

n the index have

already

hown

clear

signs

of state

ailure.

vory

Coast,

a

country

ut

in

half

by

civil

war,

s

the most vulnera-

ble

to

disintegration;

t would

prob-

ably

collapse completely

if

U.N.

peacekeeping

orces

pulled

out.

It

is

followedby theDemocraticRepub-

lic

of

the

Congo,

Sudan,

raq,

Soma-

lia,

Sierra

Leone, Chad,

Yemen,

Liberia,

ndHaiti.The ndex ncludes

others

whose

instability

s less wide-

ly acknowledged,

including

Bangladesh

17th),

Guatemala

31st),

Egypt

38th),

SaudiArabia

45th),

and Russia

(59th).

Weak

states are most

prevalent

in

Africa,

but

they

also

appear

in

Asia,

Eastern

Europe,

Latin

America,

and the Middle East.

Experts

have for

yearsdiscussedan "arc of instability"-an expres-

sion

that

came into use

in the 1970s to

refer

to

a

"MuslimCrescent"

extending

from

Afghanistan

o

the

"Stans"

n the southern

part

of the formerSovi-

et

Union. Our

study suggests

that

the

concept

is

too

narrow.

The

geography

of

weak

states revealsa

territorial

expanse

that

extends

from

Moscow to

Mexico

City,

far

wider

than

an "arc"

would

suggest,

and

not limited to the

Muslim

world.

The

index does

not

provide

any

easy

answers

or

those

ooking

o shore

up

countries

n

the brink.

Elec-

tions are

almost

universally

regarded

as

helpful

in

reducing

conflict.

However,

f

they

are

rigged,

con-

58

FOREIGN

POLICY







I n d i c a t o r s I n s t a b i l i t

1

106.0

Ivory

oast

2 105.3 Dem. ep.f heCongo

3 104.1 Sudan

4

103.2

Iraq

5 102.3

Somalia

6

102.1 Sierra eone

7

100.9 Chad

8

99.7

Yemen

9 99.5 Liberia

10 99.2

Haiti

11

99.0

Afghanistan

12

96.5 Rwanda

13

95.7 North

orea

14 95.0 Colombia

15 94.9 Zimbabwe

16

94.7 Guinea

17 94.3 Bangladesh

17

94.3

Burundi

19 94.2 Dominican

epublic

20

93.7

Centralfrican

epublic

21 93.5 Bosniand

Herzegovina

21

93.5

Venezuela

23 93.4 Burma

24 93.2

Uzbekistan

25 92.7

Kenya

26

92.0

Bhutan

27

91.7

Uganda

28 91.5 Laos

28 91.5

Syria

30 91.1

Ethiopia

31 91.0 Guatemala

31 91.0 Tanzania

33 90.9

Equatorial

uinea

34 89.4 Pakistan

35 89.0

Nepal

36 88.9

Paraguay

36 88.9 Lebanon

38

88.8

Egypt

38 88.8 Ukraine

40 88.1 Peru

41

87.6 Honduras

42 87.5

Mozambique

43

87.3

Angola

43 87.3 Belarus

45 87.1 Saudi rabia

46 87.0 Ecuador

46 87.0 Indonesia

48 86.7

Tajikistan

49 86.1

Turkey

50 85.7

Azerbaijan

51 85.6 Bahrain

52 84.9 Vietnam

53 84.6 Cameroon

54 84.3

Nigeria

55 84.1 Eritrea

56 83.9

Philippines

57 83.8 Iran

58 83.7 Cuba

59

83.5 Russia

60 82.4 Gambia

8.0 8.0 7.7 8.8

7.7

9.5

9.1

i i i

7.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.1 8.7 9.1

I

8.6

7.8 9.1 8.5

9.2 8.7

8.0 8.7 7.3

8.0

[.

