external interventions in secessionist conflicts in europe in the 1990s
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This article was downloaded by: [Kungliga Tekniska Hogskola]On: 11 October 2014, At: 10:27Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK
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External interventions insecessionist conflicts inEurope in the 1990sPavel K. Baev aa Senior Researcher at the International PeaceResearch Institute , OsloPublished online: 19 Oct 2007.
To cite this article: Pavel K. Baev (1999) External interventions in secessionistconflicts in Europe in the 1990s, European Security, 8:2, 22-51, DOI:10.1080/09662839908407405
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839908407405
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External Interventions in SecessionistConflicts in Europe in the 1990s
PAVEL K. BAEV
Secessionist conflicts have become a major feature of the Europeanpolitical landscape in the 1990s. International response to themhave varied from full-scale military interventions to half-heartedmediation, generally providing for freezing of most activehostilities and for addressing most urgent humanitarian needs.Europe in the 1990s saw more 'peace' operations on its soil thanany other region in the world, but still was not able to find asatisfactory answer. Kosovo is a tragic illustration of that, and thedeployment of NATO troops after a massive use of airpower stilllacks the framework political plan and appears very tentative andopportunistic. Several specifically European factors define theperspective of a possible new wave of secessionist conflicts in theregion.
One issue dominated heavily in European security agenda from mid-1998to mid-1999, threatening to hijack the Atlantic Alliance anniversary:Kosovo. NATO several times moved tantalisingly close before launching amassive air campaign not only without a proper mandate but even withouta clear political plan. At the moment of writing, the crisis is far from beingresolved, but in order to understand its vast resonance and its resilience tobest diplomatic efforts it seems necessary to take a broader perspective -both on the issue and on the region.
In the unruly post-Cold War international arena of the 1990s, twoprocesses have developed along remarkably similar trajectories. The first,secessionist conflicts, increased exponentially at the beginning of thedecade in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, butgradually decreased in the late 1990s. The second process, UNpeacekeeping, reached its peak around 1993 and by mid-1998 had declinedby about 75 per cent (both in numerical strength and in budget). However,the conventional wisdom that a less violent world needs fewer 'blue berets'might be a quite misleading conclusion to draw from the parallelism of thetwo trajectories. Indeed, few if any of the violent secessions have foundsatisfactory resolutions. Most are simply frozen. And it is exactly this stage
European Security, Vol.8, No.2 (Summer 1999), pp.22-51PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS 23
in conflict development that requires most attention from internationalpeacekeepers.
There is certainly nothing new about the phenomena of separatist/secessionist conflicts. Since at least the American Civil War they arerecognised as one of the major sources of disturbance in the internationalsystem. Protracted violent conflicts in Biafra, Katanga, Dohar, Punjab, SriLanka and many other regions continued during the Cold War, which isgenerally perceived as a period of 'greater stability'. Two features ofsecessionist conflicts deserve mention: (1) Until the end of the Cold War,very few of secessionist movements had achieved their goal: establishmentof a separate statehood. (2) Both during and after the Cold War, the WesternHemisphere has been relatively immune from such conflicts, Quebec beingthe exception that confirms the rule. What is also remarkable, is thetremendous military effort concentrated on three cases of reunification ofstates divided by ideological confrontations (Germany, Vietnam, Korea).
Sharp increases in the secessionist activities in the early 1990s cannot beexclusively attributed to the disintegration of two authoritarian federations:the USSR and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).Separatism has to be recognized as a modern (and even post-modern)phenomenon generated by the ongoing fundamental changes in theinternational system. In this article, secessionist conflicts are defined asviolent confrontation between a state and an armed grouping seeking to takecontrol over certain territory inside this state with the aim of establishing anindependent state.' We will exclude both minor terrorist groupings (as inCorsica, France or Lenkoran, Azerbaijan) and broad political movements(as in Northern Italy or Scotland) and focus on cases where there is a solidpublic support for the secessionist case and the actual or potential armedconfrontation presents credible threat to the state.
International peacekeeping operations, while essentially a modernphenomenon, have experienced a deep transformation with the end of theCold War, particularly as far as the UN role is concerned. The SecurityCouncil, no longer a hostage to the bipolar confrontation, has become ableto take forceful decisions, and the willingness of the Permanent Four (minusChina) to provide troop contingents have significantly increased thecapabilities to launch large-scale operations. But the exponential increase inthe UN peacekeeping activities has involved failures in several operations(the most spectacular one in Somalia), which invariably lead to reluctanceto launch other operations (most tragically in Rwanda). Disillusionment anddisappointment in the UN capacity to manage peacekeeping havedetermined the shift towards operations conducted by various regionalorganisations and 'coalitions of the willing'.
This current trend appears to be politically and militarily logical but still
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24 EUROPEAN SECURITY
might turn problematic, since many national and regional agendas arebecoming enmeshed in the implementations of external interventions. Forthe purpose of this study, which covers the first post-Cold War decade,external intervention is defined as the deployment of troops by a third party(an international organisation, a group of states, or a state) in the area ofarmed confrontation (real or potential) with the aim of termination/prevention of hostilities and/or providing humanitarian assistance. Sendingmilitary observers, conducting military exercises or selling militaryequipment therefore does not constitute an intervention.2
The last subject requiring definition in this article is Europe. This elusiveentity has defied so many attempts to draw its eastern and southeasternborders that deficiency of any 'civilizational' or geopolitical definition canbe taken as an established fact. This study will take Europe in its OSCEborders (minus USA and Canada), assuming that this internationalorganisation of 55 member states (Yugoslavia has been suspended since1992) has legitimacy to mandate peacekeeping operations across its area.The question to what degree and whether at all this huge landmassconstitutes a coherent 'security region' cannot be dealt with here, but it isintegrated not only by overlapping political structures but also byuniversally accepted standards of human rights. During the Cold War,Europe was generally considered 'off-limits' for peacekeeping, except oneinternational 'peace' intervention in its south-eastern periphery (Cyprus),but in the earlier part of this century this region had seen quite a fewoperations that might fit into a modern concept of peacekeeping.3
Post-Cold War Europe has been unable to find a satisfactory answer tothe unprecedented growth of secessionist activities. It has seen at least 15protracted violent conflicts of different scale and intensity focused on asecessionist agenda and has been invariably slow, ambivalent and indecisivein managing those. The international interventions of various formatundertaken by different actors and organisations, in many cases, wereconstructive for cessation of violence but did not help find lasting politicalsolutions. As a result, on the patchy European political map there are nowseven quasi-states with uncertain international status. Most of thesecessionist conflicts are concentrated in two areas (the Balkans and theCaucasus), but at least four major European states (the UK, Spain, Italy,France), seeking for ways to resolve those, had to keep an eye on their ownsecessionist movements and militants. The rise of secessionism in Europe isintrinsically linked to the process of transformation of nation-states and inmany ways is shaped by the 'gravity field' of the EU integration.
This article will attempt to compare the development of secessionistconflicts with the policies of external intervention as means of resolvingthem, as well as to juxtapose the thinking about secessions and about
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EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS 25
'peacekeeping' in a broad sense. One aim will be to offer some explanationsto the dubious character of international responses, another one being tosuggest more efficient approaches to the currently 'frozen' conflicts and topotential 'hot spots'.
BACKGROUND 1: THE CONFLICTS
The Wilsonian 'golden hour' of internationally guaranteed self-determination at the end of World War I, instead of harmonizing the ethno-territorial map of Europe, made territorial claims and border revisions ahigh-profile issue in the interwar period. Memel and Vilnius, Danzig andTeschen were sources of constant tensions, and the Kemalist 'liberation' ofTurkey by 1923 was achieved through 'ethnic cleansings' of such scale thatthey poison its relations with Greece and Armenia even now.4 Thevictorious Allies in 1945 opted for changing population to fit the bordersrather than the other way around, which was achieved through expulsionand resettlement of some 15 million people.5 Germany (both East and West),Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia became for the first time in theirhistory ethnically nearly homogenous entities, but in the rest of EasternEurope the problem was suppressed rather than solved. Therefore,secessionist movements had a remarkably low profile in Europe up to theend of the Cold War.
The whole problem area of secession was perceived as belongingessentially to the Third World and analyzed primarily in the context ofdecolonization; Cyprus can be taken as an exception confirming this generalrule. The escalation of tension around Nagorno-Karabakh in the late 1980swas by and large ignored, Milosevic's crackdown on Kosovo in March 1989was barely noticed, and it was only by the end of 1990 that the strongpolitical drive for independence in Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania andSlovenia convinced the leaders of the West that the tide was indeed rising.The US exercised leadership, attempting to draw a line, which appeared tobe fairly straight with one deviation: the Baltic republics were identified asa special case where Wilsonian principles and history justified secession.Political support for the Baltic trio was subordinated to the larger goal ofpreserving the integrity of both the USSR and the SFRY; no otherindependence movement should have expected any sympathy.6
Such external pressure was by far insufficient to keep the two post-socialist federal states together. Attempted 'escapes' by the three Balticstates, Georgia and Slovenia accelerated the growth of separatist forces inUkraine and Croatia - and by the end of 1991 both the USSR and the SFRYcollapsed.7 A chain-reaction of violent secessionist conflicts was triggeredwith that geopolitical catastrophe.
