exploring the aspects of law’s “goodness” in ronald
TRANSCRIPT
* PetarPopović,Ph.D.,AssistantProfessor,FacultyofCanonLaw,PontificalUniver-sityoftheHolyCross,PiazzadiSant’Apollinare49,00186Rome,Italy;
[email protected]; ORCIDID:orcid.org/0000-0001-5282-0850
EXPLORING THE ASPECTS OF LAW’S “GOODNESS” IN RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF THE
STRONG NATURAL-LAW THEORY
Assist. Prof. Petar Popović, Ph. D.* UDK:34.01 340.12
929Dvorkin,R. DOI:10.3935/zpfz.70.4.04
Izvorniznanstvenirad Primljeno:srpanj2020.
The scope of this paper is to explore certain aspects of Ronald Dworkin’s critique of the so-called “strong” natural-law theory. The author focuses on those aspects of Dworkin’s critique that gravitate toward the perspective of law’s “goodness”, namely, the question of how and to what extent Dworkin and the “strong” natural-law theory, each in its own way, allow the overlap between the concept of law and the evaluative viewpoint according to which substantive aspects of human moral good are pertinent to legal issues. In the first section of the paper, the author presents the central arguments of Dworkin’s legal theory by highlighting those theoretical elements that are often considered to be similar to the claims of the natural-law theory in a broad sense. The author then presents Dworkin’s main objections to the “strong” natural-law theory, as well as the evaluation of Dworkin’s “minimalist” natural-law account through the lens of the proponents of the “strong” theory. In the last section, the author analyses certain aspects of law’s “goodness” that have remained mostly implicit or underdeveloped in the debate between Dworkin and the “orthodox” natural lawyers.
Key words: Dworkin; natural-law theory; legal interpretivism; political morality
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1. INTRODUCTION
Istheconceptoflawinextricablyconnectedtomoralitytotheextentthatthereferencetosubstantivehumangoodsomehownecessarilyentersintothedefinitionoflaw?Canwepositavalidstandpointfromwhichitmaybeaffir-medthatlawis–initsessence,aswellasaccordingtothecontentofconcretelegalrules–substantivelygood?Islaw as it ought to besomehowalreadyinbuiltintotheverynotionoflaw as it is?Insum,towhatdegreeisitconceptuallypermissibletoestablishanessentialoverlapbetweentheconceptof lawandtheconceptofgood?
Anyanswer,affirmativeornegative,totheabovesetofquestionsrepresentsaviewpointen routetoastructuredunderstandingofwhatlawis,conceptually,ontologically,andfunctionally.AccordingtoH.L.A.Hart’snegativeanswertothesequestions,therearenonecessaryconceptualconnectionsbetweenlawasitisandlawasmorallyitoughttobe;atbestwecanspeculateabout“merelycontingent”1overlapsorlaw’stangentiallycontingent“goodness”.Theso-called“nonecessaryconnection”argumentinfavourofessentiallyseparateordersoflawandmoralitypermitsus,atbest,topostulateamerelyformal2orsystemic3 conceptionof law’sgoodness.From legalpositivismto recentendeavoursoftheartefactual legal theory4, law isconceptuallyorontologicallyenvisioned
1 SeeHart,H.L.A.,Introduction,in:Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy,OxfordUni-versityPress,Oxford, 1983, p.8.SeealsoHart,H.L.A.,The Concept of Law (3rded.),OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford, 2012, pp.187–200.
2 InHansKelsen’sview,theconceptoflawmayoverlapwiththeconceptofgoodonlyifwethoroughlyreconstructthe“good”accordingtoapurelyformalconcep-tionofitsjuristicrelevancewhollydependentonthevaluesoriginatinginpositivelegalnorms.Accordingtothisposition,theconceptofjuristicgoodisessentiallyunderstoodasthat which legally ought to beor“thatwhichconformstoasocialnorm;andiflawisdefinedasnorm,thenthisimpliesthatwhatislawfulis‘good’”.SeeKelsen,H.,Pure Theory of Law(translatedbyM.Knight),TheLawbookExchange,Ltd.,Clark,NewJersey,2005,p.66.
3 AccordingtoJosephRaz’saccountofpurelysystemicmoralpropertiesoflaw,theonlynecessaryconnectionbetween lawandmoralityamounts to theclaimthatlaw, envisioned at the level of an abstract institution, has the essential task tosecurea stateofaffairswhereincertainmoralgoals– likehavingacoordinatedstructureofauthority–arerealizedthatcouldnothavebeen(orwouldbeunlikely)achievedwithoutit.SeeRaz,J.,About Morality and the Nature of Law,in:Between Au-thority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2009,pp.178–179.
4 Forexample,seeBurazin,L.;Himma,K.E.;Roversi,C.(eds.),Law as an Artifact,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2018.SeealsoBurazin,L.,Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law?,RatioJuris,vol.29,no.3,2016,pp.385–401.
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exclusivelyasasource-based–i.e.,essentiallyidentifiablethroughsociallyre-cognizedlegalsources–socialfactorartefact.Thismeansthatlaw(what law is)isstructurallyseparatedfromclaimsaboutwhat law ought to beaccordingtovarioussubstantivemoralaspectsofthehumangoodthataredeemedultimatelyirrelevantfortheidentificationofthelaw.
Thescopeofthispaperistoexploreaspectsoftheanswertotheabovesetofquestionsregardinglaw’s“goodness”thatareoutlinedormayotherwisebecontextualizedinRonaldDworkin’s(1931–2013)critiqueofwhathereferredtoasthe“strong”5natural-lawtheory.Dworkin’scritiquecamefromapeculiartheoreticalposition,sincehehimselfwasfrequentlyaccusedbyhiscriticsfor“professing”certainargumentsthatareclassicallyattributedtothenatural-lawtradition,suchastheargumentthattheconceptoflawnecessarilycontainsareferencetonormativeorevaluativestandardsandis,thus,irreducibletopuresource-basedsocial facts.6Dworkinwasalwaysquiteclear inhisargumentsthatthestandardsoflaw’s“goodness”arehigherthanthosethatarecontainedintheclaimsformerelycontingent,formalisticorsystemicmoralpropertiesoflaw.Therealquestionis:howmuchhigher?Heclearlyarguesthat“whatthelawisdependsin some wayonwhatthelawshouldbe”7:
“IfthecrudedescriptionofnaturallawIjustgaveiscorrect,thatanytheorywhichmakesthecontentoflawsometimesdependonthecorrectanswertosomemoralquestionisanaturallawtheory,thenIamguiltyofnaturallaw”.8
Dworkin’scritiqueofthe“strong”versionofanatural-lawtheory,aswellashisqualificationofthelink(“insomeway”)betweenlaw as it isandlaw as it ought to be, reveal thatthe“necessaryconnection”argumentregardingthelaw-moralityintersectionmaybedefendedbydifferent–evenmutuallyirre-ducibleandirreconcilable–theoreticalpositions.Itisevident,evenfromtheseintroductoryremarks,thatDworkin’slegaltheoryaimsataconceptuallink
5 SeeDworkin,R.,Law’s Empire, TheBelknapPress ofHarvardUniversity Press,Cambridge,1986,p.102.
6 FortworelativelyrecentexamplesofidentifyingDworkin’slegaltheoryasasui ge-nerisanti-positivistapproachthatatthesametimeinvitesandresistsclassificationasanatural-lawtheory,seeLyons,D.,Moral Limits of Dworkin’s Theory of Law and Legal Interpretation,BostonUniversityofLawReview,vol.90,no.2,2010,pp.595–602;Priel,D.,Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence,LawandPhilosophy,vol.29,no.6,2010,pp.633–667.
7 Dworkin,R.,“Natural Law” Revisited,UniversityofFloridaLawReview,vol.34,no.2,1982,p.165.Emphasisadded.
8 Ibid.
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betweenlawandmoralitythatiscertainlybelowthelevelofanalysisthatheconsiderstobe“strong”.
