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EVALUATION OF UNICEF SUDAN COUNTRY
OFFICE FIELD DELIVERY STRUCTURE
Prepared for UNICEF Sudan Country Office (CO)
By
The Bassiouni Group
January, 2015
Evaluation Team
David Bassiouni
Sylvie Morel-Seytoux
Saeed Awadalla
Samantha Nolan
Laura Wicks
1
Contents
Map of Sudan - Field Offices Crisis in Sudan (2005-2014) ...................................................... 4
Map of Sudan - Emergency Hotspots & IDPs/OCHA Map 2014.................................................................. 4
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Evaluation Purpose, Objectives & Scope ................................................................................................. 9
Evaluation Approach & Methodology ..................................................................................................... 9
Evaluation Findings, Conclusions & Recommendations ....................................................................... 10
Chapter 1: Evaluation Purpose, Objectives & Scope ............................................................................. 14
1.1 Evaluation Purpose & Objectives .................................................................................................... 14
1.2 Evaluation Questions & Criteria ...................................................................................................... 14
Chapter 2: Background & Context ............................................................................................................. 16
2.1 Programming Context of UNICEF Sudan Country Office (SCO) ....................................................... 16
2.1.1 Country Context ......................................................................................................................... 16
2.1.2 UNICEF Programming ................................................................................................................. 17
2.2 Overview of SCO Field Office Structure: Six Field Offices & Three Sub Offices ............................. 18
2.3 Main Roles & Functions of Field Offices .......................................................................................... 19
Chapter 3: Evaluation Design, Methods & Limitations ............................................................................. 20
3.1 Evaluation Design & Data Collection Methods ............................................................................... 20
3.2 Evaluation Approach ........................................................................................................................ 22
3.3 Data Collection & Research Limitations .......................................................................................... 23
Chapter 4: Evaluation Findings Pertaining to Programme Performance, Social Indicators & Field
Delivery Structure ...................................................................................................................................... 25
4.1 Overview of Sudan Country Office Programme Performance ........................................................ 25
4.1.1 Background ................................................................................................................................ 25
4.1.2 Strengths/Accomplishments ...................................................................................................... 25
4.1.3 Weaknesses/Barriers ................................................................................................................. 26
4.2 Historical Overview of the Field Offices & Decentralization Context ............................................ 27
4.3 Trend Analysis of Social Indicators and Comparative Overview of Performance at the Field Office
Level ............................................................................................................................................................ 30
2
Part A: Trend Analysis of Social Indicators ............................................................................................ 30
Part B: Comparative Analysis of Field Office Performance................................................................... 35
4.5 Assessment of the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency & Sustainability of the Field Offices
Roles/Functions ...................................................................................................................................... 41
4.5.1 Relevance ................................................................................................................................... 41
4.5.2 Effectiveness .............................................................................................................................. 43
4.5.3 Efficiency .................................................................................................................................... 44
4.5.4 Sustainability .............................................................................................................................. 45
4.5.5 Coverage .................................................................................................................................... 46
4.5.6 Coordination .............................................................................................................................. 47
4.5.7 Connectedness ........................................................................................................................... 48
4.5.8 Impact ........................................................................................................................................ 50
Chapter 5: Conclusions & Lessons Learned ............................................................................................... 52
5.1 Overview of UNICEF’s Contribution to Improvements for Children in Sudan ............................... 52
5.2 Strengths/Weaknesses of Sudan Country Office & Field Office Programme Performance .......... 52
Towards a Theory of Change: Best Practices (Interventions) from Select FOs .................................... 53
5.3 Lessons Learned Regarding Field Delivery Structure & Approach ................................................. 55
Chapter 6: Recommendations ................................................................................................................... 57
Structure ................................................................................................................................................. 57
Coordination ........................................................................................................................................... 57
Budget ..................................................................................................................................................... 58
Staffing & Capacity Development .......................................................................................................... 58
Communication & Advocacy .................................................................................................................. 59
Monitoring & Evaluation ........................................................................................................................ 59
ANNEXES ..................................................................................................................................................... 60
Annex A: Terms of Reference (TOR) ...................................................................................................... 60
Annex B: Data Collection Instruments................................................................................................... 69
Questionnaire for Chiefs of FOs & Senior FO Officials ........................................................................ 69
Online Staff Survey .............................................................................................................................. 70
Brief Overview of the Online Staff Survey and Highlights of Major Outcomes ................................ 128
Reports of Stakeholder Meetings ..................................................................................................... 145
Annex C: List of Stakeholders .............................................................................................................. 154
3
Annex D: List of Documents Consulted ............................................................................................... 159
Annex E: Field Mission Plan ..................................................................................................................... 162
4
Map of Sudan - Field Offices Crisis in Sudan (2005-2014)
Map of Sudan - Emergency Hotspots & IDPs/OCHA Map 2014
5
Acknowledgements
The Bassiouni Group would like to extend its gratitude to Mr. Robert Ndamobissi, Chief of
Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation and Dr. Abdulaziz Dada, Planning Specialist, of the
UNICEF Sudan Country Office (SCO) Planning Monitoring & Evaluation Section, for providing
oversight and guidance throughout the evaluation process.
We would also like to thank El Siddig Musa Abbaker, Irene Alunni, and Isabel Candela, also
members of the Planning Monitoring & Evaluation Section, for their generous assistance to the
Evaluation Team.
Further, we extend gracious thanks to Mr. Geert Cappelaere, UNICEF Representative in Sudan,
and Ms. Shaya Asindua, Deputy Representative, for their steadfast support.
Thanks is also extended to the UNICEF Khartoum Administrative Unit for their practical and
logistical support during the course of the evaluation field visits.
Finally, we sincerely appreciated the generous support offered by the entire UNICEF Sudan team
in Khartoum and the Field Offices. Many individuals, counterparts and stakeholders provided
valuable feedback to the Team by participating in interviews, discussions and the online survey –
which allowed for rich and diverse data gathering.
Our deepest gratitude is extended to all who engaged in the process to ensure that UNICEF’s
commitment to the children of Sudan reverberates clearly throughout this report.
6
Acronyms
SCO Sudan Country Office
FO Field Office
CFO Chief Field Office
DG Director General
BNS Blue Nile State
RNS River Nile State
NDS North Darfur State
SDS South Darfur State
WDS West Darfur State
CDS Central Darfur State
NKS North Kordofan State
SKS South Kordofan State
WKS West Kordofan State
HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission
WES Water & Environmental Sanitation
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
FMoFE Federal Ministry of Finance & Economy
FMoH Federal Ministry of Health
FMoE Federal Ministry of Education
SMoH State Ministry of Health
SMoE State Ministry of Education
SMoF State Ministry of Finance
7
NCCW National Council for Child Welfare
SCCW State Council for Child Welfare
SPLA/M Sudan Peoples Liberation Army/ Movement
GoS Government of Sudan
TAD Transitional Authority for Darfur
IP International Professional
NPO National Professional Officer
NO National Officer
GS General Service
KO Khartoum Office
IDPs Internally Displaced People
OCHA Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP World Food Program
UNFPA United Nations Family Planning Agency
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
ITC Information, Technology & Communication
UNDSS United Nations Department for Staff Security
UNAMID United Nations Assistance Mission in Darfur
CPAP Country Programme Action Plan
CPMP Country Programme Management Plan
CPD Country Programme Document
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NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
NNGO National Non-Governmental Organization
INGOs International Non-Governmental Organizations
CFCI Child Friendly Community Initiative
NWC National Water Corporation
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
HPM Humanitarian Performance Monitoring
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
SPPME Social Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
UNCT United Nations Country Team
UNV United Nations Volunteer
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
FCPU Family and Child Protection Unit
9
Executive Summary Evaluation Purpose, Objectives & Scope
The UNICEF Sudan Country Office (SCO) is currently undertaking a Strategic Process of
Reflection (SPR) that is determining how to prepare and position UNICEF to increase and
improve its impact for children in Sudan. The SPR provides an opportunity to review how
UNICEF operates and identifies optimum strategies that will enable the organization to deliver
more effectively and in a cost effective way for the children of Sudan. The SPR process also
serves as a guide to prepare the Sudan Country Office (SCO) for the Mid-Term Review (MTR),
which commenced in November, 2014.
In the framework of the Strategic Process of Reflection (SPR) undertaken by the SCO, UNICEF
Sudan initiated an independent external evaluation to review the effectiveness and efficiency of
the current existing structure of the UNICEF Sudan Country Office and its Field Offices (FOs),
and to recommend areas of improvement and strengthening. The Evaluation is part of the
strategic review, and aims to inform potential improvements/strengthening of systems and
processes in the headquarters/field structures, and the relationships between them. It provides an
assessment of the current field delivery situation, structure and systems; identifies areas in need
of review/strengthening; and offers an action plan addressing identified gaps and weaknesses.
The purpose of the Evaluation is to provide recommendations for a more efficient and effective
UNICEF programme implementation and advocacy capacity at the field level increasing
knowledge equity between Khartoum and FOs, increasing results for more children in Sudan,
clarifying lines of accountability, and highlighting the value added of field presence. As such the
Evaluation includes recommendations for programme implementation modalities for where there
is currently no field presence. More specifically, the main objective of the Evaluation is to
measure the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the FOs roles/functions, and
to assess coverage, coordination and connectedness with regard to emergency response at the FO
level. Since the Evaluation was not originally designed as an Impact Evaluation, the Evaluation
undertook a limited assessment of “impact” within the context of Programme Performance and
overall FO contributions to impact at the local and state levels.
While the evaluation process was meant to prepare the UNICEF Sudan CO for the forthcoming
Mid-Term Review (MTR), it looked beyond the MTR to offer ideas and recommendations for
UNICEF to create a foundation for the next Country Programme (2015-2020).
Evaluation Approach & Methodology
The Evaluation utilized a mixed-methods approach, drawing upon qualitative and quantitative
information. The Evaluation was designed as a participatory process to give due importance to
self-assessment by all the key stakeholders involved in the Country Programme design and
implementation. The participative nature of the Evaluation allowed for a rich discussion of past
experiences, and the identification of new, innovative ideas for the future. Information and data
collection were carefully triangulated to ensure validity.
10
The Evaluation included a comprehensive desk review of over 187 key documents, including
annual country office reports, key strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation documents,
household surveys, among others; field work and direct observations conducted in Sudan during
the period of July through August 2014, including site visits to Khartoum, River Nile State (Al
Damer), El Fashir FO (North Darfur State), Nyala FO (South Darfur State), Al Geneina FO
(West Darfur State), Al Damazin FO (Blue Nile State), and Kadugli FO (South Kordofan State);
participatory meetings and interviews with senior management, section chiefs, and key section
staff within UNICEF in Khartoum, El Fasher and Kadugli, including UN Country Teams
(UNCT), GoS, and other donor staff members; and meetings and Focus Group Discussions
reaching approximately 96 stakeholders involved in UNICEF field operations.
The Evaluation also included the design and implementation of a comprehensive Online Staff
Survey reaching 63 FO staff located in seven regions/offices, as well as a stakeholder workshop
reaching numerous UNICEF staff and key partnering agencies and individuals with a view to
share preliminary findings and obtain valuable feedback. In addition, the Evaluation developed a
focused questionnaire for senior FO officials to identify the critical frontline issues and key
factors. Finally, a focused Trend Analysis of Social Indicators was performed by the Evaluation
Team as part of a larger programme performance analysis.
Evaluation Findings, Conclusions & Recommendations
UNICEF Sudan recently initiated implementation of its Country Programme for the period of
2013-2016. The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) is comprised of programmes and
projects jointly agreed upon by the Government of Sudan and UNICEF, which contribute
directly to relevant outcomes of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework
(UNDAF) 2013-2016. It also serves as the Cluster Lead agency for WASH, Nutrition and
Education, and as the Co-Cluster Lead for Child Protection.
The overall goal of the 2013-2016 Country Programme is to “support a more equitable
development for children while also protecting the fundamental rights of children recovering
from the effect of conflict and natural disasters.”1 Upon assessing the programme performance of
the SCO in relation to this goal, the Evaluation found that SCO has contributed substantively
toward improving the well-being of hundreds of thousands of children throughout Sudan.
Among the many notable achievements of the SCO, particularly exemplary accomplishments
were identified within the Health and WASH sectors within emergency zone FOs – underscoring
SCO’s ability to reach vulnerable communities, despite serious contextual challenges, and the
continually changing and large-scale needs of at-risk populations. Steady progress was also
identified within non-emergency zones, with especially solid results within the sectors of
Education and Nutrition.
Despite natural disasters, political conflict, and difficult access to vulnerable populations, the
Evaluation concluded that the SCO Field Delivery structure, orientation, and the specific
configuration of the FOs has been highly responsive to vulnerable communities, and has enabled
an effective emergency response. The assessment found that the geographical distribution of FOs
1 The Government of Sudan/UNICEF Country Programme Action Plan 2013-2016.
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has enabled the SCO to be well positioned to continue to carry out UNICEF’s mandate in
meeting the basic needs of Sudanese children, while ensuring their survival, protection and
development.
In particular, primary strengths identified with respect to the present Field Delivery Structure
included effective coordination and planning with local (government, NGO and community)
partners including programme ownership; solid capacity development of partners; ongoing
emergency response orientation with a continued focus on reaching the most vulnerable
communities; effective Cluster coordination; prioritization of life-saving activities; and some
exemplary activities in support of the implementation of localized innovations, among other
strengths detailed in the Evaluation Report.
In terms of challenges, highlights from the Evaluation include a lack of adequate funding to meet
the expansive needs of at-risk populations in Sudan; continuing staffing needs; various budget
disbursement considerations; and severe infrastructure barriers which impede critical access to
vulnerable populations. Addressing these challenges will allow SCO to continue to strengthen its
field presence, and maintain its essential role as an essential partner for local communities and
key government and NGO partners.
The Evaluation includes a full analysis of the SCO Field Delivery Structure using the evaluation
criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, coverage, coordination,
connectedness and impact. Select highlights are provided below, for which the full analysis is
detailed within the report.
Relevance: The Evaluation concluded that the current Field Delivery Structure and the
configuration of FOs in the emergency zones is, in fact, relevant and aligned with SCO’s
mandate and commitment to reaching beneficiaries – particularly those at-risk.
Effectiveness: The assessment determined that the SCO and FOs have been effective, overall, in
terms of programming, with mixed levels of progress and results depending on a variety of
essential variables, including communications, funding, and capacity development, among
others.
Efficiency: While the SCO and FOs were found to be operating efficiently overall, the study
concluded that continued improvements remain in the areas of increased investments in
planning, staffing, coordination and funding disbursements.
Sustainability: While the current structure is adequate, the study determined that without
additional funds for increased staffing and capacity development, sustainability in the face of the
scope and challenges of the SCO mandate will be difficult. Areas of improvement were
identified which could significantly improve the FOs’ capacity to operate sustainably.
Coverage: While the FOs are doing well in terms of reaching vulnerable groups, further
investment is required in key areas including emergency staffing, capacity development, and
infrastructure improvements (in coordination with government partners), to improve access to
the most vulnerable communities.
12
Coordination: The Evaluation found that while SCO’s coordination of emergency response is
effective overall, there is room for substantive improvement – particularly with respect to
strengthening partnerships with NGOs.
Connectedness: SCO was found to have successfully focused efforts on linking disaster and
conflict prevention activities, as well as other essential cross-cutting issues such as gender and
human rights. However, greater investments are needed in support of improved coordination
between emergency response and development.
Impact: While the Evaluation found that the FOs contributed to overall impact in varying levels
at the local and state levels, the degree of impact could not be clearly determined given the
primary focus of the Evaluation on the Field Delivery Structure and limited focus on Programme
Performance. Findings of 2014 MICS disaggregated by State are not yet available.
