ezell v. city of chicago

8/6/2019 Ezell v. City of Chicago

1/59

In theUnited States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh CircuitNo.103525

RHONDAEZELL,etal.,

PlaintiffsAppellants,

v.

CITYOFCHICAGO,

DefendantAppellee.

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt

fortheNorthernDistrictofIllinois,EasternDivision.

No.10cv5135VirginiaM.Kendall,Judge.

ARGUEDAPRIL4,2011DECIDEDJULY6,2011

BeforeKANNE,ROVNER,andSYKES,CircuitJudges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. For nearly three decades, the

City of Chicago had several ordinances in place

effectively banning handgun possession by almost all

privatecitizens.McDonaldv.CityofChicago,130S.Ct.3020,

3026 (2010). In 2008 the Supreme Court struck

down a similar District of Columbia law on an original

Thisopinion isreleased intypescript;aprintedversionwill

follow.


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2 No.103525

meaning interpretation of the Second Amendment.1

District ofColumbiav.Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 63536 (2008).

Heller held that the Amendment secures an individual

righttokeepandbeararms,thecorecomponentofwhichis

t h e r i g h t t o p o s s e s s o p e r a b l e f i r e a r m s

handguns includedfor selfdefense, most notably in

thehome.Id.at59295,599,62829.

Soon after the Courts decision in Heller, Chicagos

handgun ban was challenged. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at3027. The foundational question in that litigation was

whether the Second Amendment applies to the States

and subsidiary local governments. Id. at 3026. The

Supreme Court gave an affirmative answer: The

Second Amendment applies to the States through the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

at 3050. In the wake of McDonald, the Chicago City

Council lifted the Citys lawsbanning handgun posses

sion and adopted the Responsible Gun Owners

Ordinanceintheirplace.

The plaintiffs here challenge the City Councils treat

ment of firing ranges. The Ordinance mandates one

hour of range training as a prerequisite to lawful gun

ownership, see CHI. MUN. CODE 820120, yet at the

same time prohibits all firing ranges in the city, see id.

820080.TheplaintiffscontendthattheSecondAmend

1 TheSecondAmendmentprovides:AwellregulatedMilitia,

beingnecessary to thesecurityofa freeState, therightof thepeople to keep andbear Arms, shall notbe infringed. U.S.

CONST.amend.II.


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No.103525 3

ment protects the right to maintain proficiency in

firearm useincluding the right to practice marks

manship at a rangeand the Citys totalban on firing

ranges is unconstitutional. They add that the Ordinance

severelyburdens the core Second Amendment right to

possess firearms for selfdefense because it conditions

possession on range training but simultaneously

forbids range training everywhere in the city. Finally,

they mount a First Amendment challenge to the

Ordinance on the theory that range training is protected

expression.Theplaintiffsaskedforapreliminaryinjunction,

butthedistrictcourtdeniedthisrequest.

Wereverse.Thecourtsdecisionturnedonseverallegal

errors. Tobe fair, the standards for evaluating Second

Amendment claims are just emerging, and this type

of litigation is quite new. Still, the judges deci

sion reflects misunderstandings about the nature of the

plaintiffsharm,thestructureofthiskindofconstitutional

claim, and the proper decision method for evaluatingallegedinfringementsofSecondAmendmentrights.Onthe

presentrecord,theplaintiffsareentitledtoapreliminary

injunctionagainstthefiringrangeban.Theharmtotheir

SecondAmendmentrightscannotberemediedbydamages,

their challenge has a strong likelihood of success on the

merits,andtheCitysclaimedharmtothepublicinterestis

basedentirelyonspeculation.


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No.103525 5

onJuly12,2010.Togiveasenseofitsscope:TheOrdinance

prohibitshandgunpossessionoutsidethehome,CHI.MUN.

CODE820020,andthepossessionoflonggunsoutside

thehomeortheownersfixedplaceofbusiness,id.820

030.Itforbidsthesaleorothertransferoffirearmsexcept

throughinheritanceorbetweenpeaceofficers.Id.820100.

Apersonmayhavenomorethanonefirearminhishome

assembled and operable. Id. 820040. The Ordinance

banscertainkindsoffirearms,includingassaultweapons

andunsafehandgun[s],aswellascertainfirearmaccesso

riesandtypesofammunition.Id.820060,820085,820

170.

The Ordinance also contains an elaborate permitting

regime. It prohibits the possession of any firearm

withoutaChicagoFirearmPermit.CHI.MUN.CODE820

110(a). (Certain publicsafety and privatesecurity pro

fessionalsareexempt.)Inaddition,allfirearmsmusthavea

registrationcertificate,andtoregisterafirearm,theowner

musthaveavalidPermit.2Id.at820140(a),(b).Toapply

2 Onceissued,aChicagoFirearmPermitisvalidforthreeyears.

CHI.MUN.CODE820130(a).Anyregistrationcertificateexpires

withthePermit.ThePermitfeeis$100;theregistrationcertificate

fee is $15. Id. 820130(b), 820150(a). An application for a

registration certificate must be submitted no later than 5

businessdaysafterapersontakespossessionwithinthecityofa

firearm from any source, id. 820140(d), and registration

certificates

are

subject

to

an

annual

reporting

requirement,

id. 820145(c). Failure to file an annual report regarding each

registered firearm may result in revocation of the owners

(continued...)


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6 No.103525

for a Permit, a person must have an Illinois Firearm

OwnersIdentificationCard.Id.820110(b)(2).Onlythose

21yearsofageoroldermayapplyforaPermit,exceptthat

apersonbetweentheagesof18and20mayapplywiththe

writtenconsentofaparentorlegalguardianiftheparentor

guardian is not prohibited from having a Permit or a

Firearm Owners IdentificationCard. Id. 820110(b)(1).

PersonsconvictedofcertaincrimesmaynotobtainaPermit.

Id.820110(b)(3)(disqualifyingpersonsconvictedofany

violent crime, a second or subsequent drunkdriving

offense, or an offense relating to the unlawful use of a

firearm). Other lawsuits challenging these and other

provisionsof theOrdinancearecurrentlypending in the

DistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofIllinois.See,e.g.,

SecondAmendmentArmsv.CityofChicago,No.10C4257

(N.D.Ill.filedJuly9,2010);Bensonv.CityofChicago,No.10

C4184(N.D.Ill.filedJuly6,2010).

As relevant here, permits are conditioned upon com

pletionofacertifiedfirearmsafetycourse.Applicantsmustsubmit an affidavit signed by a statecertified

firearminstructorattestingthattheapplicanthascompleted

acertifiedfirearmsafetyandtrainingcoursethatprovides

atleastfourhoursofclassroominstructionandonehourof

r a n g e t r a i n i n g . 3 C H I . M U N . C O D E 8 2 0

2 (...continued)

registrationcertificate,hisPermit,orboth.Id.820145.

3 The Ordinance provided a 90day grandfathering period

afteritseffectivedateduringwhichpreviouslyacquiredfirearms

(continued...)


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No.103525 7

120(a)(7). At the same time, however, the Ordinance

prohibits all [s]hooting galleries, firearm ranges, or any

otherplacewherefirearmsaredischarged.Id.820280.

TheOrdinancealsoprohibitsthedischarge[of]anyfirearm

withinthecity,makingnoexceptionforcontrolledshoot

ingatafiringrangebecause,ofcourse,firingrangesare

bannedthroughoutthecity.4Id.824010.

Violationsarepunishablebyafineof$1,000to$5,000and

incarcerationforatermofnotlessthan20daysnormorethan90days,and[e]achday thatsuchviolationexists

shallconstituteaseparateanddistinctoffense.CHI.MUN.

CODE820300(a),(b).Thepenaltiesgoupforsubsequent

convictions.Id.820300(b)(For[a]nysubsequentconvic

tion,thepenaltyisafineof$5,000to$10,000andincarcera

tionforatermofnotlessthan30days,normorethansix

months.).

The firingrangeban does not apply to governmental

agencies. Id.820280.Thefederalgovernmentoperates

fourindoorfiringrangesinChicago,andtheChicagoPolice

Department operates five. Apparently, the City

also exempts private security companies; there are

3 (...continued)

couldbe registered. CHI. MUN. CODE 820140(d)(2).To take

advantageofthisprovision,afirearmownerhadtocompleteall

oftheprerequisitesforaPermit,includingafirearmsafetycourse

withonehourofrangetraining.

4 Thereareexceptionsfordischargingafirearminselfdefense

or in defense of another, and also for gamebird hunting

incertainlimitedareasofthecity.Id.824010.


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8 No.103525

two indoor firing ranges operated by private security

companiesinChicago.5

B. TheLitigation

The plaintiffs are three Chicago residents, Rhonda

Ezell, William Hespen, and Joseph Brown; and three

organizations, Action Target, Inc.; the Second Amend

ment

Foundation,

Inc.;

and

the

Illinois

State

Rifle

Associa

tion. Action Target designs, builds, and furnishes

firingrangesthroughouttheUnitedStatesandwouldliketo

dosoinChicago.TheSecondAmendmentFoundationand

the Illinois Rifle Association are nonprofit associations

whose members are firearms enthusiasts; among other

activities,theseorganizationsadvocateforSecondAmend

mentrightsandhavemadearrangementstotrytobringa

mobilefiringrangetoChicago.

The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order

(TRO),apreliminaryinjunction,andapermanentinjunc

tionagainsttheCitysbanonfiringranges,andcorrespond

ingdeclaratoryreliefinvalidatingtheban.Thedistrictcourt

twice denied a TRO, finding that the plaintiffs were

5 We say apparently because it is not clear whether the

exception allowing private security companies to operate

firing ranges is codified. The Ordinance contains an exemp

tionforprivatesecuritycontractorsatsection820020(b),butthis

exemption

appears

to

apply

only

to

the

provision

of

the

Ordi

nancemakingitunlawfulforanypersontocarryorpossessa

handgun,exceptwheninthepersonshome,id.820020(a),

nottosection820280,theprovisionbanningfiringranges.


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No.103525 9

notirreparablyharmed.Thepartiesconductedexpedited

discovery, and the court held a twoday hearing on the

preliminaryinjunction motion. The plaintiffs presented

the testimony of representatives of Action Target, the

Second Amendment Foundation, and the Illinois Rifle

Association.Declarationsfromthethreeindividualplain

tiffswerealreadyintherecord,sotheydidnottestify.

