Failed riots: Successful conflict prevention in four Myanmar cities

Matthew J Walton, Matt Schissler & Phyu Phyu Thi

M.MAS Working Paper 1:21

Abstract Collective violence between Buddhists and Muslims has taken place in nearly every state and region of

Myanmar over the last five years. Yet, such violence has not occurred in the overwhelming majority of

towns and villages across the country. Research on the production of collective violence suggests that there

is much to be learned by examining times and places where the warning signs for riotous violence are

present yet conflict does not escalate. This paper presents four such case studies, situations in which inter-

religious riots were expected or feared but then did not occur. While we do not seek to conclusively

demonstrate the counterfactual that actions by individuals in these cases prevented riots from breaking out,

we believe that even partial descriptions of each case can help us to identify some shared characteristics

and important insights for those working to prevent inter-religious violence and build peace in Myanmar.

Based on an analysis of these cases, we offer conclusions related to: (1) the individuals and groups

involved in the conflicts that made up each case; (2) the broader framing of the conflicts; (3) the kinds of

competing arguments made by those attempting to prevent violence; and (4) concerns about forms of

violence left unaddressed by these interventions.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 2

Methodology .................................................................................................................................................... 3

Case studies ...................................................................................................................................................... 5

Case study 1 ................................................................................................................................................. 5 Case study 2 ................................................................................................................................................. 8 Case study 3 ............................................................................................................................................... 11 Case study 4 ............................................................................................................................................... 13

Conclusions .................................................................................................................................................... 15

Contests and actors ..................................................................................................................................... 15 Religious framings, from conflict to violence............................................................................................ 17 Competing arguments ................................................................................................................................ 18 Recognizing other types of violence .......................................................................................................... 20

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................... 23

1 This working paper has been produced by the Myanmar Media and Society (M.MAS) project, a

partnership between the Programme on Modern Burmese Studies at St Antony’s College, University of

Oxford and the Myanmar ICT for Development Organization, and funded by a grant from the National

Endowment for Democracy. This research has been presented at an academic conference in Chiang Mai,

Thailand, and in private briefings for NGOs and government organizations inside and outside of Myanmar.

We appreciate the feedback we have received. We would also like to thank Emily Speers Mears for her

contributions to the case studies in the paper and several additional colleagues who provided feedback.

St Antony’s College

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Introduction Myanmar has been the site of serious Buddhist-Muslim violence over the last five years, generating

expressions of concern from a variety of quarters, including international organizations dedicated to

monitoring the potential for mass violence, even genocide. Much of this concern has been directed

towards Rakhine State, where at least 145,000 persons displaced since 2012 remain in rudimentary

camps.2 More than 1,500 buildings have been destroyed within the last three months.3 Collective violence

against Muslims has also taken place in nearly every other state and region of Myanmar. Yet, the

overwhelming majority of towns and villages in Myanmar have not been the sites of such violence. That

fact is the subject of this paper.

Paul Brass and Ashutosh Varshney both began ambitious studies of collective violence in India with a

similar observation. Collective violence has been a frequent occurrence in India, they note, but only in a

small number of locations relative to the rest of the country; most days in most places are peaceful. Brass

and Varshney both asked, why? Brass focused his study on those cities where riots seemed to be a

persistent feature of life. He concluded that this was best explained by the presence of “institutionalized

riot systems.”4 He argued that, when riots occurred, it was because organized groups, often involving

members of political parties and the state apparatus, chose particular moments to mobilize them.

Varshney studied precisely the cities that Brass did not—those where riots were not common. Varshney

concluded that the relative absence of collective violence in these cities was best explained by the

presence of inter-communal connections, particularly associational forms such as civil society and

business organizations that included members of different communal groups.5

In our research and work with local civil society networks, we have regularly heard of incidents that seem

to parallel the findings of both Brass and Varshney. In locales where riots have occurred, residents have

told us that these incidents were deliberately organized in ways strikingly similar to the dynamics

described by Brass in north India. Elsewhere, we have argued that taking such explanations seriously is

important both for peace-building and for holding individuals and authorities responsible for violence.6

We have also regularly heard anecdotes of incidents that seemed poised to escalate into larger-scale

violence—but then did not.7 In these cases, there were clear contests: situations where individuals and

2 UNOCHA, “Myanmar: Internal Displacement in Rakhine State (Jan 2015)” (UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), January 2015),

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Affected_Map_IDP_Sites_Rakhine_OCHA_Jan2015_A4.pdf. 3 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Military Burned Villages in Rakhine State,” December 13, 2016,

https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/13/burma-military-burned-villages-rakhine-state. 4 Paul R. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India (University of Washington Press, 2003), 32. 5 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 2002). 6 Matthew J Walton, Matt Schissler, and Phyu Phyu Thi, “Behind Myanmar’s Religious Tensions,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 10, 2016, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/Walton-Schissler-and-Phyu-Phyu-Thi-

Behind-Myanmar-s-religious-tensions; Matt Schissler, Matthew J Walton, and Phyu Phyu Thi, “Reconciling

Contradictions: Buddhist-Muslim Violence, Narrative Making, and Memory in Myanmar,” Journal of

Contemporary Asia, Forthcoming. 7 Brass’s work might suggest that this is because those leading an institutionalized riot system ultimately chose not

to force the matter. Varshney’s work might suggest that this is because intercommunal networks were able to

prevent violence. For our purposes, we take both bodies of work as the launching point for a question rather than as

sufficient for a confident answer, since aspects of both scholars’ theories seem to be present in our cases.

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groups were competing over different ends and interests. Even when the details of these contests were not

clearly apparent, the conflict was nonetheless visible. Sometimes, these contests resulted in awful

violence. Sometimes, they did not. Where such violence did occur, in other words, it was an achievement

in the non-evaluative sense used by Mike McGovern. Large-scale violence does not simply happen,

McGovern has argued. It takes work, by individuals and groups, work that does not always live up to the

actors’ intentions. Understanding such failed attempts has as much to teach us as those which come to

terrible realization.8 Or, as Varshney has argued: “Until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to

have a good theory of ethnic conflict.”9 We agree.

This paper therefore examines four cases in which localized—sometimes even individual—conflicts

seemed poised to escalate into larger conflagrations but then did not do so. Given that other situations in

Myanmar of apparently similar character have resulted in significant instances of collective violence, we

ask: why did these four cases fail to produce similar results? The first section of the paper briefly

introduces the methodology and theoretical orientation of this research. The next section details the four

case studies. In each case study, we summarize events as best we understand them and then present some

of the analyses provided in interviews with individuals who were directly involved. In the final section of

the paper, we offer four sets of conclusions that we hope will be useful for those interested in preventing

collective violence in Myanmar.

Methodology Along with McGovern and Varshney, there is a small but robust literature from those seeking to

understand collective violence by focusing on failed attempts and “negative cases.”10 A central insight

from this literature is that it is not sufficient to explain—let alone predict—violence by attending only to

the presence or absence of phenomena identified as warning signs, triggers, and root causes. These

frameworks are helpful as tools for research and early warning as well as for engaging people in non-

confrontational ways about the potential for violence in their communities. But the scholarly literature on

negative cases also demonstrates that there will be many situations in which all the warning signs will be

present and yet the most feared scenarios do not arise. As Scott Straus puts it, “One result is a frequency

mismatch: most theory posits causal factors that are much more common than the outcome.”11

8 Mike McGovern, Making War in Cote d’Ivoire (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2011), 173. 9 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 6. 10 “Negative” in the sense that the expected results did not eventuate, where the preconditions for collective violence existed but where such violence did not occur (Straus 2012, 356). 11 Scott Straus, “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint,” Perspectives

on Politics 10, no. 2 (June 2012): 343, doi:10.1017/S1537592712000709. For other studies of negative cases and

attempts to theorize why violence does not occur in situations where many theories would expect it, see Jonathan

Leader Maynard, “Preventing Mass Atrocities: Ideological Strategies and Interventions,” Politics and Governance 3,

no. 3 (October 27, 2015): 67, doi:10.17645/pag.v3i3.320; Stephen McLoughlin, “Understanding Mass Atrocity

Prevention during Periods of Democratic Transition,” Politics and Governance 3, no. 3 (October 27, 2015): 27,

doi:10.17645/pag.v3i3.318; Meghan Foster Lynch, “Civilian Agency in Times of Crisis: Lessons from Burundi,” in

The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents, ed. Steve J. Stern and Scott Straus (University of

Wisconsin Pres, 2014), 81–106; Stephen McLoughlin, “Reconceptualizing Mass Atrocity Prevention:

Understanding Risk and Resilience in Zambia,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 27, no. 4

(March 28, 2014): 427–41, doi:10.1007/s10767-014-9175-x; Stephen McLoughlin, “Rethinking the Structural

Prevention of Mass Atrocities,” Global Responsibility to Protect 6, no. 4 (November 27, 2014): 407–29,

doi:10.1163/1875984X-00604004; Jeremy Allouche and Patrick Anderson Zadi Zadi, “The Dynamics of Restraint

in Côte d’Ivoire,” IDS Bulletin 44, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 72–86, doi:10.1111/1759-5436.12008; Bert Ingelaere et

al., Genocide, Risk and Resilience: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Springer, 2013); Straus, “Retreating from the

Brink.”

