faction polarization and ideological realignment in south...

Faction Polarization and Ideological Realignment in South Korea 1

* Ewha Womans University; E-mail: [email protected]

KOREA OBSERVER, Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 2018, pp.1-23

© 2018 by INSTITUTE OF KOREAN STUDIES.

https://doi.org/10.29152/KOIKS.2018.49.1.1

Faction Polarization and Ideological

Realignment in South Korea

Jongkon Lee*

Several studies have emphasized the ideological mismatch between political parties and the

mass public in Korea. In spite of party polarization, Korean citizens have tended to be

ideologically moderate. This mismatch has been a puzzle, in that ordinary citizens are likely

to realign their ideologies following those of political elites. This article provides the key

to the puzzle regarding faction polarization in a political party. The intraparty conflicts among

political moguls' personal factions rather than inter-party conflicts led to the ideological

realignment of Korean citizens. In particular, fierce bilateral confrontation of Liberty Korea

Party (LKP) factions has led to faction polarization that increased not only the number of

extremely conservative citizens but also that of moderate people. Compared to the LKP,

the Democratic Party (DP) was less likely to cause faction polarization, because of multilateral

conflicts among small factions, which led to single-peaked ideological realignment at slightly

progressive points.

KeyWords: Korean political party, personal faction, faction polarization, ideological realignment

I. Introduction

In South Korea, several studies have argued that the ideological stances of political

parties have become polarized since the 2000s (Kang 2012, Ka 2016), whereas the Korean

mass public has been moderate (Lee 2011, Chae 2014). According to the Joongangilbo

Ideology Survey, the proportion of moderate legislators decreased to about 20% in the

late 2000s, whereas the ratio of moderate citizens has been stable and significant at around

40% in Korea (Lee 2011). The electoral surveys performed by the Korean Social Science

Data Center (KSDC) reaffirmed this fact. The KSDC surveys measured Korean citizens'

2 Jongkon Lee

2008 2012 2014 2016 2017

Most Conservative (10)+

7.00% 9.07% 3.06% 1.19% 1.71%

Median (5)+

28.24% 28.73% 25.03% 25.64% 24.87%

Most Progressive (0)+

3.05% 3.35% 0.41% 0.85% 1.79%

Ideological Variance 5.71 5.82 4.25 3.63 4.54

+

Note: the number of parenthesis means the 11 Likert-scale ideological positions in KDSC surveys.

Source: Data based on the surveys performed by KDSC

Table 1. Ideological Positions of Korean Citizens

Figure 1. Party Polarization in Korean Politics

Source: Data based on the surveys performed by Jungangilbo and KDSC

ideological positions and their inferences about Korean political parties' ideologies on

11-point Likert scales (0 through 10; a larger number indicates conservative ideology).1

The survey said that Korean citizens perceived that the ideological distance between two

major Korean political parties—the Democratic Party (DP) and the Liberty Korea Party

(LKP)—has broadened. In contrast, the ideological variance of Korean citizens has

decreased, and the ratio of ideologically extreme citizens has also decreased during the

2000s and 2010s (see Table 1).

To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the party polarization phenomenon in Korea. The KSDC

carried out public opinion surveys about the perceived ideologies of the LKP and the

1. The surveys were related to the elections of South Korea. There were National Parliament elections in 2004, 2008,

2012, and 2016. Then, KSDC performed surveys immediately after the elections. The data of 2014 was related to

the 6th local elections, whereas that of 2017 was related to the 19th presidential election.


DP, whereas Joonangilbo asked legislators about their subjective ideologies. Both surveys

indicate that the ideological gap between the LKP and the DP has increased recently.

In contrast, Korean citizens themselves believed that their ideologies were relatively

moderate compared to the party ideologies. According to the 2016 KSDC survey, LKP

supporters believed that their average ideology was 6.60 and that of LNP was 7.47. DP

supporters answered that their average ideology was 4.12 and that of the DP was 3.46.

This ideological mismatch is a puzzle. Because it is very hard for ordinary citizens

to have consistent ideologies and make ideological decisions by themselves (Converse

1964), they frequently refer to political elites regarding political ideas or activities

(Carmines and Stimson 1989, Zaller 1992, Hetherington 2001). In particular, political

parties have been the most convenient references for ordinary citizens in making political

choices (Rahn 1993). In other words, the ideologies of the aggregate bodies of political

elites (i.e., political parties) should be influential in the ideological realignment of the

mass public. In reality, several studies have argued that the policy preferences and

ideologies of Korean political parties have affected those of Korean citizens (Song 2015,

Chae 2014). Nevertheless, the proportion of moderate Korean citizens has always been

high in spite of party polarization (Lee 2011, Chae 2014).

This article discusses the puzzle in terms of faction conflict in Korean political parties.

In Korea, the political influence of political parties' brand names has been limited. Instead,

political moguls and their personal factions have dominated Korean politics (Lee 2014).

As a result, Korean citizens' ideological realignment might have been affected more by

intraparty faction conflicts than by inter-party conflicts. In particular, significant faction

conflicts might produce faction polarization among party supporters, which could increase

the ratio of moderate citizens. Faction polarization refers to the surge of two extreme

ideological positions among party factions.