TheCity called two witnesses: Sergeant Daniel Bartoli,

aformerrangemasterfortheChicagoPoliceDepartment,and Patricia Scudiero, Chicagos Zoning Commissioner.

Bartoli testified that firing ranges can carry a risk of

injury from unintentional discharge and raised concerns

about criminals seeking to steal firearms from range

users.Healsoexplainedthepossibleproblemofcontamina

tion from lead residue left on range users hands after

shooting.Heidentifiedvariousmeasuresthatafiringrange

shouldtaketoreducetheserisks.Topreventtheft,hesaid

a range should have a secure parking lot and only one

entrance into its facilities. To avoid injury from unintentionaldischarge,arangeshouldprovideaseparatelocation

fortheloadingandunloadingoffirearmsandshoulderect

a permanent, opaque fence to deter bystanders from

congregating around the facility. He also said a range

shouldhaverunningwateronsitesouserscanwashlead

residuefromtheirhandsaftershooting.

ScudierotestifiedthatChicagoszoningcodeprohibitsall

property uses not expressly permitted and contains


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No.103525 11

theplaintiffsaskedthecourttoconsiderthepreliminary

injunctionhearingasatrialonthemerits.SeeFED.R.CIV.P.

65(a)(2)(permittingthecourttoadvancethetrialonthe

meritsandconsolidateitwiththe[preliminaryinjunction]

hearing).Thecourtdeclinedtodosoandtookthematter

underadvisement.

C. TheDecisionBelow

Soon after the hearing, the district court issued a

decision denying preliminary injunctive relief because

the plaintiffs were neither irreparably harmed nor likely

tosucceedonthemerits.Thecourtsdecisionisabithardto

follow;standingandmeritsinquiriesaremixedinwiththe

courtsevaluationofirreparableharm.Aswewillexplain,

thecourtmadeseveralcriticallegalerrors.Toseehowthe

decision got offtrack requires that we identify its key

holdings.

Thejudgebeganbydeclin[ing]toadopttheintermediatescrutinystandardofreview,butheldinthealternativethat

evenifintermediatescrutinyapplied,the[p]laintiffsstill

fail to meet their burden of demonstrating irreparable

harm.Thejudgesaidtheorganizationalplaintiffsdonot

havethenecessarystandingtodemonstratetheirirreparable

harmbecauseHellerandMcDonaldaddressedanindivid

ualsright topossessa firearmbutdidnotaddressan

organizationsright.Again,thecourtpurportedtoenteran

alternativeholding:Eveniftheorganizationshadstand

ingtoassertaclaimunderHellerandMcDonald,theyfailedtopresentsufficientevidence...thattheirconstituencyhas

beenunabletocomplywiththestatute.Thecourtheldthat

none of the plaintiffs were suffering irreparable


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12 No.103525

harmbecause the injury in question was limited to the

minorcostandinconvenienceofhavingtotraveloutsidethe

citytoobtaintherangetrainingnecessarytoqualifyfora

Permit and money damages would be sufficient

to compensate the plaintiffs for this travelrelated injury

iftheyultimatelyprevailed.

On the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits,

the judge was skeptical that the firingrange ban

violated anyones Second Amendment rights: Suggesting that firing a weapon at a firing range is tanta

mount to possessing a weapon within ones residence

for selfdefense wouldbe establishing law that has not

yetbeenexpandedtothatbreadth.IftheSecondAmend

ment was implicated at all, thejudge characterized the

claim as a minor dispute about an inconvenient permit

requirement: [T]he [c]itys boundaries are merely

artificial borders allegedly preventing an individual

fromobtaininga[firearm]permit....Thecourtconcluded

that the Citys evidence about straybullets, potentialtheft,and leadcontaminationwassufficienttoshow that

thesafetyofitscitizens isatriskwhencomparedtothe

minimalinconvenienceoftravelingoutsideofthe[c]ityfor

aonehourcourse.

Finally, the judge concluded that the balance of

harms favored the Citybecause the potential harmful

effects of firing ranges outweighed any inconvenience

the plaintiffs might experience from having to travel to

rangesoutsideofChicago.Thecourtsummarilyrejectedthe

plaintiffsFirstAmendmentclaim,findingitunderdevel

oped.Alternatively,thecourtheldthattherangebandid

notappeartoimplicateanyexpressivemessage.


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No.103525 13

Theplaintiffsappealed.See28U.S.C.1292(a)(1)(autho

rizing immediate appeal of a decision granting or

denyinginjunctiverelief).

II. Analysis

Towinapreliminaryinjunction,apartymustshowthat

ithas(1)noadequateremedyatlawandwillsufferirrepa

rable

harm

if

a

preliminary

injunction

is

denied

and

(2)somelikelihoodofsuccessonthemerits.SeeChristianLegal

Socyv.Walker,453F.3d853,859(7thCir.2006);Joelnerv.

Vill.ofWash.Park,378F.3d613,619(7thCir.2004);Abbott

Labs.v.MeadJohnson&Co.,971F.2d6,1112(7thCir.1992).

Ifthemovingpartymeetsthesethresholdrequirements,the

district court weighs the factors against one another,

assessingwhetherthebalanceofharmsfavorsthemoving

partyorwhethertheharmtothenonmovingpartyorthe

publicissufficientlyweightythattheinjunctionshouldbe

denied.

Christian

Legal

Socy,

453

F.3d

at

859.

We

review

thecourts legal conclusions de novo, its findings of fact

forclearerror,anditsbalancingoftheinjunctionfactorsfor

anabuseofdiscretion.Id.

The district court got off on the wrong foot by

accepting the Citys argument that its ban on firing

r a ng e s c a u s e s o nl y m i ni m a l ha r m t o the

plaintiffsnothingmorethantheminorexpenseandincon

venience of traveling to one of 14 firing ranges

locatedwithin50milesofthecitylimitsandthisharmcan

b e a d e q u a t e l y c o m p e n s a t e d b y m o n e ydamages.Thischaracterizationoftheplaintiffsinjuryfun

damentally misunderstands the form of this claim


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No.103525 15

We note first that the district court did not address

theindividualplaintiffsstanding,probablybecauseitisnot

in serious doubt. Ezell, Hespen, and Brown are Chicago

residents who own firearms and want to main

tain proficiency in their use via target practice at

afiringrange.Ezellisthevictimofthreeattemptedburglar

ies and applied for a Chicago Firearm Permit to keep a

handgun in her home forprotection. Hespen is aretired

Chicago police detective who maintains a collection of

handguns, shotguns, and rifles. Brown is a U.S. Army

veteran who was honorably discharged after service in

WorldWarII;heiscurrentlychairmanoftheMarksman

shipCommitteeoftheIllinoisunitoftheAmericanLegion

andteachesajuniorfirearmscourseatanAmericanLegion

post outside the city. Ezell and Hespen left the city to

completetherangetrainingnecessarytoapplyforaPermit

tolegalizetheirfirearmpossessioninthecity.Brownowns

afirearmthathekeepsoutsidethecityslimitsbecausehe

doesnothaveaPermit.

TheplaintiffsallofthemframetheirSecondAmend

ment claim in two ways. First, they contend that the

Amendment protects the right of lawabiding people to

maintain proficiency in firearm use via marksmanship

practiceandtheCitysabsolutebanonfiringrangesviolates

this right. Second, they contend that the range

ban impermissiblyburdens thecoreSecondAmendment

right to possess firearms in the home for selfdefense

because it prohibits, everywhere in the city, the means

ofsatisfyingaconditiontheCityimposesforlawfulfirearmpossession.Theyseekadeclaration that therangeban is

invalidandaninjunctionblockingitsenforcement.


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16 No.103525

Ezell and Hespen took affirmative steps to comply

with the Ordinances permitting processby completing

the rangetraining requirement outside the city. Brown

did not, so he must keep his firearm outside the city

toavoidviolatingtheOrdinance.ForallthreetheCitysban

onfiringrangesinflictscontinuousharmtotheirclaimed

righttoengageinrangetrainingandinterfereswiththeir

right to possess firearms for selfdefense. These injuries

easilysupportArticleIIIstanding.

Moreover, this is a preenforcement challenge to the

Ordinance. The plaintiffs contend that the Citysban on

firing ranges is wholly incompatible with the Second

Amendment. It is wellestablished that preenforcement

challenges . . . are within Article III. Brandt v. Vill. of

Winnetka,Ill.,612F.3d647,649(7thCir.2010).Theplaintiffs

neednotviolatetheOrdinanceandriskprosecutioninorder

tochallengeit.Schirmerv.Nagode,621F.3d581,586(7thCir.

2010)(Apersonneednotriskarrestbeforebringingapre

enforcement challenge . . . .). The very existence of astatute implies a threat to prosecute, so preenforcement

challengesareproper,becauseaprobabilityoffutureinjury

countsasinjuryforthepurposeofstanding.Bauer,620

F.3dat708.TheCitydidnotquestiontheindividualplain

tiffsstanding;theirinjuryisclear.

Regarding the organizational plaintiffs, however, the

Citys argument led the district court astray. The City

emphasized that the Second Amendment protects an

individual right, not an organizational one, and this

point led the court to conclude that the organizations

do not have the necessary standing to demonstrate their


17/59

No.103525 17

irreparable harm.7 This was error. Action Target, as a

supplieroffiringrangefacilities,isharmedbythefiring

rangeban and is also permitted to act[] as [an] advo

cate[] of the rights of third parties who seek access to

its services. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976)

(allowingbeervendortochallengealcoholregulationbased

onitspatronsequalprotectionrights);seealsoPiercev.Socy

ofSisters,268U.S.510,536(1925)(allowingprivateschools

to assert parents rights to direct the education of their

children and citing other cases where injunctions have

issuedtoprotectbusinessenterprisesagainstinterference

withthefreedomofpatronsorcustomers);MainstreetOrg.

ofRealtors v.CalumetCity, 505 F.3d 742, 74647 (7th Cir.