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In Myanmar, all the warning signs of mass violence certainly appear to be present.12 And there has indeed

been awful violence, in the form of both riots and the slow burn of discrimination and systematic

injustice. But the many instances in which the worst-case scenario does not transpire compel us to ask:

what went right? This is the question we ask of four specific cases, which we believe highlight the

interplay of competing—conflicting—interests in which collective violence was a potential outcome that

did not eventuate. Examining as best we can how these cases unfolded—what went right—has much to

teach us about how violence can happen in Myanmar, and how it can be prevented.

There is, of course, a legitimate question that always plagues examination of any counterfactual: perhaps

violence in these cases was never going to occur, not for the reasons we discuss below but because there

was never the potential to begin with. Perhaps we have simply incorrectly assessed the original level of

risk or missed key intervening variables. One way of addressing this concern is to use the “possibility

principle” proposed by Mahoney and Goertz for studying such cases.13 Certainly, in these four cases, the

warning signs identified by available theories were all there. And the people we spoke with about these

cases expressed their assessments in stronger terms: to them, larger scale violence seemed probable.

Most of the research into these case studies was conducted during September-December 2015. Research

consisted of formal, audio-recorded interviews with a small number of individuals directly involved and

informal inquiries with other residents of the local area. This research was difficult because it took place

during the period immediately surrounding Myanmar’s national elections in November 2015, when issues

of ethnicity and religion were particularly tense. It was also complicated by the fact that some of those we

spoke with expressed concern that it would be unhelpful, even dangerous, to highlight their efforts. In

some cases, the issues are not yet resolved. In others, those involved may hold different versions of events

and presenting a singular narrative of the case risks generating new conflict. Time also presented an

obstacle. Where incidents were recent, associated tensions were still fresh; where they were not recent

inquiries risked raising new suspicions. For these reasons, we have withheld more detailed information

about the cases, including their precise dates and locations, out of deference to the conflict context in

Myanmar. In doing this we have sought to obscure the details of the cases so that readers could imagine

them as having occurred in multiple different areas—that is, so it is not possible to definitively and

exclusively link our description to events in a single location.

At the same time, we have tried to avoid presenting an overly confident assessment of each case. The

studies are partial—there is much about the incidents that we do not know and never will. Brass has noted

the multivalent nature of collective violence—one person’s personal dispute may be another’s communal

affront may be another’s career opportunity.14 In another context, Michael Taussig has commented on the

“epistemic murk” inherent to large scale violence, where fact and fiction can merge and mutually

reinforce one another, creating real stakes for those experiencing violence and vexing scholars’ attempts

12 For example, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the Holocaust Museum in Washington

DC listed Myanmar as among the highest risks for future mass atrocity, based on an early warning tool using such

criteria. See: http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/how-to-prevent-genocide/early-warning-project. The

International State Crime Initiative at Queen Mary University of London, meanwhile, has used the criteria

developed by Daniel Feierstein to evaluate the risk for genocide in Myanmar, concluding that it has reached the

fourth stage of a six-stage process. See Penny Green, Thomas MacManus, and Alicia de la Cour Venning,

“Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in Myanmar” (London: International State Crime Initiative, 2015), 22–23. 13 Mahoney and Goertz propose a “possibility principle,” by which counterfactual cases are valid for comparative study when assessment according to existing theory and specialists holds that the outcome under study was possible.

See, James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative

Research,” American Political Science Review null, no. 4 (November 2004): 653–669,

doi:10.1017/S0003055404041401. 14 Paul R. Brass, Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence (Princeton

University Press, 1997).

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to describe a given incident.15 We would add that these observations hold true in the case of failed riots,

too. This is not a claim about the impossibility of truth, simply a caveat that the descriptions and

understanding conveyed here are necessarily incomplete.

The studies also do not present a conclusive position on the causal relationship between different actions

and the events we summarize; attempts to demonstrate causality through counterfactual analysis often use

similar cases to identify specific configurations of causal conditions.16 Instead, we want to stress that we

are not arguing conclusively that the actions described in each case study, and these actions alone,

prevented riots from occurring. Such conclusive arguments would be interesting and valuable, but are not

necessary for the kinds of conclusions with which we close the paper. In other words, we believe that

even such partial case studies as these can generate useful insights into actions that can help to prevent

riots, and thus we have limited our conclusions to those that we think the information we collected can

bear.

Case studies

Case study 1

Background This is a case in which leaders, including members of different religious communities, cooperated to

systematically respond to a rumour that a well-known person in the area was amassing weapons in

preparation for an attack on Muslims. The rumour prompted members of both Buddhist and Muslim

communities to increase their vigilance and prepare to defend themselves, increasing tension such that

local people thought escalation into a riot was imminent.

This case study was written based on interviews conducted at the end of 2015 with four individuals who

are residents in the area and were connected in some way to the events related below: a female Muslim

youth activist, a male Buddhist local CSO leader, a male Muslim local CSO leader and a male Buddhist

local journalist. Copies of materials circulated to respond to the rumour are also on file with the authors.

The events After the Thingyan water festival in April, the situation in the local area was tense. Interviewees

remembered that this was particularly the case because people were watching and sharing videos of

violence in other parts of Myanmar. Interviewees described many of the same arguments about Muslims

as a “fearsome Other” that we have described elsewhere.17

Interviewees identified two Facebook groups created for sharing news and information about the local

area. Posts to these Facebook groups were also being printed out and circulated by people that lived in the

area, including trishaw drivers. Mobile phone, internet, and Facebook usage was less extensive then than

it is now; at that time, people using Facebook mostly did so via internet shops and then shared the

information offline through personal networks.

15 Michael Taussig, “Culture of Terror--Space of Death. Roger Casement’s Putumayo Report and the Explanation of

Torture,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 26, no. 3 (1984): 492, 494. 16 Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (University of Chicago Press, 2008). 17 Matt Schissler, Matthew J Walton, and Phyu Phyu Thi, “Threat and Virtuous Defence: Listening to Narratives of

Religious Conflict in Six Myanmar Cities,” M.MAS Working Paper 1:1 (St Antony’s College, Oxford University,

July 2015).

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Circulating online and through these other networks was a rumour that a construction company owned by

a man who was reportedly a 969 supporter had ordered hundreds of long knives18 from a nearby area

known for metal work. According to the rumour, these weapons were to be used for killing Muslims.

According to one interviewee, followers of a 969-affiliated organisation were going to do the killing;

according to another interviewee, Buddhist gangs would be involved.

According to the interviews, the rumours seemed plausible and people started to panic. The immediate

effect was that Muslims and Buddhists ceased interacting, people stopped going out at night, and people

from both religious groups began to close up their shops, anticipating violence. Muslims prepared

themselves for the rumoured attack, including gathering tools that could be used as weapons and

establishing watch patrols in their areas. However, the police soon asked that these patrols be disbanded

and those organizing them complied.

One interviewee related having heard later that a group of Buddhists approached a leading monk at a

monastery near one of the Muslim areas and asked him for help in preventing Muslims from killing

Buddhists. The monk prohibited the Buddhists from attacking the Muslims in that ward, saying that

Muslims and Buddhists had been living together in the area for a long time and had never had any

problems.19

Eventually,20 the owner of the construction company found out about the rumour and approached local

CSO leaders to ask for their help in dispelling the rumour. He apparently wanted to dispel the rumour

both because it was untrue and because he wanted to keep the situation in the city stable. At the same

time, young people from various youth volunteer groups– both Buddhists and Muslims from the area

where the knives were allegedly being produced and Muslims from the area where the rumour was

circulating – fact-checked the rumour and found out that the weapons had not been ordered and were not

being manufactured.