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26 EUROPEAN SECURITY
Dynamics of Conflicts
The speed with which these conflicts developed took the leaders of old andnew European states by surprise just as much as it did those who becamedirectly involved in the events leading to fighting. The simultaneouscollapse of state structures and ideologies produced disorientation,insecurity and quest for simple answers. Various 'conflict entrepreneurs'
TABLE 1SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS IN EUROPE 1990-98
Conflict
Azerbaijan-N-KarabakhBosnia-Rep. SrpskaBosnia-BihacBosnia-Her. BosnaCroatia-KrajinaGeorgia-S. OssetiaGeorgia-AbkhaziaMoldova-Tr-DniestriaRussia-Chechnya(Russia)N. Ossetia-IngushetiaSerbia-KosovoSpain-BasqueTurkey-KurdistanUK-N. Ireland
USSR-Lithuania
Yugoslavia-SloveniaYugoslavia-Croatia
1990
O
_
_
_
_
o
_
_
-
_
_
oo
oo_
-
1991
o
o
oo
o
o
o
-
o
oo
oo
o
oo
ooo
1992
OOO
ooo
_
oo
oo
ooo
oo
o
o
_
o
ooo
oo_
_
-
1993
OOO
ooo
o
ooo
oo_
ooo
o
-
_
_
ooo
oo_
_
-
1994
OOO
ooo
o
oo
o
ooo
-
ooo
o
_
-
1995
-
OOO
o
o
oo_
_
_
ooo
-
ooo
o_
-
1996
-
_
_
_
_
_
O O O
-
o_
ooo
o_
-
1997
-
_ _ •
_
o
-
_
o o o
o
_
-
1998
-
__
_
_
_
_
O
-
OOO
ooo
o_
_
-Notes: O - minor violence; OO - large-scale violence; OOO - warSources: Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflicts and Regional Conflict Complexes,1989-97', Journal of Peace Research 35/5 (Sept. 1998) pp.621-34; SIPRI Yearbook 1998,pp.24-30; Dan Smith, The State of War and Peace Atlas (1997) pp.90-5.
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EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS 27
achieved remarkable success in conducting ethnic mobilizations within afew months if not weeks. It is not only the sheer number of secessionistconflicts that is striking (see Table 1), but the capacity of the secessionistdrive to achieve victory as well. By the end of 1992, seven secessionistmovements (see Table 2) had proven their ability to defend their causemilitarily (Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and SouthOssetia from Georgia, Chechnya from Russia, Transdniestria fromMoldova, Krajina/Slavonia from Croatia, Republika Srpska from Bosnia),while only one attempted secession on a sub-state level was defeated(Prigorodny rayon from North Ossetia).
For comparison, it is possible to make a short list of cases where, despitea high level of tension and 'permitting' environment, secessionist conflictsdid not occur during 1992-93. The devastating civil war in Tajikistan didnot push its Uzbek-populated western districts or the loosely territorially
TABLE 2SECESSIONIST QUASI-STATES IN EUROPE 1990-98
Entity
NorthernCyprus
Nagorno-Karabakh
Chechnya(Ichkeriya)
Transdniestria(Pridnestrovye)
SouthOssetia
EasternSlavonia
Kosovo
Krajina andW. Slavonia
RepublikaSrpska
Hertzog-Bosna
Abkhazia
AbandonedState
Cyprus
Azerbaijan
Russia
Moldova
Georgia
Croatia
Serbia
Croatia
Bosnia
Bosnia
Georgia
Date ofbirth
1974
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
Ceasedto exist
-
-
-
-
—
1998
—
1995
-
1995
Externalallies
Turkey
Armenia
Turkey
Russia
N. OssetiaRussia
Serbia
Albania
SerbiaRep. Srpska
SerbiaRussia
Croatia
RussiaTurkey
ForeignTroops*
30,000(Turkey)
-
-
5,000(Russia)
—
30,000(Serbia)
-
-
-
3,000(Russia)
Refugees& IDP**
26,000
600,000
200,000
—
30,000
75,000
270,000
200,000
500,000
200,000
250,000
Notes: IDP - internally displaced person* As of mid-1998, excluding peacekeepers** As of mid-1998, estimate
Sources: JISS, The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: OUP 1998); UNHCR, The State of theWorld's Refugees 1997-98: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: OUP 1997).
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28 EUROPEAN SECURITY
connected Leninabad (Khojent) oblast to seek safety under the protection ofUzbekistan. The near collapse of state structures in Georgia did not provokethe relatively stable Adzharia to seek independence with possible supportfrom Russia and Turkey. Crimea, despite loud political quarrels withUkraine and nearly guaranteed embrace from Russia, did not attempt abreakaway. Eastern Estonia, populated almost entirely by ethnic Russians,saw only one half-hearted referendum on a limited autonomy. TheHungarian population of Transylvania preferred to address its grievancesthrough democratic means. Kosovo opted for a non-violent strategy aimedat winning international support for independence.
The apparent inability of 'abandoned' states to prevail over theirrebellious provinces militarily led to temporary agreements and ceasefires:in 1992, Transdniestria, South Ossetia and Krajina/Slavonia saw cessationof violence; in 1993, Abkhazia reached relative stability, and in 1994,Nagorno-Karabakh finally established a ceasefire. On two occasions, statesattempted to win back the lost territories: Croatia defeated separatists inWestern Slavonia and Krajina in 1995, Russia invaded Chechnya inDecember 1994 and continued the war until August 1996, when aprovisional peace accord was signed. During 1997, the only place in Europewhere war-fighting against a secessionist movement continued, was south-eastern Turkey. However, by 1998, only one elaborate and internationallyguaranteed peace treaty was being implemented (with problematic success)in Bosnia-Herzegovina; all other secessionist conflicts remained 'frozen'.Three remarkably dissimilar developments occurred in 1998: EasternSlavonia under extensive international monitoring was returned to Croatia,the breakthrough peace accord was reached in Northern Ireland, Kosovosank into a full-scale secessionist war.
Common Features and Underlying Factors
Each secessionist conflict features a unique combination of historic causes,ethnic or 'civilizational' divides, political determinants. However,remarkable commonalities in character can be found across the list. Whilegenerally ethnic factors are often found in secessionist situations,8 allEuropean secessionist conflicts are fought along ethnic lines. The only placewhere this line is slightly blurred is Transdniestria, but even there thestarting point of the conflict was the introduction of language laws(perceived as discriminatory against Russian-speakers) and the prospect ofMoldovan-Romanian reunification.9 Of the political secessionistmovements, only Lega Nord proclaims the goal of independent NorthernItaly irrespective of ethnic background. In most cases, religion hasreinforced the ethnic divides (Transdniestria and South Ossetia areexceptions), sometimes becoming a major identity-building factor in the
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EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS 29
conflict (most notably, in the former Yugoslavia and in Northern Ireland).While the breakup of the USSR and SFRY resulted in the emergence of
20 new states with a distinctive national character, most of the secessionistconflicts occur in situations where an ethnic group finds itself divided by astate border. All secessionist parties (except Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland)proclaim the goal of independence, but in the majority of conflicts the realgoal is rather reunification with a 'mother-state' (Chechnya is oneexception, PKK in Turkey is another, ETA in Spain yet another).10
Therefore, the majority of secessionist parties are able to rely on politicaland sometimes also military support from at least one European state.
The salience and often prevalence of ethno-national factors in secessionshave caused massive expulsions of 'alien' population from the territories inquestion. 'Ethnic cleansings' in Bosnia have been loudly condemned andinternationally investigated, but similar crimes have been committed inKrajina and Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and North Ossetia. In fact, onlyTransdniestria has not seen such cleansing. In Chechnya they were notcentrally organized. Turkey has managed to reverse the PKK gains of early1990s and re-establish control over most of its south-east through 'ruthlesspolicy of corralling villagers in fortified hamlets and then cleaning much ofthe surrounding land of people', which comes fairly close to ethniccleansing." Whatever the international condemnation, the organisers ofsuch crimes could refer to relatively recent European political practice,when the expulsion of 7-10 million Germans from East Prussia, Silesia andSudetenland after World War II provided for the final settlement of lastingterritorial conflicts.
In the escalation of secessionist conflicts, the availability of arms andother military equipment is a major factor. The disintegration of the militarystructures of the USSR has left tremendous stocks of arms and ammunitionin the hands of local warlords, particularly in the Caucasus. The situationwas significantly different in the Balkans, where the Yugoslav NationalArmy, withdrawing from Croatia and Bosnia, made every effort to arm thelocal Serb population, leaving as few assets as possible to the newly-bornstates (for that matter, Macedonia and Slovenia were practically disarmed).The escalation of the separatist war in Kosovo is fueled by the flow of armsfrom Albania, where many military bases were looted in spring 1997.
'Europeanness' of Secessionist Conflicts
Several common features pertain to distinctively European character of theabove listed secessionist conflicts, making them a phenomenon ofcontemporary European politics.
All these conflicts by the virtue of their location enjoy a sustainedattention from world media, which certainly comes in waves but
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30 EUROPEAN SECURITY
nevertheless projects considerable influence on political decision-making.The parties to the conflicts expect high-level external mediation to beavailable on request and have acquired considerable experience inmanipulating external actors, including NGOs. Influential Europeanpolitical organisations (the OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, the EU, theWEU) are involved in managing these conflicts, often complicating ratherthan complementing each other's efforts.
