EvEr furthEr from moscowRussia’s stance on centRal asia

Wojciech Górecki

48

EvEr furthEr from moscow Russia’s stance on centRal asia

Wojciech Górecki

nuMBeR 48WaRsaWapRil 2014

© copyright by ośrodek studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for eastern studies

content editoRsadam eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak

editoRanna Łabuszewska

co-oPeRationhalina Kowalczyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska

tRanslationilona duchnowicz

co-oPeRationJim todd

GRaPhic desiGn PaRa-Buch

PhotoGRaPh on coVeRsergei Prokudin-Gorskii, from the us library of congress collection

dtPGroupMedia

MaPWojciech Mańkowski

PuBlisheRośrodek studiów wschodnich im. marka Karpia centre for eastern studiesul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, PolandPhone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl

isBn 978-83-62936-41-0

Contents

Key points /5

introduCtion /10

I. Central asia in MosCow’s poliCy. the historiCal baCKground /12

1. the russian conquest of the region /122. Central asia in the soviet period /133. Moscow vs. Central asia in the first years since the collapse

of the ussr /15

II. russia’s goals and its Means of aChieving theM /18

1. the hierarchy of the goals /182. the available instruments /203. relations with individual countries /26

3.1. Kyrgyzstan /303.2. tajikistan /413.3. uzbekistan /513.4. turkmenistan /60

4. russian-Kazakh relations /664.1. russia’s assets /674.2. an outline of russian-Kazakh relations /78

III. the Multilateral and international Context /81

1. Central asia in Moscow’s integration initiatives /812. the Csto as a means of military and political integration /853. Moscow vs. the region in the context of the sCo /884. the perspective of winding up the isaf mission in afghanistan /90

ConClusions /94

Map /97

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Key points

• Thepost-SovietCentralAsiancountries (Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajik-istan,TurkmenistanandUzbekistan)areofimportanceforRussiaas:

– a potential source of threats (terrorism, drugs and extremist ideas,flowingbothfromthereandfrommoredistantcountries,aboveallAf-ghanistan);– an area of its relations (rivalry and limited co-operation)with otherglobalplayers:China,theWestandtheIslamicworld;– anareaofRussianintegrationinitiatives.

Thusitisakindofabufferinthebroadermeaningoftheterm,theexist-enceofwhichimprovestheRussianFederation’ssafety.CentralAsiaisnotaregionofeconomicpriorityforMoscow,itismerelyamajorsourceofrawmaterials (uraniumandhydrocarbons that are re-exported to theWest)andofcheapworkforce.

• Russiaviewsthecontinuationof(orexpandinginthebest-casescenario)its influence inCentralAsiaasanecessaryconditionformaintainingitspositionasaglobalplayer.Thelossofthisregion,understoodasthedomi-nanceofanotherexternalplayerbeingentrenchedthere(atpresent,Rus-siacouldonlybechallengedbyChinainthisarea),wouldalsobepainfulforRussiainsymbolicterms,sincethiswouldmeanthefailureofitstwocenturies-longexpansioninthisdirection,andwouldsealtheprocessofdisintegrationoftheformerTsaristandthenSovietempire.

• Moscow’scurrent‘possessions’(theinstrumentsandassetsithasatitsdis-posal)stillensureitalimitedlevelofcontrolintheregion.However,Rus-sia’sinfluencehaserodedsignificantlyoverthepasttwodecadessincethecollapseoftheUSSR.Thefactorswhichhavecontributedtothisinclude:

– thepassivenessofMoscowitself,whichonlybecameengagedmorese-riouslyasamediatorduringthecivilwarinTajikistan(1992–1997);– theemergenceofotherplayersintheregion;– theambitionsoftheCentralAsiangovernments,whohavebeenmak-ingeffortstodiversifytheirforeigncontacts.

• Theconsistentactionsaimedat integratingthepost-Sovietareatakenatthebeginningof thepresentdecade (this integrationhasbeengiven top

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priority inRussia’s foreignpolicy), togetherwith someexternal circum-stances(thethreatthattheregioncouldbecomedestabilisedfollowingthewind-up of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan scheduled for 2014) havehaltedthefurthererosionofRussianinfluence,althoughareversalofthisprocessappearsunrealisticnow.

• Russiaiscapable–albeittoalimitedextent–ofinfluencingthesituationinKyrgyzstanandTajikistan,andalsotoacertaindegreeinKazakhstan.Russia’sengagement in thehydroenergyprojects inKyrgyzstanandTa-jikistanalsoallowsit,althoughtoanevenlesserextent,toexertinfluenceonUzbekistan (whichreliesonwater fromriverswhoseheadwatersarelocated in these two countries).Moscow’s influence on Turkmenistan ismarginal.The limitationsofRussianpolicycanbe illustratedby theex-ampleofKyrgyzstan:ittookMoscowsomeyearsofeffortstoforceBishkektoclosetheUSmilitaryairbaseinManas(thisisexpectedtotakeplaceinJuly2014,andthedecisionwastakeninJune2013).InJune2010,inturn,despitearequestfromthenewKyrgyzgovernment,Russiachosenottoin-terveneintheethnicclashesthathadbrokenoutinthesouthofthecoun-try.Moscowisunabletoinfluencethesuccessionprocessestakingplaceintheregion’scountries,althoughitsinformalsupportmayimproveagivenpolitician’schancesofwinningthestruggleforpower.Italsohasa‘destabi-lisingpotential’,whichforexampleitemployedinApril2010byhelpingtooverthrowthethenpresidentofKyrgyzstan,KurmanbekBakiyev.

• Russia’smost important instrumentsare thenetworkofold,Soviet con-nections, including personal contacts between politicians, businessmenandlawenforcementofficers,aswellasthefactthatquitemanypeopleintheregion–albeitadecreasingnumber–stillspeakRussian.Overtime,theroleoftheseintangibleassetswilldiminish.However,atpresent,Rus-sia isstillnotseenasa foreigncountry. It is theonlyactiveexternalac-torinCentralAsiawhichinasenseisatthesametimepartoftheregion(duetothelanguage,post-Sovietsentiments,theopenlabourmarket,etc.).Anotherinstrumentisthemilitarypresence:thebasesinKyrgyzstanandTajikistan,andanumberofmilitaryfacilitiesinKazakhstan.Thepoliticalinstruments includeRussia’s dominant position in the structureswhichthecountriesfromthisregionaremembersof:theCommonwealthofIn-dependentStates(CIS),theEurasianEconomicCommunity(EAEC)andtheCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganisation(CSTO),aswellasthepresenceofseveralmillionexpatriateworkersfromthisregioninRussia(moneyre-mittances from expatriateworkers account for half of Tajikistan’sGDP).

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TheeconomicinstrumentsincludetheRussianmonopolyonthetransitofCentralAsianoilandgastotheWestandthetariffpolicy.

• Moscowpartlyowesitsrelativelystrongpositionintheregiontothestilllimited engagement of other players. Russia is the only external actorwhichiscomprehensivelyactiveinCentralAsia,intheareasofpolitics,se-curity,economy,socialpolicy(immigrants)andculture.Theotherplayersarefocusedonselectedsectors:Chinaontheeconomy,theWest(especiallytheUSA)onsecurityissues,andtheglobalMuslimcommunity(umma)onreligiousandspiritualissues.However,thissituationmaychangeastheseactors’ambitionsgrow–especiallythoseofChina,whichseemstobereadyforexpansionintheareasofpoliticsand ‘hard’securityalso.Thisisbe-causetheperceptionofCentralAsiahaschanged:Beijingviewsthisarealess and less asRussia’s exclusive zoneof influence, andmore andmoreasa‘noman’sland’,whereallexternalplayershaveequalrightsandmaycompetefreelywitheachother.

• Preventingotheractorsfromexpandingtheir influenceis justas impor-tantforMoscowasmaintainingitsowninfluencethere.Thisisbecauseitseesthecountriesofthisregionnotaspartners,butmerelyasobjectsofitspolicy(oneexceptionareitsrelationswithKazakhstan,whichapartfromsome issues are partnership-based). Another reason for this is the ColdWarparadigm,stillpresentintheRussianwayofthinking,whichdefinestheworldasanarenawheresuperpowerscompetefortheirzonesofinflu-ence.According to thisparadigm,Moscow’spolicy towardsCentralAsiaistoagreatextentaneffectofitsrelationswithBeijingandWashington(andalsowithAnkara,Tehran,DelhiandIslamabad,tonamejustafew).Therefore,onemighthavetheimpressionthatitissometimesinconsistentand/orreactive.MoscowhasdeclaredthattheWestisitsmainrival.How-ever,itseemsthatitfearsChina’sgrowthinsignificancemuchmoreinthelongerterm.RussiahasbeenmakingeffortstocontainBeijing’sexpansion,especiallythroughthe integrationof thepost-Sovietareaunder itsaegis(forinstancetheinfluxofChinesegoodsistoberestrictedunderregula-tionsadoptedaspartof theCustomsUnion,whosepresentmembersareRussia,KazakhstanandBelarus).

• TheintegrationprojectsareintendedtobindtheparticipatingcountriestoRussiaforgood,whichwouldallowittoactastheleaderofagroupofcountries. The presence of Central Asian countries among them allowstheseprojectstobeseenasintercontinental,trulyEurasian.TheRussian

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initiativescovertheareasofeconomy(theEurasianEconomicCommunity,theCustomsUnionandtheCommonEconomicSpace)anddefence(theCol-lectiveSecurityTreatyOrganisation).TheintegrationprocessesaretobecrownedwiththeestablishmentoftheEurasianUnion(EAU),whichwillcombine the twocomponents.Russiawants this integration tocover thelargest possible number of countries, although – due to resistance fromsomeformerSovietrepublics(especiallyUkraine),andthechangeinthebalance of forces in CentralAsia to Russia’s disadvantage –Moscowhasbeenplacingmoreemphasisonthetempoandthedeepeningofintegrationoverthepastfewyears.Thisdoesnotmeanthatithasgivenupitsconceptof‘broad’integration.InSeptember2013YerevanunexpectedlyannouncedthatitwouldjointheCustomsUnion,whichwashastilycreatedin2010–2011andstillhasonlythreemembers(Bishkekwastheonlyonetohavedeclared itwould jointheCustomsUnionbeforethis,andDushanbehasnotruledthisout).ContrarytoRussianexpectations,thecountriesfromthisregionarenotinterestedinpoliticalintegration,whichwouldinvolvetheestablishmentofsupranationalstructuresandauthorities.

• Thegreatest challenge to theRussianpolicy towardsCentralAsia is theUS’declaredwithdrawalofitsmajorforcesfromAfghanistan(thewind-upoftheISAFmission).Russiaviewsthisasbothathreat(apossibleuncon-trolleddestabilisationintheregionwoulddrivegreatnumbersofrefugeestoRussia,andcouldcause the lossofa ‘buffer’outsideRussia’s southernfrontier) and an opportunity (fearing destabilisation, the Central AsiangovernmentscouldthenbecomemorewillingtoparticipateinRussianin-tegrationprojects).

• ThetestsofsuccessforMoscow’spolicywillbe:

– in bilateral terms – the implementation ofmilitary agreementswithKyrgyzstanandTajikistan;theestablishmentofasecondmilitarybasein Kyrgyzstan (in the south of the country, close to the borderwithUzbekistan) and thepossible returnofRussianborder guards to theTajik-Afghan border; the successful completion of at least one of thelargehydroenergyprojects;andmaintainingitspresentinfluenceinKazakhstan,regardlessofwhothenextpresidentwillbe;– inregionalterms–thesuccessoftheCustomsUnion(accessionofothercountriesthatwillbenefitinatangiblewayfrommembership),followedbytheestablishmentofthepromisedEurasianUnionjointlywiththememberstatesoftheCustomsUnion,andthelaunchofefficient(and

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notmerelysuperficial)structuresandmechanismsalreadyaspartoftheEurasianUnion;andmaintainingitscontroloftheregionatleastatthepresentlevel;– in global terms – containing the growth ofWestern and (especially)Chineseinfluence;maintainingitsmonopolyintheareaof‘hard’secu-rity(theCSTO,whichformallycollaborateswiththeUN,willremaintheonlydefencealliancewhichCentralAsiancountriesaremembersof)andtheinternationalcommunity’sacceptanceofthis(anypossibleUSorChinesemilitarypresencemayonlybemanifesteduponapprovalfromRussiaandonRussianterms).

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introduction

Theterm‘CentralAsia’asusedinthispaperencompassesfivecountrieswhichareformerSovietrepublics:Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Turkmeni-stanandUzbekistan.Fourofthemaregovernedbymoreorlessauthoritarianregimes,wherethepresidenthasstrongpowerandcanholdhisofficeforanunlimitednumberof terms.TheexceptionisKyrgyzstan,wherethecentralgovernmenthasalwaysbeenrelativelyweak,andwhereaparliamentarysys-temwasadoptedafterthecoupin2010.

Manyauthorsemphasisethatthesecountriesdonotformaregioninthepo-litical sense, sincedespite their similarities andgeographical situation theyhavenocommon(precisely,regional)intereststosharewitheachother1.Evenwhendealingwithcommonthreats (drugsmuggling, terrorismand Islamicfundamentalism) the individual Central Asian governments are unwillingtotakejointaction,andinsteadtheypreferco-operationwithexternalplay-ers(suchasRussiaortheUSA).Thismaybeduetothefact thattheoriginsofthesethreatsarenotonlyexternal(AfghanistanorPakistan)butalsodo-mestic.Thus,mutualco-operationwouldhavegivensomecountriesfromthisregion insight into thedomestic affairsof theothers.No regional organisa-tion,withtheexceptionoftheephemeralbodiescreatedinthe1990s,hasbeenestablishedinCentralAsiawithoutanexternalforce(RussiaorChina)beinginvolved.Theinfrastructureinuseonthestateborders,whichareclosednowandthenforthemovementofpeopleandgoods,recallstheColdWar:barbedwire,watchtowers,minefields.Thisillustratesthestateofrelationsbetweentheneighbours,whicharecharacterisedbydistrustresultingfromthelargenumberofstillunresolvedproblemsdatingbacktotheSovietperiod(territo-rialandethnicdisputes,includingthoseoversomecountries’exclaveslocatedwithinothercountries,conflictsoverwater,etc.).

Allthesedifferences,plusthefactthatpoliticsinCentralAsiaisstronglyper-sonalised(theleaders’dominatingimpactonthestancestheircountriestake)haveforcedtheexternalplayers, includingRussia,tofocusonbilateralcon-tactsandmaintaingoodrelationswithindividual leaders.Ontheonehand,

1 Forexample,AlexeyMalashenkohasnotedthat“MorethantwentyyearsaftertheSovietcollapse,CentralAsiacanbespokenofonlyasaconglomerateofindependentcountries,each in the process of forming its ownnational interests and foreign policy priorities.”(AlexeyMalashenko, ‘The Fight for Influence.Russia inCentralAsia’,Washington 2013,page13-14).

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this makes it possible to capitalise on disagreements between individualscountriesintheregion(e.g.TajikistanandKyrgyzstan,whicharelocatedintheupperreachesof thebigriversandhavemorewaterthannecessary,vs.UzbekistanandTurkmenistan,whichhaveinsufficientamountsofwater).Ontheotherhand,thisrequiresgreatflexibility,takingconflictinginterestsintoaccountandrespondingtomutuallyexclusiveexpectations.

Theglobalpowersareinterestedintheregionmainlybecauseofitsrawma-terials(hydrocarbons,uraniumetc.),transittransportroutesandsecurityis-sues(withrespecttotheproximityofAfghanistan).Asaconsequenceofmovesmadebyotherplayers,combinedwiththerelativelyinactiveandinconsistentpolicyMoscowadoptedinthefirstyearsfollowingthecollapseof theUSSR,andtheCentralAsiancountries’effortsaimedatemancipation,Russia’sprevi-oushegemonicpositionhasweakenedovertime.WhenVladimirPutinbecamepresidentofRussiain2000(andespeciallyaftertheUSAanditsNATOallieslaunchedtheinterventioninAfghanistaninautumn2001),Moscowembarkedonamuchmoreactivepolicythere,althoughhasnotpreventeditsinfluencefromerodingfurther.Thisprocessonlysloweddown,whilenotreversingthetendency,whenVladimirPutinresumedthepresidencyin2012,andwhenthereintegrationofthepost-Sovietareawasrecognisedasoneofthetoppriori-tiesinRussianforeignpolicy.MoscowviewsCentralAsiatodayasanessentialelementof its integrationprojects,andalsoasafieldforrivalryandlimitedco-operationwiththeWest(especiallytheUSA)andChina.Itisstillamajor,andattimesdominant,actorintheregion,butitmustrespecttheinterestsoftheotherexternalactors.

This analysis is intendedatpresentingRussianpolicy towardsCentralAsiamorethantwentyyearssincethecollapseoftheUSSR.ChapterIisanattempttoanswerthequestionofhowsignificantthisregionwasforMoscowinthepast,sinceitwasfirstconqueredbyTsaristRussiauntiltheendofthefirstdec-adeinthepost-Sovietperiod(theyears2000-2001markthecaesura:VladimirPutinassumedpowerinRussia,andtheUSAanditsallies launchedtheop-erationinAfghanistanfollowingtheSeptember11terroristattacksin2001).Chapter II discusses thegoals of theRussianpolicy, themeans employed toimplementthem,theRussianinstrumentsandinbroadertermsRussia’s‘pos-sessions’intheregion.ChapterIIIfocusesonthemultilateralpolicyadoptedbyRussia–itsinvolvementinregionalorganisationsandintegrationefforts.This chapteralso includesapresentationof theregion in thecontextof thewithdrawalofmajorUSforcesfromAfghanistanscheduledfortheendof2014.

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i. central asia in Moscow’s policy. the historical bacKground

1. the russian conquest of the region

Russia’s first contactswith Central Asia date back to the 16th century. ThegroundforfurtherexpansionwaspreparedbylegationssentbyMoscowtothelocalkhanatesinordertoestablishtradecontactsandcollectinformationontheirpoliticalsystems,economicsituationsandethnicrelations.Thefirstter-ritorieswereconqueredinthe1730s:thenRussiaannexedwhatisnownorth-westernKazakhstan,whichhadbeencontrolledbytheJuniorJuz(oneofthethree Kazakh hordes) and bordered on Khwarezm (the Khanate of Khiva).Inthe1740s,SaintPetersburgextendeditsprotectorateovertheMiddle Juz,whichborderedonthelandsofBukhara,theregion’sstrongeststateformationatthattime.Inthefirstdecadesofthe19thcentury,RussiaannexedthelandsoftheSeniorJuz(whatisnowsouth-easternKazakhstan,andthenwasape-ripheryoftheKhanateofKokand).

ThepermanentconquestofCentralAsiabeganinthemid-19thcentury.With-in decades, Russia annexed a vast area stretching from the Caspian Sea toChinaandfromSiberiatoIndiaandPersia.AtthattimeitwasreferredtoasWesternTurkestan(todrawadistinctionbetweenEasternTurkestan,whichwaspartofChina).Turkicpeoplespredominatedthere,asisstillthecaseto-day.TheexceptionsareIndo-EuropeanTajiks(andalsotheYaghnobipeople,andthePamirpeoples),andtheChineseDungans.Thenorthernpartof theregion,thesteppe,wastraditionallyalandofnomads,whilethesouthernpart,wherethedesertsandmountainsprevailed,hadmorepermanenthumanset-tlements,concentratedinoases.

Russia’sexcusefortheconquestwasits‘culturalmission’,theneedtocivilisethe‘primitive’peoplesintheregionandtoestablishlastingpeaceamongthem,guaranteesecuritytotradebetweenEuropeandAsiaand,lastbutnotleast,protectitselffrombeinginvadedbynomads.However,theeconomic(SaintPe-tersburgwasinterestedincottonfieldsandsilkwormfarms)andgeopoliticalfactorswerethemostimportant.TheexpansioninCentralAsiawasanelementoftheRussian-Britishrivalryknowninhistoryasthe‘GreatGame’.Thisrival-rylastedforalmosttheentire19thcentury,andalsocoveredtheneighbouringregionsandcountries:theCaucasus,Iran,Afghanistan,IndiaandTibet.Thetwoempiresdidnotbecomeinvolvedinopenclashes,althoughtheirarmiesdidfightagainsttheforcesoflocalleaderswhowerebackedorprovokedbythe

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oppositeside.Anintensivediplomaticandespionagegamewasalsoinplace.SaintPetersburg’sintentionwastogainaccesstotheIndianOcean(viaIranandAfghanistan)andtocontaintheexpansionoftheBritishEmpire.Londonwouldnotallowthis,anditalsodesiredtoprotectthe‘jewelinthecrown’ofitscontrolledterritories,India.TherivalryintensifiedafterRussia’sdefeatintheCrimeanWar (1853–1856),which restrictedRussian influence inEurope andprovidedastimulusformoreintenseexpansionintheeasternandsoutherndirections.Theagreementof 1895,underwhichRussiagainedcontrolof thegreaterpartofthePamirs,markedthefinalstageoftheGreatGame.ThenewRussianterritorieswereseparatedfromtheBritishonesbyabufferformedbytheWakhanCorridor,whichwasofferedtoAfghanistan.

TheTsar’sadministrationdidnotinterferewiththelifeoflocalcommunitiesinCentralAsia,andtheinfluxofSlavonicsettlerswasinitiallylimited.Thissituationbegantochangetowardstheendofthe19thcentury.By1897,Rus-sians(alongwithUkrainiansandBelarusians)alreadyaccountedforalmost9%ofTurkestan’spopulation2,whileintheearly20thcentury,aspartofthereformslaunchedbyPrimeMinisterPyotrStolypin,SlavsstartedtosettleinCentralAsiaonamassscale.Thedemographicimbalancewasoneofthecausesofanuprisingwhichbrokeoutin1916onwhatisnowthefrontierofTajikistan,UzbekistanandKyrgyzstan,expandingrapidlyoverthewholeofTurkestan.Thisinsurgencewasbrutallysuppressed.SomeKyrgyzsandKazakhsescapedtoChina,whichfurther influencedthechangeintheethnicmakeupof thispartoftheregion.

2. central asia in the soviet period

IntheSovietUnion,asintheRussianEmpire,CentralAsiaplayedtheroleofthesupplierofrawmaterials,whichwere thenprocessed inwesternSovietrepublics.At that time, inaddition tocottonandsilk, it suppliedwheatandmineralresources:oil,naturalgas,iron,uraniumandnon-ferrousmetalores,andsulphur.Thelocalproductiondidnotsatisfythelocalneeds.Fuel,petro-leumproducts,variouskindsofmachineryandequipment,aswellasconsum-ergoodsneededtobebroughtfromotherpartsoftheSovietUnion.Thelocalbudgetsgenerateddeficits,andtheregionstronglyreliedonsubsidieswhichwereusedtofinanceinfrastructuralandotherinvestments.

2 Russiansaloneaccountedfor7.6%.Myowncalculationsbasedonthedatafromthe1897census,availableat:http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php?reg=117

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TheSovietleadershipwantedtointegratetheresidentsofthisregionwiththeotherpeopleswithintheUSSRwhich,accordingtotheideologyofinternation-alismandCommunistpropaganda,wouldleadovertimetothedevelopmentofauniformSovietnation.ThesupportforSlavonicsettlementsandthein-creasinglywidespreadknowledgeof theRussian languagewere intended tofacilitatetheachievementofthisgoal.Theseactionswereonlypartlysuccess-ful.Theformernomads,KazakhsandKyrgyz,whoareculturallyclose,provedtobethemostsusceptibletoRussification.ThesenationswerelessIslamisedandhadcomeintocontactwithRussiansearlierthantheirneighbours(thisisespeciallytrueoftheKazakhsfromtheJuniorandMiddleJuz).Furthermore,theyhad lost themajorityof theirelitesasaconsequenceof theuprising in1916.Inadditiontoallthis,SlavswerethemostwillingtosettleinKazakhstanandKyrgyzstan(whichwerepartlydesolateaftertheuprising).Inturn,thesouthernpartoftheregionwasSovietisedtoonlyaminimalextent,sinceSlavswerealmostabsent(withtheexceptionofcities,wheretheyformedaparticu-larkindofghetto),andIslamstronglyrootedinlocaltraditionssurvivedthere.

Theadministrativedivisionoftheregion,whichtookitsfinalforminthemid-1930s, turnedout tobe themostdurableSoviet legacy.FiveSovietrepublics(whichwouldbecomeindependentstatesafter1991)andoneautonomousre-public(KarakalpakstanwithinUzbekistan)weresetupatthattime.Thisac-celeratedtheprocessofmodernnationsbeingformed(especiallythesixtitularnations),butatthesametimecausedtheirseparationandthedisintegrationofwhatusedtobetheircommonculturalground3.Itwasimpossibletocon-sistentlyseparatetheindividualethnicgroupsinallpartsoftheregion:whentheFerganaValleywasdividedamongUzbekistan,TajikistanandKyrgyzstan,anumberof enclaves ownedby theirneighbours (Uzbeks inTajikistanandKyrgyzstan,TajiksinKyrgyzstanandUzbekistan,etc.)wereadditionallyde-limited.Furthermore,anumerousTajikminorityinhabitedUzbekistan,whileTajikistan andKyrgyzstanwere home to significantUzbekminorities. This

3 Thefactorswhichcontributedtotheculturalunityofthisregion(regardlessoftheexist-ingstronglocalidentities)includedethnicandlinguisticaffinity,andespeciallythereli-gionwhichthepeopleswho livedthereshare (Sunni Islam,andIsmailism–abranchofShiaIslam–onlyamongtheresidentsofthePamirs).Themostsignificantdividewastheonebetweennomadsandsettledpeople.Thisdistinctionwasmoreimportantthanethnicdifferences.Forexample,UzbeksandTajikslivinginthecitiesofwhatisnowUzbekistanbeforetheBolshevikRevolutionwereknownbythecommonnameofSarts,sincetheywereperceivedasonegroup.Intheopinionofsomeresearchers,theprocessoftheformationofmodernnationsintheregionisstillnotcomplete.Hencethegreatsignificanceofinformalgroups,whoareconnectedwithclanbondsoracommonplaceoforigin,inCentralAsianpoliticallife.

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wasnotreallyimportantwhentheserepublicswerepartoftheUSSR(ifonedisregardsthedissatisfactionofthosegroupsofpeoplewhofelttheyhadbeendisadvantaged,suchastheTajiksfromSamarkand,whichhadbeenmadepartofUzbekistan).However,when theSovietUnioncollapsed, this gave rise toseriousdisputesandconflicts.ThebordersdelimitedintheFerganaValleybe-cameanespeciallystrongsourceof tension: theycross the transportroutes(roadsandrailways)andwatercourses,thusadverselyaffectingtheeconomiesandpoliticalrelationsamongthecountriesintheregion.

3. Moscow vs. central asia in the first years since the collapse of the ussr

AsDmitriTrenin,directoroftheCarnegieMoscowCentre,hasnoted,theCen-tralAsianrepublics“didnotseparatefromtheUSSR:instead,theUnion,hav-ingcollapsed,leftthemtotheirfate”4.Russia,whichalongwithUkraineandBelarusdisassembledtheSovietstate,didnotshowanymajoractivityintheregionuntiltheendofthe1990s5.Italsoseemednottonoticethatsovereignentitieswiththeirownaspirationsbeganemergingtherefromtheamorphous‘post-Soviet area’. IrinaZvyagelskaya fromMGIMObelieves that “oneof themainreasonswhyCentralAsiawasabandonedwasthedesireamongtheRus-sian first-wave democrats to get rid of the political ballast of authoritarianregimeswhichhadgrownontheCommunistSovietsubstratumand, in theopinionofthosedemocrats,werereadytobackCommunistretaliation”6.Alek-sandr Solzhenitsynwas a patron of this approach; hehad already appealedin1990forrelinquishingtheSoviet ‘borderlands’whichhadbeensupportedfinancially by Moscow, and instead strengthening the Russian ‘core’7. The

4 Дмитрий Тренин, ‘Post-Imperium:евразийская история’, Москва2012,page176.5 OneexceptionwasMoscow’sactiveengagementasamediatorandintermediarybetween

thepartiestothecivilwarinTajikistan(1992–1997).6 Ирина Звягельская, ‘Становление государств Центральной Азии. Политические про­

цессы’, Москва 2009,page41.7 Inhisappealforseparatingatleastelevenrepublics(Moldova,thethreeBaltic,thethree

CaucasianandthefourAsianrepublics,exceptforKazakhstan)fromRussia,evenagainsttheir will, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn especially strongly emphasised the burden generat-edbyCentralAsia:“[Russia]willbeabletostraightenupevenmoreonceithasshedtheonerousburdenoftheCentralAsian ‘underbelly’, thatequallyill-consideredconquestofAlexanderII”.ThewriterextendedhisargumentationtoKazakhstanwithcertainreser-vations:“AsforKazakhstan,itspresenthugeterritorywasstitchedtogetherbythecommu-nistsinacompletelyhaphazardfashion:wherevermigratingherdsmadeayearlypassagewouldbecalledKazakhstan.[…]TodaytheKazakhsconstitutenoticeablylessthanhalfthepopulationoftheentire inflatedterritoryofKazakhstan.Theyareconcentratedintheirlong-standingancestraldomainsalongalargearcoflandsinthesouth,sweepingfromthe

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looseningofthebondswiththeregionwasaccompaniedbythepaternalisticbeliefthattheCentralAsianrepublicshadnootherchoicebuttorelyonRus-sia,andthereforeRussiadidnothavetomakeanyefforttoremainappealingtothem:whenRussiahadcarriedthrougheconomicreforms,theywouldcomeback to itby themselvesonRussian terms (i.e.withoutMoscowsubsidisingtheirbudgets).

Contrary to this assumption, it did not take long for the new independentstatestoappreciatethebenefitsofactingassovereignentitiesontheinterna-tionalarena,andthustheyhadnomotivationtogobackundertheKremlin’sprotectorate.russia’s position in the region eroded deeply in the 1990s. this was an effect of a number of factors, which can be divided into three groups. the first one includes negligence by Moscow itself – itspassive-ness,paternalism(MalashenkoandZvyagelskayahavepointedouttothelowcompetencesofthediplomatswhoweredelegatedtothisregion,whodidnotspeakthelocallanguagesandwereunfamiliarwiththeculturalbackground)andalmostcompletelackofinterestintheethnicRussianslivingthere,whichlocalregimescouldunderstandasadeclarationofdésintéressementinthefu-tureofCentralAsia.the second group includes actions by other external players, whose activity increased in the region which russia had ‘aban-doned’. Initially,theseactorswereTurkeyandIran,whosecultureshavemostincommon,andalsoSaudiArabia,PakistanandIndia.Atthesametime,Chi-nabecameinterestedintheregion,soonfollowedbytheWest,includingtheUSA.Theseactorsatfirstofferedsocialandculturalco-operationtograduallyincludeeconomic,politicalanddefenceissuesintheiroffer.

Othercountriesbecameactive intheregioninresponsetotheexpectationsofCentralAsiancapitals,whoweresearchingfortheirplaceinthesystemofinternationalrelationsinEurasia(whichwasaccompaniedbythesearchforanewpost-Soviet identity and state ideology) anddesired todiversify theirforeign contacts.the processes that took place in the region itself and the actions taken by the regional leaders form the third group of factors which have undermined russia’s position and significance. In this con-text,itisessentialtomentionde-Sovietisation,whichlocallytooktheformofde-Russificationcombinedwithre-Islamisation(otherformerSovietrepublics

extremeeastwestwardalmosttotheCaspianSea,thepopulationhereisindeedpredomi-nantlyKazakh.Andifitshouldprovetobetheirwishtoseparatewithinsuchboundaries,I sayGodspeed.” (Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, ‘Rebuilding Russia. Reflections and tentativeproposals’,translatedandannotatedbyAlexisKlimoff,NewYork1991,pages7-12).