8.3 6.3

8.7

8.2

8.8 8.9

8.2

8.4

II

8.0

7.4

6.3

8.3

7.8

UlIU

8.7

8.0

8.0

7.5

8.9

8.7 7.5 9.1

8.7

6.3

8.6

8.0

7.1 8.3

[i

8.0 8.9

9.0

9.1

7.0

9.4

8.0

7.8

8.0 6.4

8.2

8.8

[

9.3

6.4

9.4

7.6

7.8

7.3 8.1

7.5

8.2

8.2 6.5 7.9

l

I

8.0

7.7 3.4 8.1 9.4 8.7 7.8 8.5

8.0

8.0

7.4

7.5 8.1

8.1

7.9 8.2 8.0

7.8

8.0 8.6 9.5

5.0

8.3

5.0

8.9

8.2

8.0

6.0

7.2 8.1 9.0 8.3 8.0

3.0

8.0 6.9

7.1

4.2

8.2

5.4 9.2

I

8.0 6.4

7.7 7.3

7.9

8.5

7.5

7.9 6.7

6.0 6.1 4.5

[

7.5 8.1 8.1

9.2

7.5

8.4 7.0 7.6 6.0 7.4 9.5 8.2 8.5 8.0 8.7 6.0

7.2 7.1

3.8

7.8

7.2

9.0

8.3 7.5 8.6

i

-I

8.0

7.1

8.5

6.8

6.8

9.6

-

7.0 9.2

4.0

5.0

3.0

7.0

9.0

-

8.0 8.2 7.0

7.0

8.0 5.7 5.7 8.5 6.0

7.3 8.7

8.0 8.0 6.8

7.6 4.5 8.2 9.1 7.8

7.2

7.5

8.0 6.3

8.0

-

6.9 9.2 8.0 7.5

3.0

6.5 8.0 6.8

6.8 6.0 9.1 5.0 9.4 8.0

8.0

6.7 8.3 6.3 8.9

7.4

8.5

8.4 8.4

4.0

8.0

8.0 5.5 8.0

[

8.0

5.0

8.0 6.0

I

6.7

7.6 6.9

5.7

8.4

6.0

8.0

8.4

8.3

8.0

8.1 7.3

-

6.7

6.3 8.8

-

6.5 7.9

2.5

6.7

8.0

7.5 6.8 5.0 9.0 5.0

7.6

8.2

7.4

8.7

8.0 6.0 7.3

8.5

7.9

5.5

6.3

8.9

6.0

6.0 7.4 7.5

7.7

9.5 5.0 8.7 8.1 9.1

4.0

7.2 7.6 6.7 4.5 8.2 7.8 8.6 7.9 7.5 7.1

8.0

6.0

6.3 9.0

5.1

8.0

7.8 7.0

5.0

5.0

5.0 6.9 8.0

3.3

7.5 8.1

0

9.3

8.5

8.0

5.6 4.0

7.1

8.9 6.0 9.1

7.6

8.0

6.7

4.0

5.0 6.9 8.3 7.8 7.0 8.3 8.0

8.7

6.0

8.0

8.0 7.5

7.1 7.0 4.7

8.7

4.3

7.3

8.1 9.2

8.0

7.8

5.0 3.8

9.5 7.3 7.7 8.5

8.2

5.0

7.0

6.9

8.8 7.3 8.9 5.5 8.5

2.0

9.1 6.8

6.0

7.0 6.6

9.0

8.5

5.0 9.6

4.4 7.1

8.9

7.0

6.0 5.3 5.4

3.0 7.2

8.0

9.1

6.0

8.0 5.7 9.0 7.8

8.1

6.7

7.4

3.8

8.2 5.0

7.9 6.3

3.8

4.4

7.9

7.2 8.3

7.0

8.1 8.8

8.0 7.0

2.4

5.4

8.5

7.0 7.3 6.8

9.4 7.5

7.6 6.3 7.8 8.8

2.2

4.3 8.6

8.3 5.4

6.0

5.6 6.9 5.0

9.5

7.5

7.9 8.0

8.6

4.0

8.6 7.0 6.3 8.9 4.0 9.2 4.0 8.6 7.6 8.8 5.0

5.0

6.2 6.7 5.3

8.6

5.0

U

8.0 9.5 5.0

8.0 7.3 5.0

4.2

4.8

5.0

8.0 9.1 7.0

8.0

6.0

6.0 5.8

4.1 5.0 8.5

7.0

9.6

7.0

6.0 5.0 6.7

9.0

1.7

4.0

8.4 9.6

7.5

8.6

8.0 5.6

8.5

3.4

7.6 4.3 8.4 8.0

6.4

7.2

7.0

5.1

8.6

4.2

6.4

7.5 6.6 8.0

8.2 5.0

7.2

3.0

6.5

8.7

5.8 8.8 6.9 6.7

z W

8.3

4.5

8.0 8.0

5.4

4.0

l(

8.8 9.0 7.0 5.7

5.0

9.2 5.0

7.0 7.0 6.5 8.2 4.7 9.3

3.8

8.2 7.0

9.2

4.0

5.0

8.0 7.3 6.0

3.3

9.1 4.8 8.8

7.3 9.1 6.1

5.0

8.0 6.3 5.4 5.7 7.8

3.8 9.0 8.6 6.3

6.0

7.5

2.3

3.8

9.4 6.7 9.0 7.6 9.2

4.0

7.0 7.0

5.4 4.0 6.7 8.1

7.0

7.9

6.0 8.3 6.0

JULYI

AUGUST

2005

59







The Failed

States Index

]

ducted

during

ctive

ighting,

r attract low

turnout,

they

can be ineffective r evenharmful o

stability.

lec-

toral

democracyappears

o

have had

only

a modest

impact

on the

stability

of states such as

Iraq,

Rwan-

da,

Kenya,

Venezuela,