II. Theory and Hypothesis:

Faction conflict and Polarization in South Korea

A. Party, Faction, and Political Cue in Korean Politics

The political ideology of individual citizens could be identified from the top down

and from the bottom up (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). In a bottom-up manner, diverse

4 Jongkon Lee

personality and individual differences may affect ideological tendencies. For example,

socioeconomic status (Naumann, Benet-Martínez, and Espinoza 2016) and genetic factors

(Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005) could have affected ideological development.

Nevertheless, the ideological continuum is a high-level abstraction, and it is very hard

for ordinary citizens to hold consistent preferences across contexts (Converse 1964).

Instead, they are likely to receive and accept political cues from political elites (Zaller

1992). Political cues imply informational shortcuts for ill-informed citizens to infer

candidates' ideological stances, personal capabilities, and moralities (Bartels 2000, Lupia

1994, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). They allow citizens to interpret complex

political issues efficiently given their bounded cognitive capabilities (Lupia 1994). Thus,

effective cues in politics significantly affect electoral outcomes.

In reality, a plethora of political science studies explained the formation of ideology

in a top-down fashion (Feldman 1988, Sniderman and Bullock 2004, Carmines and

Stimson 1989). In particular, political parties as aggregate bodies of political elites have

been believed to have a significant impact on the ideological development of ordinary

citizens (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, Gilens and Murakawa 2002, Petersen, Slothuus,

and Togeby 2010). By providing informational shortcuts (i.e., party cues), political parties

allow citizens to behave ideologically consistently (Petersen et al. 2013). In this sense,

Sniderman (2000, 81) said, "Citizens can overcome informational shortfalls about politics,

not because they (mysteriously) can simplify public choices effectively, but because these

choices are systematically simplified for them." As a result, partisan-ideological sorting

could be made in the mass public (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, Bafumi and Shapiro

2009, Mason 2015). In particular, during election times, when the electoral campaign

can affect citizens' perception of party positions, the partisan-ideological sorting could

be realigned (Fernandez-Vazquez 2014).

However, partisan cues have been relatively weak in Korean politics (Dalton and

Weldon 2007). According to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data, 65% of

Korean people did not identify with a party during 1996-2000 (Schmitt 2002), and the

partisan independence ratio reached even 71.5% in 2000 (So and Hyun 2006). Likewise,

depending on KSDC surveys, only about 30% of Korean citizens answered that political

party was the most important factor in their voting decisions.2 Instead, the relative

2. For example, according to the KSDC survey in 2016, about 33.2% of Korean citizens answered that political parties

are the most important factor in voting, whereas 35.6% of the people answered that personality or morality is more

important.


importance of political moguls and their personal factions in a political party was much

greater (Heo 2013).3 Historically, several political figures who led Korean politics, such

as Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, or Park Chung Hee, have built up their own factions

in political parties and have affected the ideological realignment of Korean citizens. In

recent years, Moon Jae In, Park Geun Hye, Ahn Cheol Soo, and other influential

politicians have established their own factions in political parties and have provided

political cues for ideological realignment to Korean citizens (Lee 2014, Hellmann 2014).

Based on the argument above, Hypothesis 1 could be drawn.

Hypothesis 1: Korean citizens realigned their ideologies depending on the political

cues from favored political moguls and their personal factions.

B. Faction polarization in Korean Politics

Because multiple factions have existed in a political party, Korean citizens have faced

conflicting cues from different factions that belonged to the same party. To illustrate,

in recent years, the most dominant faction of the LKP was led by Park Geun Hye. She

is the daughter of former president Park Chung Hee and had significant political support

in the Northern Gyeongsang region. Thanks to her abundant political resources, she

formed the pro-Park faction in the LKP and provided clear political cues to Korean

citizens—especially those who supported the LKP. However, there were also anti-Park

factions in the LKP. Several party leaders, such as Lee Myung Bak, Chung Mong Joon,

Kim Moon Soo, and Kim Moo Sung, have maintained anti-Park factions in the LKP.

Consequently, LKP-supporters faced cues not only from the pro-Park faction but also

from the anti-Park faction. Likewise, in the DP, the faction led by Moon Jae In has

been dominant. Moon Jae In had a personal relationship with former president Roh Moo

Hyun and worked as a chief presidential secretary. Thus, he could succeed Roh's political

legacy, including his political faction in the DP. Similar to the LKP case, there were

several anti-Moon factions in the DP, and DP supporters simultaneously faced political

cues from pro-Moon and anti-Moon factions.

When facing conflicting cues, citizens would refer not only to favored groups (in-group,

hereafter) that they support but also to hostile groups (out-group, hereafter) in realigning

their ideologies (Nicholson 2012, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014). In other words,

3. Not only political parties but also individual politicians could affect the citizens' ideological stances .

6 Jongkon Lee

citizens tend to assimilate their ideologies to those of in-groups and contrast theirs against

out-groups (Levendusky 2018). Thus, the political relationship between factions is

important in realigning political ideologies. When the relationship between in-group and

out-group factions is bilaterally hostile, ideological polarization could result because of

the contrasting effect (Amira 2015, Davis and Mason 2016, Mason 2015, Stroud 2010).

In this manner, the severe bilateral confrontation between two dominant factions might

produce significant faction polarization.

However, the ideological polarization from faction conflicts might be narrower than

that from party polarization. Inter-party conflicts generally occur between a progressive

party and a conservative one, thereby producing two polar points at extremely progressive

and extremely conservative ideologies. In contrast, faction conflicts tend to be one-sided.