2007).TheSecondAmendmentFoundationandtheIllinois

Rifle Association have many members who reside in

Chicagoandeasilymeettherequirementsforassociational

standing:(1)theirmemberswouldotherwisehavestanding

tosueintheirownright;(2)theintereststheassociations

seek to protect are germane to their organizational pur

poses;and(3)neithertheclaimassertednorthereliefre

quested requires the participation of individual associa

7 The district courts emphasis on the organizational plain

tiffs standing is puzzling. As we have noted, its clear the

individual plaintiffs have standing. Where at least one

plaintiffhasstanding,jurisdiction issecureand thecourtwill

adjudicate the case whether the additional plaintiffs have

standing

or

not.

See

Vill.

of

Arlington

Heights

v.

Metro.

Hous.

Dev.Corp.,429U.S.252,264(1977);Bondv.Utreras,585F.3d1061,1070

(7thCir.2009);BethunePlaza,Inc.v.Lumpkin,863F.2d525,53031

(7thCir.1988).


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18 No.103525

tion members in the lawsuit. See United Food &

CommercialWorkersUnion Local 751 v. BrownGroup, 517

U.S. 544, 553 (1996); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.

Commn,432U.S.333,343 (1977);DisabilityRightsWis.v.

Walworth Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 522 F.3d 796, 80102

(7thCir.2008).

Thedistrictcourtheldinthealternativethattheorganiza

tional plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence

tosupporttheirpositionthattheirconstituencyhasbeenunable to comply with the statute. More specifically,

thecourtheldthattheplaintiffsfailedtoproduceevidence

ofanyoneresident [ofChicago]whohasbeenunable to

travel to . . .arange [or]hasbeenunable toobtain [the]

rangetrainingrequiredforaPermit.Itsnotclearwhether

theseobservationsweredirectedatstandingorthemerits

ofthemotionforapreliminaryinjunction;thisdiscussion

appearsinthecourtsevaluationofirreparableharm.Either

way,thepointisirrelevant.Nothingdependsonthiskind

ofevidence.Theavailabilityofrangetrainingoutsidethecityneitherdefeatstheorganizationalplaintiffsstanding

norhasanythingtodowithmeritsoftheclaim.Theques

tion is not whether or how easily Chicago residents can

comply with the rangetraining requirement by

traveling outside the city; the plaintiffs are not seeking

aninjunctionagainsttherangetrainingrequirement.The

pertinent question is whether the Second Amendment

prevents the City Council from banning firing ranges

everywhere in the city; that ranges are present in neigh

boringjurisdictionshasnobearingonthisquestion.


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No.103525 19

B. IrreparableHarmandAdequacyofRemedyatLaw

The Citys misplaced focus on the availability of firing

ranges outside the city also infected the district courts

evaluation of irreparable harm. The judges primary

reason for rejecting the plaintiffs request for a pre

liminary injunction was that they had failed to

establish the irreparable harm they have suffered by

requiring them to travel outside of the [c]itysborders

to obtain their firing[]range permits. The judge thusframed the relevant harm as strictly limited to

incidental travelburdens associated with satisfying the

Ordinances rangetraining requirement. The judge

noted that for at least someperhaps manyChicago

residents,complyingwiththerangetrainingrequirement

did not appear to pose much of a hardship at all. She

observedthatitmightactuallybeeasierforsomeChicago

ans to travel to a firing range in the suburbs than to

one located,say,at theoppositeendof thecity ifranges

were permitted to locate within city limits. The judgethought it significant that none of the individual

plaintiffs had testif[ied] that s/he was unable to travel

outside of the [c]itys borders to obtain the onehour

range training and all three have shown that they are

capableofdoingsoandhavedonesointhepast.Thecourt

heldthatalthoughtheOrdinancemayforcetheplaintiffsto

travel longer distances to use a firing range, this was a

quantifiable expense that can be easily calculated as

damages.

This reasoning assumes that the harm to a constitu

tional right is measured by the extent to which it can

be exercised in anotherjurisdiction. Thats a profoundly


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20 No.103525

mistaken assumption. In the First Amendment context,

the Supreme Court long ago made it clear that one is

not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in

appropriate places abridged on the plea that it maybe

exercised in some other place. Schad v. Borough of

Mt.Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 7677 (1981) (quotingSchneider

v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). The

same principle applies here. Its hard to imagine anyone

suggestingthatChicagomayprohibittheexerciseofafree

speech or religiousliberty right within its borders on

the rationale that those rights maybe freely enjoyed in

the suburbs. That sort of argument should be no less

unimaginableintheSecondAmendmentcontext.

Focusing on individual travel harms was mistaken for

another equally fundamental reason. The plaintiffs have

challenged the firingrangeban on its face, not merely

as applied in their particular circumstances. In a facial

constitutional challenge, individual application facts

do not matter. Once standing is established, the plaintiffspersonalsituationbecomesirrelevant.Itisenoughthat

[w]ehaveonlythe[statute]itselfandthestatementof

basis and purpose that accompanied its promulgation.

Renov.Flores,507U.S.292,30001(1993);seealsoNicholas

QuinnRosenkranz,TheSubjectsoftheConstitution,62STAN.

L.REV.1209,1238(2010)([F]acialchallengesaretoconsti

tutional lawwhatresipsa loquitur istofactsinafacial

challenge,lexipsaloquitur:thelawspeaksforitself.);David

L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the

CommerceClause,92IOWAL.REV.41,58(2006)(Avalidrulefacialchallengeassertsthatastatuteisinvalidonitsfaceas

written and authoritatively construed, when measured


21/59

No.103525 21

againsttheapplicablesubstantiveconstitutionaldoctrine,

withoutreferencetothefactsorcircumstancesofparticular

applications.); Mark E. Isserles,OvercomingOverbreadth:

FacialChallengesandtheValidRuleRequirement,48AM.U.L.

REV.359,387(1998)([A]validrulefacialchallengedirects

judicial scrutiny to the terms of the statute itself, and

demonstrates that those terms, measured against the

relevant constitutional doctrine, and independent of the

constitutionality of particular applications, contains a

constitutional infirmity that invalidates the statute in

itsentirety.).

Though she did not specifically mention it, thejudge

might have had the Salerno principle in mind when she

limitedherfocustoindividualtravelharms.UnderSalernoa

lawisnotfaciallyunconstitutionalunlessitisunconstitu

tionalinallofitsapplications.Wash.StateGrangev.Wash.

StateRepublicanParty,552U.S.442,449(2008)(citingUnited

Statesv.Salerno,481U.S.739,745(1987)).Stateddifferently,

[a]persontowhomastatuteproperlyappliescantobtainreliefbasedonargumentsthatadifferentlysituatedperson

mightpresent.8UnitedStatesv.Skoien,614F.3d638,645

8 WenotedinSkoienthattheSalernoprinciplehasbeencontro

versialanddoesnotapplytoallfacialchallenges:[T]heJustices

haveallowedoverbreadthargumentswhendealingwithlaws

thatrestrictspeechandreachsubstantiallymoreconductthanthe

justificationsadvancedforthestatutesupport....UnitedStates

v.

Skoien,

614

F.3d

638,

645

(7th

Cir.

2010)

(en

banc)

(citing

UnitedStatesv.Stevens,130S.Ct.1577,1587(2010)).Overbreadthclaims

areadistincttypeoffacialchallenge.Stevens,130S.Ct.at1587

(continued...)


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22 No.103525

(7thCir.2010)(enbanc)(citingSalerno,481U.S.at745).

Here, the judge zeroed in on the occasional expense

andinconvenienceofhavingtotraveltoafiringrangeinthe

suburbs,butthatsnottherelevantconstitutionalharm.The

plaintiffscontendthattheSecondAmendmentprotectsthe

righttomaintainproficiencyinfirearmuseincludingthe

right totrainatarangeand theCityscompletebanon

rangetrainingviolatesthisright.Theyalsoclaimthatthe

rangebanimpermissiblyburdensthecoreSecondAmendment right to possess firearms at home for protection

because the Ordinance conditions lawful possession on

range training but makes it impossible to satisfy this

condition anywhere in the city. If theyre right, then the

rangebanwasunconstitutionalwhenenactedandviolates

theirSecondAmendmentrightseverydayitremainsonthe

books.Thesearenotapplicationspecificharmscallingfor

individualremedies.

Ina facialchallenge like thisone, theclaimedconstitu

tional violation inheres in the terms of the statute, not

its application. See Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Con

stitution,62 STAN.L.REV. at 122938. The remedy is nec

essarily directed at the statute itself andmustbe injunc

8 (...continued)

(IntheFirstAmendmentcontext,...thisCourtrecognizesa

secondtypeoffacialchallenge,wherebyalawmaybeinvali

dated

as

overbroad

if

a

substantial

number

of

its

applications

areunconstitutional, judged in relation to the statutes plainly

legitimatesweep.(emphasisadded)(quotingWash.StateGrange

v.Wash.StateRepublicanParty,552U.S.442,449n.6(2008))).


23/59

No.103525 23

tive and declaratory; a successful facial attack means

the statute is wholly invalid and cannot be applied to

anyone. Chicagos law, if unconstitutional, is unconstitu

tional without regard to its applicationor in all its ap

plications, as Salerno requires. That is, the City Council

violated the Second Amendment when it made this law;

its very existencestands as a fixed harm to every Chica

goans Second Amendment right to maintain proficiency

infirearmusebytrainingatarange.Thiskindofconstitu

tionalharm isnotmeasuredbywhetheraparticularper

sonsgasolineormasstransitbillishigherbecausehemust

traveltoafiringrangeinthesuburbsratherthanoneinthe

city,asthedistrictcourtseemedtothink.Whateverelsethe

Salernoprinciplemightmeanforthiscase,itneitherrequires

nor supports the district courts approach to irreparable

harm.9

9 Fordifferentviewsof theSalernodoctrineand thestructureofthefacialandasappliedformsofjudicialreview,seegenerally

NicholasQuinnRosenkranz,TheSubjectsoftheConstitution,62

STAN. L. REV. 1209, 124250 (2010); David L. Franklin, Facial

Challenges,LegislativePurpose,andtheCommerceClause,92IOWAL.