igeria,

andIndonesia.Ukraine

ranksashighlyvulnerablenlargepartbecauseof last

year'sdisputed

election.

What

are

the

clearest

early warning signs

of a

failing

state?

Among

the

12

indicatorswe

use,

two

consistently

ranknearthe

top.

Uneven

development

is

high

in

almost all the states

in

the

index,

suggest-

ing

that

inequality

within states-and not

merely

poverty-increases instability.

Criminalization or

delegitimization

of the

state,

which occurs when

state institutionsare

regarded

as

corrupt, llegal,

or

ineffective,

also

figured prominently. Facing

this

condition,

people

often shift their

allegiances

to

other

leaders-opposition parties,

warlords,

ethnic

nationalists, clergy,or rebel forces. Demographic

factors,

especially

population pressures

stemming

from

refugees, nternallydisplacedpopulations,

and

environmental

degradation,

are also found

in

most

at-risk

countries,

as

are

consistent

human

rights

violations.

Identifying

he

signs

of statefailure s eas-

ier

than

crafting

solutions,

but

pinpointing

where

state

collapse

is

likely

is a

necessary

irst

step.

Go1ing

Critica[l1

F

or those near the

epicenter,

state failure is

always rightening.

tate ailurewithnuclear

weapons

could be a

nightmare

for

everyone.

Four countries

in

this

ranking

are

particularly

worrisome because of the nuclear

capabilities

or ambitions

they

harbor. North

Korea,

with

an insular

regime

and a hostile

worldview,

is

13th on the list of countries at risk of

collapse.

Pakistan,

ranked

34th,

has a substantialarsenal.

Iran,

which the United Statesaccuses of

seeking

weapons,is ranked57th, still n thedangerzone.

Russia,

with its massivenuclear

arsenal,

s 59th.

If

any

of these

regimes

begin

o

teeter,

mad dash

to secure the nukes

(or

their

building

blocks)

will

surely

follow.

Recent

history

offersa best-case cenario or

how these

weapons

can be rounded

up.

The

new states of

Ukraine,

Belarus,

and Kazakhstan

had nuclear

weapons

on

their

territory

when the

Soviet Union disintegrat-

ed

in 1991.

After inten-

sive

negotiations, they

eventuallyagreed

o cede

them and later

joined

the

Nuclear Non-Prolifera-

tion

Treaty

(NPT).

n

all,

about

3,400

warheads

were returned o

Russia.

Likewise,

South Africa

gave up

its entire nuclear

program

when the

apartheid regime negotiated

a transition to

majority

rule

in

1989. The

country

later

joined

the

NPT,

and

inspectors

verified the end of its

nuclear

weapons program.

The chancesof

securing

warheads

n

the event

of a

state's

failure

depend

on how the failure

unfolds.

If

the

collapse

s

accompanied

by

large-

scale

ooting

and

civil

disorder,

he

job

may

be next

to

impossible.