For example, both pro-Park and anti-Park factions of the LKP were conservative, despite

their relative ideological difference. Thus, the ideological sorting of LKP supporters might

be placed only on the conservative side. As a result, the right endpoint of the LKP's

faction polarization should be extremely conservative ideology, and the left endpoint

would be an only minimally conservative ideology that is close to a moderate ideology

(i.e., moderately conservative or moderate). Likewise, the endpoints of the DP's faction

polarization would be extremely progressive and minimally progressive points (around

a moderate point).

This theoretical argument explains the puzzle of Korean citizens' ideological distribution.

Because the influence of political moguls' personal factions has been significant, and their

conflicts have been severe, faction polarization has happened in Korean politics.

Consequently, faction polarization has pushed a significant number of Korean citizens to

moderate points.

Hypothesis 2: When bilateral faction conflict in a political party is significant, faction

polarization could result. The faction polarization would increase not only

the number of ideologically extreme citizens but also that of moderate

(i.e., between progressive and conservative ideologies) citizens.

C. Asymmetric Faction Conflicts in Korean Politics

In Korean politics, faction conflicts have been prevalent in both the LKP and the

DP. However, the characteristics of the faction conflicts have been slightly different in

the political parties. In the LKP, two big factions collided with each other seriously,


especially during the 2000s and the early 2010s. In particular, during National Assembly

election times, the two factions were in conflict over candidate nomination. Depending

on which faction in power, different candidates could be nominated in a top-down manner.

As a result, the citizens who supported the LKP also had conflicting cues from two

powerful factions.

In the LKP, faction conflicts have been related to Park Geun Hye for more than

a decade. In the late 2000s, the pro-Park faction was a relatively minor faction in the

LKP, because Park Geun Hye was defeated in the LKP's presidential primary in 2007,

and Lee Myung Bak was elected the Korean president. As a result, many pro-Park

legislators failed to be nominated by the party. Some of them temporarily left the LKP

and ran for the election as the candidates of the Pro-Park Alliance or as independent

candidates. The Pro-Park Alliance was the name of the political party that was temporarily

established by the defected pro-Park faction members in 2008. Nevertheless, the pro-Park

faction in the LKP was robust. Because Park Geun Hye was highly supported by the

Northern Gyeongsang region—the most important political base of the LKP—the pro-Park

faction could confront the anti-Park faction even in the late 2000s. In the early 2010s,

the faction conflict of the LKP was still fierce and the political power of the pro-Park

faction gradually increased. Park Geun Hye emerged as the most dominant presidential

candidate of the LKP. In addition, pro-Park legislators who were elected as independent

candidates or as members of the Pro-Park Alliance rejoined the LKP in 2011. As a result,

the pro-Park faction grew significantly and directly confronted the anti-Park faction. Then,

in contrast with the 2008 National Assembly election, many anti-Park legislators failed

to be nominated in 2012 because of faction conflict. This severe bilateral faction conflict

promoted faction polarization of the LKP on the conservative side. Finally, after Park

Geun Hye was elected in the 2012 presidential election, the pro-Park faction dominated

the LKP. Several anti-Park faction leaders, such as Kim Moo Sung and Ryu Seung Min,

could not directly confront the pro-Park faction. In other words, the LKP's bilateral faction

confrontation was relieved during the mid-2010s, as the pro-Park faction definitely

controlled the LKP. Even during 2016 National Assembly election, pro-Park legislators

publicly distinguished "trustworthy" pro-Park people from anti-Park legislators in the

nomination process.

Compared with the LKP, there were several personal factions in the DP. Thus,

multilateral faction conflict happened in the DP. For example, in 2008, Chung Dong

Young, Sohn Hak Kyu, the successors of Roh Moo Hyun (e.g., Ahn Hee Jung), the

8 Jongkon Lee

successors of Kim Dae Jung (e.g., Park Jie Won), and some other powerful politicians

established their own factions in the DP. However, their public popularity was limited,

and their factions hardly provided appealing cues to citizens. Moreover, Sohn Hak Kyu

and other DP politicians did not have sufficient public popularity. As a result, it was

hard for citizens to have attractive cues from the DP during the late 2000s, and could

not contrast their cues to those of other factions. In addition, even though the DP factions

were generally in conflict, they also frequently coalesced with each other, at least loosely,

because the small and unpopular factions needed to work together with other factions

to unite their political resources. Thus, the bilateral contrast in ideological realignment

was limited in the DP. A similar situation persisted in the early 2010s. Political moguls,

such as Moon Jae In, Kim Doo Kwan, Sohn Hak Kyu, Chung Sye Kyun, Chung Dong

Young, and Kim Han Gil, established their own personal factions in the DP. Also, in

the mid-2010s when several powerful politicians (e.g., Kim Han Gil, Ahn Cheol Soo,

and Park Jie Won) defected from the DP and established a new party, People's Party,

Moon Jae In, Kim Chong In, Sohn Hak Kyu, Chung Sye Kyun, and others led their

own personal factions in the DP. These multilateral faction competitions limited the

bilateral contrast in ideological realignment. In addition, unlike the fierce confrontation

between pro-Park and anti-Park factions in the LKP, the pro-Moon faction has relatively

dominated the party in the 2010s. Consequently, limited faction polarization might happen

in the DP.

Hypothesis 3: At least since the mid-2000s, faction polarization tends to be significant

on the conservative side, because of the significant faction conflict of

the LKP. In contrast, it might be limited on the progressive side.