On the level of high abstraction, one may say that secessionist conflictsaddress the spatial incongruence between peoples and borders. But thepeoples in our cases are a product of European history, with a high level ofeducation, a clear preference for the democratic system of government, andwith high expectations of affluence. The borders in question are anincredibly complex phenomenon, some of them being settled throughhundreds of years of wars and compromises, and some drawn by capricioushands of authoritarian leaders after World War II. Another theoreticalperspective interprets secessions as a conflict between ideologies ofnationalism and multi-national state, and again both are able to draw fromlong historical traditions and exploit a variety of models.12 Disregardinghistory and geography, the inviolability of all state (but not sub-state) bordersis established as one of the fundamental principles of European security.
Perhaps the most distinctive common feature for all the conflicts underinvestigation is that they develop in the near periphery (except two in theinner periphery) of the European integration zone. The multi-dimensionalimpact from the EU amounts to the effect of gravity field centered onBrussels and gradually subsiding towards the Central Asia.13 In fact, someof the secessionist drives inside the USSR and SFRY in early 1990s can beattributed to the desire to move closer to the 'Europe' of NATO and the EU.The three Baltic states and Slovenia are the obvious examples here, but thewillingness of the Czech Republic to cut off Slovakia is also illustrative.There is a clear similarity in the determination of Serbs in Republika Srpskaand Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh not to accept the authority of a'Muslim' state, since both feel strongly that they belong to Christian'Europe'. Even the secessions that apparently go against the dominant'European' trend (such as Chechnya and, to a certain degree,Transdniestria), are trying to make use of it by building their own links tothe West. Some analysts argue that the gravitation from Brussels wouldeventually force bigger states to 'amputate' such backward and troubledperipheries as Kosovo, Chechnya or Kurdistan.
It would be an oversimplification to reduce the impact of the Europeanintegration to economic calculations and expectations to achieve prosperity.Thus, Pascal Boniface in a recent article argues that 'this search forprosperity instead of power explains in large measure the advent of the
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EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS 31
secessionist age'.15 The EU continues to function as an inter-governmentalinstitution, so political elites in Catalonia and Montenegro, Scotland andCrimea can see clear benefits from participating in the integration processas separate entities and not as mere 'regions'. The successor states of theUSSR and the SFRY immediately on arrival became exposed to theevolutionary crisis of European states on their course of integration, whichmight further deepen with the introduction of the euro in 1999, so the riseof secessionist movements is far from being exhausted.
BACKGROUND 2: THE INTERVENTIONS
Europe in the 1990s saw more 'peace' operations on its soil than any otherregion in the world. Secessionist conflicts were the major reason and the keytargets for those. On the one hand, many European countries had reasons toperceive the above-examined conflicts as sources of instability directlythreatening their security interests through possible spillover. On the otherhand, these conflicts brought such appalling violations of human rights andproduced such flows of refugees, that strong international pressure tointervene on humanitarian grounds was generated on many occasions.
The failure of existing European political frameworks to prevent theconflicts and to handle their initial escalation determined that theorganization which was called upon to launch the first major 'peace'operation in spring 1992 was the UN.16 But just a few months later, Russiastarted its first two peacekeeping experiments in the 'Near Abroad'(Transdniestria and South Ossetia), thus opening a list of improvisedarrangements and ad hoc coalitions. For the first few years, Russianinterventionism and Western peacekeeping appeared to develop alongvastly different trajectories (the Chechen War being the ultimate proof), butby the end of the decade the experiences have turned much more similar.
Scale of 'Peace' Operations
The intensity of secessionist wars in the early 1990s was such that whenplanning for interventions, the European powers had to think in terms ofhundreds of combat-ready troops and not dozens of military observers ormonitors. Even the preventive deployment in Macedonia, aimed not atpreventing an internal conflict but at monitoring the border with Serbia, wasgiven the strength of about 1,000 troops. In spring 1995, six international'peace' operations were underway in five countries affected or threatenedby secessionist conflicts with the total strength of about 40,000 troops. Byspring 1998, the scale of this unprecedented non-combat use of militaryforce had only slightly decreased to five operations with about 35,000troops (see Table 3).
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32 EUROPEAN SECURITY
TABLE 3PEACE OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS 1964-98
State
Cyprus
Croatia
Croatia
Bosnia
Bosnia
Bosnia
Macedonia"
Moldova
Georgia
Georgia
Russia-N. Ossetia
Azerbaijan'
Conflictareas
NorthernCyprus
Kraijna,W. Slavonia
EasternSlavonia
Bosnia
Bosnia
Bosnia
Border withSerbia
Trans-Dniestria
SouthOssetia
Abkhazia
Prigorodnyrayon
Nagorno-Karabakh
Mandatefrom
UN
UN
UN/OSCE
UN
UN/NATO
UN/NATO
UN
Bi-Lateralagreement
Bi-Lateralagreement
CISUN
(Internal)
OSCE
Actor
UNFICYP1
UNPROFORUNCRO
UNPROFORUNTAES
UNPROFORUNMIBH
IFOR
SFOR MI
UNPROFORUNPREDEP
JointForce4
JointForce4
RussiaUNOMIG
Russia
Coalition
StartedEnded
03.1964-
03.92-03,9503.95-01.96
03.92-03.9503.95-1.98
03.92-12.9512.95-
12.95-12.96
12.96-
03.92-03.9503.95-
07.92-
07.92-
06.94-09.93-
10.92-
Strength(max. mid-1998)
6,200; 1200
10,500;-3,500; -
4,000;-5,000; -
20,000; -2,000; 2,000
60,000; -
35,000; 30,000
1,200; 1,000
5,000; 2,000
3,000; 1,000
4,500; 1,500136; 83
3,000; 500
3,000(planned)
Casualties to(mid-1998)
168
207!
17
207!
10
207'4
52
78
4
-
1
(60)
(50)
-
Notes:1. A major change in the UNFICYP mandate, composition and deployment occurred after the escalation of
hostilities in Aug. 1974.2. Total number of fatalities for UNPROFOR.3. The operation in Macedonia has not been aimed at preventing a secessionist conflict, but is included here
since it had been a part of UNPROFOR and now de facto provides for internal stability increasinglychallenged by ethnic divides.
4. Russian forces have been the major component of the trilateral Joint Forces; Russia has effectivelydominated the Joint Control Commission.
5. The operation was mandated by the OSCE at the Budapest summit (Dec. 1994) and prepared by the HighLevel Planning Group. It has not been launched due to the inability to reach a peace agreement in theMinsk Group.
Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 1998 (Oxford: OUP 1998); JJSS, The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: OUP1998); United Nations Peace-keeping (NY: UN Dept. of Public Info. Aug. 1996).
The first problem regarding these operations is: what is the mostefficient and legitimate framework for their implementation? The wisdomof the first choice for the UN gradually came under question as theessentially humanitarian UNPROFOR operation in the midst of the civilwar in Bosnia ran into more trouble. The UN Security Council kept issuingnew mandates for the operation but failed to provide resources. The solutionwas sought in an increasing co-operation with NATO, but by early 1995 thecommand system, which required the UN authorisation for every NATO airstrike, had brought permanent high tension between the two bodies. Despite
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its many tangible achievements, by mid-1995 the UNPROFOR was on thebrink of failure, The disappointment in the UN mechanism temptedEuropean nations to consider the OSCE as the framework for apeacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, but after much bureaucraticsquabbling this most elaborate plan was quietly shelved.
Meanwhile, Russia was continuing and even expanding its conflictmanagement in the post-Soviet area with little regard to the UN or pan-European organizations; the mandates were various but invariablyquestionable. Ignoring these activities was increasingly difficult; in mid-1994, the UN had to extend an acknowledgement to Russia's newpeacekeeping operation in Abkhazia with a CIS mandate and re-focus itsown presence in the area towards monitoring this operation.
By late 1995, the near unanimous conclusion was reached in Brusselsand Washington that the UN could play only a supporting role and be anauxiliary vehicle for peacekeeping in Europe in general and in the Balkansin particular; NATO was promoted as the key institution. Launching itsfirst-ever military operation in Bosnia, the Atlantic Alliance achieved aremarkable success both in military and political terms and has restored itscredibility, seriously damaged during 1994-95."
The second problem in these operations was how to providehumanitarian relief and contribute to conflict resolution without takingterritorial control over war zones. With the UN Protection Force(UNPROFOR), the UN Security Council initially opted for a system ofarmed convoys, but in spring 1993 - under growing pressure from Westernpublic opinion - it attempted to establish six 'safe areas', modelled after the1991 'Provide Comfort' operation in Northern Iraq. Bosnian 'safe havens'were both indefensible and uncontrollable, so the UN found itself helplessand loudly condemned when in summer 1995 the nominally protected'pockets' in Srebrenica and Zepa were captured by the Bosnian Serbs. TheUN operation was further discredited when its ceasefire monitoring inCroatia was bluntly dismissed by Croatian troops who recaptured westernSlavonia in May and Krajina in August 1995. NATO, taking over fromUNPROFOR in Bosnia, moved significantly beyond securing the agreedseparation lines and guaranteeing disarmament. It assumed major functionsin territorial control, not hesitating to take such actions as seizing policeprecincts or radio stations and executing several special operations aimed atcapturing key war criminals.20
As for Russia, in Transdniestrian, South Ossetian and Abkhazianoperations it deliberately avoided any 'territorialization', limiting the tasksto ceasefire monitoring and patrolling the disengagement zones.Humanitarian tasks were essentially neglected. Thus, the Georgiangovernment insisted on Russian peacekeepers to take control over the Gali
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region in Abkhazia in order to facilitate the return of refugees, but theRussians refused to assume additional responsibilities, even if that increasedthe risk of new clashes, as in May 1998. The only place where Russia hadto assume control over the contested territory was Prigorodny rayon inNorth Ossetia, where the issue of refugee return remains unresolved despiteseveral official agreements.22 The most spectacular Russian failure toestablish territorial control over a secessionist region was certainly theChechen War.