InthefirstpartofthispaperIwillshowwhatIconsidertobethemostobvioussimilaritiesbetweenDworkin’spositionandthecentralclaimsofthenatural-lawtheoryoflawandjuridicity.IwillsubsequentlypresentDworkin’sreasonsfordissociationfromthestrongnatural-lawtheory.Mynextaimistobrieflypresentsomeofthemostprominentnaturallawyers’argumentsagainstDworkin’sassociationwiththenatural-lawtheory.InthefinalpartofthepaperIwillexplorecertainaspectsofthequestionregardinglaw’s“goodness”thatinhabitthefieldbetweenDworkin’s legal theoryandthestrongnatural-lawtheory,butwhichgobeyondtheirexplicitmutualcritiques.
Forthepurposesofthispaper–andinaccordancewithwhatIbelievewereDworkin’sintentionswhenhecriticizedaversionofthenatural-lawtheorythathedeemed“strong”–Iwillhenceforthpresumethatthecoreclaimofthestrongnatural-lawtheoryiscontainedintheargumentthataspectsofsubstantivehu-manmoralgoodenterintotheverydefinition–theconceptortheontologicalstatus–ofwhatlawis.
2. A DWORKINIAN ACCOUNT OF LAW’S “GOODNESS” AND ITS PROXIMITY TO A NATURAL-LAW LINE OF ARGUMENT
AlthoughDworkinseldomexplicitlyaddressestheissueoftheconceptualin-terconnectednessoflawandmoralityintermsoftheoverlapbetweenthenotionoflawandthenotionof“goodness”,itisquiteclearthatthisoverlapoccupiesastrategicpositionontheconceptualmapofhisviewsonthenatureoflaw.
“Wecannotidentifythecorrecttestsfordecidingwhatthelawreallyiswithoutdeployinganddefendingaconceptionoflegality,andwecannotdothatwithoutdecidingwhat,ifanything,is really good about legality.Jurispru-denceisanexerciseinsubstantive political morality.[…]Thecuttingedgeofajurisprudentialargumentisitsmoral edge.[…]Westrivetounderstandlegalitybyunderstandingwhatisdistinctlyimportantandvaluableinit”.9
9 Dworkin,R.,Justice in Robes,TheBelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,Cam-bridge, 2006, p. 178. Emphasis added. A conception of legality is, according toDworkin,“ageneralaccountofhowtodecidewhichparticularclaimsoflawaretrue”.Ibid.,p.170.Itmaybesaidthat“legality”denotesthejuristicphenomenonat thehighest levelofanalysis, caught in itsaxiologicalperspectiveof thepointforhavinglawasaninstitutionandasapracticeatall,whilealsoembracinglaw’sconcretesocial-factualinstantiations.Seeibid.,pp.168–171.
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Inordertounderstandthefullmeaningandlegal-philosophicalimpactofthesearguments–especiallytheitalicizedparts–ontheneedtoestablishthesenseinwhichlawmay(ormaynot,ormust)besaidtooverlapwith“goodness”,itwillbehelpfultorevisitthecrucialclaimsofDworkin’saccountofthenatureoflaw.Theselectionandpresentationoftheseclaimswillbefilteredthroughthequestionofwhether,andtowhatextent,theyresemblethekeyfeaturesofanatural-lawapproachtotheconceptoflaw.
ThefirstimportantclaiminDworkin’stheoryoflawishisthesisthat“lawincludesnotonlythespecificrulesenactedinaccordancewiththecommunity’sacceptedpracticesbutalsotheprinciplesthatprovidethebestmoraljustificationforthoseenactedrules”.10Thisclaimisdevelopedasacritiquetothecentralthesisoflegalpositivism,whichDworkincallsthe“rule-book”conception11,accordingtowhichlawisenvisionedexclusivelyasasetofsource-basedsocialfacts“explicitlysetoutinapublicrulebookavailabletoall”.12Incontrasttolegalpositivism’srejectionoftheideathat“legalrightscanpre-existanyformoflegislation”13,Dworkinarguesthat,besidestheexclusiveappealtoenactedlegalrules,lawincludesalsothejustifying legal principles.14
Thesejustifyingprinciples,identifiedbeyond(oratthefoundationsof)so-urce-basedlegalrules,pointtothe“politicalormoralconcernsandtraditions”ofthepoliticalcommunitythatsupportandtherebyjustifythecontentoftheenactedrules.15However,thecontentofsaidprinciplesisnotexhaustedbyde-notingpurelymotivationalorexplanatorybackgrounddataforenactedrules;accordingtoDworkin,thejustifyingprinciplespointtoclaimsaboutrightsthatcitizenshave.Theprinciplesjustifyalegalenactmentfromthe“rulebook”by“showingthat[it]respectsorsecuressomeindividualorgroupright”.16Despite
10 Dworkin,R.,Justice for Hedgehogs,TheBelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,2011,p.402.Emphasisadded.
11 Dworkin,R.,A Matter of Principle,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,1985,p.11.12 Ibid.13 Dworkin,R.,Taking Rights Seriously(2nded.),HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,1978,p.xi.
14 Ibid.,p.46.“Thelawthenalsoincludestherulesthatfollowfromthosejustifyinglegalprinciples,eventhoughthosefurtherruleswereneverenacted”.Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.10),p.402.
15 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.13),p.67.16 Ibid.,pp.82,343–344.Dworkinprovidestheexampleofanti-discriminationstat-utesthatarejustifiedbythelegalprincipleaccordingtowhichaminorityhasarighttoequalconcernandrespect.Seeibid.,p.82.Elsewhere,Dworkinwillrefertoargumentsofprincipleas“right-based”.SeeDworkin,op. cit.(fn.11),p.3.
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thefactthatthey(1)maylacktheexplicitmentionintherulebook,(2)pre-existtherule-booklegislation,and(3)belongtoaspecificgroupof“principlesofpersonalandpoliticalmorality”,therightsinquestionarefullylegal.17Thus,inDworkin’sview,the“rule-book”conceptionoflawmustbeexpandedtoinc-ludethe“rights”conceptionwhichsecurestheidentificationofcitizens’moralandpoliticalrightsthatare,evenifnotexplicitlyandentirelycontainedintherule-book,alsoincludedintheconceptoflawaslegalrights.18Atthesametime,althoughDworkin’sconceptionofrightsthatoriginateinjustifyinglegalprinci-plesdeniesthat“therulebookistheexclusivesourceofrights”,it“concedesthattherulebookis[…]asourceofmoralrights”19inthesensethatenactedrulesincludeanecessaryreferencetoaspecifickindofpolitical-moraljustification.
Dworkinadmitsthatthebackboneofthisaccountoftheconceptoflawbearsstrongresemblancetooneofthecentralfeaturesofthenatural-lawthe-ory,namely, theargument that the identificationof law(ordecidingwhichpropositionsof lawaretrue)gravitatestoward“criteriathatarenotentirelyfactual,butatleasttosomeextentmoral”.20Inotherwords,Dworkinadvocatessomethingverysimilartothecoreclaimsofthenatural-lawtheorywhenhepostulatesthenecessityofextendingtheconceptoflawalsotoaspecificgroupofnormativemoralprinciplesthatarenotcontainedinthesocial-factualrulebookofpubliclyrecognizedlegalsources.