Finally, the Evaluation offers a set of detailed and carefully researched recommendations in
support of the SCO’s continued efforts to achieve widespread, lifesaving results for the children
of Sudan. These include practical and meaningful recommendations such as the introduction of
flexible staff rotations between the Khartoum and FOs to encourage cross-fertilization of
experiences and information; the establishment of joint programme visits with national
government partners to FOs and states to cultivate interest and further commitment to
collaborative service delivery at the State levels; budget reviews among the FOs to assure
resources adequately meet the most extreme emergency situations and are rapidly disbursed; and
recommendations for improved staffing and capacity development at all levels.
A full set of detailed recommendations is provided in the Evaluation Report in pages 57-59,
for which a few select highlights are provided below.
Structure
1. Introduce dynamic and flexible staff rotation system between Khartoum and FOs to enhance
cross-fertilization of experiences and ensure bridging of the emergency-development divide.
2. Further develop the system the Office has initiated of exploring and maximizing the greater
use of common premises, facilities and transport, especially between UN partners to save on
operational costs and strengthen partnerships.
Coordination
1. Enhance internal communication capacity and connectivity between Khartoum and FOs for a
more efficient and effective coordination and collaboration. Establish a Web-based platform
(“KhartoumConnect”) for continuous staff feedback monitored daily by M&E staff.
2. Initiate joint programme visits with national government partners to FOs and states to cultivate
their interest and commitment to service delivery and development at the state levels.
Budget
1. Review the FO budget monthly to determine those states which experience the most extreme
emergency situations, and allocate/disburse funds based upon documented needs.
2. Increase the authority that FOs have over their own budget by introducing policies and
procedures to monitor and ensure decentralized and appropriate disbursement of funds.
13
Staffing & Capacity Development
1. Establish a Task Force to review the qualifications, experiences, profiles and capacity of SCO
staff with special emphasis on the FOs and match them to programmatic and operational
responsibilities along the lines of the “Staff Capacity Review and Analysis” that The Bassiouni
Group conducted for UNICEF Liberia.
2. Identify the additional staffing needs, their profiles and expertise for the emergency states, and
take steps to provide such staff to the concerned FOs.
Communications & Advocacy
1. Promote mechanisms to enable community-based partnership building on the experiences of
FOs with a track record in this area.
2. Enable closer coordination and partnership with local partners (government, NGO,
community) throughout shared FO experiences/case studies disseminated via the proposed
“KhartoumConnect” web platform.
Monitoring & Evaluation
1. Promote the practice of documentation of programme experiences, best practices and lessons
learned, and monitoring as the basis of establishing monitoring and evaluation capacity in FOs.
2. Develop, articulate and mainstream the implementation of MoRES (Monitoring Results for
Equity System) by establishing a Task Force working in conjunction with The Bassiouni
Group’s UNICEF and Evaluation Practice Groups.
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Chapter 1: Evaluation Purpose, Objectives & Scope
1.1 Evaluation Purpose & Objectives
The UNICEF Sudan Country Office (SCO) is currently undertaking a Strategic Process of
Reflection (SPR) that is determining how to prepare and position UNICEF to increase and
improve its impact for children in Sudan. The SPR provides an opportunity to review how
UNICEF operates and identifies optimum strategies that will enable the organization to deliver
more effectively, and in a cost effective manner, on behalf of the children of Sudan. The SPR
process also serves as a guide to prepare the SCO for the Mid-Term Review (MTR), which was
initiated in November 2014.
In the framework of the Strategic Process of Reflection (SPR), undertaken by the SCO, UNICEF
Sudan initiated an independent external evaluation to review the effectiveness and efficiency of
the current existing structure of the UNICEF SCO and its FOs, and to recommend areas of
improvement and strengthening. The Evaluation is part of the strategic review, and aims to
inform potential improvements/strengthening of systems and processes in the headquarters/field
structures and the relationships between then. It provides an assessment of the current field
delivery situation, structure and systems; identifies areas in need of review/strengthening; and
offers recommendations toward addressing identified gaps and weaknesses.
The purpose of the Evaluation is to provide recommendations for a more efficient and effective
UNICEF programme implementation and advocacy capacity at the field level, increasing
knowledge equity between Khartoum and FOs, increasing results for more children in Sudan,
clarifying lines of accountability, and highlighting the value added (benefits and advantages) of
field presence. More specifically, the main objective of the Evaluation is to measure the
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and overall impact of the FOs roles/functions,
and to assess coverage, coordination and connectedness with regard to FOs’ emergency
response.
While the evaluation process was meant to prepare the UNICEF SCO for the Mid-Term Review
(MTR), it looked beyond the MTR to offer ideas and recommendations for UNICEF to create a
foundation for the next Country Programme (2015-2020).
1.2 Evaluation Questions & Criteria
The main objective of the Evaluation is to measure the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and
sustainability of the FOs roles/functions, and to assess coverage, coordination and connectedness
with regard to FOs emergency response.
As such, the Evaluation focused on the following guiding questions (provided in the ToR) for
each criteria listed below:
Relevance of the Field Structure
To what extent is the current structure/set up still valid?
15
Are the tasks, functions & existing resources consistent with the overall goal of UNICEF
Sudan & the implementation of its mandate?
Are the tasks, functions & existing resources consistent with the intended impacts &
effects (CPD, sector strategies, commitments)?
Effectiveness of the Field Structure
To what extent were the country programme results achieved/are likely to be achieved?
What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the
results?
Efficiency of the Field Structure
Are the current activities, processes, and functions cost-efficient?
Can objectives and activities be achieved on time?
Is the current set up the most efficient way compared to alternatives?
What would be the most cost-effective way to obtain the expected CPD results?
How effective have internal and external resources been harnessed to achieve results?
Sustainability of the Field Structure
Is the current structure sustainable considering current & projected developments in
context, needs & financial support?
What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of
sustainability of the programme or project?
Coverage of Field Offices’ Emergency Response
How well is the FO emergency response reaching the affected population in terms of total
coverage & vulnerable groups within affected populations?
Do all groups have equal access to services provided?
How are protection, gender issues & the socially excluded adequately addressed?
Are the FOs able to identify most vulnerable groups within their area of operation?
How do FOs collect, manage, analyze and share data and information?
Coordination of the Field Offices’ Emergency Response
How well is the emergency response coordinated, with partners within cluster/sectors and
cross-sectorally?
What other coordination mechanisms exist that have facilitated response?
Connectedness of the Field Offices’ Emergency Response
To what extent is the emergency response shaped by commitment to addressing longer
term development issues and goals?
What linkages are being made to disaster and conflict prevention activities and other
cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights?
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Chapter 2: Background & Context 2.1 Programming Context of UNICEF Sudan Country Office (SCO)
2.1.1 Country Context
Sudan is the third largest country on the African continent, with a total area of 1,882,000 sq km.
It shares international borders with seven states, including Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan,
Central African Republic, Chad and Libya.2
Sudan has a long history of conflict and chronic emergencies. It has been experiencing a high-
risk programming environment for several decades, characterized by ongoing internal conflicts
in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile States, as well as past conflict with South Sudan
prior to secession in 2011. UNICEF assisted programmes and staff continue to be adversely
affected as a result of this insecurity. The Government of Sudan’s military operations and attacks
by different factions have resulted in large population displacements for the past few decades.
Following the establishment of South Sudan as an independent State in 2011, Sudan lost
approximately 75% of its annual revenues generated from Oil production in South Sudan.3 These
economic problems have been exacerbated by high rates of inflation and corruption. Sudan ranks
166th out of 187 countries in the latest Human Development Index (HDI) published by the
United Nations Human Development Report of 2014. Poverty, lack of adequate social services,
and urban-rural inequity persist. The ongoing conflicts, prolonged emergencies, economic
constraints (such as 44% percent inflation in 2012, South Sudan separation, loss of oil revenue)
and austerity measures – including reduced public sector spending at the state level – have all
contributed to the precarious situation faced by women, men and children.4
The impact of chronic conflict and emergencies is particularly clear within the Nutrition sector.
The Sudan Household Health Survey of 2010 documented the prevalence of global acute
malnutrition at 16.4%, and severe acute malnutrition at 5.3% -- rates which are both well above
international thresholds for an emergency situation.5 The UNICEF Sudan Annual Report of 2013
estimated that 553,350 children suffer from life-threatening severe acute malnutrition every
year.6 With respect to immunizations, due to restricted access arising from protracted conflicts in
South Kordofan and Blue Nile, immunization campaigns to prevent polio and measles have left
over 165,000 children unreached. The Health sector has faced similar challenges but has been
able to decrease the under-five mortality rate by an annual rate of 2.2% between 1990 and 2013.7
2 Sudan National Human Development Report 2012. 3 International Energy Agency, 2012 (http://www.iea.org/neewsroomandevents/news2012/february/2012-02-15-
.html.) 4 IMF 2013 (http://www2.anba.com.br/noticia/21840141/macro-en/imf-sudan-must-cooperate-with-south-sudan-to-
grow/?indice=0
5 Sudan Household Survey 2010. 6 SCO Annual Report 2013 for Sudan, MENA 7 UNICEF State of the World’s Children Report 2015
17
There also remain large-scale water and sanitation needs in the conflict affected areas of Darfur
and Kordofan, as well as in the neglected eastern regions of Sudan.
With respect to education, a 2013 study estimated that more than 2.8 million school age children
in Sudan are out of school.8 In addition to widespread poverty and limited access to school,
increased tribal conflict and fighting between armed movements and Government forces in 2013
have worsened the security environment in several States -- resulting in increased displacement,
affecting over 55,000 newly displaced primary school-aged children.9 A UNICEF supported
2013 gender analysis of adolescents and youth in Kassala and West Darfur found that a majority
of adolescents and young people in the States do not have access to education, technology,
vocational training, employment opportunities or other services (such as health care) due to the
persistent conflicts in Darfur, high poverty levels, and lack of information.
The worst affected states are reported as the Darfur states, the Kordofan states and Blue Nile;
however, other states also suffer from neglect and marginalization of the population and natural
disasters, such as flooding. Due to renewed fighting in South Sudan, many states in Sudan
bordering South Sudan have populations that are seeking refuge from the fighting. Darfur is
reported as one of the worst affected areas with nearly 300,000 new displacements following a
renewed conflict in 2014.10 Conflict continues to affect parts of the three Kordofan States, as
well as Abyei and Blue Nile State. In addition, UNICEF and partners are stretched to respond to
needs on the border with South Sudan, supporting South Sudanese seeking refuge from the
fighting in South Sudan. Other concerns include flooding in the East and an increase in health
outbreaks, such as the yellow fever outbreak in South and West Kordofan in late 2013.
According to OCHA, a total of 9 million people (approximately 20% of Sudan’s population)
have been identified as in need of humanitarian assistance. UN system agencies and partners are
assisting 6.7 million people across the country. Of these, it is reported that 5.5 million people
need life-saving assistance; 4.6 million in 115 localities need protection support; 5.4 million in
134 localities need resilience support; and 2.4 million in 75 localities need support toward
durable solutions.11
The context is complex and challenging due to various access, capacity and security constraints,
and significant gaps, particularly in recovery and more durable solutions. OCHA reports that as
many as 900,000 people in contested areas are currently not receiving urgently needed
humanitarian assistance.12
2.1.2 UNICEF Programming
UNICEF Sudan operates within this highly complex and rapidly changing humanitarian
situation. It serves as the Cluster Lead agency for WASH, Nutrition and Education, and as the
Co-Cluster Lead for Child Protection.
8 SCO Annual Report 2013 for Sudan, MENA. 9 SCO Annual Report 2013 for Sudan, MENA. 10 UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children, July 2014 report. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.
18
UNICEF Sudan recently initiated implementation of its Country Programme for the period of
2013-2016. The Basic Cooperation Agreement (BCA) signed by the Government of Sudan
(GoS) and UNICEF on May 18, 1994, as amended and signed on March 31, 2010, provides the
basis for the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP). The UNICEF Executive Board approved
a total commitment not exceeding the equivalent of $41.2 million from UNICEF Regular
Resources to support the activities of the CPAP. This CPAP supersedes the CPAP 2009-2012
previously agreed upon by the Government and UNICEF.
The CPAP is comprised of programmes and projects jointly agreed upon by the GoS and
UNICEF, which contribute directly to relevant outcomes of the United Nations Development
Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2013-2016. The overall goal of the 2013-2016 Country
Programme is to “support a more equitable development for children while also protecting the
fundamental rights of children recovering from the effect of conflict and natural disasters.”13
As part of the equity focus, the Country Programme identifies and addresses key bottlenecks and
barriers to the needs of disadvantaged children. These are children living in low performing
localities in terms of access to decentralized basic services, in rural areas, in urban slums or in
nomadic and internally displaced person’s communities, children living with disabilities, as well
as children affected by conflict.
The four primary programme components of the CPAP include:
Programme Component 1: Child Rights and Disparity Reduction
Programme Component 2: Transition from Emergency to Early Recovery and
Sustainable Development
Programme Component 3: Social Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation, and
Communication
Programme Component 4: Cross-Sectoral/Management Support
2.2 Overview of SCO Field Office Structure: Six Field Offices & Three Sub Offices
UNICEF Sudan currently operates through six Field Offices (FOs) and three Sub-Offices, in
addition to the Head Office in Khartoum. The six FOs include:
El Fasher in North Darfur
Nyala in South Darfur
Al Geneina in West Darfur
Kadugli in South Kordofan
Damazin in Blue Nile
Kassala in Kassala
13 The Government of Sudan/UNICEF Country Programme Action Plan 2013-2016.
19
The three Sub-Offices include Zalingei in Central Darfur (which reports to the Al Geneina Field
Office); El Obeid in North Kordofan (which reports to the Kadugli Field Office); and Abyei in
(which reports to the Kadugli Field Office).
The UNICEF SCO maintains a sectorally-defined office structure that includes the following six
programmes:14
Health-HIV/AIDS Programme
Water Sanitation & Hygiene Programme
Nutrition Programme
Education Programme
Child Protection Programme
Adolescents Programme
SCO also has three cross-cutting programme components, including:
Social Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Media & External Relations
Communication for Development
2.3 Main Roles & Functions of Field Offices
The primary roles and functions of the FOs include:
Implementation of UNICEF programme (per signed CPAP).
Ensuring UNICEF resources are optimally utilized for intended purposes.
Coordination of recovery and development activities in collaboration with government
and other partners.
Support to Emergency preparedness and response.
Monitoring and Evaluation of UNICEF-supported programmes.
Representation at State and locality levels.15
14 The Government of Sudan/UNICEF Country Programme Action Plan 2013-2016.
15 UNICEF Sudan Evaluation Terms of Reference 2013.
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Chapter 3: Evaluation Design, Methods & Limitations 3.1 Evaluation Design & Data Collection Methods
The Bassiouni Group conducted the independent Evaluation in close coordination with UNICEF
Sudan. The Evaluation was led by Mr. David Bassiouni, the Project Team Leader, along with
core team members including: Ms. Sylvie Morel-Seytoux (Lead Evaluator), Mr. Saeed Awadalla
(National Consultant), Ms. Laura Wicks and Ms. Samantha Nolan. The Team was supported by
members of The Bassiouni Group’s Technical/Project Support Team as well as its UNICEF
Practice Group and Sudan Practice Group led by Dr. David S. Bassiouni. Also, Ms. Gabriella
Buescher and Ms. Nivine El-Kabbag participated in the Field Visit portion of the project.