REV. 41, 58 (2006); Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the

Structure ofConstitutionalAdjudication:AResponse to Professor

Fallon,113HARV.L.REV.1371(2000);RichardH.Fallon,Jr.,As

AppliedandFacialChallengesandThirdPartyStanding,113HARV.

L. REV. 1321 (2000); Mark E. Isserles,OvercomingOverbreadth:

FacialChallengesandtheValidRuleRequirement,48AM.U.L.REV.

359(1998);MichaelC.Dorf,FacialChallengestoStateandFederalStatutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994); Henry P. Monaghan,

(continued...)


24/59

24 No.103525

Beyond this crucial point about the form of the claim,

forsomekindsofconstitutionalviolations,irreparableharm

ispresumed.See11ACHARLESALANWRIGHTETAL.,FED

ERALPRACTICE&PROCEDURE2948.1(2ded.1995)(When

anallegeddeprivationofaconstitutionalrightisinvolved,

most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable

injury is necessary.). This is particularly true in First

Amendmentclaims.See,e.g.,ChristianLegalSocy,453F.3d

at 867 ([V]iolations of First Amendment rights are pre

sumedtoconstituteirreparableinjuries....(citingElrodv.

Burns,427U.S.347,373(1976))).ThelossofaFirstAmend

mentrightisfrequentlypresumedtocauseirreparableharm

basedontheintangiblenatureofthebenefitsflowingfrom

theexerciseofthoserights;andthefearthat,ifthoserights

are notjealously safeguarded, persons willbe deterred,

even if imperceptibly, fromexercising thoserights in the

future.MilesChristiReligiousOrderv.Twp.ofNorthville,629

F.3d533,548(6thCir.2010)(internalalterationandquota

tion marks omitted); see alsoKHOutdoor, LLC v.City of

Trussville,458F.3d1261,1272(11thCir.2006).TheSecond

Amendmentprotectssimilarlyintangibleandunquantifi

able interests.Heller held that the Amendments central

componentistherighttopossessfirearmsforprotection.

554 U.S. at 59295. Infringements of this right cannotbe

compensatedbydamages.10

9 (...continued)

HarmlessErrorandtheValidRuleRequirement,1989SUP.CT.REV.

195.

10 The City cites our opinion in Campbell v.Miller, 373 F.3d

(continued...)


25/59

No.103525 25

10 (...continued)

834, 835 (7th Cir. 2004), which cautioned against the assump

tionthatmoneyneverisanadequateremedyforaconstitutional

wrong. But Campbell concerned a Fourth Amendment

unreasonablesearch claima claim properly characterized as

a constitutional tort and often . . . analogized to (other)

personalinjurylitigation.Id.InCampbelltheplaintiffcontendedthatjailofficersviolatedtheFourthAmendmentbysubjecting

himtoanunreasonablesearch;theproper,fullyadequateremedy

forthatkindofconstitutionalviolationisdamages.Theconstitu

tionalclaimhereisquitedifferent.Theplaintiffsdonotcontend

thatacityofficialviolatedtheSecondAmendmentbyenforcing

therangebanagainstthem;theycontendthattheCityCouncil

violatedtheSecondAmendmentbyenactingthefiringrangeban

inthefirstplace.Iftheyprevail,theonlyappropriateremedyis

adeclarationthatthefiringrangebanisinvalidandaninjunction

forbiddingitsenforcement.

TheCityalsocitestheFirstCircuitsdecisioninPublicService

Co. ofNewHampshire v.Town ofWestNewbury, 835 F.2d 380,

382(1stCir.1987).InPublicServiceCo.,localregulatorsordereda

nuclearpowerplant to removeutilitypoles from itsproperty

because theywere toohigh.Theplantownersued,alleginga

denialofdueprocess.TheFirstCircuitnotedthatthealleged

denial of procedural due process, without more, does not

automaticallytriggerafindingofirreparableharm.Id.Thecourt

thenaffirmedthedenialofpreliminaryinjunctivereliefbecause

theprospectsofanyirreparabledamagewerespeculativeand

the

owner

had

little

likelihood

of

success

on

the

merits.

Id.

at

383.Public Service Co., like Campbell, does not help the City. An

improperorderrequiringtheremovalofutilitypolescaneasily

beremediedbydamagesnotsowiththeconstitutionalviola

(continued...)


26/59

26 No.103525

In short, for reasons related to the form of the claim

and the substance of the Second Amendment right, the

plaintiffs harm is properly regarded as irreparable and

havingnoadequateremedyatlaw.

C. LikelihoodofSuccessontheMerits

Having rejected the plaintiffs claim of irreparable

harm,

the

district

court

only

summarily

addressedwhether they were likely to succeedon themerits.Early

on in her decision, thejudge said she would not apply

intermediatescrutinytoevaluatetheconstitutionalityofthe

range banand by implication, rejected any form

ofheightenedreview.Whenshelaterreturnedtothemerits,

thejudgesuggestedthatbanningrangetrainingmightnot

implicate anyones Second Amendment rights at all. She

observedthatalthoughChicagorequiresrangetrainingas

aprerequisitetofirearmpossession,theCitydoesnothave

the

ability

to

create

a

Constitutional

right

to

that

training.Instead,thejudgethoughtthekeyquestionwaswhether

the individualsright topossess firearms withinhis resi

denceexpandstotherighttotrainwiththatsamefirearmin

a firing range located within the [c]itysborders. This

statementofthequestionendsthecourtsdiscussionofthe

merits.

There are several problems with this analysis. First, it

is incomplete. Thejudge identifiedbut did not evaluate

10 (...continued)

tionsallegedhere.


27/59

No.103525 27

theSecondAmendmentmeritsquestion.Moreimportantly,

thecourtframedtheinquirythewrongway.Finally,itwas

a mistake to reject heightened scrutiny. Thejudge was

evidentlyconcernedaboutthenoveltyofSecondAmend

ment litigation and proceeded froma default position in

favorof theCity.Theconcern isunderstandable,but the

defaultpositioncannotbereconciledwithHeller.

1. Heller, McDonald, and a framework for SecondAmendmentlitigation

Its truethatSecondAmendment litigation isnew,and

Chicagos ordinance is unlike any firearms law that has

receivedappellatereviewsinceHeller.Butthatdoesntmean

we are without a framework for how to proceed.

TheSupremeCourtsapproachtodecidingHellerpointsina

general direction. Although the critical question in

Hellerwhether the Amendment secures an individual

or

collective

right

was

interpretive

rather

than

doctrinal,theCourtsdecisionmethodisinstructive.

With little precedent to synthesize, Heller focused

almost exclusively on the original public meaning of the

Second Amendment, consulting the text and relevant

historical materials to determine how the Amendment

was understood at the time of ratification. This inquiry

led the Court to conclude that the Second Amendment

secures a preexisting natural right to keep and bear

arms; that the right is personal and not limited to

militiaservice;andthatthecentralcomponentoftherightistherightofarmedselfdefense,mostnotablyinthehome.

Heller,554U.S.at595,599600;seealsoMcDonald,130S.Ct.


28/59


29/59

No.103525 29

entire field . . . .). Instead, the Court concluded that

whatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to

futureevaluation,itsurelyelevatesaboveallotherinterests

therightoflawabiding,responsiblecitizenstousearmsin

defenseofhearthandhome.Id.

And in a muchnoted passage, the Court carved out

someexceptions:

[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast

doubtonlongstandingprohibitionsonthepossessionoffirearms by felons and the mentally ill, or

laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive

places such as schools and governmentbuildings, or

laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the

commercialsaleofarms.

Id.at62627.TheCourtaddedthatthislistofpresump

tively lawful regulatory measures was illustrative, not

exhaustive.Id.at627n.26;seealsoMcDonald,130S.Ct.at

3047

(repeating

Hellers

assurances

about

exceptions).These nowfamiliar passages fromHeller hold several

keyinsightsaboutjudicialreviewoflawsallegedtoinfringe

SecondAmendmentrights.First,thethresholdinquiryin

someSecondAmendmentcaseswillbeascopequestion:

IstherestrictedactivityprotectedbytheSecondAmend

mentinthefirstplace?SeeEugeneVolokh,Implementingthe

Right toKeepandBearArmsforSelfDefense:AnAnalytical

Frameworkand aResearchAgenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443,

1449.Theanswerrequiresatextualandhistoricalinquiry

intooriginalmeaning.Heller,554U.S.at63435(Constitu

tionalrightsareenshrinedwiththescopetheywereunder

stoodtohavewhenthepeopleadoptedthem,whetheror


30/59

30 No.103525

notfuturelegislaturesor(yes)evenfuturejudgesthinkthat

scope toobroad.);McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 ([T]he

scopeoftheSecondAmendmentright isdeterminedby

textualandhistoricalinquiry,notinterestbalancing.).

McDonald confirms that when state or localgovern

mentactionischallenged,thefocusoftheoriginalmeaning

inquiryiscarriedforwardintime;theSecondAmendments

scopeasalimitationontheStatesdependsonhowtheright

was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment wasratified.SeeMcDonald,130S.Ct.at303842.Settingasidethe

ongoingdebateaboutwhichpartoftheFourteenthAmend

mentdoes the workof incorporation,andhow, see id.at

303031 (plurality opinion of Alito, J.); id. at 305880

(Thomas,J.,concurring);id.at308999(Stevens,J.,dissent

ing);id.at312021(Breyer,J.,dissenting),thiswiderhistori

callensisrequiredifwearetofollowtheCourtsleadin

resolvingquestionsaboutthescopeoftheSecondAmend

mentbyconsulting itsoriginalpublicmeaningasbotha

startingpointandanimportantconstraintontheanalysis.SeeHeller,554U.S.at61019;McDonald,130S.Ct.at3038

42.11

11 On this aspect of originalist interpretive method as applied

to the Second Amendment, see generally AKHIL REED AMAR,

THEBILLOFRIGHTS:CREATIONANDRECONSTRUCTION21530,257

67(1998);BrannonP.Denning&GlennH.Reynolds,FiveTakes

on McDonald v. Chicago, 26 J.L & POL. 273, 28587 (2011);

Josh

Blackmun

&

Ilya

Shapiro,

Keeping

Pandoras

Box

Sealed:Privilegesor Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, andProperly

ExtendingtheRighttoKeepandBearArmstotheStates,8GEO.J.L.