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primarily rejected the Soviet socio-economic system,while in Central Asia“theSovietera’ssocial[collective]values[...]hadquicklybeenorganicallyin-tegrated into local [Muslim] traditions”8). Ineffect,Moscow’shegemonicpo-sitionhasbeenundermined.Russiahaslostitsroleastheonlycivilisational‘pointofreference’,butatthesametimeithasremainedappealingasaplacetostudyorwork,andmanyresidentsoftheregionhavefeltstronglyboundtotheRussianlanguageandculture.However,attheturnofthecentury,apartfromRussiatheregionwasalsoorientedtowardstheWest(asanembodimentofwelfareandasourceofmoderntechnologies),China(asasourceofcheapconsumergoodsandadesirableinvestor)andtoacertainextenttowardstheIslamiccountries(asourceofnon-materialvalues).Tomaintainwhatwasleftofitsinfluence,Russiawasforcedtoenterthecompetitionwithotherentitiesintheareawhichitsawasits‘own’.

Thepresenceofexternalplayersandthecompetitionemergingbetweenthemhaveinclinedsomeresearcherstoproposethethesisthata‘newGreatGame’hasbegun9.Disputableas itmaybe (atpresent, theCentralAsiancountriesare,at leastformally, independententities),thisanalogyappearsreasonabletoacertainextent.

8 AlexeyMalashenko,‘TheFightforInfluence...’,op. cit.,page27.9 IgorZonnandSergeyZhiltsovhavewrittenthatthe‘GreatGame.2’differedfromthefirst

oneonlyinthenumberoftheplayers(whichhasincreasedsignificantly)andthevalueofthefundsallocatedfortherivalry,nowreachinghundredsofmillionsofUSdollars(Игорь Зонн, Сергей Жильцов, ‘Стратегия США в Каспийском регионе’, Москва2003,page148).

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ii. russia’s goals and its Means of achieving theM

1. the hierarchy of the goals

RelationswithindividualCentralAsiancountries(withtheexceptionofKa-zakhstan)arenotgrantedhighpriorityinRussianforeignpolicy,butthere-gionasawholeisaveryessentialelementofit.CentralAsiaisimportantforMoscowasanareacoveredbyRussianintegrationinitiatives,aspaceforre-lationswiththeWest,ChinaandtheIslamicworld,andlastbutnotleast,asapotentialsourceofthreats(originatingbothfromthereandfrommoredis-tantcountries,primarilyAfghanistan).Thusinanycaseitistreatedasasub-ject,andismostoftenviewedasa‘softunderbelly’,i.e.abufferwhosepresencecouldimprovetheimpermeabilityoftheRussianborders.Atthesametime,this is the last part of the Soviet ecumen, apart fromBelarus andArmenia,wheretheKremlincanstillfeellikeapoliticalleader,albeitevermorerarelyandwithnumerousreservations.Forthisreason,Moscow’spresenceandin-fluence inCentralAsiaareessential for itsprestige, since its statusasa su-perpowerdependsonthem.thus russia’s basic and most important goals are to maintain its influence there (and expand it, in the optimal case)10 and to restrict the influence of other actors, so that it has the decisive say in the region’s most important issues, and that this prerogative not be questioned by any of the major players. Thisinparticularconcernssecu-rityissues,inthebroadmeaningoftheterm.Asregardstheeconomy,MoscowseemstobeacknowledgingChina’s increasingsignificanceandexpectedfu-turedominance(especiallyintheareasoftransportandcommunication),al-thoughithasbeenmakingattemptstoretainitsadvantageinselectedmarketsegments,suchasinvestmentsinthehydroelectricsector.

ThusRussiadesires thatCentralAsia,which itbelieves tobe its zoneof in-fluence, be unquestionably perceived as such by all the parties concerned.AllotherRussiangoalsaresubordinatetothisvision.Thesecanbeclassifiedwithinfour,partlyoverlapping,areas:politics,security(both‘soft’and‘hard’),economyand‘softpower’11.TheoperationofregimesinCentralAsiawhichare

10 Thisinfluenceisunderstoodintraditionalterms.Attheendofthefirstdecadeofthe21stcentury,Chineseexpertswouldoftenclearlycomparetheregiontoafertilebutneglectedgardenlocatedoffthebeatentrack,guardedbyadangerousdogwhowasunabletoproperlycultivatethegardenbutwouldnotletinanyonefromtheoutsidewhowouldwishtotakecareofthis(OSW’sconversationwithAdilKaukenov,apoliticalexpertandSinologist,Al-maty,12December2011).

11 Softpowerisusuallydefinedasagivencountry’scapabilitytogainandstrengthenitsin-

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friendlytowardsRussiaandwillingtorespectitsinterestsisessentialtoalltheseareas.Inthepolitical area, Moscowalsowantsthesecountriesnottoenterintoallianceswithanyotherexternalactors,buttoremainwithinthestructureswhichitcontrolsorco-controls(suchastheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisation,SCO).

In the security area, Russia’s primary goal is for the entire region to becoveredwitha collective security systemwhich ithasapproved,and in theshortterm,tominimisethepossiblenegativeconsequencesofthewind-upofNATO’soperationinAfghanistanin2014.Thisoverridinggoalincludesanum-berof lower-levelgoals:expandingRussia’smilitarypresence in theregion,preventingothercountries’(especiallyUS)troopsfrombeingdeployedthere,thereturnofRussianborderguards to theTajik-Afghanborder,andalso toserveas ‘softsecurity’,byreducingthevolumesofdrugssmuggledtoRussiaandrestrictingillegalimmigrationlevels,amongothermeasures.

In thearea of the economy,Russiadesires tokeepCentralAsiancountriesdependentonitinselectedareas(investmentsinthehydroenergysector,sup-plies of fuels and petroleum products,maintenance ofmilitary equipment,etc.).Italsowantstomaintainitspositionasamonopolyinthetransitofhy-drocarbonsfromCentralAsiatotheWest.

Inthearea of soft power,Moscowwouldlikeasaminimumtomaintainitspreviouslevelofinfluence:commonknowledgeoftheRussianlanguageacrosstheregion,thedominanceintheinformationspaceofRussianandlocalRus-sian-speakingmedia(especiallyelectronic),andtheorientationofpartoftheculturalandpoliticalelitestowardsRussia.

ContrarytonumerousRussiandeclarations,itappearsthatitdoesnotintendtostabilisethesituationintheregion,butitratherwantsastateof‘controlledin-stability’tobemaintainedthere.Thisallowsittoactasanarbiter,andpossiblytotakeadvantageofthesituationbyplacingvariouskindsofpressureontheconflictingparties.OneproofofthisthesisisthatRussiarefrainedfrominter-veninginsouthernKyrgyzstanatthetimeoftheethnicKyrgyz-UzbekclashesinJune2010(althoughthethenKyrgyzinterimgovernmenthadaskedforsuchan intervention). Another example is Russia’s long-running game concern-ingtheplanstobuildlargehydropowerplantsinKyrgyzstan(KambarAtaI)

fluenceowingtotheattractivenessofitsculture,politicsandideology.Unlikehardpower,whichinvolvestheuseofviolence,yieldingtosoftpowerisprincipallyvoluntary.

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andTajikistan(Rogun),whichareopposedbyUzbekistan12–Moscowhasbeenavoidingtakingaclearstanceonthismatter,fromtimetotimedeclareditsassistanceandevenparticipationintheconstruction,andthenfailedtocom-plywithitsobligations,thuswieldingaconstantinstrumentofpressureoverseveralcountries.Inturn,theriotswhichtookplaceinJuly2012intheGorno-BadakhshanautonomousprovinceofTajikistan(whichhaveproventhatDu-shanbedoesnothavefullcontroloveritsterritory)probablyacceleratedtheprocessofsigningtheTajik-Russianmilitaryagreement,whichprovidesforlong-termRussianmilitary presence in this country (the Tajik governmenthadbeenplayingfortimebeforethat,bysettingnumerouspreconditions)13.

2. the available instruments

Russiahasawidearrayofinstrumentsitcanusetoinfluencethesituationintheregion.Theseareofvariousnaturesandcanbeappliedtovariousmutuallyoverlappingorders.Foreaseofreference,thesecanbeclassifiedaspolitical,military,economicandsoftpowerinstruments.

Thepoliticalinstruments includedominanceoftheregionalorganisationswhichCentralAsiancountriesbelongto(suchastheCommonwealthofInde-pendentStates,theEurasianEconomicCommunityandtheCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganisation).Russiacanpushthroughsomesolutionsmoreeasilyattheseforumsthanbymeansofbilateralrelations.OneexampleistheDecem-ber2011decisionbytheCSTOmemberstatesunderwhichthedeploymentofamilitarybasebyacountrywhichdidnotbelongtotheorganisationinanyof theCSTOmemberstateswouldrequireapproval fromtheothermemberstates14.ThishasinfactenabledRussiatovetosuchprojects.

IncountrieswhereRussianinfluenceisthestrongest(KyrgyzstanandTajik-istan),supportofferedtoalocalpolitician,whetherofficiallyornot,mayfacili-tateelectoralsuccessorstrengthenthatpolitician’sposition.ThisinstrumentwasemployedinthecaseoftheteamwhotookpowerinKyrgyzstanasaconse-quenceofthecoupinApril2010(Moscowwasthefirsttorecognisethede factonewgovernment;instatementsfromMoscow,theheadoftheinterimgovern-ment,RozaOtunbayeva,hadbeenreferredtoastheprimeministerfromthe

12 TashkentevenconsidersthepossibleconstructionoftheRogunpowerplantasacasus belli.13 Formoreonthistopic,seethesectiondevotedtoRussian-Tajikrelations.14 ThepresentCSTOmemberstatesareRussia,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,Armenia

andBelarus.

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verybeginning,etc.)andPresidentAlmazbekAtambayev(whowasreceivedbyRussian leadersduringhiselectoralcampaign,whenhedidnot formallyholdanypositioninthestateadministration).

ThepresenceofmillionsofCentralAsianexpatriateworkersinRussiaoffersMoscowaverystrongpoliticalinstrument15.FacilitationsavailabletotheminfactmeansupportfortheregimesinCentralAsia.Toagreatextent,immigrantstoRussialifttheburdenoffthelocallabourmarkets.Thelikelihoodofsocialtension,whichisathreattoeachgovernment,isthusreduced.Furthermore,expatriateworkerssendremittancestotheirfamilies,thussupportingthelo-calbudgetsinvariousforms(inthecaseofTajikistan,thetotalvalueofbanktransfersalone,withouttakingintoaccountcashbroughtbackbyindividualpersons,equalsnearlyhalfthecountry’sGDP16).TheRussian-Tajikagreementstruckinautumn2012,whichprovidesforfacilitationstoTajikimmigrants,canbeseeninthiscontextasasignofsupportforPresidentEmomaliRahmon,whowasrunningforanotherterminofficeon6November2013.Inturn,theannouncements thatstrictermigration lawswillbeadopted,and theosten-tatiousdeportationsof illegal immigrants fromRussia, representsa formofthreateningpressureonindividualgovernments.Forexample,Moscowusedthistoolinautumn2011,whenagroupofhundredsofTajiksweredeported,amovewhich forced Dushanbe to revise the verdict concerning two pilotsfromaRussiancompanywhohadbeensentencedto imprisonment. (Ontheotherhand,however,Dushanbechoseatthesametimenottosignanagree-mentconcerningaRussianmilitarybase,whichMoscowhadbeeninsistingon;thisagreementwassignedonlyayearlater,followingtheaforementionedriotsinBadakhshan).

On 18April 2013, PresidentVladimir Putin announced that citizens of CISmember states entering the Russian Federation would be required to holdapassportstartingfrom1January2015(sofar,peopletravellingbetweenRussia

15 TheprecisenumberofimmigrantsfromCentralAsiaisnotknown.Theestimatescover-ingallexpatriateworkers(alsofromothercountries, includingUkraine)rangebetween5and15million.AccordingtodatafromtheFederalMigrationService,asoftheendof2012(generatedon thebasisof the so-calledmigrationcards foreignersare required tocom-pleteuponentrytoRussia),around2.3millioncitizensofUzbekistan,around1.1millioncitizensofTajikistan,around550,000citizensofKazakhstan,around540,000citizensofKyrgyzstanandaround26,000citizensofTurkmenistanwerestaying inRussia. Itmustbeassumedthat thegreatmajorityof themareexpatriateworkers.Алексей Бессуднов, ‘Сколько гастарбайтеров в России?’,Slon,27December2012,http://slon.ru/russia/skolko_gastarbayterov_v_rossii-870263.xhtml

16 FormoreinformationseethesectiondevotedtoRussian-Tajikrelations.

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andCentralAsia –with the exception of Turkmenistan – haveneeded onlytheirdomesticidentificationdocuments–identitycards).Whenthesechangesareadopted,theprivilegeofenteringRussiawithoutapassportwillremainwithcitizensofthecountrieswhichbelongtotheCustomsUnion:KazakhstanandBelarus17.ThisdecisionisintendedatencouragingothercountriestojointheCustomsUnion.

the most spectacular instrument is the russian military presence intheformofmilitarybasesinKyrgyzstan(Kantairbase)andTajikistan(the201stgroundtroopbase,thelargestoutsideRussia),whereatotalofaround8500–9000Russiansoldiersserve.Inadditiontothebases,RussiahasseveralothermilitaryfacilitiesinKyrgyzstan,TajikistanandKazakhstan(theKantairbaseispartoftheCSTORapidReactionForce,butitisintegratedwiththeRussiandefencesystem)18.Thesearetheonlyforeignmilitaryfacilitiesintheregion,except for those linked toNATO’s operation inAfghanistan: theUSTransitCentreatManasairportnearBishkekinKyrgyzstan,theGermantransitairbaseinUzbekistan’sTermez,andthesmallFrenchbaseattheairportinDu-shanbe,Tajikistan19.

Theeconomic instruments includetheassetsRussiaownsinthecountriesofthisregion20,andalsoitsdominantpositioninthetransitofCentralAsianoil andgas to global (especiallyWestern)markets. For example, despite thelaunchofthepipelinesrunningtoChina,75%oftheoilexportedfromKazakh-stan(thecountrywiththelargestoildepositsintheregion)istransportedviaRussianterritory.WhenthecapacityoftheTengiz–Novorossiyskoilpipelineisincreased,thissharewillgrowevenmore.

17 AgataWierzbowska-Miazga, ‘Kreml zwiększykontrolęnadmigracją.’Tydzień na Wschodzie,OSW,24April2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2013-04-24/kreml-zwiekszy-kontrole-nad-migracja

18 The Russianmilitary presence in the regionwill be discussed in detail in the sectionsdevotedtoRussia’srelationswithKyrgyzstan,TajikistanandKazakhstan.

19 Józef Lang,MarekMatusiak, Krzysztof Strachota, ‘A new chapter in relations betweenNATO&theUSAandCentralAsia’,EastWeek,OSW,21March2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-03-21/a-new-chapter-relations-between-nato-usa-and-cen-tral-asia

ThebaseinDushanbehavebeenclosedcompletelyin2013.InNovember2012,FrancesignedanagreementwithKazakhstan,grantingittherighttouseShymkentairportinthesouthofthecountryduringthewithdrawalofitsforcesfromAfghanistan.

20 ThesewillbepresentedindetailinthesectionsdevotedtoRussia’sbilateralrelationswiththeCentralAsiancountries.

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CentralAsiancountriesrelyonsuppliesofanumberofRussianproducts,in-cludingpetroleumproducts.ThisprovidesMoscowwithanothereconomicin-strument,thetariffpolicy.Theimpositionofa100%exportdutyon1April2010onsuchproductssoldtoKyrgyzstan(whicharethenre-exported,forinstance,toAfghanistanandTajikistan)adverselyaffectedKyrgyzstan’seconomy.Thisintensifiedpublicdissatisfaction,andasaconsequencecontributedindirectlytotheoverthrowofthethenPresidentKurmanbekBakiyev’sadministration.Inturn,morethanayearbefore,atthetimeofasevereeconomiccrisis,Rus-siaofferedKyrgyzstananon-repayablegrant,aloanatalowinterestrate,andpromised to investUS$1.7billion in theconstructionofahydropowerplant.Inresponsetothis,Bishkek(asMoscowexpected)madeaninitialdecisiontoclosetheUSairbaseinManas(andtheeffectivewithdrawalfromthisdecisionhasledtoaseriouscrisisinKyrgyz-Russianrelations)21.

a cultural affinity resulting from a sense of shared history is one of rus-sia’s most important soft power instruments22.Asaconsequence,theRus-sian state feels like ‘home’ to a significantproportionofCentralAsian resi-dents,whowouldnotdefineitasaforeigncountry.Formanyofthem,includingalmostallthemembersofthelocalrulingelites,Russianisstillnotaforeignlanguage.PeoplewhosepersonalitywasformedintheUSSRstillgovernthecountries in this region; thepresent leadersenteredadulthoodbetween the1950sand1970s,wereeducatedintheRussianlanguage,andarestillboundbyanetworkofvariousconnectionswithRussia (economic,cultural, interper-sonal,etc.),whichaffecttheirsympathiesandpoliticalchoices23.Thissituationwillcontinueforatleastfifteentotwentyyears(thepeoplebornatthetimeofthecollapseoftheUSSRwillbeintheirfortiesandwillstarttakingimportantpositionsinstateadministrationsonlyaroundtheyear2030).

21 These issueswill be discussed in amore detailedway in the section outliningRussian--Kyrgyzrelations.RussiaalsoindirectlycontributedtotheoverthrowofPresidentBakiyevbyresortingtopolitical(ostentatiouslyreceivingrepresentativesofthethenKyrgyzoppo-sitioninMoscow)andsoftpowerinstruments(broadcastingprogrammesdenouncingtheBakiyevclanonRussianTV,whichisverypopularinKyrgyzstan).

22 Thisreferstothe‘culturecode’sharedbyRussiansandmanyresidentsofotherpost-Sovietcountries(especiallytheelderandmiddlegenerations)resultingfromtheirbeingfamiliarwiththesamefilms,booksandsongs.InCentralAsia,thislegacyisdefinitivelyrejectedonlybyMuslimradicals.Forobviousreasons,itsrolewillfallobjectivelyovertime.

23 Theterm‘Russianparties’,whichisdisputableandimprecise, issometimesusedinpubli-cationstorefertotheinformalgroupsofMoscow-orientedpoliticiansoperatinginCentralAsiancountries,whosometimesactasRussianlobbies(analogously,theterms‘Westernpar-ties’and‘Chineseparties’arealsoinuse;butforthetimebeingtheseplayonlyaminorrole).

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Russia’sintangibleassetsareenhancedowingtotheeasyaccessibilityofRus-sian (and local Russian-speaking) media, especially electronic (TV and theInternet). The Russian language predominates in Kazakhstan’s informationspace,whichisstronglyinfluencedbytheRussianmedia.Forexample,Presi-dentNursultanNazarbayevpublisheshisarticlesintheRussiandailyIzvestia.ThesituationinKyrgyzstanissimilar.InTajikistan,anumberofnewspapersarepublishedinRussian,Internetportalsareasarulebi-ortrilingual(Tajik--Russian-English), and theTajik languagepredominatesonTV.TheRussianlanguageoccupieslessspaceinUzbekistanandTurkmenistan,butithasnotbeenoustedcompletely,andstillhasagreatadvantageoverEnglish.Russianis still themostnatural languageusedbyrepresentativesofexpert,artisticorbusinesscirclesfromvariouscountries(intheSouthernCaucasus,EnglishisalreadyaseriousalternativetoRussianamongpeopleintheirthirtiesandyounger).Furthermore,Russianplaysanimportantroleinthecountry’spopculture.

AllthisoffersRussiaagreatadvantageovertheotherplayersactiveinthere-gion:theWest,andespeciallyChina.However,overtime,thisadvantagewillnaturallyweaken,inparticularifMoscowfailstoactivelypromotetheRus-sianlanguageandculture24.FollowingthecollapseoftheUSSR,therangeoftheRussianlanguage’sinfluencehasshrunksignificantly:atfirstintheearly1990sduringthemassmigrationsofethnicRussianstoRussia25,andthenasaconsequenceof itsgraduallybeingsupersededby thenational languagesinoffices,educationfacilities,mediaandculture.Overtwo-thirdsofschoolswith Russian as the language of instructionwere closed in TurkmenistanandTajikistan,andhalfinKazakhstanandUzbekistan,inthe1990salone.In2001,allsuchschoolsweretransformedintobilingualestablishmentsinTurkmenistan26.More andmore representatives of thenewgenerationsofKazakhs, Kyrgyzs, Tajiks and Uzbeks entering adulthood, especially fromtheprovincialareas,eitherdonotspeakRussianatall,orspeakitpoorlyor

24 ThepresentpositionoftheRussianlanguageinCentralAsiaisnotaneffectofMoscow’sac-tivityorefforts.Instead,itispartofthelegacyoflivinginonestate.Russiahasbeenpursu-ingacomprehensivesoftpowerpolicyforjustafewyears.TheRusskiy Mir Foundationwasestablishedon21June2007,andRossotrudnichestvo – theFederalAgencyfortheCommon-wealthofIndependentStates,CompatriotsLivingAbroadandInternationalHumanitarianCo-operation–on6September2008.InCentralAsia,Russkiy Mir holdsvariousseminars,conferencesandexhibitions.

25 According to the 1989 census, around 9.5millionRussians lived inCentralAsia and ac-countedforalmost20%oftheregion’stotalpopulation.Atpresent,nomorethan5.5million(lessthan10%)ofthemhaveremainedthere.

26 AlexeyMalashenko,‘TheFightforInfluence...’,op. cit.,page29.

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understanditatthemost.ThisalsoappliestoexpatriateworkersemployedinRussia27.

MoscowhasnotcapitalisedonthepresenceofthestillsignificantRussianminority in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan28. Thewebsite of theRussianEmbassyinAstanalistsdozensofRussianminorityorganisations,statingtheircontactdata(theseincludealsoculturalcentresforothereth-nicgroupslivinginRussia,e.g.Caucasians)29,andsimilardataconcerningothercountriescanbefoundonthewebsitesofRossotrudnichestvooffices30.However, the large number of organisations does not always mean thattheyareactive.

nevertheless, potential threats are inherent in some of the instruments available to russia. Thepresenceofimmigrants,includingillegals,isonesuch‘double-edgedsword’.OnecouldriskthestatementthatRussiahasbe-comedependentonthecheapworkforcefromthispartoftheformerUSSR– itsabsencewouldcreateadifficult-to-fillgap in theRussian labourmar-ket31.Atthesametime,thepresenceofimmigrantsgeneratesethnictensioninRussiancities,andextremistideas(includingradicalIslam),increasinglypopularamongimmigrants,areasourceofconcern.Nodetaileddataallow-inganassessmentof thescaleof thisphenomenonareavailable.However,thefactthattheproblemisserious(andatleastthatthefearofitissharedbythegovernmentandtheRussianpublicalike)hasbeenprovenbypoliceac-tionstakenfromtimetotimeagainstunofficialmosquesoperatinginplaceswheretheconcentrationofimmigrantsishigh,includingmarketplaces.For

27 AccordingtoestimatesoftheRussianMigrationService,onlyhalfofimmigrantsareabletocompleteasimplequestionnaireinRussianbythemselves,andbetween15%and20%donotknowRussianatall.Thisisduetothefactthatalmost25%oftheCIScitizenswhocrossthe Russian border were born after 1986.Михаил Фалалеев, ‘Гастарбайтеров обяжут говорить по­русски’, Российская Газета, 14May 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2013/05/14/mi-granti-site.html

28 Probablysoasnottoworsenrelationswiththepartnersfromthisregion.ThisissuehasnotbeenraisedatanyCISsummitsoratanyotherforumsoftheCommonwealth,whichprovesthatMoscowhastakenacompletelydifferentapproachtothisproblemthanithasinrela-tionswiththeBalticstates.ItisworthremindingthatprotectingRussiancitizenswasalsousedasacasus belliintheRussian-GeorgianwarinAugust2008.

29 http://www.rfembassy.kz/tm/russian_mission_in_kazakhstan/organizacii_ros_soot-echestvenn/

30 For example see http://kgz.rs.gov.ru/node/16, http://tjk.rs.gov.ru/node/16, http://uzb.rs.gov.ru/node/16

31 ImmigrantspartlytakejobswhichRussiansviewaslow-prestige(caretaker,garbagecol-lector,constructionworker,etc.).

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example,271peopleweredetainedinSaintPetersburgduringapoliceraidinFebruary201332.

3. relations with individual countries

Byemployingthe instrumentsavailable to it,RussiahasbeenattemptingtoachieveitsgoalsinCentralAsiathrough:

1. bilateralrelationswithCentralAsianstates;

2. rivalryandlimitedco-operationwithexternalplayers:theWest(theUSA,andpartlytheEU)andChina;

3. multilateral diplomacy (integration of the post-Soviet area by buildingasystemofregionalorganisationswhereithasassumedthedominantpo-sition).

Thesevectorsareinter-related;forexample,theissueoftheUSmilitarypres-enceatManasairportnearBishkekinKyrgyzstanhasbeenraisednotonlyinbilateraltalks(bothRussian-KyrgyzandRussian-US)butalsoduringmultilat-eraldiscussions(forexample,attheSCOandCSTOforums).

Moscow is still capable of influencing the current situation in central asian countries, albeit not to the same extent everywhere and not always successfully, as has been shown in the examples referred to previously in this text. what it cannot do is create the situation there. Ithasmain-tainedmostofitsinfluenceinKyrgyzstanandTajikistan(althoughitdoesnothave amonopoly position even there), much less in Kazakhstan (PresidentNazarbayev’sopennesstoco-operationandRussianinitiativeshasbeenwork-ingtoitsbenefit)andalmostnoneinUzbekistan,letaloneTurkmenistan.TheKremlinmaysuccessfullybackacandidateforpresidentofKyrgyzstanorTa-jikistan(althoughitisunabletoimposeitsowncandidateonthesecountries),butitsimpactismuchmorelimitedinthecaseofthesuccessionprocessesinKazakhstanandUzbekistan33.Most likely, thebalanceof forcesamong local

32 WojciechGórecki, ‘RaidonMuslims inSt.Petersburg’,EastWeek,OSW,13February2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-02-13/raid-muslims-st-petersburg

33 Moscowhastakenbehind-the-scenesactionstoreinforcethepositionofpotentialsucces-sorswhomit seesasuseful, and to reduce thechancesof those lessdesirable.Naturallylittleisknownaboutsuchmoves,anditisdifficulttopredicthowsuccessfultheywillbe.

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elites(aswasthecaseinTurkmenistanafterSaparmuratNiyazov’sdeathin2006)willplaythedecisiveroleinchoosingthesuccessorstoNursultanNaz-arbayevandIslamKarimov.Theexternalfactormayplayacertainrole,buttheimpactwillcomefromseveraldirections,andwilldependonthedynamicbalancewithintheChina–Russia–USAtriangleexistingatagiventime.ThefactthatMoscowhasbeenunabletoforceanyoftheCentralAsianstates(andtheCISingeneral) torecogniseAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaas independentstatessincetheRussian-Georgianwarin2008isanotherproofofRussia’slim-itedinfluence.

russia’s advantages include its comprehensive presence in the region, covering the areas of politics, security, economy and soft power, and the great number and diversity of the instruments available to it as a conse-quence of this. it is therefore able, despite limited means, to pursue a rel-atively successful policy towards two or three countries in this region, although not towards central asia as a whole. in this context, Moscow may only attempt to contain the expansion of other powers in this re-gion.TheRussianstanceontheUSmilitarypresenceintheregionfollowingtheattacksof 11September2001 could serveasanexample.Russia initiallybackedthecoalition’sinterventioninAfghanistan,anddidnotopposethees-tablishmentof theUSmilitarybases inKyrgyzstanandUzbekistan34.How-ever, later, fearingUSdominance in the region, it tookanumberof actionswhichwereaimedontheonehandatrestrictingWesternmilitarypresenceintheregion,andontheotheratmakingRussiathesoledecision-makerinthisarea(MoscowwantedWashingtontodiscussthepresenceofUSbaseswithitdirectly,andnotwithBishkekandTashkent).Theseeffortswereunsuccess-fulforseveralyears(Bishkek,byusingtricksofformalitiesandprocedures,continuedrenewingitsconsentforUSforcestousetheManasairbase).How-ever,theKyrgyzgovernmentfinallydecidedthattheUSmilitarypresencein

MostcommentatorsinterpretedthenominationofTimurKulibayev(PresidentNursultanNazarbayev’sson-in-law,whoisbelievedtobehismost likelysuccessor)asamemberofGazprom’sboardofdirectorson30June2011asRussia’s‘investment’inthispromisingpoli-tician.Inturn,PresidentIslamKarimov’sdaughterGulnara(whountilrecentlyhadbeenmentionedasoneofhispossiblesuccessors)hasasarulebeenpresentedunfavourablyintheRussianmedia,whichmaybeanelementofanintentionalcampaignaimedatdiscredit-ingher.Forinstance,itwassuggestedthatKarimovawasinvolvedinthetakeoverofUzbekassetsintheRussiancompanyMTS(seethesectiondevotedtoRussian-Uzbekrelations);thenthemediaspreadtherumourthatherluxuryMoscowapartment,worthUS$10mil-lion,hadbeenseized,whichlaterturnedouttobeuntrue.

34 ThebackgroundforthisdecisionandtheRussianmanoeuvreslinkedtotheUSbasesarediscussedinmoredetailinsubsequentchapters.

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Manaswouldend insummer2014 (if this reallyhappens, theevacuationofISAFforcesfromAfghanistanmaybecomemoredifficult,andlogisticsupportforthoseUSunitsthatremaininAfghanistanaftertheoperationhasbeenfor-mallyclosedwillbecomplicated).Atthesametime,RussiannegotiationswithKyrgyzstanandTajikistanendedwiththeextensionofitstroopdeploymentsinthesecountriesbyovertenyearsorevenafewdecades.

MoscowsupportstheCASA-1000projectwhichenvisagesthedevelopmentofinfrastructuralelectricenergyconnectionsbetweenCentralAsia(TajikistanandKyrgyzstan)andSouthernAsia (AfghanistanandPakistan),although itinitiallyopposedthemoveastheprojectwouldlessentheregion’sdependenceonRussia.However,itappearsthatMoscowprimarilyseestheprojectasanel-ementofcounterbalancetotheUSconceptofa‘BroaderMiddleEast’or‘Broad-erCentralAsia’35.Ithasevenexpresseditsreadinesstoinvestintheproject,onconditionthatRussia’sInterRAOisgrantedtheroleofprojectoperator.

Russia’srelationswithChinahavedevelopedinadifferentwayinthisregion.ThelaunchesoftheoilpipelinerunningfromKazakhstanin2006,andofthegaspipelinefromTurkmenistanin2009,markedtheendofRussia’smonopolyonhydrocarbons’transitfromthisregion(ashortgaspipelinerunningfromTurkmenistantoIranhadbeenbuiltbefore;butRussiahasmaintaineditsmo-nopolyontransitintheWesterndirection).In2010,thevalueofCentralAsia’stradewithChinaexceededthevalueofitstradewithRussia.TheChineseex-pansionhasbeenraisingseriousconcerninMoscow,albeitalleviatedbythefact thatBeijinghasbeen tryingnot to ‘hurt Russia’s imperial feelings’, andhasnotarticulatedthisasexpresslyasitsreservationsaboutWesternactiv-ity.ManyRussianexpertsclaimthattherecanbenorivalrybetweenMoscowandBeijinginthisregion36.BothcountriesaremembersoftheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisation(SCO)37;thisstructure,activeintheareasofsecurityandeconomicco-operation,servesasaninformalplatformfordialogue,andisusedtoconsultthestancestakenbyRussiaandChina,aswellastoneutraliseanytensionemergingbetweenthem.ItisalsointendedtocounterbalancetheUSmilitarypresenceinCentralAsia.