The Evaluation utilized a mixed-method approach to collect and analyze information relevant to
the Terms of Reference, comprised of the following components:
Comprehensive Desk Review
Field Mission to UNICEF Sudan Country Office and Six Field Offices (July - August 2014)
Participatory meetings with Key Stakeholders (El Fasher and Kadugli)
Interviews with UNICEF, UNCT, GoS, Donors and other Key Stakeholders
Stakeholder Workshops in El Fasher & South Kordofan
Online Staff Survey
Trend Analysis of Social Indicators
Comparative Analysis
Validation Workshop in Khartoum
Comprehensive Desk Review: The Evaluation included a comprehensive desk review of over
187 key documents, including key strategic planning documents (such as CPD, annual work
plans, project proposals and funding proposals); key programme monitoring and evaluation
reports (such as the Mid-term Strategic Plan); programme reports (such as annual reports, donor
reports, monitoring field trip notes and activity schedules); utilization reports; household
surveys; select management reports, correspondence and meeting minutes; UNEG norms and
standards for evaluations; OCHA documents; documents produced by other donors, such as
DfID and UNDP; and a variety of national sources (such as the National Development Plan and
Strategic Objectives, Poverty Reduction Strategic Plans, sectoral national documents, UNDAF
Mid-Term Framework, and the Common Country Assessment.)
Field Missions: Field work and direct observations were conducted in Sudan during the period
of July through August 2014, which included working closely with the Khartoum Office (KO)
and visits to six (6) Field Offices (FOs), including: River Nile State (Al Damer), El Fasher FO
(North Darfur State), Nyala FO (South Darfur State), Al Geneina FO (West Darfur State), Al
Damazin FO (Blue Nile State), and Kadugli FO (South Kordofan State). The Team also visited
two Sub-Offices, including Zalingi (Central Darfur) and El Obeid (North Kordofan).
Participatory Meetings with Key Stakeholders: Participatory meetings and interviews were
conducted with senior management, section chiefs, and key section staff within UNICEF in
Khartoum, El Fasher and Kadugli, including UNCT, GoS, and other donor staff members; and
21
meetings and Focus Group Discussions reaching approximately 96 stakeholders involved in
UNICEF field operations.
Interviews with UNICEF, UNCT, GoS, Donors and other Key Stakeholders: The Evaluation
Team conducted a large number of interviews with individuals and small stakeholder groups,
based on interview guides and customized questionnaires. Key informants included UNICEF
staff, key representatives from the Government of Sudan, UN organizations, NGOs, civil society
and the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
Stakeholder Workshops (El Fasher & South Kordofon): The Evaluation Team conducted two
stakeholder workshops: one in El Fasher in North Darfur, and the other in Kadugli in South
Kordofan. The purpose of these stakeholder meetings, from a participatory and experience-based
perspective, was to explore directly with stakeholders their views and observations pertaining to
the programme strategy and implementation strengths and weaknesses. The meetings offered an
opportunity for the Team to share initial views and findings, and to receive feedback from key
partners, stakeholders, and local authorities. A total of 58 participants attended, including
representatives from the Government, NGOs and international NGOs. The criteria for evaluating
performance and results of UNICEF in the two stakeholder workshops included relevance,
effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Whenever relevant, issues of coverage and of gender
mainstreaming, were also discussed.
Online Staff Survey: The Evaluation included the design and implementation of a
comprehensive Online Staff Survey. The survey was conducted to solicit staff perceptions
regarding the agency-wide strengths and weaknesses of the SCO, including the KO and the FO’s
operations and performance.
The survey covered several key topics in line with the Evaluation objectives, including
accountability and transparency; office efficiency, linkages and communication; knowledge
management; and monitoring and reporting, among others. Results were compiled and analyzed
in aggregate, and principles of confidentiality, privacy and impartiality were fully applied
throughout the process. Equity was considered in the survey, while ensuring the disaggregation
of data between location (KO/FO); type of position (National Officer, General Service,
International staff, United Nations Volunteer (UNV)); and gender identity (male/female). Survey
data was compiled and analyzed, with relevant findings incorporated into the Evaluation.
Of the 274 staff members solicited to participate in the survey, 96 responded. Survey participants
were comprised of 24% females and 76% males, including 40 National Officers; five UNV; 24
General Service Staff; one international UNV; and 23 international staff. Of the 93 survey
respondents, 35% identified as serving in the KO, and 65% identified as serving in one of the
FOs.
Over 80% of survey participants indicated having served with the SCO (either in the KO or one
of the FOs) for over one year, with less than 20% having served less than one year. Interestingly,
52% of all survey participants reported having served with the SCO for more than three years (of
which 42% have served for over five years). This indicates that among those participating in the
survey, there is substantive institutional history – which allowed for findings to shed light on
issues of sustainability.
22
Focused Questionnaire for Senior FO Officials: The Evaluation included the design and
implementation of a focused questionnaire for senior FO officials. The survey was conducted to
solicit specific and detailed insights from the frontlines regarding key issues, key achievements,
areas for improvement and recommendations.
Historical Review of Field Delivery Structure: Since SCO did not possess original
documentation related to the Field Delivery Structure, the Evaluation Team conducted a
historical review. As part of this effort, the Team leveraged the institutional knowledge of a key
Team Member (National Expert – Mr. Saeed Awadalla) with prior SCO experience, as well as
relevant findings from reference materials.
Trend Analysis of Social Indicators: In order to understand the Field Delivery context and
overall progress toward achieving results for Sudanese children, the Evaluation Team conducted
a focused Trend Analysis of Social Indicators, and reviewed FO performance on a comparative
basis. This exercise involved close analysis of annual reports, Annual Work Plans (AWPs),
Rolling Work Plans (RWPs) and other relevant documents, as well as an analysis of select
indicators within the Education, Health, Nutrition and WASH sectors.
Comparative Analysis of FOs in Emergency-Non Emergency Zones: The Evaluation Team
conducted a site visit to the River Nile State. The original intention was to utilize River Nile as a
“control state” without a FO presence and to compare indicators with other states with a FO
presence. Following the Validation Workshop, SCO determined that the selection of River Nile
State was “not adequate [because the] state has the most improved contextual factors [due to its
proximity to the capital],”and “social indicators are well improved in this state in comparison to
UNICEF FO zones.” As such, it was agreed that the Team would select a state in a rural area (the
same condition of other states). Since the states without an FO presence lack the necessary
data/indicators, the Team selected two states with FO presence – Kassala (Gedarif) and Nyala
(South Darfur State) – based on their emergency and non-emergency zone status; the
comparatively sized local population; the amount of available data based on achievements
toward planned outputs and indicators; and overall relevance to the challenges that affect their
respective beneficiary communities.
Validation Workshop in Khartoum (September 2014): A validation workshop was carried out
after the Team’s fieldwork was completed, reaching 42 UNICEF staff and key partnering
agencies and individuals. It served as a consultative forum in which preliminary findings were
shared, and valuable feedback was culled for the Evaluation. Participants included UNICEF SCO
senior management; UNICEF Chief Field Managers and Staff; and UNICEF CO staff, including
senior management, section chiefs and other staff.
3.2 Evaluation Approach
The Evaluation was conducted in a transparent and participatory process involving relevant
UNICEF stakeholders and partners at the CO and FO levels. It was carried out in accordance
with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG)
Norms and Standards and Ethical Code of Conduct
and UNICEF’s Evaluation Policy and Guidelines.
Explicit emphasis was placed on the integration of
gender equality and human rights principles in the
Human rights-based approach
a. Analyzes root causes and aims to redress discrimination
b. Based on international human rights and humanitarian law standards
c. Involves state (duty-bearers) and non-state (rights-holders)
d. Addressed within political, legal,
23
evaluation focus and process as established in the UNEG Handbook Integrating Human Rights
and Gender Equality in Evaluation - Towards UNEG Guidance.
The Team also supported UNICEF’s endeavor to ensure a Human Rights Based Approach
(HRBA) throughout the Evaluation. To this end, the Evaluation took particular account of the
cultural and social contexts within which gender relations are defined. Methodology and survey
instruments were adapted to fit the form of inquiry and country context.
The UN HRBA guided this Evaluation by ensuring that the 2003 UN Statement of Common
Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation and
programming was considered across the Evaluation. This Statement was designed to ensure all
UN agencies, funds, and programmes consistently apply HRBA.
The Evaluation Team also looked at possible efforts by the SCO to link up with The
Strengthening Humanitarian Action initiative, which has been working to refocus UNICEF’s
humanitarian and development programming in regards to direct implementation, partnerships,
accountability and adaptability. The Team also analyzed how/if the SCO built on the lessons
from the IASC Transformative Agenda, which was adopted in 2011 and builds off the 2005
Humanitarian Reform.
Finally, the Evaluation analyzed how/if the SCO tried to strengthen knowledge of staff about the
CCCs – a tool to better address the divide between humanitarian and development programming
in the incorporation of humanitarian response into guidance documentation including the Core
Commitments to Children (CCCs) in humanitarian action, which includes emergency risk-
informed programming in all country contexts – a process that lays out steps in the programme
cycle to help ensure that UNICEF regular programming better addresses priority emergency risks
threatening the rights of children.
3.3 Data Collection & Research Limitations
Limited Documentation and Information Gaps: The Evaluation was limited by the quality and
availability of documentation and data relevant to the task, including the following constraints:
limited access to Rolling Work Plans, Annual Work Plans, Mid-Year Reports during the initial
Desk Review; lack of access to key documents, including strategy documents related to
decentralization; lack of consistent and/or available data across all sectors; and lack of
standardized reporting documentation and critical information gaps. In particular, the Child
Protection sector did not provide the requested documentation required for analysis. These
challenges hindered the Team’s efforts to create a foundational understanding of the FO service
delivery structure. After receiving feedback on the Draft Report, the Evaluation Team worked
closely with SCO, including the M&E division, section heads and FO chiefs, to obtain more
consistent and relevant documentation to incorporate into the Final Report.
Refining the Evaluation Focus/Terms of Reference (ToR): A primary challenge with respect to
conducting the Evaluation was that the specific focus of the Evaluation, as outlined within the
ToR, lacked a sufficient contextual framework. The Evaluation Team recognized that a quality
and meaningful assessment of the SCO field delivery structure (in terms of addressing the
evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, coverage, coordination
24
and connectedness) required a broader framework of SCO’s overall programme performance. As
such, the Evaluation Team worked closely with SCO to better refine the Terms of Reference
(ToR) to reflect the need for a more in-depth and contextual analysis of the overall goals,
objectives and achievements of the SCO and its FOs -- within which the internal processes and
systems within the Headquarters and FOs (and the relationship between them and their partners,
collaborators and stakeholders) could be more effectively analyzed and assessed for
programming and procedural strengths and weaknesses. As noted in the (above) limitation, the
Evaluation Team also encountered limited data and substantive gaps in data, as well as
inconsistent reporting methods -- which also impeded the level and consistency of the
assessment. Nevertheless, with the concerted and diligent efforts on the part of the Evaluation
Team and dedicated counterpart SCO staff, sufficient data was obtained and utilized to produce a
quality evaluation with meaningful insights.
Evaluation Focus (Field Delivery Structure and Programme Performance vs Impact): The
Evaluation focused on the Field Delivery Structure and a limited assessment of Programme
Performance. The “impact” criteria was not reflected in the original Terms of Reference and the
project was not designed as a standardized Impact Evaluation – a systematic exercise that
typically analyzes the causal logic (direct cause-and-effect factors/relationships, causal pathways
from outputs to impacts, and key interventions) as a foundation for an applicable and actionable
Theory of Change. As noted in the 2013 UNEG Impact Evaluation guidance document (titled
Impact Evaluation in UN Agency Evaluation Systems: Guidance on Selection, Planning and
Management), the role of an Impact Evaluation is to “demonstrate the effectiveness of an
intervention in relation to its objectives; inform decisions about the continuation or
(discontinuation), expansion or replication of a programme or project, to contribute to the global
evidence base of ‘what works’ and ‘what works for whom in what situations.’” It must “focus on
the effect of the intervention on the outcome for the beneficiary population…and the extent to
which the observed change in outcome is the result of the intervention, having allowed all other
factors which may also affect the outcome(s) of interest.” This relies upon a “strong focus on
tracing cause and effect, to demonstrate if an intervention actually produced results.” Lacking
this focus and foundational structure, the Evaluation focused on overall FO contribution to
impact and outlined a path towards an Impact Evaluation which would reflect a standardized
Theory of Change. Logistical/Travel Constraints: The Evaluation Team had originally planned to visit one of the
Darfur States not covered by a FO presence, but was unable to do so given there were lengthy
travel permit procedures that the Team’s challenging travel schedule could not accommodate. As
an alternative, the Team visited the River Nile State, which did not require a travel permit. Also,
given its more accessible location, it was feasible to visit the State in a one-day period.
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Chapter 4: Evaluation Findings Pertaining to Programme Performance, Social Indicators & Field Delivery Structure 4.1 Overview of Sudan Country Office Programme Performance
4.1.1 Background
UNICEF Sudan recently initiated implementation of its Country Programme for the period of
2013-2016. The CPAP is comprised of programmes and projects jointly agreed upon by the
Government of Sudan (GoS) and UNICEF, which contribute directly to relevant outcomes of the
United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2013-2016. It also serves as the
Cluster Lead agency for WASH, Nutrition and Education, and as the Co-Cluster Lead for Child
Protection.
The overall goal of the 2013-2016 Country Programme is to “support a more equitable
development for children while also protecting the fundamental rights of children recovering
from the effect of conflict and natural disasters.”16
As part of the equity focus, the Country Programme identifies and addresses key bottlenecks and
barriers to the needs of disadvantaged and hard to reach children. These are children living in
low performing localities in terms of access to decentralized basic services, in rural areas, in
urban slums or in nomadic and internally displaced persons’ communities, children living with
disabilities, as well as children affected by conflict.
The four primary programme components of the CPAP include:
Programme Component 1: Child Rights and Disparity Reduction
Programme Component 2: Transition from Emergency to Early Recovery and
Sustainable Development
Programme Component 3: Social Policy, Monitoring and Evaluation, and
Communication
Programme Component 4: Cross-sectoral/Management Support
4.1.2 Strengths/Accomplishments
According to the UNICEF Annual Report 2013 for Sudan, the Sudan Country Programme has
contributed to the following recent accomplishments:17
Ensured “a timely and children focused response which lead to establishing Child
Friendly Spaces that reached 73,355 children.”
Ensured provision/sustenance of access to improved drinking water for 420,000 people in
Sudan.
16 The Government of Sudan/UNICEF Country Programme Action Plan 2013-2016. 17 SCO Annual Report 2013 for Sudan, MENA.
26
Enabled approximately 336,618 children to access equitable quality education through
advocacy, technical and financial assistance.
Supported 17 States in the development of draft five-year Education Sector Strategic
plans which will feed into the development of a consolidated National Education
Strategic Plan.
Supported Sudan in maintaining its polio-free status for the fifth year. More than seven
million under-five children were targeted with polio vaccinations, and 95 percent were
reached with coverage during Polio NIDS.
In 2013, there was an increase in data availability in Sudan due to UNICEF efforts. Two
MICS surveys were conducted in 2006 and 2010 which provided data at the national,
urban-rural and State levels. UNICEF supported the S3M multi-indicator survey which
collected information at locality levels on nutrition as well as health, WASH and food
security.
The number of children treated for severe acute malnutrition in 2013 increased to 90,000,
compared to 79,000 in 2012.
Six UN agencies signed an MOU to improve integration of activities to combat stunting.
Collaboration with WFP was strengthened to improve coordination of treatment
programmes and a joint programme on resilience.
The partnership with the European Union was further strengthened with an additional
investment of approximately seven million Euros for improving access, promoting Child
Friendly Schools, strengthening teacher training, and establishing a functional Education
Management Information System (EMIS), with a focus on the marginalized children in
Darfur and Eastern States.
A strategic partnership was established with Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA), enabling the in-service training of 1963 village midwifes in 12 States, with a
potential of supporting nearly 20,000 pregnant women and newborn infants every day.
The Partnership with the government at national and state levels enabled a shift toward a
focus on sanitation and accelerating the WASH policy approval process. Federal and
states MoHs will lead and set up a high level body to coordinate sanitation.