The CSO leaders, the construction company owner, youth groups, and religious leaders acted quickly to

stop the rumour spreading. The young people communicated to religious leaders that the rumour was

untrue. One evening21 around 6pm, Buddhist, Muslim and Christian religious leaders, CSOs, young

people, trusted people of good public standing in their communities (myo mi myo pa), and people who

work as freelance journalists for a number of news organisations came together to meet. The myo mi myo

pa led the meeting because they had widely accepted positions of authority within the community. The

construction company owner was present and informed the meeting’s participants directly that the rumour

was not true.

Within a few hours—by approximately 8pm—the participants had produced an announcement stating that

the rumour was not true. This announcement was signed by three Muslim religious leaders, three

Buddhist religious leaders, and two myo mi myo pa, all of whom provided their phone numbers next to

their signatures. The announcement was scanned and circulated online, and photocopied and distributed

throughout the area. Religious leaders and the myo mi myo pa also shared this information back to their

communities, through other informal networks. Copies of the announcement are on file with the authors.

According to the interviewees, this coming together of communities and the announcement that the

rumour was untrue seemed to calm the situation.

18 One interviewee said 100, one said 300. 19 Female, 25 years old, Muslim. 20 We were not able to determine exactly how much time elapsed between the initial circulation of the rumour and the response described here. 21 Again, accounts differed as to how long after the rumour had begun circulating this meeting was convened.

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Interviewees’ analysis Interviewees consistently stressed the fact that people wanted to avoid conflict. They recognised the

negative impact it would have and that nobody would benefit: “The main reason [why people came to the

meeting] was that they didn’t want the conflict to happen. If this conflict really occurred, it wouldn’t be

good for anyone and nobody would be safe.”22 There was also a feeling that it was better to communicate

through face-to-face dialogue than to let the situation escalate, a dynamic that was probably reinforced by

the already-existing close relationships and regular interactions between people of different faiths in the

area. One person explained, “whether or not this information [about the stockpiling of weapons] was true,

it would be better to engage in dialogue face to face. So we negotiated with youths and we brought them

[religious leaders] together.”23

It is important to note that a desire to resolve the growing tensions around the rumour or the regular

interactions that facilitated the dialogue did not necessarily mean that relationships between the

communities were friendly. As one youth activist explained, “People would like to keep their relationship [with Muslims] but inside their heart, there is still hatred. They don’t want to have conflict because if

there were a conflict, it wouldn’t be good for everyone. So instead they just stick together [with their own

kind].”24 These seemingly contradictory dynamics and their implications will be explored further in the

conclusion.

Interviewees also noted the importance of civil society groups from all different types of backgrounds

(not just explicitly interfaith groups) taking the lead in bringing people together. One interviewee thought

that the role of youth had been particularly important, as it is easier for youth to come together and talk

because of their relative lack of other responsibilities.25 Everyone participated in solving the problem – a

wide range of people were involved in the meeting and the subsequent announcement, including Christian

leaders as well as Buddhists and Muslims. Including phone numbers of those who signed the

announcement was thought to be particularly effective, as it added credibility to the statement. In addition

to that, civil society leaders approached religious leaders who would be able to promote understanding,

rather than foster divides. One Buddhist man noted, “For Muslim and Christian leaders, they are good at

negotiations… they are very gentle when they talk.”26

As noted above, people believed that an important contributing factor to the resolution of this issue was

the existing strong relationships between religious communities in the area. People of different religions

have been living together in the area for years and take pride in this aspect of their region. Interviewees

drew upon this to explain why they were able to work together to combat the threat of violence. For

example, businesses from different religious groups have been working together for years and many

religious groups invite people of different faiths to their religious celebrations. One interviewee illustrated

this by pointing to an area where the main water well is in a monastery compound. This means that

Muslims and people of other religions interact closely and regularly with the Buddhist community, and

people felt that they could easily contact each other to discuss how to address the situation. As one

interviewee put it, “this area’s tradition [of inter-religious cooperation] is stronger than individuals’

religious beliefs. ‘We are the residents of this area’ is stronger than their religion.”27

22 Male, 35 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 23 Male, 30 years old, Muslim, local CSO leader. 24 Male, 25 years old, Muslim, youth activist. 25 Male, 30 years old, Buddhist. 26 Male, 35 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 27 Male, 35 years old, local CSO leader, Buddhist.

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Considering the role played by various authority figures, interviewees believed that the myo mi myo pa (a

kind of informal yet influential authority) were helpful and their role in the intervention was beneficial.

The police were also seen by some to be helpful in asking the Muslim night watch guard to disband,

which seemed to calm the situation by assuaging Buddhist fears of a counter-attack. However, the Special

Branch (domestic intelligence agency) was apparently less helpful. When local residents shared their

growing fears that there would be an attack by Buddhists on Muslims, they were told that such an attack

was “impossible.” It was left to community members to resolve the issue themselves, which they did

quickly and effectively.

Finally, although it may not have been a dynamic that was present during the time of the incident

described here, people we spoke to noted a growing suspicion that religious conflict is being politically

manipulated and that this has led people to be more sceptical about rumours. One interviewee explained

that since 2013, particularly with the widespread student protests against the proposed national education

law, it has become more apparent to people that conflicts have an element of political manipulation.28

Another said something similar in relation to the violence that happened in the lead-up to the 2015

election, that some people who are instigating violence want to cause problems for the election, but local

people want the election to go ahead, so they don’t want conflict to happen.29 A Muslim youth activist

explained, “If we compare the current situation and the situation from the past, [peoples’] views have

been changing. [People] started to see that [the topic of] Islam had been used to create religious conflict.

At the beginning, people didn’t believe that it was rumour, nobody believed, it was very difficult to talk

[convince them].”30 This shift of views is consistent with that described elsewhere and is considered in

more detail in the Conclusions.

Case study 2

Background This is a case in which a local woman intervened to prevent the family of a Buddhist man killed in a fight

with a Muslim man outside a beer station from making a public call for revenge. A monk had come to ask

the family if they wanted him to get revenge on the Muslim men and the woman persuaded the family to

take up a police case instead, and not to consent to work with the monk, in an effort to avoid worsening

inter-religious tensions in the area.

This case study was written primarily based on information gathered from an audio-recorded interview

and a series of phone conversations with the woman who persuaded the bereaved family not to take up the

case. The woman lives in a squatter community and does informal work, including as a motorcycle taxi

driver for other local women. She is active in advocating for squatters’ rights, so she is referred to in what

follows as a squatters’ advocate. An interview was also conducted with a local civil society leader from

whom the squatters’ advocate had sought advice. Additional interviews were also conducted with local

residents and civil society activists from the surrounding area; these individuals were not aware of the

case, but they were nonetheless helpful in contextualizing feelings in the area at the time. The squatters’

advocate also advised us not to contact the family of the young man who had been killed, because the

police case is still ongoing and she thought it might risk disrupting a tenuous calm.

The events Two young Buddhist men were stabbed and killed in a fight with some Muslim men outside of a beer

station. The men had apparently been involved in an argument inside the beer shop and were asked to

28 Male, 35 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 29 Female, 25 years old, Muslim. 30 Male, 25 years old, Muslim, youth activist.

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leave; the argument continued outside the shop and then escalated to physical violence. There was no

indication, as far as we have been able to determine, that religious identities played any role in this initial

incident, although this has still been a question, as the case is ongoing at present.

The mother of one of the young men that was killed was subsequently approached by a monk with

connections to Ma Ba Tha.31 The squatters’ advocate would not give the monk’s name, but said that he

had been active in campaigning for the Protection of Race and Religion Laws. This monk offered to take

up the case and to help the families get revenge, in any way they wanted. Soon after their arrest, a group

of people had also gathered outside the police station where the Muslim assailants were being held; this

group of people also then went to the family to encourage them to kill the perpetrators. The monk and

some of the men from this group also attended the young man’s funeral.