(continued...)


31/59

No.103525 31

TheSupremeCourtsfreespeechjurisprudencecontainsa

parallel for this kind of threshold scope inquiry. The

Courthaslongrecognizedthatcertainwelldefinedand

narrowly limited classes of speeche.g., obscenity,

defamation, fraud, incitementarecategoricallyoutside

thereachoftheFirstAmendment.UnitedStatesv.Stevens,

130 S. Ct. 1577, 158485 (2010); see also Brown v. Entmt

MerchantsAssn,No.081448,2011WL2518809,at*34(June

27, 2011). When the Court has identified categories of

speechasfullyoutsidetheprotectionoftheFirstAmend

ment,ithasnotbeenonthebasisofasimplecostbenefit

analysis.Stevens,130S.Ct.at1586.Instead,somecatego

riesofspeechareunprotectedasamatterofhistoryand

legal tradition. Id. So too with the Second Amendment.

11 (...continued)

& PUB. POLY 1, 5157 (2010); Clayton E. Cramer, NicholasJ.

Johnson & George A. Mocsary, ThisRight IsNotAllowed by

GovernmentsThatAreAfraid of thePeople:ThePublicMeaning

of the SecondAmendmentWhen the FourteenthAmendmentWas

Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823, 82425 (2010); Steven G.

Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State

Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in

1868:What RightsAre Deeply Rooted inAmerican History and

Tradition?,87TEX.L.REV.7,1117,5054(2008);RandyE.Barnett,

WastheRighttoKeepandBearArmsConditionedonServiceinan

OrganizedMilitia?,83TEX.L.REV.237,26670 (2004);DavidB.

Kopel,TheSecondAmendmentintheNineteenthCentury,1998BYU

L.

REV.

1359;

Stephen

P.

Halbrook,

Personal

Security,

PersonalLiberty,andTheConstitutionalRighttoBearArms:Visionsofthe

FramersoftheFourteenthAmendment,5SETONHALLCONST.L.J.341

(1995).


32/59

32 No.103525

Heller suggests that some federal gun laws will survive

Second Amendment challenge because they regulate

activity falling outside the terms of the right as publicly

understoodwhentheBillofRightswasratified;McDonald

confirmsthatiftheclaimconcernsastateorlocallaw,the

scopequestionaskshowtherightwaspubliclyunder

stoodwhentheFourteenthAmendmentwasproposedand

ratified.Heller,554U.S.at62528;McDonald,130S.Ct.at

303847.Accordingly,ifthegovernmentcanestablishthat

achallengedfirearmslawregulatesactivityfallingoutside

thescopeoftheSecondAmendmentrightasitwasunder

stoodattherelevanthistoricalmoment1791or1868then

theanalysiscanstopthere;theregulatedactivityiscategori

cally unprotected, and the law is not subject to further

SecondAmendmentreview.

Ifthegovernmentcannotestablishthisifthehistorical

evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regulated

activityisnotcategoricallyunprotectedthentheremustbe

a second inquiry into the strength of the governmentsjustification for restricting or regulating the exercise of

SecondAmendmentrights.Hellersreference toany . . .

standard[]ofscrutinysuggestsasmuch.554U.S.at62829.

McDonald emphasized that the Second Amendment

limits[,] but by no means eliminates, governmental

discretiontoregulateactivityfallingwithinthescopeofthe

right.130S.Ct.at3046(emphasisandparenthesesomitted).

Deciding whether the government has transgressed the

limitsimposedbytheSecondAmendmentthatis,whether

ithasinfringedtherighttokeepandbeararms

requiresthecourttoevaluatetheregulatorymeansthegovernment

has chosen and the publicbenefits end it seeks to


33/59

No.103525 33

achieve. Borrowing from the Courts First Amendment

doctrine, the rigor of thisjudicialreview willdependon

howclosethelawcomestothecoreoftheSecondAmend

mentrightandtheseverityofthelawsburdenontheright.

Seegenerally,Volokh,ImplementingtheRighttoKeepandBear

ArmsforSelfDefense,56UCLAL.REV.at145472(explaining

thescope,burden,anddangerreductionjustificationsfor

firearmregulationspost Heller);NelsonLund,TheSecond

Amendment,Heller,andOriginalistJurisprudence,56UCLAL.

REV.1343,137275(2009);AdamWinkler,HellersCatch22,

56UCLAL.REV.1551,157173(2009);LawrenceB.Solum,

DistrictofColumbiav.HellerandOriginalism,103NW.U.L.

REV.923,97980(2009);GlennH.Reynolds&BrannonP.

Denning,HellersFutureintheLowerCourts,102NW.U.L.

REV.2035,204244(2008).

BothHellerandMcDonaldsuggestthatbroadlyprohibi

tory laws restricting the core Second Amendment

rightlikethehandgunbansatissueinthosecases,which

prohibited handgun possession even in the home

arecategorically unconstitutional. Heller, 554 U.S. at 62835

(We know of no other enumerated constitutional right

whose core protection has been subjected to a free

standing interestbalancing approach.);McDonald, 130

S.Ct.at304748.Forallothercases,however,weare left

to choose an appropriate standard of review from

among the heightened standards of scrutiny the Court

appliestogovernmentalactionsallegedtoinfringeenumer

atedconstitutionalrights;theanswertotheSecondAmend

mentinfringementquestiondependsonthegovernmentsabilitytosatisfywhateverstandardofmeansendscrutiny

isheldtoapply.


34/59

34 No.103525

The approach outlined here does not undermine

Skoien, 614 F.3d at 63943, or United States v. Williams,

616 F.3d 685, 69193 (7th Cir. 2010), both of which

touchedonthehistoricalscopequestionbeforeapplyinga

formofintermediatescrutiny.Andthisgeneralframework

hasbeenfollowedbytheThird,Fourth,andTenthCircuits

in other Second Amendment cases.12 SeeUnited States v.

Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (As we read

Heller, it suggests a twopronged approach to Second

Amendment challenges. First, we ask whether the chal

lengedlawimposesaburdenonconductfallingwithinthe

12 The Ninth Circuit recently adopted a somewhat different

frameworkforSecondAmendmentclaims.InNordykev.King,

a divided panel announced a gatekeeping substantial bur

dentestbeforethecourtwillapplyheightenedscrutiny.No.07

15763, 2011 WL 1632063, at *46 (9th Cir. May 2, 2011)

(OScannlain,J.).Under thisapproachonly laws thatsubstan

tiallyburden Second Amendment rights will get some form

ofheightenedjudicialreview.Id.TheNordykemajorityspecifi

cally deferred judgment on what type of heightened

scrutiny applies to laws that substantially burden Second

Amendment rights. Id. at *6 n.9. Judge Gould, concurring

inNordyke, would apply heightened scrutiny only [to] arms

regulations falling within the core purposes of the Second

Amendment, that is, regulations aimed at restricting defense

of thehome, resistanceof tyrannousgovernment,andprotec

tion of country. Id. at *15. All other firearms laws, he said,

should

be

reviewed

for

reasonableness,

id.,

although

by

thishe meant the sort of reasonableness review that applies in

the First Amendment context, not the deferential rational

basisreviewthatappliestoalllaws,id.at*16.


35/59

No.103525 35

scopeoftheSecondAmendmentsguarantee....Ifitdoes

not,ourinquiryiscomplete.Ifitdoes,weevaluatethelaw

undersomeformofmeansendscrutiny.);UnitedStatesv.

Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (A twopart

approachtoSecondAmendmentclaimsseemsappropriate

underHeller,asexplainedby . . .thenowvacatedSkoien

panelopinion . . . .);UnitedStatesv.Reese,627F.3d792,

80001(10thCir.2010)(same).Eachofthesecasesinvolved

aSecondAmendmentchallengeassertedasadefensetoa

federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 922,but we think

thesameprinciplesapplyhere.McDonaldreiteratedthatthe

Court has long since abandoned the notion that the

Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a

w a t e r e d d o w n , s u b j e c t i v e v e r s i o n o f t h e

individualguaranteesoftheBillofRights.130S.Ct.at

3035(quotingMalloyv.Hogan,378U.S.1,1011(1964)).

2. Applying the framework to Chicagos firing

rangeban

The plaintiffs challenge only the Citysban on firing

ranges, so our first question is whether range training

is categorically unprotectedby the Second Amendment.

Heller andMcDonald suggest to the contrary. The Court

emphasizedinbothcasesthatthecentralcomponentof

the Second Amendment is the right to keep and bear

armsfordefenseofself,family,andhome.Heller,554U.S.

at599;McDonald,130S.Ct.at3048.Theright topossess

firearms for protection implies a corresponding rightto acquire and maintain proficiency in their use; the

core right wouldnt mean much without the training


36/59

36 No.103525

andpracticethatmakeiteffective.SeveralpassagesinHeller

supportthisunderstanding.ExaminingpostCivilWarlegal

commentaries to confirm the foundingera individual

rightunderstandingoftheSecondAmendment,theCourt

quotedatlengthfromthemassivelypopular1868Treatise

on Constitutional Limitations by judge and professor

ThomasCooley:[T]obeararmsimpliessomethingmore

thanthemerekeeping;itimpliesthelearningtohandleand

use them . . . ; it implies the right to meet for voluntary

disciplineinarms,observingindoingsothelawsofpublic

order. 554 U.S. at 616, 61718 (internal quotation marks

omitted);seealsoid.at619(Nodoubt,acitizenwhokeeps

agunorpistolunderjudiciousprecautions,practicesinsafe

placestheuseofit,andinduetimeteacheshissonstodo

the same, exercises his individual right. (quoting

BENJAMINVAUGHANABBOTT,JUDGEANDJURY:APOPULAR

EXPLANATIONOF THELEADINGTOPICS IN THELAW OF THE

LAND333(1880))).

Indeed, the City considers live firingrange trainingsocriticaltoresponsiblefirearmownershipthatitmandates

thistrainingasaconditionoflawfulfirearmpossession.At

thesame time,however, theCity insists in this litigation

thatrangetrainingiscategoricallyoutsidethescopeofthe

Second Amendment and maybe completely prohibited.