4.1.3 Weaknesses/Barriers
The UNICEF Sudan Country Programme operates within a highly complex and rapidly changing
humanitarian situation. The 2013 SCO Annual Report identified some of the key programming
challenges as follows: “Key challenges remain the operating environment in Sudan, where
displacement and population movements occur continuously, compounded by limited access to
conflict areas making it extremely difficult to fully understand the situation of children in those
areas and ensure their access to services. Limited presence of partners following the expulsion of
key INGOs impacts heavily on service delivery.”18
18 SCO Annual Report 2013 for Sudan, MENA.
27
4.2 Historical Overview of the Field Offices & Decentralization Context
In order to evaluate the Field Delivery structure and overall performance and contributions of the
FOs, a foundational understanding of the historical context of the FOs, and the factors that led to
or influenced the decentralization effort, is necessary. However, during the research process, the
Evaluation found there to be a lack of original/primary documentation pertaining to the historical
structure of the FOs, and the strategic imperative and justifications that led to the
decentralization process. Without such documentation, the Team was deterred from fully
establishing the historical benchmark/context; analyzing the FO structure in a comprehensive
manner; or fully determining the original purpose, direction and focus of the decentralization
effort. Nevertheless, the Evaluation was able to draw upon the deep institutional knowledge of
many long-term SCO staff, and cross referenced this information with materials from the desk
review.
The Evaluation identified a number of influencing factors that may have inspired, contributed to
and/or shaped the decentralization process from the early 1990s to the present. Since the original
establishment of UNICEF in Sudan in 1969 – and then as a full office in 1974 – SCO has
continuously established programmes and FOs throughout the country to serve children and
women with life-saving services. Originally, UNICEF’s focal priority areas were Health, Water
and Basic Education – areas that are still priorities for the FOs and good examples of positive
performance. SCO established its first Sub-Office in Juba to cover the Southern Sudan region
and support the supplies, logistics and operations for the Wau Water Project. In 1978, SCO
established the Kadugli Water Project to assist with the water needs of the South Kordofan
population.
The two subsequent FOs were established were to meet the nutrition needs of Red Sea State
through Port Sudan and North Kordofan State through El Obeid. The latter was established
originally to support emergency operations in Kordofan following the famine of 1984/85. It then
became the El Obeid FO in 1991 when the Project Office developed into a FO focusing on area-
based programmes in Northern Kordofan province. Meanwhile, the FOs in Darfur were
originally established to mitigate the challenges women and children faced during the early
1990s. The first office (El Fasher) opened in 1993, and then expanded (after the Darfur Crisis)
into the three FOs of El Fasher, Nyala and Al Geneina. In 2006, the Zalengi Outpost was created
to cover the newly established Central Darfur State.
It is important to note that the Nyala Office was expanded to include the newly created state of
Eastern Darfur, while Al Geneina focused on West Darfur. The FOs were positioned to meet the
vast needs of the population that had been displaced into large camps around El Fasher, Nyala
and Al Geneina.
Finally, the Damazin FO (covering Blue Nile) and the Kassala FO (covering West and South
Kordofan) were established to meet the needs of returnees in Blue Nile and Kassala – covering
Red Sea and Gedarif – after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between
GoS and SPLA/M.
28
At present, SCO currently operates through six FOs and three Sub-Offices, in addition to the
Head Office in Khartoum. The six FOs, which are primarily located in emergency zones,
include: El Fasher (North Darfur), Nyala
(South Darfur and East Darfur), Al
Geneina (West Darfur), Kadugli (South
Kordofan and West Kordofan), Damazin
(Blue Nile) and Kassala (Kassala,
Gedarif, and Red Sea). The three Sub-
Offices include: Zalengi, Central Darfur
(which reports to Al Geneina FO), El
Obeid, North Kordofan (which reports to
Kadugli FO), and Abyei, in Abyei
contested area, which reports to the
Kadugli FO. Currently, the emergency
states include Darfur (North, South, East,
West and Central), South Kordofan and
Blue Nile states. The average number of
staff at FOs is just 17 yet the average
population size is 3.16 million within an
area of approximately 162,231 sq kilometers – a notable finding which highlights the scope of
the challenge that SCO faces.
The non-emergency states covered by UNICEF FOs are Kassala, including Gedarif and Red Sea
states and North and West Kordofan states under the Kadugli FO. It is important to note that all
the states that receive UNICEF support are characterized by poor social indicators for children,
women and overall human development. These states generally are affected by war, tribal
conflicts, instability, and lack of infrastructure and located in remote areas – making it difficult
to access services.
Comparatively, Sennar and the Northern states receive support from UNICEF under national
programmes and policies including Immunization, FGM and Child Protection. Compared to
emergency states, the non-emergency states are characterized by stable governance systems,
development projects and access to all children and women. Also, these states are considered
better in terms of child indicators based on current survey results in Nutrition and Education.
Based on the Evaluation’s historical review, the Evaluation determined that the FOs were
established primarily to extend UNICEF’s commitment to the children and women of Sudan;
address the urgent needs of beneficiaries in remote (formerly inaccessible) locations; and to
provide services in response to major emergencies and (environmental, political and security)
crises (as evidenced by the emergency/humanitarian maps enclosed below reflecting the
comparative situation in 2011 and 2014 and the location of FOs). The overall pattern, focus and
geographical distribution of FOs reflects SCO’s ongoing commitment to the betterment of
Sudanese children. Moreover, the current Field Delivery structure is designed to enable SCO to
fulfill UNICEF’s mandate and equity-based strategy, which aims to maximize resources – and
results – by targeting the most disadvantaged children and women with cost-effective, integrated
interventions.
29
OCHA: Sudan Humanitarian Hotspots as of July 2011
OCHA: Sudan Humanitarian Hotspots as of September 2014
30
Based on the orientation of SCO and geographical distribution of FOs, SCO is positioned to
carry out UNICEF’s mandate in meeting the basic needs of Sudanese children while ensuring
their survival, protection and development. The current FO delivery structure, which emerged
from the emergency context as detailed above, is still firmly anchored in emergency zones. As a
result, SCO is well positioned to follow UNICEF’s mandate to “form appropriate policies and
deliver services for children and their families; ensure special protection for the most
disadvantaged children – victims of war, disasters, extreme poverty, all forms of violence and
exploitation and those with disabilities; promote the equal rights of women and girls and support
their full participation in the political, social, and economic development of their communities”
in line with UNICEF’s mandate.
The alignment of FOs to emergency and non-emergency zones is further examined and analyzed
in the Performance/Trend Analysis of Social Indicators in section 4.3 below.
4.3 Trend Analysis of Social Indicators and Comparative Overview of Performance at the Field Office Level
Part A: Trend Analysis of Social Indicators
Overview
In order to understand the Field Delivery context and overall progress toward achieving results
for Sudanese children, the Evaluation included a focused Trend Analysis of Social Indicators
(Part A of this subsection), and reviewed FO performance on a comparative basis (Part B of this
subsection). This exercise involved a close analysis of annual reports, AWPs, RWPs, MYRs and
other relevant documents as detailed in Annex D.
The review included a focused analysis of select indicators within the sectors of Education,
Health, Nutrition, and WASH. Overall, the analysis provided evidence of a generally positive but
mixed picture of programme performance and social indicators, which are highlighted below. In
particular, the social indicators within emergency states were typically found to be stronger than
those within non-emergency states in the sectors of WASH, Education and Communication for
Development (C4D) – which indicates that the FOs have played a positive role in contributing to
the improvement of these social indicators despite ongoing challenges that are addressed in this
report. Given SCO’s goal of reaching the most vulnerable communities, especially children,
across Sudan, this finding is consistent with SCO’s mandate and underscores the effective
implementation of its decentralized FO service delivery system.
There were several research challenges during the Trend Analysis. First, there was a lack of
consistent data and critical gaps in documentation/ information. The Evaluation thus focused on
select yet representative indicators in an effort to provide an insightful analysis of progress in the
emergency and non-emergency zones. Second, the Evaluation recognized the inherent limitations
in assessing SCO’s overall impact on Sudanese children. While UNICEF plays a significant
enabling role in supporting GoS (at the national, state and local levels) in the decentralized
context to reach beneficiaries, it is important to take into account the contributions of other (UN
and non-UN) organizations that serve children and operate in the same areas. The FOs may not,
31
in and of themselves, be solely responsible for major changes/variations in the social indicators.
However, the FOs play a key frontline role in the overall improvement and betterment of the
state of Sudanese children through priority programmatic activities that address the needs of
children, women and vulnerable communities. Given this important contextual framing, the
Evaluation adopted a balanced and contextual approach when assessing overall performance and
impact.
Findings
The following Trend Analysis of Social Indicators (in the areas of Health, Education, Nutrition
and WASH) highlights the Evaluation’s findings with respect to the context in which the FOs
operate, perform and contribute to results for children in Sudan.
Health: Based on the review of overall trends in the Health sector (2006-2013) using RWPs
AWPs, MYRs, sector reports and other relevant documents as detailed in Annex D, the
Evaluation found that the level of performance varied significantly over the time period
including an overall decrease in performance from 2006 to 2013, which may be attributable to
ongoing conflicts and pre/post-secession issues. However, within ten states, five FOs performing
at an average of 64.4% contributed significantly to increasing the number of children receiving
the Penta 3 vaccination. On the other hand, 50% of the states performed poorly at the levels of
62.5% – a finding which indicates that there is room for major improvement in this life-saving
child survival effort considering the planned national target for 2014 is 94% coverage.
Based on the focused trend analysis, the Evaluation identified generally positive Health
indicators, particularly in the emergency zone states served by FOs. The analysis found there to
be a significant variation between emergency and non-emergency states. Two out of the five
states that showed increased Penta 3 vaccinations were located in emergency zones, including
South Darfur (+21.6%) and West Darfur (+28.4%). The latter two states outperformed their non-
emergency states – a finding which merits closer consideration of the key factors (such as
responsiveness and effectiveness of service delivery, staff capacity) usually associated with
humanitarian response. Accordingly SCO’s signature achievements on this front deserve closer
attention: For example, SCO strengthened systems within the Ministry of Health (MoH)
resulting in the institutionalization of a Nutrition Surveillance System. This system houses a
national database for all surveys and Feeding Center data, with routine surveys every 2 months,
and the Sudan Health Bulletin is published every year.
32
Nutrition: The Evaluation assessed overall trends in the Nutrition sector from the period of 2006
to 2013. The assessment was based upon a careful review of the RWPs AWPs, MYRs, sector
reports and other related documents as detailed in Annex D. The Evaluation found that the level
of performance varied amongst indicators throughout the FOs. All FOs accounted for a decrease
in underweight prevalence by an average of 17.82%. Overall, 50% of states experienced a
decrease in Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), and this list included the four emergency states of
South Darfur (-.8), North Darfur (-2.4), West Darfur (-7.2) and South Kordofan (-.8); and one
non-emergency state Gedarif (-.9).
Based on the focused Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified a mixed set of Nutrition
indicators overall, and generally positive indicators in the emergency zone states served by FOs.
This trend indicates efficient and effective mobilization of resources by FOs, particularly FOs in
the emergency zones, toward the improvement of Nutrition indicators. However, despite the
overall progress made, the persistent continuation of high prevalence of the preventable cases of
SAM in the country, still poses a challenge to SCO – a finding that merits further consideration
and attention given the progress so far.
33
Education: Based on a review of overall trends in the Education sector (2006-2013) using
RWPs AWPs, MYRs, sector reports, and related documents as detailed in Annex D, the
Evaluation found widespread differences in performance between emergency states and non-
emergency states. Among the 12 states covered by the FOs, eight states (of which six FOs are
located in emergency zones) have greatly surpassed their target for the percent of the population
of war-affected children supported by UNICEF under the emergency education programme: The
list included the emergency zone FOs located in North Darfur (611%), South Darfur (617%),
East Darfur (138%), West Darfur (358%), South Kordofan (195%) and Damazin (131%).
Meanwhile, the Nyala FO, which is located in an emergency zone, also reached and surpassed its
target of 8,500 for the number of out-of-school children supported by UNICEF to access
education (under the Alternative Learning Programme in 2014) having reached 9,691 children
(Nyala MYRs). Four other FOs have reached at least 50% of the target for out-of-school children
supported by UNICEF to access education under the Alternative Learning Programme in the first
nine months of 2014, for instance, the Al Geneina FO planned to reach 74,000 children and had
reached 51,300 by July 2014 (Al Geneina MYRs). Comparatively, the Kassala FO, which is
located in a non-emergency zone, reached at least 50% of its target in all of 2014.
Based on the focused trend analysis, the Evaluation identified a mixed set of Education
indicators based on widespread variations. However, the Evaluation found generally positive
indicators in the emergency zone states served by FOs and highlights the importance of
specialized emergency Education initiatives in reaching beneficiaries. This trend indicates a
strong correlation between the undertaking of specialized emergency Education initiatives and
strong Education indicators – a finding which merits further consideration.
34
010,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000
Nor
th D
arfu
r (El F
ashe
r FO
)
South
Dar
fur (
Nya
la F
O)
East D
arfu
r (N
yala
FO
)
Wes
t Dar
fur (
Al G
enei
na F
O)
Cen
tral D
arfu
r (Zal
engi
South
Kor
dofa
n (K
adug
li
Wes
t Kor
dofa
n (K
adug
li FO
)
Nor
th K
ordo
fan
(El O
beid
Kas
sala
(Kas
sala
FO
)
Ged
arif
(Kas
sala
FO
)
Red
Sea
(Kas
sala
FO
)
Blu
e N
ile (D
amaz
ine)
NUMBER OF WAR AFFECTED CHILDREN SUPPORTED BY UNICEF
UNDER THE EMERGENCY EDUCATION PROGRAMME
2012
2013
2014 (to date)
WASH: Based on the review of overall trends in the WASH sector (2006-2014) using RWPs
AWPs, MYRs, sector reports and other relevant documents as detailed in Annex D, the
Evaluation found that the level of performance has varied significantly over the time period
analyzed (2006-2014). A total of seven FOs (six of which are located in emergency zones)
contributed to increasing the amount of people with access to improved water sources through
the construction of new facilities by at least 50%.
Comparatively, three emergency zone FOs (El Fasher, Kadugli and Damazin), contributed to
increased numbers of the population reached with improved sanitation services through the
construction of new facilities every year from 2012 through 2014. All of the FOs have reached
thousands of beneficiaries through interpersonal and media hygiene promotion interventions, and
three FOs have reached over 700,000 people in 2014 alone. Notably, the Nyala FO reached
975,000 people with key WASH messages surpassing their planned target by 25,000 persons in
the first nine months of 2014 (WASH 2013-2014 RWP). Based on the focused Trend Analysis,
the Evaluation identified a mixed set of WASH indicators based on widespread variations.
However, generally positive indicators were identified within the emergency zone states served
by FOs. The strong correlation between the construction of new facilities emergency zone FOs
and improved WASH outcomes – coupled with concerted efforts by some FOs to declare Open
Defecation Free (ODF) zones as indicated later in this report – merits further consideration. It is
also worth noting some of SCO’s key achievement on this front: As indicated in the stakeholder
workshops, Water & Environmental Sanitation (WES) partners praised UNICEF interventions
particularly in the area of hygiene promotion. It also established community based WASH
Committees composed of five women and five men. The evidence shows that WASH services
have been successful when approached from a community-based, participatory perspective as is
evident following the success of the Community Approach to Total Sanitation (CATS) initiative.
35
Part B: Comparative Analysis of Field Office Performance
In an effort to generate deeper insights into FO performance (within the context of overall
progress), the Evaluation selected two FOs for a comparative, data-driven performance analysis
of the mid-year July 2014 indicators and achievements. The FOs (states) selected for analysis –
Kassala (Gedarif State) and Nyala (South Darfur State) – were chosen based on their emergency
and non-emergency zone status; the comparatively sized local populations covered; the amount
of available data based on achievements towards planned outputs and indicators; and overall
relevance to the challenges that affect their respective beneficiary communities.