InDworkin’sadjudication-centredlegaltheory,theinsufficiencyoflegalposi-tivism’srule-bookapproach,andtheneedtoconsultjustifyinglegalprinciplesintheprocessoftheidentificationofthelaw,ismadeparticularlymanifestinthecourseofreflectiononhowtoresolveissuesthathereferstoas“hardcases”.Wehaveahardcasewhen(1)anissuethatcausestheneedtoidentifytherelevantlawdoesnotcorrespondtoastateofaffairsdescribedinanyoftheenactedrulesfromtherulebook(“therulebookissilent”),orthe“wordsintherulebookaresubjecttocompetinginterpretations”21,and(2)thelawmaybesettledonlythroughachoicebetweeneligibleinterpretationsbasedontheassessmentthatthisparticularchoice“showsthecommunity’sstructureofinstitutionsanddecisions[…]inabetterlightfromthestandpointofpoliticalmorality”.22Thus,
17 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.5),p.96.18 SeeDworkin,op. cit.(fn.11),pp.11–13.19 Ibid.,p.16.20 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.5),p.35.21 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.11),p.16.Weareconfrontedwithahardcasewhen“nosettledruledictatesadecisioneitherway”.Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.13),p.83.
22 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.5),p.256.
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theresolutionofissuesqualifiedashardcasesisnotjustamatterofdecidingatone’sowndiscretionandtherebyexpandingtherulebook,noramatterofchoosing,allenactedrulesconsidered,thecorrectintra-systemic(i.e.,intrarulebook)interpretationofpertinentsource-basedrules.AccordingtoDworkin,it isamatterofdecidingbetweencompeting conceptions of political morality.23 Inotherwords,itisamatterofprinciples,includingcorrespondingrights,thatprovidethebestpolitical-moraljustification(orconstructiveinterpretation)ofthelegalnorms,institutionsandpracticesinaparticularpoliticalcommunity.24
Toillustratetheweightofponderationinhardcases,Dworkinintroducestheidealofanimaginaryjudgewithsuperhumanintellectualpowerandpatience,whomhenamesHercules.Inordertoreachthebestpossiblepolitical-moraljustificationoflawandthepointoflegalpracticeasawhole,Herculesmust,forexample:(1)elaborate,inadvance,acoherentoverarchingsetofthoseprinciplesofpoliticalmoralitythatbestjustifyenactedrulesinagivencommunity,soastobeabletoenforcetheminfreshcases25,(2)recognizethe“easycases”asjusta“specialcaseofhardones”towhichheknowsboththerule-bookanswerandtherelevant justification26, (3)harmonizethe justifyingprincipleswithotherapplicableprinciplesaswellaswiththerulebookitselfintoaconsistentretrospectiveandforward-lookingunfoldingpoliticalnarrative27,(4)bepreparedtore-examinesomepolitical-moralelementsofhisjustificatorysystemoflegalreasoningfromtimetotime(thoughhecan“neverbesure,inadvance,whenandhow”)28,and(5)askwhat is the legal relevanceofdisagreementamonglawyersandlegalscholarsonaparticularissue,evenifitiseasytoidentifytherelevantenactedrulesand“allthefactsaboutwhatinstitutionshavedecidedinthepast”(i.e.,ask:ifthisissettledlaw,then“whatintheworldaretheydisagreeingabout?”).29
23 Ibid.24 SeeDworkin,op. cit.(fn.13),pp.84,340;Dworkin op. cit.(fn.7),p.165;Dworkin,R.,A Reply by Ronald Dworkin,in:Cohen,M.(ed.),Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence,Duckworth,London,1983,pp.247,254;Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.11),pp.3,11,75,77;Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.5),p.262;Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.9),pp.144,248;Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.10),p.402.
25 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.5),p.243;Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.9),pp.54,189n5,247–248.26 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.5),p.266.27 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.11),p.17;Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.5),pp.225,227–228.28 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.9),p.56.29 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.9),p.163.Tothecriticwhomightobjectthatordinaryreal-lifelawyersandjudgesmayreasonaboutconcretelegalissues,evenhardcases,onlythroughpartialjustificationandfromtheinside-out–i.e.,bystartingfromspecific
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WhenreflectingupontheargumentsthatheprojectsontoHercules’sjobdescription,Dworkinassertsthat:
“Itisobviouswhythistheoryofadjudicationinvitesthechargeofnaturallaw.Itmakeseachjudge’sdecisionabouttheburdenofpastlawdependonhisjudgmentaboutthebestpoliticaljustificationofthatlaw,andthisisofcourseamatterofpoliticalmorality”.30
Besidesthepurportedsimilaritywithhisunderstandingofthecoreargu-mentofnatural-lawtheory–namely,thatwhat the law is (i.e.,thecontentoflaw)dependsinsomewayonwhat the law should be (i.e.,onthebestpolitical-moraljustification at the foundations of enacted lawwhich includes normativeprinciplespointingtoexistinglegalrights)31–Dworkinseemstoshowsometheoreticalsympathyfortheconceptionofnaturalrightsaswell.Rightsthatthejustifyinglegalprinciplespointtofunctionasinterest-basedtrumps“overotherwiseadequatejustificationsforpoliticalaction”andevenover“policiesthatwouldindeedmakepeopleasawholebetteroff”.32
The crucial element for understandingDworkin’s theory of rights is hisdistinction–“adistinctionofcapitalimportancetolegaltheory”33–betweenjustifyinglegalprinciplesandpolicies.Apolicyisacollectivegoalthat,allthingsconsidered,advancesorprotectsthe(economic,political,social,etc.)goodofthecommunityaccordingtosomeconceptionofgeneralwelfare,commonflo-urishingorsomesortofpublicinterest.34Ontheotherhand,individualshaverightswhenaprincipleofpoliticalmoralityjustifiestheirbenefitsorinterests,evenifthatmeansquashinganotherwisevalidcollectivegoalthat,directlyorindirectly,damagesthesebenefitsorinterests.35SinceDworkinarguesthatinissuesqualifiedashardcasesthelawshouldbeidentified,inadditiontocon-
problemsandnotfromoverarchinggrandtheoriesofpoliticalmorality–DworkinrespondsthattheprinciplesthatareoperativeinHercules’sreasoningmaybehelp-fulto“mortal”lawyers,who“cansetnoapriorilimittothejustificatoryascent”intowhichaproblemwilldraweitherthemorthepoliticalcommunityanditslegalofficials.SeeDworkin,op. cit.(fn.9),pp.55,68;Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.7),p.166.
30 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.7),p.166.31 Ibid.,p.165.32 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),p.329.SeealsoDworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.xi;Dworkin,R.,Rights as Trumps,in:Waldron,J.(ed.),Theories of Rights,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1984,p.153.
33 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.11),p.2.34 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),pp.22,82,90–94,294;Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.11),pp.2-3,11;Dworkin,R.,op. cit.(fn.32),p.166.
35 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),pp.xi;294;Dworkin,R.,op. cit.(fn.32),p.166.
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sultingtherulebook,bydeterminingthejustifyingprinciples,heobviouslymaintainsthattherelevantlawshouldbesettledbydetectingexistingindividualrightsandbygivingthempriorityovercollectivegoalsorpolicies,eventothedetrimentofwhatmaybeperceivedascommunity’sflourishing.36
Dworkin’saccountofrightsisrelevantalsoincasesthatcouldbequalifiedas“easy”,especiallyinthosesituationswheretherulebookleavesnodoubtonhowtoapplythelawoncertainstatesofaffairs,butwheretheenforcementofenactedruleswouldbemanifestlyunjustandimmoral.Inaccordancewiththepremisesofhis legal theory,he firstdistinguishes and stratifies variousstages inthe identificationof therelevant law incasesofmanifestlyunjustrule-booksolutions,andthenevaluates,throughthosepremises,theaspectsofthevalidityandlegalormoralobligatorinessofsuchlaws.Dworkinmaintainsthat“evillaws”,suchas,forexample,“Naziedicts”,cannotbesaidtoconstitutedownrightinvalidorinexistentlawsinonesense,namely,inthepre-interpretivesenseinwhichweidentifythetextualcontentoftherulebookasrecognizedsocial-factualsourcesoflegalobligation.Ontheotherhand,ifweincludeintheconceptoflawalsotheinterpretivestageinwhichwedetecttheunderlyingprinciplesofpoliticalmoralityandthecorrespondingrights,eveninthefaceofclarityofenactedunjustrules,thenthesepolitical-moralrightsmaybesaidtotrumpeach“legal”rule-bookrightthatisgroundedinanunjustlaw,andinthissensethe“Naziedicts”werenot law.37
Dworkin’stheoryofrightsisnot,accordingtohisownwords,dependentuponany“specialmetaphysical”foundationthatwouldbeunacceptableforaliberallegaltheory.38AtthispointofourpresentationofthemaintraitsofDworkin’slegaltheory,itshouldbeclearthathistheoryofrightsisgroundedpreciselyintheircapacitytotrumpanyargumentbasedonapolicyorcollectivegoal,evenifadvancedthroughappealstometaphysicaltruthsregardingindivi-dualorcommon-goodmorality.Histheoryoflawandrightsfindsitsultimatepointofreferencenotinmetaphysicsorphilosophical-anthropologicaltruths,butinthenatureoflawasasocialinstitution,namely,in“somefundamentalassumptionsaboutthequalityofadecentsocialorganization”.39
Dworkin’sargumentonrightsastrumpsrestsonthefundamentalpostulateofliberalpoliticalmoralitythatitiswrongtolegallyenforceprivatenon-political
36 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.24),p.263;Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.11),pp.3,75.37 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),pp.102–104;Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),pp.410–412.38 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),pp.xi–xii.39 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.24),p.266.