There isanobviouscontradictionhere,butwewillset it

asideforthemomentandconsidertheCityssupportforits

categorical position. The City points to a number of

foundingera, antebellum, and Reconstruction state and

locallawsthat limitedthedischargeoffirearms inurbanenvironments.Aswehavenoted,themostrelevanthistori

cal period for questions about the scope of the Second


37/59

No.103525 37

AmendmentasappliedtotheStatesistheperiodleadingup

to and surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth

Amendment.Thatpointaside,mostofthestatutescitedby

the City are not specific to controlled target practice

and, in any event, contained significant carveouts and

exemptions.

For example, the City cites a 1790 Ohio statute that

prohibitedthedischargeofafirearmbeforesunrise,after

sunset, or within onequarter of a mile from the nearestbuilding. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, Ch. XIII, 4, in 1 The

Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory 104

(Chase ed. 1833). This statute is not directly related

to controlled target practice. A similar 1746 statute

limiting the discharge of firearms in Boston provided an

exceptionfortargetpractice:Cityresidentscouldfir[e]ata

Mark or Target for the Exercise of their Skill and

Judgment . . . at the lower End of the Common if they

obtainedpermissionfromtheFieldOfficersoftheRegi

ment in Boston; they could also fir[e] at a Mark fromthe Several Batteries in Boston with permission from

theCaptainGeneral.ActofMay28,1746,Ch.X,inActs

andLawsoftheMassachusettsBay208(Kneelanded.1746).

TheCitycitesothereighteenth andnineteenthcentury

statutes regulating the discharge of firearms in cities,

but most of these allowed citizens to obtain a permit

or license to engage in firearms practice from the

governor or city council.13 That was the case under the

13 See Act of Aug. 26, 1721, IV, in A Digest of the Acts of

(continued...)


38/59

38 No.103525

PhiladelphiaActofAugust26,1721,4,oneof thevery

statutestheSupremeCourtconsideredinHelleranddeemed

alicensingregime.554U.S.at633.Inshort,these laws

weremerelyregulatorymeasures,distinguishablefromthe

Citysabsoluteprohibitiononfiringranges.Seeid.at632,574

(foundingera statute that restricted the firing of guns

within the city limits to at least some degree did not

supporttheDistrictofColumbiasgeneral[]prohibit[ion]

onthepossessionofhandguns).Thesetime,place,and

mannerregulationsdonotsupporttheCityspositionthat

13 (...continued)

AssemblyRelating to theCityofPhiladelphia183 (Duaneed.

1856)(hereinafterPhiladelphiaDigest)(providingforgovernors

speciallicense);ActofFeb.9,175051,ch.388,in1Lawsofthe

CommonwealthofPennsylvania312(Careyed.1803)(providing

forGovernorsspeciallicense);OrdinanceofJune7,1813,V,

inPhiladelphiaDigest188(providingforpermissionfromthe

board of commissioners); Ordinance of Sept. 8, 1851, IX, in

Philadelphia Digest 419 (providing for permission from the

presidentoftheboardofcommissioners);Ordinanceof1854,ch.

5,20,inRevisedOrdinancesoftheCityofManchester,N.H.59

(Gage ed. 1859) (providing for permission of the Mayor and

Aldermeninwriting);ActofFeb.14,1855,78,inPrivateLaws

of the State of Illinois 144 (Bailhache ed. 1861) (providing for

permissionfromthemayororcommoncouncil);Bylaw,Title

XI,ch.IV, inCharterandByLawsoftheCityofNewHaven,

Conn.90(Benhamed.1865)(providingforpermission...ofthe

Mayor,orsomeoneormoreoftheAldermen);Ordinanceof

June

12,

1869,

17,

in

Laws

and

Ordinances

Governing

the

CityofSt.Joseph,Mo.110(Grubbed.1869)(providingforpermis

sion from the city council or written permission from the

mayor).


39/59


40/59

40 No.103525

notstakeourinterpretationoftheSecondAmendmentupon

asinglelaw...thatcontradictstheoverwhelmingweight

ofotherevidence....).Thisfallsfarshortofestablishing

thattargetpractice iswhollyoutside theSecondAmend

mentasitwasunderstoodwhenincorporatedasalimita

tionontheStates.

We proceed, then, to the second inquiry, which asks

whether the Citys restriction on range training survives

Second Amendment scrutiny. As we have explained,this requires us to select an appropriate standard of re

view.AlthoughtheSupremeCourtdidnotdosoineither

Heller orMcDonald, the Court did make it clear that the

deferential rationalbasis standard is out, and with it the

presumptionofconstitutionality.Heller,554U.S.at628n.27

(citingUnitedStatesv.CaroleneProds.,304U.S.144,152n.4

(1938)). This necessarily means that the City bears the

burden of justifying its action under some heightened

standardofjudicialreview.

The district court specifically decided against an inter

mediatestandardofscrutinybutdidnotsettleonanyother,

then sided with the City even if intermediate scrutiny

applied. A choice mustbe made. The City urges us to

importtheundueburdentestfromtheCourtsabortion

cases,see,e.g.,PlannedParenthoodofSe.Pa.v.Casey,505U.S.

15 (...continued)

General

Nature

of

the

State

of

Ohio

162

(Olmsted

ed.

1831)(subjectinganypersonorpersons[who]shallshootorfireagun

atatargetwithinthelimitsofanyrecordedtownplattoafine

notexceedingfivedollars,norlessthanfiftycents).


41/59

No.103525 41

833,87679(1992),butwedeclinetheinvitation.BothHeller

andMcDonaldsuggestthatFirstAmendmentanaloguesare

more appropriate, see Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 595, 635;

McDonald, 130 S. Ct.at 3045, andon the strength of that

suggestion, we and other circuits have alreadybegun to

adaptFirstAmendmentdoctrinetotheSecondAmendment

context, see Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641; id. at 649 (Sykes,J.,

dissenting);Chester,628F.3dat682;Marzzarella,614F.3dat

89n.4;seealsoVolokh, Implementing theRight toKeepand

BearArmsforSelfDefense,56UCLAL.REV.at1449,1452,

145455;Lund,TheSecondAmendment,Heller,andOriginalist

Jurisprudence,56UCLAL.REV.at1376;Winkler,Hellers

Catch22,56UCLAL.REV.at1572.

In freespeechcases, theapplicablestandardofjudicial

reviewdependsonthenatureanddegreeofthegovernmen

talburdenon theFirstAmendmentrightandsometimes

also on the specific iteration of the right. For example,

[c]ontentbased regulations are presumptively invalid,

R.A.V.v.CityofSt.Paul,505U.S.377,382(1992),andthusget strict scrutiny, which means that the law must be

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental

interest, id.at395;seealsoAriz.FreeEnter.ClubsFreedom

ClubPACv.Bennett,Nos.10238,10239,2011WL2518813,

at*9(June27,2011).Likewise,[l]awsthatburdenpolitical

speecharesubjecttostrictscrutiny.CitizensUnitedv.Fed.

ElectionCommn,130S.Ct.876,898(2010)(internalquota

tionmarksomitted).Ontheotherhand,time,place,and

mannerregulationsonspeechneedonlybereasonable

and justified without reference to the content of theregulatedspeech.Wardv.RockAgainstRacism,491U.S.781,

791(1989).TheSupremeCourtalsousesatieredstandard


42/59

42 No.103525

of review in its speechforum doctrine; regulations in a

traditional public or designated public forum get strict

scrutiny,whileregulationsinanonpublicforummustnot

discriminateonthebasisofviewpointandmustbereason

ableinlightoftheforumspurpose.ChooseLifeIll.,Inc.

v.White, 547 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotingGood

NewsClubv.MilfordCent.Sch.,533U.S.98,10607(2001)).

In electionlaw cases, regulations affecting the

expressive association rights of voters, candidates, andparties are subject to a fluctuating standard of review

thatvarieswiththeseverityoftheburdenontheright;laws

imposing severeburdens get strict scrutiny, while more

modest regulatory measures need only be rea

sonable,politicallyneutral,andjustifiedbyan important

governmental interest. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty.

ElectionBd.,553U.S.181,19091(2008);Wash.StateGrange,

552 U.S. at 45152; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434

(1992);Leev.Keith,463F.3d763,768(7thCir.2006).First

Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements inthe electoral contextfor example, laws compelling

the disclosure of the names of petition signersare re

viewed under what has been termed exacting

scrutiny.Doev.Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010). This

standard of review requires a substantial relation be

tweenthedisclosurerequirementandasufficientlyimpor

tant governmental interest, and the strength of

thegovernmentalinterestmustreflecttheseriousnessofthe

actualburden on First Amendment rights. Id. (internal

quotationmarksomitted).

Similarly, restrictions imposed on adultbookstores are

reviewed under an intermediate standard of scrutiny


43/59

No.103525 43

that requires the municipality to present evidence that

therestrictionsactuallyhavepublicbenefitsgreatenough

tojustify any curtailment of speech.Annex Books, Inc.

v.CityofIndianapolis,581F.3d460,462(7thCir.2009)(citing

LosAngelesv.AlamedaBooks,Inc.,535U.S.425(2002),and

Rentonv.PlaytimeTheatres,Inc.,475U.S.41(1986)).Andin

commercialspeechcases,theCourtappliesanintermediate

standard of review that accounts for the subordinate

positionthatcommercialspeechoccupiesinthescaleof

FirstAmendmentvalues.Bd.ofTrs.ofStateUniv.ofN.Y.v.

Fox,492U.S.469,477 (1989). In thiscontext intermediate

scrutinyrequiresafitbetweenthelegislaturesendsand

themeanschosentoaccomplishthoseends,...afitthatis

notnecessarilyperfect,butreasonable;thatrepresentsnot

necessarily the single best disposition but one whose

scope is in proportion to the interest served. Id. at 480

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also

Sorrell v. IMSHealth Inc., No. 10779, 2011 WL 2472796,

at *13 (June 23, 2011) (Tojustify commercialspeech re

strictions, the State must show at least that the statute

directly advances a substantial governmental interest

andthatthemeasureisdrawntoachievethatinterest.).