35 MalikMuhammadAshraf,‘TAPIandCASA-1000’,The Nation,23March2013,http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/columns/23-Mar-2013/tapi-and-casa-1000

36 MarcinKaczmarski, ‘Thebearwatches thedragon.TheRussiandebateonChina’,Policy Briefs, OSW,no.31,February2013,page20.

37 TheotherSCOmembersareKazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,TajikistanandUzbekistan.

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the Kremlin has been pinning great hopes for strengthening its posi-tion in central asia on multilateral diplomacy. the eurasian economic union/the eurasian union (the eeu/eau), which like the sco will com-bine the economic and military components, is expected to be the crown-ing achievement of the post-soviet area integration project promoted by vladimir putin, and the participation of central asian countries is a vi-tal element of this project. ItisplannedthattheUnionwillbegintooperateinallmaterial aspects in2015–2016; its fundamental assumption isnotonlyacounterpoisetotheactivityoftheWest,butalso,asitseems,thatoftheSCO,whichisfallingmoreandmoreunderChineseinfluence38.

In itsbilateral relationswithCentralAsiancountries,Moscow isasa ruleclearlyorientedtowardstheregimesoperatingthere,anddoesnotkeepanyofficialcontactswiththeopposition,oranyotheralternativeelitessuchassocialmovementsornon-governmentalorganisations39.ItappearsthatRus-siaissatisfiedwiththeauthoritariangovernmentmodelthatpredominatesthere,sinceitviewsthisasmorestablethanthedemocraticmodel.Asseenfrom thisperspective, its support for local leaders (Moscowdoesnot raisehuman rights issues, does not criticise violations of international conven-tions, recognises the results of rigged elections, etc.40)may beunderstoodasinvestmentsthatareexpectedtoyieldprofitsintheformofvariouscon-cessionsandcompromises.FollowingtheviolentsuppressionoftheAndijanriots inMay 2005,when Tashkent’s relationswith theWestwerede facto frozen,Moscowacted asUzbekistan’s advocate at the international arena.The effects of this rapprochement included signing a treaty of alliance on14November2005,whichallowedRussiatoestablishitsmilitarybaseinUz-bekistan(althoughithasnotsucceededindoingso,sincetherapprochementturnedouttobetemporary).

38 TherecentlyestablishedregionaleconomicstructureswhereMoscowisthedominantac-toraretheEurasianEconomicCommunity,theCustomsUnionofBelarus,KazakhstanandRussia,andtheCommonEconomicSpace.TheCSTOisinchargeofthemilitarycomponent.The ideological foundationof thesestructures is ‘Neo-Eurasianism’,whichdrawson theEurasianismconceptsborninthe1920s,accordingtowhichRussiaisnotpartoftheWest,but forms a separate civilisation. Supporters of Neo-Eurasianism (including AleksandrDugin)appealforintegrationwithCentralAsiancountries,claimingthatRussianeedstomaintainprimacyinEurasiaforcivilisationalandculturalreasons.Formoreontheinter-nationalandmultilateralaspectsofRussianpolicyinCentralAsia,seeChapterIII.

39 Unofficialcontactsarekept,andsomepoliticalemigrantsfromthisregionliveinRussia.40 Beijingunderstandstheprincipleofnon-interferenceinthedomesticaffairsofothercoun-

triesinasimilarway.

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Inthiscontext,Russia’srelationswithKyrgyzstan,wherethegovernmenthasbeenoverthrowntwicesince2005,areanexception.Intheperiodwhichpre-cededthecoupof2010,theKyrgyzoppositionactivistswhowouldlatertakepower visitedMoscow on a regular basis. Moscow also maintained officialcontactswithallthemajorpoliticalforcesinKyrgyzstanafterthecoup.ThisseemstoprovethethesisthatRussiadoesnotruleoutthepossibilityoffurthergovernmentchangesthere.

WhendrawingthemapofRussianinfluenceinCentralAsia,oneshouldstartpreciselywith Kyrgyzstan,where this influence is beyond doubt strongest.RussiaalsohasastronginfluenceinTajikistan,whileitsimpactonUzbekistanand Turkmenistan is clearlyweaker. Kazakhstan,whose co-operationwithRussiaisbasedoncompletelydifferentprinciplesthantherestoftheregion,isincomparabletotheotherCentralAsiancountriesinthiscontext,andshouldbediscussedseparately.

3.1. Kyrgyzstan

3.1.1. russia’s assets

The military presence

RussiahasfourmilitaryfacilitiesinKyrgyzstan,themostimportantofwhichistheKantairbase(located20kmeastofBishkek)41,whichitleasesalongwiththeadjacentrailwaysiding.Theother facilitiesareanavalcommunicationscentreinChaldovar(nexttoSpartakvillageclosetothecityofKara-Balta)42,anaval testing siteonLake Issyk-Kul,where torpedoesare tested (thehead

41 Formally,KantAirBaseno.999oftheRussianAirForce’s5thAirArmy.Thebasewasopenedon22September2003,butthefirstsoldiershadalreadybeendeployedtherein2002.ThiswasthefirstmilitarybaseRussiaopenedoutsideitsterritoryfollowingthecollapseoftheUSSR,andwasMoscow’sresponsetotheUSopeningtheManasAirBase(see3.1.2.Anout-lineofRussian-Kyrgyzrelations).Thebaseleaseagreementwasenteredfora15-yearterm(andmaybeautomaticallyextendedforfivemoreyears).However,anewagreementwassignedon29May2009,settinga49-yearleaseterm(withanoptiontobeextendedby25years).Itisestimatedthataround1500soldiersareinserviceatKantAirBase,whichfor-mallyisapartoftheCSTORapidReactionForce.

42 The338thcommunicationcentreoftheRussianNavy.

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officeislocatedinKoysary,nearthecityofKarakol)43andaradioseismiclabo-ratoryinMailuu-Sai(withabranchinIchke-Suu)44.

RussiaandKyrgyzstansignedanagreementduringPresidentVladimirPutin’svisittoBishkekon20September2012.Pursuanttothisagreement,allfourofthesefacilitieswillbecombinedintoonebasein2017.Theagreedtermfortheoperationofthisunitedbaseis15years(i.e.until2032),andcanbeextendedforsubsequentfive-yearperiods. Inearly2013, therewasspeculation in theRus-sianpressthatoncethisdocumentwasratifiedbythetwoparties45,RussiacouldagainproposetheopeningofanotherbaseinKyrgyzstan,mostlikelyinthecityofOshinthesouthofthecountry46,butnosuchproposalhasyetbeenmade.

Furthermore,tensofofficersfromRussianbordertroopsareactingasadvis-ersinKyrgyzstan(theyareprobablystayinginOsh).Theirstatusisunclear47.RepresentativesoftheRussianFederalDrugControlService(FSKN)arealsostationedinOsh.

The economic presence

Russianeconomicassetswereuntilrecentlymuchmoremodestthanitsmili-tary ones, although Kyrgyzstan had received a great deal of interest fromleadingRussiancompaniesoperatinginthehydroenergy,gas&oil,mining,primary and arms sectors (such as RAOUES, RusGidro, AtomredmetzolotoandGazprom;thelatterwasengagedininitialexplorationoftheKugartand

43 The954thanti-submarineweapon testingbase.Ozero,aRussian-Kyrgyz jointventure inchargeoftorpedotesting,ispartofthisbase(whichreportstotheRussianNavy).

44 The1stautomatedseismicstationandthe17thradio-seismiclaboratoryoftheSeismicSer-viceoftheRussianMinistryofDefence.

45 Kyrgyzstanratifiedthisagreementon19December2012,andRussiaon27April2013.46 Айданбек Акмат уулу, ‘Российская военная база в Оше?’,Азаттык,1March2013(http://

rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_russia_military_base/24916457.html). No additionalbasewasmentioned in thedocumentof20September2012,but this topichadbeendis-cussedatleastsince2009–thethenpresidents,DmitriMedvedevandKurmanbekBakiyev,evensignedapreliminaryagreementtothiseffecton1August2009,whichwasopposedbyUzbekistan(http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=3190).

47 Кубанычбек Жолдошев, ‘Какой статус у пограничников РФ в Кыргызстане?’,Азаттык,17April 2012 (http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_russia/24550893.html).Around5000RussianborderguardswerestationedinKyrgyzstanuntil1999(underanagreementsignedin1992),keepinganeyeontheborderwithChina,Bishkekairportandperiodicallyalso theKyrgyz-Tajikborder (during thecivilwar inTajikistan). It is aproven fact thatagroupof40Russianborderguards/advisersbasedinKyrgyzstanweresentfromthenorthtothesouthofthecountryinspring2010.

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VostochnyMailuu-SuuIVsites).26May2013markedabreakthrough:theKyr-gyzgovernmentdecidedtosellGazpromallitsassetsinthenationalgascom-pany,Kyrgyzgaz(forasymbolicpriceofonedollarinexchangeforwritingoffthe company’sdebts and investments, aroundUS$650millionwithinafive-yeartimeframe),whichneedstobeseenasaRussiansuccessandareinforce-mentofRussia’spositioninbothKyrgyzstanandtheentireregion48.Otherin-vestmentsplannedbyRussiahavenotyetbeenlaunchedforpoliticalreasons(see3.1.2.AnoutlineofRussian-Kyrgyzrelations).

In2005,MTScompanyspentUS$150milliontobuya51%stakeinTarinoLtd.,theowneroftheKyrgyzmobilecommunicationnetwork,Bitel.However,theseassetswerethentakenoverbyKyrgyzentities49.

In2006,GazpromneftboughtafillingstationchaininBishkek50.Gazpromneft-Aero Kyrgyzstan, a Russian-Kyrgyz joint venture, which took over air fuelsuppliesfromtheUS-leasedManasTransitCentre,waslaunchedinSeptem-ber2011.Thecompanysupplied147,000tonnesoffuelworthUS$169millioninthefirstyearofitsoperation51.

In2009,TremadonVenturesLtd.,aRussianfirmregisteredintheVirginIs-lands, paid US$16.5million for a 9.99% share in Highland Gold, a companywhichownsgoldminesinRussiaandKyrgyzstan.HighlandGoldwasgrantedthegoldmininglicencesfortheUnkurtashandKaratubeprojectsin201252.

48 ‘KyrgyzGvt. ApprovesAgreement onKyrgyzgas Sale toGazprom’, RIANovosti, 26May2013,http://en.ria.ru/world/20130526/181357205.html

TheRussian-Kyrgyzinter-governmentalagreementtothiseffectwassignedon26July2013inMoscow(‘«Кыргызгаз» продан «Газпрому» за один доллар’,Fergananews.com,29July2013,http://www.fergananews.com/news/21020).

49 Unless otherwise indicated, the information on Russian investments in Kyrgyzstanand other Central Asian countries originates inMarekMenkiszak, Ewa Paszyc, IwonaWiśniewska,‘AktywnośćgospodarczaRosjizagranicąwlatach2004–2010’(OSW Report).All parts of the report are available in Polish at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/raport-osw/2011-08-17/aktywnosc-gospodarcza-rosji-za-granica-w-latach-2004-2010

ForinformationonthefurtherdevelopmentoftheMTStransactionsee Игорь Цуканов, ‘МТС ищет киргизские активы на Сейшелах’, Ведомости,14March2013.

50 Thechainconsistsof116stations(http://www.gpnbonus.ru/our_azs/).51 ‘“Газпромнефть Аэро Кыргызстан” поставила топлива на ЦТП “Манас” за год на $169

миллионов’,Aviation Explorer,2October2012,http://www.aex.ru/news/2012/10/2/98754/ TheestablishmentofthiscompanycanbeinterpretedasmeetingMoscow’sexpectations

halfway,sinceithadwantedtoinfluencetheoperationofManas(seeMarekMenkiszak,‘Russia’sAfghanProblem.TheRussianFederationandtheAfghanistanproblemsince2001’,OSW Studiesno.38,September2011,page104).

52 http://www.highlandgold.com/investor/releases/2012-07-24.aspx

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Soft power

Theconstitution(Article10(2))guaranteesRussian“officiallanguage”statusinKyrgyzstan.However,pursuanttotheamendmentstotheNationalLanguageActof13March2013,allofficialdocumentsmustbeissuedintheKyrgyzlan-guageonly(althoughtheconstitutionalprovisionisstillinforce)53.Accordingtoestimatesmadeinearly2013,52.5%residentsofKyrgyzstanspeakRussian(76.4%speakKyrgyzand1.2%speakEnglish)54.Kyrgyzisthelanguageofin-structionin64.2%schoolsinKyrgyzstan,Russianin9.14%schools,andUzbekin5.5%,while21%oftheschoolsusemixedlanguagesofinstruction.Moststu-dentsathighereducationfacilitiesarestilltaughtinRussian55.

AnagencyofRossotrudnichestvo56 actively operates inKyrgyzstan, supportingRussian nationalminority organisations57 and co-operatingwith educational(includingtheKyrgyz-RussianSlavicUniversity58)andculturalinstitutions(theChinghizAitmatovStateNationalRussianDramaTheatre)andthemedia: lo-calRussian-language(theVecherniy Bishkek newspaper,andtheNews-AsiaIn-ternetportal)aswellasRussianmedia,whichhavetheirofficesinKyrgyzstan

53 ‘Киргизия запретила русский язык в делопроизводстве’,Mail.ru,13March2012,http://news.mail.ru/politics/12319087/

‘В Киргизии государственные документы теперь будут только на киргизском языке’,Mail.ru,14March2013,http://news.mail.ru/politics/12343155/

54 KaliyaDuishebayeva,‘About52.6percentofKyrgyzstan’spopulationspeaksRussian’,24.kg,6March2013,http://eng.24.kg/community/2013/03/06/26221.html

Accordingtoestimatesmadein2004,30%ofresidentsofKyrgyzstanspokeRussianineve-rydaylife,whilelessthan8%ofthemwereethnicRussians;Александр Арефьев, ‘Сколько людей говорят и будут говорить по­русски?’,Демоскоп Weekly,251/252(http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0251/s_map.php#1).

55 KaliyaDuishebayeva, ‘About52.6percent…’,op. cit.Apartfromlocalhighereducationfa-cilities,sixbranchesofRussianuniversitiesandtwoKyrgyz-Russianuniversitiesoperatethere(http://www.russia.edu.ru/obruch/sng/1115/).

56 http://kgz.rs.gov.ru/ Thiswebsiteisfrequentlyupdated,andcontainsalotofpracticalinformation.Asinother

countries,theRussianScienceandCultureCentreoperatesinKyrgyzstanundertheae-gisofRossotrudnichestvo,whichhostsvariousculturalandsocialevents,andhasalibraryofitsown.

57 More than 40 such organisations are registered in Kyrgyzstan. 32 of them are mem-bers of the Russian Coordination Council in Kyrgyzstan (Координационный совет российских соотечественников в Кыргызстане,http://korsovet.kg/,situationasof1June2012).Inturn,themembersoftheAssociationofCompatriots’Guilds(Ассоциация Гильдий Соотечественников,http://www.ags.kg/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1) in-cludearound150firms,whoseownersorinvestorsareRussians.Thesefirmsaredividedinto‘guilds’,dependingonthesectortheyoperatein.

58 http://krsu.edu.kg/index.php?lang=enThenumberofstudentsisapproximately11,000.

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(Rossiyskaya Gazeta).Noinformationonthenatureofthisco-operationisavail-able.However, itcanbeassumedthat inaddition topropagating theagency’sactivity,grantsandstudyvisitsforjournalists,itmayalsocoverthepublicationofarticlesthatcontributetobuildingapositiveimageofRussia59.

Three so-called ‘Russian centres’ operate in Kyrgyzstan under the ae-gisof theRusskiy Mir Foundation60: inBishkek (at theBishkekUniversityofHumanities)61,Kant(attheoblastlibrary)62andOsh(attheOshbranchoftheRussianStateSocialUniversity)63,and inadditionto these: the trainingandconsultationcentreatKyzyl-Kiya64,thecentreofSlavonicstudiesattheKyr-gyz-RussianSlavicUniversity65,theSlavonicCultureCentreinBishkek66,andtheAssociationofRussianLanguageandLiteratureTeachersinKyrgyzstan67.Thefoundationalsodeclaresonitswebsitesthatitco-operateswithanumberofKyrgyzmedia68.AswithRossotrudnichestvo,itisdifficulttogiveanydetailsofthisco-operation.

RussianisthepredominantlanguageinKyrgyzstan’sinformationspace.Itisusedbythefollowingmedia:

59 ThenewspapersVecherniy BishkekandDla Vas,theInternetportalNews-AsiaandthelocalofficeoftheRossiyskaya Gazetadailynewspaperarespecifiedontheagency’swebsitesinthe‘Partners’section(inadditiontoeducationalandculturalinstitutionsandofficialRussianagencies(theembassy,theagencyoftheFederalMigrationService,andtheRussiantraderepresentativeoffice):http://kgz.rs.gov.ru/node/14

60 TheRusskiy Mir FoundationrunsRussiancentresinvariouscountriesacrosstheglobeinco-operationwithlocaleducationinstitutions(mostoftenuniversities).Theirform(equip-ment,activitydirections)isthesameeverywhere,butthespecificprogrammesandpro-jectstheyimplement,includingthevariouskindsofRussiancourses,areadjustedtolocalconditions.

61 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=286162 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=286263 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=286364 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=5122&catalo

g=&country=83&region=&city=65 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=14828&catal

og=&country=83&region=&city=66 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=14047&catal

og=&country=83&region=&city=67 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=13765&catal

og=&country=83&region=&city=68 Thesearetheradiostations:Almaz,Avto-RadioandMaks,theInternetportals:Karablar.org,

StanRadar.comandForum.kg,andtheStateTelevisionandRadioCompanyofKyrgyzstan:http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?country=83&pager.offset=0&pageIndex=1&pageSize=10

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1. RussiansfromRussia,

2. localRussians(localeditionsofthepressissuedinRussia)and

3. KyrgyzusingtheRussianlanguage.

ThefirstgroupprincipallyincludesRussianTV,whichisaccessibleacrossthecountry(broadcastbothviaterrestrialtransmittersandincablenetworks)69,aswellasRussiannewsInternetportals.

ThesecondgroupincludeslocalbranchesoftheRussianpress.Theseare:Kom­somolskaya Pravda Kyrgyzstan (withacirculationof 15,000copies),Moskovsky Komsomolets Aziya (7000),Argumenty i Fakty v Kyrgyzstane (5000)andRossiy­skaya Gazeta v Kyrgyzstane(3500)70.AsignificantsectionoftheKyrgyzmediaalsousetheRussianlanguage.TheshareofprogrammeswhichlocalTVandradiostationscanbroadcastinRussianisrestrictedbylaw(overfiftypercentmustbebroadcast in theKyrgyz language71).Newspaperspublished inRus-sian andKyrgyzhave similar shares in thepressmarket, although the for-mer have clearly higher circulation levels. These include:Vecherniy Bishkek,which ispublishedthree timesaweek(daily issueat 14,500copies,andFri-dayissueat40,000copies),Delo N(40,000)andSlovo Kyrgyzstana(14,000withsupplements). The newspapers published in the Kyrgyz language include:Daat (50,000), Kyrgyz Tuusu (20,000), Agym (17,000) and Aaalam (13,000).TheAy­Danek newspaper is published inbothRussian andKyrgyz (20,000).ThekeyKyrgyznewsInternetportals(24kg.org,AKIpress.org,Azattyk.org,Ka­bar.kg,Knews.kg,KyrgyzNews.com,Vesti.kg)arepublishedinRussian,althoughmostofthemalsohaveKyrgyzversions(andsporadicallyalsoEnglish,TurkishorUzbekversions).

3.1.2. an outline of russian-Kyrgyz relations

KyrgyzstanwasoneoftheCentralAsiancountrieswhichbackedthecoalitionoperationinAfghanistanfollowingtheterroristattacksintheUSAon11Sep-tember2001,andtohavemadetheirterritoryavailableforthepurposesofthe

69 Аркадий Дубнов, ‘Как живут русские в Киргизии’,StanRadar.com, 15 June 2013, http://stanradar.com/news/full/3037-kak-zhivut-russkie-v-kirgizii.html

70 ThenewspapercirculationvolumesinKyrgyzstanhereandfurtherinthistexthavebeentakenfromMediaCenter,http://monitoring.kg/?pid=69

71 Аркадий Дубнов, ‘Как живут...’,op. cit.

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operation(althoughBishkekhadattemptedtoconductanindependentpolicyevenbefore,oneproofofwhichis itsaccessiontotheWTOin1998).TheUSairbasestartedoperatingatManasairportinDecember2001.Moscow,whichitselfbackedthecoalition,didnotopposethis.However,atthesametime,itcommencedconsultationsaimedatrestrictingtheWesternmilitarypresenceandestablishingcloserco-operationwithCentralAsiancountriesintheareaofsecurity72.ItseemsthatMoscowwasnotsoconcernedabouttheexistenceofthebase,butratherthefactthatithadhadnoinfluenceontheconditionsofitsstationing,anddidnottakepartinthedecision-makingprocess73.RussiaandChinaensuredthatanappealforsettingtheschedulefortheinternationalforces’withdrawalfromAfghanistanwasincludedinthejointdeclarationattheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisation’ssummitinAstanaon5July200574.

Moscowhopedthat followingthe ‘TulipRevolution’ inKyrgyzstanofMarch2005,theadministrationofthenewpresidentKurmanbekBakiyev,whode-finedRussiaas“Bishkek’sstrategicandmostimportantally,”wouldtakeRus-sianinterestsintoaccountintheirpolicy.BakiyevhintedthathesawnopointinfurtheroperationoftheairbaseinManas,buthetooknoactiontotermi-natethelease75.

On3February2009Bakiyevannouncedthathisgovernmenthaddecidedtoclose thebase (and theparliamentpassed therelevantresolutionon 19Feb-ruary).Beyondanydoubt,thisdecisionhadbeenforcedbyMoscow–itwas

72 MarekMenkiszak, ‘Russia’sAfghanproblem…’,op. cit., page 102.KyrgyzstanandRussiawerealliesundertheCollectiveSecurityTreatysignedon15May1992(theCST;Uzbekistan,whereaUSbasewasalsoestablished,didnotsigntheprotocoltoextendthetermofthedocumentin1999);aforeignmilitarypresencewascontrarytothespiritoftheTashkentTreaty,yetMoscowassumedthat“USbaseswerebetterthanterroristbases.”Nevertheless,itwasdecidedatasessionon14May2002inMoscowthattheCSTbetransformedintoaninternationalorganisation(theCSTO),whichwassupposedtotightenthebondsbetweenRussiaandtheothersignatories,includingCentralAsianstates(atthattimeKazakhstan,KyrgyzstanandTajikistan;Uzbekistanrejoinedtheorganisationin2006-2012).

73 DmitriTreninwrites,“TheRussianleaderswouldmostlikelyagreetoextendingthelease[oftheManasbase],howeverprovidedthatMoscowsignedanagreementwithWashingtontothiseffect,whereBishkekwouldonlyactasasubcontractor.”(Дмитрий Тренин,‘Post-Imperium...’,op. cit.,page178).

74 Formoreinformationonthisdeclaration,seechapterIII.75 Mostlikely,Bishkekdidnotwanttolosetheleaserent(overUS$17millionannually)aswell

asthelucrativesupplycontracts,worthmanytimesmore,especiallythoseconcerningfuelsupplies(thesewereimplementedbyfirmslinkedtotheBakiyevclan).WojciechGórecki,‘Russia’spositionontheeventsinKyrgyzstan(April–June2010),OSW Commentary,no.38,27July,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2010-07-27/russias-posi-tion-events-kyrgyzstan-april-june-2010

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announcedalmostsimultaneouslythatRussiawouldofferassistancetoKyr-gyzstanworthUS$2.15billion, includingUS$150millionasanon-refundablegrant,andUS$300millionasaloanonpreferentialconditions(bothofthesesums,atotalofUS$450million,havebeenmadeavailabletoKyrgyzstan).TheremainingUS$1.7billionwas tobegrantedasa loan for theconstructionoftheKambar-Ata1hydropowerplant76.ThisassistancewascommonlyseenasBishkek’s‘charge’forclosingtheManasairbase.

Contrarytohispromises,however,on7July2009BakiyevsignedanagreementwhichallowedtheUSAtocontinueusingtheManassite.Thefollowingtrickwasused:thebasewasrenamedasa‘TransitCentre.’Theleaserentwasalsoraised,uptooverUS$60millionannually77.Moscowexpressedits“disappoint-ment”inconnectionwiththerenewaloftheleaseofManas,whichshouldbeunderstoodasstrongdissatisfaction.Inresponse, ittookactiontodeployitssecondmilitarybase inKyrgyzstan.AtfirstBishkekplayed for timeduringthetalks,suggestingthatthebasecouldbelocatedinBatkendistrict(south-westernKyrgyzstan,closetotheborderwithTajikistan)78,toannouncelaterthataKyrgyzmilitarytrainingcentrewouldbelocatedinthesamedistrict(inco-operationwiththeUSA,whichdeclareditwouldallocateUS$5.5millionforthisproject)79.

76 Ibid.Adeal settingup theRussian-Kyrgyz company, InterRAO/ElectricPowerPlants ofKyrgyzstan(eachpartyholdinga50%stake),wasstruckinApril2009.Thecompanywasputinchargeofbuildingpowerplants.RAOUESofRussiahadalreadysignedamemoran-dumenvisagingtheconstructionoftwohydropowerplantsontheNarynriver:Kambar--Ata1andKambar-Ata2withthegovernmentinBishkekinAugust2004(itwasassumedthatthepowerplantscouldsupplyelectricitytoKazakhstan,RussiaandChina).Itisun-clearwhetherMoscowreallywantedtobecomeengagedintheseprojects,orwhetheritwasanattempttoputpressureonUzbekistan(whichfearsthattheimplementationofthehydroenergyprojectsinKyrgyzstanandTajikistancouldrestrictitsaccesstowater).

77 SeeKonradZasztowt, ‘RywalizacjaRosji iNATOwAzjiŚrodkowej’,Bezpieczeństwo Naro­dowe, volume 11/2009,pages. 132–134.Washingtonalsoundertook toofferUS$117millionasnon-returnableassistancetotheKyrgyzgovernment,partofwhichwouldbespentondevelopingtheairport’sinfrastructureandsupportinganti-drugpoliceunits(theUSAal-locateda totalofUS$33millionbetween theearly 1990sand2009onequippingmilitaryfacilitiesinKyrgyzstan.SeeKABARPressAgency,23October2009).

78 ‘Kyrgyzstan:AHollowRegimeCollapses.InternationalCrisisGroup’,Asia Briefing,no.102,Bishkek-Brussels,27April2010.

79 KABARPressAgency,23October2009.BishkekwasdeludingMoscowinasimilarwayintheareaofeconomy. InFebruary2009,PresidentBakiyevundertooknegotiationstoen-surethattheKyrgyzdebtofUS$180millionwouldbecancelledinexchangeforhandingovera48%stakeintheweaponmanufacturer,Dastan,toRussia.However,itlaterturnedoutthattheKyrgyzgovernmentheldonlya37.665%stake,andtherestoftheshareswereownedbyprivateshareholders.WhenthedealwithMoscowwasstruck, thepresident’sson,MaksimBakiyev,startedbuyinguptheseshares,asaconsequenceofwhichtheirpric-

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MoscowhasmanifesteditsdissatisfactionwithBakiyev’spolicyinthreeways:by increasing itseconomicpressureonKyrgyzstan,byorchestratinganan-ti-Bakiyevcampaign in theRussianmedia, andbyenhancingcontactswiththeKyrgyzopposition.TheRussian-Kyrgyzthree-yeareconomicco-operationplan,signedon27February2010,didnottaketheloanontheconstructionoftheKambar-Ata1hydropowerplantintoaccount80.Furthermore,on1April,Russiaimposedtheaforementioned100%exportdutyonpetroleumproducts.Atthesametime,theRussianmediastartedpublishingmaterialsaimedatdis-creditingBakiyev’sregime(whereaccusationsoflarge-scalecorruptionwereespeciallyfrequent)anddenouncingthenetworkofhisclanandbusinesscon-nections.

Bakiyevlostpoweron7April2010asaconsequenceofanotherrevolutioninKyrgyzstan.There isnoproof that theRussiangovernmentwasdirectly in-volvedinthecoup.However,onecouldriskthestatementthatitwasasourceof inspiration (the accusations brought against the Bakiyev administrationonRussianTV,whichispopularinKyrgyzstan,werecertainlyafactorwhichfuelled the protests), andwas even ‘lobbying’ for the president’s overthrowamongtheoppositionelites.Russiawasthefirstcountryintheworldtorecog-nisethede factonewgovernment,butitssupportforRozaOtunbayeva’steamwasnotunconditional.TheManasissuebecamethelitmustest.Meanwhile,OtunbayevaannouncedthatBishkekwouldrespectitspreviousarrangementswiththeUSA.ThentheKyrgyzsidestartedplayingfortime,usingthepoliticaltransformationofthecountryasanexcuseandthusdemonstratingitsinde-pendence(whentheleasetermexpiredinJuly2010,itwasautomaticallyex-tendedforoneyear,sincetheparliamentwhichcouldhaveterminateditwastobeelectedonlyinOctober,andthetermoftheparliamentinsessionatthattimewasabouttoend).

Thenewpresident,AlmazbekAtambayev,whotookhisofficeon1December2011,returnedtotheManasissue.DuringtalkswithadelegationfromtheUSDepartmentofStatevisitingKyrgyzstaninFebruary2012,heannouncedthat“noforeignmilitarycontingentshouldbepresentatManascivilianairportby

esrose.ThenBishkekdeclaredthatitcouldhandoveritssharesandsuggestedthatMoscowcouldbuytheremainingsharesatmarketprice.(WojciechGórecki,‘Russia’spositionontheevents…’,op. cit.).

80 ‘Kirgistan bez rosyjskich pieniędzy na hydroenergetykę’, Tydzień na Wschodzie, OSW,3March2010.Sinceearly2010,Bakiyev’steamhadbeenmakingeffortstoensurethattheinvestmentwouldbefinancedbyChina.

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summer2014.”81Hehasreiteratedthisdeclarationonseveralmoreoccasions,althoughnobindingdecisionstothiseffecthavebeentaken.

Kyrgyz-Russianrelationsseriouslydeterioratedinthefirsthalfof2012.Rus-sia demanded to be given significant assets in theKyrgyz economy82,wish-ing,asitseems,to‘test’thenewgovernment’sreadinesstoco-operate.Inre-sponse,BishkekpointedtotheRussiandebtlinkedtotheuseoftheKantAirBase (whichMoscow immediately repaid). President Vladimir Putin signedanumberofagreements inBishkekon20September2012, includingtheal-readymentionedagreementontheunitedmilitarybase(whichMoscowde-siredespeciallystrongly).RussiaundertookonceagaintofundandconstructtheKambarAta 1hydropowerplant,aswellas thepowerplant’scascade intheupperreachesoftheNarynriver.ItalsowroteoffpartoftheKyrgyzdebt(US$189millionoutofUS$489million).Theeconomicdealswerequitegeneralandfailedtoincludeanumberofvitaldetails,whichmaygiverisetoconcernthattheywouldnotbeimplemented,asbefore.

