F22 analysis

Mismanagement● Costs grew, orders were reduced:

– 1986 – 750 planes– 1991 – 648– 1993 – 442– 1997 – 339– 2003 – 279– 2005 – 178

Mismanagement● Lt Gen Daniel Darnell estimated that USAF will be

short of it 2250 fighters requirement by 800 aircraft in 2024

● “fly before you buy” policy abandoned – bugs discovered and hastily patched up during production – or not patched up at all

Costs● In 2011, F22s flyaway cost 250 million USD● Unit procurement cost 411 million USD● Operating cost – 61 000 USD per hour● F15C flyaway cost 100 million USD, operating cost

30 000 USD per hour● F16 flyaway cost 60 million USD, operating cost 5

000 USD per hour● F22 electronics not federated – upgrade requres

replacement of entire electronics suite

F22 numbers● Too few – more stress on single airframe, degrades

faster, more maintenance required, impact on training

● Only 50 planes avaliable for Pacific theatre, 50 for European theatre, 80 for home defense – insignificant numbers in any possible war against China

● Only 130 F22s are combat-coded● In 2009, unit avaliability 60%● 180 F22s bought can generate 60 combat sorties /

day – F16s bought for same cost – 1480 sorties

Number Total sorties0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

F15F16F22

Number of planes Number of sorties flownFor same cost

F15

F16

F22

F15

F16

F22

Effects of training● US commander in Gulf War: “Had we exchanged

equipment with the enemy, result would have been same.”

● In '70s and '80s, instructors in F5s whipped studensts who flew F14, F15 and F4

BVR vs WVR combat● BVR (beyond visual range) combat cannot be relied

on– Low probability of kill – between 7 and 8 %– Iraqi and Serbian planes had no ECM or radar; did

not manouver– Forces turn off radar and IFF to avoid being tracked

● WVR combat– Probability of kill 15% for IR missiles, 31% for gun– Allows visual identification of target

Effects of numbers● Lanchester square criteria

– Per-unit combat effectiveness of outnumbered side must be square of outnumbering side's numerical advantage just for outnumbered side to break even

– In WW2, USAF had quantitative advantage; in both Gulf wars and in Operation Allied Force, USAF had both qualitative and quantitative edge

F22s shortcomings● 26 % increase in weight lead to thrust-to-weight

ratio and wing loading inferior to that of F15C; promised increase in manouverability not achieved

● Fuel fraction decreased from 0,36 to 0,28 – insufficient persistence

● Supersonic cruise ability worse than that of F15● Very large – very visible in visual, infrared and

acoustic spectrum● Radar can be sensed by advanced RWRs –

imprudent to rely on it as main battlefield sensor

F22 shortcomings● No passive sensors that can detect non-radiating

enemy fighter● Weapons held in bays / covered by doors due to

stealth requrements – unable to perform quick shots

Anti-stealth● UHF radars display continual increase in capacities● Long wavelength (VHF) radar can easily detect any

stealth fighter due to their dimensions creating resonance; stealth coatings ineffective for reasons of physics

● IRST – can detect fighters from distances of 50+ km; missile launch can be detected from 90 km

● Passive radar – forces VLO fighter to rely on IRST or risk being detected by using its own radar

Anti-stealth● LIDAR – Light Detection And Ranging – can

detect particles from exhaust at distance of beyond 100 km

● Background scanning – stealth fighter shows as a hole in data in front of background being scanned

● Multistatic radar – emitter and receiver not in same place

● Over-the-horizon radar

Anti-stealth● Acoustic detection● LPI radar uses narrow spread of frequencies; can be

detected by spread-spectrum RWR

Exercises● Exercises featuring F22 with F15s have been set-up

to play on F22s strengths – F22s always Blue force; Red force not allowed to use radar detectors, IRST, anti-radiation missiles; BVR missiles assigned wishfully high probability of kill

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