People v. Abriol367 SCRA 327FACTS:Accused-appellants were charged of murder and illegal possession of firearms at the RTC of Cebu City for killing one Alexander Flores aka Alex. Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution were Romeo Sta. Cruz, Jr., a radio news reporter then aboard his jeep who heard a couple of gunshots; PO3 Celso Seville, Jr., a homicide investigator of Police Station No. 3 who found four (4) .45 caliber shells some four (4) feet away from the victim's body, and two (2) deformed slugs where the victim had lain; Dr. Ladislao Diola, Jr., Chief of the PNP Region 7 Crime Laboratory who had autopsied the victim's body; andSPO4 Lemuel Caser, a ballistician of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who reported the following:1. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-1" to "JA-3" possesses similar individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 with SN: PGO13506;2. Fired cartridge cases marked "JA-4" and "E-69-6" possesses similar individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: 52469;3. Fired bullet metal jacket marked "JA-5" possesses similar individual characteristics markings with test bullets fired from cal .45 pistol with SN: PGO13506;4. Fired cartridge cases marked "E-45-1 " to "E-45-6" possesses similar individual characteristics markings with the test cartridge cases fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445;5. Fired bullets marked as "JA-6" and "LD" possesses similar individual characteristic markings with the test bullets fired from cal .38 Rev. SN: P8445.15Accused appellant Abriol also testified that he surrendered his service firearm to the BBRC Administrative Officer when he was served a warrant of arrest for murder in Criminal Case No. CBU-28843. However, the handgun was defective and it was returned to him for repair by Armscor, He presented a Memorandum Receiptauthorizing him to carry the government-issued .38 revolver. The defense also presented Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, medico-legal officer of the Cebu City PNP Command, to testify on the caliber of the firearms which might have caused the gunshot wounds of the victim. Relying on the Necropsy Report prepared by Dr. Diola, Dr. Cerna declared that wound nos. 1 and 2, which each measured 0.6 cm. by 0.6 cm., may have been caused by a .38 caliber firearm. As to wound nos. 3 and 4, which each measured 0.5 cm. by 0.5 cm., it was possible that a .38 handgun was used, or one with a smaller bore. Dr. Cerna opined that a .45 pistol could not have inflicted all the foregoing wounds, as the entry points were too small for a .45 caliber bullet. With respect to the grazing wounds found on the victim's body, Dr. Cerna testified that it was impossible to determine the caliber of the firearm used.The trial court found appellants' version of the incident neither convincing and credible and, as earlier stated, it believed the prosecution's version. Petitioners' were convicted of the offenses charged.Hence, this appeal. The defense stated that the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellants for the crime of murder and illegal possession of firearms when they received in evidence the testimony of Dr. Diola and P/Inspector Lemuel Caser. They contend that both findings were ambiguous and have no basis. On the other hand, appellants allege that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecution's ballistics expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel.(2) He is not conversant with "the required references concerning ballistics," particularly books on the subject by foreign authorities.(3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber of a bullet."Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser's failure to take the necessary photographs to support his findings.ISSUE:Whether or not the expert opinion of both the medical doctor and ballistic expert should be stricken down.HELD:No. The Office of the Solicitor General points out that Dr. Diola's testimony is supported by Dr. Pedro P. Solis, a medical expert, in his book entitledLegal Medicine. The factors which could make the wound of entrance bigger than the caliber include: (1) shooting in contact or near fire; (2) deformity of the bullet which entered; (3) a bullet which might have entered the skin sidewise; and (4) an acute angular approach of the bullet. However, where the wound of entrance is smaller than the firearm's caliber, the same may be attributed to the fragmentation of the bullet before entering the skin or to acontraction of the elastic tissues of the skin(stress supplied).Dr. Diola testified that a .45 caliber pistol could have caused the grazing wounds on the victim's head and extremities.33Dr. Cerna corroborated Dr. Diola's findings in this regard.Such expert opinions disprove appellants' theory that the .45 caliber handguns confiscated from them could not have been used in killing the victim.An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express an opinion."There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based.The question of whether a witness is properly qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.In giving credence to Caser's expert testimony, the trial court explained:The defense downgraded the capability of Caser in forensics ballistics and identifying firearms. Much stress is given to the absence of photographs of his examination. Nonetheless, the Court is satisfied (with) Caser's examination, findings and conclusions with the use of a microscope. Caser's conclusion based on his examination deserves credit. He found the impressions on the primer of the fired cartridges that were test-fired to have the same characteristics with those recovered at the scene of the crime. Whenever a triggerman pumps a bullet (into) the body of his victim, he releases a chunk of concrete evidence that binds him inseparably to his act. Every gun barrel deeply imprints on every bullet its characteristic marking peculiar to that gun and that gun alone. These marking might be microscopic but they are terribly vocal in announcing their origin. And they are as infallible for purposes of identification, as the print left by the human finger.41We agree with the trial court that P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Bonifacio, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country.An expert witness need not present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings.Examination under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the same gun is sufficient.Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the evidence, test cartridges and slugs.