InMay2013,theKyrgyzgovernmentdecidedtoterminatetheUSA’s leaseofManas,andPresidentAtambayevsignedanacttothiseffecton26June83.TheUSmilitarypresenceinManasisexpectedtocometoadefiniteendon11July2014,whichtheRussiansideissatisfiedwith.However,someexpertshavere-centlystartedstatingthatBishkekmaybereadytomakeanothervolte-face,andtheUSforceswillremainatManasaspartofanewformulaafterthisdateaswell84.StatementsfromPresidentAtambayevhimselfseemtoplacethesespeculationsonprettyfirmground85.

81 ‘Кыргызстан: Президент А. Атамбаев и представитель госсекретаря США обсудили судьбу базы «Манас»’,Fergananews.com,20February2012,http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=18194

82 Including a 75% stake in the weaponmanufacturer, Dastan (it was agreed in February2009thatthestakewouldbe48%)anda75%stakeinthecompanyinchargeofbuildingtheKambar-Ata1powerplant(insteadofthe50%stakeasagreedinApril2009).‘Россия не выполняет свои обязательства’,Коммерсанть Власть,16April2012[Aconversationbe-tweenYelenaChernenko&KabayKarabekovandtheprimeministerofKyrgyzstan,Omur-bekBabanov].

83 JózefLang,‘KyrgyzstanhasterminatedtheagreementwiththeUSontheManasairbase’,EastWeek,OSW, 10 July 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-07-10/kyrgyzstan-has-terminated-agreement-us-manas-air-base

84 Ibid.85 ‘Алмазбек Атамбаев: Не все американские войска будут выведены из Кыргызстана’,

Kant.kg,21May2013,http://kant.kg/2013-05-21/almazbek-atambaev-ne-vse-amerikanskie-voyska-budut-vyivedenyi-iz-kyirgyizstana/

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MoscowstillhassignificantinfluenceamongpoliticiansinKyrgyzstan86.An-otherimportantfactoristhegenerallypositiveattitudeofthatcountry’speo-ple towardsRussia,which is aneffectofboth theirpositive sentimentwithregardtotheRussiancultureandlanguage,andoftheRussiangovernment’sconsciouspolicy(thosewishingtobegrantedRussiancitizenshipdonothavetorelinquishcitizenshipofKyrgyzstan,theycantraveltoRussiaandsearchforworkthere,etc.).Thisgenerallypositiveevaluationisstillunaffectedbythefactthatanti-RussiansentimentsarisefromtimetotimeinKyrgyzstan,mostoftenastheconsequenceofracialaggressionaddressedtoKyrgyzlivinginRussia.Itispossiblethatsuchsentimentswillbecomeaggravatedovertime.Moscowmaintainscontactswithallthemajorpoliticalandsocialforcesinthecountry,andthefactthatalongwithitsembassyinBishkekitalsohasacon-sulategeneralinOshishelpfulinthiscontext.

russia – Kyrgyzstan

Russia isKyrgyzstan’smost importantpolitical andeconomicpartner. Itaccounts for 13% of Kyrgyz exports (third after Switzerland, 32.6% andKazakhstan,24.1%)and33.2%of its import(firstbeforeChina,22.5%andKazakhstan, 9.7%,data for 201287).However,Russianpromises to invest,especiallyinhydroenergy,stillremainunfulfilled.NowthatBishkekhasallowedGazpromtotakeoverKyrgyzgaz,theonlyseriouscarditcanplayintalkswithMoscowisthepossiblecontinuationoftheUSmilitarypres-ence(aftertheassumedUSwithdrawal fromManas)andthefact that itstill remains outside the CustomsUnion structures: for example, in ex-changeforjoiningtheCU,KyrgyzstancouldinsistontheconstructionoftheKambar-Ata1hydropowerplant88.IthastobeadmittedthatthedegreeofKyrgyzstan’sdependenceonRussiaishigh.

86 None of themajor political forces inKyrgyzstanmanifests anti-Russian sentiments, andtherearenoseriousanti-Russianpoliticiansinthiscountry.EventheoverthrownPresidentBakiyev,whoseactionscouldbeseenbytheKremlinasunfriendly,cannotbeclassifiedasa‘pro-Western’politician.HewasactuallytryingtomanoeuvrebetweenWashingtonandMoscow,andtocapitaliseontheirconflictinginterests(hismovesweremotivatednotonlybytheinterestsofthestate,butalsobyfinancialbenefitsforhimselfandhisfamily).

87 http://stat.kg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=135&Itemid=12588 RepresentativesofKyrgyzstan’sgovernmenthavedeclaredtheirwilltojointheCustoms

Union on numerous occasions; for example, President Atambayev said in an interviewforITAR-TASSagencyon12April2013thatBishkekhadtakena“firmdecision”regardingthisissue(buthealsoemphasisedthat“thisdoesnotdependonusalone,butalsoontheCUmemberstates–anappropriatedecisionmustbe takenby the threestates”). Its for-malaccessionisexpectedin2014.Михаил Гусман, ‘Киргизия приняла твердое решение

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3.2. tajikistan

3.2.1. russia’s assets

The military presence

Moscowhasits201stgroundtroopbaseinTajikistan(thelargestoneoutsideRussia),whichconsistsofanumberoffacilitiesgroupedinthreegarrisons:Dushanbe, Kulab (Kulob) and Qurghonteppa (Kurgan-Tyube)89. Between6800and7500soldiersservethere.WhenPresidentPutinvisitedDushanbeon5October2012,anagreementextendingthestationingofthebasefor30yearswassigned(until2042;thepreviousdealswouldhaveexpiredin2014).MoscowhasthusguaranteeditselfamilitarypresenceinTajikistanonveryfavourableterms.Thedocument,asreportedbytheRussianside,doesnotprovideforanyleaserent,andpartialimmunitywillbevestedinthesoldiersondutyatthebase(similartothestatuswhichthetechnicalembassystaffhave). InexchangeRussiahasundertakentoparticipateinthemodernisa-tionoftheTajikarmyandtraininglocalofficers90.Theagreementwasrati-fiedbyTajikistanaslateasthebeginningofOctober201391,whichwaslinkedtoDushanbe’sstrategicmanoeuvres(seesection3.2.2.AnoutlineofRussian--Tajikrelations).

вступить в Таможенный союз – президент Атамбаев’, ITAR-TASS,12April2013,http://www.itar-tass.com/c1/704922.html

89 Thisbasewasformallyopenedon17October2004.However,thetroopswhichformithadalreadybeenstationedinTajikistansince1989(theyhadfoundthemselvesthereaspartofthe201stMotorRifleDivisionfollowingtheirwithdrawalfromAfghanistan,wheretheyhadbeenpartoftheSovietcontingent).WhenthecivilwarbrokeoutinTajikistanin1992,theRussiangovernmentdecidedtomakethe201stdivisionpartoftheRussianarmy.Itper-formedthefunctionsofpeacekeeping(undertheaegisoftheCIS)andstabilisation,andinfactbackedthegovernmentside(aforceofaround15,000soldiers).Whenthewarendedin1997,thedivisionremainedinTajikistan.ItwastransformedintothebasefortheGroundTroopsoftheRussianFederationin1999(althoughtheagreementconcerningthishasnotcomeintoforce, forformalreasons).Thedealof2004specifiedtherealestatewhichbe-longedtothebaseandsetthelimitsoftheplotsoflandoccupiedbyit.

90 WojciechGórecki,‘RussiastrongerinTajikistan’,EastWeek,OSW,10October2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-10-10/russia-stronger-tajikistan

91 ‘Таджикистан ратифицировал соглашение о статусе и условиях пребывания россий­ской военной базы Узбекистана’, Fergananews.com, 1 October 2013, http://www.ferga-nanews.com/news.php?id=21271.Russiaratifiedtheagreementon27April2013.PresidentEmomaliiRahmonpromisedduringhismeetingwithVladimirPutinon1August2013thattheTajikparliamentwoulddothesameinautumn2013.

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In2008,RussiaandTajikistansignedanagreementonthejointuseoftheAyniairbasenearDushanbe.However,Tajikistanisthesolepartywhocandecideontheuseofthefacilities.

In2004,Russiagainedsupervisionfor49yearsovertheOknospacesurveil-lancesite92locatednearNurakinsouth-westernTajikistan.Thesiteissituatedat2200mabovesealevel,andautomaticallyregistersanyobjectsemerginginspaceatanaltitudeofupto40,000km.

RussianbordertroopswerestationedinTajikistanin1992–200593.AgroupofuptoonehundredRussianadvisersisstayingtherenow(inDushanbeandontheTajik-Afghanfrontier)94.

The economic presence

Russia’slargestinvestmentinTajikistanistheSangtuda1HydroelectricPowerPlant,whichwasputintooperationinJuly2009ontheVakhshriver.Tocom-pleteitsconstruction,whichhadalreadycommencedinthe1980s95,andtocon-tinueitsoperation,aRussian-TajikjointventurenamedSangtudinskayaGES-1,inwhichtheRussiangovernmentandfirms(principallyRAOUES)acquired75%minusoneshare,andtheTajikistangovernment25%plusoneshare.Thepowerplantaccountsforaround15%oftheelectricenergygeneratedinTajikistan.Asof1June2011,thecompany’sshareholdingstructurewasasfollows:theRussianstate-controllednuclearenergycorporation,Rosatom,held60.13%ofitsshares,InterRAO14.87%,andthegovernmentofTajikistan25%plusoneshare96.

92 The 1109th separate optic-electronic tracking station Nurek is part of the Space DefenceTroopsoftheRussianFederation.Thiscomplexhasbeeninoperationsince2002(thecon-structionwaslaunchedin1979);http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/okno.pdf

93 RussiantroopshavetakenovertheSovietborderinfrastructure.TheprocessofTajikistantakingcontrolofborderprotectioncommencedin1998andcontinueduntil2005(thecriti-calsectionsoftheborderwithAfghanistanwerethelasttobehandedover).ThenumberofRussianborderguardtroopsinTajikistanattimesreachedupto11,500soldiers(localTajiksoldierspredominatedamongtheprivates).

94 Thisgroupinitiallyconsistedofover300advisers; theirnumberhasbeenreducedaftertheywereaccusedofspyingin2011bySheraliMirza,theheadoftheTajikBorderGuardService.Кубанычбек Жолдошев, ‘Какой статус...’,op. cit.

95 Thispowerplantispartoftheso-calledcascade,acomplexofninehydropowerplantsontheVakhshriverdesignedinthe1950s(sixofthemareinoperation,two–includingthelargest,theRogunpowerplant–areunderconstruction,andoneisinthephaseofinitialpreparatorywork).

96 http://www.sangtuda.com/shareholder/

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Gazprom has been interested in Tajikistan for many years. A strategic co-operationdealsignedbyGazpromandthegovernmentinDushanbein2003fora25-yeartermgrantedthecompanyalicenceforgeologicalexplorationoftheSargazonandRenganoil&gasfields, and later for theSarikamyshandWestern Shokhambary sites (the project’s operator isGazprom’s subsidiary,Zarubezhneftegaz).Thelattertwoprojectsturnedouttobethemostpromis-ing,andtrialproductionhasbeenlaunchedthere97.GazpromneftcommenceditsactivityinTajikistanin2007.Atpresent,ithasachainof25fillingstationsinthecountry98.

In2001,MegaFon,aRussianmobiletelephoneoperator,andTajikistan’sstate-ownedTojiktelecomestablishedTTMobilecompany,inwhichtheRussiansideacquireda75%stake,andtheTajiksidea25%stake.Atpresent,thiscompanyisknownasMegaFon-Tajikistan.

Soft power

As inKyrgyzstan, an agencyof theRussianFederalMigrationService op-erates inTajikistan99. Russianhas the status of “language for inter-ethniccommunication”(Article2of theconstitution).However, thenewNationalLanguageActadoptedon7October2009statesthatTajikistheonlylanguageallowed in any official contactswith the state administration100. InMarch2010,theTajikparliamentadoptedanactliftingtheobligationtopublishle-galactsinRussian101.

Russianisthelanguageofinstructionin15outofthe3810generaleducationschools102inTajikistan.Inadditiontothese,thereare95Tajik-Russian,61Tajik--Uzbek-Russian and 3 Tajik-Kyrgyz-Russian schools, as well as a Russian--Uzbek,aRussian-KyrgyzandaRussian-Englishschool.Five(public)Russian

97 http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/deposits/tajikistan/; http://gazprom-international.com/ru/operations/country/tadzhikistan?overlay=true98 See:http://www.gpnbonus.ru/our_azs/99 AspartoftheRussianEmbassyinDushanbe.Russiaalsohasaconsulate-generalinKhujand.100 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/news/common/news4827.html101 http://inlang.linguanet.ru/Cis/CisRussianLanguage/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=2574&PAGEN_1=2102 InTajikistan,asintheotherCIScountries,thegeneraleducation(secondary)schoolisthe

mostimportantlinkoftheeducationsystem,whichprovideseducationatprimary,middleandsecondaryschoollevels.EducationiscompulsoryinTajikistanfortenyears,andfullsecondaryeducation,whichgivestherighttoenterhighereducationschools,isachieveduponthecompletionoftwoadditionalyearsofeducation(grades11and12).

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schoolsoperateindependentlyoftheTajikeducationsystem:fourarelocatedwhereRussianmilitaryunits are stationed, andoneoperates aspart of theRussian-TajikSlavonicUniversity103.Around4500studentsreceiveeducation(in Russian) at this university. Furthermore, a branch of theMoscow StateUniversityhasbeenoperatinginDushanbesince2009.Russianisacompul-sorysubjectatallTajikhighereducationschools(twosemesters,106hoursofclasses)104.

Rossotrudnichestvo issignificantlylessactiveherethaninneighbouringKyr-gyzstan.This institution’swebsite listsonly threeRussianminorityorgani-sations105. Educational institutions predominate among the agency’s partnerorganisations(theRussian-TajikSlavonicUniversity,theStateRussianDramaTheatreofTajikistan,theTajikAssociationforFriendshipandCulturalRela-tionswithForeignCountries,etc.106)–theabsenceofmediafromthisgroupisworthnoting.

The Russkiy Mir Foundation runs four Russian centres in Tajikistan: all ofthemoperateinDushanbeaspartofvarioushighereducationschools107.Thefoundationalsoco-operateswithanumberofTajikculturalandsocialinsti-tutions,Russianminority organisations andRussian-languagemedia (thosewithnationalcoverage,aswellaslocalandspecialistmedia,suchasRussian

103 http://www.rusemb.tj/ru/index/index/pageId/305/,Datafor2010.104 Ibid.105 Understoodinthebroadmeaningofthetermasadiasporaofnationsformingtheindig-

enouspeopleoftheRussianFederation(oneofthemisanorganisationofTajikOssetiansandanotherofTajikTatars).Accordingtothecensusof2000,(ethnic)Russiansaccount-ed for approximately 1.1% of Tajikistan’s population (68,200 http://demoscope.ru/week-ly/2005/0191/analit05.php);inDecember2012,theRussianEmbassyinDushanbeestimatedthattheirnumberwas“over40,000.”(http://www.rusemb.tj/ru/index/index/pageId/276/).TheRussianCoordinationCouncil of Tajikistan (Совет российских соотечественников Таджикистана),whichhasbeenoperating since2004, lists thirteenminorityorganisa-tionsonitswebsites,includingtenfromDushanbe(http://russ.tj/category/obshchestven-nye-organizatsii/gdushanbe).Atleastseveralotherorganisations(especiallythosewhicharenotbasedinDushanbe)aremissingfromthislist.

106 http://tjk.rs.gov.ru/node/14 http://rs.gov.ru/node/1472107 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2859&cata

log=&country=82&region=&city=,http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2160&catalog=&country=82&region=&city=,http://www.russ-kiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=2860&catalog=&country=82&region=&city=,http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=7204&catalog=&country=82&region=&city=

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Language and Literature at Schools of Tajikistan; someofthemareco-financedbythefoundation)108.

TheRussianlanguageplaysanimportant,albeitnotdominant,roleinTajik-istan’sinformationspace.RussianTVprogrammesarenotrebroadcastthere,unlikeinKyrgyzstan,buttheycanbewatchedviacablenetworksandsatellitedishes,whichareincommonuse,especiallyintheprovinces109.FromtimetotimethegovernmentblocksaccesstoRussiannewsportals(usuallythisco-incideswithaworseningofrelationsbetweenDushanbeandMoscow)110.AsaruleTVstationsinTajikistanbroadcastprogrammesintheTajiklanguage(separatenewsblocksarealsoavailableinRussian).Russiancanbeheardalit-tlemoreoftenontheradio(thelawprovidesthatcontentintheTajiklanguage,includingmusic,mustfillatleasthalfoftheairtimeintheelectronicmedia.Someradiostations,likeVatanandespeciallyOriono,usethefollowingtrick:theybroadcastlocalmusic,whiletheirnewsandpublicistprogrammesareal-mostexclusivelyinRussian)111.

TheRussian-languageweekliesDigest Press andVecherniy Dushanbe,aswellasAziya­Plus,whichispublishedtwiceaweek(thiscorporationalsoownsara-dio stationwith thesamename,andapressagencywhichuses thewebsiteNews.tj),arepopularamongDushanbe’sintelligentsia.Thesetitleshaveasmallreachoutsidethecapital;forexample,Digest Press, whichisakindofTajikpressanthology,hasacirculationofaround10,000copies (forcomparison,Dzum­huriya, theofficialorganofTajikistan’spresidentandgovernment,which ispublishedintheTajiklanguage,hasacirculationof24,000copies).

TajikInternetnewsportalsusuallyhaveseverallanguageversions,andaRus-sianlanguageversionisalwayspresent.ThemostpopularportalsareAvesta.tj(RussianandEnglishversions112),theaforementionedNews.tj(English,RussiaandTajik),Ozodi.org(TajikandRussian),Pressa.tj(RussianandTajik),andlastbutnotleastKhowar.tj(thewebsiteofthenationalpressagency,publishedinTajik,Russian,EnglishandArabic).

108 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?pageSize=40&catalog=&country=82&region=&city=&company=

109 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1044568-echo/110 Аркадий Дубнов, ‘Русские в Таджикистане – исчезающая нация’, Pressa.tj, 29March

2013,http://pda.pressa.tj/news/russkie-v-tadzhikistane-ischezayushchaya-naciya111 Ibid.112 Thelanguageversionsarespecifiedintheorderoftheirappearanceonagivenportal’swebsite.

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3.2.2. an outline of russian-tajik relations

RussiaplayedamajorroleinendingthecivilwarinTajikistan.Thegovern-mentandtheUnitedTajikOppositionsignedthefinalpeaceagreementinMos-cowon27June1997,duringtheninthroundofthetalksbetweenthetwopar-tiestotheconflict,withtheaidoftheUN(aninitialagreementhadalsobeenconcluded inMoscowsixmonthspreviously).ThecountrywasveryheavilydependentonRussiathroughouttheentire1990s,onepracticalmanifestationofwhichwasthecurrencyinuse,whichwaseitherRussianorcloselytiedtotheRussiancurrency113.

After11September2001,Tajikistan,likeitsneighbours,supportedtheinter-ventioninAfghanistan,seeingtheWesternpresenceintheregionasanop-portunitytogainabroaderfieldformanoeuvreanddiversifyitsforeignpolicy.DushanbeallowedNATOaircrafttouseairportsandairspaceonitsterritory,andinreturnbenefitedfromUSfinancialassistance.ThewithdrawalofRus-sianborderguardsfromTajikistanandthecollaborationwithIndiacoveringtherenovationofTajikistan’sAyniairbase(alsoknownasGissar),locatedontheoutskirtsofDushanbe,weresignsoftheTajikgovernment’semancipationfromMoscow’sinfluence114.

Russiamaderepeatedattemptstoregainitsinfluenceduringthenextdecade(andisstilldoingso).Itsmainaimswereasfollows:theregulationofthestatusofitsmilitarypresence(negotiatingalongtermforthestationingofitsbase),the returnof itsborderguards, the leaseof theAyniairbase, andprevent-ingtheestablishmentofforeignmilitarybasesinTajikistan.Toachievethesegoals,Moscowhasbeenmakingvariouskindsoffriendlygesturesaswellasputtingpressure on the government (the carrot-and-stickpolicy), using thesameinstrumentsinbothcases.Suchmajorinstrumentsincludeparticularlythehydroenergysector(support–orthelackofsupport–fortheconstructionofhydropowerplants),andtheTajikexpatriateworkersinRussia(makinglifeeasierormoredifficultforimmigrants,includingthreatsofmassdeportations;

113 Tajikistanwas the last formerSovietrepublic toadopt itsowncurrency.Thishappenedonlyattheendof2000,whentheTajiksomoniwasintroducedintocirculation(itbecamethesolemeansofpaymenton1April2001).ThecurrenciesinusebeforeweretheSovietrouble(untilJanuary1994),theRussianrouble(January1994–May1995),andfinallytheTajikroubletiedtotheRussiancurrency(May1995–March2001).

114 In2002–2010,IndiaspentaroundUS$70milliononmodernisingthebase,forinstancebyextendingtherunway.Furthermore,IndianAirForcesalsooccasionallyusedtheFarkhorairbaseontheTajik-Afghanborder.

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formoredetails,seebelowinthissection).Inturn,Tajikistanhasbeentryingtomakethemostofitsco-operationwithRussia,whileavoidinganincreaseindependenceandretainingsomeroomformanoeuvre(owingtoitsco-opera-tionwithotherglobalactors).

Moscow’sstrategycanbetrackedusingthehydroenergysectorasanexam-ple.Russia andTajikistan reached afinal agreement on the construction oftheSangtuda1powerplantinOctober2004.Thiswas–tousethecomparisonpopularamongcommentators–atthesametimea‘carrot’forDushanbeanda‘stick’forTashkent(Uzbekistan,whichhasopposedtheconstructionoflargehydropowerplantsinKyrgyzstanandTajikistan,wasatthattimeactivelyen-gaged inco-operationwith theUSA,whichwasusing theKarshi-Khanabadairbase(seesection3.3.2.AnoutlineofRussian-Uzbekrelations).Moscowwasimplementingthisproject,whileatthesametimewithholdingitsparticipa-tion inanotherone, thecompletionof theconstructionof theRogunpowerplant,whichisplannedtobethelargestinthecountry115:atfirstitdidnotwantitsrelationswithUzbekistantodeteriorateevenfurther,andthenitdesiredtoestablishevencloserrelationswiththiscountry(whentheWesthadwith-drawnfromUzbekistanaftertheAndijanmassacre,andtheopportunityarosetodeployRussianunitsattheKarshi-Khanabadairbase).

Dushanbe made some concessions as a consequence of Moscow’s moves:Tajikistan’s government relinquished theOkno complex toRussia, agreed tothetransformationofthe201stdivisionintoamilitarybase,andrefusedtheestablishmentofaUSbaseinTajikistan(whichwasbeingwithdrawnfromUz-bekistan).However,Dushanbewasnotreadyforlong-termmilitaryagreementswithRussia,norforthereturnofRussianborderguards.Atthesametime,itavoidedanyunambiguousdeclarations,suggestingthatitwasexpectingRussiatobecomeinvolvedintheRogunproject.Tajikistanwasalsotryingtofindoutwhetherother investors, forexample fromChina,mightbe interested in theproject.InAugust2008,PresidentDmitriMedvedevdeclaredinDushanbethatRussiawasreadytocompletetheconstructionoftheRogunpowerplant,buthe

115 In 2004,Tajikistan’s government signed an agreement envisaging the completion of theRogunconstructionwithRusAl,buttheagreementwasdiscontinuedin2007(thepartieswereunabletoagreeontheheightofthedam:Наталья Гриб, Владимир Соловьев, ‘Между Россией и Таджикистаном встала плотина’, Коммерсантъ, 5 September 2007, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/801523). Dushanbe attempted unsuccessfully to interest RAOUES in thisproject.Atpresent, it isunclearwhetherandwhentheconstructionwillbefinished(Tajikistan’sgovernmenthasannouncedonnumerousoccasionssince2007thatitwillputthepowerplantintooperationatitsownexpenseandeffort).

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cancelledthisdeclarationinJanuary2009duringhisvisittoTashkent(sayingthatMoscowwouldnotbackthosehydropowerplantswhichdidnottaketheinterestsofallcountriesintheregionintoaccount).Thisprovokedafiercereac-tionfromDushanbe;PresidentEmomaliiRahmoncancelledhisvisittoRussia.ItappearsthattheKremlin’sstancechangedasaconsequenceoftheevolutionof thesituationconcerningUzbekistan: inNovember2008, theEU lifted thesanctionsimposedonthiscountry;furthermore,TashkentallowedtheUSAtousetheTermezairportforstopovers.ThefactthattheKremlinalloweditsre-lationswithDushanbe(andatthesametimewithBishkek)todeterioratemaydemonstratethatithadgrantedhigherprioritytorelationswithTashkent;orpossiblythat,giventheinfluenceithadinTajikistan(andKyrgyzstan)anyway,thelossesincurredtherewouldberelativelylowincomparisontothepoten-tialgainsinUzbekistan.Thetensionwasalleviated,butTajikistanavoidedanybindingdeclarationsregardingtheRussianbaseforthenexttwoyears.

Anopportunityto‘discipline’Dushanbearoseon8November2011,whentwopilotsfromRussia’sRolkanInvestmentLtd.weresentencedbyacourtinTajik-istantoseveralyearsinprisononchargesofviolatingflightsecuritystandards,illegalbordercrossingandsmuggling116.ThesentencewasseverelycriticisedbyRussian seniorofficials:PresidentDmitriMedvedevannouncedRussiawouldrespond“symmetricallyorasymmetrically”,dependingonexplanations fromTajikistan,andtheRussianministerofforeignaffairs,SergeyLavrov,insistedthatthesentenceberevised.Atthesametime,raidsonillegalTajikimmigrantscommencedinMoscow.TheRussiangovernmentdidnotruleoutimposingabanon employing Tajik workers, arguing that infectious diseases were allegedlywidespreadamongthem.Nationalistmovementsandorganisationsjoinedtheaction,whichwasaccompaniedbyawitch-huntinthemedia;theyheldpick-ets in frontofTajikistan’sembassy,amongotheractivities.Dushanbeyieldedtothepressure(thepilotswerereleased),butitonlyresumedthebindingtalksconcerning theRussianbase in summer 2012,most probably after coming totheconclusionthataRussianmilitarypresencewouldhelpitensurestability,given that the state structureswereweakand thegovernmenthadproblems

116 Thepilots,whohadtransportednon-militarycargoforISAFforcesinAfghanistanunderacontractwiththeUSfirmSupremeFood,werearrestedinMarch2011followinganemer-gencylandinginQurghonteppa.Thematterwasveryunclear;somecluessuggestedthattheentitiesinvolvedcouldhaveparticipatedindrugtraffickingandillegalarmstrading.KatarzynaJarzyńska,WojciechGórecki,‘CrisisinRussian-Tajikrelations.Theinternation-alandinternaldimensionsforRussia’,EastWeek,OSW,16November2011,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-11-16/crisis-russian-tajik-relations-international-and-internal-dimensions

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controllingitsownterritory(aspreviouslymanifestedbytheaforementionedriotsinGorno-BadakhshanAutonomousProvince)117.

Theagreementof5October2012,underwhichthepresenceofthe201stbasewasextendedfor30years,metoneofRussia’skeydemands.However,Moscowhascontinueditseffortstoensureitsotherdemandsaremet:accesstoAyniairportandconsenttothereturnofRussianborderguards(whichisvitalforMoscowinthecontextoftheplannedwind-upoftheISAFmission).Dushanbehasdeclared that it can talkaboutAyniafterRussiahasmet its obligationsunderotheragreements118:inadditiontothedealonthemilitarybase,anum-berofothermemorandaweresignedon5October2012,themostimportantofwhichprovidedforfacilitationstoTajikexpatriateworkers(othersconcernedthepartialliftingofthedutiesonpetroleumproductsexportedfromRussia,andenergyco-operation:Russiapromisedtoparticipate intheconstructionofseveraladditionalsmall-andmedium-sizedhydropowerplants)119.Forthesamereason,Dushanbepostponedtheratificationoftheagreementconcern-ingthemilitarybaseuntilautumn2013(justonemonthbeforethepresidentialelection120).Simultaneously,accordingtomedialeaks,TajikistaniscontinuingnegotiationsonAyniwiththeUSA,asWashingtonispotentiallyinterestedinusingtheairportwhenitwithdrawsitsforcesfromAfghanistan121.

117 TherewasmediaspeculationatthetimeastowhethertheriotscouldhavebeeninspiredbyRussia.ThiswasprovokedbyastatementfromGeneralVladimirChirkin,command-eroftheRussianGroundForces,whosaidamonthbeforetheriotsthatlocalarmedcon-flictswerepossibleinUzbekistan,TajikistanandKyrgyzstan(http://ria.ru/defense_safe-ty/20120626/685459967.html#ixzz21d6Q7IRt). Even if such speculation was groundless(forexample,Moscowmighthavehad intelligencedata suggesting thatclashescouldbeexpected),Russiacapitalisedonthissituation, threatening that itwouldwithdrawcom-pletelyifthenegotiationsfailed;thismadethegovernmentofTajikistanmoreflexible,asitfearedpossiblechaosinthecountry(atsomepoint,Moscowevenwithheldthefinancingof its ownbase). Formore informationon the riots, seeMarekMatusiak, ‘Tajikistan: inBadakhshan,thegovernmentfightswithformerfieldcommanders’,EastWeek,OSW,25July2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-07-25/tajikistan-badakhshan-government-fights-former-field-commanders

118 ‘Таджикистан отдаст РФ военный аэродром „Айни” после того, как Москва выполнит обещания’,Rosbalt.ru, 18 January2013,http://www.rosbalt.ru/exussr/2013/01/18/1083101.html

119 ThemediabrandedthesememorandaasRussia’s‘payment’forTajikistan’sconsenttothelong-termstationingofthe201stbase.

120 RussiaandTajikistansignedaprotocolafewdaysaheadoftheelection,on29October2013,underwhichcitizensofTajikistanwereallowedtoobtainaworkpermitinRussiaforthreeyears, andnot oneyear as before. ‘Гражданам Таджикистана увеличили срок работы в России до трех лет’,Fergananews.com, 29October2013,http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=21423

121 http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1363580760

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Tajik expatriateworkers in Russia are a separate issue. Figuratively speak-ing,thisisthemostimportantsectoroftheTajikeconomy.AccordingtotheWorldBank’scalculations,expatriateworkers in2012remitteda totalofal-mostUS$3.35billiontotheirhomeland,whichaccountedfor47%ofTajikistan’sGDP,andwasthehighestratioontheglobalscale.(Liberia,wheremoneyre-mittancesreached31%ofGDP,wasrankedsecond,Kyrgyzstan(29%)third,Le-sotho(27%)fourthandMoldova(23%)fifth122.)Duringthefirsttwomonthsof2013,thevalueofmoneyremittancesreachedUS$360million,whichwas9%morethanatthesametimein2012.Itisestimatedthat90%ofemigrantsfromTajikistan(atotalofatleast1.1million)workinRussia.InJanuaryandFebru-ary2013,over150,000peopleleftTajikistan(24%morethanayearbefore),andmorethan100,000cameback123.

russia – tajikistan

Russiaaccountsfor25.4%ofimportsintoTajikistan(firstaheadofKazakh-stan,16%,andChina,12.9%)and7.9%ofitsexports(TajikistansendsmoregoodsonlytoTurkey,36.3%,andAfghanistan,14.1%:datafor2012)124.SinceTajikistandoesnotborderonRussiaorKazakhstandirectly,(thelatterbe-ingamemberoftheCustomsUnion),Moscow’spressureonTajikistantojointheorganisationisnotasstrongasinthecaseofKyrgyzstan.However,ofalltheCentralAsiancountriesTajikistancouldbemostaffectedbyanypossibledestabilisationinAfghanistanfollowingthewithdrawaloftheUSmainforces(ithasthelongestborderwithAfghanistan).ThismaymakeDushanbeinclinedtoenhanceitsco-operationwithMoscowintheareaofsecurityafter2014.