III. Hypothesis Testing: Ideological Distribution of the Mass Public

To examine the effect of faction conflict on ideological realignment, several regression

tests were performed, using KDSC survey data on the National Assembly elections in

2008, 2012, and 2016. The dependent variable was the ideological stances of individual

citizens, and the major independent variables were the perceived ideological positions

of faction leaders. The KDSC used 11-point Likert scales (0 through 10; a larger number

indicates conservative ideology) to measure (perceived) ideological stances.

In the LKP, the most dominant faction has been the pro-Park faction. Thus, for the


LKP-related regression, the perceived ideologies of Park Geun Hye were included. In

addition, the perceived ideologies of several publicly well-known anti-Park politicians,

such as Chung Mong Joon (2008 and 2012), Kim Moon Soo (2012), and Kim Moo

Sung (2016), were also included in regression models. Chung Mong Joon had been one

of the potential presidential candidates in the LKP and publicly supported Lee Myung

Bak in the 2007 presidential election against Park Geun Hye. In the early 2010s, Kim

Moon Soo and Chung Mong Joon were in conflict with Park Geun Hye, especially over

the LKP's presidential candidate, and were supported by the anti-Park faction. Kim Moo

Sung was the LKP chairperson during the mid-2010s, led the anti-Park faction, and

frequently criticized Park Geun Hye during her presidency. The regression models were

repeatedly tested with three different sample groups. The first group was all the supporters

of the LKP (i.e., the people who strictly preferred the LKP to any other Korean political

parties). The second group of people included the supporters of Park Geun Hye (i.e.,

the people who strictly preferred Park Geun Hye to other LKP's politicians, such as

Chung Mong Joon, Kim Moon Soo, and Kim Moo Sung) among the LKP supporters.

The third group was those who supported the LKP, but whose most preferred politician

was not Park Geun Hye.

This model and sample selection rules were also applied to DP-related regressions.

The only difference was that the second and third groups were defined in terms of Moon

Jae In supporters in 2012 and 2016, and Chung Dong Young supporters in 2008. Because

the most dominant faction in the DP was related to Moon Jae In and Chung Dong Young

in recent years, the sample groups were divided in terms of the supporters of these

politicians. In addition, several faction leaders' perceived ideologies were included in

the DP-related regressions: Sohn Hak Kyu (2008 and 2012) and Kim Chong In (2016).

Sohn Hak Kyu participated in the presidential primaries of the DP, in 2007 against Chung

Dong Young and in 2012 against Moon Jae In. Also, he was the DP's chairperson in

2008 and during the early 2010s. Kim Chong In belonged to the LKP for a long time

and was one of Park Geun Hye's main advisors. However, he joined the DP as chairperson

of the Emergency Planning Commission after the resignation of Moon Jae-in as party

leader in 2016. Even though he could not establish a big faction in the DP, he led the

2016 National Assembly election and provided an important cue to DP supporters.

In addition to these independent variables, several demographic factors were inserted

because bottom-up ideology establishment might be possible. Several studies have argued

that income might have a curvilinear effect on ideological stances (Kang 2013, Lee 2015,

10 Jongkon Lee

Han 2013); income and the squared value of income were inserted. In addition, it has

been well known that regional background has been highly related to ideological stances.

In particular, the residents of Northern Gyeongsang and Southern Gyeongsang tended

to be conservative, whereas Jeolla citizens were relatively progressive. Thus, these

regional variables were also inserted as dummies. In addition, education level, gender,

and age were also included in the regression models.4

A. LKP's Faction Conflict and Ideological Realignment

The regression results of LKP supporters' ideological realignment are specified in

Table 2. The LKP supporters' ideologies were generally affected by the perceived ideologies

of Park Geun Hye in 2008, 2012, and 2016. However, depending on the most preferred

politician, the voters realigned their ideologies differently.

In 2008, regression tests were performed three times with different groups. Model

1-1 included all the LKP supporters. Model 1-2 and Model 1-3 were for the groups

who most preferred Park Geun Hye, or not.5 The same sampling rule was consistently

applied to other ideological realignment models. For Model 1-2, citizens tended to realign

their ideologies following that of Park Geun Hye. However, Model 1-3 indicates that

they realigned with Chung Mong Joon, instead of Park Geun Hye. In other words,

statistically significant independent variables for the perceived ideologies of political

moguls were different between Models 1-2 (Park Geun Hye) and 1-3 (Chung Mong Joon).

That implies significant cue conflict among LKP supporters. Likewise, in 2012, regression

results show that the political cue of Park Geun Hye was not influential for the LKP

supporters who did not prefer Park Geun Hye the most (Model 1-6), even though Park

Geun Hye's perceived ideology was influential for those who supported her. In contrast,

in 2016, the perceived ideology of Park Geun Hye affected all kinds of LKP supporters.

These results indicate that the faction conflict of the LKP was highly significant in 2008

and 2012, but somewhat relieved because of the dominance of the pro-Park faction in

4. Income was measured by monthly household income. The KDSC surveyed income with 10 groups in 2008, 12 groups

in 2012, and 8 groups in 2016. Education was measured by 8 groups in 2008, 9 groups in 2012, 4 groups in 2016.

Higher value indicates more education. Gender was inserted as a dummy (1: male, 0: female).