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moralbeliefsthroughstatepoliciesandcorrespondingrule-bookenactedlaws.40 Thus,theinstitutional–notmetaphysical–foundationsofhisconceptionoflawaremodelledby“themostfundamentalofrights”:the right to equal concern or respect.41
“Governmentmusttreatthosewhomitgovernswithconcern,thatis,ashumanbeingswhoarecapableofsufferingandfrustration,andwithrespect,thatis,ashumanbeingswhoarecapableofformingandactingonintelligentconceptionsofhowtheirlivesshouldbelived.Governmentmustnotonlytreatpeoplewithconcernandrespect,butwithequalcon-cernandrespect.Itmustnotdistributegoodsoropportunitiesunequallyonthegroundthatsomecitizensareentitledtomorebecausetheyareworthyofmoreconcern.Itmustnotconstrainlibertyonthegroundthatonecitizen’sconceptionofthegoodlifeisnoblerorsuperiortoanother’s”.42
Theright toequalconcernandrespectmaybesaidtobeanatural rightinsofarasitisnottheproductoflegislationorconvention43,butis,instead,embeddedinaliberaltheoryoflawasaninstitution.Itisa“fundamentalandaxiomatic”rightinthesensethatitisthesourceofallotherparticularrights.44
Thebasicrighttoequalityisthecorevalueatthecentreofthelegal-institu-tionaldomainofpoliticalmorality.Thelawasaninstitution“benefitssociety”notonlythroughinstrumentalproperties,suchas“predictabilityorproceduralfairness”,butalso“bysecuringakindofequalityamongcitizens”that“impro-vesitsmoraljustificationforexercisingthepoliticalpoweritdoes”.45Thevalueofequality,orequalconcernandrespect,providestheinstitutionoflawwiththeviewpoint–the“pointoflaw”–thatsetsthelimitontheextenttowhich“citizens’andofficials’viewsaboutjustice[…]figureintheiropinionsabout
40 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.11),p.205.SeealsoDworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),pp.173–175.41 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.xii.42 Ibid.,pp.272–273.43 Seeibid.,pp.176–177.InthissectionofTaking Rights Seriously,DworkinactuallypositstherighttoequalconcernandrespectasthefundamentalrightimplicitinJohnRawls’stheoryofjusticeasfairness.However,itmaybesaidthatDworkinreallyonlyreadshisownargumentsintoRawls’stheory,asissuggestedbyRawls’sexplicitdenialofimplyingsuchnaturalrightasfoundationalforhisconceptionofjustice(“ThisisaningenioussuggestionbutIhavenotfolloweditinthetext”).SeeRawls,J.,Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,vol.14,no.3,1985,p.236.
44 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.xv;Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),p.330.45 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),pp.95–96.
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whatlegalrights”personshaveaccordingto“pastpoliticaldecisions”.46Thus,therighttoequalityhasthecharacteristicofapolitical-moralsubstantivevaluethathasafoundationalroleintheidentificationofthelawinapoliticalcommunity.ThismeansthatDworkin’saccountoflaw’s“goodness”isnotpurelyformalistic,aslegalpositivismsustains,norisitfoundeduponmetaphysicalclaimsabouthumangood,astheclassicalnatural-lawtheoryfirmlyholds.Instead,aDwor-kinian“goodness”of lawismanifestedinthe institutionalviewpointofthejuridicalmeaningofequalityfromwhichlawshouldbeidentified,interpreted,andultimatelypositivizedintherulebooks.
Thecrucialquestionthatmustnowbeansweredis:whatdoesthisstateofaffairs–thatattherootsofDworkin’sideaofthelegalsystemwefindafoundationalvaluethatbelongstothesphereofpoliticalmorality–sayabouttheconceptoflaw?
ItcertainlyconfirmsDworkin’sobjectionstolegalpositivismfor“mistakingpartofthedomain”oftheconceptoflaw,namely,thepositivizedrule-bookdomain,“forthewhole”.47Ontheotherhand,Dworkin’sconceptoflawresiststhecompleteoverlapbetweenthecontentofprinciple-basedrightsandtheratio ofgoal-basedpoliciesrootedinnon-politicalorprivatemorality.Aswewillseeinthenextsection,thislatterclaimrepresentsthemainlineofcritiquethatDworkinadvancesagainstthestrongnatural-lawtheory.
Intheimmediateaftermathofhisfirstbook,Taking Rights Seriously,Dworkinwonderswhetherthetwoquestions–“whatrightsdopersonshave”and“whichpoliciesmakethecommunityflourish”–couldbe,fromsomeviewpoint,consi-deredtoconstituteaspectsofthesamequestion.Hisresponseisthat,althoughthislineofinquiryisnotaltogetherincoherent,itis“veryimplausible”48,pre-ciselyonaccountofbothhissystematicbifurcationofprinciplesandpoliciesandthepredominantlycontrastingconceptionsoflawthatcorrespondtothepreferenceforeachofthosestandards.
Towardtheendofhisacademiccareer,Dworkinrevisitedthemainthreadofthe“principlesaspolicies”lineofanalysisinhisreassessmentofwhathecallsthe“two-systemspicture”,whereintheconceptoflawisdeterminedbyenvisioninglawandmoralityastwoseparatesystemsofnormsthatsomehow,onlyoccasionally, interact.49Atthisstageofhisthought,Dworkinseemstohavereachedamorearticulateall-encompassingviewofthelineofargument
46 SeeDworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),p.98.47 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.47.48 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.24),pp.265–266.49 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),p.402.
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hehasbeen,somewhatimplicitly,claimingallalong.Healwaysunderstoodlawasaninterpretiveconcept50“whoseelucidationrequirestakingastandonissuesofpoliticalmorality”.51Inthefinal,perhapsmostmature,stageofhisthought,Dworkiniscertainthatthequestionof“howdoesthecontentofeachsystem[namely,lawandmorality]affectthecontentoftheother”52mustbeansweredinthefollowingfashion:
“Wehavenowscrappedtheoldpicturethatcountslawandmoralityastwoseparatesystemsandthenseeksordenies,fruitlessly,interconnectionsbetweenthem.Wehavereplacedthiswithaone-systempicture:we now treat law as a part of political morality”.53
Hence,thereisoneplausiblewaytotreatthequestionssuchas“whatrightsdopersonshave”,“whatmakesthecommunityflourish”,“whatisthelawofapolitical community”under the samedoctrinalumbrellaof thenatureoflaw.Thisistheway:insteadofstartingfrom“theessenceorveryconceptoflawtotheoriesaboutrights”,accordingtoDworkin,“ourjourneymustbeintheoppositedirection”54,namely,bystartingfromtheequality-basedtheoryofrightsthatisembeddedintheinstitutionoflaw.Itispreciselyinthiswaythat,asDworkinsays,“decidingwhatlawshouldbelikehelpsustoseewhat,initsverynature,itactuallyis”.55Thus,aDworkinian“goodness”oflaw–thevalue-fuelledideaofwhatlaw,asaninterpretiveconcept,shouldbelike–isdeterminedbypositingequalityasthefundamentalinstitutionalviewpointoflegalityfromwhichtointerpretandidentifythesettledlawinapoliticalcom-munity.ThisiswhyDworkinreferstohisownlegaltheoryas“interpretivism”.56 Legal reasoning–theidentificationofthelawordeterminingwhichpropositionsofthelawaretrueinagivencaseatagiventime–anddefining law conceptually bothpresupposethecomplexenterpriseofinterpretationandjustificationof
50 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.9),pp.10–12,168–171,221–222.SeealsoDworkin, op. cit. (fn.5),pp.87–89,410–411.