TheborderwithAfghanistan,which is 1200km longanda sourceofnumerous threats,could in thiscaseserveasanadvantage forTajikistan,since itwillbe thecountrymostaccessibletoagreatpartofthewithdrawingtroops.ArailwayconnectingTajikistanwithTurkmenistanisplannedtobebuiltinthefuture.ThiswouldprovideTajikistanwithanexittotheexternalworld(atpresent,allmajorroadsandbothraillinesrunfromTajikistanviaUzbekistan,whichallowsTashkenttoblockthemovementofpeopleandgoodstoandfromthiscountry).

122 Thepublicationof20November2012.http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationDevelopmentBrief19.pdf

AccordingtoWorldBankestimates,thevalueofthemoneyremittancesreachedUS$4billionin2013(48%ofTajikistan’sGDP):http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/02/Migrants-from-developing-countries-to-send-home-414-billion-in-earnings-in-2013

123 ‘Трудовая миграция из Таджикистана усиливается’, Iarex.ru, 20 March 2013, http://www.iarex.ru/news/34877.html

124 http://stat.tj/ru/img/a6069090cb7edbe5efb67aec241e9816_1359030405.pdf

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3.3. uzbekistan

3.3.1. russia’s assets

The (lack of) military presence

UzbekistanistheonlyCentralAsianstatenottohaveconcludedanyagreementwithRussiaregardingthepresenceofRussiantroopsonitsterritorysincethecollapse of theUSSR.Russian soldiers enteredUzbekistan for thefirst timeinSeptember2005aspartofasmall four-dayexercise. In2006–2012,whenUzbekistanwas amemberof theCSTO,Russianair forcesused theKarshi--Khanabadmilitaryairbaseforstopovers.MoscowpaidTashkentwithsup-pliesofweapons,ammunitionandspareparts125.

The economic presence

RussiahassignificanteconomicassetsinUzbekistan.LeadingRussiancom-paniesinvolvedintheoilandgassectorinUzbekistan(andalsoinTurkmen-istanandKazakhstan)haveforyears investedrelatively little inupstreamprojects,focusingmainlyonthepurchaseandtransitofrawmaterials.TheRussianmonopolyonhydrocarbontransportfromUzbekistanwasbrokeninAugust2012,whengasbegantobeexportedviathebeingdevelopedCentralAsia–Chinagaspipeline, running fromTurkmenistanviaUzbekistan, andon throughKazakhstan toChina126 (before this,TurkmenistanhadstartedexportingnaturalgasandKazakhstancrudeoil toChina).Russia stillhasthemonopolyonthetransportofCentralAsianoilandgastoEurope,anditwantstomaintainthisposition,bytryingtopreventtheemergenceofanyalternativeexportroutes.

125 Александр Садчиков, ‘Ушла с базы. Россия может лишиться военных объектов за рубежом’,Московские Новости, 6 July 2012, http://mn.ru/society_army/20120706/32221-6546.html

126 ThesuppliescommencedundertheframeworkofUzbek-Chinesecontractsignedin2010,whichprovidesforexportsof10bcmofgas(thislevelwastohavebeenachievedin2013).Uzbekistanistheregion’slargestnaturalgasproducer;itsannualoutputreachesaround63bcm(2011),ofwhich thus far ithasexportedonly 11–12bcm(mainly toRussia,whichre-exports this gas to EU member states, and also marginal amounts to Kazakhstan,Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, ‘Uzbekistan starts gas exports toChina’,EastWeek,OSW, 19September2012:http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-ses/2012-09-19/uzbekistan-starts-gas-exports-to-china

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Russia’slargestinvestorisLUKoil,whichhasinvestedsomeUS$2.5billioninUzbekistansince2004,anditstotalinvestment(takingintoaccountthepro-jectscurrentlyunderimplementation)couldexceedUS$6billion.LUKoilisen-gagedinthreeprojects.TheProductionSharingAgreement(PSA)withthena-tionalholding,Uzbekneftegaz,concerningtheKandym-Khauzak-Shadysites,wassignedin2004fora35-yearsterm.Theoutputofthesefieldsreached3.8bcmofnaturalgasin2012(LUKoilhadashareof3.3bcm)and19,000tonnesofgascondensate(16,000tonnestoLUKoil)127.TheSouth-WestGissarproject,whichencompassessevenoil&gasfields,waslaunchedin2008(thePSAwassignedayearbefore,fora35-yearterm).Itsoutputin2012reached1.15bcmofnaturalgas(LUKoil’ssharewas1bcm)and141,000tonnesofoilandgascon-densate(LUKoil’ssharewas121,000tonnes)128.TheAralprojectisattheinitialstageofimplementation(explorationwork,withtheseismictomographytech-niqueemployed,wasconductedin2007–2009).Theshareholdersinthispro-ject,apartfromLUKoil(26.7%)andUzbekneftegaz(26.7%),includeCNPCfromChina(26.7%)andtheKoreaNationalOilCorporationfromKorea(20%).Inthemediumterm(by2018),LUKoilwantstoachieveatotalannualoutputfromallthethreeprojectsat18bcmofnaturalgas,0.5milliontonnesofgascondensateand1milliontonnesofoil129.

GasProjectDevelopmentCentralAsiaAG(GPD),afirmregisteredinSwit-zerlandand50%controlledbyGazpromGermany,formedaconsortiumwithGazpromZarubezhneftegaz(eachholdinga50%stake).Thisconsortiumhasoperatedsince2009underaPSAconcludedfora15-yeartermattheShakh-pakhtyfield;in2012,itsoutputreached280millionm3,andthesite’sesti-matedreservesare39.9bcm.TheGPDGroupalsoholdsa25%stakeintheKokdumalak-Gazjointventure,whichin2012produced5.2bcmofassociat-edpetroleumgas(APG),ofwhich3.1bcmwasexported.Inturn,theoutputofGissarneftgaz,whichis40%controlledbyGPD,reached1.1bcmin2012,ofwhich0.9bcmwasexported.Inadditiontothis,113,000tonsofcrudeoiland33,000ofcondensatewereproduced.Thiscompanyalsoextractssmallamountsofoil;itsoutputisprocessedlocallyandsoldonthedomesticmar-ket130.In2009,GazpromZarubezhneftegazdiscoveredtheDzhelgasfieldinUzbekistan.

127 http://www.lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/uzbekistan/81.php128 http://www.lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/uzbekistan/82.php129 http://www.lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/uzbekistan/79.php130 http://www.gazprom-germania.de/ru/cfery-biznesa/dobycha-prirodnogo-gaza.html

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Overthepastfewyears,RussiahasofferedUzbekistanassistanceinthecon-structionofanuclearpowerplant(ithasbeensupplyingnuclearfueltotheUzbektestreactorunderanagreementsignedinJune2007).

Currencyexchange(theofficialrateissignificantlydifferentfromtheblack-market rate), the transfer of funds abroad and the lack of high face-valuebanknotesposeseriousproblemstoforeignfirmsoperatinginUzbekistan,es-peciallymedium-sizedandsmallones131.Since2011,themediahavereportedmoreandmorefrequentcasesofsuchfirmsbeingtakenoverbyforce(includ-ingRussian132).Theymustalsodealwithrestrictivelegalregulationsandju-dicialpractice.Forexample,insummer2012,theUzbekauthoritiescancelledthelicenceheldbyUzdunrobitamobiletelephonenetworkoperator(100%con-trolledbyRussia’sMTS,Mobil’nyeTeleSistemy)for“regularandrepeatedvio-lationsand failure to complywith the supervisingbody’s requirements.” Itsfourmanagersweredetainedontaxfraudcharges,andthecompany’sentireassetswereseized.Thecompanyopposedthechargesandpointedtosomepro-cedural irregularities(forexample, itsrepresentativeshadnotbeenallowedtoparticipateinthecourtproceedings)133.TheUzbekeconomiccourtdeclaredUzdunrobitabankrupton22April2013.Earlier,inlate2009/early2010,Rus-sia’sleadingfoodmanufacturer,Wimm-Bill-Dann,hadtowindupitsbusinessinUzbekistanundersimilarcircumstances134.

Soft power

Theprocessofde-Russification,whichhadbeenongoingfortwodecades(see:3.3.2.AnoutlineofRussian-Uzbekrelations),slowedinaround2010;theRus-sian language isno longerbarred from thepublic space inUzbekistan, andmembersoftheelites,includingthepolitical,donotconcealthattheirchildrenandgrandchildrenattendschoolswhereRussianisthelanguageofinstruction.

131 Forthesereasons,manyairlineshavewithdrawnorreducedtheirnumberofconnectionswithUzbekistan.Forexample,Russia’sAeroflothas regularly complainedaboutvariouskindsofproblems;forinstance,theairlinehadoverUS$50millioninitsUzbekaccountsandwasunabletodisposeofthemoneyinanywayinautumn2011(‘Компания «Аэрофлот» просит правительство России ответить на «недружественные» запретительные меры со стороны Узбекистана’,Fergananews.com,21March2013, http://www.fergananews.com/news/20382).

132 Therewerewell-knowncasesin2011–2012,whenRussianownersmovedentirefactories(machineryandequipment),alongwiththeircrew,fromUzbekistanfearingtakeover.ThisconcernedbusinessesoperatingoutsideTashkent.

133 http://www.company.mts.ru/comp/press-centre/press_release/2012-08-31-1764524/134 Куркмас Бурибоев, ‘Зиндан для олигархов’,http://www.compromat.ru/page_28923.htm

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EventhoughRussianhasnospecialstatusinUzbekistan(itistreatedasanyother foreign language), registry documents (birth, death,marriage certifi-cates,etc.)canagainbecompletedinUzbekandRussianasoftheendof2012135.

848generaleducationschoolswithRussianasthelanguageofinstructionop-erate inUzbekistan.Thisnumber isequivalent to8.6%ofallgeneraleduca-tionschoolsinthiscountry(8742schoolsteachinUzbek,417inKazakh,377inKarakalpakand256inTajik).8.33%ofthetotalnumberofpupilsattendsuchschools136.Highereducationinstitutionshaveso-calledRussiansectors,wherestudentsreceiveeducationinRussian.BranchesofthreeRussianuniversitiesoperate inTashkent: theRussianUniversityofEconomics (since 1995, ithasover500students137),MoscowStateUniversity(since2007,230students138)andtheRussianStateUniversityofOilandGas(since2007,around600students139).

TheRussianminority,whousedtoformadiasporaofover1.5millionjustbeforetheUSSRcollapsed(morethan8%ofthepopulation)140,hasshrunk,depend-ingontheestimate,tobetween250,000and900,000people(0.85–3%)141.TherearefewRussianminorityorganisations,adozenorsoatthemost(noprecisedataareavailable)142.They includetheofficialUzbekistan-RussiaFriendshipAssociation143andtheRussianBusinessCentre,whichhasshownlittleactivity(ithasnowebsiteofitsown).

135 ‘Узбекским ЗАГСам разрешили использовать русский язык’,Lenta.ru,1November2012,http://lenta.ru/news/2012/11/01/language/

Itappearsthatthegovernmentthuswantstohaltthefurtheremigrationofthenon-Uzbekpopulation(theyarebeingreplacedinlargecitiesbyaruralUzbekpopulation).

136 Datafortheschoolyear2012/2013:http://uzedu.uz/rus/info/pokazateli/137 http://rea.uz/about/history/138 http://msu.uz/e/4f49c4da1adf57f542000000139 http://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/kvoti+v+gubkina/140 According to thecensusof 1989, 1.65millionpeople (8.3%of the totalpopulationof the

UzbekSSR).141 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1120730-echo/andtheOSW’sownestimates.142 Thesearepredominantlycultural,andtoalesserextentsocialorganisations;firstofalltheRus-

sianCultureCentre(RCC)inUzbekistananditsaffiliatedorganisationsoperatingacrossthecountryundervariousnames,e.g.the‘RussianCulture’Association(inTermez),theBukharaDistrict ‘Harmony andMercy’ RussianCultureCentre, the ‘Rus’ Centre in Samarkand, etc.(http://uzb.rs.gov.ru/node/16). TheRCCoperatesunder the aegis of theRepublican Interna-tionalCultureCentre–culturalcentresofothernationsalsooperateaspartofthisstructure,includingPolish,Armenian,Korean,Tajik,etc.(http://www.icc.uz/rus/cultural_centre/).

143 http://uzru.uz/ This association operates under the aegis of the Council of Friendship Associations, to

whichanumberofsimilarstructuresbelong(http://djk.uz/?do=friend).

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Rossotrudnichestvo’s agency in Tashkent co-operates with the Russian Cul-tureCentreandvariousUzbek institutionswhileholdingcultural and folk-loreevents.TheRussianScienceandCultureCentreoffersRussianlanguagecourses.TheRusskiy Mir Foundationmanagesfivespecialistlanguage‘cabinets’(oneeachinChinaz,FerganaandNukus,andtwoinTashkent)144,andalsoco-holdsculturaleventsandcollaborateswiththeRussiandiaspora145.ThescopeofoperationofthetwoRussiangovernmentagenciesisclearlysmallerthaninTajikistan.

Russian still plays an essential role in Uzbekistan’s information space, al-thoughunlikeinTajikistan,Russianmediaareevenlessaccessible.Uponthegovernment’s instructions, cable network operators either temporarily orcompletelyexcludesomeTVchannelsfromtheiroffer(theycanbewatchedbyownerswithindividualsatelliteaerials),Russiannewsportals,communitynetworkservicesandsomeblogsareblockedfromtimetotime146.UzbekTVstationsbroadcastselectedprogrammes,especiallynews,inRussian.Localra-diostationsallocatemoreoftheirairtimeforprogrammesinRussian(halfofthetimemustbefilledwithUzbekcontent)147.Russian-languagenewspapers’circulationsreachbetween5000and15,000copies(thecirculationsofUzbek-languagenewspapersareoneandahalftotwotimeslarger).Pravda Vostoka andNovosti Uzbekistana arethemostimportanttitles.SomepressispublishedinRussianandUzbek,likethegovernment-controlledNarodnoye Slovo(Khalq Sozi) and the specialist magazine Nalogoviy Tamozhenniy Vestnik148. RussianisanimportantlanguageinUzbeknewsportals,bothofficialandindepend-ent:alongwiththosewhichpublishcontentsonlyUzbek,therearealsopor-talswhereonlytheRussianlanguageisused(e.g.Vesti.uzorUzMetrnom.com, whichhasbeenblockedinUzbekistan).OtherportalshavebothRussianandUzbekversions(suchasUz24.uzandOzodlik.org, whichissupportedbyRadioLiberty),andsometimesRussian,UzbekandEnglishversions(e.g.Podrobno.uz).ThewebsiteofthenewsagencyoperatingaspartofUzbekistan’sMinis-tryofForeignAffairs( Jahonnews.uz)hasRussian,Uzbek,EnglishandArabic

144 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/rucenter/kabinet_list.html145 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?pageSize=40&catalog=

&country=81&region=&city=&company=146 For instance, thisbanhasbeen imposedonTVCentr,TNTandSTS.NotonlyhaveRus-

sianinternetportalsbeenblocked,butalsoWesternones.http://echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1120730-echo/

147 Ibid.148 Ibid.

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versions,andthewebsiteof theUNNApressagency(Uza.uz) ispublishedinUzbek,Russian,English,German,French,Spanish,ArabicandChinese.Theofficialwebsitesofgovernment institutionsandagenciesusuallyhave threelanguageversions:Uzbek,RussianandEnglish.

IntheopinionofUzbekistan’sjournalistcircles,thoseworkinginRussian(es-peciallyethnicRussians)enjoyalittlemorefreedomthantheirUzbek-speak-ingcolleagues,anddonotgotoprisonfortheirwork149.

3.3.2. an outline of russian-uzbek relations

Uzbekistan’sstrategiclocation(itbordersonalltheotherCentralAsiancoun-triesandonAfghanistan),demographicpotential(almosthalfoftheregion’spopulationlivethere)andnaturalresourcesmeanthatfromtheverybegin-ning,Tashkenthasaspiredtoassumetheroleoflocalleader.Suchambitionshavebeenmanifested,forexample,byitsunwillingnesstoparticipateinanystructuresdominatedbytheKremlin.UzbekistanhasbeenvyingforregionalleadershipwithKazakhstan,howeverwhile employing completelydifferentmeans and instruments.WhileAstana has joined all the integration initia-tives,oftenastheirinitiator,Tashkentwouldusuallydistanceitselffromthem(albeitnot isolating itself, likeTurkmenistan). Inbilateral relationswith itsneighbours,itwouldusuallynarrowdownthefieldfordialoguewithoutseek-ing a compromise, but instead highlighting, sometimes assertively, its ownnationalinterestsandpushingthroughsolutionsthatarebeneficialforitself.Thishasgivenrisetonumerousconflicts(themostbitterofwhicharewithKyrgyzstanandTajikistan).

Uzbekistan has consistently and ostentatiously resisted the ‘post-colonialsyndrome’ since theearly 1990s.Theprocessesofde-Sovietisationand therelatedde-Russificationhavebeencarriedoutinseveralstages.Thefiststagewasmarkedby theall-embracingchangeof theSovietandRussiannames(evenrenamingPushkinStreetinTashkent),whichincludedtheintroduc-tionoftheLatinwritingsystemtotheUzbeklanguagein1992(althoughtheCyrillicscriptisstillinuse).Anotherstagewasfocusedonremovingmonu-mentsandotherobjectsreminiscentoftheSovietandpreviousRussianrule.Allmonuments commemorating theGreatPatrioticWar (theeasterncam-paignofWorldWarII)wereremovedtowardstheendofthefirstdecadeof

149 Ibid.

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this century150. For example, themonumentalDefenderOf The Fatherlandcomplexanda formerChristianOrthodoxchurchweredemolishedduringonedayinautumn2009151.TashkentishometotheonlymuseumofRussianoccupationinCentralAsia152.

Tashkent’s ‘sinusoidal’policy (involving longerperiodsof co-operationwiththeWest,interspersedwithperiodsofcloserrelationswithMoscow)isusu-allyinterpretedasaneffectofPresidentIslamKarimov’sunpredictabledeci-sions.However,whenseenfromtheperspectiveofthelasttwodecades,theoverallaimsseemconsistent,anditsgoals,includingaboveallreinforcingUz-bekistan’s sovereigntyand independence, are inalterable.Following thecol-lapseoftheUSSR,UzbekistanbecameapartytotheCST(collectivesecuritytreaty) in1992.However, in1999, itchosenottosigntheprotocolextendingthe operation of the treaty. Instead, it joinedGUAM, a bloc of southernCIScountriesdemonstratingapro-Westernapproach.After11September2001,itallowedthecoalitiontouseitsairspace,andaUSairbasewasestablishedattheKarshi-Khanabadmilitaryairport.RelationsbetweenWesterncountriesandTashkentbegantodeteriorate,partlyasaconsequenceofthecampaignbyhumanrightsactivistswhohadcriticisedtheirgovernmentsforsupport-ingKarimov’sdictatorship, andalsodue to thepresident’s fearof apossiblecolouredrevolutioninhiscountry.TheWestfrozeitsrelationswithUzbeki-stan after theAndijanmassacre inMay 2005 (when opposition demonstra-tionswerebrutallysuppressedandat least187peoplewerekilled,andmostlikelymuchmore).Ineffect,theUStroopshadtoleaveKarshi-Khanabad153.Asrequiredbyzero-sumlogic(whereoneplayerwinstheother loses,andviceversa),thealreadyhintedUzbek-Russianrapprochementtookplace(Uzbeki-stanleftGUAMandjoinedtheCSTO,TashkentsignedanalliancetreatywithMoscowandallowedRussianairforcestousetheKarshi-Khanabadairbase)154.WhentheWeststartedliftingitssanctions(2007–2008),Tashkentresumedits

150 MostprobablytoerasethetracesofsharedUzbekandRussianhistoryfromthecollectivememory.

151 Insummer2013,accesstotheRussianPravoslavie.ruandUzbekPravoslavie.uzwebsites,andalsototheRussianChristianOrthodoxtelevisionSoyuz,wasblockedinUzbekistan.‘Но и в церкви всё не так…’, Uzmetronom, 13 August 2013, http://www.uzmetronom.com/2013/08/13/no_i_v_cerkvi_vsjo_ne_tak.html

152 Вадим Трухачев, ‘Узбекистан включился в „войну с памятниками’,Pravda.ru,23Novem-ber2009,http://www.pravda.ru/world/formerussr/other/23-11-2009/1000713-0/

153 Meanwhile,GermanandDanishunitswereabletousetheTermezairportuninterruptedly.154 However,thecountryIslamKarimovfirstvisitedfollowingtheAndijanmassacrewasChina.

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previouspolicy,allowingtheUSanditsalliestousetheUzbekairspaceandairportsagain155,andannouncingitsparticipationintheNabuccogaspipeline,whichMoscowseesasananti-Russianproject. InOctober2008,UzbekistanlefttheEurasianEconomicCommunity(ofwhichithadbeenamemberfromMarch2006)156.

RussiamadeanattempttokeepUzbekistanwithin itsorbit,offeringhigherpricesforUzbekgasinadditiontowithdrawingitssupportfortheconstruc-tionoflargehydropowerplantsinKyrgyzstanandTajikistan:duringPresidentDmitriMedvedev’svisittoTashkentinJanuary2009,heconfirmedthatMos-cowwouldbuyUzbekgasatmarketprices(accordingtomediaspeculations,thiscouldmeanapriceofaroundUS$300per1000m3)157.TheRussianproposalwasmadewhentheconstructionofthegaspipelinerunningfromTurkmeni-stantoChinawasnearlycomplete.Uzbekistanintendedtoexportpartofitsoutputviathispipeline,andsothisofferwasnotasappealingtoTashkentasitwouldhavebeenafewyearsbefore.PresidentIslamKarimov’svisittoMoscowinApril2010didnotmarkanybreakthrough.ThesummitprovedthatthetwocountrieshadconflictingpoliticalandeconomicinterestsanddifferentvisionsforaregionalsecuritysysteminCentralAsia158.

UzbekistansuspendeditsCSTOmembershipon20June2012(itshouldbenot-edthatevenwhenitbelongedtothisorganisation,itdidnottakepartinits

155 Tashkent became more important for NATO when the Northern Distribution Network(NDN), handling supplies for the coalition forces inAfghanistan,was launched in 2009(althoughtheUSAseemedundecidedastowhetherUzbekistan’soffershouldbeacceptedasawhole). Its shortborderwithAfghanistan (137km) iseasilyaccessible for land traf-fic(thisisthebest-guardedsectionoftheAfghanborder).AnotherbenefitisthefactthatthecityofTermez,whichhasanoperatingmilitaryairbase,islocatedimmediatelyontheborder,andalsohasarailwayconnectionwithAfghanistan’sMazar-i-Sharif.EventhoseaircraftwhichdonotcontinuetheirflightfromAfghanistanviaUzbekistan,butthroughTajikistan,KyrgyzstanandKazakhstan,useTermezairport.USSecretaryofStateHillaryClintonvisitedTashkenttwicein2010–2011.ShevisitedthecountryforthefirsttimeinDe-cember2010ontheoccasionoftheOSCEsummitinKazakhstan(Ms.Clinton,alsovisitedBishkekandAstana).ShereturnedthereinOctober2011(andalsovisitedDushanbe).

156 ThepresentEAECmembersareBelarus,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,RussiaandTajikistan.Formoredetailsconcerningthisissue,seechapterIII.

157 MaciejFalkowski,‘MiedwiediewwUzbekistanie–RosjawysyłasprzecznesygnałydoAzjiCentralnej’,Tydzień na Wschodzie,OSW,27January2009,http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/pub-likacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2009-01-28/miedwiediew-w-uzbekistanie-Russia-wysyla-sprzeczne-sygnaly

158 ‘Rosja–Uzbekistan:szczytbezprzełomu.’,Tydzień na Wschodzie,OSW,21April2010,http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2010-04-21/Rosja-uzbekistan-szc-zyt-bez-przelomu

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militaryexercises,itrefusedtoparticipateintheCollectiveOperationalReac-tionForceswhichwerebeingformedaspartoftheorganisation,andopenlycontesteditsplans;forexample,UzbekistanopposedthesitingofaCSTO(de factoRussian)militarybaseinsouthernKyrgyzstan).Apparently,whatTash-kentfearedmostwasMoscow’sdesiretocoordinatetheactivitiesoftheCSTOmemberstatesinforeignandsecuritypolicy(whichinfactwouldmeangreat-ercontrolbyRussia).OneoftheinitiativesTashkentopposedwasthepossibil-ityofinterventionbyCSTORapidReactionForcesinanyofthememberstatesincaseofaninternalthreattotheirstability159.Uzbekistanannounceditsde-cisiontowithdrawfromtheCSTOonlytwoweeksafterVladimirPutin’svisit(thiswashisthirdofficial tripsincehisresumptionofthepresidency).ThisdemonstratedevenmorestronglyUzbekistan’sambitiontoconductits inde-pendentsecurityandforeignpolicy,andalsounderminedtheimageofbothRussiaandPutinintheregion160.

russia – uzbekistan

SinceUzbekistanwithdrewfromtheCSTO,ithasbeenabletoco-operatewiththeUSAandNATO,withouttheneedtoconsultanyCSTOmemberstates,aboveallRussia.Uzbekistanseemstoexpectthatitwillreceivenotonlyfinancialgains(forexampleintheformoftransitcharges)butalsosome of theweapons used by the international coalition upon its with-drawalfromAfghanistan.IthasalsobeenspeculatedthatapermanentUSmilitarybasecouldbesetupinUzbekistanafter2014161.However,anotherreversalofthealliances,andathawinTashkent’srelationswithMoscow(whichwouldcertainlybeamoretacticalthanstrategicmove)cannotberuledout162. It shouldnotbedisregarded thateven thoughUzbekistan is

159 MarekMatusiak,‘UzbekistanwithdrawsfromtheCSTOonceagain’,EastWeek,OSW,11July2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-07-11/uzbekistan-withdraws-csto-once-again

160 Mostlikely,VladimirPutinwantednotonlytoshowhisappreciationforUzbekistan,butalsotodemonstratetoKazakhstan,Russia’sregionalally,thatMoscowhasbroadroomformanoeuvreinCentralAsia(immediatelyafterTashkent,hewenttoAstana).

161 PeterLeonard,‘USCoziesuptoOutcastUzbekistanforAfghanRole’,Bigstory.ap.org,6July2012,http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-cozies-outcast-uzbekistan-afghan-role

162 Itwasannouncedat the timeof IslamKarimov’svisit toMoscow(15April2013) thatUz-bekistanwouldsignanagreementontheCISfreetradezone.ThisisasuccessforMoscow,butthisdoesnotrestrictTashkent’ssovereignty.WojciechGórecki,‘Uzbekistan’spresidentinMoscow:limitedco-operation,notrust’,EastWeek,OSW,17April2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-17/uzbekistans-president-moscow-limited-coop-eration-no-trust

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capableofblockingothercountries(especiallyTajikistan),itstronglyreliesonRussia(andKazakhstan)asregardsthetransitofitsoilandgasexports– itdoesnotborderonChina (oron Iranor through theCaspianSeaonAzerbaijanasTurkmenistandoes).PoliticalrelationsbetweenMoscowandTashkentarecharacterisedbytotaldistrust.However,RussiaisstillavitaltradepartnerforUzbekistan,asitisthefourthlargestrecipientofUzbekexports(12.8%;afterChina,18.5%,Kazakhstan,14.6%,andTurkey,13.8%)andthe largest importer (20.6%;beforeChina, 16.5%,SouthKorea, 16.3%,andKazakhstan,12.8%;datafor2012)163.

3.4. turkmenistan

3.4.1. russia’s assets

The military presence

TurkmenistanwastheonlyCentralAsianstatenottosigntheTashkentTrea-ty(theCollectiveSecurityTreaty)on15May1992.Nevertheless,MoscowandAshgabatsignedanagreementonthejointprotectionofTurkmenbordersforanindefinitetermin1993.Anoperationalgroup(consistingofupto3000sol-diers)was formed inMarch 1994;Russianborder guardswere stationedontheborderswithAfghanistanandIran164.In1995,thegovernmentofPresidentSaparmuratNiyazovannouncedthatTurkmenistanhadadoptedthestatusofaneutralstate.Asaconsequence,theRussianborderguardsleftTurkmeni-stan(thelastunitdepartedinDecember1999)165.

The economic presence

Russia’seconomicassetsinTurkmenistanarequitemodest.OneRussianfirminvolvedinprojectsontheoil&gasmarketisItera,whichcontinuedprepara-toryworkin2013ontheBlock21offshoreprojectinTurkmen(theestimatedre-servesofthissiteare219mtonnesofoiland100bcmofnaturalgas).Gazpromparticipated ingeological explorationofCaspianoffshoregasfields towardstheendof thefirstdecadeof thiscentury.AnothermajorRussianplayeron

163 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html164 ‘Государственная пограничная служба Туркменистана’, Agentura.ru, http://www.

agentura.ru/press/about/jointprojects/greatgame/pogranturkmen/165 ‘Туркмения отказывается от услуг российских пограничников’,Scripts.online.ru,27May

1999,http://scripts.online.ru/misc/news/99/05/27_013.htm

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theTurkmenmarketisthemobilenetworkoperatorMTS(Mobil’nyeTeleSis-temy).In2005,thiscompany(operatingasMTS-Turkmenistan)boughtato-talof100%sharesinBCTI,thenthecountry’slargestoperator,intwotrans-actions. Ithad2.4millioncustomersat theendof 2010 (while the country’spopulation is slightlyover 5million).However, at that time itwas forced tosuspenditsservicessincethefive-yeartermofthedealwiththelocalMinistryforCommunicationhadexpired.ThecompanymanagedtorenewitsoperationinTurkmenistaninAugust2012166.

Soft power

TheTurkmenisationofallareasofpubliclife,whichhasbeenconsistentlypur-suedtogetherwiththeisolationismpolicybythecountry’stwopost-independ-ence presidents, Saparmurat Niyazov and Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov,hasverystronglyreducedRussianinfluenceinthesoftpowerareaalso167. Ithasshrunkevenmoreasaconsequenceof theemigrationofagreatpartoftheethnicRussiansandothernon-Turkmenpopulations168.OneschoolwithRussianasthelanguageofinstructioncurrentlyoperatesinAshgabat169.Sin-gleclassesreceivingeducationinRussianexistinsomeotherschoolsinandoutsideAshgabat(thegenerallysharedopinionisthattheyrepresentahigherlevelthanclassesreceivingeducationinTurkmen)170.Inaround2000,theRus-sian languageceased tobeused inTurkmenistan’shighereducationschools–all ‘Russiansectors’wereliquidated,anditwasnolongerpossibletostudyin this language.Theresultinggaphasbeenpartlyfilledwithanetworkof

166 ‘МТС вернулись на рынок Туркмении после почти двухлетнего перерыва’,Gazeta.ru,30August2012,http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2012/08/30/n_2507237.shtml

167 Forexample,theLatinscriptwasformallyintroducedtothewrittenTurkmenlanguageasearlyas1991(itunderwentvariousmodificationsoverthenextfewyears).

168 Accordingtothecensusof1989,almost334,000RussianslivedintheTurkmenSSR(nearly9.5%oftherepublic’spopulation).Itisestimatedthataround165,000RussiansliveinTurk-menistanatpresent(3.23%ofthecountry’spopulation).

169 ThisistheTurkmen-RussianPushkinSchool,whichhasbeenoperatingsince2002.Around800pupilsreceiveeducationatthisschool.ItsgraduateshavetherighttoseekadmissiontohighereducationschoolsinRussia.PresidentsGurbangulyBerdymukhamedovandDmitriMedvedevofficiallyopeneditsnewvenueattheendof2009(http://www.trsosh.edu.tm/about.html).Accordingtomediareports,parentswhowanttheirchildtoattendtheschool,whichisseenasprestigiousandrepresentingahighlevel,needtopayabribeoverseveralthousand dollars (‘Туркменистан: Почем бесплатное образование в русской школе?’,Fergananews.com,30December2009,http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6420).