5. The KDSC surveyed the citizens' preferences for important politicians. The people who answered that they most

preferred LKP to any other parties and that they preferred Park Geun Hye more than any other politician, including

the leaders of the anti-Park faction, were sampled for Model 1-2. The people of Model 1-3 were the LKP supporters

who did not most prefer Park Geun Hye.


Year 2008 2012 2016

Sampled People+

LKPLKP &

Park

LKP &

~ParkLKP

LKP &

Park

LKP &

~ParkLKP

LKP &

Park

LKP &

~Park

Model NameModel

1-1

Model

1-2

Model

1-3

Model

1-4

Model

1-5

Model

1-6

Model

1-7

Model

1-8

Model

1-9

Park Geun Hye

Ideology

.280*

(.128)

.649***

(.130)

.145

(.164)

.543***

(.087)

.616***

(.092)

.296

(.217)

.287***

(.076)

.321***

(.095)

.241†

(.122)

Chung Mong Joon

Ideology

.326**

(.107)

-.067

(.163)

.418**

(.131)

.030

(.076)

.079

(.089)

.188

(.226)

Kim Moon Soo

Ideology

-.134*

(.056)

-.084

(.064)

-.293***

(.085)

Kim Moo Sung

Ideology

.180**

(.062)

.276***

(.065)

.009

(.098)

Income.175

(.246)

.174

(.304)

.356

(.318)

-.880

(.605)

-1.533*

(.653)

.274

(1.113)

.501†

(.284)

.265

(.306)

.830

(.515)

Income Squared-.005

(.020)

-.001

(.024)

-.022

(.027)

.170

(.103)

.271*

(.116)

-.018

(.202)

-.050†

(.029)

-.027

(.037)

-.074

(.046)

Education-.140†

(.084)

.004

(.120)

-.191†

(.114)

.126

(.094)

.064

(.105)

.169

(.191)

-.051

(.097)

.099

(.094)

-.206

(.181)

Gender.159

(.274)

.016

(.419)

.330

(.374)

.223

(.271)

-.274

(.314)

.974*

(.461)

-.037

(.137)

-.280†

(.158)

.395†

(.230)

Age.038**

(.012)

.030*

(.015)

.044**

(.017)

.044***

(.012)

.035*

(.015)

.052†

(.028)

.033***

(.006)

.030***

(.008)

.042***

(.012)

Northern

Gyeongsang

.723

(.495)

.419

(.787)

.891

(.614)

.870*

(.354)

1.339**

(.458)

.558

(.554)

.417†

(.215)

-.028

(.294)

1.022**

(.323)

Southern

Gyeongsang

.570

(.384)

.686

(.485)

.450

(.466)

-.115

(.339)

.327

(.323)

-1.092

(.672)

-.364*

(.182)

-.548*

(.223)

.376

(.369)

Jeolla++ -1.097***

(.289)

.523

(.932)

-1.095*

(.485)

-1.509†

(.824)

-1.518

(.929)Omitted

-2.674***

(.362)

-1.982***

(.399)Omitted

Constant.627

(1.083)

-.208

(1.403)

.540

(1.464)

1.455

(1.236)

2.344†

(1.308)

.263

(2.592)

.509

(1.042)

.212

(.945)

.309

(2.112)

N 162 56 106 148 101 47 396 255 141

R-Squared .376 .511 .378 .444 .520 .572 .311 .422 .265

Robust standard errors in parentheses, † Significant at .10 level, * Significant at .05 level, **Significant at .01

level, ***Significant at .001 level (two-tailed)

Note: + LKPS means all the LKP supporters. LKP & Park means LKP supporters who most preferred Park Geun Hye.

LKP & ~Park means LKP supporters who did not most prefer Park.++

Jeolla variable was omitted in some models because of a collinearity problem.

Table 2. Regression Tests on the LKP's Ideological Realignment

2016. This regression generally approves Hypothesis 1, that Korean citizens realigned

their ideologies because of the political cues from favored political moguls and their

personal factions.

In addition, according to Hypothesis 2, the fierce bilateral faction conflict of the LKP

might increase faction polarization on the conservative side. The faction polarization of

12 Jongkon Lee

Figure 3. LKP's Relieved Faction polarization in 2016

Figure 2. LKP's Faction polarization in 2008 and 2012

the LKP in 2008 and 2012 can be observed in Figures 2-1 and 2-2. Figure 2-1 is the

ideological distributions of the LKP supporters who did not most prefer Park Geun Hye.

In contrast, Figure 2-2 shows those who most preferred Park Geun Hye.6 As expected

in Table 2, there was faction polarization during this period. In the ideological distribution

of Park Geun Hye supporters, extremely conservative ideology peaked, whereas the

6. In 2012, only the LKP supporters who most preferred Park Geun Hye were sampled. However, in 2008, because

of the collective defection of pro-Park faction members and the establishment of the "Pro-Park Alliance," previous

LKP supporters refused to express their preference for the party. To correct the bias, those who believed that Park

sincerely represented their opinions were sampled, even when they were Pro-Park Alliance supporters or did not

express their party preferences.