51 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.9),p.31.52 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),p.401.53 Ibid.,p.405.Emphasisadded.Thisargument, fromDworkin’s2011book Justice
for Hedgehogs,isalreadyprefiguredinhisintroductiontothe2006bookJustice in Robes:“Wemightdobetterwithadifferentintellectualtopography:wemighttreatlawnotasseparatefrombutasadepartmentofmorality.[…]Wemighttreatlegaltheoryasaspecialpartofpoliticalmoralitydistinguishedbyafurtherrefinementofinstitutionalstructures”.Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.9),pp.34–35.
54 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),p.407.55 SeeDworkin, op. cit.(fn.9),p.145.56 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),pp.401–402.
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enactedrule-booknormsagainstthebackdropofexistingrightswhich,inturn,representmoralkindsof reasons for actionbecause theyultimately restonconsiderationsofpoliticalmorality.57
3. DWORKIN’S “NATURALIST” CRITIQUE OF THE STRONG NATURAL-LAW THEORY
Dworkinseemstofindnothingproblematicinhiscritics’accusationthattheless-than-metaphysicalinterpretivelegaltheoryhedevelopedacrosshiscareerrepresentsaradicalturninthedirectionoftheclassicaltheoryofnaturallawandnaturalrights:“Supposethisisnaturallaw.Whatintheworldiswrongwithit”?58Whenidentifyingtheplaceofhisowntheoryonthebroadconceptualmapofthenatural-lawapproachestotheconceptoflaw,Dworkinfindsnoprobleminoccasionallylabellinghisbrandoflegal“interpretivism”as“naturalism”.59
However,Dworkinisverycarefultohighlighttheincompatibilitybetweenhis“naturalism”andwhatheconsiderstobea“strong”60,an“orthodox”61,oradownright“extreme”62versionofthenatural-lawtheory.Hefindstheselatterunacceptableandimplausiblefortwointerrelatedsetsofreasons.
Hisfirstobjectiontothese,ashemaintains,orthodoxnatural-lawtheoriesisthattheydenyany“differencebetweenprinciplesoflawandprinciplesofmorality”63intheidentificationofthelaw,or,inotherwords,thatthey“denythedifferencebetweenlegalandmoralargumentinhardcases”.64Intheschemawherejusticeisunderstoodasa“matterofthecorrectorbesttheoryofmoralandpoliticalrights”settledatthelevelofpersonalnon-politicalconvictions,whilelawisamatterofidentifying“whichsupposedrights[…]areincludedinorimpliedbyactualpoliticaldecisionsfromthepast”,thestrongnatural-lawtheory“insiststhatlawandjusticeareidentical”.65Whereaslegalpositivismpostulatesathoroughseparationbetweenlegalandmoralrules,thenatural-law
57 SeeDworkin, op. cit.(fn.24),p.256.SeealsoDworkin, op. cit.(fn.9),p.56.58 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.7),p.165.59 Ibid.60 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),p.102.61 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.339.62 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),pp.342,344;Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),p.35.63 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.342.Emphasisadded.64 Ibid.,p.344.65 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),pp.35,97.
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theorythatistheobjectofDworkin’scritiquetreatsthem,inhisview,asauniquesetofrulesunitedintheconceptoflaw.66Thelogicalconsequenceofthestrongnatural-lawlineofargumentisthat“nounjustpropositionoflawcanbetrue”67,or,inotherwords,that“aschemeofpoliticalorganizationmustsatisfycertainminimalstandardsofjusticeinordertocountasalegalsystematall”.68
Dworkin’ssecondobjectiontostrongnatural-lawtheoriesisthattheyarguefortheinclusionofnon-politicalprinciplesofprivatemoralityintheprocessofidentificationofthelawonthepremisethattheseprinciples“existinvirtueofobjectivemoraltruthratherthanhistoricaldecision”,andarethereby“objecti-velyrequiredbytheprinciplesofanidealpoliticalmorality”.69Saiddifferently,theargumentsofthestrongnatural-lawtheoryreston“ontologicalluxury”70 thatisunacceptabletoa“metaphysicallyunambitious”71liberallegaltheory,beitlegalpositivismorDworkin’sinterpretivism.
Insum,accordingtoDworkin’sreadingofthestrongnatural-lawtheory,lawcannotbesaidtobe“good”inthesubstantivesensethatisinvokedbythattheory.Inhisview,itisunacceptabletoholdthatcertainsubstantiveaspectsofhuman(individualorcommon)goodmustnecessarilyenter,asevaluativestandards,intotheprocessofidentification,interpretation,orjustificationofthelaw.Suchapositionwouldhavetopresuppose–erroneously,inDworkin’sopinion–thatthepointofreferencefortheinterpretationofthelawconsistsingoal-basedpoliciesforcommunity’sflourishingratherthanontheunderlyinglegalprinciples thatpoint to individualorgrouprights filtered through thearchitectonicrighttoequality.
Dworkin’scritiqueadvocatestheviewthatneithertheconceptoflawnorthelegalsystemofaparticularpoliticalcommunitymaybepredicatedupon–orderiveitsidentityorvalidityfrom–ontologicallyvalidobjectivetruthsaboutvaluesextracted“directlyfromtheordinaryrequirementsofindividualperso-nalmoralitymostofusacceptforourselvesandothersinnon-politicallife”.72 Instead,hesays,what“wealltogetheroweothersasindividuals”whenweact,especiallythroughlaw,onbehalfofthepoliticalcommunity–thisishisdefi-
66 Ibid.,p.98.67 Ibid.,p.35.68 Ibid.,p.102.69 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.11),p.147.70 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.xi.71 Ibid.,p.177.72 SeeDworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),p.173.
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nitionofpoliticalmorality73–isequal concern and respect,andnotmetaphysicallyambitiousobjectivemoraltruthsenforceableascommon-goalpolicies.Thelawofapoliticalcommunityisfullyidentified–andtheconceptoflawdetermined–whentheviewpointoftheimperativetograsptheunderlyinginfrastructureofrightspermissiblebythestandardofequalconcernandrespectfindsthebestdiachronic justificationofthepoliticalcommunity’spastdecisionsandlegalnorms.Thisviewpointis,accordingtoDworkin,thecentralcaseandthelimitoflaw’s“goodness”.
4. THE RESPONSE OF THE STRONG NATURAL-LAW THEORY: DWORKIN’S MINIMALIST “NATURALISM”
Theproponentsof the strongnatural-law theory tend toarticulate theirviewsonDworkin’scritiquebychallengingtheadequacyofthe“naturallaw”labelthatissometimesattachedtohis“interpretivism”,ratherthanbydirectlyaddressinghisobjectionstotheexcessive“strength”oftheirmetaphysicalposi-tions.InthissectionIwillonlysummarilyhighlightthemainelementsofthenaturallawyers’critiqueofDworkin’slegaltheory.InthenextsectionIintendtomovebeyondtheestablishedlociofthediscussionbetweenDworkinandthenatural-lawtheoristsinordertoexplorecertainlesscontemplatedaspectsofthequestionsregardinglaw’s“goodness”thatarecontextualizedinthisdiscussion.