Duration and Withdrawal
Two crucial and related issues in conducting external interventions insecessionist conflicts are how to limit their duration and how to withdrawthe troops - without destabilising the situation and re-igniting the violence.The tradition in the UN peacekeeping is to issue short-term mandates but tomake their prolongation nearly automatic; this provides for sustainedoperations - but not for their mid-term planning. The ever-lasting saga ofUN Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) remains one example of the limitedusefulness of such policy for conflict resolution. It was the disaster inSomalia in September and October 1993 that made the USA particularlyconcerned about setting a clear time limit for any new military interventionand working out a withdrawal plan before the deployment
These concerns figured strongly in 1995 at Dayton, where theAmericans absolutely insisted, dismissing objections from their NATOallies, who had acquired a better insight in the Balkans, that the mandate forthe Implementation Force (IFOR) would be strictly limited for one year.The fairly obvious prospect that the parties to the conflict would take thisdeadline not as a stimulus to move fast with implementation of theagreement but as a chance to win through procrastination, was deliberatelyplayed down due to the need to win support from the US Congress for thedeployment of US troops to Bosnia.23 By autumn 1996, it had becomeimpossible to deny that ending the IFOR on schedule would lead to a newround of hostilities; so on 15 November 1996 President Clinton announcedthat 8,500 American troops would take part in the follow-up StabilizationForce (SFOR) with the new deadline of June 1998.24 In less than half a year,this deadline again became a problem, and in February 1998 NATO decidedto continue the operation indefinitely.25
Three and a half years after NATO assumed the main responsibility formilitary security in Bosnia, it is not clear at all when the operation may besafely discontinued and fairly clear that the continuation of the state-building, however slow and incoherent, depends upon the commitment tostay 'as long as necessary' ,26 SFOR, even reduced to about 30,000 troops,has strong deterrent capability and the withdrawal is not expected to be
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risky. This makes a significant difference with the plans for theUNPROFOR withdrawal hastily drafted in late May 1996, which envisagedthe deployment of up to 50,000 new troops to secure evacuation fromcombat zones.27 The IFOR/SFOR experience, currently perceived as goodand improving, still does not preclude heavy political pressure on anypossible new operation regarding when and how it is scheduled to end.
Russia, in conducting its series of interventions, has never been worriedabout their endings and remains satisfied with open-ended deployments.This gives ground to the analytical conclusion that for Moscow the militaryinterventions are not means in resolving violent conflicts but much moreinstruments of political control of the 'Near Abroad'.28 This policy hasbecome both counter-productive and unsustainable. Georgia and Moldova -the two states most affected by Russia's interventionism - are increasinglyable to receive sympathetic international attention for their demands thatRussian troops withdraw.29 Logistical support for forward deployment ofthousands of troops has long become inadequate due to severe resourceconstraints for the Defence Ministry; while the problem is most acute inTajikistan, the operation in Abkhazia is also in trouble.30 The problem ofending inconclusive interventions and withdrawing from barely stabilisedbattle-zones can hardly be postponed, but Russian policy-makers remain indenial.
Ready for More?
One of the strategic lessons from external military interventions inEuropean secessionist conflicts in the 1990s is that limited-scaledeployment with an uncertain mandate is risky, inefficient and evenperpetuates violence. Thus, UNPROFOR suffered more than 200 casualtiesand was blamed for prolonging the pain of the war in Bosnia,3' Russia'smilitary role in Abkhazia from October 1992 to October 1993 and inTransdniestria in winter/spring 1992 was ambivalent and destabilizing. Theoptimal pattern appears to be that of IFOR: deployment of a strong groupingsupported by sufficient air power and capable of performing according to a'deterrence by punishment' strategy. This pattern requires the capability andreadiness to deploy large contingents of troops for considerable time.
In Western military doctrines and in NATO planning (including variousPfP exercises) such operations are thoroughly examined.32 The fundamentalproblem here is that in all NATO member-states the military expenditureshave been reduced by more than 25 per cent (in constant prices) from thepeak in 1989 and more financial cuts are expected.33 That leads tosignificant and continuing cuts in military manpower, which is becomingrelatively and absolutely more expensive. In ongoing restructuring andmodernisations, it is the land forces that are most radically cut, with morearmy units being disbanded every year.
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The bottom line is that by the end of the 1990s, NATO would have halfthe battalions ready for deployment outside its area that it had during the1991 Gulf War. While peacekeepers are becoming better trained andequipped, the capacity for large-scale and sustained deployment isdiminishing. New members of the Alliance would not be able to contributemuch as their armies are severely affected by underfinanced restructuring.34
The saga of BALTBAT is fairly typical in this respect: back in 1993,Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed to establish a joint peacekeepingbattalion, but by mid-1998 this unit - after receiving all sorts of aid andsupport from NATO - is still unfit for deployment.35 Russia, which in 1994tried to build up its interventionist capabilities and designated two armydivisions as peacekeeping units, had to abandon any such plans due to itsdisastrous failure in Chechnya.36 Military reform guidelines, uncertain asthey are, aim at deploying at least ten fully-manned and moderniseddivisions, but currently (and quite certainly for the next few years) Russianmobile forces are in a truly dismal state.37
The net result is that in the near future (with the SFOR still deployed inBosnia) NATO or any other European security institution will find itincreasingly difficult to launch any new large-scale military operation. Thedisagreement over responsibility for organising a medium size (eventually,about 7,000 troops) operation in Albania in early 1997, which in the end hadto be an ad hoc coalition led by Italy, is perhaps typical in this respect.38 Theshortage of peacekeepers is certain to increase, and Norway (which at thattime provided troops for UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNPREDEP in Macedonia,and SFOR) had to send a detachment of Royal Guards to participate inNATO exercises in Macedonia in September 1998.
SOURCES OF HALF-SUCCESS
The overall assessment of the effectiveness of external militaryinterventions in secessionist conflicts is inescapably mixed: major violenceis terminated but armed confrontation continues, peace processes aredeveloping but none of the conflicts is satisfactorily resolved, internationalframeworks are established but half a dozen of quasi-independent statespersist with their non-recognized status. The pattern of this half-success isfairly similar in all the unique features of the conflicts and various modes ofinterventions. Generalizations, as presented below, are inevitablyincomplete, since the focus of the analysis is on the military-political sideof the problem, but certain political conclusions still can be drawn.
Political Deadlocks
With all the sophistication of its security architecture, Europe remains
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unable to find a political solution for the issue of secession. The only clueto legitimising an escape from a state is found in the human rights domain:brutal and sustained discrimination against a community gives it grounds toseek independent statehood.39 But every violent conflict produces violationof basic human rights of such a scale that applicability of this clue becomesproblematic.
The established fact of break-up of three federal states in early 1990slogically, if not legally, leads to political recognition of the possibility andpermissibility of a withdrawal from a federal arrangement, irrespective ofthe provisions of the constitution. But that leaves slim chance forsurvivability of the 'Daytonland' in Bosnia-Herzegovina, undermines thedetermination of Azerbaijan and Georgia to re-establish control overNagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, puts Russia under more pressure to letChechnya go, and makes Ukraine vulnerable vis-a-vis Crimea (which hasthe status of a republic). Besides, this leaves open the question of aunilateral cancellation of a federal arrangement by the 'centre' (Georgia vw-a-vis South Ossetia and Serbia vis-a-vis Kosovo).
The political solution, which is perceived as optimal in most Europeanpolitical institutions, is to convince a mutinous province to return to thestate in a framework of expanded autonomy. But the states in question -recognising the unreliability of federal/confederal arrangements - aregenerally reluctant to grant meaningful and internationally guaranteedautonomy.40 Russia is perhaps an exception here, agreeing on significantredistribution of political authority from Moscow to the regions andpromising Chechnya just about every attribute of independence short of thepolitical fact.41
The secessionist quasi-states are generally eager to enter into politicaldialogue and internationally supervised negotiation process. But their aimsare essentially uncompromising. First, internationally organized 'peaceprocesses' de facto give such quasi-states an equal status with the'abandoned' state. Second, political 'normalization' allows the formallyunrecognized secessionists to increase international profile and to buildrelations with friendly states and NGOs. In some cases (Transdniestria andRepublika Srpska), negotiations are considered as means to drawinternationally recognized borders and to, establish loose federalarrangements, which later could be quickly abandoned. Finally, protractednegotiations are perceived as important way to secure time for building realstatehood, which sooner or.later will be internationally recognised as faitaccompli.