Labelsaside,wecandistillthisFirstAmendmentdoctrine

and extrapolate a few general principles to the Second

Amendment context. First, a severeburden on the core

SecondAmendmentrightofarmedselfdefensewillrequire

anextremelystrongpublicinterestjustificationandaclose

fitbetweenthegovernmentsmeansand itsend.Second,

lawsrestrictingactivitylyingclosertothemarginsoftheSecondAmendmentright,lawsthatmerelyregulaterather

thanrestrict,andmodestburdensontherightmaybemore


44/59

44 No.103525

easilyjustified. How much more easily depends on the

relativeseverityoftheburdenanditsproximitytothecore

oftheright.

InSkoienwerequiredaformofstrongshowinga/k/a

intermediate scrutinyin a Second Amendment chal

lengetoaprosecutionunder18U.S.C.922(g)(9),which

prohibitsthepossessionoffirearmsbypersonsconvictedof

adomesticviolencemisdemeanor.614F.3dat641.Weheld

that logic and data established a substantial relationbetweendispossessingdomesticviolencemisdemeanants

andtheimportantgovernmentalgoalofpreventingarmed

mayhem.Id.at642.Intermediatescrutinywasappropriate

inSkoienbecausetheclaimwasnotmadebyalawabiding,

responsiblecitizenasinHeller,554U.S.at635;nordidthe

case involve the central selfdefense component of the

right,Skoien,614F.3dat645.

Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs are the lawabiding,

responsible citizens whose Second Amendment rights

are entitled to full solicitude under Heller, and their

claim comes much closer to implicating the core of the

SecondAmendmentright.TheCitysfiringrangebanisnot

merelyregulatory;itprohibitsthelawabiding,responsible

citizensofChicagofromengagingintargetpracticeinthe

controlledenvironmentofafiringrange.Thisisaserious

encroachment on the right to maintain proficiency in

firearm use, an important corollary to the meaningful

exerciseofthecorerighttopossessfirearmsforselfdefense.

ThattheCityconditionsgunpossessiononrangetraining

isanadditionalreasontocloselyscrutinizetherangeban.

All thissuggests thatamorerigorousshowing than that

applied inSkoien shouldbe required, if not quite strict


45/59


46/59

46 No.103525

Inc., 535 U.S. at 438 (A municipality defending zoning

restrictions on adultbookstores cannot get away with

shoddydataorreasoning.Themunicipalitysevidencemust

fairly support the municipalitys rationale for its ordi

nance.);seealsoAnnexBooks,Inc.v.CityofIndianapolis,624

F.3d 368, 369 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming preliminary in

junction where a citys empirical support for [an] ordi

nance[limitingthehoursofoperationofanadultbookstore]

was too weak); New Albany DVD, LLC v. City of

New Albany, 581 F.3d 556, 56061 (7th Cir. 2009)

(affirming preliminary injunction where municipality

offered only anecdotal justifications for adult zoning

regulation and emphasizing the necessity of assessing

the seriousness of the municipalitys concerns about

litterandtheft).

Byanalogyhere,theCityproducednoempiricalevidence

whatsoeverandresteditsentiredefenseoftherangebanon

speculationaboutaccidentsandtheft.Muchofthefocusin

the district court was on the possible hazards of mobilefiring ranges. The City hypothesized that one cause of

rangerelatedinjurycouldbestraybullets,butthisseems

highlyimplausibleinsofarasaproperlyequippedindoor

firing range is concerned. The district court credited the

plaintiffsevidencethatmobilerangesarenexttoSams

Clubsandresidencesandshoppingmallsand inparking

lots,andtheresnotbeenanydifficultieswiththeminthose

places. Commissioner Scudiero acknowledged that the

lawenforcement and privatesecurity firing ranges in

Chicago are located near schools, churches, parks, andstores, and they operate safely in those locations.

And Sergeant Bartoli testified about the availability of


47/59

No.103525 47

straightforward rangedesign measures that can effec

tively guard against accidental injury. He mentioned,

for example, that ranges should be fenced and should

designateappropriatelocationsfortheloadingandunload

ing of firearms. Other precautionary measures might

includelimitingtheconcentrationofpeopleandfirearmsin

arangesfacilities,thetimeswhenfirearmscanbeloaded,

and the typesofammunitionallowed.Seealso,e.g.,NRA

RANGE SOURCE BOOK (providing basic and advanced

guidancetoassistintheplanning,design,constructionand

m a i nt e na nc e o f s ho o t i ng r a ng e f a c i l i t i e s ) ,

http://www.nrahq.org/shootingrange/sourcebook.asp(last

visitedJune2,2011);FLA.STAT.823.16(6)(2011)(referenc

ing the safety standards of the NRARangeSourceBook);

KAN.ADMIN.REGS.115221(b)(2011)(same);MINN.STAT.

87A.02(2010)(same);NEB.REV.STAT.371302(4)(2010)

(same);OHIOADMIN.CODE1501:312903(D)(2011)(same).

At the preliminaryinjunction hearing, the City high

lighted an additional publicsafety concern also limitedto mobile ranges: the risk of contamination from lead

residue leftonrangeusershandsafterfiringagun.Ser

geant Bartoli was asked a series of questions about

theimportanceofhandwashingaftershooting;hesaidthat

lucrativeamountsof[coldrunning]waterandsoapwere

requiredtoensurethatleadcontaminantswereremoved.

TheCityarguedbelowthatmobilefiringrangesmightnot

besufficientlyequippedforthispurpose,suggestingthat

mobile ranges would have inadequate restroom facilities

andmighthavetorelyonportapotties.Thissparkedadiscussionabouttheadequacyofthewatersupplyavailable

at a standard portapotty. The City continued on this


48/59

48 No.103525

topicuntilthejudgecutitshortbyacknowledgingherown

familiarity with portapotties. On appeal the City

raisedbut did not dwell on its concern about lead con

tamination.Forgoodreason:Itcannotbetakenseriously

asajustificationforbanishingallfiringrangesfromthecity.

Toraiseitatallsuggestspretext.

Perhaps the City can muster sufficient evidence to

justifybanningfiringrangeseverywhereinthecity,though

that seems quite unlikely. As the record comes to us atthis stage of the proceedings, the firingrange ban is

wholly out of proportion to the public interests the

City claims it serves. Accordingly, the plaintiffs Second

Amendment claim has a strong likelihood of success on

themerits.

D. BalanceofHarms

Theremainingconsideration forpreliminary injunctive

relief is the balance of harms. It should be clear fromtheforegoingdiscussionthattheharmsinvokedbytheCity

areentirelyspeculativeandinanyeventmaybeaddressed

by more closely tailored regulatory measures. Properly

regulatedfiringrangesopentothepublicshouldnotpose

significantthreatstopublichealthandsafety.Ontheother

side of the scale, the plaintiffs have established a strong

likelihoodthattheyaresufferingviolationsoftheirSecond

Amendmentrightseverydaytherangebanisineffect.The

balanceofharmsfavorstheplaintiffs.

Theplaintiffsaskedthedistrictcourttoenjointheenforce

mentofChicagoMunicipalCode820280theprohibition


49/59

No.103525 49

on[s]hootinggalleries,firearmranges,oranyotherplace

where firearms are discharged. They are entitled to a

preliminaryinjunctiontothateffect.Tobeeffective,how

ever,theinjunctionmustalsopreventtheCityfromenforc

ingotherprovisionsoftheOrdinancethatoperateindirectly

to prohibit range training. The plaintiffs have identified

severalprovisionsoftheOrdinancethatimplicateactivities

integral to range training: CHI. MUN. CODE 820020

(prohibitingthepossessionofhandgunsoutsidethehome),

820030(prohibiting thepossessionof longgunsoutside

thehomeorbusiness),820080(prohibitingthepossession

ofammunitionwithoutacorrespondingpermitandregis

tration certificate), 820100 (prohibiting the

transfer of firearms and ammunition except through

inheritance), 824010 (prohibiting the discharge of

firearms except for selfdefense, defense of another, or

hunting). To the extent that these provisions prohibit

lawabiding, responsible citizens from using a firing

range in the city, the preliminary injunction should

include them as well. Similarly, the injunction should

prohibit the City from using its zoning code to exclude

firingrangesfromlocatinganywhereinthecity.

Finally,becauserangetrainingisrequiredfortheissuance

ofaChicagoFirearmPermit,aregistrationcertificate,and

ultimately, for lawful possession of any firearm, see CHI.

MUN.CODE820110(a),820140(a)(b),thefiringrange

banimplicatesnotonlytherighttotrainatarangebutalso

thecoreSecondAmendmentrighttopossessfirearmsfor

selfdefense.Accordingly,thepreliminaryinjunctionshouldinclude sections 820110(a) and 820140(a) to the extent

thatthoseprovisionsoperatetoprohibitotherwiseeligible


50/59


51/59

No.103525 51

theFirstAmendment.Giventhestronglikelihoodofsuccess

ontheformerclaim,thelatterclaimseemslikesurplusage.

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district

courtsorderdenyingtheplaintiffsmotionforaprelimi

nary injunction and REMAND with instructions to enter

apreliminaryinjunctionconsistentwiththisopinion.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

Stungby the result ofMcDonald v. City of Chicago, 130

S.Ct.3020 (2010), the Cityquicklyenactedanordinancethatwastoocleverbyhalf.Recognizingthatacompletegun

banwouldno longersurviveSupremeCourtreview, the

City required all gun owners to obtain training that in

cludedonehourofliverangeinstruction,andthenbanned

allliverangeswithinCitylimits.1Thiswasnotsomucha

nod to the importance of liverange training as it was a

1

As

the

majority

clarifies,

the

City

grants

exceptions

forranges in a few select circumstances such as ranges usedby

lawenforcementpersonnel. Noneof these rangesareopen to

thepublicingeneralortotheplaintiffsinparticular.