According to the squatters’ advocate, the feeling in the area was already tense because of violence

elsewhere in Myanmar. She said that people had to watch what they say and also teach their children to be

careful with their language, since teasing among children was common but ran a risk of being

misunderstood:

“Children tease each other. They may say that today is Eid day, so, treat us to pork and sour

bamboo shoot curry. It is just a joke, but as conflict can happen as the result of a single word,

conflict between children can lead to conflict between adults, and then to ethnic and religious

conflict.”32

People were also discouraging their children from being friends with children from other religions. The

unfortunate result, according to those we spoke to, was that, in order to avoid conflict, people were

choosing to self-segregate and avoid those from other religious groups.

According to the squatters’ advocate, she is friends with the bereaved mother who had been approached

by the monk. Although the advocate had not been able to attend the funeral herself, she said that her

mother went and heard the monk and others discuss the need for taking revenge against Muslims for the

murder. The mother told her daughter, who decided to act to prevent further conflict. The squatters’

advocate said she then discussed the case with her social networks and “people who are more educated,”

who told her that they also didn’t want conflict to happen and advised her on what to say to the family.

She then went with one of the men whom she had consulted to see her grieving friend to discuss the

monk’s offer with her and her family and the possible consequences, were she to take him up on his offer.

The squatters’ advocate said that the bereaved family wanted to see their son’s attackers killed, but also

worried that if they took up the case with the monk it would lead to a wider conflict that no one would be

able to control. The squatters’ advocate said the she agreed and advised the family to tell anyone who

asked that they wanted to follow due legal procedure. She also warned them that if they decided to go

along with the monk and there were riots, people would blame the family and they would receive

unwelcome attention. She also pointed out that riots and further violence would not bring back their son.

According to the squatters’ advocate, during the following week, the bereaved mother was again

pressured by monks and an uncle from the family of the other young man who had been killed to seek

revenge. She was also interviewed by journalists and other individuals about the case. To all of the people

who came to talk to her, the woman replied that she wanted to follow due legal process and that her

family would agree with the decision of the courts. The squatters’ advocate said that after the mother

rebuffed outside interest in the case for about a week, interest appeared to wane and she felt that the risk

of escalation had been averted. It was not clear whether the other bereaved family decided to take up the

case with the monk.

31 Informants could not confirm whether this monk was acting on behalf of the organisation or on his own initiative. 32 All quotes in this section are from the female squatters’ advocate.

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Interviewees’ analysis For the squatters’ advocate, the motivation to approach the family and discourage them from going along

with the monk’s suggestion came from a desire to prevent further conflict from occurring. From her own

experience, she believed that it would particularly affect poor people, regardless of religion, saying that

“Both Bamar and Kalar33 will be affected.” Other people that she discussed the case with also reinforced

this feeling, saying that they did not want further conflict to happen.

The squatters’ advocate was both personally influenced by and able to draw on the recent negative

impacts felt by people in other areas affected by religious violence. “When there is a conflict, the ones

who suffer most are the grassroots people. The consequences are that the price of rice rises, and they

announce martial law, so we cannot work within our working hours. So, we have less income and that

affects our livelihoods.” She also drew on an experience she knew of, in which a friend in an area affected

by a riot had loaned money to a Muslim woman who was then unable to repay her because she was afraid

to travel. Religious conflict in that area had also affected small businesses that she knew of. In that area, normally Muslims would buy raw materials from Buddhists to make furniture, but the rise in tensions had

limited interaction between the communities. Finally, the squatters’ advocate said that an escalation of

violence was particularly frightening for squatters, because if fires were set they could destroy both

everything peopled owned and their basic ability to stay on the land they occupied.

Finally, those interviewed conveyed a strong sense that conflict was being orchestrated or encouraged by

people who do not have the public interest at heart, and that these (unnamed) people’s ulterior motives

have to be questioned:

“The people who want to create conflict are drawing plans but we can say that people from [her

area] are very smart as they do not follow the plan of the people who want to create conflict. Even

if they didn’t realise [that it was part of a plan] and were about to go along with it, other people can

explain to them and stop them. For example, like my friend, when they are very upset, they would

like to kill the person who killed their son. However, we explained to them the situation and they

accepted it because they have their own brain to think. As we have the saying ‘don’t set the fire,’

they didn’t allow this situation to [get out of control] because of them.”

This finding is consistent with many of the views expressed throughout our research and with interviews

conducted by other scholars and journalists.

33 Note that the word kalar is controversial—many feel that it is derogatory, but many do not; its use does not

necessarily index communal animus on the part of the speaker. Most contemporary Burmese language dictionaries

list the primary definition as “person from South Asia,” but the term’s etymology is contested. Etymological

controversies aside, while many feel that the term is not intrinsically pejorative others feel that current usage is and

strongly so. Maung Zarni, for example, uses the American English word “n---er” as a translation that emphasizes the

negative rhetorical force of the word and while the appropriateness of such a choice might be debated it is consistent

with other scholarship that has drawn comparisons between racial politics in the United States and dynamics

between Burman and non-Burmans in Myanmar (See Walton 2013). One Muslim man that we interviewed in

Mawlamyine during our Listening Project research, meanwhile, offered the following reflection on being referred to

as “kalar”: “Since I was studying… if you’re small, they’d call you kalar lay (‘small kalar’), if you’re strong and

big, you’d be called kalar gyi (‘big kalar’). There weren’t many Muslims at my school, only a couple Muslims in

one class. We had some good [non-Muslim] friends but there were also naughty ones, however there was nothing

like being badly discriminated or something. I still felt something when I was called ‘kalar’. But I can understand

them [non-Muslims] because it’s a habit for them, calling us ‘kalar.’ However, they don’t know how we feel” (Man,

34, Muslim, “Pathi,” March 2015, Mawlamyine).

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Case study 3

Background The following two cases concern two separate but related events in the same region. Both cases are part

of a growing controversy and antagonism over the right to slaughter cattle, an issue that has drawn

particular attention in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta.34 Over the last few years, 969, Ma Ba Tha, and similar

organisations have been purchasing the rights to slaughter cattle in the Delta, in order to prevent the

animals being slaughtered. In the past these permits have tended to be awarded to Muslims, who slaughter

the cattle as a business (to sell the meat), and also as part of religious custom on the occasion of religious

festivals.

The case studies were written based upon interviews with two Buddhist activists and one Christian

activist, all of whom are residents of the region, spend time in the affected areas and were involved in

some way with the events described. These individuals cautioned against further inquiries into the cases

for two reasons: cow slaughter is still a sensitive issue, and renewing inquiries after some time has passed

since the events could prompt new suspicions. That illegal activity was involved, with possible

knowledge of local government authorities, also made inquiries additionally delicate.

The events These events took place after a 969-affiliated group had purchased the permit to control cattle slaughter in

the local area. Although Muslims no longer had the permit for cattle slaughter, some Muslims reportedly

continued to slaughter cattle illegally and paid money to the municipal authorities so that they would turn

a blind eye. At some point after the 969-affiliated group took over the permit, two individuals connected

to the group visited a Muslim-owned slaughterhouse to investigate whether cattle were being slaughtered

without a permit. The men were beaten up when they tried to do so, and hospitalised. In addition, monks

from the local 969 group attempted to arrest Muslims for illegal slaughter and confiscated beef from the

slaughterhouse. The area is inhabited by Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Christians.

After this incident, rumours spread across the wider area through social media and phones that Muslims

had beaten up a monk, that the monk was in the hospital with head wounds, and that Muslims were going

house-to-house killing people with knives. Leading 969 monks from elsewhere came to the village, and

the situation became tense.

Interviewees also said that the authorities from the General Administrative Department office in a nearby

town had come to the village when they first heard the news; however, they didn’t feel they had authority

to act. Soon after, the interviewees said that the army or police came and declared what the interviewees

described as “martial law.” This included measures such as preventing people within the village from

going outside after dark. People in the area began to worry that they might face shortages of basic food

supplies, as the village required difficult travel to other trading centres and the increased restrictions

disrupted trade.

When the rumours started spreading, a civil society leader who had been working with farmers in the area

was contacted by at least one local resident about the case. He went straight to the village to find out what

was going on. The police were checking cars on the road and there were soldiers, firemen, and local

Pyithu Sit militias standing guard, an obviously expanded security presence from the norm. The civil

34 Swe Win, “Protecting Cows - a Buddhist Tradition Revived?,” Myanmar Now, September 17, 2015,

http://www.myanmar-now.org/news/i/?id=95b1414d-bd48-4531-84e5-1f069be1075f; Swe Win, “With Official

Help, Myanmar’s Radical Buddhists Target Muslim-Owned Businesses,” Myanmar Now, September 17, 2015,

http://www.myanmar-now.org/news/i/?id=9ba61afc-285d-49bd-8f73-8b9efaf941c0.