European states (with full support of the US) so far remain determinedto deny the secessionist quasi-states the advantage of procrastination. Therevitalization during 1997-98 of US-led efforts to find a compromise
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solution for Cyprus, which has remained divided for a political generation,are expected to prove the irrelevance of the time factor. Major Europeanpowers are also cautious about creating a precedent for the political triumphof a violent secession, being worried not only about the continental south-eastern zone of instability, but about the general trend of statefragmentation.42 This postpones the political settlement of all the conflictsinto indefinite future, but time may indeed be on the side of secessionists.
Strategic Shortcomings
Another side of the half-success story of interventions is related to the gapbetween their political and military objectives. Since an externalintervention is typically launched with the consent of parties to the conflict,it is objectively (political declarations notwithstanding) aimed at freezingthe situation on the ground. In at least six cases, international peacekeepersmonitoring or even securing the cessation of hostilities, de facto provideguarantees for the victorious secession (compare Table 2 and Table 3). Thatthey failed to do so in Western Slavonia/Krajina in 1995 does notsignificantly challenge this pattern. Feeling protected by internationalforces, the secessionists are less motivated to reach a compromise innegotiations.
The state parties to secessionist conflicts, on their side, seek to exploitthe deployment of international peacekeepers for tightening internationalisolation of the mutinous provinces, enforcing economic blockade and armsembargo, demilitarizing certain areas. Their aim typically is to securegradual changes in the balance of military forces and to increaseopportunities for winning back the lost territories. The model here is theCroatian blitzkrieg in summer 1995; the Georgian government is trying toproceed along the same avenue but has not arrived very far in rebuilding itsarmy; Azerbaijan obviously has this model in mind when discussing thepossible frameworks for an OSCE peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.43 The controversial US 'train-and-equip' program for the federalBosnian army clearly paves the way for possible attempt to complete thedefeat of the weakened Republika Srpska, which the Croatian army wasordered to stop in September 1995.44
One strategic dilemma in conducting external interventions is thenegative correlation between their scale and duration. Symbolicdeployments can continue for a long time indeed (such as in Cyprus), buttheir usefulness is uncertain, since either of the parties to the conflict can optfor a military solution, ignoring such intervention (besides Croatia, UNIFILin Lebanon provides a perfect example). Large-scale deployments, whileoften efficient in the short-term, are generally perceived as unsustainable.SFOR remains a test case here, but the problem of sustainability looms evengreater over Russia's military presence in Georgia and Transdniestria.
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In rare cases when international interventions are launched not with themandate to ensure the cessation of hostilities but with the aim to deliverhumanitarian supplies, protect certain objects or areas, or evacuate civilians,they are extremely vulnerable to manipulation by the parties of the ongoingconflict. Since the combatants are so eager to use human suffering as meansto reach their tactical goals, humanitarian operations are objectivelysupporting one side against another, and sometimes are exploited by allparties to the conflict in various places. UNPROFOR was trapped in such asituation for the duration, and Russian troops in Abkhazia (from October1992 to October 1993) experienced somewhat similar misfortune. WhileWestern military leaders, drawing on these lessons, are extremely reluctantto repeat such deployments, politicians - under the pressure of publicopinion - may choose such options again. Thus, the political setting forOperation 'Alba' in Albania in spring 1997 was fairly similar to that ofUNPROFOR.45
Perhaps the most complicated option is external peace enforcement insecessionist conflicts. A coherent political mandate could be issued only onenforcing the implementation of a peace treaty, as with IFOR. Even in suchsituations, international forces could find the military aspects of such atreaty (including partial disarmament) much more enforceable than itspolitical agenda (particularly as far as elections are concerned). But in theabsence of any political compromise, external intervention becomesobjectively a decisive support for one of the sides to the conflict. NATO,contemplating an operation in Kosovo in spring 1998 and movingtantalizingly close to air campaign in October, made every effort to avoidtaking the side of the KLA militants. This problem has returned in summer,1999, as NATO took control over Kosovo with an obligation to disarm theKLA. Russia with few doubts intervened on the side of Transdniestria in theclash around Bendery in July 1992; Russian military deployment inPrigorodny rayon in late October 1992 also had features of externalintervention in a secessionist conflict (albeit inside a federal state), this timeagainst the separatists.46 Generally, taking sides in such conflicts could be amilitarily efficient way to end hostilities, but political legitimisation of sucha victory remains extremely problematic.
Humanitarian Failures
Secession commonly involves such an uncompromising clash between twoor several interwoven and ethnically mobilized communities that violationsof human rights escalate like a chain reaction. This creates major demandfor as well as justification of an international intervention. But the Europeanrecord in providing relief in humanitarian catastrophes is mixed andunimpressive.
UNPROFOR can claim credit for the fact that population of Bosnia-
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Herzegovina, despite all the destruction of protracted civil war, did notsuffer from hunger. IFOR/SFOR can list achievements in providing furtheraid, rebuilding infrastructure, demining. The Russian operation in SouthOssetia can be credited with gradual economic and social normalization inthis region. But these achievements are overshadowed by the inability toreverse the pattern of ethnic cleansing and provide for return of refugees.
The practice of ethnic cleansing, while condemned by international lawas a crime against humanity, is a common feature in the majority ofsecessionist conflicts. Any international intervention with the mandate forsecuring a cessation of hostilities has to face the fact that freezing the statusquo means accepting de facto the results of successful ethnic cleansing andresettlement. The problem remains unresolved in Cyprus,47 appearspractically closed in Croatia, continues to reverberate in Georgian politics,and is one of the main obstacles for a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. But the prime focus of international attention in this respect iscertainly on Bosnia.
The Dayton Accords contain clear and unconditional provisions for thereturn of refugees and displaced persons,48 there are also numerous politicalpledges not to accept the results of ethnic cleansing. It would be unfair to saythat these commitments and pledges were completely forgotten in theimplementation, but the efforts to secure the rebuilding of multi-ethniccommunities were insufficient by far. By the end of 1997, as Jane Sharpcalculated, 'of the 2.3 million displaced during the war and the 80,000 since,only 381,000 had returned home and of these only 22,500 returned to areas inwhich the army of their ethnic group did not control the territory'. There werefew positive achievements in this regard in 1998. SFOR mobilized everyresource to allow the refugees to vote in their home constituencies, but thelocal governments elected by their votes are unable to function; the electionsin September 1998 in Republika Srpska were won by an ultra-nationalist.50 Asmonths go by, it is becoming increasingly clear that no return to ethnic statusquo ante is feasible and a 'soft partition' of Bosnia is consolidating. Even thepeaceful return of Eastern Slavonia to Croatia in 1998 produced a stream ofthousands of refugees reaching as far north as Norway.
Besides ethnic cleansing, there is a more general problem of peopleescaping from areas engulfed by hostilities and unable to return until theconflict is settled. It is quite acute in Turkish Kurdistan and particularly inChechnya, whence tens of thousands of refugees fled as the internal conflictescalated during 1992-94, then as Russia invaded and waged the war in1995-96, then as Russian troops were withdrawn and the new regime hasbeen struggling to enforce a quasi-Islamic order. No reliable statistics canbe found for either of these cases, but generally it can be estimated thattermination of most secessionist conflicts in Europe during 1995-98
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(excluding Kosovo) has not so far brought a significant reduction in theEuropean refugee population.51 This is perhaps the most dramatic failure ofall the international efforts to facilitate and enforce solutions for secessionistconflicts, which contribute strongly to the high potential for resumption ofhostilities.
DEALING WITH A NEW WAVE OF SECESSIONS
The year 1997 saw the lowest level of secessionist activity and violence inEurope in this decade; only Turkey continued large-scale militaryoperations in Kurdistan. Several peace processes and negotiations appearedto be on track, and, indeed, the Belfast Agreement in April 1998 apparentlyended the most protracted of European violent conflicts and proved itsviability despite extremist attacks in July and August.52 But an attempt toreach a compromise over Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in resignation ofArmenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian on 3 February 1998; implemen-tation of Dayton agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina was consolidating its'soft partition';53 the fresh US-led attempt to find a solution for Cyprus hasbore little fruit. And in spring 1998 a new large-scale secessionist warerupted in Kosovo.
Kosovo as a Test Case
This war was not only predictable, but also expected to explode every yearsince 1992, testifying to the futility of European conflict preventionpolicies.54 It showed that the political dilemma of secession remainsunresolved: major European states and inter-state organizations are notready to legitimize secession, even if a huge majority of population of aterritory (which lost its federal status in 1989) has clearly expressed itsdesire to split from a state, which openly discriminates against this ethnicgroup and massively violates basic human rights.55
With the first escalation of violence in spring 1998, European politicianswanted to prove that they had learnt certain lessons from the Balkans. Whilethe US has been leading the diplomatic efforts, NATO was eager todemonstrate its new ability to deploy force and act decisively. The plans foroperation in Kosovo were hastily drawn by May, and an exercise with 85aircraft from 13 countries taking part was conducted in mid-June.56 But afterthat both the political will and the military readiness quickly eroded; anotherexercise staged in mid-August in Albania was a logistical and PR disaster.57
The pattern of conflict mismanagement became all too familiar. As CarlBildt succinctly put it: 'The EU is as hesitant, NATO as unwilling, Russiaas reluctant and the US as much a solo player as ever.'58
The immediately available explanation for that back-pedalling was
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Russia. President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov unequivocally andfirmly opposed any NATO action against Serbia,59 and even in the free-fallof economic crisis in September-October Moscow persisted in criticizingNATO's forceful approach. Some Western analysts saw this policy as 'ill-conceived' and 'detrimental to Russian national interests'.60 But, in fact,Western and Russian perceptions of the crisis were strikingly opposite. TheRussian perception, while seemingly quite unsophisticated, was actuallymore complex.