Year 2008 2012 2016

Sampled People+

DPSDPS &

Chung

DPS &

~ChungDPS

DPS &

Moon

DPS &

~MoonDPS

DPS &

Moon

DPS &

~Moon

Model NameModel

2-1

Model

2-2

Model

2-3

Model

2-4

Model

2-5

Model

2-6

Model

2-7

Model

2-8

Model

2-9

Moon Jae In

Ideology

.665***

(.093)

.831***

(.188)

.633***

(.106)

.405***

(.047)

.484***

(.078)

.340***

(.061)

Chung Dong

Young Ideology

.467**

(.147)

.422*

(.166)

.470†

(.252)

Sohn Hak Kyu

Ideology

.068

(.166)

.189

(.211)

-.183

(.269)

.077

(.079)

.060

(.161)

.057

(.091)

Kim Chong In

Ideology

.307***

(.047)

.303***

(.081)

.310***

(.062)

Income.950

(.609)

1.512

(.897)

1.429

(1.251)

.768

(.773)

1.967†

(.987)

.444

(.980)

.357

(.290)

-.080

(.433)

.682

(.371)

Income Squared-.068

(.051)

-.131

(.073)

-.089

(.095)

-.169

(.133)

-.368*

(.163)

-.096

(.171)

-.027

(.030)

.027

(.046)

-.066†

(.037)

Education-.256†

(.146)

-.181†

(.249)

-.269

(.224)

-.171†

(.095)

.067

(.186)

-.236*

(.115)

-.080

(.089)

.133

(.119)

-.150

(.129)

Gender.515

(.584)

.415

(.779)

1.650†

(.937)

-.065

(.299)

-.154

(.650)

-.022

(.347)

-.189

(.146)

-.145

(.206)

-.210

(.211)

Age-.002

(.024)

.035

(.044)

-.037

(.027)

-.001

(.013)

.055*

(.020)

-.009

(.015)

.010

(.007)

.013

(.010)

.009

(.008)

Northern

Gyeongsang++

2.366*

(.894)Omitted

2.678

(1.575)

.638

(.623)Omitted

.608

(.638)

.324

(.409)

.469

(.593)

.221

(.555)

Southern

Gyeongsang

-.361

(1.182)

-1.763

(.859)

.244

(1.217)

-.729†

(.425)

-.414

(.795)

-.642

(.533)

-.016

(.181)

.506†

(.288)

-.271

(.241)

Jeolla.731

(.811)

.654

(.1.366)

1.767*

(.748)

.304

(.374)

.487

(.604)

.370

(.426)

.622**

(.206)

.684**

(.225)

.587†

(.324)

Constant.831

(2.531)

-2.645

(5.029)

1.245

(3.098)

1.715

(1.583)

-4.611

(2.730)

2.951

(1.845)

-.105

(.843)

-.727

(1.354)

-.029

(1.031)

N 63 34 29 158 30 128 308 134 174

R-Squared .473 .550 .561 .420 .720 .360 .500 .583 .476



Note: +

DPS means all the DP supporters. DPS & Chung (or Moon) means DP supporters who most preferred Chung Dong

Young (or Moon Jae In). DOS & ~Chung (or Moon) means DP supporters who did not most prefer Chung (or Moon).++

Northern Gyeongsang variable was omitted in some models because of a collinearity problem.

Table 3. Regression Tests on the DP's Ideological Realignment

minimally conservative (i.e., moderate) point also peaked for other LKP supporters who

did not like Park Geun Hye.

However, the trend has changed during the mid-2010s. Models 1-7, 1-8, and 1-9

show that Park Geun Hye affected the ideological realignment of all kinds of LKP

supporters in 2016, which implies relieved faction conflict. During this period, the

14 Jongkon Lee

Figure 4. DP Supporters' Ideological Distribution in 2008, 2012, and 2016

pro-Park faction totally dominated the LKP. As a result, faction polarization was also

relieved. Figure 3 shows that the LKP supporters' ideological distributions similarly

peaked at a moderately conservative point without polarization in 2016, regardless of

their preferred political moguls/factions. Surely, ideological distribution of supporters for

a specific party is dependent on many conditions including the existence of third parties

and presidential issues. Despite the limitation, Figures 2 and 3 indicate that there might

be significant ideological realignment among LKP supporters.

B. DP's Faction conflict and Ideological Realignment

Different from the LKP case, the DP's faction conflicts have tended to be multilateral.

Not only Chung Dong Young and Moon Jae In, but also plenty of politicians have

established their own factions in the DP. However, relative to the public popularity of

Moon Jae In and Chung Dong Young, there were no highly popular political moguls

in anti-Moon or anti-Chung factions, because there were too many small factions in the

DP, and their conflicts were less noticeable, compared to the LKP's fierce bilateral

confrontation.

As a result, DP supporters could not employ the cues from anti-Moon factions in

2012 and 2016, even when they did not most prefer Moon Jae In. Likewise, even though

the ideological sorting of Chung Dong Young was relatively limited in 2008 (partly

because he was defeated in the 2007 presidential election in a landslide), DP supporters


were likely to use his cue in ideological realignment, because there was no other

remarkable option. Table 3 indicates this situation. All kinds of DP supporters have

realigned their ideologies similarly. Without fierce bilateral faction conflicts, there was

limited faction polarization in the DP. Extremely progressive ideologies have been absent

compared to the extremely conservative ideologies in the LKP.

Consequently, the ideological distribution of DP supporters tended to be bell-shaped,

proving Hypothesis 3. DP supporters' ideologies also peaked at moderate points (at four

or five in Figure 4), thereby increasing the number of moderate citizens. Similar to the

LKP that contributed to increasing moderate citizens under faction polarization, the DP

also positively affected the growth of moderate citizens. However, the moderation has

happened without faction polarization.