170 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1125130-echo/ Noreliabledataonthenumberoftheseclassesareavailable.

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Turkisheducationinstitutions171.Atthesametime,relativelymanypeople,atleast inAshgabat,speakRussian172.Theeducationprogrammeapplicablefortheschoolyear2013/2014specifies‘nationallanguageandliterature’inthelan-guagesblock,and‘Russian’and‘foreignlanguages’separately173.

Rossotrudnichestvo’sagencyinTurkmenistanhasnoseparatewebsite:informa-tionon itsactivity, suchasculturaleventsandcelebrationsheldonvariousoccasions,canbefoundonthewebsiteofRossotrudnichestvo’scentraloffice174.Russkiy Mir hasnocentresinthecountry.ThefoundationonitswebsitemakesreferencestotheAssociationforCultural,TradeandEconomicContactswithRussiainTurkmenistan(ithassixbranchesalloverthecountry175).However,noinformationisavailableonthisstructure’sactivity.

AccesstotheRussianmediaismarginal,andsotheyhavenomajorinfluenceonthesituationofTurkmenistan(thosewhohaveindividualsatelliteaerialscanwatchRussianTV,but–ascanbeconcludedfrompressreports–Turkishchannelsaremorepopularthere176).UnlikeinotherCentralAsiancountries,theRussianprintedpressevendoesnotreachTurkmenistan177.Russianweb-sitesareblockedtoanevengreaterextentthaninUzbekistan.

Turkmen TV stations broadcast only short news and entertainment blocksinRussian.OneexceptionistheTurkmenistanchannel,whichistargetedat

171 FourteenTurkmen-Turkishgeneraleducationschools,aTurkishprimaryschool,aneduca-tioncentrenamed‘Bashkent’andtheInternationalTurkmen-TurkishUniversitywereop-eratingin2009inTurkmenistan(А. Шустов, ‘Русские школы вытесняются турецкими. Состояние русского образования в ЦентрАзии’, Baromig.ru, 11December 2009, http://www.baromig.ru/foreign-expierence/rossiyskaya-diaspora-za-rubezhom/russkie-shkoly-vytesnyayutsya-turetskimi-sostoyanie-russkogo-obrazovaniya-v-tsentrazii.php).Around1200studentscurrentlyreceiveeducationatthisuniversity.Thenumberofstu-dentsplannedfortheacademicyear2015/2016isaround3000.

172 MyownobservationsasofDecember2011. I couldcommunicate inRussianwithoutanyproblemsintaxis,atkiosks,coffeeshops,currencyexchangesandbazaars.

173 ‘Новой эпохе – новый образовательный потенциал’,Turkmenistan.gov.tm,3March2013,http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/?id=3465

174 http://rs.gov.ru/node/1473 NoactivityfromtheRussianScienceandCultureCentreinAshgabathasbeenseen.175 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/catalog.html?pageSize=40&catalog=

&country=80&region=&city=&company=176 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1125130-echo/177 It canonlybe subscribed toby selected institutions; singlecopiescanbeboughtathigh

pricesatmarketplacesandbazaars(theyarebroughtaspartoftheso-calledsuitcaseim-portsbyindividualtradesmen).

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viewers abroad and broadcasts programmes in seven languages: Turkmen,English,Russian,French,Chinese,ArabicandPersian.Turkmen is theonlylanguagespokenontheradio.ThemostpopularnewspaperisNeitralnyi Turk­menistan publishedinRussian(acirculationofover45,000copies,whileTurk­menistanpublishedintheTurkmenlanguagehasacirculationof36,500cop-ies).Inadditiontothisnewspaper,severalmagazinesarepublishedinRussian,includingVozrozhdeniye.Thewebsiteof theTDHpressagencyhasTurkmen,RussianandEnglishversions,asdothenewsportalsTurkmeninform.comandTurkmenistan.gov.tm.

AnagencyoftheFederalMigrationServiceoperatesaspartoftheRussianem-bassyinAshgabat(RussiaalsohasaconsulateinTurkmenbashi).

3.4.2. an outline of russian-turkmen relations

EnergyissueshavealwayspredominatedinRussian-Turkmenrelations.

WhentheUSSRfellapart, ‘CentralAsia–Centre’,runningtoRussiaviaUz-bekistan and Kazakhstan, was Turkmenistan’s only export gas pipeline.Moscowwantedthissituationtoremainunchanged,andtomaintainitsmo-nopolyongastransit178.For thisreasonitattemptedtoblocktheconstruc-tionofanynewconnections.ItwasespeciallyconcernedaboutplanstobuildtheTrans-Caspiangaspipeline,whichwould connectAzerbaijanwith theBaku–Tbilisi–ErzurumrouteandsupplygastoWesternrecipients,aswellastheEU’sNabuccoprojectrunningalongthesameroute.Russiarespondedtotheseprojectsin2007byannouncingplanstobuildcompetitiveroutes:theCaspianCoastalGasPipeline179andSouthStream180.Inturn,Ashgabatwant-ed a diversifiednetworkof gaspipelines, so that itwasno longerdepend-entononerecipient,andgainedamuchbetternegotiatingposition.The200

178 MostTurkmengas,likeUzbekgas,wasre-exportedtoWesternEurope.179 TheCaspianCoastalGasPipeline,withaplannedcapacityof20bcm,wastorunalongthe

eastern coastline of the Caspian Sea fromTurkmenistan viaKazakhstan to Russia, andconnecttothe‘CentralAsia–Centre’main.Aninitialtrilateralagreement(betweenRussia,KazakhstanandTurkmenistan)concerningitsconstructionwassignedinNovember2007.RussiawithdrewfromthisprojectinOctober2010.

180 TheSouthStreampipelinerunsalongnearlythesamerouteasthatplannedforNabucco(fromRussiaalongtheBlackSeabedtoBulgaria,andfromthereviaSerbiaandHungarytoBaumgarteninAustria,andinthetwo-branchversionalsotoGreeceandItaly).Thein-augurationoftheconstructionoftheoffshoresectionwascelebratedon7December2012.Russia isconsideringsendinggas fromTurkmenistan,UzbekistanandAzerbaijanusingthisroute.

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km-longKorpezhe-KurtKuigaspipelinerunningtoIrancameintooperationattheendof1997,withanannualcapacityof8bcm.Attheendof2009,theTurkmenistan–China gas pipelinewas launched (it runs for over 1800kmandhasaplannedcapacityof40bcm).

A section of the ‘Central Asia–Centre’ gas pipelinewas damaged on 9April2009,andgassuppliesfromTurkmenistantoRussiawerewithheld.InTurk-menistan’sopinionthedamageoccurredbecauseofasuddenandsignificantreductioninthevolumeofgasreceivedbyGazprom.Althoughthepipelinewasrepaired,gastransportwasnotresumed.Gazpromdemandedthatthelong-termcontractberevisedandthegaspriceorsupplyvolumesbereduced(de-mandforgasandgaspriceshadfallensignificantlyinEuropeasaconsequenceoftheeconomiccrisis;thusGazprom,re-exportingTurkmengasandreducingitsownoutput,wasunabletogeneratetheexpectedprofits181).ThecoreoftheRussian-TurkmengasconflictwasRussia’sdesiretotakecontroloftheplanned‘East–West’gaspipeline,whichwouldhaveconnectedTurkmenistan’slargestgasproject,Yolotan,withtheCaspianSeacoastline(MoscowwasconcernedthatinthefuturethispipelinecouldbecomepartoftheTrans-CaspianroutepromotedbytheUSAandtheEU).GazpromreducedthevolumeofTurkmengasreceivedsoonafterAshgabatrejectedGazprom’soffertotakepartinthisproject182.

ThisconflictinflictedmorelossesonTurkmenistan,whichwasdeprivedofitsplannedincomes(aroundUS$1billionpermonth,accordingtoestimates)andwasforcedtowithholdproductionat195fields,whichposedtheriskofthesefieldsbeingdestroyed.However,theupcominginaugurationofthegasmainrunningtoChinaandtheaccompanyingChineseloanmadeRussianpressureless effective. Finally, supplies to Russia were resumed at the beginning of2010,althoughexportlevelsreachedonly10.5bcm(thelevelbeforethecrisishadbeenaround40bcm).AnadditionalshortgaspipelinerunningfromTurk-menistan to Iran (Dovletabad–Khangiran, 182kilometres,witha capacityofupto12bcm)wasopenedmoreorlessatthesametime,inearlyJanuary2010.TheTrans-CaspiangaspipelinecouldensureAshgabatarealdiversificationofoutlets.However,Turkmenistanislikelytobecomemoredependentonthe

181 Furthermore,GazpromhadstartedpayinghigherratesforTurkmengasafewmonthsbe-fore.

182 AleksandraJarosiewicz,‘Rosyjsko-turkmeńskawojnagazowa’,Tydzień na Wschodzie,OSW,3 June 2009, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2009-06-03/rosyjsko-turkmenska-wojna-gazowa

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Chinesedirectioninthecomingyears(thecontractssignedthusfarprovideforsuppliesat65millionm3).

RelationsbetweenAshgabat andMoscowwere still very tense in 2011 and2012.TheRussian restrictionsonTurkmengas importswereaccompaniedbyacampaignintheRussianmediasuggestinga“Libyanscenario”inTurk-menistan183.

Theissueswhichreceivedmostattentioninbilateralrelationsinthefirsthalfof2013werelinkedtoanewcitizenshipactinTurkmenistan,wheredualciti-zenshipwasnotenvisagedasapossibleoption.Thisaffectedover43,000Rus-siancitizenswhowerepermanentresidentsinTurkmenistan.Inadditiontotheneedtorelinquishoneofthecitizenshipstheyheld,theywereconcernedtheywouldbeunabletotravelabroad.Onlyholdersofbiometricpassportshavebeenallowedtoleavethecountrysince10July.However,suchpassportshavenotbeen issuedto these individualssincetheir introduction in2006. Inten-sivediplomaticconsultations ledtoacompromise,owingtowhichindividu-alswhohadbeengranteddualcitizenshipbefore10April2003(thepresidentsofRussia andTurkmenistan signedaprotocol terminating thedual citizen-shipagreementonthatday)couldapplyfornewpassports.Thenewpassportswouldlateralsobemadeavailabletothosewhohadgainedtheirstatusafterthisdate,althoughnotlaterthantheprotocol’seffectivedate(Turkmenistanratifiediton22April2003,andRussiawasexpectedtodothisinautumn2013buttillFebruary2014itdidn’t;theprotocolwillcomeintoforcefollowingtheexchangeoftheratifyingdocuments)184.

183 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, ‘Turkmenistan getting closer to China’,EastWeek, OSW, 30No-vember 2011, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-12-01/turkmenistan-getting-closer-to-chinaFor„Libyanscenario”seee.g.:Евгений Минченко, ‘Ливийский сценарий для Туркмении’,http://www.rbcdaily.ru/politics/opinion/562949982814811

184 ThenewcitizenshipactfinallybecameeffectiveinTurkmenistanon3July2013.Article5,whichwasaddedafterconsultationswiththeRussianside,providesthatanyothercitizen-shipheldbyacitizenofTurkmenistan“shallnotberecognised”,andatthesametimeclari-fiesthatindividualswhoholdsuchcitizenshipshallbetreatedsolelyascitizensofTurk-menistan.Thustheexistenceofsuchindividualsbecamelegallyacceptable.By9July2013(thelastdayonwhichtheoldTurkmenpassportswerevalid)over6000individualshold-ingdualTurkmenandRussiancitizenshipssubmittedapplicationsforbiometricpassports,andover1000hadalreadyobtainedthenewdocument.ИТАР­ТАСС,9July2013.Thetextofthecitizenshipactisavailableat:http://www.chrono-tm.org/2013/07/opublikovan-zakon-o-grazhdanstve-turkmenistana/

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russia – turkmenistan

Moscow is capable of influencing the situation in Turkmenistan to onlyaminimalextent,sincethiscountryhaspursuedapolicyofself-isolationcombinedwithdiversificationoftherecipientsof itsoilandgasexports.RussiaisnotanimportantrecipientofTurkmenexports(thefirstpositionisheldbyChina,66%,followedbyUkraine,7%,andItaly,4.5%),althougha13%shareinimportsplacesitthirdafterChina(20.1%)andTurkey(17.5%;datafor2012)185.

4. russian-Kazakh relations

KazakhstanistheCentralAsiancountrywithwhichRussiahasalwayshadtheclosestrelations186.ThisistheonlycountryfromthisregiontohavebeenmentionedinsuccessiveConceptsoftheForeignPolicyoftheRussianFedera-tion(whereithasbeenreferredtointhecontextofintegrationprojectsforthepost-Sovietarea:Astanahasactivelyparticipatedinallsuchprojects,andhasinitiatedsomeofthem,althoughitsvisionofintegrationdiffersslightlyfromthatproposedbyMoscow).KazakhstanhasthelargestoildepositsintheCas-pianregion(alsotakingintoaccountAzerbaijan),andsignificantreservesofnaturalgas(comparabletoUzbekreserves;onlyTurkmenistanhaslarger).Itisalsotheregion’sonlycountrytoborderdirectlyonRussia187.ForthisreasonMoscowseesitasanaturalbarrierseparatingitfromthreatscomingfromthesouth(terrorists,drugsandextremistideas),anditplaysanimportantroleintheareaofsecurity.Kazakhstan’ssouthernborderisdescribedbysomeRus-sianexperts as the southernstrategic frontierof theRussianFederation188.Russiaaccountsforupto38.4%ofKazakhexports(firstaheadofChina,sec-ondwith16.8%,andUkraine,thirdwith6.6%)and7.3%ofitsimports(fourthafterChinawitha17.9%share,Italywith16.8%andHollandwith8.1%;datafor2012)189.

185 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tx.html186 Thiscountryisoftentreatedseparatelyfromthisregion.Theterm‘MiddleAsiaandKa-

zakhstan’wasusedintheUSSR.187 Thelengthoftheborderbetweenthetwocountriesis6846km(althoughthefigureof7512

kmisalsoprovidedinsomesources).TheKazakhgovernmentviewsthecountry’slocationandvastareaasbeingtoitsbenefit,offeringtransitservicestoitsneighbours.

188 Дмитрий Тренин,‘Post-Imperium...’,op. cit.,page180.189 http://www.stat.kz/digital/vnesh_torg/Pages/default.aspx

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4.1. russia’s assets

The military presence

Anumberofmilitaryfacilities,whichareessentialforRussia’sdefence,haveremainedinKazakhstansincethecollapseoftheUSSR.Atpresent,thetotalareaofthemilitaryfacilitiesleasedbyRussiainKazakhstanis11millionha.

TheBaikonurcomplex190(consistingofacosmodromeofthesamenameandthecityofBaikonur,formerlyknownasLeninsk)islocatedinKyzylordaprov-ince,totheeastoftheAralSea.ThefirstBaikonurleaseagreementwassignedin1994fora20-yearterm.In2004,theleasewasextendeduntil2050,atanannualcostofUS$115million.RussialaunchesSoyuzandProtontyperockets,carryingorbitalcomplexes.21rocketlauncheswerecarriedouttherein2012,thelargestnumberintheworld191.

the case of baikonur

Russia’s Ministry of Defence transferred individual units forming theBaikonurcomplextoRoskosmos(RussianFederalSpaceAgency)between1997and2011.Atpresent,thefollowingRussianenterprisesoperatethere:a branch of the Rocket and Space Corporation Energia (RSC Energia),abranchoftheProgressStateResearchandProductionRocketandSpaceCentre(TsSKBProgress),abranchoftheKhrunichevStateResearchandProductionSpaceCentre and theCentre forOperationof SpaceGround--BasedInfrastructure(TsENKI).

In2012,Kazakhstandidnotallowtheplannedlaunchofseveralsatellites,playingfortimeduringarrangementsconcerningthelocationswherethelauncherswouldreturntoearth192.TalgatMusabayev,theheadoftheKa-zakhspaceagencyKazkosmos,saidinDecember2012thatAstanaandMos-cowwereconsideringanewagreementwhichwouldenvisageagradualre-placementofleasingthefacilitieswithcommonusethereof(Russiawould

190 Formally,untilrecently,the5thStateTestingGroundoftheRussianMinistryofDefence.191 http://novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/news/4209/ TheUSSpaceCentreonCapeCanaveralinFloridawasrankedsecond,with10launches.192 Ольга Самофалова, ‘На правах хозяина. Казахстан мешает России выполнять запуски

сБайконура’,Vz.ru,26May2012,http://vz.ru/economy/2012/5/26/580679.html

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relinquishitsjurisdictionoverthecityofBaikonurtoKazakhstan)193.ThentheKazakhgovernmentapprovedthescheduleforProtonrocketlaunches,reducingtheplannednumberoflaunchesfrom17to12,thusexposingRus-siatolossesreachingofUS$500million(thecostofwithdrawalfromtheinternationalcontractsalreadyconcluded).Inresponse,Russia’sMinistryofForeignAffairsaddressedanote toAstana threateningpossiblewith-drawalfromanumberofjointspaceprojects(includingtheBaiterekcom-plexproject)194.Theconflictwastemporarilyresolved: followingthefirstmeetingofthenewlyestablishedRussian-Kazakhintergovernmentalcom-missionforBaikonuron28March2013,Russia’sdeputyprimeministerIgorShuvalovstated that therewerenodisagreementsbetween the twopar-ties,andthelaunchplanfor2013hadbeenfinallyapproved.Inturn,Ka-zakhstan’sdeputyprimeminister,KairatKelimbetov,statedthatAstanadidnotintendtorevisetheleaseagreement195.ItcannotberuledoutthatKazakhstanwantedtoinduceRussiatoincreaseitsfinancialshareinjointspaceprojectsinthisway,orwaspossiblytestingMoscow’sdeterminationtoretainBaikonur.TheRussianpressstartedspeculatingthattherewereplans to lease the cosmodrome to theUSA (following the terminationofMoscow’slease)196.BaikonurwillloseitsimportanceforMoscowwhentheVostochnyCosmodrome,whichisbeingbuilt intheAmuroblast, isacti-vatedin2015–2018197.

193 ‘Решение о статусе „Байконура” могут принять после 2050 г, считают в ГД’,Ria.ru,10De-cember2012,http://ria.ru/science/20121210/914211038.html

194 Иван Чеберко, ‘Россия выдвинула ультиматум Казахстану на $500 млн’, Izvestia.ru,24January2013,http://izvestia.ru/news/543574

The Baiterek space launch complex is being built at Baikonur, using the cosmodrome’sinfrastructure.AKazakh-Russianjoint-stockcompanyinchargeofitsconstruction,andafurtheroperationwassetupin2005.Thecomplexisexpectedtocomeintooperationin2015(http://www.bayterek.kz/about/).

195 On4July2013,agroupofKazakhoppositionactivistsandrepresentativesofpoliticalpar-tiesappealedtothegovernmenttobanrocketlaunchesfromBaikonurandtocloseallsitesleasedbyRussia.Theoppositionactivistshighlightedtheriskofcontaminationofthenatu-ralenvironmentandthethreattolocalresidents.

196 TatianaSerwetnyk,‘KazachstandalejodKremla?’,Rzeczpospolita,30February2013.197 ‘В 2018 году Россия начнет космические запуски с „Восточного’,Infuture.ru,http://www.

infuture.ru/article/9019 Despitetheconstructionofthenewcosmodrome,MoscowintendstouseBaikonuruntil

theexpiryofitsleaseterm.Елена Объедкова, ‘Первую ракету с космодрома „Восточный” запустят в 2015 году’, Rg.ru, 4 April 2013, http://www.rg.ru/2013/04/04/popovkin-site.html

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TheothermilitaryfacilitiesleasedbyRussiainKazakhstanare198:

• anindependentradarnodeofthe3rdMissile-SpaceDefenceArmyoftheRus-sianAerospaceDefenceForces(aspecialistradar,theso-calledBalkhash9site).ItislocatedinPriozerskbyLakeBalkhashnorthofAlmaty.Itispartoftheunitedmissiledefencewarningsystem.Italsoregistersthetechni-calparametersofthecombatmissilecomplexesbeingtestedattheSary-Shagansite199;

• the 10th State Testing Range of the Russian Ministry of Defence (Sary--Shagan).ThissiteextendsoverareaslocatedinfourprovincesofKazakh-stan(600kmfromeasttowestand250kmfromnorthtosouth200);

• the929thChkalovStateFlight-TestCentreof theRussianMinistryofDe-fence. Its headquarters are located in Russia’s Astrakhan oblast, but itstestinggrounds(numbers85,171and231)aresituatedinnorth-westernKa-zakhstan;

• the5580thBaseforSecuringResearchWork(former11thStateTestingRangeoftheRussianMinistryofDefence,attheEmbasite).Airdefenceweaponsareresearchedandtestedatthisbase.

• an Independent Air Transport Regiment of the Russian Air Forces sta-tionedatKostanayairport.Itprovidestransportservicesfortheneedsoftheaforementionedmilitaryfacilities.

Thecurrenttotalannual leaserentforall thesites inKazakhstanisUS$27.5million.

198 ‘Военные объекты, арендуемые Россией за рубежом’,Ria.ru,11December2012,http://ria.ru/spravka/20121211/914287081-print.html?ria=vqi2j1k4o8pcskkmornk3v7o6mknpmfi

199 Thenode isownedbyKazakhstan; thevalueof therentpaidbyRussia for itsuse isnotknown.On 29 January 2013, the defenceministers of Russia andKazakhstan signed anagreementsettingupajointregionalairdefencesystem(liketheoneRussiahadpreviouslycreatedwithBelarus).

200 ‘Военные базы России за границей. Справка’,Centrasia.ru,16February2010,http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1266297300

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The economic presence

Russia’seconomicpresence inKazakhstan,as inUzbekistanandTurkmeni-stan,ismainlyfocusedontheprimarysectors.Russianentitiesareprincipallyinterestedintheproductionandtransportofrawmaterials.Theirgoal is tohelpRussiaremain thedominant transitcountry (althoughno longeramo-nopoly)whileinvestingrelativelysmallfunds.Kazakhstanhasbeenmakingconsistent,albeit smallsteps inorder todiversify its transportroutes201.AnoilpipelineconnectingthefieldsbytheCaspianSeawithwesternChinawaslaunchedin2006.Anewopportunitytoexportnaturalgasviatheextendedgas pipeline fromTurkmenistan to China (running viaUzbekistan andKa-zakhstan)isalsoopeningup.Inthemediumterm,KazakhstanmaybecomeRussia’skeycompetitorontheEuropeanandChinesemarkets,withexportslevelsreaching150milliontonnesofoilannually.

luKoil in Kazakhstan

LUKoilisRussia’skeyplayerontheoil&gasmarket;ithasbeenpresentinKazakhstansince1995,andhasinvestedoverUS$4.7billioninthiscountrythusfar.Thecompanyaccountsforatenthofthecountry’shydrocarbonoutput,anditsassetsinKazakhstanformalmost90%ofallitsforeignas-sets.LUKoilparticipatesinsevenproductionprojects(asLUKOILOverseasinsixof them),andisashareholder intheCaspianPipelineConsortium(CPC),whichbuilt,operatesandwilldeveloptheCPCoilpipeline(Tengiz–-Novorossiysk,viatheLukarcocompany).Theseprojectsare:

–theKumkolfieldinKyzylordaprovince.TheprojectisoperatedbyTurgaiPetroleum(LUKoilandChina’sCNPCholda 50%stakeeach in this com-pany;ajointventurewassetupwithKazakhstan’sPetroKazakhstan).Thefieldoperationcontractwassignedfora25-yeartermin1996.Itsoutputin

201 Twelveyearsago,PresidentNazarbayevmentionedthisinaninterviewforthePolishdailynewspaperGazeta Wyborcza: “Kazakhstan ismakingefforts so that futurepipelineswillruninvariousdirections,andnotonlyviaRussia,asisthecasenow.WehavebackedtheBaku–Ceyhanproject, andourparticipation in itwilldependon theprofitabilityof thisinvestment,thetransitcharges,thesituationontheMediterraneanoilmarket,etc.Apipe-line running towesternChinawill alsobe important.However, this is aproject for thefuture;wehavenotreachedthenecessaryproductionlevelasyet.Lastbutnotleast,wearenotrulingoutarouterunningthroughIran.”‘MarzęoUniiEurazjatyckiej[zprezydentemKazachstanuNursułtanemNazarbajevemrozmawiająMarekJ.KarpiWojciechGórecki]’,Gazeta Wyborcza,23May2002.

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2012was2.14milliontonnesofoil(includingLUKoil’sshareof1.07milliontonnes)and222millionm3ofnaturalgas(LUKoil’sshare111millionm3)202;

–theKarachaganakfieldinWestKazakhstanprovince.Thisprojectisoper-atedbyKarachaganakPetroleumOperatingCompany,whereLUKoilholdsa13.5%stake.ThePSAwassignedin1997foraforty-years’term.Itsoutputin2012reached12.2milliontonnesofoil(includingLUKoil’sshareof1.4milliontonnes)and17.5bcmofnaturalgas(LUKoil’ssharebeing2.1bcm)203;

–theArmanfieldinMangystauprovince.TheprojectisoperatedbyAr-mancompany(LUKoilandChina’sSinopeceachholda50%stakeinit).Thefieldoperationcontractwassignedin1994fora30-yearterm.LUKoilhasparticipated in thisproject since2005. Itsoutput in2012 reached67,200tonnesofoil(includingLUKoil’sshareof39,500tonnes)and10millionm3ofnaturalgas(LUKoil’sshare4.6millionm3)204;

–theSevernyeBuzachifieldinMangystauprovince.TheprojectisoperatedbyJVBuzachi(50%ofitssharesareheldbyChina’sCNPCand50%byCas-pianInvestments,inwhichLUKoilandSinopeceachholda50%stake).Thefieldoperationcontractwassignedin1997fora25-yearterm.LUKoilhasparticipatedinthisprojectsince2005.Itsoutputin2012reached2milliontonnesofoil(includingLUKoil’sshareof0.5milliontonnes)and94millionm3ofnaturalgas(LUKoil’sshare23.5millionm3)205;

–theKarakudukfieldinMangystauprovince.TheprojectisoperatedbyKarakudukMunai(inwhichLUKoilandSinopeceachholda50%stake).Thefieldoperationcontractwassignedin1995fora25-yearterm.LUKoilhasparticipatedinthisprojectsince2005.Itsoutputin2012reached1.13mil-liontonnesofoil(includingLUKoil’sshareof0.57milliontonnes)and110millionm3ofnaturalgas(LUKoil’sshare56millionm3)206;

– theAlibekmolaandKozhasaifieldsformingoneproject inAktyubinskprovince.TheprojectisoperatedbyKazachoilAktobe(inwhichKazakh-stan’sKazMunaiGazholdsa50%stake,andLUKoilandSinopeceachhold

202 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/39.php203 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/61.php204 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/63.php205 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/64.php206 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/65.php

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a25%stake).Thefieldoperationcontractwassignedin1999fora25-yearterm.LUKoilhasparticipatedinthisprojectsince2005.Itsoutputin2012reached 1.25 million tonnes of oil (including LUKoil’s share of 313,000tonnes)and63millionm3ofnaturalgas(LUKoil’sshare16millionm3)207;

–theTengizandKorolevskoyefields(Tengizproject)inAtyrauprovince.Theproject isoperatedbyTengizchevroil.LUKoil(viaLukarco, inwhichitboughttheremaining50%sharesfromBPin2009)currentlyholdsa5%stakeinit(theothershareholdersare:Chevron–50%,ExxonMobil–25%andKazMunaiGaz–20%).Theprojectoperationcontractwassignedin1993fora40-yearterm.LUKoilhasparticipatedinthisprojectsince1997.TheoutputofthisoneofKazakhstan’srichestfieldsin2012reached24.2milliontonnesofoil(includingLUKoil’sshareof1.2milliontonnes)and11.7bcmofnaturalgas(LUKoil’sshareof0.6bcm)208;

Inadditiontothese,LUKoilhasacquiredstakesinseveralprojectscover-ingfields intheKazakhsectoroftheCaspianSea:Atash,Tyub-Karagan,YuzhnyZhambai&YuzhnoyeZaburunyeandKhvalynskoye209;

LUKoilalsoholdssharesintheCPCconsortium(Lukarcohasa12.5%stake).TheothershareholdersofCPCare:theRussiangovernment(representedbyTransneft,24%andKTKCompany,7%),atotalof31%shares,thegovern-mentofKazakhstan(representedbythestate-ownedcompanyKazMun-aiGaz),19%,ChevronCaspianPipelineConsortiumCo.,15%,MobilCaspianPipelineCo.,7.5%,Rosneft–ShellCaspianVenturesLtd.,7.5%,EniInterna-tional(N.A.)N.V.,2%,OryxCaspianPipelineLLC,1.75%,BGOverseasHold-ings Ltd., 2% and Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC (a joint venture ofKazMunaiGazandBP),1.75%210. In2012,thispipelinetransportedaround35milliontonnesofoil211.

207 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/67.php208 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/3988.php209 Marek Menkiszak, Ewa Paszyc, Iwona Wiśniewska, ‘Aktywność gospodarcza Rosji...’,

op. cit.LUKoil acquired the shares inKazakhoilAktobe,Buzachi,KarakudukMunaiandArmancompaniesaswellastherighttooperateatYuzhnyZhambaiandYuzhnoyeZabu-runye by taking over 100% control of the Bermuda-registered Nelson Resources Group,whichhadownedtheseshares,inOctober2005forUS$2billion.

210 http://www.cpc.ru/RU/about/Pages/shareholders.aspx211 http://lukoil-overseas.ru/projects/kazakhstan/3989.php

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RosneftholdssharesintwoprojectsinKazakhstan:theAdaiblockinAtyrauprovince(itandSinopecholda50%stakeeach)212andtheKurmangazyfield(theCaspianSeashelf,a25%stake)213.Bothprojectsareatinitialphasesofim-plementation.

Gazpromalsoparticipatesintwoprojects.ThefirstcoversthedevelopmentoftheresourcesoftheTsentralnayastructureontheCaspianSeashelf(Gazpromand LUKoil set up a company named CentrKaspNeftegaz, in which each ofthemholdsa50%stake;inturnthiscompanyholdshalfofthesharesintheproject,andtheotherhalfiscontrolledbyKazakhstan’sKazMunaiGaz).Thesecondproject,whichisataninitialphaseofimplementation,coverstheIma-shevskoyefieldlocatedontheKazakh-Russianfrontier.Pursuanttoaninter-governmentalagreementof2010,workonthisprojecthasbeenentrustedtoGazpromandKazMunaiGaz214.

GazpromnefthasbeenpresentinKazakhstansince2007.Currently,itcontrolsachainof50fillingstationsinthiscountry215.