Obviously, humanitarian considerations had little if any influence on it.The ambiguous idea of the 'Slavic-Orthodox solidarity' might havecoloured the rhetoric somewhat but had little political weight.61 Much moreimportant were the deep-rooted anti-NATO feelings which translated intopolitical aims to prevent the Alliance from asserting itself as the centralinstitution of European security. The ambitions on the part of Russia to re-assert her own 'Great Power' role - ambitions by no means diminished, butperhaps even increased by the crisis - further strengthened the intention tohave a big say on the crisis. And finally, the growing fear of separatism anddisintegration, for which Chechnya was a daily trigger, determined the firmpolitical line against any precedent of legitimizing a secession. Theunderlying perspective was that opting for a unilateral air-strike, NATO wasestablishing a pattern for possible forceful action against Russia.62
It might have seemed that the urgent need to secure financial andhumanitarian aid from the West would overrule all these considerations, butactually much in the previous experience told Russian policy-makers thatambitious and non-co-operative stance was the best bargaining position.They have also learned when to step down in order not to be left out of thegame - hence the Contact Group consensus in late January 1999. What wasindeed unusual about the Kosovo case, was that Russia's position did makesome sort of sense. NATO autumnal determination to resolve ahumanitarian crisis with the help of air strikes was not entirely rational. Infact, the Alliance had successfully laid for itself another credibility trap -and was very lucky to get out of it in late October.
NATO had to clear three hurdles before undertaking any forceful actionin Kosovo. First, it had to establish a legitimate mandate in the absence ofUN Security Council authorization or OSCE approval. Some US andGerman officials argued that NATO could act on its own, but it was all tooobvious that 'punishing' Serbia would make a very different story fromconducting missile strikes on targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. The UNSecurity Council Resolution 1199, approved in late September, did notauthorize any use of force, and the Resolution 1203 from late October alsohad to be formulated 'politically'. Going into the war, the West did not eventry to exploit the spiralling financial crisis in Russia, in order to force it into
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agreeing to a clear UN mandate for action, since China remained opposedto any action which might qualify as 'external interference' in Serbia's'internal affairs'. The UN Resolution 1244 from 10 June 1999 was again acompromise allowing for various interpretations.
Second, NATO had to achieve consensus among its 19 member states,who have rather different views on and exposure to the crisis in Kosovo.Thus, Greece has maintained special relations with Serbia, while Denmarkand Norway are extremely reluctant to ignore the UN in any peace supportoperations. Heavy pressure from the US in September-October 1998produced the traditional NATO common front, but it remained less thanrock-solid. Hence the political manoeuvre of shifting the responsibility formonitoring the last-minute compromise to the OSCE, which remains aperfect candidate for scapegoating. When the issue of deploying groundtroops came to the forefront in February 1999, the allies found it extremelydifficult to agree on burden-sharing and had to sponsor the negotiations inRambouillet without any action plan.63 However, NATO unity waspreserved during the air war.
Third, NATO had to ensure a military rationale for the operation. It wasunclear whether pin-point strikes on a few command centres wouldseriously hamper Serbian military campaign in Kosovo, while a full-scalesuppression of the air defence system would require hundreds of sorties andmight involve considerable collateral damage.64 What made the autumnal aircampaign particularly problematic, was the categorical exclusion of anypossibility of deploying NATO troops to Kosovo. Only when the OSCE-centred scheme, invented by Richard Holbrooke, started to fall apart, the USagreed - with all sorts of reservations - to step over its unwillingness to putAmerican troops in harms way. However, the impossibility of a pure 'airsolution' was pretty obvious back in October when NATO issued theactivation order. Its eventual 'victory' in the 78-day air war came at a heavymoral price.
In autumn 1998, the optimal scenario was to perform such an impressiveshow of force that Serbia would have to accept a political compromise,agreeing to grant Kosovo an equal status with Montenegro in the YugoslavFederation in exchange for an internationally guaranteed commitment not tosecede.65 But Richard Holbrooke, with all his talent for conducting forcefulnegotiations, was not able to hammer out anything resembling such acompromise. The optimal scenario in February 1999 shifted towards athree-year 'freeze' period, secured by deployment of a NATO-led force. Atthe moment of this writing, it still remains unclear whether this scenario isenforceable. What is clear is that the fundamental dilemma of NATOmilitarily backing secessionists and denying them political support remainsunresolved.
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European Solutions?
Secessionism continues to cause trouble world-wide, but there are severalspecifically European factors that define the perspective of a new wave ofsecessionist conflicts in this region. The dramatic culmination of thepermanent crisis in Russia should be mentioned first. The spectacular failureof the central authorities could accelerate the centrifugal forces in thefederation, it can also resonate in conflict areas around Russia. While theperspective of this huge and troubled state falling completely apart is toodangerous and fortunately not that close, a few loosely connected parts (suchas Kaliningrad, which was the first to declare a regional state of emergencyin early September 1998) may drift away.66 The shock waves from theRussian crisis can cause economic and political collapse in Ukraine, wherestalled reforms and rampant corruption gradually increase societal pressure- and the presidential elections of 2000 might become a detonator.
Another factor is the combined impact of two institutional expansions:the much debated NATO enlargement being too restrictive (with uncertainperspectives regarding the 'second wave', particularly in the Baltic area)and the less controversial EU enlargement being too slow. The front-runnersin both processes may get disappointed about the results of their painfulefforts, while other applicants (particularly Romania) can turn disheartenedin their near prospects. Bitter competition and various new fault lines(particularly visible around Hungary) can bring destabilization.
The third factor is the lack of progress in resolving the secessionistconflicts of the early 1990s. While separatist leaders in Transdniestria andAbkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Republika Srpska are not able to securefor their respective entities any prosperity, they are able to build manystructures of statehood and gradually establish a pattern of quasi-independentbeing. Such pattern is not unattractive for potential secessionists.
A crude assessment of combined impact of these factors points toward ashort list of potential secessionist conflicts in Europe (see Table 4). Toevaluate their probability - with every reservation about precision andwithout any intention to spell disaster - we can assume that the majordeterminant is ethno-political mobilization. It can be very approximatelymeasured through the sharpness of ethnic distinction between thepopulation of a territory in question and the state to which it belongs, andthrough the development of political-territorial organization by this ethnicgroup. The first is non-existent in Kaliningrad and uncertain in Vojvodina,Karelia and Transcarpathia; the second is absent or weak in about a half ofall cases.
Four key enabling factors are the presence of an international border orsea (Tatarstan is landlocked inside Russia), the ethnically or politicallydriven support from at least one state (Montenegro, Kaliningrad and
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TABLE 4POTENTIAL SECESSIONIST CONFLICTS
45
Unit-State
Karelia-Russia
Crimea-Ukraine
Adzharia-Georgia
Montenegro-Yugoslavia
Vojvodina-Serbia
Ingushetia-Russia
N. Kazakhstan-Kazakhstan
E. Estonia-Estonia
S. Slovakia-Slovakia
W. Tajikistan-Tajikistan
Tatarstan-Russia
Tetovo-Macedonia
Kaliningrad-Russia
E. Ukraine-Ukraine
Tr Carpathia-Ukraine
TransylvaniaRomania
EthnicDivide
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
PoliticalOrganiz.
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
Internat.Border
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Externalallies
Finland
Russia
Turkey
NO
Hungary
Chechnya
Russia
Russia
Hungary
Uzbekistan
NO
Albania
NO
Russia
Poland
Hungary
Arms
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
•YES
NO
NO
NO
PoliticalStability
LOW
LOW
LOW
LOW
LOW
LOW
LOW
HIGH
HIGH
LOW
LOW
HIGH
LOW
LOW
LOW
HIGH
Probability
Medium
High
High
High
Medium
High
Medium
Low
Low
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Tatarstan cannot count on that), the availability of arms (fairly low in halfof the cases), and political stability of the controlling state (weakest inTajikistan, deteriorating in Russia, problematic in Georgia, Kazakhstan,Serbia, and Ukraine). Summing up all these variables, we can conclude thatAdzharia, Crimea, Montenegro, Ingushetia, and Eastern Tajikistan have thehighest probability of secessionist conflict.
If any of these potential conflicts could see an international intervention
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it is probably Montenegro, where secession could have certain legitimacy(as unilateral withdrawal from a federal arrangement).69 This 'Alba'-scale'peace' operation could enjoy the support of at least several NATO memberstates (Italy might take a lead again), it might make a 'natural' connectionbetween operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, so the troops could be coveredfrom the air and logistically supported without much difficulties. At thesame time, it is quite possible that secessionist attempts in Adzharia,Crimea, Ingushetia, Eastern Tajikistan and Northern Kazakhstan can bedirectly supported by interested neighbours - and receive little if anyinternational attention.