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society leader alerted a friend in the media to the story but asked that nothing be published before he

attempted to negotiate, and that the story should only be publicized if the negotiations broke down.

The following day, the civil society leader met with the hundred-household leader, the village tract leader,

and laypeople and monks from 969. He met with them on the road and the villagers came and listened.

When he spoke to the Township General Administrator, he was referred to the District General

Administrator, saying that it was this man who had the authority to handle the situation. The civil society

leader then went to the seat of the township and discussed the case with authorities from different

departments.

When he went to talk to the police and the army, 14 or 15 people from the village went with him. He

asked the person responsible from the army why they had declared martial law. They replied that it was

because they have responsibility for security. The army then referred him to the same District General

Administrator. Because this administrator knew the civil society leader, he trusted him to help with the

problem. The civil society leader also met with police, other district GAD authorities, district-level 969

leaders, and Muslim and Hindu religious leaders from the area.

He argued to these leaders that the villagers did not want conflict, and so the case should be handled

according to the law. He explained that the people who been hospitalised deserved medical compensation

from those who had beaten them. In addition, Muslims had been in error because they were butchering

cattle before Eid and had not informed the municipal authorities. He urged them to acknowledge and

confess their mistake.

His argument was eventually accepted by the Muslim leader, who explained that the Muslims had made

the mistake because they did not know the rules. In return, the 969 leader said that they would not be too

strict about the rules. The leaders agreed that Muslims would only have to inform the 969-affiliated

group, as the permit holders, when they were planning to slaughter cows and sell the meat.

According to the interviews, getting to this point of mutual agreement took about eight days. During this

time, people who live in the area supported the civil society leader and encouraged him in the

negotiations. Ultimately, the people who were hospitalised also received compensation. In addition, the

civil society leader is still in contact with 969 and was invited to at least one meeting later convened by

the group.

Interviewees’ analysis Again, one of the primary motivations, both for the civil society leader who facilitated the negotiations

and for those he was trying to convince, was a desire to avoid the negative effects of a wider conflict. The

civil society leader explained that he was particularly worried about the religious dimensions:

“There are not many Muslims in [another town in the area]. But there are many Muslims,

Burmese, and Karen in [this area]. 969 has been around for only 1 or 2 months and already

conflict is occurring between Muslims and monks. Conflict has occurred across Myanmar. So I

was worried about it and helped to solve the problem.”35

One person also contacted him to say that “I am afraid that our religion [Buddhism] will be affected,”

presumably because people from outside of the area might blow the case out of proportion, not

understanding the local dynamics.36

The villagers were also concerned about the impact that conflict would have on them:

35 Male, 38 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 36 Male, 28 years old, Buddhist, local resident.

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“Everyone from [the village] is making a living from farming. No one has a comfortable life.

There are no rich people, no businesspeople. There are no businesspeople in the village or the

surrounding area. If conflict were to occur, everybody’s livelihoods would be affected. Not only

that village, but also the villages around it would be in trouble.”37

The civil society leader believed that it was this desire to avoid a destructive conflict that motivated the

villagers to support him in conducting the negotiations.

Interviewees also believed that government authorities were willing to negotiate because they were

worried about the case getting out of hand: “The [local] authorities were worried that the case would

become bigger. There has never been a case like this before [in the area]. The situation could really

deteriorate as a result of this case.”38

Case study 4

The events This case also involves cattle slaughter in a village in an area where a group of Buddhists had recently

purchased the permit for the activity. Among the group controlling cow slaughter were monks (some

affiliated with Ma Ba Tha) and laypeople affiliated with Ma Ba Tha, some of whom also work with local

CSOs. Before Eid, Muslims reported the number of cows they were planning to kill on Eid to the group.

The group did not grant them permission to kill cows. According to the interviewees, the refusal to grant

permission led to a very tense situation in the village. Muslims then went and guarded the mosque and

people began to gather outside the mosque, so the police went to that area as well.

CSOs in the area found out about the rising tensions from their community-based networks, including

those in the village, and got involved to negotiate with the monks and the Muslim religious leaders. These

CSOs work on various issues including the environment, education, substitute fuels, and healthcare. They

met in the administrative office of the village.

The CSOs told the authorities that the Muslims have always killed cows, and that it is a religious

obligation for them. They also advised the authorities to give the Muslims permission to kill 100 cows, a

compromise number which was less than they had originally requested. Then they spoke to the Muslims,

who agreed to this number. The son of the Muslim religious leader, who does humanitarian work and

with whom the CSOs have a relationship, represented the Muslim community in the negotiations. He

agreed on their behalf to this reduced number, and promised that there would be no protests against the

reduced number. The group controlling cattle slaughter also agreed to give permission.

Interviewees’ analysis Interviewees identified two key factors in resolving the case. First was the perceived close relationships

and networks among CSOs, which have become very strong and influential in the area. The CSOs that got

involved in this case are working on different issues and they have a good relationship with the local religious leaders. One interviewee said that, “[The CSOs] are a big group and strong. They are united if

something happens. They do not do bad things. Some of them understand the law and they are good.”39 It

seems clear that the high standing of the CSOs allowed them to play a crucial mediating role.

In addition, some of the CSO members are also part of the group that controls cow slaughter and of the

area Ma Ba Tha network. While this may seem surprising, the networks of Ma Ba Tha and related groups

37 Male, 28 years old, Buddhist, local resident. 38 Male, 38 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 39 Female, 31 years old, Christian, local activist.

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are wide-ranging and people from CSOs hold a variety of different political views. Ma Ba Tha itself is not

necessarily a unitary organization and many people join or support it because of its educational and

religious activities, not simply its anti-Muslim activities. We were told that those individuals who were

part of the group controlling cow slaughter and also active in CSOs were more open-minded (this was

attributed to their civil society background) and so they could convince the other members of the group to

give ground in the negotiations.40

The second important factor was a perceived sense of shared community or mutual respect. Buddhists and

Muslims in the area have lived together and shared each other’s festivals. There seem to be good relations

between the two groups and an acknowledgement of the importance of their respective religious practices.

As one person explained,

“The reason they could control this case successfully was because [Muslims] have always

celebrated this day [Eid], and it is part of their culture. The people from this side [Buddhists] also

were aware that the Muslims have not just started celebrating this day. They have always done

so… Muslims always celebrated this Eid Day every year with many people and the beef that they

made was sent to all the Burmese’ houses. The Burmese people go and eat in their celebration

and also the meat is packaged and sent to their houses as well.”41

Interviewees also highlighted how this relationship of mutual respect came through in the negotiations,

when the CSOs brought up an incident in the village that had occurred a few years earlier where Muslims

had helped Buddhists. There had been a fire in the village and the monastery risked being burnt. A large

number of Muslim youth, who were in the area for religious reasons, helped to put out the fire and saved

the monks and items from the monastery. By bringing up this story, interviewees said that people from

the CSOs were able to remind the people in the negotiations that there was a tradition of mutual assistance

that crossed religious lines.

Interviewees also highlighted two aspects that they felt were conditions of possibility for inter-religious

tolerance, which will be explored in more detail in the following section. First, there was a sense that

tensions were less in the area because there was not a perception that Muslims were moving in from

outside; Muslims in the area had lived there long enough to be accepted as part of the local population. As

an interviewee said, “This is not a place where Bengalis are coming in. They [the Muslims] are people

who have always lived here.”42

There was also a perception that the “non-confrontational” behaviour of Muslims had contributed to a

positive outcome. One interviewee gave the example of another moment in time when, after news of a

riot in Rakhine State reached the area, Muslim residents informed the ward administrative officers that

they would not riot and also closed their houses and shops as a precaution. This person concluded that

“They just live peacefully by themselves and they controlled themselves. And, they do not live very

proudly.”43

40 However, one interviewee also thought that Ma Ba Tha didn’t really have much popular support in the area. She gave an example of a Ma Ba Tha protest that was organized in a nearby town that had very low levels of

participation. Additionally, she said that a key person supporting the protest was the owner of a noodle shop, and the

shop lost business after the protest. 41 Female, 31 years old, Christian, local activist. 42 Female, 31 years old, Christian, local activist. 43 Female, 31 years old, Christian, local activist.