As a consequence of the faction politics of the LKP and the DP and subsequent

ideological sorting, there were plenty of moderates, as Figure 5 indicates. However, as

faction polarization was limited in the LKP, the ratio of moderate citizens declined in

the mid-2010s. In addition, a slightly asymmetric ideological distribution of all Korean

citizens emerged in 2008 and 2012. There were some extremely conservative citizens

because of faction polarization in the LKP, whereas there were few extremely progressive

citizens. However, this trend was also relieved. The ratio of extremely conservative people

also decreased, as faction polarization of the LKP disappeared.

Figure 5. Korean Citizens' Ideological Distribution in 2008, 2012, and 2016

16 Jongkon Lee

Sampled People LKP Supporters Korean Citizens

Year (DV Dummy)+

2008 (10) 2012 (10) 2016 (10) 2008 (4,5,6) 2012 (4,5,6) 2016 (4,5,6) 2016 (4,5,6)

Model Name Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 3-4 Model 3-5 Model 3-6 Model 3-7

Park Geun Hye

Ideology

2.756**

(.899)

.688**

(.218)

1.591

(1.151)

-.146**

(.046)

-.176**

(.055)

-.114*

(.051)

-.109*

(.050)

Chung Mong Joon

Ideology

.218

(.264)

-.039

(.119)

.046

(.043)

-.050

(.052)

Kim Moon Soo

Ideology

-.144†

(.085)

.027

(.049)

Kim Moo Sung

Ideology

-.084

(.162)

-.044

(.043)

-.039

(.043)

Moon Jae In

Ideology

.004

(.056)

.120**

(.042)

.109*

(.042)

Chung Dong

Young Ideology

.040

(.046)

Sohn Hak Kyu

Ideology

-.036

(.051)

.084

(.054)

Ahn Cheol Soo

Ideology

.108**

(.040)

Kim Jong In

Ideology

.136**

(.046)

.108*

(.047)

Income-.376

(1.168)

-.633

(1.056)

1.335

(1.282)

-.085

(.146)

.134

(.451)

.369

(.222)

.356

(.219)

Income Squared.035

(.095)

.116

(.184)

-.163

(.140)

.005

(.013)

-.022

(.078)

-.041

(.024)

-.039

(.024)

Education-.267

(.300)

.223

(.171)

.169

(.353)

.073

(.060)

-.034

(.070)

.065

(.078)

.065

(.078)

Gender.785

(.1.172)

-.378

(.473)

-.123

(.479)

-.326†

(.174)

-.226

(.187)

.013

(.131)

.011

(.131)

Age.021

(.040)

.051†

(.029)

.061

(.037)

-.012†

(.007)

-.025**

(.008)

-.013*

(.005)

-.014**

(.005)

Northern

Gyeongsang

.620

(.1.147)

.808

(.600)

.154

(.734)

.759

(.289)

-.806*

(.361)

-.193

(.230)

-.184

(.229)

Southern

Gyeongsang

1.437

(.2.040)

-.306

(.551)

-.853

(1.009)

.007

(.272)

.182

(.240)

.569**

(.179)

.482**

(.180)

Jeolla++

Omitted Omitted Omitted.934**

(.333)

.631†

(.360)

.775***

(.235)

.834***

(.238)

Constant-28.180**

(10.109)

-9.326**

(2.929)

-22.807

(14.233)

.755

(.755)

1.779†

(.992)

-.195

(.785)

-.465

(.796)

N 166 182 398 606 563 1118 1118

Log

pseudolikelihood-17.643 -68.494 -40.931 -394.957 -344.103 -717.75 -713.86



Note: +

The numbers in parentheses explain how to make dummy variables. When the number in a parenthesis is 10, the

value regarding ideological stance was recoded into 1. Others were recoded into 0.++

Jeolla was omitted in some models because of a collinearity problem.

Table 4. Regressions for Extreme Ideology Determinants


C. Extreme and Moderate Ideology Determinants in Korean Politics

Depending on the previous argument, extremely conservative ideological realignment

might be positively affected by the perceived ideology of Park Geun Hye in 2008 and

2012, when faction polarization was significant. To examine the argument more rigorously,

the effect of the perceived ideology of Park Geun Hye was reexamined, with extremely

conservative ideology as a dependent variable. To measure the dependent variable, a

dummy variable was made; in the 11-Likert ideology scale of the KDSC, 10 was recoded

1, other values were recoded 0. Then, Table 4 reaffirmed the argument that the perceived

ideology of Park Geun Hye positively affected the extremely conservative ideological

realignment in 2008 and 2012. In contrast, as expected, the variable is not statistically

significant in 2016, because of the limited faction conflict of the LKP.

In addition, in terms of moderate ideology, the cue from Park Geun Hye was also

highly meaningful. For Models 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, and 3-7, a dummy variable of moderate

ideology was employed as the dependent variable; in the 11-Likert ideology scale of

KDSC, 4, 5, and 6 were recoded 1, other values were recoded 0. As seen at Table

2, LKP supporters who did not want to follow Park Geun Hye's ideological stances moved

far away from the perceived ideological points of Park Geun Hye. They realigned their

ideologies at the minimally conservative (i.e., moderate) points. In other words, a bilateral

contrast in ideological realignment happened for the cue from Park Geun Hye. On the

other hand, the perceived ideologies of the DP politicians (e.g., Moon Jae In and Kim

Jong In) positively affected the ideological realignment of moderate people. In addition,

Ahn Cheol Soo, who belonged to the DP prior to 2016, also led the moderate ideological

realignment in the mid-2010s. Different from the case of Park Geun Hye, assimilation

in ideological realignment increased the number of moderate citizens.