The following chart, which displays the 2014 ranking of states based on indicators, underscores
the rationale behind the selection of Kassala (Gedarif State) and Nyala (South Darfur State).
36
Identifying Focus States-Ranking Indicators
State Infant
Morta;ity
Under-5
Mortality
MMR Nutrition
Status
Vacc. All Improved
Warter
Enroll All Diarhea
Incid
Sanitary
Facilites
Literacy
All
Literacy
Female
Aid Knowl Delivery
Attandence
Tetanus Weight Ranking Pop
X000
Al-Gezira 1 1 2 11 3 3 4 13 7 4 5 4 3 7 68 1
Nahr al Nil 4 3 2 12 7 10 2 15 3 2 2 2 4 2 70 2
Khartuom 9 9 5 15 1 1 1 14 1 1 1 1 14 1 74 3
Northern 3 2 1 9 9 6 3 3 12 3 3 5 1 14 74 4
Red Sea 16 15 4 6 10 5 7 2 2 5 8 10 2 5 97 5
Sennar 2 7 2 4 11 4 10 5 9 7 9 11 5 11 97 6
White Nile 10 11 2 14 5 14 5 8 10 6 7 6 11 4 113 7
South Kordofan 13 13 6 1 4 2 12 1 11 14 17 13 13 3 123 8 1127
North Darfur 6 8 3 3 14 12 16 6 8 8 10 12 10 9 125 9 1,503
South Darfur 7 6 3 13 6 11 8 11 5 10 13 7 12 13 125 10 2,859
North Kordofan 5 4 6 16 13 13 13 7 16 11 12 3 6 8 133 11 1,506
Al-Gadarif 8 12 4 8 8 9 9 12 15 9 11 15 9 10 139 12 1,515
Kassala 15 14 4 7 12 8 6 10 14 12 14 9 8 12 145 13 1,507
West Kordofan 12 5 6 10 15 7 11 4 4 15 18 16 7 15 145 14 1,144
Blue Nile 14 16 2 5 2 16 14 16 6 13 16 8 15 6 149 15 655
West Darfur 11 10 3 2 16 15 15 9 13 16 19 14 16 16 175 16 1614
Total Focus States Population 13,430
Total population for Nortern States 26,797
Kassala FO (Gedarif State – Non-Emergency Zone): The Kassala FO was established in 2005
and covers Kassala State and the Eastern Region including Gedarif State and Red Sea State,
which are all classified as non-emergency zones. The FO covers a large area (totaling 261,169
square kilometers) and challenging environment marked by tribal conflict, the annual threat of
flash floods and a continuous influx of refugees from Eritrea and Somalia resulting in a large
IDP population of over 66,000 (Gedarif State Emergency Profile, Kassala State Emergency
Profile, Red Sea State Emergency Profile, 2014). The FO maintains just 19 staffers who cover a
population of approximately 4.5 million persons in a largely rural setting. In terms of budget, the
FO has a planned budget of $8,626,145 USD for 2014. As of July 2014, $5,141,635 had been
allocated, and the FO had utilized $2,367,082 to implement planned activities – accounting for a
utilization rate of 46% at the mid-year mark (2014 MYR).
Nyala FO (South Darfur State – Emergency Zone): The Nyala FO was established in 1999 to
cover South Darfur State, and has recently incorporated East Darfur State – another emergency
zone – into its operations. The FO also covers a geographically vast and challenging
environment covering 127,300 square kilometers: Besides periodic floods and disease outbreaks,
tribal conflicts in 2013 and 2014 resulted in an increase of 226,661 IDPs which led to an
increased demand for WASH, Education, and Nutrition services among others. This FO
maintains 25 staffers who cover a population of approximately 4.2 million, including a high
number of refugees and IDPs. In terms of budget, the Nyala FO has a planned budget of
$10,738,903 USD for 2014. As of July 2014, $5,761,503 had been allocated and the FO utilized
$3,659,117 to implement planned activities – accounting for a notably high utilization rate of
64% at the mid-year mark (2014 MYR).
Although the selected FOs face a number of unique and mitigating factors that are unique to their
emergency and non-emergency contexts, the analytical exercise provided the Evaluation with
key insights into the overall performance of FOs based on zonal orientation. The Team found
that, for a majority of key indicators, emergency states exhibited a higher rate of progress than
non-emergency states. The following table illustrates the key indicators and achievements
between non-emergency state, Gedarif, and emergency state, South Darfur.
37
Mid-Year (July, 2014) Key Indicators and Achievements Health
Key Indicator Kassala FO – Gedarif State Nyala FO – South Darfur State Target Status Target Status
Percent of children who received the first dose of the measles vaccine
90% 30.4% 90% 36%
Percent of births attended by skilled birth attendants 75% 51% 45% 55% Percent of health facilities that provide IMCI services 70% 66% 65% 42% Percent of pregnant women receiving at least four antenatal care visits
55% 18% 50% 43%
Number of pregnant women attending health facilities who are tested for HIV and received their results
80% 15% 20% 23%
Nutrition Key Indicator Kassala FO – Gedarif State Nyala FO – South Darfur State
Target Status Target Status Percent of children with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) that received treatment
30% Reached 2,236 children (percent unknown)
75% 43%
Percent of primary health care facilities providing treatment for SAM
35% PHC – 208, with CMAM - 48
69% 60%
WASH Key Indicator Kassala FO – Gedarif State Nyala FO – South Darfur State
Target Status Target Status Number of males and females trained based on the capacity gaps identified by the bottleneck analysis
120 No funds allocated for this output
240 (40% female)
50 (of which 36% were female)
Number of returnees and host communities with increased access to WASH services
20,000 No progress made 30,000 23,571
Number of emergency affected population who have access to life saving WASH services
10,000 No progress made 257,000
423,624
Number of communities provided with improved water and sanitation facilities
N/A No progress made 80 22
Education Key Indicator Kassala FO – Gedarif State Nyala FO – South Darfur State
Target Status Target Status Number of enrollment campaigns conducted 1 Completed 1 Planned Number of 6-13 year olds out of school 32,211 On track: data collected
from 1300 schools and preparation are in place to be entered in the system for analysis and reporting
5,000 6,491 previously out-of-school children in basic education and ALP classes
Number of boys and girls in states affected by emergencies benefitting from education support. Emergency-affected children per year target.
4,360 Emergency supplies prepositioned, contingency plan drafted.
12,880 14,081 (7,745 boys and 6,336 girls)
Child Protection Key Indicator Kassala FO – Gedarif State Nyala FO – South Darfur State
Target Status Target Status Number of children benefitting annually from services of Family and Child Protection Units
5,000 Prepared to roll out the Standard Model FCPU in Gedarif state.
N/A 472 (162 girls and 310 boys)
Benchmarks of UNICEF’s Core commitments for Children have been fully attained
8 of 8 Only 2 of 8 achieved some were not applicable in non-
8 of 8 Reached 14,975 (approx. 5,990 girls) with core commitments
38
emergency as (CAAF, MRM, GBV) others due to funding shortages
Government endorsement of a national Plan of Action to address early/child marriage
Yes NCCW launched the survey report on the process of SMIS of endorsement of a national Plan of Action to address early/child marriage
Yes No
C4D Key Indicator Kassala FO – Gedarif State Nyala FO – South Darfur State
Target Status Target Status Number of focus states implementing integrated strategic communication initiative on improved family care practices.
120 Delayed: No fund allocated for the output
10 Mapping survey conducted in the state for all the NGO and INGOs, partnerships. Progressing as planned
Number of frontline community-based health staff (including village midwives) with enhanced capacity to facilitate community dialogue/engagement on essential family care practices
2000 N/A 3000 2 Social mobilization officer SMOH
Alshufaa Strategic / communication Plan developed and endorsed by key federal ad state partners
1 No progress made 1 Strategy for Alshuffa’a Alsoghar Communication Initiative developed, discussed state steering committee with MOH, PHC
When comparing FO performance in emergency and non-emergency zones, the FOs based in the
former context demonstrated significant progress in the WASH, Education and C4D sectors,
whereas the non-emergency FOs demonstrated similar progress in the Health and Nutrition
sectors. This points to positive progress overall.
Health Sector
In the Health sector, the comparative analysis shows that Gedarif State, which is covered by the
Kassala FO, provided the Penta 3 vaccine to 27,386 children (under one-year old) as of May
2014. Comparatively, South Darfur State, which is covered by the Nyala Office, provided the
vaccine to 135,791 children. Another indicator shows the percent of children who received the
first dose of the measles vaccine was targeted at 90% for each FO, and the Kassala FO reached
30.4% while the Nyala FO reached 36% (2014 MYR, Gedarif and South Darfur).
It is important to note that the two FOs have similar populations and the targets for the Kassala
FO were higher than those for the Nyala FO. However, the Nyala FO was able to reach a higher
percentage of its population and exceed target levels due to a combination of factors. In fact, the
Nyala FO is currently on track to meet 10 of the 11 expected accomplishments for the 2012-2016
time period, while the Kassala FO is on track to meet just eight out of its 13 expected
accomplishments (2014 MYR, South Darfur and Gedarif).
With respect to resource allocation, an analysis of sector specific budgets revealed that Health
sector funding decreased by 31.2% from 2011 to 2014. Although the Health sector was the most
39
funded sector in 2011, it dropped to fourth by 2014. This finding indicates that the allocation of
financial resources and the insufficient budget for this sector played a critical role in outcomes
and merits further consideration.
Nutrition
The comparative analysis of the Nutrition sector revealed similar trends as other sectors.
Approximately 10,014 children with SAM in South Darfur State were admitted to CMAM
centers and received treatment with 14% cured and discharged, which accounted for 43% of the
75% planned target. This finding points to effective mobilization of resources around emergency
programming. In comparison, Gedarif State did not report on SAM treatment but conducted OTP
training for 60 staff, SAM training for 30 staff, and a refresher training for an additional 60 staff.
Subsequently, the Nyala FO is on track to meet seven out of the nine expected accomplishment
Nutrition targets during the 2012-2016 period. Comparatively, the Gedarif Nutrition sector is on
track to meet six of the nine expected accomplishment targets during the same period. As of
August 2014, the Gedarif Nutrition sector had utilized 66.3% of its allocated budget, an
indication that the sector has efficiently utilized its budget and is on track to meet its budgetary
goals. Given that budget documentation for the Nutrition sector was not available for 2011, a
comparative analysis between 2011 and 2014 was not conducted.
Education
The comparative analysis of the Education sector revealed that both the Nyala and Gedarif FOs
were able to reach most of their target populations through planned activities. The Evaluation
found that the Gedarif Education sector is on track to meet six out of its 10 expected
accomplishments for the 2012-2016 period (60%), while the Nyala FO is on track to meet six out
of 12 (50%) expected accomplishments. Comparing Gedarif State (Kassala FO) to South Darfur
State (Nyala FO), the former was determined to be “on track” to meeting its planned target of
reaching 32,211 out of school children whereas South Darfur had already exceeded its goal of
reaching 5,000 school children by 1,491. This finding is an indication that specialized emergency
education efforts have enabled SCO to meet, and in this case, exceed the stated target. The
Nyala FO in South Darfur State provided 9,081 new IDP children with adequate teaching and
learning materials and is currently supporting the construction and/or rehabilitation of 47
emergency classrooms with WASH facilities whereas the Kassala FO in Gedarif State provided
teaching and learning materials to 15,000 children and is currently supporting the rehabilitation
of 15 Alternative Learning Place (ALPs) centers. This finding indicates that effective and
focused mobilization of resources has enabled some FOs to achieve key targets (2014 MYR,
South Darfur and Gedarif).
When examining budget allocation, the Evaluation found that the Education sector experienced a
34.1% decrease in funding between 2011 and 2014. In 2011, the sector was funded $19,076,404.
However, this amount decreased to $12,589,953 by 2014. Given this funding challenge, the
continued progress towards the expected accomplishments indicates efficient utilization of
financial resources despite a challenging funding environment. Conversely, it points to a
potentially disruptive challenge that may impede service delivery and overall progress in the
future. This finding merits further consideration.
40
WASH
In comparing the Kassala FO’s WASH sector to Nyala’s sector, the study found that the Nyala
FO demonstrated a significant pace of progress when compared to the Kassala FO. For all key
indicators, the Kassala FO either made no progress or did not plan any funding for the activity.
The Nyala FO is expected to reach 67% (six out of its nine) targeted accomplishments for the
time period between 2012-2016. For 2014, the Nyala FO has already surpassed its 2014 planned
target of increasing the number of returnees and host communities with increased access to
WASH services by 257,000 having reached 423,624 people in the first nine months of 2014.
Meanwhile, WASH sector activities have been hindered, delayed, or cancelled in Gedarif State
and within the Kassala FO for the time being due to a lack of funds. This is a finding that merits
further consideration given the potentially disruptive impact of limited funding in the short and
long-term (2014 MYR, South Darfur and Gedarif).
In terms of budget utilization, the WASH sector was the highest allocated sector in 2014, and
also utilized the most funds by August 22, 2014. Comparing the 2011 WASH allocated budget to
that of 2014, the Evaluation found there to be a 16.5% decrease in funding, which, once again,
indicates key challenges on the funding front (2011 SCO Annual Report and budget documents).
Child Protection and C4D
The comparative analysis of the Child Protection and C4D sectors revealed that emergency and
non-emergency zones exhibit varying levels of progress toward their targets. The Child
Protection Sector in Gedarif State provided 62 legal, psychosocial and medical services to 98
children, and provided 472 children with Family Child Protection Unit (FCPU) integrated
services in South Darfur State. Finally, C4D sector activities were limited under both FOs in the
states. However, in South Darfur State, the Nyala FO supported the Back-to-School Enrollment
Campaign and a FTR family tracing and reunification campaign for unaccompanied children.
Meanwhile, in Gedarif State, the C4D section enabled the delivery of WASH-related CCCs for
children in emergencies efficiently through coordinated WASH humanitarian activities (2014
MYR, South Darfur and Gedarif).
Corresponding Trends: The trends exemplified by Gedarif State and South Darfur State are
reflected across the other emergency and non-emergency zone states/FOs. For example, West
Kordofan State (Kadugli FO), a non-emergency State, does not maintain any food fortification
laws, which are critically important in helping to decrease the number of people suffering from
iodine deficiency disorders that can lead to deficiencies in growth and development as well as
cretinism, stillbirth, miscarriage, and infant mortality. However, West Darfur, an emergency
State covered by the Al Geneina FO, does maintain similar laws. Similarly, the non-emergency
El Obeid outpost has surpassed its planned target of 15% of births attended by skilled birth
attendants by 17% whereas the Kadugli FO in South Kordofan, an emergency state, also
surpassed their planned target by 14.9%. The trend is also evident in the Education sector where
the emergency zone FOs have succeeded in reaching more beneficiaries. For example, the
Zalengi outpost in Central Darfur helped to decrease the number of 6-13 year olds out-of-school
by enrolling 27,300 children in grade one and 24,000 in ALP centers in basic education
programmes. In comparison, the non-emergency Kadugli FO in West Kordofan State reached
just 1,505 students (2014 MYR, Central Darfur and West Kordofan).
41
In summary, the comparative performance-based analysis of Gedarif and South Darfur States –
and the Kadugli and Nyala FOs located in those States – provided the Evaluation with key
insights into the operational context of the FOs, and overall progress at the state level based on
social indicators. The findings indicate a noteworthy pace of progress in the emergency zone
states – where most FOs are located – in comparison to steady progress in the non-emergency
zone states. Given the variations in the scope and degree of contextual challenges – including
conflict, natural disasters, disease, refugee influxes – the positive progress demonstrated by the
emergency zone FOs indicate that FOs are strategically located, and are well positioned, to meet
the needs of beneficiaries and hard-to-reach populations. However, key challenges – such as
adequate funding, budget disbursement and access to vulnerable populations – must be addressed
if SCO is to maintain an effective presence in the field.