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Finally, as with the other cases, interviewees mentioned a desire to avoid conflict. One person explained

“If there is a conflict, there will be many consequences. People will kill each other and die. There will be

no benefit. It is worse for people to die than for cows or animals to die.”44

Conclusions All of these cases represent situations in which there appeared to be a strong possibility that localized

conflict between individuals or small groups could escalate into riotous violence between religious

communities. Several of them occurred at times when conflicts in other parts of the country had produced

heightened tensions—and fears that localized disputes could lead to wider repercussions. It is important to

repeat that the factors we have identified in these cases as helping to reduce communal tension and stave

off wider violence do not make up a universal “recipe” for responding to religious instigation and

potential riots. Even this small number of cases reveal a number of situation-specific factors and those

that can be generalized (such as the necessary role of trusted interlocutors) cannot necessarily be directly

implemented.

We also cannot prove the counterfactual that the actions described in each case prevented violence that

would have otherwise occurred. But in each case, those we interviewed believed strongly that such

escalation was a serious risk. At a minimum, escalating violence was a distinct possibility in line with the

methodological approach of Mahoney and Goertz, explained above.

Based on our research into these cases and the analysis offered by those we interviewed, we provide four

sets of conclusions that we believe are instructive for anyone interested in promoting peace and

preventing inter-religious violence in Myanmar. These conclusions relate to (1) the operational dynamics

of each case (the individuals and groups involved and the contestations between them); (2) the broader

framing of the conflicts; (3) the kinds of competing arguments made by those attempting to prevent

violence; and (4) concerns about forms of violence left unaddressed by these interventions.

Contests and actors Each of the four cases discussed in this paper could have escalated into wider violence, but did not. From

our perspective, what is most important to highlight is that each of these cases entailed a contest, between

and among both individuals and groups operating with their own ideas about what was good and right.

Such an observation might border on the banal, but it underpins two corollary observations.

First, each case included activities by some organized groups seeking ends that risked escalating the

situation into wider violence. Collective violence may not have been the outcome they sought; this paper

does not attempt to prove the existence in Myanmar of the “institutionalized riot systems” Brass studied

in north India. But, whatever the goals of the groups involved in these four cases, their efforts made such

violence probable. In Case Study 1, interviewees indicated that, at least on social media, the rumours of

weapons stockpiling and preparation to attack Muslims appeared to be shared and promoted in a

systematic fashion. We know little about who might have been organising this information dissemination,

though interviewees felt it was clearly more than one individual. In the other three cases, however, the

level of organization appears to have been stronger and more transparently institutionalized. In the last

two cases, for example, principle protagonists were involved or affiliated with groups such as 969 and Ma

Ba Tha. To be clear, if riots had indeed transpired, this paper is not arguing that 969 and Ma Ba Tha

members would have been the leaders or that their intentions were to instigate a riot. But, whatever their

44 Female, 31 years old, Christian, local activist.

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intentions, they played central roles in driving forward situations that made others in the affected areas

feel seriously afraid of violent escalation.

Second, whatever ends were sought by those driving the situation in each case towards violence, their

failure to achieve these ends was no accident. It took work, on the part of civil society and religious

leaders, along with individual active citizens, who were important for efforts to de-escalate each of these

situations. The cases considered here did not necessarily include previously-existing interfaith or peace-

building groups, or at least not that self-identified as such. Instead, the common trait of the individuals

involved is that they had built up trust and credibility in communities and with local authorities through

previous activities that did not relate to promoting peace or inter-faith harmony. But this previous work

enabled them to counsel against violence, meditate disputes, and act as trusted interlocutors in situations

where communities either were not directly communicating with one another or when they would not

have been inclined to believe statements from the other community. In Case Study 1, for example, the

monk who offered support—in the form of revenge—may not have been relied upon because the

nationalist monks did not necessarily have a good reputation in the neighbourhood; U Wirathu had

apparently been unhelpful when the squatters had turned to him for aid during a previous struggle with

police who were trying to push them off their land. The squatters’ advocate pointed to this experience

when she explained why she turned to other civil society leaders for advice rather than the monk. In Case

Study 3, the civil society leader who navigated the bureaucratic and social channels necessary to facilitate

negotiations was only able to do so because he had already built connections and established himself as

working for the betterment of the area.

While these cases did not include explicitly interfaith groups, they did involve a diversity of actors from

different religious communities working together. This dynamic should be distinguished from explicitly

“interfaith” organizing, which, at least in Myanmar, has tended to focus on mutual understanding of each

other’s religious beliefs and practices. In these four cases, it was more often a different type of mutual

interest that brought people together across religious lines to discuss a dispute. In Case Study 1, for

example, it was sharing water from a communal well. In Case Study 3, it appears clear that the civil

society leader who played a crucial role in negotiations was well connected because he had done other

forms of social welfare and relief work in the area. Similarly, in Case Study 4, the young man who

negotiated on behalf of the Muslim community had developed relationships with non-Muslim community

members and civil society leaders via his social development and relief activities. It is also essential to

recognize that, even in these situations of heightened tension and distrust, Buddhists and Muslims in

diverse contexts were able to hold discussions and mediate potential conflicts. Highlighting this fact

directly challenges common perceptions of intractable and long-standing antagonism between religious

groups in Myanmar, although it does also highlight the further difficulties posed by extended geographic

and social separation of religious communities, such as exists in parts of Rakhine State at the moment.

The CSOs and individuals that played key roles in calming, mediating, or bringing together opposed

groups did not necessarily identify as “peace-builders,” but they did appear to play critical roles in de-

escalating conflict and avoiding violence. In some cases, they had to do this when the state was not

fulfilling its obligations, or when state officials or institutions were acting in ways that exacerbated the

tensions. In Case Study 1, the police were seen to play a positive role in encouraging Muslims to disband

night-time security patrols that might have escalated fears of a pre-emptive strike. However, interviewees

said that the Special Branch was unresponsive to people’s concerns about an imminent attack by

Buddhists on Muslims. Similarly, in Case Study 3, the move by the military to declare martial law (or

impose restrictions on movement) seemed to create additional worries for the local community regarding

their ability to conduct business and get sufficient food. While much more research is needed into the role

of state officials in cases of violence between religious groups, these examples make clear that both action

and inaction by state authorities are crucial in either supporting or undermining the efforts of those who

seek to make peace at a local level.

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Religious framings, from conflict to violence These four cases highlight the way in which framing conflicts in religious terms can serve to expand and

escalate them. Effective collective action frames can accentuate and expand the resonance of particular

grievances and mobilise a broader range of participants.45 Whatever the cause of the fight between the

young men in Case Study 1, for example, subsequent emphasis on the religious identities of the young

men both drew in new actors and offered the potential for escalation beyond the initial dispute and its

aftermath. The monk who came to visit the bereaved mother of one of the victims in this case, as well as

those who subsequently pressured her to seek revenge, became involved because of identities understood

in religious terms and directed antagonism towards a community larger than the young men involved or

their families. Similarly, those concerned that the case might escalate recognized this potential for wider

involvement and escalation. This underscores the fact that, in an environment with heightened attention to

religious difference, the possibility always exists for quotidian incidents to be re-framed as religious or as

having broader implications for religious communities. It also highlights the way that fears of “terrorism”

in Rakhine State may become the basis for expanding violence towards Muslims elsewhere in Myanmar.

Re-framing a conflict as religious in nature both reinforces and is reinforced by already-existing

stereotypes of religious others. M.MAS Working Paper 1:1 explored some of the narratives circulating

about Muslims in non-Muslim communities, for example—that they are potential threats and that, as a

group, they are intolerant, violent, and rapacious (or at least, potentially so).46 With this image of

Muslims in circulation, religious framing of conflicts between individual followers of Buddhism and

Islam can also help to paint both the participants and their coreligionists as aggressors. The bare facts of

the individual stories at hand—a fight between young men, unsanctioned slaughter of cows, or the

(rumoured) stockpiling of weapons—may or may not be true, but these examples underscore that the

salient point is their framing and the resonance of that framing with pre-existing stereotypes. Just as broad

stereotypes are effectively applied to marginalized or excluded groups (with corresponding positive

actions generally ineffective in shifting the narrative), individual acts of violence committed by Buddhists

(as the dominant majority) do not affect the majority’s view of themselves as a whole. Indeed, throughout

the violence in Myanmar, Buddhists have insisted—sometimes contrary to all evidence—that

“Buddhists” are not violent.