RussiaisanactiveplayerontheKazakhuraniumminingandnuclearenergymarket216.AnothercompanyoperatingthereisCanada’sUraniumOnecompany,whosemainshareholder(51.4%oftheshares) isAtomredmetzoloto,aRussianholdingcontrolledbythestate-ownedcorporationRosatom.UraniumOne’sas-setsinKazakhstanincludea70%stakeinBetpakDalacompany,whichownstheAkdalamine(itsoutputin2012reached1095tonnes,includingUraniumOne’sshareof766tonnes)andtheYuzhnyInkaimine(1870tonnes,includingUrani-umOne’sshareof1309tonnes);a50%stakeinKarataucompany,whichownstheKarataumine(2135tonnes,includingUraniumOne’sshareof1068tonnes),anda50%stakeinAkbastaucompany,whichownstheAkbastaumine(1203tonnes,includingUraniumOne’s share of 601 tonnes); a 49.67% stake in Zarechnoyecompany,which owns theZarechnoyemine (942 tonnes, includingUranium

212 http://www.rosneft.ru/Upstream/Exploration/international/aday_kazakhstan/213 A50%stakeisheldbyKazakhstan’sKazMunaiGaz,andtheremaining25%havenotbeen

allocated. http://www.rosneft.ru/Upstream/Exploration/international/kurmangazy_ka-zakhstan/

214 http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/deposits/kazakhstan/215 See:http://www.gpnbonus.ru/our_azs/216 2872tonnesofuraniumwereminedinRussiain2012,whichaccountedforlessthan5%of

globaloutput(6thintheworld).Kazakhstanisfirst,havingproduced21,317tonnes(36.5%ofglobal output). http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Mining-of-Urani-um/World-Uranium-Mining-Production/#.UdmV7ztFCf9

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One’sshareof468tonnes)anda30%stakeinKyzylkumcompany,whichownstheKharasanmine(582tonnes,includingUraniumOne’sshareof175tonnes)217.RussiaalsobuysuraniumorefromKazakhcompanies.

On 29March 2011, Kazakhstan andRussia agreed on a comprehensive pro-grammeofco-operationintheareaofpeacefuluseofnuclearenergy,whichenvisagestheconstructionofanuclearpowerplantnearthecityofAktau218.AjointRussian-KazakhprojecttosetupaninternationaluraniumenrichmentcentreinRussia’sAngarsk,includingaproposaltoestablishaninternationalcentreforthedisposalofspentnuclearfuelandaninternationalnuclearfuelbank,wasinitiatedinMay2007219.RussiaalsosuppliesfueltoKazakhstan’stestreactors.Moscow’sactivityinthisareaisanattempttoconsolidatethenu-clearsectorinthepost-SovietareaunderRussiancontrol.WIththispurposeinmind,Russiahasbeenrebuildingoldco-operationcontactsandusingexist-ingpost-Sovietinfrastructure.WhatmaypreventMoscowfromachievingthisgoalarethestrengtheninginternationalcompetitionandfearssharedbysomestates(includingKazakhstan)thattheycouldbecomedependentonRussiaaspartofsuchnuclearco-operation,alsoapplyingtotheprimarysector220.

Russiancorporationsholdsharesinthecompaniesinvolvedintheproductionandenrichmentoflead-zincoresatAkzhalmine,andoperationofamolybde-nummine221andhardcoalmines222.

ThekeyRussianassetsintheelectricpowersectorincludea50%stakeheldbyInterRAOinEkibastuzStatePowerPlant2(acoalpowerplant,knownas

217 Databasedon:http://www.armz.ru/media/File/facts/2013/armz_annual_report_20120608_encr.pdfFormoreinformationonpreviousownershipshiftsintheuraniumproductionsector,seeMarekMenkiszak,EwaPaszyc,IwonaWiśniewska,‘AktywnośćgospodarczaRosji...’,op. cit.

218 http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/about/projects/perspective/vber_300/219 ThisinitiativewasputforwardbyRosatom’sCEO,SergeyKiriyenkoduringtheIAEA’sses-

sioninViennaon18September2007.RosatomandIAEAstruckadealtothiseffecton29March2010.Underthisdeal,alow-enricheduraniumstoragefacility(foronereactorwithacapacityof1000MW),whichpurchasescanbemadeatspotprices,wasbuiltinAngarsk.MarekMenkiszak,EwaPaszyc,IwonaWiśniewska,‘AktywnośćgospodarczaRosji...’,op. cit.

220 Ibid.221 Ibid.222 RusAl company and the Kazakh holding Samruk established a joint venture known as

BogatyrKomir,whichowns the largestbituminouscoaldeposits in theCIS (Ekibastuz).http://rusal.ru/press-center/files/RUSAL%20Media%20Pack%202011%20RUS.pdf

http://www.bogatyr.kz/ru/about/

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EGRES-2) inPavlodarprovince,whichproducesaround12%ofKazakhstan’senergy.Twoblocks,withacapacityof500MWeach,arecurrentlyinoperation.Twomoreblocksareplannedtobelaunchedby2015,althoughthistimetableisquiteunrealistic.PartoftheenergyproducedisexportedtoRussiaviatheEkibastuz–Barnaulpowertransmissionline(itwasrebuiltandputintoopera-tionthankstoaninvestmentmadebyInterRAOUESworthUS$1.5million)223.

In2008,Russia’sAvtoVAZ(themanufacturerofLadacars)boughtforaroundUS$80million25%plus1shareinAsiaAuto,Kazakhstan’slargestcarmanufac-turer(Lada,Kia,SkodaandChevroletmakes)224.

Russian entities are also present in other sectors of Kazakhstan’s economy,suchasthemobiletelecommunicationandbankingsectors.Upto9,201(28.5%)ofthe32,257registeredbusinessentities,branchesandagencieswithforeigncapitalrepresentRussianmoney225.

Soft power

InaccordancewithKazakhstan’sconstitution(Article7(2)),Russianhasan‘of-ficiallanguage’status.The‘trilingualism’programmehasbeenimplementedin Kazakhstan since 2007, and envisages that the country’s citizens shouldspeakthreelanguagesinthefuture:Kazakh,RussianandEnglish226.Accord-ingtothe2009census,84.8%residentsofKazakhstancouldwriteandspeakRussian(62%couldwriteandspeakKazakh,and7.7%English),andupto94.4%understoodRussian(74%Kazakhand15.4%English)227. ItwasdecidedinDe-cember2012 that theCyrillicscriptwouldbereplacedwith theLatin in thewrittenKazakhlanguageby2025,amovewhichisexpectedtosymbolisethecountry’sdecreasingdependenceonRussia228.

223 70%ofenergy importedviaRussiaoriginates fromKazakhstan.MarekMenkiszak,EwaPaszyc,IwonaWiśniewska,‘AktywnośćgospodarczaRosji...’,op. cit.

224 Ibid.225 Dataasof1January2013.Turkishcapitalisrepresentedby3918entities,Chineseby2782

entities and German by 1253 entities (http://www.stat.kz/digital/bizness_registr/Pages/arhiv_12.aspx).

226 ‘В Казахстане на госуровне принят культурный проект Триединство языков’,Centr­ asia.ru,24July2007,http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1185221100

227 http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2010/0443/panorm01.php#7 Accordingtodataasof2005,66%residentsofKazakhstanspokeRussianintheireverydaylife.228 Раушан Нуршаева, ‘Казахстан перейдет с кириллицы на „современную” латиницу’,

Ru.Reuters.com, 14 December 2012, http://ru.reuters.com/article/topNews/idRUMSE8B-D02D20121214

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RussianisstillapopularlanguageofinstructionatKazakhstan’sschools.Intheschoolyear2011/2012,ofatotalof7706generaleducationschoolsoperatinginthecountry(including7596publicschools),1508(19.5%)wereschoolswithRussianasthelanguageofinstruction.Adefinitemajorityofbi-andmulti-lin-gualschools(2163schools,i.e.28%)hadclasseswhereeducationwasprovidedinRussian229.RussianisthepredominantlanguageathighereducationschoolsandinscienceinKazakhstan;adefinitemajorityofPhDandpostdoctoralthe-sesarewritteninthislanguage230.SevenbranchesofRussianhighereducationfacilities, includingMoscowStateUniversity (since2001231) and theMoscowAviationInstitute232operatethere.

TheRussianminorityaccountsforovertwentypercentofthecountry’spop-ulation233. Numerous Russian organisations234 are active there, the largest(and oldest) ofwhich include the Semirechye Cossack Communitywith sixbranches235,theAssociationoftheSteppeCossacks(12branches)236,theLad Re-publicanSlavonicMovement(14branches)237, theRussianCommunityofKa-zakhstan(14branches)238,theSlavonicCultureCentre(7branches)239andtheRusichi RussianNationalYouthCultureCentre240.Someorganisationspublish

229 ThenumberofschoolswithKazakhasthelanguageofinstructionwas3843,i.e.almost50%.‘В Казахстане насчитали 3843 школы с казахским языком обучения и 1508 с русским’,News.nur.kz,25January2012,http://news.nur.kz/207313.html

Forcomparison,inthelastyearsoftheSovietera,onlytwoschoolswhereeducationwasprovidedinKazakhoperatedinAlma-Ata,thethencapitaloftheKazakhSSR.

230 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/linguafranca/1012040-echo/ IntheopinionofKazakhstan’sambassadortoRussia,GalymObrazbakov,Russianismore

widespreadthanKazakhinKazakhstan.Somepublicservants,oftenethnicKazakhs,donotknowthenationallanguage(ibid.).

231 http://www.msu.kz/index.php232 http://www.mai.ru/info/subfac/voshod233 In2009,ethnicKazakhsformedaround63%,andRussianslessthan24%ofKazakhstan’s

population.234 Dataon38organisationsisavailableonthewebsitesoftheRussianembassyinAstana(see

footnote29).235 Семиреченская казачья община,http://kazak-center.ru/index/0-64236 http://kazak-center.ru/news/roo_sojuz_kazakov_stepnogo_kraja_itogi_i_perspek-

tivy/2010-04-18-516237 Theorganisationstatesonthewebsitehttp://www.arvedi.kz/lad.htmlthatithas24branch-

es(althoughonly14arespecified)and50,000members.238 Thisorganisationstatesthatitformallyhas60,000members(howeveronly3000-4000of

themareactive),http://www.msrs.ru/organisations/kazakhstan/176/239 Thisorganisationhas5000members,http://www.slavcentr.kz/240 http://vserusskie.ru/org/?id=7216fc785998497187aaec87825c6b50

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theirownnewslettersandregularlyupdatetheirwebsites241,whileothersdonotpublicisetheiractivitysomuch.TheAssociationofRussian,SlavonicandCossackOrganisationsofKazakhstan,establishedin1999,consistsofover40organisations,andpublishestheRusskiy Vestnik weekly,withacirculationof5000copies242.

TwoagenciesofRossotrudnichestvo areactiveinKazakhstan(inAstanaandAl-maty).Theyco-operatewithleadingscientificandculturalinstitutionsinthiscountry243.TheRusskiy Mir FoundationrunsthreeRussiancentres,inAstana,Aktyubinsk andUst-Kamenogorsk244, and also supports teachers ofRussianandkeepscontactswithawiderangeofKazakhmediaandRussiannationalminorityorganisations.

Russianpredominates inKazakhstan’s informationspacetoanevengreaterextent than inKyrgyzstan.As there, theRussian language isused inmediaoriginatingfromRussia(whichisgenerallyaccessible)andlocalRussianme-dia(includingArgumenty i Fakty v Kazakhstane,Komsomolskaya Pravda Kazakh­stan)andKazakhRussian-speakingmedia (includingTVstations,whichal-locateasignificantportionoftheirairtimetoprogrammesandbroadcastsinRussian).Russianisalsothemostpopularlanguageamongnewsandanalyti-calinternetportals(forexample,Zonakz.net,Risk.kzandNewskaz.ru;thelatteralsohasaKazakhversion).PressagencyreportsareusuallymadeavailableinKazakh,RussianandEnglish(Interfax.kz)orinotherlanguageversions(Ka-zinformalsohasanArabicversiononitswebsite,Inform.kz)245.

InadditiontotheembassyinAstana,Russiaalsohasconsulates-generalinAl-maty, Uralsk andUst-Kamenogorsk. Furthermore, Bashkortostan, Dagestan

241 OtherexamplesofethnicRussianwebsitesinKazakhstanare:http://www.arvedi.kz/andhttp://www.rusazia.net/

242 http://www.msrs.ru/organisations/kazakhstan/174/243 http://kaz.rs.gov.ru/ Thiswebsite is frequently updated and publishes extensive information on all kinds of

eventsorganisedandco-organisedbyRossotrudnichestvo’sagencies.244 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=4325&cata

log=&country=79&region=&city=,http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=3522&catalog=&country=79&region=&city=,http://www.russ-kiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/catalogue/company_view.html?id=4324&catalog=&country=79&region=&city=

245 AnextensivecatalogueofwebsitesofKazakhmedia(includinglocal)canbefoundathttp://www.nomad.su/?z=1

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andTatarstanhaveseparateagencies.TheRussianTradeAgencyandanagen-cyoftheFederalCustomsServicealsooperateinthiscountry.

4.2. an outline of russian-Kazakh relations246

EthnicKazakhsdidnotformanabsolutemajorityinKazakhstanintheperiodimmediatelyprecedingthecollapseoftheUSSR.Accordingtothe1989census,theyaccounted for 39.7%of the republic’spopulation (Russianswere 37.8%).This unfavourable situation for the titular nation, alongwith the country’svastareaandlowpopulationdensity,wereamongthereasonswhyPresidentNursultanNazarbayevdecidedtomovethecapitalcityfromAlma-Ata(nowknownasAlmaty) in the southernpartof the country toAkmola (formerlyknownasTselinograd,andnowasAstana),whichislocatedfurthernorth,andsignificantlyclosertotheRussianborder,wheretheshareofethnicKazakhswasthelowest.Bymovingthecentraladministrationthere,ethnicKazakhshavereinforcedtheirpositioninthispartofthecountry(intheearly1990s,Russiannationalists,includingVladimirZhirinovsky,insistedonmanyocca-sionsthatnorthernKazakhstanshouldbecomepartofRussia).

Furthermore,Nazarbayevconcludedthattoensurestabilityandsecurityforhiscountry,themostbeneficialsolutionwouldbetomakeitpartofanetworkofvariouskindsofintegrationprojects.Kazakhstanhasactivelyparticipatedinallsuchprojects,andhas initiatedsomeof them.TheenlargedCommon-wealthofIndependentStates(beforethat,itsmemberswereonlytheSlavonicrepublicsofRussia,BelarusandUkraine)wasformedattheAlma-Atasummiton21December 1991. Furthermore, theEurasianEconomicCommunitywasestablishedon10October2000inAstana.Kazakhstan’spresidenthadalreadyputforwardtheideaofcreatingtheEurasianUnionin1994.OntheonehandthispolicywastheresultoffearofChinesedominationandawishtooutbal-anceChineseinfluence(Astanawasengagedincloseco-operationwithBeijingaspartoftheSCOandintheformatofbilateralrelations),whileontheotheritwasaconsequenceofthecountry’sdesiretobuilditsimageasapromoterofstabilityandinternationalco-operation,andasadistinctive,independenten-titywithsomeglobalambitions.ThevisionofKazakhstanasamulti-national

246 GiventheintensityofRussian-Kazakhcontacts(thepresidentsmeetseveraltimesayear,andcontactsatlowerlevels,includingbetweentheheadsofthefrontierregions,areequal-lyfrequent),thisoutlineisasanaturalconsequencemoregeneralthanthoseonRussia’srelationswithothercountriesinthisregion,andisfocusedonkeytrendsandtendencies.Theprecedingoutlinesweremoredetailedsinceitwasnecessarytopresentconcretecasestudies,suchastheoneconcerningRussia’splayingonthehydropowerplantissues.

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andmulti-culturalstate,fosteredbyNazarbayev,contributedtothat.HedidnotallowKazakhnationalismtodevelop,thuspreventingethnicconflictsandtension247.

TheseintegrationistideashavebringKazakhstanclosertoRussia.However,thetwocountrieshavedifferentvisionsfortheintegrationofthepost-Sovietarea.Nazarbayevset theboundaries for thisprocess (fromAstana’spointofview)on18January2013atameetingwiththeheadsofforeignmissionsac-creditedinKazakhstan,whenhestatedthatAstanaopposedthetransforma-tionofeconomicprojectsintoaplatformforpoliticalintegrationwithRussiaastheleaderandrepresentativeofthememberstates(thePresidenthassaidthat“thereisnoreturntotheUSSR”).Furthermore,unlikeMoscow,Astanadoes notwant supranational bodies to be created. Kazakhstan’s decision tostartusing theLatin script is a symbolic gesture in this context.Moreover,proofsofKazakhstan’sassertivenessanddeterminednessindefendingitsin-terestshave includedperiodical intensificationsof tensionbetween the twocountries,caused forexampleby theaforementionedcontroversiesover theBaikonurcosmodrome248.

Allthistakenintoaccount,Russian-Kazakhrelationscannevertheless(withsome reservations) be determined as partnership-based, which cannot besaid about Russia’s relations with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan andTurkmenistan249.Atthesametime,MoscowandAstanahaveconflictingeco-

247 Intheopinionofsomeexperts(forexample,asgiveninOSW’sconversationwithNikolaiKuzmin, a journalist from Expert weekly in Almaty, on 12 December 2011), Nazarbayevalsoviews this integrationasameansof resolving the country’sdomesticproblems; forexample,hehassometimesattemptedtoshifteconomicissuestotheleveloftheEurasianEconomicCommunity(EAEC)andsecurityissuestotheforumoftheCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganisation (CSTO),andatother times todialoguewithNATO.Astanahasalsodrawnon ‘Eurasian’ ideason suchoccasions,presenting themasanexplanation for thespecialcharacteristicsofthecountry,whichlikeRussiaissituatedontwocontinents(seefootnote38).Moreinformationonintegrationprojectswillbeprovidedinthenextchapter.

248 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, ‘Kazakhstan distances itself from Moscow’s integration pro-jects’, EastWeek, OSW, 23 January 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-ses/2013-01-23/kazakhstan-distances-itself-moscows-integration-projects

Before that, at theKazakh-Turkishbusiness forum in Istanbul on 12October 2012,Naz-arbayevsaid:“WhenthelastKazakhKhanwaskilledin1861,webecameacolonyoftheRussianEmpireandthenoftheSovietUnion.Kazakhshavenearlylosttheirnationaltradi-tions,customs,languageandreligionoverthepast150years.Weproclaimedourindepend-encein1991withthehelpoftheAlmighty.”http://inform.kz/rus/article/2502148

249 DmitriTreninhasnotedthat“forMoscow,Astanaisnotpartoftheproblem[securityinCentralAsia,addedbyWG]butakeyelementofthesolutiontoallproblemsofthisregion.”(Дмитрий Тренин,Post-Imperium...,op. cit.,page177).

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nomicinterests,andithasbeenimpossibletoremovetheexistingdifferencesoverthepasttwentyyears.Ashasalreadybeenmentioned,MoscowwantstomaintainitsdominantpositioninthetransportofCentralAsianoilandgastoglobal (aboveall,European)markets. Inturn,KazakhstanhasbeenmakingeffortstounderminethispositionandreduceitsdependenceonthetransportroutesrunningthroughRussia.Inthemediumterm,Russiawillmaintainandevenstrengthenitsposition(followingtheplannedincreaseinthetransportcapacityoftheTengiz–Novorossiyskoilpipeline250.Thissituationmaychangetowardstheendofthedecade,whenproductionattheKashaganfieldstartsandtheplannedlargeexportsofoilviatheCaspianSeacommence251.

Nevertheless,suchdisagreementsareunlikelytoaffectthecloseco-operationofthetwocountries,andtheemergingtensionwillmostprobablybesoothed(likebefore).Inadditiontothefactorsmentionedabove,thiswillbeinfluencedbytheirsharedfearofdestabilisationintheentireregionfollowingthewind-upoftheISAFmissioninAfghanistan,andinthecontextofapossiblesucces-sioncrisisinUzbekistan252.

250 TheCaspianPipelineConsortium(CPC),whichisthepipeline’sownerandoperator,final-lydecidedon15December2010toincreasetheroute’sannualcapacityfromthepresent28millionto67milliontonnesofoil.Currently,around75%ofKazakhstan’sexportedoilis transferredviaRussia (thepipeline running toNovorossiysk carries around40%ofKazakhoilexports).KazakhstanalsoexportsoilviatheCaspianSeaandtheCaucasus(around15%)anddirectlytoChina(around10%).ThegreaterpartofKazakhoil(around75%)issenttotheBlackSeabasin,fromwhereitisdirectedtointernational(includingEuropean)markets.

251 AleksandraJarosiewicz,‘RussiaasthemaincorridorforoilexportfromKazakhstan’,East­Week,OSW,29December2010,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-12-29/russia-main-corridor-oil-export-kazakhstan

252 A succession crisis is also possible in Kazakhstan itself. It is currently difficult to pre-dicthowpowerwillbetransferredandtowhatextentthenextleaderwillcontinueNaz-arbayev’spolicies(forexample,concerningthedegreeofparticipationinintegrationpro-jects,andwithregardtoethnicminorities).

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iii. the Multilateral and international context

1. central asia in Moscow’s integration initiatives

Theintegrationofthepost-SovietareaisatoppriorityissueinRussianforeignpolicy. TheConcept of the ForeignPolicy of theRussian Federation adoptedon12February2013providesthatMoscowwill“activelysupporttheEurasianeconomicintegrationprocess,workingtogetherwithBelarusandKazakhstantowards the transformation of the Eurasian Economic Community and theestablishmentof theEurasianEconomicUnion,contributetoengagementofotherEAECMemberStatesinthisprocess,takestepstofurtherdevelopandimprovemechanismsandthelegalandregulatoryframeworkoftheCustomsUnionand theCommonEconomicSpace,helpstrengthen theEurasianEco-nomic Commission as a common standing regulatory body of the CustomsUnionandtheCommonEconomicSpace.”TheEurasianEconomicUnion,alsoreferredtoas theEurasianUnion(EAU),which isplannedtobe thecrown-ingachievementoftheinitiatedintegrationprojects–astructuresimilartotheEuropeanUnion, albeitwith somemodifications– is expected “notonlytomakethebestuseofmutuallybeneficialeconomictiesintheCISspacebutalsotobecomeamodelofassociationopentootherstates,amodelthatwoulddeterminethefutureoftheCommonwealthstates.ThenewunionthatisbeingformedonthebasisofuniversalintegrationprinciplesisdesignedtoserveasaneffectivelinkbetweenEuropeandtheAsia-Pacificregion”253.

It canbeconcluded thatMoscowwants to cover theentireCISby thiskindofdeeperintegration.However,asprovenbytheexperiencesofthelasttwodecades,thisgoalappearsquiteunrealistic.Ineffect,the‘broad’integration,coveringa largernumberof countrieswillnotguarantee theestablishmentofcloserrelationsbetweenthem,while,apartfromRussia,onlytwoorthreecountriesatmostareinterestedinthe‘deep’integration.Moscowdoesnotcon-cealthatitwouldmostofallliketoseeUkraineinthestructuresithasbeencreating.However,atpresent,theonlypartnersRussiacanrelyonareKazakh-stanandBelarus,whichhavetakenpartinallitsinitiatives254.Theothertwomembers of the economic projects are currentlyKyrgyzstan andTajikistan

253 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D254 AlexeyMalashenkohasnotedthattheannouncedEAUiscurrently“aunionbetweenRus-

siaandKazakhstanwithweakandeconomicallyhelplessBelarustackedonbecauseitsgov-ernmenthopestouseitasameansforbuildingmoreadvantageousrelationswithRussia”(‘TheFightforInfluence...’,op. cit.,page49).

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(theyhavealreadyjoinedsomeofthestructures,andareexpectingaccessiontoothers;furthermore,itwasreportedon3September2013thatArmeniahaddecidedtojointheCustomsUnion255).IfnotfortheCentralAsianstates,Rus-sia’sonlyconstantpartnerwouldhavebeenBelarus.Therefore,Moscowneedsthisregioninthecontextofitsintegrationprojects.

Due toproblemswithreconciling the ‘broad’and the ‘deep’ integration, theRussiangovernmenthas,withouthavingdeclaredso, inpracticechosenthelatterversionatthebeginningofseconddecadeofthiscentury.OneproofofthiswasMoscow’sdeterminationandhasteinsettinguptheCustomsUnion256,whichwasofficiallyestablishedon1July2010butstillhasonlythreememberstates:Russia,KazakhstanandBelarus.On18November2011,thepresidentsofthesethreestatessignedadeclarationofeconomicintegrationbasedonWTOrulesandstandards(whichenvisagestheestablishmentoftheEurasianEco-nomicUnion257by thebeginningof2015)andanagreementestablishing theEurasianEconomicCommission(EEC)asthestandingregulatoryauthorityoftheCustomsUnionandtheCommonEconomicSpace.Thecommissionbecamethefirstsupranationaldecision-makingbody in thepost-Sovietarea (whosecompetencescoverthecurrentoperationoftheCUandtheCES)258.

255 SzymonAnanicz, ‘Armenia turnsaway from theEU’,EastWeek,OSW,4September 2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-09-04/armenia-turns-away-eu

256 Thefirsteconomicorganisationof formerSovietrepublicswastheCIS,aspartofwhichanumberofstructureswerealreadyestablishedinthemid-1990saimingattheintegra-tionoftheconsentingparties(theagreementenvisagingtheestablishmentofaneconomicunionof1993,the1994agreementonthefreetradezoneandthe1995agreementbetweenRussia,BelarusandKazakhstansettingupacustomsunion).Thesestructureswerenotputintooperation.On10October2000,Russia,Kazakhstan,Belarus,KyrgyzstanandTajik-istansetuptheEurasianEconomicCommunity(EAECorEurAsEC,inRussianЕвразийское экономическое сообщество, ЕврАзЭС),whichisstillformedbythesamemembers(Uzbek-istanbelongedtotheEAECin2006–2008).Itsgoalshaveincludedestablishingacommonmarketinitsmemberstatesbydevelopingasinglepolicyfortariffs,prices,customs,etc.Thenextstageofintegrationwasmarkedbytheestablishmenton1July2010oftheCustomsUnion(CU,inRussianТаможенный союз, ТС),whichcoveredtheEAEC’s‘hardcore’ofRus-sia,KazakhstanandBelarus.InternalcustomscontrolsintheCUareawereliftedoneyearlater.On9December2010,thepresidentsofthethreeCUmemberstatessignedadeclara-tionestablishing theCommonEconomicSpace (CES, inRussian Единое экономическое пространство, ЕЭП) aimed at a comprehensive economic integration of these countries.TheCESwaslaunchedon1January2012.NonewmembershavejoinedtheCUortheCESasyet(theseprojectsaremutuallyconnected;theCommonEconomicSpaceisaformatavail-abletothememberstatesoftheCustomsUnion).FormoreonRussianintegrationprojects,seeIwonaWiśniewska,‘EurasianIntegration.Russia’sattemptattheeconomicunificationofthePost-Sovietarea’,OSW Studies,no.44,July2013.

257 EAEU:inRussianЕвразийский экономический союз, ЕЭС.258 Furthermore,amonthbefore,on18October2011,anagreementsettinguptheFreeTrade

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Whilefocusingondeepeningrelationswithitsseveralclosestpartners,Mos-cowhasnotgivenuptheideaof ‘broad’integration,whichremainsitsstra-tegicgoal.Oneproofofthiswasthecampaignlaunchedinmidsummer2013toinduceUkraine,MoldovaandArmeniatojoinRussia’sintegrationprojects.

The integrationprojects are important forMoscow in two aspects: the eco-nomicandthegeopolitical. Ineconomicterms,theyareexpectedtobeare-sponseprimarilytoChina’seconomicexpansion.Asregardsgeopolitics,theyaresupposedtoprovethatRussiaisamajorpowerandofferitaspecifickindofcapital,andadvantageinrelationswithotherglobalplayers259.Ifallthepro-jectswereimplemented,RussiacouldgainthehegemonyitdesiresintheCISarea.However,morepost-Sovietcountrieswouldhavetoparticipateinthis,especiallyUkraine,andinCentralAsiaatleastKyrgyzstanandTajikistan,asmentionedbyVladimirPutin260.ThisiswhyMoscow,havingachievedthetem-porarysuccesswhichthebeginningsoftheCustomsUnion’soperationshouldbeseenas,hasnotgivenuptheideaof‘broad’,integrationandiscontinuingits efforts toattract these countries to theCustomsUnionand theCommonEconomicSpace261–whichhasgivenrisetosuspicionsthatitwantstorebuilditsempire262.Theseattempts(asshownbyvariousstatementsanddeclarations

Area(FTA,inRussianЗона свободной торговли, ЗСТ)forCIScountrieswassigned.ThecountrieswhichjoinedtheFTAwereRussia,Kazakhstan,Belarus,Armenia,MoldovaandUkraine,aswellasUzbekistaninspring2013.

259 Aleksandra Jarosiewicz,KamilKłysiński, IwonaWiśniewska, ‘CommonEconomic Space:anothersteptowardsintegrationfocusedonRussia’,EastWeek,OSW,15December2010:“Bystrengtheningandsolidifyingitsneighbours’interdependency,Russiamayactastherep-resentativeoftheentireblocofcountries(KazakhstanandBelarus)initsrelationswiththeEU,whichwillstrengthenMoscow’spositiontowardsBrussels.ForthisreasonRussiaisalsonowespeciallyconcernedwithmakingitsmodelforintegratingtheregion’sothercountriesappearconvincing,especiallytoUkraine(whichiscurrentlyuninterestedinthisproject).ThiswouldsignificantlyincreasethepotentialoftheCES,henceits importance.Bymov-ingtowardsthecreationoftheCES,Moscowisworkingtopresentitasanattractiveplanforintegrationinthisregion.”,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-12-15/common-economic-space-another-step-towards-integration-focused-russia

260 Inanarticlepublishedon3October2011inIzvestianewspaper,followingtheannouncementofhisdecisionthathewouldrunforthepresidencyagain:http://izvestia.ru/news/502761

261 ThisisimportantforMoscow,eventhoughthesearesmalleconomiesandunattractiveout-lets,anddespitethefactthatneitherBishkeknorDushanbeiscapableofimplementingtherequiredregulationsoreffectivelycombatingsmugglingontheCUborders,andregardlessofthefactthatthefreemovementofworkersislikelytoincreasethenumberofKyrgyzandTajikexpatriateworkersinRussia,whichcouldgiverisetonewsocialtensionsthere(seee.g.ArkadyMoshes, ‘WillUkraineJoin(andSave)theEurasianCustomUnion?’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo247,IV2013).

262 Forexample,theUSSecretaryofStateHillaryClintonspokeofthe“movetore-Sovietisethearea”(reconstructtheformerUSSR)duringlectureinDublinon6December2012.Uzbek-

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containingreferencestotheaforementionedforeignpolicyconcept)havebe-comemoreintensesincetheendof2012263.

Whatever the forecasts for the future operation of theCU, theCES and theEAEU, there are also opinions thatMoscow’s integration efforts could com-pletelyruin its influence inCentralAsiaandeven throughout theCIS264; itspartnersinthesestructuresarestronglyconcernedabouttheasymmetryofrelationsresultingfromthedisproportioninthepotentialsofRussiaandtheothermemberstates(forexample,Kazakhstan’sGDPisover11timessmallerthanRussia’s).Kazakhstan,asmentionedbefore,alsofearsthatMoscowcouldinsistonpolitical integration (PresidentNazarbayevhasemphasisedonnu-merousoccasionsthathiscountryisparticipatingsolelyinthecreationofaneconomicunion),whilethecandidatestojointhesestructures,KyrgyzstanandTajikistan,areafraidofbeingdominatedbyRussiaandKazakhstan(Bishkekseemsmorereadyforintegrationatpresent,whileDushanbeisusingtheex-cusethatithasnocommonborderwiththeCustomsUnionmemberstates265;expertsfromthesetwocountrieshavewarnedthattheiraccessiontotheCUwillentailaradicalincreaseinprices,partlyresultingfromtherequirementtoreducetradewithChina)266.TheaccessionofthetwosmallestCentralAsiancountries to theEurasian structureswould showMoscow’s real integrationpotentialbutalsoitslimitations;RussiaisnolongercapableofattractingUz-bekistanorTurkmenistan,whileKazakhstan’sparticipationintheprojectsistoagreatextentaresultofAstana’spolicyofbalancingtheChineseinfluence.

istan’sPresident IslamKarimovfiercelyopposedthe integrationprocesses (as leading tothereconstructionoftheempire)ayearbefore:‘Президент Узбекистана Ислам Каримов выступил против интеграционного процесса, инициированного Россией’,Fergananews.com,14December2011,http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=17790&mode=snews

263 Atpresent,Kyrgyzstanisthemostlikelytojointhisstructure,followedbyTajikistanandArmenia.MoscowstillviewsUkraine’sparticipationasvital:amemorandumonenhanc-ingco-operationbetweenUkraineandtheEurasianEconomicCommissionwassignedon31May 2013 (Tadeusz Iwański, SzymonKardaś, ‘Ukraine closer to the CustomsUnion?’,EastWeek,OSW, 5 June 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-06-05/ukraine-closer-to-customs-union).