Regardlessoftheirsharpcritiqueofhisviews,natural-lawtheoristsdonothesitatetocomplimentDworkinonanumberof issuesonwhichhisthesesprovetobeproximatetosomeoftheirowncoreclaims.Thus,JohnFinnispra-isesDworkin’sefforttointroducethepracticalviewpointofwhat law should be likeintheinterpretationofthesources“inwhichthatlawsubsists”aswellasintheveryconceptoflaw–i.e.,inwhat law,notonlysocial-factually,butalsoconceptually,is.74Dworkin’senterpriseisnotthatdissimilar,atleastinsomeaspects,toFinnis’saccountoflaw’s“duallife”.Finnisarguesthatlaw,atthelevelofitsontologicalstatus,includesnotonlythesource-basedsocial-factualexistence,butalsotheevaluativeviewpointfromwhichlegalrules–withregardtotheircontentandtotheentirelegallyrelevanthistoryoftheirsocial-factualexistence–maybesaidtostillprovidesufficient reasons foraction,among
73 SeeDworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),p.327.74 SeeFinnis,J.,Reason and Authority inLaw’sEmpire,in:Philosophy of Law. Collected
Essays: Volume IV,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2011,pp.280–281.
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othercriteria,alsoinlightofcertainfundamentalprinciplesofpracticalreaso-nablenessormorality.75
Ontheotherhand,natural-lawtheoristscriticizeDworkin’spreferencefor“poor”metaphysicalresourcesatthefoundationofhiscaseforlaw’sinherentlypracticalorevaluativeviewpoint. InFinnis’sassessment,Dworkin’sarchite-ctonicrighttoequalconcernandrespectinbuildsintheveryconceptoflawasystematicallyneutralstandpoint“abouteventhebasicelementsofthehumangood”.76Fromtheperspectiveoflaw’ssubstantivegoodness,Dworkin’stheoryrestsuponthe“reductionofgoodsforwhichlawisneededtoequality”.77
Howdoesthisreductiontoequality,combinedwithsystematicneutralityregardingotheraspectsofthehumangood,affecttheoverallcategorizationofDworkin’stheoryasanatural-lawposition?
InVeronicaRodriguez-Blanco’sunderstanding,despiteDworkin’sattentiontotheinterpretivepointoflaw,hisaccountcannotbeclassifiedasadvocatingagoods-basedoverlapoflawandmorality.Consequently,shequestionswhetherthecoreofhislegaltheorymayevenbesaidtorestonadeliberativeviewpointofpracticalreasonandintentionalaction,sinceitobviouslycannotbeassessed,eveninprinciple,intermsofhumangoods.78RobertP.Georgedevelopsasimi-larlineofcritiquetoDworkin’sconceptionofrights.Inhisview,Dworkinianrights–including the abstract general right to equality–arederivedinawaythatiswhollydetachedfromconsiderationsofwhatistrulygoodforhumanbeings.79 IthasbeenpointedoutthatthereisgoodreasontoconsiderDworkin’srighttoequalitytobefoundedpredominantlyupontheformal-institutionalcharacteroftheequalpersonalsovereigntyoverone’sownprivateautonomy,ratherthanonsubstantiveequalityofpersonalworth.80
InRussellHittinger’sview,Dworkin’snatural-lawaccountis“minimalist”.Itrestson“thin”ontologicalassumptionsonequalitythataresufficienttosecure
75 See,forexample,Finnis,J.,A Grand Tour of Legal Theory,in:Philosophy of Law,op. cit.(fn.73),pp.101–102,107.
76 Finnis,J.,Introduction,in:Human Rights and the Common Good. Collected Essays: Volume III,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2011,p.11.
77 Finnis,J.,The Nature of Law,in:Tasioulas,J.(ed.),The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Law,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2020,p.51.
78 Rodriguez-Blanco,V.,Law and Authority Under the Guise of the Good,HartPublishing,Oxford,2014,pp.176,210–213.
79 George,R.P.,Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1993,p.85.
80 Finegan,T.,Dworkin on Equality, Autonomy and Authenticity,TheAmericanJournalofJurisprudence,vol.60,no.2,2015,pp.143–180.
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theconnectionbetweenthecentralvaluesofpoliticalmorality,legalreasoning,andtheappealtoindividualrightsastrumpsthatstructurallyprecedeorunderlytheenactedlegalrules.81However,insteadofavoiding“metaphysicalswamps”82,Dworkin’slegaltheory,atleastimplicitly–fromthestandpointoflaw’sonto-logyandlegalreasoning–containselementsthatrevealamoredeterminateandcomplexjuridical-philosophicalanthropologythanDworkiniswillingtoadmit.HittingerarguesthattheDworkinianrighttoequalpersonalsoverei-gntyoverone’sownprivateautonomy–which,inprinciple,trumpsallothersubstantivegoods-basedtelicviewpointsoflaw–mustnecessarilypresupposeasufficientlystructuredphilosophicalviewthatsketchesaliberalimageofthehumanperson.83Inotherwords,Hittingerandtheotherproponentsofthestrongnatural-lawtheoryarguethatDworkin’sconceptionofthelaw-moralityoverlapthatgroundslawinpoliticalmoralityandinvokesequalityasthearchitectonicvalue-rightcannotaltogetheravoidontologicalpremises.
5. THE ASPECTS OF LAW’S “GOODNESS” IMPLICIT IN THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN DWORKIN AND THE NATURAL LAWYERS
Dworkin’scentralargumentforlaw’s“goodness”isthattheidentificationoflaw–andthedeterminationoftheveryconceptoflaw–necessarilyincludestheviewpointthattakesintoconsiderationthevalueorthegoodoflegality,namely,theviewpointofwhatisreallygoodaboutlawasaninstitution.Whatisreallygoodaboutlaw,its“goodness”,isthenidentifiedasasetofvaluesthatpertainto,ashesays,“substantivepoliticalmorality”84,andthatare,assuch,ultimatelyharmonizedwiththehigherrequirementsofthefundamentalrighttoequality.Dworkincriticizesthestrongnatural-lawtheoryforexpandingthisviewpointoflaw’s“goodness”byincludingnon-political(andnon-institutional)moralstandardsthatarebasedonobjectivemetaphysicaltruth-claimsregardingtheaspectsofthehumangood.
InthissectionIwanttochallengeDworkin’scritiqueofthestrongnatural-lawtheory.Myaimistoshowthatatleastinoneimportantaspecttheclassical
81 SeeHittinger,R.,Varieties of Minimalist Natural Law Theory,TheAmericanJournalofJurisprudence,vol.34,no.1,1989,pp.144,149–152.
82 Hittinger,R.,Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition,WakeForestLawReview,vol.25,1990,pp.476–477,481–482.
83 Seeibid.,p.477.84 Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.9),p.178.
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natural-lawtheorycannotbesaidtoconfusemoralandlegalprincipleswhendescribingtheconceptoflawandidentifyingthecontentofsettledlaw.Afterthat,IwillarguethatDworkin’slegaltheorymayitselfbefoundguiltyofin-sufficientattentiontodetaileddistinctionsbetweenmoralandlegalargumentsinitscoreclaim.