IV. Ideological Realignment in 2017

During late 2016, there was a significant political change in Korea. President Park

Geun Hye was impeached by the National Assembly on charges related to influence

peddling. As a result, the pro-Park faction became significantly weak in 2017. Before

the 2017 presidential election, Hong Jun Pyo who has never been related to the pro-Park

faction was nominated as the presidential candidate of the LKP. Even after his defeat

18 Jongkon Lee

Figure 6. DP and LKP Supporters' Ideological Distribution Change in 2017

in the presidential election, Hong was elected as the chairperson of the LKP in July

2017. The political transformation of the LKP destroyed the political cue from Park Geun

Hye. Moreover, her cue could not be inherited by other pro-Park politicians such as

Kim Jin Tae or Seo Cheong Won, because of their limited popularity. As a result, the

faction conflict between two big factions in the LKP could not persist. In reality, regarding

the impeachment, many anti-Park faction members defected from the LKP and established

a new party named the "Bareun Party." As a result, the faction conflict of the LKP

and subsequent faction polarization has been minimal in 2017. Figure 6-2 compares the

ideological distribution of LKP supporters in 2012, 2016, and 2017. The data of 2017

was also from KDSC's electoral survey immediately after the 19th presidential election.

In 2012, there was faction polarization in the LKP, thereby producing two peaked points

in ideological realignment. However, the ideological distribution of the LKP became

single-peaked without polarization at the moderately conservative point. In 2017, the

ideological distribution has been more sharply single-peaked than in 2012 and 2016.

In addition, Figure 6 indicates the possibility of partisan sorting that has been hidden

by faction polarization. Following party polarization, the supporters of the DP became

more progressive, while those of the LKP became more conservative. Admittedly, this

trend might be related to factional cohesion/fractionalization instead of partisan sorting.

The progressive trend of DP supporters could be caused by the party's significant split

in early 2016, regardless of partisan sorting. Moreover, it is highly probable that

exceptional political moods that were related to the presidential impeachment made the


partisan sorting only temporary. Progressive and conservative people have been in severe

conflict for several months over the impeachment, and the ideological polarization of

Korean citizens could emerge regardless of party polarization. Despite that, it is also

probable that the phenomenon might not be exceptional.

V. Conclusion

Faction conflict has been significant in Korean politics and has affected electoral

politics and party politics for a long time (Lee 2014). Despite that, there have been

few studies to interpret the effect of faction conflict on the ideological distribution of

Korean citizens. Even though political parties have been highly important in Korean

politics, they have been less powerful in ideological realignment. Because Korean party

organizations have been weak, and thus easily destroyed by political environments, Korean

citizens have been more interested in the decisions and behaviors of political moguls

and their personal factions. In particular, when there was a significant intraparty faction

conflict, the party supporters have become narrowly polarized. Admittedly, there might

be a circular causation between faction polarization and the ideological realignment of

Korean citizens. Despite that, as many political behavior studies have argued, elite cues

are meaningful in determining the ideological stances of the public, and the variance

of elite cues derived from faction polarization would affect the Korean citizens' ideological

realignment.

However, faction conflict was asymmetric between the DP and the LKP. While LKP

faced a bilateral confrontation between pro-Park and anti-Park factions, the DP's faction

conflicts were somewhat multilateral and were dominated by a pro-Moon faction recently.

As a result, faction polarization has been significant only on the conservative side.

Especially in 2008 and 2012, among LKP supporters, those who preferred Park Geun

Hye moved to extremely conservative positions, but those who did not most prefer Park

Geun Hye tended to be only minimally conservative. The faction polarization contributed

to increasing the number of moderate citizens. However, as the pro-Park faction definitely

dominated the LKP, faction polarization has been reduced in the mid-2010s. In reality,

the ratio of moderate citizens relatively decreased in the mid-2010s (see Figure 5). In

contrast, relative to the LKP, the DP's faction conflicts were multilateral, and the

pro-Moon faction has been relatively dominant. Therefore, fierce bilateral faction collision

20 Jongkon Lee

was generally absent in the DP. As a result, even though there were some faction conflicts

in the DP, their bilateral contrast in ideological realignment was insignificant. All kinds

of DP supporters have tended to sort their ideologies similarly, thereby producing a

bell-shaped ideological distribution around slightly progressive points.

Considering that faction conflict has affected the ideological realignment of Korean

citizens, the recent transformation of Korean politics might be highly meaningful. Since

the 2017 presidential election, faction conflicts in the DP and the LKP have significantly

changed. The impeachment of Park Geun Hye and the weakening of the pro-Park faction

relieved bilateral faction conflicts in the LKP. Likewise, the election of Moon Jae In

as the 19th Korean President increased the internal power of the pro-Moon faction in

the DP. Thus, the bilateral confrontation between two big factions might disappear both

in the LKP and in the DP at least temporarily, thereby limiting their faction polarization.

Instead, the hidden effect from party polarization could grow; mass polarization could

follow party polarization, instead of (intraparty) faction polarization. In reality, the

ideological realignment of Korean citizens has gradually polarized in recent years as

Figure 6 indicates.

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Received 25 August 2017

Received in revised form 16 December 2017

Accepted 19 January 2018

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