Framing disputes and other conflicts in religious terms may be instrumental—by actors with political

interests—or produced from existing narratives. In this sense, many disputes are not religious per se but

are framed as such. It is also necessary, however, to recognize that some of these conflicts undeniably

concern religious tenets or practices, not as a matter of framing but as a matter of content. Case studies 3

and 4 were not simply administrative concerns regarding Muslims slaughtering cattle without a license

but appear to be conflicts generated by the clash of traditions that are held up as mutually exclusive. That

is, to the degree that Muslims feel slaughter of cattle is a religious obligation (during Eid, for example)

and to the degree that Buddhists feel slaughter of cattle is proscribed, followers of the two traditions can

appear to be fundamentally at odds.47

45 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge University

Press, 1994) especially Chapter 7. 46 Schissler, Walton, and Phyu Phyu Thi, “Threat and Virtuous Defence: Listening to Narratives of Religious Conflict in Six Myanmar Cities,” 7–8. 47 Cherry Thein, “Govt reaffirms rules on killing cows ahead of Muslim festival,” Myanmar Times, 22 September

2014; http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/11712-govt-reaffirms-rules-on-killing-cows-ahead-of-

muslim-festival.html

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Yet, such an analysis needs to take into consideration that categories such as “Buddhist” and “Muslim”

are not stable concepts, and the practices and norms that they contain not only vary across space, but

across time.48 This is certainly the case with the tradition of cow protection. While it is true that avoiding

the taking of life is a central Buddhist precept and some Buddhists in Myanmar avoid killing cows or

eating beef due to the key role that cows play in agricultural life as work animals, there has never been a

consistent or universal Buddhist tradition of protecting cows from slaughter. Prior to the current

movement, which is difficult to date precisely but seems to have been revived recently, the most

influential campaign to abstain from eating beef was led by the colonial-era monk Ledi Sayadaw, who

argued that Buddhists should avoid eating beef also as a moral practice that would counter a presumed

increase in beef consumption by the British.49 Contemporary views on the subject in Myanmar diverge

significantly,50 acting as a reminder that what counts as quintessentially “Buddhist” (or “Muslim”) not

only changes over time, but is contested in particular moments as well.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that some conflicts may be centred on perceptions of the

irreconcilability of religious practices, because ignoring the religious nature of such disputes would be to

ignore the broader implications of state-sanctioned religious intolerance and discrimination. There has

been clear evidence of state officials acting in a biased manner in, for example, awarding cattle slaughter

licenses. Case studies 3 and 4 illustrate the way this can connect to individual moments that risk

escalating violence. Such practices also appear to violate Article 34 of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution,

which provides the right to freely profess and practice one’s religion. Acknowledging the religious aspect

of these disagreements also highlights what could be a more fundamental disagreement about religious

values and practices; while these may appear irreconcilable, engaging openly and fairly with religious

difference is a necessary component of a plural democratic society.

Competing arguments Studying these cases helped us to see the multiple contests involved in the kinds of situations that,

particularly when framed in religious terms, could escalate and expand into collective violence. Each of

these cases, however, also contained individuals and groups seeking to respond and prevent violence.

These efforts employed various arguments and ways of framing or re-framing the situation that

undermined or directly opposed both the individual contest that appeared primed to escalate and, in some

cases, the larger negative narrative regarding Muslims that was the central focus of M.MAS Working

Paper 1:1. In particular, we think four competing arguments are worth highlighting, because they appear

to have enabled the situations to be de-escalated and because they may have wider application. These

seem to have been critical in the cases described above in reminding people of shared experiences or

solidarities, in forcing people to confront and reconcile contradictory views, and in offering plausible

accounts of the causes of and motivations behind inter-religious violence.

First, consistent among all of the cases was the importance of highlighting the many devastating impacts

of a riot. Those who attempted to defuse tensions emphasized that everyone would suffer if a dispute

48 While many have made this point, one of the most cogent recent versions of this argument specifically related to

Buddhism in Myanmar and the role of scholars in studying it comes from Alicia Turner, who considers the

constructed and contested nature of seemingly stable Buddhist concepts during the colonial period and in the

present. See, Alicia Turner, “Myanmar: Contesting Conceptual Landscapes in the Politics of Buddhism,” Kyoto

Review of Southeast Asia, no. 19 (March 2016), http://kyotoreview.org/issue-19/myanmar-buddhism-conceptual-

landscapes/; Alicia Turner, Saving Buddhism: The Impermanence of Religion in Colonial Burma (University of

Hawaii Press, 2014). 49 Erik Braun, The Birth of Insight: Meditation, Modern Buddhism, and the Burmese Monk Ledi Sayadaw (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2013), 35–38. 50 Swe Win, “Protecting Cows - a Buddhist Tradition Revived?”

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turned into wider violence, regardless of religious identity. In each case, they had compelling recent

examples to draw on, of the other destructive instances of inter-religious conflict in Myanmar’s recent

history. Drawing attention to the potential effects of a riot was also a way of making people conscious of

the power they held to escalate tensions further or not. In Case Study 2, for example, the squatters’

advocate made a strong case that, if riots occurred as a result of the mother taking up the monk’s offer to

seek revenge, she and her family would likely be held responsible, if not legally, then at least within the

community or the wider area. She also emphasized how poor squatters were particularly vulnerable, being

affected by lack of trade and communication, but also living in conditions that would be especially

susceptible to destruction by fires set during a riot. Or, in the words of one interviewee from Case Study

3: “No one has a comfortable life. There are no rich people, no businesspeople… If conflict were to

occur, everybody’s livelihoods would be affected.”51

Second, interviewees emphasized alternative pathways for resolving the disputes at hand, particularly

intervention via state authorities. In Case Study 2, for example, the core approach of the squatters’

advocate was to pair her emphasis on the negative impacts of calling for revenge with using the law for

punishing the man who killed the woman’s son. At the same time, the delicacy of such an approach was

emphasized to us when the squatters’ advocate entreated us not to contact the mother lest we disrupt a

precarious calm. The murder case was not resolved; a potential call for revenge could still be made.

Third, people drew on past experiences of solidarity, inter-dependence, or peaceful coexistence with

neighbours of other religions. In Case Study 3, people were able to draw on the experience of collective

suffering during a destructive weather event and the relief activities that followed as a way of reminding

others of a point of commonality. Those who intervened were also able to invoke another important event

in the past, of the time when a fire threatened the monasteries in the town. At the time, large numbers of

Muslim youth had helped to put out a fire and saved materials from the monasteries and the monks

themselves. Recalling this event in the midst of tense negotiations over cattle slaughtering was a way of

reminding Buddhists that, despite different religious practices, Muslims considered themselves to be

members of the community, contributing to the collective welfare. Interviewees in Case Study 1,

meanwhile, repeatedly mentioned the power of their collective local civic identity, which they believed

was an important factor in overcoming inter-religious tensions, not only in the context of the rumour

described in the case, but throughout a time period when the area saw aggressive anti-Muslim organizing,

especially among monks. Throughout, those who sought to intervene to calm tensions noted the

interdependence of the religious communities in a number of different aspects, despite whatever conflicts

might arise between them. Varshney would categorize these aspects of interdependence as “everyday”,

which he argued is less resilient during times of tension and conflict because it is less institutionalized.52

We do not dispute his claim about the importance of institutionalized webs of communal solidarity—but

these cases illustrate ways in which “everyday” experiences of interdependence and solidarity can also be

leveraged to promote peace even at difficult moments.53

Finally, interviewees emphasized that the tense situation and apparent potential for conflict was the effect

of political machinations. This argument viewed inter-religious tension as having been orchestrated by

51 Male, 38 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 52 Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 9. 53 Connecting the first and third arguments in this section, although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be

valuable to conduct further study of the effectiveness of this argument regarding mutual suffering, in relation to

varying levels of socio-economic interdependence within different communities. Another important consideration is

whether what Varshney’s categories of “everyday” vs “institutionalised” do not effectively capture dynamics of

exchange and relationality in Myanmar, where, in large part due to decades of state repression, informal structures

and arrangements might be more meaningful and influential in people’s lives. This is a question that warrants further

examination.