52/59

52 No.103525

thumbingofthemunicipalnoseattheSupremeCourt.The

effect of the ordinance is another completeban on gun

ownership within City limits. That residents may travel

outsidethejurisdictiontofulfillthetrainingrequirementis

irrelevanttothevalidityoftheordinanceinsidetheCity.In

thisIagreewiththemajority:giventheframeworkofDist.

ofColumbiav.Heller,554U.S.570(2008),andMcDonald,the

Citymaynotconditiongunownershipforselfdefensein

thehomeonaprerequisitethattheCityrendersimpossible

to fulfill within the City limits. The plaintiffs have a

strong likelihood of success on the merits of that claim

and the district court should have granted an injunction

against the operation of the ordinance to the extent that

it imposed an impossible precondition on gun owner

ship forselfdefense in thehome.Thereare twoobvious

waysfortheCitytoremedythisproblem:itmayeitherdrop

therequirementforonehourofliverangetrainingoritmay

permitliverangetrainingwithintheCitylimits.

Even if the City were to drop the liverange requirement, though, the plaintiffs claim an independent

SecondAmendmentrighttomaintainproficiencyinfirearm

useby practicing liverange shooting. The majority goes

much farther than is required orjustified, however, in

findingthattheplaintiffsclaimforlive rangetrainingisso

closely allied to core Second Amendment rights that a

standardakintostrictscrutinyshouldbeapplied.Granted,

therighttouseafirearminthehomeforselfdefensewould

beseriouslyimpairedifgunownerswerepreventedfrom

obtainingthetrainingnecessarytousetheirweaponssafelyforthatpurpose.Wedonotyetknowhowacompleteban

onanyfirearmstrainingwouldbereceivedbytheSupreme


53/59

No.103525 53

Court,butHeller andMcDonald strongly suggest that a

comprehensive training ban would not pass constitu

tional muster. But the City has notbanned all firearms

training;ithasbannedonlyonetypeoftraining.Thereisno

banonclassroomtraining.Thereisnobanontrainingwith

a simulator and several realistic simulators are commer

ciallyavailable,completewithgunsthatmimictherecoilof

firearms discharging live ammunition. See e.g.

http://www.virtrasystems.com/lawenforcement train

ing/virtrarangele (last visited July 6, 2011);

http://www.meggitttrainingsystems.com/main.php?id=25

&name=LE_Virtual_Bluefire_Weapons(lastvisitedJune24,

2011); http://www.ontargetfirearmstraining.com/

simulator.php (last visited July 6, 2011). It is possible

that, with simulated training, technology will obviate

the need for liverange training. In any case, the limited

record todatesuggests thateventheCityconsiders live

rangetrainingnecessarytothesafeoperationofgunsinthe

homeforselfdefense.Acompletebanonliverangesinthe

City,therefore,isunlikelytowithstandscrutinyunderany

standardofreview.Theplaintiffshaveastronglikelihood

of succeeding on the merits of this claim. Public safety

interests apply on both sides of the balance: there are

obvioussafetyrisksassociatedwithoperatingliveshooting

ranges(moreonthatlater),butthereareperhapsequally

compelling safety interests in ensuring that gun owners

possesstheskillsnecessarytohandletheirweaponssafely.

Ontherecordasitcurrentlystands,thedistrictcourtshould

have

enjoined

that

part

of

the

ordinance

banning

all

liverangeswithinCity limits.Forthatreason,Iconcurinthe

judgment.


54/59

54 No.103525

I write separately because the majority adopts a

standardofreviewontherangebanthatismorestringent

than isjustifiedby the text or the history of the Second

Amendment. Although the majority characterizes this

aspect of the ordinance asa completeban onan activity

implicatingthecoreoftheSecondAmendmentright,a

more accurate characterization would be a regulation

in training, an area ancillary to a core right.Ante, at 45.

A right to maintain proficiency in firearms handling is

not the same as the right topractice at a livegunrange.

As such, I cannot agree that a more rigorous showing

thanthatappliedinSkoien,shouldberequired,ifnotquite

strictscrutiny.Ante,at46.Skoienrequired thegovern

ment to demonstrate that the statute at issue served

an important government objective, and that there

was a substantial relationshipbetween the challenged

legislation and that objective.UnitedStatesv.Skoien, 614

F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010), cert.denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674

(2011).

The majoritys analysis of laws in effect during the

timeperiodsurrounding theadoptionof theSecondand

Fourteenth Amendments helps to prove the point that

noscrutinybeyond that described inSkoien isnecessary.

The majority concedes that the City has presented us

withanumberoffoundingera,antebellum,andRecon

struction state and local laws that limited the discharge

of firearms in urban environments. Ante, at 37. Some

jurisdictions enacted outright bans on discharging

firearmsincitylimits.Somelawslimitedthetime,placeandmanner of firearms discharges. Some laws re

quired permission from a government authority before


55/59

No.103525 55

discharging firearms in urban areas. The majority finds

these laws irrelevant to the Second Amendment

analysisherebecause theyarenotspecific tocontrolled

target practice and, in any event, contained significant

carveoutsandexemptions.Ante,at3738.Themajorityalso

distinguishes them as regulatory measures rather

thanoutrightbans on firing ranges.Finally, themajority

dismissessomeofthelawsbecausetheywereclearlyaimed

atfiresuppression,whichthemajoritybelieveswouldnot

beaconcernatasafelysitedandproperlyequippedfiring

range.

Buttheseobservationscontraveneratherthansupportthe

majoritysensuinganalysis.Firstofall,noneofthe18thand

19thcenturyjurisdictionscitedbytheCityanddismissedby

the majority were apparently concerned thatbanning or

limitingthedischargeoffirearmswithincitylimitswould

seriously impinge therightsofgunownersor limit their

abilityto learnhowtosafelyuse theirweapons.Citizens

living in densely populated areas had few legitimatereasonstodischargetheirfirearmsneartheirhomes,and

likelyusedthemmostlywhenoutinthecountry.Opportu

nitiestohuntandpracticeoutsideofcitylimitswerelikely

adequatefortrainingpurposes.Giventhemajoritysnodto

the relevance of historical regulation, curt dismissal of

actualregulationsoffirearmsdischargesinurbanareasis

inappropriate.

Second, as I noted above, many of thesejurisdictions

regulatedthetime,placeandmannerofgundischarges.For

example, as the majority itself points out, one

statute prohibited the discharge of firearms before

sunrise, after sunset, or within one quarter mile of the


56/59

56 No.103525

nearest building. Others prohibited firearms discharge

without specific permissions and only then at specific

locations. The time, place and manner framework of

theFirstAmendmentseemswellsuitedtotheregulationof

liverangetrainingwithinadenselypopulatedurbanarea.

AcompletebanonliverangetraininginChicago,ofcourse,

likelywouldnotsurviveunderthe intermediatescrutiny

appliedtorestrictionsontime,placeandmanner,especially

because the City itself concedes the importance of this

trainingtothesafeoperationoffirearmsforselfdefensein

thehome.Indeed,theCityallowsrangestooperateinsome

of the most densely populated parts of the City, albeit

strictlyfortheuseoflawenforcementandtrainedsecurity

personnel.Themajoritypurportstodistinguishtime,place

and manner restrictions and other regulations on the

groundsthattheCitysordinanceisacompleteban,butthe

ban on live ranges affects only one aspect of firearms

training.Theintermediatescrutinyappliedtotime,place

andmannerrestrictionsisbothadequateandappropriate

inthesecircumstances.

Finally,thatsomeofthoseearlylawswereconcernedwith

firesuppressiondoesnotmeanthattheyareirrelevantto

ouranalysistoday.Onthecontrary,theselawsinformus

thatpublicsafetywasaparamountvaluetoourancestors,

avaluethat, insomecircumstances,trumped theSecond

Amendment right to discharge a firearm in a particular

place. Analogizing to the First Amendment context, a

categoricallimitissometimesappropriate,asinthecaseof

bansonobscenity,defamation,andincitementtocrime.SeeSkoien,614F.3dat641.Inthesamewaythatapersonmay

notwithimpunitycryoutFire!inacrowdedtheater,a


57/59

No.103525 57

personin18thcenturyNewYork,and19thcenturyChicago

andNewOrleanscouldnotfireaguninthetinderboxes

thatthesecitieshadbecome.SeeFootnote14above.Ifwe

aretoacknowledgethehistoricalcontextandthevaluesof

theperiodwhentheSecondandFourteenthAmendments

were adopted, then we must accept and apply the full

understandingofthecitizenryatthattime.Intheinstance

of firearmsordinanceswhichconcerned themselveswith

fire safety, we must acknowledge that public safety

wasseen tosupercedegunrightsat times.Although fire

is no longer the primary public safety concern when

firearmsaredischargedwithinCitylimits,historicalcontext

tells us that cities may take public safety into account in

settingreasonabletime,placeandmannerrestrictionson

thedischargeoffirearmswithinCitylimits.

ThemajorityssummarydismissaloftheCitysconcern

for public safety related to live gun ranges is to my

mindnaive.Oneneedonlyperformasimpleinternetsearch

ongunrangeaccidentstoseethemyriadwaysthatgunowners manage to shoot themselves and others while

practicing in these supposedly safe environments. From

droppingaloadedguninaparkinglottolosingcontrolof

astrongweapononrecoil,gunownershavecausedconsid

erabledamagetothemselvesandothersatlivegunranges.

To say that the Citys concerns for safety are entirely

speculative is unfounded. Ante, at 46. The plaintiffs

themselvesdonotdoubtthatgunrangesmayberegulated

intheinterestofpublicsafety.ReplyBriefat22.Seealso

Reply Brief at 2627 (conceding that the City mayexceptcertainpartsoftheCity,setrangedistancesfromotheruses,

require a license or permission for target practice, and


58/59

58 No.103525

regulate the operation and location of gun ranges). The

plaintiffsconcessionsregardinggunrangeregulationsare

by no means a complete list of restrictions the City may

impose on gun ranges. At this stage of the litigation,

the City has not yet had an opportunity to develop a

full record on the safety issues raised by placing live

gun ranges in an urban environment. Common sense

tellsusthatgunsareinherentlydangerous;responsiblegun

owners treat themwithgreatcare.Unfortunately,notall

gun owners are responsible. The City has a right

to impose reasonable time, place and manner restric

tions on the operation of live ranges in the interest

ofpublicsafetyandotherlegitimategovernmentalconcerns.

Asfortheremainingpartsoftheordinancechallengedby

theplaintiffs,Iagreethat,totheextentthattheseprovisions

entirelyprohibitgunownersfrompracticingatliveranges,

theymustbeenjoinedforthetimebe

ezell v. city of chicago

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