This alarming perspective can only - and perhaps only to a degree - beaddressed if Europe will move forward in developing political and legalframeworks for dealing with secessionist situations. The innovative politicalcompromise on Northern Ireland, while clearly tailor-made to the conflict,could be one model for possible solutions. The EU certainly has a huge rolein securing the benefits from such model. The impact of the EU might beeven greater in the possible secession of the Faeroe Isles from Denmark, inwhich a violent escalation is entirely hypothetical, but a political precedentmight be useful.™ On the other hand, the EU decision to start admissionnegotiations with the Cyprus government, essentially ignoring the politicalreality of secession, has not contributed anything positive to conflictresolution or even provoked new 'bridge-building' between Turkey andNorthern Cyprus."
In relations between the 'EU-Europe' and the outlying 'OSCE-Europe'we have a characteristic divergence of normative and geopoliticalperspectives. The basic political norms and human rights standards aredeclared equal and applicable throughout, but the will to observe, maintainor enforce these norms and standards declines proportionally to distance onthe south-eastern axis. From this point of view, the decision to launch a'peace' operation in Nagorno-Karabakh was a paradoxical deviation thatcould only result in failure. One factor that has worked against thisgeopolitical perspective is the Caspian Sea oil. It attracted serious politicalattention during 1995-97, which potentially could have beeninstrumentalized for conflict resolution. But the sharp drop in oil prices in1997-98 has considerably altered the mid-term perspectives and reducedthe strategic decisions on pipelines routes to a second priority issue. Thereis now hardly much prospect for mobilizing sufficient political will inEurope for dealing with secessionist conflicts in the Caucasus and even lessin Central Asia, so the focus on changing certain norms could be morerelevant.
One promising model for resolving secessionist dilemmas can be foundin the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in August 1998 regarding
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Quebec.72 The point is that a unilateral decision of a political-territorial unit,even if supported by a popular vote, does not provide sufficient ground forbreaking up a state. But the state in question also cannot ignore thedemocratically expressed preference of its province and should in good willnegotiate the conditions and timetable for a separation. This compromisebetween the basic principles of territorial integrity and self-determinationneeds solid international guarantees to be applicable to conflict situations.The introduction of such a norm in the European political system that nostate can force any of its constituent parts to stay in, is certain to face plentyof political resistance. Still such a norm generally corresponds to theongoing transformation of states and ultimately allows to resolve the currentabnormal situation with half a dozen illegitimate political subjects and moreto come.
The implementation of such compromises in conflict situations isextremely difficult, but in most European 'frozen' secessionist conflicts it isstill possible to secure conditions for executing a democratic choice. TheOSCE, Council of Europe and other institutions have accumulatedexperience in monitoring elections and verifying their 'free-and-fair'character. One particularly complicated aspect of such normalization will besecuring the rights of refugees in any settlement and consistently rejectingthe results of ethnic cleansings. For that matter, it is the Moldova-Transdniestria conflict (which remains the only one without majordisplacement of people) that may serve as a testing ground for newsolutions, while Montenegro appears to be the most demanding case forpreventive deployment. International interventions aimed at creating asecure environment for exercising democratic choice may become acommon feature in de-escalating and defusing European secessions.
NOTES
This article presents the results of research in the project Humanitarian Intervention and the NewSecurity Agenda, conducted in co-operation between the International Peace Research Institute,Oslo (PRIO) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).
1. For more theoretically elaborate definitions of secessions see James Mayall, Nationalism andInternational Society (Cambridge: CUP 1990) p.61 and Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass 1991) pp.1-2.
2. On the helplessness of UN military observers in Tajikistan and Abkhazia see Andrew Meier,'Arm the UN Military Observers', International Herald Tribune, 25 Aug. 1998.
3. The deployment of International Forces for securing law and order during the plebiscites inSchleswig, Upper Silesia, Sopron in the early 1920s and in the Saar in 1935 can bementioned. On this see Alan James, 'Peacekeeping in Europe - the Historical Heritage', inEspen Barth Eide (ed.), Peacekeeping in Europe, UN Programme Report No. 5 (Oslo: NUPI1995) pp.25-42.
4. See Richard and Ben Crampton, Atlas of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (Londonand NY: Routledge 1996).
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5. For a recent comprehensive analysis of this problem see Chaim D. Kaufmann, 'When AllElse Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century',International Security 23/2 (Fall 1998) pp.120-56.
6. Secretary of State James Baker's warning of 'very tragic consequences' of the break-up ofYugoslavia in June 1991 (just two weeks before the Slovenian one-week war) and PresidentBush's condemnation of 'suicidal nationalism' in Aug. 1991 in Kiev (just three weeks beforethe putsch in Moscow) deserve places in the annals of modern history under the rubric of'Blunders of Shortsightedness'.
7. For a useful comparative analysis of the two break-ups, which is more convincing on theYugoslavian case, see Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals(Oxford: OUP 1996).
8. Alexis Heraclides argues: 'A common fallacy of most of the literature on separatist andethnic conflict is to take for granted that all separatist conflicts are ethonationalist incharacter'. See his article 'The Ending of Unending Conflicts: Separatist Wars', Millennium26/3 (1998) p.683 of pp.679-707.
9. On this see Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (London: Hurst 1995)pp. 143-65. See also the chapters of Edward Ozhiganov and Brian D. Taylor in AlexeiArbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler and Lara Olson (eds.), Managing Conflict in theFormer Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997).
10. Even Abkhazia has applied several times to join the Russian Federation, although it does nothave any ethnic links across the border.
11. 'Down but Far From Out', The Economist, 1-7 Aug. 1998, p.26.12. For a recent examination of various theoretical perspectives see Percy B. Lehning (ed.),
Theories of Secession (London and NY: Routledge 1998). The chapters by Michael Freeman,Paul Gilbert and Allen Buchanan are particularly enlightening.
13. See the brilliant analysis by Ole Wfever in 'Imperial Metaphors: Emerging EuropeanAnalogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems', in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev and Einagel(eds.), Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe (London: SAGE 1997) pp.59-93.
14. Ola Tunander observes that 'despite this central role of territory, one state (or republic) afteranother is seeking to move towards the centre, towards a European Cosmos, by liberatingitself from its own backward periphery'. See his chapter 'Post-Cold War Europe' inTunander, Baev and Einagel (note 13) p.37. For argument on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict,see Ola Tunander 'A New Ottoman Empire?', Security Dialogue 26/4 (Dec. 1995)pp.413-26.
15. In the same article, the argument is elaborated: 'When a cultural or ethnic group decides thatit is the principal generator of wealth in a larger nation or federation, a secessionistmovement is just a press release away.' See Pascal Boniface, 'The Proliferation of States',Washington Quarterly 21/2 (Summer 1998) pp.111-27, on pp.114, 122.
16. See on this Shashi Tharor, 'The Role of the United Nations in European Peacekeeping', inEspen Barth Eide (ed.), Peacekeeping in Europe, UN Programme Report No. 5 (Oslo: NUPI1995) pp.43-58.
17. For opposing views on that non-starter, see John Maresca, 'Why an OSCE Role in theCaucasus?', and Heikki Vilen, 'Planning a Peacekeeping mission for the Nagorno-KarabakhConflict', both in Security Dialogue 27/3 (Sept. 1996) pp.87-90, 91-4.
18. For more on that subject, see Pavel K. Baev, Russia's Policies in the Caucasus (London:RIIA 1997) pp.43-50, and idem, 'Conflict Management in the Former Soviet South: TheDead-End of Russian Interventions', European Security 6/4 (Winter 1997) pp.1ll-29.
19. For a penetrating analysis of the mechanics of the take-over see Espen Barth Eide and PerErik Solli, From Blue to Green: The Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia andHerzegovina, NUPI Working Paper No. 539, Dec. 1995.
20. According to US official sources, NATO had spent up to $100m on developing plans forcapturing the two most wanted suspects - Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, but finallyhad to drop these high-risk plans in summer 1998. See Tim Weiner, 'US Drops Plan to NabAccused Serbs', International Herald Tribune, 27 July 1998; Thomas Sancton and GillesDelafon, 'The Hunt for Karadzic', Time, 10 Aug. 1998.
21. For a more detailed analysis, see Baev (note 18) pp.43-50.
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22. Most recently, this conflict was addressed by Russian Security Council in mid-Jan. 1999 butaside from creating a new bureaucratic framework few real progress is achieved. See, on thissubject, the chapters of Olga Osipova and David Mendeloff, in Arbatov et al. (note 9).
23. Carl Bildt argued: 'Following the Dayton Agreement of November 1995, it became a centralthesis in US policy that what was required was a 12-month military operation under firm USleadership, and not much more than that.... This attitude was not only nai've, but dangerous'.See 'There Is No Alternative to Dayton', Survival 39/4 (Winter 1997-98) p.17.
24. See Jane Sharp, 'Recommitting to Dayton', War Report (Nov.-Dec. 1996) pp.89; Ivo H.Daalder, 'Bosnia after SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement', Survival 39/4(Winter 1997-98) pp.5-18.
25. See Greg Schulte, 'SFOR Continued', NATO Review, No.2 (Summer 1998) pp.27-30.26. See Thomas L. Friedman, 'Redo Dayton on Bosnia, and Do a Deal on Kosovo',
International Herald Tribune, 8 Feb. 1998.27. See Anthony Borden and Richard Caplan, 'The Former Yugoslavia: The War and the Peace
Process', in S1PR1 Yearbook 1996 (Oxford: OUP 1996) p.214.28. See Lena Jonson, 'In Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in Its 'Near
Abroad", Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 5/3 (Winter 1996) pp.440-65.29. Thus, Moldova presented its case with unexpected urge during the discussions on the
Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe at the OSCE summit in Lisbon inDec. 1996.