It should be noted that the Trend Analysis of Social Indicators and FO performance is – as stated
here – a topline analysis that provides contextual guidance. It serves as a key reference point for
more in-depth analysis. It does not conclusively reveal the key enabling factors behind FO
performance, nor does it fully uncover the core issues that impact the Field Delivery structure
and Service Delivery. As detailed earlier, FOs play an important contributing role alongside
other actors including UN and non-UN agencies/programmes. As indicated in Section 4.5 below,
there are several factors – such as targeted emergency response efforts to reach the most
vulnerable communities, prioritization of life-saving activities, effective Cluster coordination,
effective planning and coordination with local (government, NGO, community) partners,
capacity development of partners, implementation of localized innovations – that have enabled
several FOs to achieve their planned targets and improve overall performance.
The following sections provide the necessary in-depth analyses around key factors that have
enabled/impacted Field Delivery Structure and Service Delivery.
4.5 Assessment of the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency & Sustainability of the Field Offices
Roles/Functions
4.5.1 Relevance
In assessing relevance, the Evaluation applied the following evaluation framework/questions: To
what extent is the current structure/set up still valid? Are the tasks, functions & existing
resources consistent with the overall goal of UNICEF Sudan & the implementation of its
mandate? Are the tasks, functions & existing resources consistent with the intended impacts &
effects (CPD, sector strategies, global commitments)?
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annex B and Annex C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and
findings from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key
findings highlighted below.
The Evaluation determined that the current Field Delivery structure and configuration of FOs in
emergency zones is, in fact, relevant and aligned with SCO’s mandate and commitment to
reaching beneficiaries – particularly those at-risk. Based on the orientation of SCO and
geographical distribution of FOs, SCO is well positioned to carry out UNICEF’s mandate in
42
meeting the basic needs of Sudanese children while ensuring their survival, protection and
development. The current FO delivery structure, which emerged from the emergency context, is
still firmly anchored in emergency zones.
The Online Staff Survey indicated that a large majority (73%) of SCO staff in both the KO and
FOs believe that “the current field office structure brings optimal results.” This view was echoed
by a majority of senior FO officials who indicated that the local orientation of the FO structure is
responsive to local needs and a contributing factor in the context of recent key achievements
during the current programme cycle. For example, one senior FO official contended that many of
their achievements, which included capacity building of government partners, increased local
ownership, and increased local involvement of partners, were rooted in the local orientation of
the FO. Most achievements were “made possible by the NGO-wide and active presence at the
local level.” Feedback from the stakeholder workshop also indicated that there is a good level of
consensus among stakeholders with regards to the relevance and appropriateness of the
programme to the local priorities. The programmes, tasks, and functions are consistent with
intended results in CPD and sector strategies.
This view was echoed by a senior FO official, who noted that his FO maintained “good visibility
at the community and state-level” and this helped to “translate advocacy into actions by the state
government” including the passing of the salt iodization law and the formation of the sanitation
council in Blue Nile State. Furthermore, the Damazin FO utilized its proximity to at-risk
populations to mobilize emergency response to support children and women affected by the
current war in Blue Nile and also respond effectively to the need for the return and repatriation
of refugees after the 2005 agreement.
Further, the Online Staff Survey indicated that a large majority of SCO staff (91%) believe that
programmes carried out by their offices/sections are “managed transparently according to
UNICEF rules and regulations.” The Staff Survey also indicated that a large majority of SCO
staff (82%) believe that SCO employees, at all levels, “comply with the standards of conduct of
the United Nations.”
When asked as part of the Online Staff Survey if SCO staff believe there is adequate knowledge
within their specific office/section pertaining to their responsibilities not only for UNICEF
programming, but also for their Cluster Lead Agency responsibilities, a large majority (83%) of
staff agreed that knowledge on these two delivery responsibilities is adequate – with only 17%
reporting inadequate knowledge pertaining to their Cluster Lead Agency responsibilities. This
view was echoed by a Kadugli FO chief, who indicated that UNICEF remains a “strong and
effective sector lead in WASH, Nutrition, Education and Child Protection.”
Finally, the Online Staff Survey inquired as to whether or not FOs provide “easily accessible key
documents, such as the CPAP, MTSP, WFFC, CEDAW, CCCs, UNDAF, etc.,” for which 76%
of survey respondents confirmed that their offices provide these documents in easily accessible
formats. The survey also indicated that quality control is a high priority within the SCO. An
overwhelming majority of SCO staff (80%) reported that their office “maintains very high
standards of quality,” and 58% of staff reported being satisfied with the information they
received regarding their sector work.
43
The Evaluation also identified several factors that could – if they are not adequately addressed –
undermine the current orientation of the FOs. While the emergency zone FOs are strategically
positioned to meet the needs of vulnerable communities, interviews with senior FO officials
outlined the need to improve access to vulnerable communities; strengthen decentralization to
enable planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting; and strengthen the equity
lens to ensure outreach to vulnerable communities. The majority of FOs in emergency zones
cited the urgent need to invest in emergency staffing to cope with the ongoing challenges and
unexpected crises. The average number of staff at the FOs is just 17 yet the average population
size is 3.16 million within an area of approximately 162,231 sq kilometers – a notable finding
which highlights the scope of the challenge that SCO faces.
In conclusion, the independent Evaluation determined that the current Field Delivery structure
and configuration of FOs in emergency zones is, in fact, relevant and aligned with SCO’s
mandate and commitment to reaching beneficiaries – particularly those at-risk. Based on the
orientation of SCO and geographical distribution of FOs, the SCO is well positioned to carry out
UNICEF’s mandate in meeting the basic needs of Sudanese children while ensuring their
survival, protection and development. Yet, significant investment in adequate staffing, training
and funding is required if SCO wants to maintain a strong and effective presence at the FO level.
4.5.2 Effectiveness
In assessing effectiveness, the Evaluation applied the following evaluation framework/questions:
To what extent were the country programme results achieved/are likely to be achieved? What
were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the results?
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annex B and Annex C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and
findings from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key
findings highlighted below.
The Evaluation found there to be mixed results in terms of achieving programme results (which
are detailed in full within section 4.3). While the Evaluation identified a noteworthy pace of
progress in the emergency zone states – where most FOs are located – in comparison to steady
progress in the non-emergency zone states. Given the variations in the scope and degree of
contextual challenges – including conflict, natural disasters, disease, refugee influxes – the
positive progress demonstrated by the emergency zone FOs indicate that FOs are strategically
located, and are well positioned, to meet the needs of beneficiaries and hard-to-reach
populations. However, key challenges – such as adequate funding, budget disbursement, access
to vulnerable populations – must be addressed if SCO is to maintain an effective presence in the
field.
In terms of effectiveness, the Evaluation identified several key factors that impact the
achievement of results, including: funding and disbursement issues; staffing levels; access to at-
risk populations; coordination with local partners (including involvement at state and local
levels); delivery of emergency services; how well planning and policy development is
harmonized across sectors; and, how effective cluster lead and coordination is carried out
through working groups.
44
In terms of positive highlights, the Evaluation found a series of key factors that contributed to
overall effectiveness – namely close coordination with beneficiary communities; effective
capacity building with government partners in key areas such as Education and Health; increased
involvement of partners in the planning process; effective provisioning of technical assistance to
government partners; [programme] ownership by government partners particularly Walis; and,
locally-focused innovations to improve service delivery.
A notable example is that of the Kadugli FO, which worked with (government, non-government,
community) partners to develop and strengthen a Child Protection system that responds to
children in all categories including displaced and vulnerable children in other situations. The
system is considered as a best practice within SCO. As a potential highlight that supports the
replication of best practices, it is worth noting that the Damazin FO also supported and
operationalized a Family and Child Protection Unit, which significantly contributed to the Child
Protection system in the state and overall service delivery.
The Evaluation also identified several factors that have inhibited progress, including: a lack of
support and/or coordination from Khartoum; a need for additional funds for emergency areas; a
lack of documentation of good practices; and delays in terms of disbursement of funds. In
addition, the Evaluation identified staff capacity as a critical factor and identified a number of
key factors that require urgent action. A majority of FOs, particularly FOs based in emergency
zones, reiterated the need to increase the staffing level for emergency response, monitoring and
evaluation and integrated delivery of services; and improve overall technical capacity,
management capacity and office capacity.
In conclusion, the independent Evaluation determined that the SCO and FO’s have been effective
overall in terms of programming – with mixed levels of progress and results depending on a
variety of factors (as described above) relating to SCO and FO processes, communications,
relations, funding and coordination. However, further investment in the enabling factors cited
above – particularly coordination, fund disbursement and capacity development – is required.
4.5.3 Efficiency
In assessing efficiency, the Evaluation applied the following evaluation framework/ questions:
Are the current activities, processes, and functions cost-efficient? Can objectives and activities
be achieved on time? Is the current set up the most efficient way compared to alternatives?
What would be the most cost-effective way to obtain the expected CPD results? How effective
have internal and external resources been harnessed to achieve results?
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annex B and Annex C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and
findings from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key
findings highlighted below.
Full details pertaining to the budget utilization analysis conducted for select FOs is provided in
section 4.3. However, the rigorous evaluation analysis and participatory staff feedback indicates
that, overall, SCO and FO activities have been cost-efficient – but substantive improvements are
still needed. Specific evaluation feedback from SCO and FO staff, particularly senior FO
45
officials, indicates that there needs to be increased investments in planning, coordinating,
staffing levels, and funding disbursements.
In terms of improvements, feedback from senior FO officials, in particular, suggests that FOs
require faster allocation of financial services in order to operate more efficiently and effectively.
In addition, senior FO feedback also indicates that the KO should provide extra funds for
emergency-affected areas; there needs to be improved planning and coordination with Khartoum;
and that the operationalization of different sectors (strategic plans) needs to be conducted in a
more harmonized manner to improve efficiency.
In conclusion, the independent Evaluation concluded that while the SCO and FOs have been
operating efficiently overall, major improvements are still needed in the areas of increased
investments in planning, coordination, staffing and funding disbursements. Given the positive
progress – cited in the Performance Analysis – across various sectors, the investment in effective
disbursement, coordination and planning is required.
4.5.4 Sustainability
In assessing sustainability, the Evaluation applied the following evaluation framework/
questions: Is the current structure sustainable considering current & projected developments in
context, needs & financial support? What were the major factors which influenced the
achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme or project?
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annex B and Annex C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and
findings from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key
findings highlighted below.
In terms of positive highlights, the Evaluation found a consistently high level of performance in
non-emergency zones as cited in the Performance Analysis. More specifically, feedback from
senior officials underscored some of the local innovations that have enabled some FOs to adopt
robust and innovative measures and achievements despite the challenging local environment. For
example, the Damazin FO introduced solar power to enhance its water systems and enabled a
20% increase in access to safe water supplies. The FO also managed to sustain immunization
access/reach to difficult areas during the rainy season by providing heavy-duty tractors as
logistical support. Finally, the FO helped numerous communities to be declared Open Defecation
Free (ODF) communities and is on track to declare a whole locality as an ODF by adopting the
effective CATS approach. Such innovative measures merit consideration for replication starting
with cross-fertilization of knowledge and sharing of best practices.
However, based upon CFO feedback and the performance analysis, the Evaluation found that the
current structure is adequate, but not necessarily sustainable, given the vast scope of challenges
and demands. Feedback from evaluation participants clearly indicated that in order to enhance
sustainability, the FOs require sufficient decentralized funding; funding for capacity
development (such as increased staff per section); and improved support from Khartoum,
including closer coordination efforts. A majority of senior field officials cited the need for
greater support from Khartoum.
46
Evaluation feedback indicated that there remains a lack of staff to meet the needs of large
populations in remote locations, and that there needs to be increased local coordination with the
local government to ensure sustainability of programs. Evaluation feedback also indicates there
is a lack of funds for some sections, and that access to affected populations remains a barrier to
continued and sustained programme progress.
In conclusion, the independent Evaluation determined that while the current structure is
adequate, without additional funds for increased staffing and capacity development,
sustainability in the face of the scope and challenges within the SCO mandate will be difficult.
The Evaluation identified several areas of improvement, which could significantly improve FO
capacity to move forward in a sustainable manner.
4.5.5 Coverage
In assessing coverage, the Evaluation applied the following evaluation framework/ questions:
How well is the FO emergency response reaching the affected population in terms of total
coverage & vulnerable groups within affected populations? Do all groups have equal access to
services provided? How are protection, gender issues & the socially excluded adequately
addressed? Are Field Offices able to identify most vulnerable groups within their area of
operation? How do Field Offices collect, manage, analyze and share data and information?
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annex B and Annex C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and
findings from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key
findings highlighted below.
First, the Evaluation found that the FOs are doing well in terms of reaching vulnerable groups.
UNICEF and the FOs consistently conduct needs assessment missions throughout the various
sectors to identify the most vulnerable groups and their immediate needs. However, they still
face specific problems, including access to the very communities they seek to serve. The poor
infrastructure that is prevalent across the vast majority of states – coupled with natural and man-
made crises – poses serious challenges for the FOs in emergency and non-emergency zones
alike. As one senior official noted: “The areas of coverage are affected by violence and conflicts.
Access to affected population is often been denied or restricted. Under [this] situation, the ability
to deliver for children is often reduced and rights of children are violated.”
The Evaluation also indicates that while FOs attempt to provide equal access to services
provided, there are challenges to reaching populations due to critical issues such as lack of access
and lack of emergency funds. For instance, the Evaluation found that there remain gaps in
services needed for rural, nomadic and returnee areas – an opinion widely shared by a majority
of FO officials. FOs are clearly working to identify the most vulnerable groups, and are
providing life saving assistance to thousands of Sudanese women and children. For instance, the
FOs have provided services in conjunction with NGO partners on caring for survivors of gender-
based violence – including the training of 150 staff of government and NGO partners on the
issue in 2013. SCO has also collaborated with government ministries to ensure enforcement of
the 2010 Child Act, and has also worked with various agencies and collaborators on the issue of
47
Female Genital Mutilation. These are only a few examples of UNICEF reaching the most
vulnerable and at-risk groups. A detailed summary of FO performance is provided in section 4.3.
In terms of collecting, managing, analyzing and the sharing of data and information, the
Evaluation found that basic information systems are clearly in place. However, evaluation
feedback indicates that there is a lack of coordinated documentation methodology, as evidenced
(for instance) by a lack of consistent data for this evaluation effort. This extends to survey data
focused on beneficiaries. As a senior FO official noted, SCO must do more to “provide the
required evidence for [child-focused initiatives] by collecting, updating and analyzing data
through surveys conducted at the state and local levels.”
In conclusion, the independent Evaluation determined that while the FOs are doing well in terms
of reaching vulnerable groups, further investment is required in a number of key areas including
emergency staffing, capacity development and infrastructure improvement. Of these, it is clear
that further investment in infrastructure improvement – in coordination with government partners
at the state and local levels – is required in order to improve access to the most vulnerable
communities.
4.5.6 Coordination
In assessing coordination, the Evaluation applied the following evaluation framework/ questions:
How well is the emergency response coordinated, with partners within cluster/sectors and cross-
sectorally? What other coordination mechanisms exist that have facilitated response?
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annex B and Annex C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and
findings from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key
findings highlighted below.