The failure of coalition

military

forces to securesensitivesites

in

Iraq

s a sober-

ing lesson.Thepresenceof radical slamicgroups

in

Pakistanmakes ts nucleararsenal

a

particular

concern. It has even been

reported

hat

the

Pen-

tagon

has

contingency plans

for

securing

Pak-

istani

nukes

n

the

case

of a

coup

or civil

strife,

but

experts

admit that

hunting

down these

weapons

on short notice

would be a

long

shot at best.

Country IndexRanking Nuclear tatus

Not nownhetherucleararheadsave

NorthKorea

13

been

eveloped.

issile aterial

ufficientor

betweenne ndive uclearevices.

Pakistan

34

Between4and 8nucleararheads.issile

materialor

p

o50nuclearevices.

Iran

57

No

warheads.raniumnrichment

rogram

I

and

ossibleeaponsrogram.

Russia

59

Approximately

,200

uclear

eapons.

I

Nuclearrialtlnill

iativle;

DI nf

ri

60 FOREIGN POLICY







Ir w IIY ̀ IY Y -

, -

Z.,

O u t

o f S

g h t

N V I i e n t h e

M i g h t y

F a l l

IA

en a large tate alls, veryone ears bout

b

it-and

some

unlucky eighborsmay

even

be

brought

own

with t. Countries

n

the ndex's

danger

one nclude ndonesia

242

million

peo-

ple),

Pakistan

162million),

Russia

143million),

and

Nigeria

(129 million).

The

Democratic

Republic

f the

Congo

60 million)

as

n

many

waysalreadyailedmore hanonce,and t is esti-

mated hat he

resulting

onflicts nddisease ave

probably

akenat least3 million ives.

Therecent

experiences

f

Congo

and heformer

Yugoslavia

suggest

hatstate ailure

n thisscale an

spin

off

smaller onflicts hatcreate

egional

nrest nd

humanitarian

rises.

Congo'scollapse

was,

in

part,precipitated

y

Rwanda's

urmoil,

and it

led

to

the

military

nvolvementf at leastseven

other tates. ermed

Africa's

irstworld

war,"

he

Congo

conflict

aised

the.specter

f entire ailed

regions.

Yugoslavia'sisintegration,

hich,

when

compared

o other

states,

was

relatively

mall,

sent

refugees

ouring

nto Western

Europe

nd

destabilizedeveral

eighboring

ountries.

Only

after hree

years

andmore

han

250,000

deaths

did

theU.S.-ledNATO

orces estore rder.

Outside

ntervention

o

address tate

ailure

becomes

tougher roposition

hena

large

tate

isin tsdeath hroes.Onthepositiveide,because

the stakes

re o

high,

a

politically

nd

diplomat-

icallyengaged

nternational

ommunity

s more

likely.

However,

he

logistical

nd

rooprequire-

ments

necessary

or

any

effective umanitarian

interventionr

peacekeeping

ission-whether

welcomed or not-could be

overwhelming.

Attempting

o establishrder

n

Iraq,

whichhasa

population

f

only

26

million,

has stretchedhe

limitsof the world'smost

capable

military.

f

the

failed tatewere our imes s

arge,

t couldmake

the

slog

n

Iraq

ook ikea cakewalk.

JULY I

AUGUST 2005 61

A r i e s p r 1 0

p o l







The Failed States Index

J

F

ueling Failure

The

discovery

f

large

oil and

gas

reserveshas

been a boon to many nationaleconomies,

and countries

often

spend

decades

trying

to

strike

t

rich.

But is black

gold

actually

good

for

stable

government?

Political cientists

have

coined

the term

"pet-

rostate" o describe

country

hat s

dependent

n

income from oil and

gas

yet plagued by

weak

institutions,

a

poorly

functioningpublic

sector,

and

a

gross disparity

of

power

and wealth. Some

experts

have

argued

hat

arge

oil

economies

often

stunt he

development

f

stable,

ransparent

nsti-

tutions-a phenomenon

hat has been abeled he

"resource

urse."

Jose

Ramos-Horta,

he

foreign

minister f East

Timor,

as

openly

worried

hat

his

small

country might

not be able to handle the

temptations

hatwill arisewhen t

begins

o

exploit

its

offshore

oil and

gas

fieldswith

Australia's

elp.