30. On Tajikistan, see Lena Jonson, The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy, DiscussionPaper 74 (London: RIIA 1998). Abkhazia saw a new spasm of fighting in April-May 1998;in July, four Russian peacekeepers were killed with a remote-controlled mine. See DodgeBillingsley, 'Truce Means Nothing in Western Georgia', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/6(June 1998) pp. 12-17.
31. See Brian Urquhart and Michael Dole, 'Peacekeeping Up to Now: Under Fire from Friendand Foe', International Herald Tribune, 16-17 Dec. 1995.
32. On the integration of concepts of war and operations other than war (OOTW) in the new USArmy Field Manual 100-5 Operations, see Michael McCormick, 'The New FM 100-5: AReturn to Operational Art', Military Review 77/5 (Sept.-Oct. 1997) pp.3-14. See alsoCharles Swannack and David Gray, 'Peace Enforcement Operations', ibid. 77/6 (Nov.-Dec.1997) pp.3-10. On NATO planning, see John Kriendler, 'PfP Crisis Management Activities',NATO Review, No. 3 (Autumn 1998) pp.28-31.
33. See Appendix 6B 'Tables on NATO Military Expenditure', in SIPRI Yearbook 1998,pp.236-9.
34. Perhaps the only exception is Polish special forces unit GROM, which performedimpeccably in Haiti in 1994. See 'Samuel Katz, 'GROM: The Advent of Polish Thunder',Jane's Intelligence Review 10/8 (Aug. 1998) pp.12-17.
35. See Henning Frantzen, 'The Baltic Response to NATO Enlargement', Jane's IntelligenceReview 9/10 (Oct. 1997) pp.438-4l. The presentation of Major Geir Hågen Karlsen at the34th Annual Comference of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Leangkollen, 1-3 Feb.1998, was illuminating.
36. On the long-term impact of this defeat on the Russian military see Roy Allison, 'TheChechenia Conflcit: Military and Security Policy Implications', in idem and Christoph Bluth(eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (London: RIIA 1998) pp.241-80.
37. See David Isby, 'Russia Looks to New Breed of Blue Berets', Jane's Intelligence Review10/5 (May 1998) pp.5-8.
38. See Ettore Greco, 'New Trends in Peacekeeping: Operation Alba', Edward Foster, 'Ad Hocin Albania: Did Europe Fail?', Security Dialogue 29/2 (June 1998) pp.201-12, 213-18.
39. See Brumo Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP1994) pp.65-8.
40. For a good conceptual discussion see Will Kymlicka, 'Is Federalism a Viable Alternative toSecession?', in Percy B. Lehning (ed.), Theories of Secession (Routledge 1998) pp. 111-50.
41. Uncertain trajectory of federalism in Russia where the centre, being paralysed by structuralcrisis, is unable to produce any comprehensive blueprint and relies on a series of ad hoccompromises, was examined at the conference 'Contemporary Russian Federalism' at the
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Carnegie Moscow Center in Dec. 1997.42. An editorial in the Financial Times points out that there are already 35 countries with
population less than 500,000. The trend towards 'more and smaller countries' is set tocontinue, particularly since 'liberalisation of trade has favoured small countries the most',while 'telecommunications and computers increasingly render size and distance irrelevant'.'Secession', Financial Times, 13 Aug. 1998.
43. Another tactical manoeuvre from Azerbaijan was the suggestion to host an Americanmilitary base as a counter-weight to Russian military deployment in Armenia. See'Unwelcome Azerbaijani Offer', International Herald Tribune, 6-7 Feb. 1999.
44. On the 'train and equip' program see Eniz Dzanic and Norman Erik, 'Retraining theFederation Forces in Post-Dayton Bosnia', Jane's Intelligence Review 10/1 (Jan. 1998),pp.5-9.
45. See Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'Innovations in Peacekeeping: The Caseof Albania', Security Dialogue 29/1 (March 1998) pp.49-58.
46. This case has certain similarities with the deployment of British troops in Northern Irelandin 1969; ethnic cleansing, certainly, makes a huge difference.
47. This was illustrated by the sharp reaction in Turkey to the ruling of European Court onHuman Rights in July 1998 that Turkey had to pay a Greek family $640,000 in compensationfor property lost due to ethnic cleansing in 1974. A flurry of lawsuits is expected from200,000 Greeks who had to flee from Northern Cyprus after the Turkish invasion. See 'CourtAward Irks Ankara', Financial Times, 31 July 1998.
48. Article VII of the General Framework Agreement; Annex 4, Art. II, §5, Constitution ofBosnia-Herzegovina; Annex 6, Ch.1, Agreement on Human Rights; Annex 7, Ch.l,Agreement of Refugees and Displaced Persons.
49. Jane M.O. Sharp, 'Dayton's Unfinished Business', War Report 58 (Feb.-March 1998) p.27.50. The prevailing tone of the comments was that 'three years of concerted and hugely expensive
efforts by the West to rebuild a stable Bosnia with a measure of ethnic co-operation will havecome to nought'. The Economist, 19-25 Sept. 1998, p.45.
51. According to the UNHCR estimates, in 1997 Europe had nearly 2,000,000 refugees and upto 5,000,000 internally displaced people. See The State of the World Refugees 1997-98(Oxford: OUP 1997) pp.3, 105.
52. See Bill McSweeney, 'Interests and Identity in the Construction of the Belfast Agreement',Security Dialogue 29/2 (June 1998), pp.303-14.
53. See Tihomir Loza, 'Adventures in Daytonland', War Report 58 (Feb.-March 1998) pp.46-9.54. See Alexis Heraclides, 'The Kosovo Conflict and Its Resolution', Security Dialogue 28/3
(Sept. 1997) pp.317-31.55. Dana H. Allin and John Roper, insisting that 'the West is right to discourage Kosovo
secession', also admit that 'independence may be inevitable, and the West should not opposeit at all costs'. See 'Facing Realities in Kosovo', The World Today, Nov. 1998, p.287.
56. See Marc Rogers, 'NATO Ministers Air Latest Plans for Kosovo Crisis', Jane's DefenceWeekly, 17 June 1998, p.3; idem, 'Air Power Makes Its Point in Kosovo', ibid., 24 June 1998,p.3.
57. See Ian Mather, 'NATO's Co-operative Chaos in Albania', The European, 24-30 Aug. 1998.58. Carl Bildt, 'Déjà vu in Kosovo', Financial Times, 10 June 1998.59 See Ralph Atkins, 'Yeltsin Wary over Strikes on Serbs', Financial Times, 10 June 1998;
'Russian Envoy, in Kosovo, Rejects NATO Strikes', Reuters, 7 Aug. 1998, in Russia Today(Internet service).
60. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, 'A Flawed Pragmatism', Moscow Times, 10 Oct.1998.
61. See Maxim Yusin, 'Why Russia Must Back the Serbs', The European, 17-23 Aug. 1998.62. As Dmitry Trenin, Deputy Director of Carnegie Moscow Center, put it, 'Russian generals
fear that one day they may be on the other end of the stick'. See 'Russia Rattles Sabers overKosovo', Russia Today, 13 Oct. 1998.
63. See Joseph Fitchett, 'Use of Force in Kosovo Splits NATO', Int. Herald Tribune, 8 Feb.1999; Jane Perlez, 'NATO Far from Ready on Kosovo Deployment', ibid. 10 Feb. 1999.
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64. See Marc Rogers, 'NATO Moves May Support Possible Kosovo Ceasefire', Jane's DefenceWeekly, 5 Aug. 1998, p.3. The moral dilemmas of these air strikes were certainly a factor inthe spy scandal in NATO Headquarters, in which French Major Pierre Bunel was arrested forpassing secret documents on targeting to Serbia. See Craig R. Whitney, 'French Officer IsAccused of Passing Data to Serbs', International Herald Tribune, 3 Nov. 1998; ThomasSancton, 'Bitterness and Betrayal', Time, 16 Nov. 1998, p.35. .
65. See Edward Mortimer, 'Serb Tragedy', Financial Times, 10 June 1998.66. Ambiguous secessionist noises from Kalmykia in mid-Nov. 1998 were rather a symptom
than a real political issue.67. On the EU half-hearted and slow-moving enlargement, see Kirsty Hughes, 'A Most
Exclusive Club', Financial Times, 26 Aug. 1998; 'European Union Looks Outwards', ibid,10 Nov. 1998.
68. See Barry James, 'EU Specter: New Version of the Old East-West Line', InternationalHerald Tribune, 28 Oct. 1998.
69. See Zoran Kusovac, 'Montenegro: The Crisis That Could Scuttle Yugoslavia', Jane'sIntelligence Review 10/7 (July 1998), pp.9-14; William Shingleton, 'NATO Threat SplitsMontenegro', Pointer, Dec. 1998, p.3.
70. See 'Will the Faeroes Flee the Nest?', The Economist, 5 Sept. 1998.71. See F. Stephen Larrabee, 'The EU Needs to Rethink Its Cyprus Strategy', in response to
Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Survival 40/3 (Autumn 1998) pp.25-972. See Edward Alden, 'Secession of Hostilities', Financial Times, 22-23 Aug. 1998.
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