Through feedback from FO staff, as well as a wide range of stakeholders, the Evaluation found
evidence of overall effective coordination. The majority of senior FO officials cited the
establishment of cluster/coordination groups at the state level as a positive development, and a
key contributing factor to improvements in coordination efforts. With respect to cluster
coordination, the Evaluation analysis found that coordination is working well – and is clearly
recognized by stakeholders. For instance, the Damazin FO achieved progress in improving the
implementation capacity of the government partners and expansion of partnership with INGOs
and NGOs whereas the Kadugli FO noted that “UNICEF remains a strong and effective sector
lead in WASH, Nutrition, Education and Child Protection in 3 states and [has] delivered
enormous support to children.”
Feedback from the stakeholder workshops indicated that SCO is gradually increasing and
improving partnerships with local and international organizations. Furthermore, various FOs
cited effective coordination with local partners in sector-specific initiatives. For instance, the
Kadugli Zone Office worked effectively with partners (government and non-government) and
communicates to develop and strengthen a Child Protection system that responds to all children
categories, including displaced and other vulnerable children. Similarly, El Fasher developed
several partnerships during 2013 and 2014, including cooperation with local partners such as
48
Fasher Rural Development Network, Zolfa, Ahnar as well as with international NGOs such as
Médecins Sans Frontières, Relief International, GOAL, Plan, COOPI, Oxfam and others.
While there are positive signs within the context of external coordination, the Evaluation
identified a need for further improvement on the internal coordination front. The majority of
senior FO officials reiterated the poor level of coordination between Khartoum and the FOs. One
senior official cited the importance of “sharing standard messages rather than interpretations”
while another official noted “poor coordination with the Khartoum office” as a challenge that
further undermines coordination between Khartoum and the FOs. Furthermore, survey and
interview feedback indicated the FO staff would like SCO to invest more effort on coordination
issues. For instance, one FO expressed a need for increased involvement of partners in the
planning process, and indicated a lack of strong NGO partners.
In conclusion, the Evaluation determined that while coordination of emergency response is
effective overall, the FOs would like to this aspect strengthened – particularly in terms of
strengthening partnerships with NGOs. Despite Survey data indicating satisfactory “lines of
communication” between FOs and Khartoum, the majority of senior FO leaders actually
highlight “poor coordination” between Khartoum and the FOs. This poses a major challenge and
requires urgent attention.
4.5.7 Connectedness
In assessing connectedness, the Evaluation applied the following evaluation framework/
questions: To what extent is the emergency response shaped by commitment to addressing
longer-term development issues and goals? What linkages are being made to disaster and
conflict prevention activities and other cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights?
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annex B and Annex C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and
findings from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key
findings highlighted below.
Based on a close assessment of key documents such as the Emergency State Profile and related
material, the Evaluation found that SCO’s emergency response has resulted in reaching millions
of emergency-affected people with lifesaving services. SCO currently continues to make
progress in meeting all eight of its Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) benchmarks in
emergencies, increased risks to life, protection and physical insecurity suffered by conflict,
having met at least 5 of the 8 (62.5%) targets. SCO has displayed targeted responses within each
sector, which also highlights the areas of need in the crisis zones. It has continuously dealt with
crisis emergencies in the Darfur region, Blue Nile State, South Kordofan State, and North
Kordofan State. However, in 2013, UNICEF also had to respond to floods in Blue Nile State and
was able to conduct 29 rapid assessments with the Nutrition team to identify the areas of need.
While UNICEF does face many challenges in emergency response as detailed below, SCO has
still reached many of its 2012-2016 programme targets for reaching children in emergencies
across the FOs.
49
In terms of the extent to which emergency response is shaped by commitments to addressing
longer-term development issues and goals, the Evaluation found that FO staff feedback indicates
that the extensive focus on IDPs has, perhaps, led to neglecting other underserved and vulnerable
areas. For instance, one FO indicated a need to advocate for more funds for emergency affected
areas beyond only reaching the IDPs. Another FO cited their key role as “mainly focus on
emergency response [and] life-saving” but advocated for greater support from Khartoum, noting
that the FOs needed clear and coordinated guidance (on M&E / Programmes / Emergency) under
Senior Management leaders.
It is important to frame these challenges in a broader setting. The Evaluation identified a number
of broader contextual challenges that continue to hinder the linkage between emergency response
and longer-term development goals. Starting in 2006, the CPMP 2008-2012 noted that due to a
funding crisis the office had to abolish many different staff posts, many of which were those
recruited for the Darfur emergency, which hindered the programme response for a number of
years. The CPMP also noted that emergency response was hindered because the Emergency
Section is largely funded by other resources which has led to challenges in utilization within
short periods impacting areas of staff recruitment, supply planning, budget management and
donor reporting. The Annual Reports from 2009 to 2013 have also discussed many of the various
factors that have hindered emergency response including weak “human resource capacity, lack
of allocated government budget, huge disparities among states and across regions, weak
governance and poor accessibility” (2009 Annual Report). In 2011, the secession created a
number of hindrances for emergency response as well. A highly problematic issue that occurred
was that INGOs departed, reducing the implementation capacity of all sectors, especially in
emergencies, which is still a lingering problem today.
The 2014 Mid-Year Reviews (MYR) of the various states covered by UNICEF FOs also
revealed a number of challenges affecting emergency response. One FO covering an emergency
zone noted that a lack of staff capacity and funding has left the state without reliable data
whereas another FO noted that emergency response has been hindered because the staff has a
lack of access to the affected population due to fighting between GoS military and faction rebels
in the Jabal Mara areas having destroyed much of the infrastructure.
Another hindrance many of the FOs have reported is a lack of supplies to meet the needs of all of
the vulnerable children during emergencies. Prepositioning of supplies can be slow and delivery
faces numerous challenges especially to areas that are not accessible by road. Meanwhile, the
2013 Sector Annual Reviews noted that “inadequate coordination at all levels resulted in
untimely and ineffective flood emergency response,” highlighting the need for UNICEF’s
emergency response to be better coordinated at all levels (2013 Nutrition Sector Annual
Review). This data was supported by the views of the majority of the FO chiefs, who noted that
they are unable to access the areas of coverage most affected by violence because access is
“denied or restricted” and emergency response is continually hindered by poor infrastructure and
challenges in emergency response due to a lack of staff capacity. The majority of FO chiefs also
noted that a lack of strong NGO partners, low government capacity, limited UNICEF staff
mobility, and poor coordination with the KO have all hindered the overall emergency response.
With respect to linkages between disaster and conflict prevention activities and other cross
cutting issues, the Evaluation clearly found that UNICEF promotes a comprehensive approach to
disaster and development issues. For instance, SCO is reaching children in crisis areas with
50
sector sections that are acting in synergy and addressing the disaster to development continuum.
SCO has most notably responded effectively to the need for the return and repatriation of
refugees after the signature of the 2005 CP. Finally, SCO is supporting and operationalizing the
Child Unit that is contributing to the Child Protection System in the state and service delivery –
meeting both relief and development objectives.
In conclusion, the independent Evaluation found that SCO has also successfully focused some
effort on linking disaster and conflict prevention activities and other cross-cutting issues such as
gender and human rights. However, it is clear that emergency response is not yet shaped by
commitment to addressing longer-term development issues and goals due to the overwhelming
focus on life-saving services. This merits greater investment in coordination between emergency
response and development, clear coordinated guidance from Khartoum and adoption of emerging
strategies aimed at strengthening Humanitarian Action to ensure efficient, effective and timely
response.
4.5.8 Impact
As noted earlier, The Evaluation focused on the Field Delivery Structure and a (limited)
assessment of Programme Performance. However, it was not designed as a standardized Impact
Evaluation – an exercise that typically uncovers the causal logic (cause-and-effect elements,
causal pathways from outputs to impacts, and key interventions). As a result, the Evaluation did
not develop a set of evaluation questions focused around impact – in and of itself – and did not
seek to establish the causal pathways or identify the key interventions that may have contributed
to impact.
The Evaluation also recognized the inherent limitations of assessing SCO’s overall impact on
Sudanese children – given the roles played by other organizations and governmental agencies –
and adopted a balanced approach. While acknowledging the primary frontline role that FOs play
in the overall improvement and betterment of the state of Sudanese children, the Evaluation
focused on overall FO contribution towards impact and did not arbitrarily establish strict
attributable correlations between efforts and impact, a step which could have jeopardized the
integrity of the evaluation process.
Based on the Desk Review, consultative interviews with FO officials and stakeholders detailed in
Annexes B and C, key findings from the Online Staff Survey detailed in Annex B, and findings
from the Performance Review/Trend Analysis, the Evaluation identified several key impact-
related findings highlighted below.
The Evaluation found mixed results in the level of impact the programme achieved during the
period assessed. While the Evaluation found multiple areas in which the FOs achieved a
moderate-to-high level of impact it also identified internal and external barriers preventing
increased impact. The Evaluation found that the SCO is undertaking multiple activities that
positively affect the FOs ability to impact local communities. Effective coordination and
planning with local government agencies, NGOs and the community itself has facilitated FO
impact. This is evident in the Kadugli FO’s partnerships which resulted in the development and
strengthening of its Child Protection system. Cluster and coordination groups at the state level
have also increased coordination efforts – resulting in an increase in community impact.
51
The impact of the Field Delivery structure has been challenged on many fronts including lack of
adequate funding and disbursement issues, staffing needs and infrastructure barriers. Feedback
from FO senior officials noted that the lack of adequate funding and delays in disbursement have
a negative effect on the ability of the FO to increase and improve community impact. Small staff
sizes serving large populations limit the amount of impact the FO can have throughout the
community. Many senior FO officials also noted that underdeveloped infrastructure remains a
primary challenge and undermines their ability to reach some of the most vulnerable
communities. Without increased investment in infrastructure or methods to reach these
populations the FOs will not be able to positively impact these communities in a consistent
manner.
Finally, the Evaluation found notable differences in the level of impact between emergency and
non-emergency states. More specifically, the Evaluation found a generally positive but mixed
picture of programme performance and social indicators. In particular, the social indicators
within emergency states were typically found to be stronger than those within non-emergency
states in the sectors of WASH, Education and Communication for Development (C4D) – which
indicates that the FOs have played a positive role in contributing to the improvement of these
social indicators despite ongoing challenges that are addressed in this report. Given SCO’s goal
of reaching the most vulnerable communities, especially children, across Sudan, this finding is
consistent with SCO’s mandate and underscores the effective implementation of its decentralized
FO service delivery system.
52
Chapter 5: Conclusions & Lessons Learned 5.1 Overview of UNICEF’s Contribution to Improvements for Children in Sudan
The Evaluation found that SCO has significantly contributed to improvements for children in
Sudan. Despite key challenges, the Field Delivery structure, orientation and configuration of
FOs continues to respond to vulnerable communities and enables effective emergency response.
Based on the geographical distribution of FOs, SCO is well positioned to carry out UNICEF’s
mandate in meeting the basic needs of Sudanese children while ensuring their survival,
protection and development. In particular, the Evaluation found noteworthy progress and
exemplary achievements particularly in the Health and WASH sectors within emergency zone
FOs – underscoring SCO’s ability to reach vulnerable communities despite serious challenges.
At the same time, the Evaluation found steady progress in non-emergency zones, indicating
positive overall progress.
Nevertheless, key challenges – such as adequate funding, staffing, budget disbursement, access
to vulnerable populations – must be addressed if SCO is to strengthen its field presence and
maintain its role as an important partner for local communities and key (government and NGO)
partners. At the same time, SCO must still contend with the lingering achievement gaps and
challenges that persist in key sectors such as Health.
5.2 Strengths/Weaknesses of Sudan Country Office & Field Office Programme Performance
The Evaluation identified the following strengths and weaknesses. In terms of the strengths, the
Evaluation determined the following: effective coordination and planning with local
(government, NGO and community) partners including programme ownership; capacity
development of partners; ongoing emergency response orientation with a continued focus on
reaching the most vulnerable communities; effective Cluster coordination; prioritization of life-
saving activities; and, implementation of localized innovations.
When assessing weaknesses, the Evaluation identified the following: lack of access to vulnerable
communities due to conflict and infrastructure issues; insufficient decentralization; inadequate
emergency funding; lack of sufficient emergency staffing; inefficient budget disbursement
(delays) coupled with downward shifts in sector-specific funding in some cases; concerns
regarding poor coordination with Khartoum; concerns regarding lack of harmonized planning
with Khartoum; need for increased coordination with local partners; need for increased linkage
between emergency response and longer term development issues; and, lack of standardized
documentation.
53
5.2.1 Towards a Theory of Change: Best Practices (Interventions) from Select FOs
As noted earlier, the Evaluation focused on the Field Delivery Structure and a limited assessment
of Programme Performance. Since it was not designed as a standardized Impact Evaluation, the
Evaluation did not analyze the causal logic (direct cause-and-effect factors/relationships, causal
pathways from outputs to impacts, and key interventions) and was not adequately positioned to
create a standardized and applicable Theory of Change.
As noted in UNEG’s Impact Evaluation Guidance Document, a Theory of Change is a “model
that explains how an intervention is expected to lead to intended or observed impacts – it
illustrates, generally in graphical form, the series of assumptions and links underpinning the
presumed causal relationships between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts at various levels.”
The Document also notes that a “participatory approach [with all relevant stakeholders] should
be followed [at the outset of the project] to articulate the Theory of Change” and this “group
process can help create a shared perspective regarding the nature of the intervention and how it is
expected to lead to impact.”
Lacking the necessary foundational structure required for a standardized Theory of Change, the
Evaluation focused on the overall FO contribution to impact and outlined a path towards an
Impact Evaluation and a corresponding Theory of Change. The following chart, which includes
highlighted best practices – designated here as innovative interventions – provides a general
guideline and could be utilized to initiate the evaluability process for a comprehensive Impact
Evaluation.
5.2.2 Towards a Theory of Change
Resources Activities Outputs Short & Long Term
Outcomes
Impact
In order to accomplish a
set of activities; FOs
utilized a variety of
resources and initiatives.
In order to address
key issues, some FOs
undertook the
following innovative
activities.
These activities
produced the
following
outputs.
These outputs have
produced the following
outcomes.
The following result
were generated within
the context of overall
impact.
Improved
collaboration with
INGOs and NGOs to
improve service
delivery.
SCO strengthened
systems within
Ministry of Health.
Institutionalized
a Nutrition
Surveillance
System.
Access to national
database for all surveys
and Feeding Center
Data with routine
surveys every two
months, and the Sudan
Health Bulletin
published every year.
Increased access to
health data, providing
a better understating
of national health
demographics.
Localized innovations
in concert with existing
initiatives.
Damazin FO
introduced solar
power.
Used solar
power in the
operation of
water systems.
Resulted in a 20%
increase in the
population with access
to safe water.
Multiple sectors
benefited from
increased access to
safe drinking water
throughout FO
population.
54
Resources Activities Outputs Short & Long Term
Outcomes
Impact
FOs recognized the
importance of local
government entities
and have thus
increased
collaboration with
local Walis.
Established
Community based
WASH Committees
composed of five
women and five
men.
Promoted
hygiene-
promotion using
a community-
based
participatory
approach.
Higher success rate for
WASH interventions.
Empowered
population to make
community benefiting
decisions as well as
increased involvement
of women in
community decisions.
Investment in
community-based and
state- wide media
campaigns
FOs adopted
effective CATS
approach.
Numerous
communities
declared ODF
zones.
On track to declare a
whole locality an ODF
zone.
On track to improve
national initiatives to
create a state-wide
ODF zone.
Adopted international
and regional initiatives
and best practices.
Damazin FO
contributed to the
Child Protection
System.
Supported and
operationalized
the Family and
Child Protection
Unit.
State enhanced service
delivery.
Improved
environment for
children.
Close coordination
with beneficiary
communities
Damazin FO
supported
community-based
activities.
Used
community-
based activities
for the
promotion of the
collective
abandonment of
FGM.
Increased number of
SDF villages and
expansion of CMAM.
Decreased prevalence
of FGM at local level.