` PEOPLE v. DURANAN 37 SCRA 15

Doctrine: It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.

Facts:

- Appeal from the decision of the RTC finding Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. Kalbo, guilty of two counts of rape against AAA, a feebleminded girl. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.

- Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old when she was raped, is considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does household chores for her family. Accused- appellant lived with the complainants family in the same apartment in where he rented a room.

o The first incident: AAA was standing by the door of her grandfathers house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside the common bathroom. Duranan kissed her and then removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help because accused- appellant threatened her that he would get angry if she did.

o The second incident: AAA was cleaning the family residence when Duranan took her to his room. Duranan threatened her, laid her on the floor and raped her. After the incident, Duranan sent her letters professing love for her and telling her how beautiful she was.

o Third incident: He attempted but stopped when he heard someone coming. After the attempted rape, BBB testified that she noticed that her daughters lower lipwas bruised. The latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her.

- Apart from claiming that he wasnt in the house during the first incident and that he couldnt have raped her in his room because there were six other people in his room during the second incident, on appeal, Duranan claimed that the court erred in holding that AAA is deprived of reason because there was no testimony by a competent medical expert to that effect, especially since her own mother described AAA as quite intelligent. He contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental age was not proven (Remember, her actual age is 25).

o He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the

complainants mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.

Issue:

WON the court erred in holding that AAA is deprived of reason because there was no testimony by a competent medical expert to that effect

Held:

No, the trial court was correct. RTC decision affirmed.

- Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding --- (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

- The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.

- It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in question.

o Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. (conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, etc.)

- The statement that complainant is quite intelligent must be read in the context of BBBs previous statement that complainant thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable. Thus, what complainants mother meant was that complainant, although she thought like a child, nevertheless could tell others what happened to her.

- Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes complainant as coherent and contends that this is an evaluation of the mental state of complainantNO! The medico legal reports purpose is limited to determining whether the complainant had been sexually abused.

Bautista v. CA436 SCRA 141FACTS:1. The dispute involves a parcel of land situated along Maceda Street, Sampaloc, Manila, which was previously owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos. 2. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned parcel of land in favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista.3. Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages.4. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not his. 5. Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The witness to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista sign the same. 6. RTC: Deed of Sale is valid and dismissed Morelos claim for insufficient evidence the claims and counterclaims for damages of the parties. 7. CA: reversed the decision. Hence, this petition for review.ISSUE:Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a strong basis to nullify a duly executed and notarized deed of absolute sale.HELD:YES.1. Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys theprima faciepresumption of authenticity and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument.To overturn this legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.3. In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof.Having been physically present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners.4. Witness Francisco Cruz, Jr. failed to establish the fact that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was not that of Cesar Morelos. He merely concluded that the document was a forgery without citing any factual basis for arriving at that conclusion. Cruz did not point out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing, which would ordinarily escape detection by an ordinary lay person. Besides, a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. The authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale must therefore be upheld.

People v. Lee382 SCRA 596

facts:

On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98), which sentenced accused-appellant Noel Lee to death for the murder of Joseph Marquez.

Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989.[9]

Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo.

The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victims desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his crime.[12]

In a decision dated June 22, 1999, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to the penalty of death.

Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:

Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:--

(a) In Criminal Cases:

(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.

(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.

(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

x x x x x x x x x.

issue:w/n the proof of bad moral character of the victim is relevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing?

held:

no, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.

Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with treachery and premeditation. the proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated June 22, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98) is affirmed insofar as accused-appellant Noel Lee is found guilty of murder for the death of Joseph Marquez. The death sentence imposed by the trial court is however reduced to reclusion perpetua, there having been no aggravating circumstance in the commission of said crime.`

People vs. Diopita436 SCRA 794

Facts: ( Crime of Robbery with Rape)-Dominga Pikit-pikit, 24 years old (victim)accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman,a "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God Diopita dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields And sat on her(Pikit's) thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00 cash.As he was sexually assaulting her, Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he finally satiated his lust.

Issue:W/N Diopita is entitled to acquittal because of his good moral character and exemplary conduct? NO.

HELD:The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.

2. Credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are Jehovahs Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the first.The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be concocted and fabricated.

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed by the trial court.