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people in power. Some versions of the narrative speculate (or claim) that religious identities, insecurities

and fears are being used as a way of undermining the NLD. One interviewee in Case Study 1 explained

that, since 2013, particularly with the student protests (that began in late 2014), it has become more

apparent to people that conflicts have an element of political manipulation:

“When there was a political conflict…at first people only focused on the religious conflict. After

the student protest, [these religious conflicts] appeared to be tricks of the military government. If

we compare the current situation and the situation in the past, [people’s] views are changing.”54 Another interviewee related similar sentiments regarding instigation in the lead-up to the 2015 election,

arguing that those people were attempting to cause problems for the election, but since local people

wanted the election to go ahead, they were willing to work together to avoid conflict:

“This problem happened before the election, so people have started to understand the situation.

They [the local people] didn’t want the election to be postponed, so people used election-related

language to prevent the conflict.”55

Recognizing other types of violence Each of the four cases discussed in this paper failed to escalate into wider violence and reflecting on how

this came to pass has been instructive for us. Yet at the same time, some of the factors that interviewees

believed had helped to avoid riotous violence have negative aspects that must also be considered. There is

much positive to take away from the four “negative cases” studied here, but we feel compelled to close

with three concerns that might dampen our optimism.

First, the unstated premise lurking under the analysis by some interviewees is that culpability for violence

centres on the actions of the group that is a minority in terms of demography as well as political power.

One woman in Case Study 4, for example, explained the value of what she saw as the non-confrontational

behaviour of Muslims in her area: “They just live peacefully by themselves and they controlled

themselves. And they do not live very proudly.”56 A Buddhist man who described the meeting in Case

Study 1 that seems to have dissipated religious tensions, spoke about the conduct of Muslim participants

in the following way: “The Muslim group [at the meeting] was the minority and they apologized to other

religious groups. Even if other factors stimulated the rumours, they also apologized for that. Whatever it

was, they didn’t put themselves on the same level with the other groups, and they stepped down and

apologized to others, to have a better relationship with other groups and show respect to all.”57

This does not mean that our interviewees’ causal accounts were incorrect; it does seem clear that the

incidents in these places did not escalate in part due to the deferential and submissive actions of Muslim

leaders. It also appears to have been a wise strategy—and perhaps the only option—for non-Buddhists

seeking to avoid worsening an already tense situation. But our concern is with the degree to which it

implies that, if the incidents had escalated, the blame would have then rested with the Muslim minorities

involved. While recognizing that Muslims can and have been antagonists, such an assessment is

problematic because it suggests that the central precondition for peace is that Muslim populations in

Myanmar keep quiet. This shifts focus away from any others who are involved in violence, including

those who encourage and enact it. An interviewee in Case Study 4, for example, illustrates how this can

play out even between friends: “Muslims [here] are very social. They do not live isolated [from others].

You can make jokes with them about eating pork.”58 Willingness to allow joking about one’s religious

54 Female, 25 years old, Muslim. 55 Male, 25 years old, Buddhist. 56 Female, 31 years old, Christian. 57 Male, 35 years old, Buddhist, local CSO leader. 58 Female, 31 years old, Christian.

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practices or beliefs might be a hallmark of a tolerant and flexible religiously plural society, but this is not

the case if the tolerance is not mutual; recent events suggest that similar flexibility is not displayed toward

jokes or comments about Buddhism.59

Second, local accounts of riotous violence that attribute instigation and participation to “outsiders” or

political machinations can be challenging to interpret. On the one hand, such claims should not be

casually dismissed as conspiracy theories. Cases like the July 2014 riots in Mandalay, which were later

found to have been deliberately instigated, bear out much of these concerns, though the ultimate

motivations of those involved remain opaque. It is also hard to look at Case Study 1, in which some

individual or group appears to have systematically and deliberately attempted to foment tension and

distrust, and not conclude that similar machinations were afoot. The other three cases, meanwhile, also

involved individuals and groups who were working hard towards ends that risked escalating those

particular conflicts into something larger. This is not to say that the outcome they desired was a riot—but

it is understandable that those in the immediate area would look at such events and conclude that there are

those who desire further violence. This dynamic is even more prevalent in other areas where we have

done research, where individuals appeared to work in coordinated ways to plan and implement riots that

did occur. Though we made no detailed study of such claims they sound strikingly similar to the

“institutionalized riot systems” Brass described and, insofar as violence in Myanmar is potentially

organized in a systematic fashion, anyone working towards peace must engage with this potential directly.

But, perhaps just as important, these case studies show that the mere presence of this suspicion—

whatever the empirical reality—can be an effective counter argument leveraged by those seeking to

promote peace, since it can encourage people to be sceptical of claims made by those seeking to escalate

conflict.

On the other hand, even if inter-religious violence is instigated deliberately, it is also the case that there

are many others who join in, support, or at least tacitly condone it. The insistence that violence is

primarily a function of conflicts in the larger political transition (or triggered and conducted by

“outsiders”) can thus obscure deeper problems. In a general sense, this can inhibit efforts to honestly

engage with discriminatory or exclusionary attitudes towards religious minorities—Muslims as well as

other non-Buddhists. And in a more specific sense, claims by residents of locales in which riots occurred

that it was not “their own” who committed acts of violence can be an obstacle to assigning culpability for

particular actions.

Finally, preventing riotous violence is not the same thing as promoting peace. We can find useful

guidance from Johan Galtung’s classic distinction between “negative” and “positive” peace: “negative

peace which is the absence of violence, absence of war—and positive peace which is the integration of

human society.”60 The cases here entailed work to avoid some forms of violence, but this work is not

necessarily mutually exclusive with violence in other forms. Those interviewed in every case, for

59 One recent example is Ma Ba Tha’s vehement response to a portrayal of the Buddha wearing headphones by a bar owner with dual UK-New Zealand citizenship and two of his Burmese employees, mounting a public campaign for

prosecution that resulted in sentences of two and a half years with hard labour. To be clear, the purpose of this

comparison is not to suggest that Buddhists should not have been insulted by the image of the Buddha in

headphones. It is merely to point out that (minority) Muslim populations in Myanmar might be forced into tolerating

insults about their religion (that others might think are simply jokes) because they are not in a position to complain,

knowing that their best chance of avoiding violence is to maintain a low profile. See Reuters, “Burma Jails New

Zealand Bar Manager over ‘Insulting’ Buddha Images,” The Guardian, March 17, 2015, sec. World news,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/burma-jails-new-zealand-bar-manager-over-insulting-buddha-

images. 60 Johan Galtung, “An Editorial,” Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (1964): 1–4,

doi:10.1177/002234336400100101; see also Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of

Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167–91.

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example, discussed their reasons for intervening in terms of the potential damage to either their own

community or to the prestige of their own religion. Indeed, this motivation was an important counter

argument in their efforts to prevent violence; it helped convince people to assist in de-escalation or not

engage in activities that could further inflame communal tensions.

However, the twin to this argument is that it ceases to function where the escalation of violence poses no

threat to the protagonists’ own community. In Case Study 2, for example, it may have been possible to

dissuade a call for revenge on the basis of concern for subsequent repercussions. But concern for such

repercussions can do little to militate against other forms of violence. The impact of systemic

discrimination and disenfranchisement can be just as devastating as a riot, but it does not pose the same

risk of fire that spreads beyond the homes of those initially targeted.

Similarly, insofar as religious framings that attribute negative characteristics to all followers of Islam

remain in wide circulation, the risk of escalation will also persist. Recognition of this is particularly

relevant in light of new violence in parts of Rakhine State since October 2016. Religious framings will be

effective ways for instigators to brand Muslims in other parts of Myanmar as extremists by virtue of their

religion and work to escalate violence as an extension of anti-terrorism operations in Rakhine State. The

competing arguments discussed in this paper may not effectively counter such claims.

We do not raise these concerns as criticism of the ways in which escalating violence was countered and

avoided in these four cases. Those involved seem to have made the best of difficult situations. Their

actions were necessary—we just mean to say that they are not alone sufficient. They may prevent riots,

but the apparent quiet that follows is not peace. To be sure, some of these cases illustrate dynamics that

helped to prevent escalating violence but could also undergird work to promote peace. These include the

arguments about shared local civic identity, for example, as seen in Case Study 1; shared forms of

vulnerability born from poverty, as seen in case studies 2 and 3; or common experiences of hardship and

cooperation to surmount difficulties or respond to local crises, as seen in Case Study 4. These arguments

are born from lived experiences in Myanmar. They are in circulation and can help to promote peace, in

the form of maintaining and encouraging forms of coexistence and solidarity that already exist. We

should do our best to support them.

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