"Whileoil and

gas

revenuescan be a

blessing,"

Ramos-Horta

has

said,

"we are conscious

that

our

public

administration,

ur

Treasury,

ndother

branchesof

government

re

very

weak."

The index

suggests

hat

many

states

with oil

and

gas

are

indeedvulnerable.

raq,

home to the

world'ssecond-largest il reserves, s the fourth

C i t c a l s t t e

most

vulnerable

ountry,although

he

causes of

its

instability

re

manifold.

Chad,

which

has

nego-

tiated a

major

oil

pipeline

deal with

private

com-

panies

and the World

Bank,

is the seventhmost

vulnerable.Oil-rich

Venezuela,

under he mercu-

rial

eadership

f President

Hugo

Chavez,

s 21st.

Most of the

energy-rich

tates, however,

are

clustered oward the back of the

index,

indicat-

ing

that

they

are

vulnerable

but have also man-

aged

to craft and

preserve

a semblance of sta-

bility.

These states-Saudi

Arabia, Indonesia,

Bahrain,

and

Nigeria,among

others-have filled

their coffers

with oil

money.

But

those

funds

may come at a steep politicalcost.

Th

Continntt~aluDivid

Seven

of the 10 weakest states are

in

Africa.

Several

tates,

ncluding

Liberia,

he Democ-

ratic

Republic

of the

Congo,

and Sierra

Leone,

havesuffered

arge-scale

ivilwars.Sudan s

in

the

midst of what some observers have termed a

genocide.

Is

Africa doomed to remain he No.

1

manufacturer f failed states?

A decade

ago,

there was considerable

hope

that South Africaand

Nigeria

could

help

fill

the

continent's

governancegap. Today,

hat

hope

is

much diminished. outhAfricanPresidentThabo

Mbeki racks

up frequent flyer

miles

trying

to

resolve

many

African

rises,

but his interventions

haveoften acked

ollow-up.

SouthAfrica

has sent

troops

o

join

the

peacekeeping

missions

n

Congo

and

Darfur,

but it lacks the

resources-including

soldiers ree of HIV-to

impose

solutions.

The limits of South African

diplomacy

are

particularly pparent

n

Zimbabwe,

where

strong-

man PresidentRobert

Mugabe

has

presided

over

his country'sdownwardspiral(it now ranks as

the 15th most at-risk

country).

Mbeki has

opted

for what he calls

"quiet diplomacy"

toward

Mugabe,

but

many

observersbelievethat South

Africa s

propping

up

a dictatorrather han

pre-

venting

a

looming political

meltdown.

Nigeria,

Africa'smost

populous country,

s

itselfa weak state

(ranking

54th).

Its current

ov-

ernment s

consumed

by cleaningup corruption

and

mediating

erioussectarian ension at home.

Even

f

Nigeria

can overcome ts own

challenges,

it is

in

no

position

to

export stability.

62 FOREIGN POLICY







I v o r y

D e m o c r a t i c

R e p u b l i c

t h e

C o n g o

C o a s t

S o a i

A f h n s a

H a t

R a d

Z i m b a b w

o n i a d H e z e o v n

T a z a i

Y e m e n

B u r u n d i

A n g o l a

B a h r a i n

Less

pending Militarypending

as

a

percentage

f

GDP)

More

pending

T h

W a

r l

iT

I n

P o w e r o

s a d ,

c o m r r e

a g u n b u t

g u n

b a r r e l

d o n t

n e c e s a r i l y

p r o d u c e

p o w e r f u l

a t e

c o m p a e d

t h e

i d e x

r a n i n g s

t a t e

s p n d i n g

o n t h e m i l

t r y a n

o u d

h t

s a e s c o e w i h

m a l m d i m

l a r g e

a n d

s u p e r s i z e d

d e f e n s e

b u d g e t s .