People v. Padrigone382 SCRA 74Facts:Roberto Padrigone a.k.a. Roberto San Miguel, Michael San Antonio, Jocel Ibaneta and Abelardo Triumpante were charged with rape. Roberto Padrigone and the other accused broke into the house of Rowena Contridas, then 16 years old, situated in San Benito, Salvacion, Buhi, Camarines Sur.Appellant Roberto Padrigone and accused Jocel Ibaneta poked a knife at Rowena and her fourteen year-old sister, Nimfa, and threatened to kill them if they reported the incident to others.Then, appellant undressed Rowena, and sexually violated her while his co-accused watched with glee. After appellant satisfied his lust on Rowena, the other accused took their turns.Appellant assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court.He claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence by not presenting Rowena, the victim, when the latter should have had her sane moments.As a consequence, the trial court deprived appellant of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she allegedly declared before the Chief of Police of Buhi that it was only appellant who raped her which declaration became the basis for the latters conviction.

Held:The basis of his conviction was not Rowenas declaration before the Chief of Police but rather Nimfas testimony before the trial court that it was him who raped Rowena, among others. The non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of evidence.Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case.First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness.Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand.Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus cannot stand judicial proceedings yet.The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful.Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P. DEV.CORP.GR No. 122899, June 8, 2000333 SCRA 212, 219FACTS: The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of six hundred ninety (690) square meters originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-16753 (106901) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property.Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP, went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980 to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August, 1980.The deed of sale and the memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed on 04 September 1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days later, or on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71), for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment.This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October 17, 1980 an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. ChiaThe trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent ordering herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (hereafter, METROBANK) to release/cancel the real estate mortgage constituted over the subject property. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court, however the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer to require METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia.The petitioner bank failed to present its evidence (alleged unpaid balance). The CA amended its previous decision affirming the judgment of the regional trial court. Hence the petition for review.ISSUE:Whether the petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause, thereby estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage.HELD:Yes. Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun, this Court enumerated the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:

1. there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;2. the representation must have been with knowledge of the facts;3. the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and4. it must have been with the intention that the other party would act upon it.Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner METROBANK to defend its non-release of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the following pronouncements of this Court in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals et. al, speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo Francisco, find rightful application, viz. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary. . . .No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact does not exist.x x x x x x x x xWhere facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded. . . .The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party.Verily, petitioner METROBANK's omission to present its evidence only created an adverse inference against its cause. Therefore, it cannot now be heard to complain since respondent Court extended a reasonable opportunity to petitioner METROBANK that it did not avail