Dworkinholds that the strongnatural-lawtheoriesdenyany“differencebetweenprinciplesoflawandprinciplesofmorality”85intheidentificationofthelaw.Ibelievethereissomethingtobelearnedaboutplurallevelsoflaw’s“goodness”fromshowingwhereexactlyDworkin’scritiquefails.Theclassicalnatural-lawtheory–perhapsparadigmaticallyrepresentedbythetraditionofThomasAquinas’sjuridicalrealism–argues,inawayquitesimilartoDworkin’s,thatlawandthejuridicalphenomenoningeneralisaspecializeddomainwithinmorality.Accordingtothistheory,thelawofapoliticalcommunityisneitherreducibletomoralprinciples(asDworkinclaimsinhiscritique),norisitwhollydetachedfrommetaphysicalassumptionsregardingaspectsofthehumangood.Themoralprinciplesthatpointtocertainaspectsofthehumangood–i.e.,theprinciplesofnaturallawortheprinciplesofpracticalreasonableness–do not enterintotheframeworkoflegalreasoningasmetajuridicalmoralstandardsofevaluationofpositivelaw.86Instead,theyentertheviewpointoflaw’s“goodness”intheformofnatural rightsasjuridical goodsthataretheobjectsoftheprinciplesofnaturallaw.LetmebrieflyexplainwhatImeanbythis.
Althoughtheysharetheontologicalidentitywiththehumanmoralgoodspickedoutbytheprinciplesofnaturallaw–forexample,humanlifeasanaturalrightisalwayshumanlifeidentifiedasabasichumanmoralgood–natural rights arenotprimarilymoralentities,butgenuinelyjuridical goodsthatstructurallyprecedeenactedpositivelegalrules.AccordingtoaThomisticnatural-lawac-count,naturaljuridicalgoodsorrightsdifferinscopeandextensionfrombasichumanmoralgoodsaccordingtoaprecisesetofcriteriathatmustbesatisfiedfortheirinclusioninthejuridicaldomainandinlegalreasoning.
85 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.13),p.342.Emphasisadded.86 Dworkinmaybeexcusedforhislackofawarenesstothislineofargumentofthenatural-lawtheory,sincemanynaturallawyersaresometimesinsufficientlyatten-tivetothedistinctionbetweenmoralandjuridicallevelsofanalysisintheirpre-dominantlymetajuridicalpresentationsofthelegalrelevanceofnatural-lawargu-mentsonmoralprinciplesandrights.See,forexample,thefollowingclaim:“Thisnatural-lawtheoryofindividualrightsandcollectiveinterestshastheadvantage[…]ofprovidingarationalaccountofthemoralfoundationsofrightsbyunder-standingthemasimplicationsofintrinsichumangoodsandbasicmoralprincipleswhichrationallyguideandstructurehumanchoosing inrespect forsuchgoals”.George,op. cit.(fn.79),p.93.
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First,naturalrightsdonotowetheirjuridicalcharacterandtheirinclusioninlegalreasoningtotheveryfactthattheyrefertovaluesthataremorallygoodandmetaphysicallyorobjectivelytrue.ThemoralstatusofbasichumangoodsdoesnotofitselfgeneratejuridicalorlegalobligationsinawayenvisionedbyDworkin.Rather,thejuridicalcharacterofnaturalrightscomesfromadiscretelevelof“goodness”thatisconnectedtotheattainmentofendssetbytheope-rativeprincipleofjustice.Wehaveseenthat,inDworkin’stheoryoflaw,justiceisunderstoodasa“matterofthecorrectorbesttheoryofmoralandpoliticalrights”settledatthelevelofpersonalnon-politicalconvictions.87IntheparlanceofThomisticlegaltheory,justiceistheoperativeprinciplethatconstitutesanaxiologicalframeworkwhoseoverarchingendis“renderingtoeachpersonhisownright”.88Inthistelicframework,“things”,entities,orstatesofaffairs–inthecaseofnaturalrights:basichumangoods–thatareattributedbytheprinciplesofnaturallaworpositivelawtotheirdesignatedtitleholdersareintroducedinaspecificorderof“goodness”notbecauseoftheirmoralstatus,butbecauseoftheirattributionasrightsandcorrespondingdebtsinjustice.Thus,althoughtheThomisticaccountofjuridical goodnessisnotaltogetherdetachedfromtheperspectiveofmoralgoodness–torespectlifeassomebodyelse’srightinclu-desrespectinglifeasamorallyperfectiveaspectofthewholehumangoodofanotherpersonandofhumanityingeneral–itisclearlydistinguishedfromit.
Secondly,naturalrightsdonotcomprehendthewholedomainofbasichumanmoralgoods.Rather,theyreferonlytothedomainofthatgoodthatissusceptible to outward and other-directed (interpersonal) potential interferencebyanotherindividualorgroupwho,becauseoftheverypossibilityofinterferencewiththetitleholder’slived-outattainmentofthegoodinquestion, owehimthedeterminateactionthatessentiallyconsistsin“giving”or“respecting”theratioofthatgood.89
87 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.5),p.97.88 Theargumentontheright(ius)asthe“justthingitself”(ipsa res iusta)–namely,theverything,stateofaffairsoractionthatconstitutestheobjectoftheoperativeprincipleofjustice–istakendirectlyfromAquinas.SeeS. Th.,II-II,q.57,a.1–2;q.58,a.1.FortheEnglishtranslationofthetextsfromAquinas’sSumma Theologiae,IhaveconsultedAquinas,T.,Summa Theologiae: First Complete American Edition in Three Volumes(translatedbyFathersoftheEnglishDominicanProvince),BenzigerBrothers,NewYork,1947-1948.
89 FormoredetailsonthisinterpretationoftheThomisticjuristicargumentregardingthegenesisofnatural rights, seeHervada, J.,Critical Introduction to Natural Right (translatedbyM.Emmons),Wilson&LafleurLtée,Montréal,2020,pp.7–30.SeealsoPopović,P.,The Concept of “Right” and the Focal Point of Juridicity in Debate Between Villey, Tierney, Finnis and Hervada,PersonayDerecho,vol.78,no.1,pp.65–103.
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Insum,theoperativeprincipleof justiceestablishesa sui generisorderofhumanactionthatisessentialfortheconstitutionofthejuridicalphenome-non,atthehighestlevelofanalysis.Accordingtothistelicorder,athing,anentity,orotherfactualoroperativestateofaffairsisjuridicalwhenitis–initsoutwardandother-directeddomain–attributedandconsequentlyowedtoitsdesignatedtitleholderashisright(juridicalgoodness).Thisisdifferentfromtheoperativeprincipleofpracticalreasonableness(i.e.,thenatural-lawmorallevelofanalysis)thatengagesalsotheinternalsubjectivedispositionsoftheagentsinviewofattainingcertainself-referentialorother-directedobjects–i.e.,goods–becausetheyaremorallyperfectiveofhumanpersons,understoodindividuallyorcollectively(moralgoodness).
InThomisticjuridicalrealism,naturalrightsenterintolegalreasoninginawaythatissimilartoDworkin’sjustifyinglegalprinciplesandcorrespondingindividualrights.Theyformpartof law’sontologyasanessentialaspectofthepracticalviewpointthatisoperativeintheprocessoftheidentificationofthelaw.Ofcourse,sincetheThomisticlegaltheoryconsidersthecontentofnaturalrightstobeinclearontological continuity–thoughwithout full identity in evaluative range –withthebasichumanmoralgoods,legalreasoningwillprovidedifferentresultsthantheonepromotedbyDworkin.However,theforegoinganalysisshouldbesufficienttoestablishthatinatleastoneimportantaspectthenatural-lawtheory’scoreclaimsonlegalreasoning–andthecorrelativedistinctionbetweenmoralandjuridicaldomains–isfarmorenuancedthanDworkin’scritiquewouldsuggest.