Y e m e n t h e

g h t h -

m o t v u n r a l s a e

s e d i g a

h p p n

. 8 p r c n

g r o s s

o m e s t i

p r o d c t

m i i t a r y . T h e

m s t

v u l e r a b l

s t a e ,

v o y

C a s ,

s e n s

o l y 1 . 2 p e c e n .

i b e i a a n d t h

D e m c r t i

R p u l i

o n g

a s o h a e m a l

e f n s

b u g t .

ag

m l t ry i

o s i n o

saiiyhwve Fv

JULY I

AUGUST 2005 63







eacekeepers

n P a r a d e

F

oreign

intervention

s not a cure-all for

states on the edge.TheDemocraticRepub-

lic

of the

Congo,

which hosts

a

16,000

mem-

ber U.N.

peacekeeping

force,

ranks second in

the index.

Iraq

is the

fourth

most vulnerable

country,

Haiti

is

10th,

Afghanistan

is

11th,

and

Bosnia

claims the 21st

spot.

Congo,

Haiti,

and Sudan

are

recipients

of

what

might

be

termed

peacekeeping

on

the

cheap.

In

none

of these

countries

is the multi-

national

force

strong enough

to assert control

over the

country.

The small

AfricanUnion

force

in

Sudan,

for

example,

has

failed to

prevent

ongoing

atrocities

n

the Darfur

region.

Instead,

the

international

orces

in

these

places

have,

in

some

ways,

become

additional factions

in

envi-

ronments

already

chock-full of

warring camps.

Overwhelming

intervention,

like that

employed

in

Bosnia

in

1995,

is

at the

other end

of the

spectrum.

There,

foreign

troops

effec-

tively installed an international protectorate

for the

ethnically

divided

country.

Bosnia's

standing

in the index is

surely

better than it

would have been

if

peacekeepers

had never

arrived. But

some

observers

suggest

that

an

overweening

foreign presence

has stunted the

country's

political development.

Ten

years

after

large-scale

intervention,

nobody

thinks the

peacekeepers

can

leave

anytime

soon.

Iraq

and

Afghanistan

fall

in

between

these

two

poles.

In

both

countries,

U.S.-led forces

toppled existing governments,

but

they

have

steered

away

from

establishing protectorates.

Relatively

quick

elections

put

in

place

fragile

new

regimes

that are

now

struggling

to assert

control.

The fate of these

experiments

n

nation

building

will

shape

the

menu

of

options

for

future

foreign

interventions.

-dH

Want

to

KnowMore?

]

More informationon the methodologyusedin the FOREIGN OLICY/Fundor Peace Failed State

Index is

available

at

www.ForeignPolicy.com

and

on the

Web site of the Fund for

Peace

at

www.fundforpeace.org.

For a transnational ook at

responses

to

failed

states,

see the British

study

on state

instability,

Investing

n Prevention:An International

Strategy

o

Manage

Risks

of Instability

and

Improve

Cri-

sis

Response

(London:

PrimeMinister's

Strategy

Unit,

2005).

The CIA's

Directorate

of

Intelligence

fundeda

study

on

state

failure,

and

some of

its

findings

an be read

n

StateFailureTaskForce

Report:

Phase

III

Findings

(McLean:

Science

Applications

International

Corporation,

2000),

prepared

by

Jack

A.

Goldstone,

Ted Robert

Gurr,

and others.

Regionalexperts speculateabout what will happenafter strongmenfall in "The Day After"

(FOREIGN

POLICY,

November/December

2003).

Several

good

case

studies of

countries n conflict

are available n

Ending

Civil Wars:

The

Implementation

of

Peace

Agreements

Boulder:

Lynne

Rien-

ner, 2002),

edited

by

Stephen

John

Stedman,

Donald

Rothchild,

and

Elizabeth

M. Cousens. Polit-

ical

scientist

Francis

Fukuyama mphasizes

building

basic state

institutions

n

State-Building:

Gov-

ernance

and World

Order n the

21st

Century

Ithaca:

Cornell

University

Press,

2004).

For a detailed

look at how the United Nations

has

fared

in

recent

state-building

efforts,

see

You,

the

People:

The

United

Nations,

Transitional

Administration,

and

State-Building

(New

York:

Oxford

University

Press,

2004),

by

Simon

Chesterman.

)For

links to relevantWeb

sites,

access to the

FP

Archive,

and

a

comprehensive

ndex of

related

FOREIGN

POLICY

articles,

go

to

www.ForeignPolicy.com.

JULY

I

AUGUST

2005 65

failed state

Documents