CAYABYAB VS IAC, FAUSTINO, GABRIEL, SOLEDAD & FRANCISCA LANDINGIN and AMPARO FRANCISCO323 SCRA 1

Facts:1.Respondents Gabriel, Soledad and Francisca are children of respondent Faustino Landingin and the late Agapita Ferrer. 2.Petitioner is the son of Agapita Ferrer by her first husband, Ludovico Cayabyab, while respondent Amparo Francisco is petitioner's niece, being the daughter of his sister, Nieves Cayabyab.3.Respondents asked for the annulment of the deeds of sale and the recovery of possession of four parcels of land. Two of the parcels of land (Lots [a] and [d]) are situated in Dagupan City while the other two (Lots [b] and [c]) are situated in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.4.Respondents alleged that petitioner was able to obtain the signatures of Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin in the deeds of sale through fraud, undue influence and abuse of confidence. It was only in 1980, or three years thereafter, that they learned of said sales after respondent Gabriel Landingin received from petitioner a demand to vacate Lot (d) on which petitioner and private respondents all reside. According to private respondents, these lots form part of their inheritance as the compulsory heirs of Agapita Ferrer, to the exclusion of petitioner, who already received his share during Ferrer's lifetime.5.Petitioner did not claim Lot (a) but alleged that he acquired by purchase one-third portion of Lots (b) and (c) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer on March 21, 1973; the remaining two-thirds portion of Lots (b) and (c) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer on April 21, 1977; and Lot (d) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Agapita Ferrer with the marital consent of respondent Faustino Landingin on April 21, 1977.6.Trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.7.Intermediate Appellate Court rendered judgment reversing the questioned decision. It ordered the annulment of the deeds of sale over the subject lots and declared the heirs of Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin the owners and rightful possessors of the parcels of land in question. ISSUE:Whether or not the respondents, who alleged that the petitioner committed fraud in respect to the transaction, have the burden of proving the sameHELD:1.Petitioner claims that the sale of the subject lots to him is valid and binding as clearly evidenced by the deeds of sale which are public documents. According to him, private respondents' allegation of fraud, deceit and undue influence have not been established sufficiently and competently to rebut the presumption of regularity and due execution of the deeds of sale.2.Indeed, the general rule is that whosoever alleges fraud or mistake in any transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care for his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular. This rule is especially applied when fraud or mistake is alleged to annul notarial documents which are clothed with the prima facie presumption of regularity and due execution (Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 132 [B], Sec. 30).3.Nevertheless, the general rule admits of exceptions, one of which is Article 1332 of the Civil Code which provides: When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.4.Under the foregoing provision, where a party to a contract is illiterate, or can not read nor understand the language in which the contract is written, the burden is on the party interested in enforcing the contract to prove that the terms thereof are fully explained to the former in a language understood by him 5.In the case at bench, both respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer were illiterate. The latter, in fact, could only thumbmark her signature on all the deeds of sale; and although respondent Faustino Landingin may have affixed his signature to the deeds of sale, he could neither read nor write and actually lost the use of his right arm to paralysis in 1971. To make matters worse, all the deeds were written in English while the spouses could speak and understand only the Pangasinense and Ilocano dialects.6.Since fraud and undue influence in the execution of the subject deeds are alleged by respondents, the burden, under the circumstances, shifted to petitioner to prove that the contents thereof had been adequately explained to the vendors and that the latter fully understood the same.7.As very well found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to discharge this burden.8.The testimonies of Bartolome Ceralde and Dr. Alfredo Cerezo are not sufficient and credible enough to tip the scale in favor of petitioner.9.First, Ceralde is a "compadre" of petitioner. The fact that the respondent Faustino Landingin and Agapita Ferrer sold a parcel of land to him in 1973, does not necessarily make the sale of the lots to petitioner valid and binding. Dr. Cerezo, on the other hand, has been the spouses' physician since 1955 and his testimony that he never knew of Agapita Ferrer's eye operation and hospital confinement in Manila raises serious doubts about his credibility.10.Second, when the two contracts were executed and witnessed by Dr. Cerezo in 1977, Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin were 81 years old. In fact, barely six months later, Agapita actually died of senility, as stated in her death certificate.11.Third, both Dr. Cerezo and Ceralde testified that Atty. Tandoc, the lawyer who allegedly drew up the deeds of sale in 1977, read and explained in Pangasinense the contents of said deeds to the spouses. Ceralde, however, was not present when Atty. Tandoc allegedly performed the said act. Surprisingly too, Atty. Tandoc allegedly performed the said a witness. Even Attys. Caguioa and Siapno, who notarized respectively the same deeds of sale, as well as the 1973 contract, were never called to testify. No explanation whatsoever was given as to the failure of petitioners to present these two notaries public who notarized the deeds of sale in question.12.The weight of the testimony of Dr. Cerezo is therefore undermined by this lapse on the part of petitioner. Only the two notaries public could be examined and cross-examined on the accuracy of their translation of the contents of the documents written in English into the dialect known to and understood by the vendors.13.Fourth, the couple was not assisted by any of their children in the execution of the subject contracts. This circumstance is strange and highly suspicious. Magdalena, respondent Faustino Landingin's daughter by his first marriage, and Soledad Landingin were then living with their parents. Like Amparo Francisco, their step-niece, they actually assisted the couple in their correspondences and transactions. However, neither of the sisters nor Amparo was invited to act as an instrumental witness, much less informed of the execution of the contracts at petitioner's house which is merely one meter away from their house.14.Fifth, there is no satisfactory showing that the consideration for the sale of the lots was ever paid to Agapita Ferrer and respondent Faustino Landingin. Where it is claimed that the signature and thumbmark of the vendors were procured by the vendees through fraud, undue influence and abuse of confidence, a showing that valuable consideration passed hands and that the vendors benefitted therefrom, may help erase any thought that such sinister designs attended the transaction.15.Indeed, all these facts and circumstances lend credence to the claim that the sale of the subject lots and the execution of the deeds of sale were done surreptitiously and in fraud of the couple and their heirs.16.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED.

People vs. Dy

Facts:Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar atBoracayIslandand was sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.

Issue:Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.

Held:In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule onRES GESTAEis applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it.An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.

People vs OngG.R. No. 137348June 21, 2004

Facts:

Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division (SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius D. Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming@ Robert Tiu. As per order of Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct abuy-bust operation. Once, CI confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused Ong and boodle money placed in a W. Brown plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the latter arrested Ong while the CIand the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.

The two (2) accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was referred to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

However, appellants denied the story of the prosecution and maintained innocence to the crimes charged.

On November 18, 1998 the trial court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. It likewise ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the case was on automatic review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue : Whether or not the testimony of the CI qualifies for the exceptions of the rules on hearsay?

Ruling:No, it is abundantly clear that it was the CI who made the initial contact, and he was likewise the one who closed the deal with accused William Ong, and set the venue and time of the meeting. Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the offer to purchase shabu, the court held that SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the poseur-buyer but merely the deliveryman because a careful reading in his testimony would reveal that he was not privy to the sale transaction. His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of shabu is hearsay and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the appellants.