Notwithstandingtheobviousdifferencesbetweenthetwoapproachesregar-dingthefunctionofrightsinlegalreasoning,IamconvincedthatDworkin’slegaltheoryandthestrongnatural-lawtraditionaredoctrinalalliesinatleastonemoreimportantargument,besidesthealreadyhighlightedattentiontothepracticalviewpointinlegalreasoningandtheclaimthatlawisaspecializeddomainof(political)morality.Anothercommongroundofbothlegaltheoriesiscoveredbythegeneral lineofinquirythatleadstotheconclusiononthenatureoflaw.WehaveseenthatDworkininsistsonstartingourinquiryonthenatureoflawnotfromtheessenceoftheconceptoflawtowardtheoriesaboutrightsthatpeopleactuallyhave,butintheoppositedirection:“decidingwhatlawshouldbelike”–bytakingintoconsiderationthejuristicphenomenasuchasrights–“helpsustoseewhat,initsverynature,itactuallyis”.90ThislineofinquiryisstronglyechoedinauthorsfromtheThomisticnatural-lawtraditionwhoclaimthattheconceptoflawisnotanaprioristicconcept,butaresult–a
90 SeeDworkin, op. cit.(fn.9),p.145.
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pointofarrival–oncealltherelevantjuridicalphenomena,especiallynaturalrights,andthepropertiesthatrenderthemjuridicalhavebeenconsultedandwell-researched.91
Next,IwanttoarguethatDworkin’scritiqueofthestrongnatural-lawtheoryforconfusingmoralandlegalargumentsintheidentificationofthelawmightbackfireonhim.Heclaimsthatthe“goodness”oflaw,whatisreallygoodaboutlegality,isdecidedinthecontextofsubstantivepoliticalmorality,andthat“thecuttingedgeofajurisprudentialargumentisitsmoral edge”.92Hislineofargumentontheunderlyinglegalprinciplesthatpointtorightsamongwhichtherighttoequalityhastheoverarchingsignificanceis,inmyreading,thatmoraledge.ItissufficientlyclearthatDworkinenvisionstherighttoequalityofpersonalsovereigntyoverone’sownprivateautonomyasaninstitutionalless-than-me-taphysicalvalueofpoliticalmoralitythatrepresentsanessentialmoralmoduleintheconceptoflaw.IamawarethatDworkinconsiderstheincorporationofamoralmoduleintolegalreasoningtobecompletelylegitimate.Iamalsoawarethathisobjectionstothenatural-lawtheoryconcernthefull identification of all moralandlegalprinciplesindeterminingwhatthelawis.
But I do not see how a value of politicalmorality can have immediatejuridical relevanceandconstituteanessentialaspectof theveryconceptoflaw–onthesolemeritofamoralargument–andescapethesameobjectionthatDworkin directs at natural lawyers: the confusion betweenmoral andlegalarguments.Dworkin’sone-systemparadigmrestsonthethesisthat“legaltheory[is]aspecialpartofpoliticalmoralitydistinguishedbyafurtherrefi-nementofinstitutionalstructures”.93However,Idonotseewhatthis“furtherrefinement”addstohisessentiallymoral,orcertainlymetajuridical,defenseofthevalueofequalitythat,soitseems,pre-existsandmodelsthelegalorder.94 WehavealreadyquotedDworkin’s evidentlydecisivequestionof “how thecontentofeachsystem”,namely,lawandmorality,“affectsthecontentoftheotherasthingsactuallystand”.95Itiseasytonoticehow,inDworkin’stheory,moralnorms“affect”theinterpretationoflegalnorms.Itislessobvioushowlegalnorms,andlegalityitself,affectthecontentofrelevantmoralnormsand
91 SeeHervada,J.,Problemas que una nota esencial de los derechos humanos plantea a la filo-sofía del derecho,in:Escritos de derecho natural,EUNSA,Pamplona,2013,pp.155–159.
92 SeeDworkin,op. cit.(fn.9),p.178.Emphasisadded.93 Ibid.,pp.34–35.94 Dworkinoftendescribestherighttoequalityasthemainformativeprincipleforthedesignofthepoliticalorderandlegalinstitutions.SeeDworkin,op. cit.(fn.13),pp.180–182;Dworkin,op. cit.(fn.7),p.185.
95 Dworkin, op. cit.(fn.10),p.401.
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influencethejuristicanalysisandelaborationofmoralarguments.Dworkinseemstopreferbendinghisargumentsonprinciple-basedrightstowardtheiroverlapwithcommon-goodpolicies– i.e.,therighttoequalityasthecentralpolicyofthepoliticalcommunity–ratherthanexplaininghowcommon-goodpoliciesmaybesaidtopossessajuristiccharacter.Inotherwords,Dworkinhasgonemuchfurtherthanlegalpositivistsinexplainingthe“goodness”oflaw,buthehasnotgoneveryfarinclarifyingtheprerequisitesforadiscourseonthejuridicityof“goodness”.
ItismoreprobablethattherealdifferencebetweenDworkin’slegaltheoryandthestrongnatural-lawpositionisthemetaphysicalreachoflaw’s“goodness”andmodesofexpressingthatreachinanauthenticallyjuridicallineofargument.Dworkinclaimsthatwhat“wealltogetheroweothersasindividuals”inourinstitutionalpractices,includinglegalreasoning,isthepolitical-moralvalueofequalconcernandrespect.96Thestrongnatural-lawtheoryarguesthatwhatweowetoeachother,eveninthecontextofthepoliticalcommongood,istherespectandsecuringofnaturalrightsasjuridicalgoodswhichalsoinclude–asonerightamongothers–thereferencetothevalueofequality(equalworthofpersons,equalopportunities,equalityinprocedures,etc.).Perhapsthereadercouldhaveintuitedthecrucialimportanceofaversionofthisdifferenceevenbeforereadingthispaper.Thereissomethinginsightfultobefound,however,inunderstandingtheprecisestagesoftheitineraryen routetoestablishingtheexactdifferencesandcommongroundsbetweenDworkinandnaturallawyersregardingtheaspectsoflaw’s“goodness”.Or,toparaphraseBlaisePascal,thereissomethingofvaluealsointhesearchitself,notonlyinthe“thingsthemselves”thataretheobjectofthesearch.97
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* Dr.sc.PetarPopović,docentFakultetakanonskogprava,PapinskosveučilišteSvetogKriža,PiazzadiSant’Apollinare49,00186Rim,Italija;[email protected];
ORCIDID:orcid.org/0000-0001-5282-0850
Sažetak
Petar Popović*
PREISPITIVANJE VIDIKA “DOBROTE” PRAVA U DWORKINOVOJ KRITICI “SNAŽNE” TEORIJE NARAVNOG PRAVA
Cilj ovog rada preispitivanje je određenih vidika kritike američkog filozofa prava Ronalda Dworkina upućene “snažnoj” teoriji naravnog prava. Za žarišnu točku preispi-tivanja autor je odabrao perspektivu “dobrote” prava, odnosno pitanje na koji način i do koje granice Dworkin i predstavnici “snažne” teorije naravnog prava, svatko u okvirima vlastitog pristupa, dopuštaju preklapanje pojma prava sa stajalištem prosuđivanja prava sukladno moralnim vidicima ljudskog dobra. U prvom dijelu rada prikazani su ključni argumenti Dworkinove teorije prava s naglaskom na one elemente zbog kojih se Dworkina često smatra predstavnikom teorije naravnog prava u širem smislu. Nakon toga predstavljene su temeljne tvrdnje Dworkinove kritike upućene “snažnoj” teoriji naravnog prava, s poseb-nim naglaskom na Dworkinovo razlikovanje “snažne” teorije od njegova naravnopravnog pristupa. U nastavku su opisani osnovni smjerovi argumentacije kojima su predstavnici “snažne” teorije naravnog prava upozorili na otklon Dworkinova “minimalističkog” jus-naturalizma od klasičnih postavki naravnopravne teorije. U posljednjem dijelu analizirani su vidici “dobrote” prava koji proizlaze iz predmetne rasprave, s naglaskom na određene manjkavosti Dworkinove kritike “snažne” teorije naravnog prava. Pritom se upućuje i na teorijske sastavnice prema kojima se, unatoč uzajamnoj kritici, ova dva pravno-filozofska pristupa mogu smatrati srodnima.
Ključne riječi: Dworkin, teorija naravnog prava, interpretacijska teorija prava, politička moralnost