264 AlexeyMalashenko,‘TheFightforInfluence...’,op. cit.,page53.265 Tajikistan,whichjoinedtheWTOon2March2013,isoftheopinionthatitsquickaccession

totheCUwouldnotofferitanytangiblebenefits,giventhissituation.266 IwonaWiśniewska, ‘Eurasian Integration...’,op. cit. Since theCustomsUnionwasestab-

lishedandthecustomsdutyrateswereraisedtothelevelapplicableinRussia,manygoods,includingfoodandcars,havealsobecomemoreexpensiveinKazakhstantothedissatisfac-tionofthepublic.(AleksandraJarosiewicz,‘Kazakhstandistances...’,op. cit.).

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2. the csto as a means of military and political integration

The raison d’être of the Eurasian Economic Community and all the entitieswhichhaveemergedfromitiseconomicintegration(regardlessofMoscow’sgeopoliticalgoals).Inturn,theCollectiveSecurityTreatyOrganisation(knownin1992–2002astheunionofcountries-partiestotheCollectiveSecurityTrea-ty)wasforgedasapoliticalanddefencealliance.Atthepeakofitspopular-ity, itsmembers included up to nine of the former Soviet republics, amongthemfourfromCentralAsia(allbutTurkmenistan),whichmadeitthesecondlargeststructureinthepost-SovietareaaftertheCIS.Inthe1990s,theCSTOguaranteedRussia,whichwasthedominantpower,thatitwouldmaintainitsinfluenceinthememberstateswhilebeingforcedtoreduceitsfinancialout-lays.Thisinfluencewasmanifestedespeciallythroughthemilitarypresence(bases)andalso thepartners’dependenceonRussianweapons (whichweresuppliedtothematattractiveprices).Fortheirpart,theothermemberssharedthebelief,whichhasweakenedovertime,thatinexchangefortheirloyaltyMoscowisready toguarantee themsecurity.Theyhavealsobenefited fromsuppliesofweaponsanduniforms,trainingatRussianmilitaryacademies,etc.

Russia’spositionwasreinforcedwhentheunionofstateswastransformedin2002intoafull-scaleinternationalorganisation.OnlythencouldittalktotheUSA,whichledthecoalitionoperationinAfghanistan,asanequalpart-nerandtheleaderofagroupofstates;thereorganisationoftheCSTOandtheconsolidationoftheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisationwererespectivelytheresponsesfromRussiaandfromRussia&ChinatotheemergenceoftheWest,andespeciallytheUnitedStates,asanewmajorplayerinthisregion.TheCollectiveOperational Reaction Forces (CORF)267, consisting of around4000 soldiers,were established in 2009 as part of the CSTO. These forceshavetakenpartinanumberoflarge-scaleexercises.Meanwhile,thenum-ber of the CSTOmember stateswas reduced to six (periodically seven268),three(orfour)ofwhichrepresentedCentralAsia.RussiawasstillaimingtomonopolisethecollectivesecuritysysteminCentralAsia,andtoreceivethestrongestpossiblemandateforitsactions.Forexample,thedeclarationofco-operationbetweentheCSTOandtheUNsignedon18March2010servedthispurposes,asitmeantanacknowledgementoftheCSTO’sabilitytocontributetosecurityatagloballevel.

267 CollectiveRapidReactionForcespreviouslyexistedaspartoftheCSTO.Inlate2007/early2008theyconsistedof10battalions:5Russian,2Kazakh,2Tajikand1Kyrgyz.

268 Uzbekistanrejoinedtheorganisationbetween2006and2012.

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ThepassivestancetakenbytheCSTO(andRussiaitself)ontheUzbek-Kyrgyzethnicclasheswhichbrokeouton10June2010insouthernKyrgyzstanhasundermined the organisation’s reliability. On 12 June, Kyrgyzstan’s actingpresident,RozaOtunbayeva, askedRussia tobring itspeacekeeping forcesintotheconflictarea.However,Moscowruledoutgettinginvolved,restrict-ing itsmoves to sendingmorepersonnel to theKantairbase. In turn, thesecretaries of the security counsels of the CSTOmember states, who hadgatheredatanemergencymeetinginMoscow,promisedonlymilitary-tech-nical(excludingweaponsupplies)andlogisticassistancetoBishkek.Russia’sdecisionnottosenditsmilitarycontingentcouldhavebeencausedbyresist-ancefromitspartners(especiallyUzbekistan,butalsopossiblyKazakhstan).Nevertheless, themost likelyreasonseems tobeMoscow’s insufficientde-termination,resultingfromafearofbecominginvolvedinalong-lastingandviolentethnicconflict,whichwouldhaveentailedhighfinancialcostsandriskedalossofface269.

TheofficialreasonfornottakinganyactionatallwasthefactthattheCSTO’sstatute did not provide for an intervention in case of an internal crisis inamemberstate;interventionwasreservedonlyforexternalthreats,apretextMoscowusedtoreinforcethisformula.Thecrisisreactionstrategyadoptedattheendof2010alreadyenvisagedjointactionstoprotectstabilityofthemem-berstates,andthe‘StanceontheprinciplesofemergencyresponsefromthememberstatesoftheCSTO’,adoptedoneyearlater,providedforthepossibilityofusingtheCollectiveOperationalReactionForcesinsituationswhereagiv-encountryisunabletoovercomethecrisisbyitself270.ThusRussiagainedaninstrumentwhichallowedittolegallylaunchaninterventioninanypartnerstate.Itseemsthatthisinstrumentwaspreparedincasethe‘ArabSpring’,oranotherwaveofpublicprotestsandrevoltsfollowingtheso-called ‘colouredrevolutions’thatMoscowfeared,spilledontothepost-Sovietarea.SincethesefearsweresharedbytheleadersofotherCTSOmemberstates,especiallythosefromCentralAsia,nooneopposedtheadoptionofthe‘Stance’.

269 WojciechGórecki,‘Russia’spositionon…’,op. cit.270 ‘События в Кыргызстане подвигли ОДКБ к принятию нового Положения о порядке

реагирования на кризисную ситуацию’,Kyrtag.kg,10December2010,http://www.kyrtag.kg/?q=ru/news/2734

‘В Москве прошла очередная сессия Совета коллективной безопасности ОДКБ’,Regnum.ru,20December2011,http://www.regnum.ru/news/1481734.html

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Pursuant to the CSTO’s statute, its member states consult and coordinatetheirpositionsonforeignpolicyissuesandregionalsecurityproblems271.InDecember2011,theleadersoftheorganisation’smemberstatesagreedthatthird-partymilitary bases could only be deployed on their territories fol-lowingconsultationswiththeotherpartners272.ThiswasasuccessforRus-sia,sincetheUnitedStatescouldnotentrenchitsmilitarypresenceinKyr-gyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan after the Afghanmission ended (thisdidnot concernUzbekistan,which left theCSTOhalf a year later), unlessMoscowagreedto it.MeanwhileRussia,withouthavingconsultedanyone,opened a transit base in Ulyanovsk for the needs of NATO in September2012273.RegardlessoftheassurancesthatNATOwouldonlybeallowedtousethecivilianfacilitiesthere,thisprovesthatMoscowtreatstheCSTOanditscommitmentstoitsalliesasitseesconvenient.

Aswitheconomicintegration,Russia’smilitaryandpoliticalco-operationpro-jects are to a great extentbasedonCentralAsia.Threeoutof the sixCSTOmemberstatesarefromthisregion.TheISAFwithdrawalfromAfghanistanwillbeatestoftheirloyaltytoMoscow.Itcannotberuledoutthattheycouldresort to formal and legal tricks to legalise some form ofWesternmilitarypresenceontheirterritoriesafter2014inexchangeforfinancialandmaterialbenefits(suchasweaponsleftbythewithdrawingarmies,whicharemoreat-tractivethanRussianarms).

TheeconomicandmilitarycomponentsmayalsobecomepartoftheEurasianEconomicUnion/EurasianUnioncurrentlybeingformed.However,itisquiteunlikelythat theCSTOwillbedisbandedafter theunionhasbeenformallysetup.Inturn,theexistenceoftheEurasianEconomicCommunity,andprob-ablyalsooftheCustomsUnionandtheCommonEconomicSpace,maybecomepointless.

271 http://www.dkb.gov.ru/b/azg.htm272 http://www.odkb.gov.ru/session_fortnight/a.htm273 http://politykawschodnia.pl/index.php/2012/09/25/natowski-tranzyt-przez-rosje-juz-mo-

zliwy/See the sectiondiscussing theprospectsofwindingup the ISAFmissionbelow in thischapter.

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3. Moscow vs. the region in the context of the sco

TheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisationwasestablishedin2001asaconse-quenceofthetransformationofthe‘ShanghaiFive’(formedbyChinaandtheformerSovietrepublicswhichborderedonit:Russia,Kazakhstan,KyrgyzstanandTajikistan274),whichUzbekistanjoinedaswell.Theorganisation’smakeuphasnotchangedsincethen,butfiveothercountrieshavebeengrantedobserv-erstatus(Mongolia, India, Iran,PakistanandAfghanistan),andthreemore‘partnerindialogue’status(Belarus,SriLankaandTurkey).

ThetasksoftheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisationincludepromotingsta-bilityinthememberstates(especiallyinCentralAsia)andgoodneighbourlyrelationsbetween them; jointlycombating the ‘threeevils’ (separatism, ter-rorismandextremism);fosteringeffectiveregionalco-operationinallareas(includingpolitics,tradeandeconomy,defence,scienceandtechnology,cul-ture, etc.); establishing andmaintaining relationswith other countries andinternational organisations. On the one hand, the very broad spectrum oftheSCO’sgoalsmakesthisorganisationamorphous,andontheotherallowsagreatvarietyofinitiativestobeimplementedaspartofit(security,economy,transport,protectionofthenaturalenvironment,andmanyothers).

The Shanghai Co-operationOrganisation aspires to be Eurasia’s leading or-ganisation(theareasofallitsmemberstatestakentogetherform60%ofEura-sia’s territory) and to counterbalance theglobaldominanceof theUSA (andespeciallytheUSmilitarypresenceintheregion)275.TheambivalentattitudetowardsthecoalitionofpowerspresentinAfghanistan(inpractice–towardstheUnitedStates),asrepresentedbyChinaandRussia,whichpredominateinthis organisation, has beenmanifested in the above-mentioned declarationadoptedon5July2005attheSCOsummitinAstana,whichstated:

Giventhefactthattheactivewarphaseoftheanti-terroristoperationhasbeenclosed,thememberstatesoftheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisationbelievethat it isnecessaryforrelevantparticipantsoftheanti-terroristcoalitiontodeterminethefinaltimeframeoftheirtemporaryuseoftheaforementioned

274 Theaimofthe‘Five’wastosettleborderissuesbetweenChinaanditsneighbours.275 KrzysztofStrachota, ‘TheSummitoftheShanghaiCo-operationOrganisation’,EastWeek,

OSW, 13 June 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-06-13/summit-shanghai-cooperation-organisation

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infrastructurefacilitiesandpresenceoftheirmilitarycontingentsintheSCOmemberstates.

Howeveritwasalsostatedthat“Wesupportandwillcontinuesupportingtheeffortsoftheinternationalcoalitionengagedintheanti-terroristoperationinAfghanistan.”276

Anumberofspecialistagendasandco-operationprogrammesexistaspartoftheorganisation.TheRegionalAnti-TerroristStructure(SCORATS)277formedon7June2002isinchargeofcoordinatingthememberstates’fightagainstter-rorismandextremism(forexample,acommondatabasehasbeencreatedanddraftinternationallegalsolutionsinthisareahavebeenprepared).Anti-ter-roristmilitaryexercises(since2003)andannualexercisescodenamed‘Peace-keepingMissions’,inwhichprimarilyChineseandRussianunitsparticipate,havebeenheldsince2005aspartoftheSCO278.

InSeptember2003, thegovernmentheadsof theSCOmemberstatessigneda‘ProgrammeofMultilateralEconomicandTradeCo-operation’tolasttwen-tyyears.Itenvisagedboostingtrade,aswellasco-operationinsuchareasasenergy,transport,agricultureandtelecommunications,etc,andinthelongerterm,establishingafreetradeareawithintheframeworkoftheorganisation.However, these provisions have remained mere declarations. The BusinessCouncilconsistingofrepresentativesoftheSCOmemberstates’financialcir-cleswasformedinJune2006.AproposaltosetupanSCOEnergyClubwasmadeinDecember2012.Manymoresuchinitiativeshavebeenputforward.

China and Russia view the SCO as a convenient forum for striking dealsandneutralising tension inCentralAsia.Beijinghasbeenmakingefforts tostrengthentheinstrumentsavailabletotheSCOintheareasofeconomicco-operationandsecurity(theEconomicDevelopmentFundwasestablisheduponits initiative).Meanwhile,Moscowisopposedtothis,as it fearsthatChina’spotentialandvigourcouldthwartitsownintegrationprojects.Toavoidcom-petitionbetweentheSCOandtheEAEC/CES,whicharemadeupofasimilarsetofmembers(whereRussiaanditsimitatedstructureswouldcertainlybe

276 http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/deklaratsiya-glav-gosudarstv-chlenov-shankhaiskoi-or-ganizatsii-sotrudnichestva_1341805545

277 http://www.ecrats.com/ru/rats_history/1805278 ‘Максим Семенов, Российско­китайские учения „Мирная миссия­2013” завершились на

Урале’,Vz.ru,15August2013,http://vz.ru/news/2013/8/15/645837.html

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lessappealingthantheChineseoffer),Moscowsupportsco-operationbetweenthese two formats279,which in turn iscontrary toChina’s interests.For thisreason,Beijingpreferstofocusonbilateraleconomicrelations,whilenotgiv-ingupitsattemptstotaketheinitiativeattheSCO,whichisalsoanessentialmatterofprestigeforChina.Russiaseesthepoliticalcomponentoftheorgani-sationasmoreimportant,asbalancingChina’sinfluenceand,jointlywithChi-na,US influence in theregion.Asregards themilitarycomponent,Moscowdefinitelyprefersco-operationwiththeCentralAsiancountriesaspartoftheCSTO,whichisunderitscontrol(preservingthemonopolyon‘hard’securityintheregionisvitalforit).TheconflictbetweenthetwovisionsoftheSCOhasadverselyaffectedtheorganisation’seffectiveness.However,participationinithascontributed–atleastthusfar–tothepreventionofopenconflicts,espe-ciallybetweenRussiaandChina280.

4. the perspective of winding up the isaf mission in afghanistan

TheabilitytorespondtocontinuinginstabilityinCentralAsia,andtothede-velopmentofthesituationinAfghanistaninthecontextofthewithdrawalofthe ISAFmission fromAfghanistanandof theUSpresence fromtheregionafter2014,willbeatestforboththeSCOitselfandfortheinfluenceofRussiaandChinainthisorganisation.Thiswillalsobeatestforotherregionalor-ganisationsand,lastbutnotleast,forthegovernmentsofalltheCentralAsiancountriesindividually.ThepossibilitythatselectedUSunitswillremaininAf-ghanistan(includingattheBagrambase)hasmetwithan(officially)negativereactionfromRussiaandareservedresponsefromChina,whiletheCentralAsiancountrieshaveadoptedanambiguousstance.ItseemsthatUzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan,andprobablyalsoTajikistanwouldbereadytoacceptthepresenceofUSmilitaryfacilitiesontheirterritoriesfirstlyforsecurityreasons(fearoftheTalibanandthethreatsspreadingfromAfghanistan:radicalIslam,terror-ismanddrugs),andsecondlyforfinancialreasons(leasingfees,andpossibly

279 MarcinKaczmarski,‘Thebear...’,op. cit.,page30-31.280 AsAlexeyMalashenkohasnoted,“TheCentralAsiancountrieswouldbefacedwiththe

dilemmaofdecidingwhethertheSCOortheEurasianUnionwouldofferthemthegreaterbenefits,inessencehavingtotacitlychoosebetweenChinaandRussia.”AlexeyMalashen-ko,‘TheFightforInfluence...’,op. cit.,pages64.Inanothersection,hewrites:“ThedynamicofChina’sutilizationoftheSCOhasbeenstraightforwardandconsistent:atthefirststagewasthe“ShanghaiFive”tosettleborderdisputes;thesecondstagewasitstransformationintotheSCOtoprovideabasisforeconomiccooperation;andthethirdstagehasbeentograduallyacquireapoliticaldimension.China’srolehasgrownateachstage,asevidencedbythewaythattheemergingoutlineoftheSCO’scooperationwiththeUnitedStateshasbeguntoappearclosertoakindofU.S.-Chinesecooperation.”(Ibid.,page70).

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militaryequipment, training, etc.)281.At the same time, since the latter twocountriesbelongtotheCSTO,theymustobtainMoscow’sconsenttothis.

RegardlessofMoscow’sresistancetothecontinuationoftheUSforces’pres-enceinAfghanistanafter2014,alikelihoodexpressedonnumerousoccasions,thisscenario isseenasbeneficialbyRussia,sinceotherwiseRussiantroops(andthoseofRussia’salliesfromtheCSTO)willfindthemselvesonthefrontlines(assumingthatAfghanistanbecomesahotbedofaggressive,expansiveextremism).ThisisdirectlystatedintheConceptoftheForeignPolicyoftheRussianFederationof12February2013:

TheongoingcrisisinAfghanistanandtheforthcomingwithdrawalofinter-nationalmilitarycontingentsfromthecountryposeagreatsecuritythreattoRussiaandotherCISmembers.TheRussianFederationtogetherwithAfghani-stanandconcernedcountries,theUnitedNations,theCIS,theCSTO,theSCOandothermultilateralinstitutionsincludingRussia-NATOprojects,willmakeconsistentefforts tofinda justand lastingpoliticalsolutiontotheproblemsfacedby this countrywithdue respect for the rights and interests of all itsethnicgroupsandachieveapost-conflictrecoveryofAfghanistanasapeace-lovingsovereignneutralstatewithstableeconomy.Comprehensivemeasuresto reduce terrorist threat from Afghanistan and eliminate or reduce illicitdrugproductionandtrafficinasignificantandmeasurablemannerwillbeanintegralpartofthoseefforts.Russiaiscommittedtofurtherintensifyingin-ternationaleffortsundertheauspicesoftheUNaimedathelpingAfghanistananditsneighbouringstatestomeetthesechallenge.282

Asalreadymentioned,RussiamadethetransitbaseinUlyanovskavailabletoNATOinSeptember2012;thisfitswithMoscow’sambivalentstanceonitsco-operationwithWashington,whichcanbesummedupas“ideologicalconfron-tation and pragmatic co-operation”283. This co-operation covers the Afghan

281 SomehintsofthishavealsobeenmadebyKazakhstan.On26April2013,ataconferenceofforeignministersoftheso-calledIstanbulProcessregardingAfghanistan,PresidentNaz-arbayevsuggestedthattheCaspianportofAktaucouldbeusedbyNATOmemberstatesasanISAFmissiontransitport.Wiadomości,OSW,29April2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/wiadomosci/2013-04-29

282 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D283 WitoldRodkiewicz,‘Ideologicalconfrontationandpragmaticco-operation–Moscow’sre-

cipe for its relationswithWashington’,EastWeek, OSW, 6March 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-03-06/ideological-confrontation-and-pragmatic-co-operation-moscows-recipe

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issueamongothers.Whenstatingthereasonsforopeningthebase,atameet-ingwithsoldiersfromairborneunitsstationedinUlyanovsk,PresidentPutinsaidthatassistancehadtobeofferedtoNATOforcesfightinginAfghanistansothatitwouldnotbenecessarytosendRussiantroopsthere.However,healsoexpressedhisregretthatthestatesengagedintheoperationweremainlycon-cernedabouthowtheywouldwithdrawfromthere:“Theyhaveassumedsomeresponsibilities,sowhywouldtheynotbringtheissuetoaconclusion?”284.Fur-thermore,MoscowalsomadeitsterritoryavailableforthetransitneedsoftheISAFoperationforfinancialreasons(transitcharges),andbecauseitwantedtorestricttransitviatheCentralAsiancountries285.

Russiaistakingvariousscenariosintoaccount,andispreparingitselfforvari-ouspossibilities,oneproofofwhichisitsactiveengagementinabroadvarietyofAfghanistan-related initiatives,asobservedsince theendof thepreviousdecade,suchasitssuccessfulattempttogetAfghanistangrantedobserversta-tusattheSCO(thistookplaceatthebeginningofJune2012).ItappearsthatMoscow thuswanted to createanotherplatform fordialoguewithAfghani-stan,andalsotohaveanothermeansofinfluenceonthiscountry(especiallyifUSforcesremainthere).Anotherformatsetupin2009istheannualmeet-ingsof thepresidents ofRussia,Afghanistan,PakistanandTajikistan,dur-ingwhichfirstofall issues linkedtostabilisingAfghanistanintheregionalcontextarediscussed,includingdrugproductionandtraffickingissues(thisformatisespeciallyvaluedbyMoscowsinceneithertheUSAnorChinapar-ticipateinit).

Atthismoment(February2014),nobodystillknowshowthesituationinthere-gionwilldevelopfollowingthewithdrawaloftheISAFmission,andespeciallywhetherandtowhatextentthesecurityconditions(inthebroadmeaningoftheterm)willdeteriorate.Intensivediplomaticconsultationstothiseffectareunderway,inwhichrepresentativesofglobalpowersandCentralAsiancoun-triesareinvolved.The‘year2014problem’(whenISAFiswithdrawn)hasbeen

284 ‘Putin: Trzeba pomócNATOwAfganistanie’,Rp.pl, 1 August 2012, http://www.rp.pl/ar-tykul/921231.html

285 Inpractice, theUlyanovskbase isnotusedbyNATOpreciselyfoetotheveryhightran-sit costs; onlyone test cargo transithasbeen transportedusing thisbaseuntilmid-Au-gust 2013 (Forbes.ru, 15 August 2013, http://www.forbes.ru/news/243493-tranzit-gruzov-iz-afganistana-cherez-ulyanovsk-ostalsya-nevostrebovannym). US troops decided theywould not use the base in October 2013 (‘США не будут использовать транспортный узел в Ульяновске’, Gazeta.ru, 28 October 2013, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2013/10/28/n_3284597.shtml).

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givenagreatamountofattentioninthemediaandinexpertdiscussionsinthisregion286.Accordingtothemorepessimisticscenarios,theregionwillbedesta-bilised,extremistcircleswillgaininfluenceandtheflowofdrugsfromtherewill increase.TheCentralAsian countries also fear an influxof refugees287.DiscussingsuchscenariosmayturnoutbeneficialforRussia’spositioninCen-tralAsia,sincethiswillstrengthenthebelief(whichisstillsharedbypartoftheelites)thatinthecaseofrealthreatRussiawillremaintheonlyguarantorofsecurity288.Ontheotherhand,aquitedifferentscenarioalsoseemslikely,wherethereductionofUSmilitarypresenceandevenareturntopowerfortheTalibaninAfghanistanwillnotinitiallyaffecttheregion’ssecurityinanyessentialway,sinceAfghanistan’smajorpoliticalforceswillbefocusedontheinternalsituation.However,itcannotberuledoutthatinthecaseofalong-termconflict(andespeciallyofacivilwarinAfghanistan),ethnicTajiksandUzbekswillmigrateonamassscalefromAfghanistantoCentralAsia,whichmayleadtovariouskindsoftensionanddestabilisethesituationthere.

286 Numerousconferences,seminarsandroundtablediscussionsdevotedto this issuehavebeenheld.OneofthemanyexampleswastheinternationalconferencehostedbytheBishkekLiberal Club and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation under the title ‘Страны Центральной Азии: влияние глобальных игроков и перспективы развития’(CentralAsiancountries:theinfluenceofglobalplayersanddevelopmentprospects,Bishkek29–30March2013).

287 On22–26April2013,representativesoftheUNHCRmissioninKyrgyzstanandoftheKyr-gyzministryforemergencysituationsdevelopedapreliminaryplanincasealargewaveofrefugeesfromAfghanistancomestotheregion.(‘Кыргызстан подготовил план на случай потенциального притока в страну беженцев’, Fergananews.com, 29 April 2013, http://www.fergananews.com/news/20592).

288 Theexistenceofthisbelief,whichisverydifficulttonoticeandcannotbequantified,wasobserved by the author of this paper during conversations with numerous representa-tivesofexpert,academicandjournalistcirclesonhistripstoCentralAsiancountriesin2010–2013.Intheauthor’ssubjectiveopinion,thisbeliefisstrongestinKyrgyzstanandlessstronginTajikistan,andisalsosometimespresentinKazakhstan.

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conclusions

Moscow’sinfluenceinCentralAsiahasstronglyerodedduringtheperiodofovertwodecadessincethecollapseoftheUSSR.ThisprocesshassloweddownasaconsequenceofPresidentVladimirPutin’sactivepolicy,andduetofearofadestabilisationofthesituationinAfghanistan,inthefaceofwhichlocalleaderswouldprefertheirrelationswithRussianottodeteriorate.However,itcannotbesaidthatthetrendhasbeenreversed.Onesymbolicexampleisthenetworkofairconnectionsformedoverthepastfewyears.Themostcon-venientflight transfers fromtheregion to theWestareofferedby Istanbul,Frankfurt,ViennaandRiga,whileat thebeginningofthiscenturyMoscowwaspracticallytheonlyairhubavailableinthepost-Sovietarea(withtheex-ceptionoftheBalticstates)289.

AnotherproofofMoscow’sdissipatingattractivenesstoCentralAsiancoun-tries(andinbroaderterms,totheCIS)isthenumberofmemberstatesintheorganisations it has established and supported over the past two decades.TwelvecountriesjoinedtheCommonwealthofIndependentStates(establishedin 1991), nine joined the Collective Security TreatyOrganisation (1992), fivejoined theEurasianEconomicCommunity (2000),and three joined theCus-tomsUnion(2010).InCentralAsia,Russia’sinfluenceisthestrongestinKyr-gyzstan, strong inTajikistanand significant inKazakhstan (albeit skilfullybalancedbyAstanawithBeijing’sandWashington’sinfluences).Itcannotbesuccessfullychallenged in theshort term,althoughChina’s increasingpres-enceandKazakhstan’sconsistentemancipationmaychangethiseveninthemediumterm.ItseemsquiteunlikelythatMoscowwillbeabletoregainitsinfluenceinUzbekistanandTurkmenistan,andevenlesslikelythattheentireregionwillagainfinditselfwithintheRussianzoneofinfluence.Beingawareofthis,Moscowwillattemptatleasttocontaintheexpansionofotheractors(especiallyintheareaofsecurity).

Allthisconsidered,Russiaisstillanimportantandattimesevenkeyplayerintheregion.Itsbeing‘Eurasian’,whichhasbeenusedasanideologicalbasisforitsintegrationprojects,isinfactoneofitsadvantages.Thisistheonlypower

289 ThesignificanceofTurkishairlinesandofIstanbulasatransferairporthasbeengrowingyearonyear.Atpresent,IstanbulisthebesttransferairportforflightforexamplefromAshgabat toDushanbe, and thevisa-free regimebetweenTurkmenistanandTurkeyad-ditionallycontributestothis(thesmallnumberofdirectconnectionsinCentralAsiaisinturnfurtherproofofthepoorbilateralrelationswithintheregion).

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whichisperceivedinCentralAsianotasforeignbutaspartoftheregion(sensu largo).Unlikeotheractors,Moscowhasbeeninvolvedintheregioninacom-prehensiveway,whileChinahasfocusedoneconomicco-operation(althoughBeijinghasalsohintedattakinganinterestinthesecurityarea),theUSAonsecurity issues and to a lesser extent on political co-operation, and Islamicstatesonspiritualvaluesoftheirreligion.Theaforementionedthreecentresofinfluence(China,theUSA,andmoregenerallytheWestandtheIslamicumma)andtheiractivityposeachallenge,andatthesametimesetapointofreferenceforMoscow.Withtheexceptionoftheintegrationprojects(whichareprimar-ilytargetedatUkraineandCentralAsia),Russianpolicytowardsthisregionhasbeenshapedbyrelationswiththesethreecentres,anditmaythusgivetheimpressionofbeinginconsistentandreactive.ItcanbeassumedthatRussiacouldhaveachievedmoreinthisregionifithadtreatedtheCentralAsiangov-ernmentsmorelikepartners(althoughitssupportforthelocalauthoritarianregimeswithoutraisinghumanrightsanddemocratisationissuesisundoubt-edlyveryimportantforthem).

RussiahaslostitsmonopolyonexportsofCentralAsianhydrocarbonstoglob-almarkets (pipelinesrunning fromtheregion toChinaand Iranhavebeenbuilt), but ithasmaintained thismonopoly in its exports toEurope.There-fore,itwillmostlikelyconsistentlycontinueblockingallattemptsatbuildingtrans-Caspianroutes(initsofficialstatementsMoscowdoesnotpresentitsre-lationswithChinaintermsofrivalry,unlikewiththeWest,althoughitdoesinfactseethemassuch).

ThemostimportantregionalproblemforRussiaistheupcomingwithdrawalof the ISAFmission fromAfghanistan.Moscow seems to be less concernedabout thepossible ‘hard’ threats (it is separated from theAfghanborderbyKazakhstanandoneortwootherstates)butmoreabout ‘soft’ threats,espe-ciallydrugsmuggling.Thisisthereasonwhyitattachessomuchimportanceto itsmilitarypresence inCentralAsiancountries (thebases inKyrgyzstanandTajikistan,andthedesiredreturnofRussianborderguardstotheTajik--Afghanborder)andpreventingthecontinuedmilitarypresenceofanyotherplayerwhomitdoesnotapprovedof.

AnotherconsequenceofthewithdrawalofthegreaterpartofUStroopsfromAfghanistanmaybeanincreaseintensioninRussian-Chineserelations.BothMoscowandBeijinghaveconsistentlyopposedtheUSmilitarypresenceintheregion;USbaseshavebeentheconstantpointofreferenceandcatalystforco-operationbetweenthetwocountries,especiallyattheSCOforum.After2014,

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whenthisfactornolongerplayssuchagreatrole,theroomforco-operationbetweenRussiaandChinawillbereduced,whiledisagreementsbetweenthemwillprobablyintensify(theconflictbetweenRussianintegrationprojectsandtheco-operationofferedtoCentralAsiancountriesbyChinamayplayamajorrole.Itisalsopossiblethatconlictswillariseconcerningaccesstoandexportsfromenergydeposits,andsotheirrivalrymaybecomemorebitter.

Russiawillmostlikelyprotectitspossessionsintheregionwithdeterminationandgreatengagement.ApartfromBelarusandArmenia,CentralAsiaisthelaststripoftheformerRussianandSovietempirewhereMoscowcanstillfeellikeapoliticalleader.Itspresenceandinfluenceinthisregionareimportantforitfromboththegeopoliticalandsymbolicpointsofview,asitspositionasamajorpowerdependsonthis.

wojciech górecKiThe text was closed in January 2014

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Map.Post-SovietCentralAsia/

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