Needs assessment
missions to identify
most vulnerable
groups and their
immediate needs.
Kadugli FO
promoted a
comprehensive
focus on difficult to
reach children and
children caught in
crisis areas.
Health,
Nutrition,
WASH, and Child
Protection
sectors act in
synergy.
Increased support to
many conflict and
displacement affected
communities through
strategic and action-
oriented delivery.
Improved access to
hard-to-reach
communities.
Establishment of
cluster/coordination
groups at state level
has been a positive
development.
Al Geneina FO
increased local
ownership of
Government
Partners
Discussed and
signed a Rolling
Work Plan with
local Wali.
Increased involvement
of local partners in the
planning process.
Set standard of
improved relations
with local partners.
Implementation of
innovative approaches
in response to
infrastructure
Damazin FO
provided heavy-
duty tractors as
logistical support.
Used heavy-duty
tractors to reach
difficult areas
during the rainy
Immunization coverage
sustained during the
rainy season.
Increased national
immunization
coverage.
55
Resources Activities Outputs Short & Long Term
Outcomes
Impact
challenges. season.
5.3 Lessons Learned Regarding Field Delivery Structure & Approach
As expressed by some participants at the Validation Workshop, there are Lessons Learned
throughout SCO at the national and local levels. However, the lack of documentation prevented
the Evaluation from harnessing these case studies fully. Despite that challenge, the Evaluation
sought feedback from senior FO officials and derived some unique Lessons Learned. Some
highlights are presented below:
The introduction of solar power in the operation of water systems in Damazin resulted in
a 20% increase in the access to safe water.
The Damazin FO innovatively managed to sustain immunization access/reach to difficult
areas during the rainy season by providing heavy-duty tractors as logistical support.
The Damazin FO was able to help numerous communities to be declared ODF
communities and is rapidly approaching to declare a whole locality (Er Roseires locality)
as an ODF community by adopting the effective CATS approach.
The Damazin FO managed to significantly support and operationalize the Family and
Child Protection Unit, which significantly contributed to the Child Protection system in
the state and has enhanced service delivery.
The Damazin FO’s support to community-based activities started to achieve results for
children particularly in the collective abandonment of FGM, increasing numbers of SDF
(Sudan Defense Force) villages and expansion of CMAM.
The field maintained good visibility both at community and state level – a key factor
which has helped to translate advocacy into actions by the state government such as the
passing of the salt iodization law, the formation of the Sanitation Council in Blue Nile
State and the commitment to increase government expenditure on education.
The Al Geneina FO increased local ownership by Government Partners (community not
yet reached) and discussed and signed a Rolling Work Plan with the local Wali (not
Khartoum), thereby increasing the involvement of local partners in the planning process.
The Kadugli FO promoted what can be described as a comprehensive focus on the
difficult to reach children and children caught in the crisis areas, where the Health,
Nutrition, WASH and Child Protection sectors act in synergy. This strategic and action-
oriented delivery has supported many conflict and displacement affected community.
56
UNICEF Kadugli remains a strong and effective sector lead in WASH, Nutrition,
Education and Child Protection in three states and has delivered substantive support to
children.
Despite the local challenges, which are manifested by insecurity, the committed Kadugli
Zonal Office team was awarded the Global UNICEF Award for 2013.
SCO strengthened systems within the MoH resulting in the institutionalization of a
Nutrition Surveillance System. This System houses a national database for all surveys
and Feeding Center data, with routine surveys every two months, and the Sudan Health
Bulletin being published every year.
WES partners praised UNICEF interventions particularly in area of hygiene promotion.
SCO established community based WASH Committees composed of five women and
five men, and WASH services have been successful when approached from a
community-based participatory approach.
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Chapter 6: Recommendations
While the Evaluation found the SCO FO service delivery system technically and
programmatically strong, it identified a number of programmatic, operational and budgetary
weaknesses that could – if they are not addressed – reduce and jeopardize the programmatic
gains achieved. Furthermore, the weaknesses could limit the ability of SCO to maintain its
leadership role in meeting the survival and development needs of the Sudanese children. It is
with this background in mind that the following recommendations are proposed.
Structure
Introduce a dynamic and flexible staff rotation system between Khartoum and FOs to
enhance cross-fertilization of experiences and ensure the bridging of the usual
emergency-development divide that prevails in most UNICEF Offices. This will make it
possible for high-caliber experienced staff to dedicate more time and service in the field
and, in turn, strengthen the capacity of FOs (Action: SCO)
Develop a system of structured incentives – within the existing rules and regulations – to
benefit staff serving the emergency FOs, thereby encouraging and supporting service in
hardship duty stations (Action: SCO)
Further develop the system the Office has initiated of exploring and maximizing the
greater use of common premises, facilities and transport, especially between the UN
partners to save on operational costs and strengthen partnership (Action: SCO)
Develop a system of Phased Take-Over of Responsibilities by the Government at the
national and state levels to assume greater responsibilities for the planning, funding,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes from UNICEF over a
specified period of time. Ensure that this is accompanied and supported by a robust
Capacity Building Programme and resource back-up for Sustainability (Action: SCO)
Coordination
Initiate and encourage joint programme visits with national government partners to FOs
and states to cultivate their interest and commitment to service delivery and development
at the State levels to facilitate the sharing of responsibility and ensure sustainability
(Action: SCO/FOs)
Establish a system of weekly teleconferences between the UNICEF Representative and
FOs for updates, sharing of experiences and; progress on work plans and resolving of
outstanding programme and operational issues (Action: SCO/FOs)
Organize periodic programme planning and review operational meetings in a rotational
basis in the FOs to encourage and cultivate stronger working and social relationships
between KO and FO staff (Action: SCO/FOs)
58
Create greater opportunities for Operations and GS Staff to participate in programme
implementation especially at the FOs to narrow the gap between them and the
programme staff (Action: SCO/FOs)
Enhance internal communication capacity and connectivity between Khartoum and FOs
for a more efficient and effective coordination and collaboration. Establish a Web-based
platform (“KhartoumConnect”) for continuous staff feedback and ensure that this is
monitored daily by M&E staff with appropriate actions taken in a timely fashion (Action:
SCO)
Budget
Review the FO budget on a monthly basis to determine those states which experience the
most extreme emergency situations; and allocate and disburse funds appropriately based
on documented needs (Action: SCO)
To ensure rapid disbursement of funds and ensure efficient utilization, SCO should
accelerate the preparation of disbursement plans and inputting into VISION. In addition,
upon approval of plans, sections should agree with FOs on modalities for the acceleration
of disbursement and utilization of funds to ensure effective and efficient programme
implementation (Actions: SCO/Sections)
Increase the authority of management FOs have over their own budget by introducing
policies and procedures to monitor and ensure decentralized and appropriate
disbursement of funds, thereby increasing FO ability to implement programme activities
more effectively and efficiently leading to sustainability (Action: SCO/FOs)
Determine which sectors are lacking the most improvement in meeting goals and adjust
funding for sectors appropriately on a regular basis. This assessment should also include
the relevance of each sector to the particular community and region (Action: SCO)
Staffing & Capacity Development
Establish a Task Force to review the qualifications, experiences, profiles and capacity of
SCO staff with special emphasis on the FOs and match them to programmatic and
operational responsibilities along the lines of the Staff Capacity Review and Analysis that
The Bassiouni Group conducted for UNICEF Liberia (Action SCO)
Based on the findings and recommendations of the Staffing Task Force, SCO should
identify the additional staffing needs, their profiles and expertise for the emergency states
and take steps to provide such staff to the concerned FOs (Action: SCO)
Promote staff greater exchanges between KO and FOs to encourage cross-learning and
appreciation of their complementary roles, and functions. This will also enable the
mobilization of substantive technical support through joint training opportunities,
programme planning and prioritization, budget allocations and responsibilities as well as
transparency and accountability (Action: SCO)
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Work with FOs to determine the staff gaps in each FO based on caseload established by
the size of the population, number of children affected by conflict, natural disasters and
other inhibiting factors (Action: SCO/FO)
Provide Programme Support for technical advancement and learning for all sectoral staff
based on performance and evaluation (Action: SCO/FOs)
Continuously improve Staff management capacity by exposing each staff member to
different challenges and assignments on rotation, to improve and benefit from the
exposure to various functions and programmes (Action: SCO/FOs)
Strengthen the office capacity in terms of staffing level for emergency response,
Monitoring and Evaluation and integrated delivery of services (Action: SCO/FOs)
Develop a knowledge management strategy and hub of knowledge and excellence (via
the proposed “KhartoumConnect” web-based platform) to cover issues such as Child
Protection and Development channeled from Khartoum to FOs and to decision makers,
civil society, media and relevant knowledge networks. This will help raise visibility,
inspire policy discussions and action, and foster partnerships (Action: SCO/FOs)
Communication & Advocacy
Promote mechanisms to enable and strengthen community-based partnership building on
the experiences of FOs with track records in this area (Action: SCO/FOs)
Enable and increase closer coordination and partnership with local partners (government,
NGO, CSO and community) through shared FO experiences/case studies disseminated
via the proposed “KhartoumConnect” web platform (Action: SCO)
Monitoring & Evaluation
Promote the practice of documentation of Programme Experiences, Best Practices and
Lessons Learned and Monitoring as the basis of establishing Monitoring and Evaluation
capacity in FOs (Action: SCO/FOs)
Develop, articulate and mainstream the implementation of MoRES (Monitoring Results
for Equity System), which was originally developed as a key approach intended to
accelerate progress in reaching the most deprived children, throughout SCO by
establishing a Task Force working in conjunction with The Bassiouni Group’s UNICEF
and Evaluation Practice Groups (Action: SCO)
Establish a joint Task Force comprising of the Monitoring & Evaluation Unit and The
Bassiouni Group’s UNICEF and Evaluation Practice Groups to review the feasibility of a
follow-up Impact Evaluation (reflecting a standardized Theory of Change) to be
conducted in 2015 (Action: SCO)
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ANNEXES
Annex A: Terms of Reference (TOR)
TERMS OF REFERENCE
Purpose
TO UNDERTAKE AN EVALUATION OF SUDAN
COUNTRY OFFICE FIELD DELIVERY STRUCTURE
Expected fee TBD
Location Khartoum with frequent visits to the field offices
Contract Type SSA
Proposed level Evaluation Team composed of:
Senior Team Leader
Evaluation expert at P4 level
National Consultant
Duration 10 weeks
Start Date 16-March-2014
Reporting to Chief of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation
Budget Code/PBA No WBS: Grant:
Background:
UNICEF Sudan has recently started implementation of its country programme, prepared during a
difficult transition period both from external and internal perspectives. UNICEF operates within
a multi-layered UN system, combining a large number of AFPs in emergency response and
development throughout the country and two active missions.
The Sudan CO is currently undertaking a Strategic Process of Reflection that will look into how
to prepare and position UNICEF to increase and improve its impact for children in Sudan, a
process to prepare the CO for the Mid Term Review (MTR), which is due in the later part of
2014. The SPR provides an opportunity to review how we do business and identifying optimum
strategies that enables us deliver more effectively and in a cost effective way for the majority of
the children of Sudan
The strategic review will be composed of a series of cumulative elements, which will inform its
conclusions, and recommendations to the MTR. The elements will look into increasing our
knowledge and understanding of the situation and the context in which operate, improving our
effectiveness and efficiency, with a particular focus on decentralization, strengthening our equity
lens and emphasis, and improving our approach to resilience. This consultancy is part of the
strategic review and will inform potential improvements/strengthening of systems and processes
in the headquarters/field structures and the relationships between them.
Sudan is challenged by protracted emergencies and chronic under-development, a complicated
post-conflict context which includes violence in 8 out of 18 of its States, lack of international
61
interest and support, highly complicated logistics and poor infrastructure. It is within this
complex environment that the Sudan CO proposes an external review of its field operations to
improve the quality and predictability of its programme implementation, both humanitarian and
recovery/development.
Overview of the current field offices structure:
The UNICEF Sudan operation functions through 6 Field Offices: El Fasher (North Darfur),
Nyala (South Darfur), El Geneina (West Darfur), Kadugli (S. Kordofan), Damazin (Blue Nile)
and Kassala (Kassala); Additionally, 3 sub offices are also operational: Zalingei, Central Darfur,
reporting to Al Geneina FO); El Obeid, N. Kordofan, reporting to Kadugli FO, and Abyei, in
AAA, reporting to Kadugli FO.
The main roles of the Field Offices include, among others, the following:
1) Implementation of UNICEF programme as per the signed CPAP
2) Ensuring UNICEF resources as optimally utilized for intended purposes.
3) Coordination of recovery and development activities in collaboration with the government
and other partners
4) Providing technical assistance to decentralized government structures and other partners
5) Support to Emergency preparedness and response
6) Monitoring and Evaluation of UNICEF-supported programmes
7) Representation at State and locality levels
The Purpose of the external evaluation:
In the framework of the Strategic Process of Reflection (SPR) undertaken by the Sudan Country
Office (see below and attached for details), the proposed evaluation will review effectiveness and
efficiency of current existing structure of UNICEF Sudan Country Office and its field offices and
recommend areas of improvement and strengthening.
The main purpose of this evaluation is to provide recommendations for a more efficient and
effective UNICEF programme implementation and advocacy capacity at the field level
increasing knowledge equity between Khartoum and field offices, increasing results for more
children in Sudan, clarifying lines of accountability, highlighting the value added of field
presence including recommendations for programme implementation modalities for where there
is currently no field presence. Gap
Scope of work:
The Evaluation Team will undertake during the first quarter of 2014 a documented external
review of UNICEF field operations structure in Sudan through review of documentation,
consultations with staff, partners and other key stakeholders and comparison of other set-ups in
Sudan and elsewhere. Drawing from best practices and the assessment of Sudan’s system and
processes, the consultants will provide a series of specific and actionable recommendations,
tailored to the needs and realities of Sudan and UNICEF Country Office. The evaluation will
deliver an assessment of current situation, structure and systems, identify areas in need of
review/strengthening and propose an action plan addressing identified gaps and weaknesses. The
62
plan will include justification and provide several options for different courses of action with
detailed time frames to inform management decision-making.
The main objective of the external evaluation will be to measure the relevance, effectiveness,
efficiency and sustainability of the field offices roles/functions. Additionally it will be also
assessing coverage, coordination, and connectedness with regard to field offices emergency
response.
More specifically, for each of the above criteria, the external evaluation will provide answers to
the following questions, which – for many of them – derive directly from the anticipated
functions/roles of the field offices. More specific questions, for each of the functions of the field
offices and generally, will be developed by the evaluation team as part of their methodology and
workplan.
Relevance
The extent to which the structure is suited to the priorities and policies of the country’s regional
realities, children needs, target group, recipient and donor. In evaluating the relevance of the
field structure, it would be useful to consider the following questions:
To what extent is the current structure/set up still valid?
Are the tasks functions and existing resources consistent with the overall goal of
UNICEF Sudan and the implementation of its mandate?
Are the tasks, functions and existing resources consistent with the intended impacts and
effects (CPD, sector strategies, global commitments)?
Effectiveness
A measure of the extent to which the field delivery structure is the most effective for UNICEF
Sudan in order to attain its objectives. In evaluating the effectiveness, it would be useful to
consider the following questions:
To what extent were the country programme results were achieved / are likely to be
achieved?
What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the
results?
Efficiency
Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an
economic term, which signifies that the field delivery structure uses the least costly resources
possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative
approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been
adopted.
When evaluating efficiency, it is useful to consider the following questions:
Are the current activities, processes, functions etc. cost-efficient?
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Can objectives and activities be achieved on time?
Is the current set up the most efficient way compared to alternatives?
What would be the most cost-effective way to obtain the expected CPD results?
How effectively have internal and external resources been harnessed to achieve results?
Sustainability
Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the field delivery structure is sustainable in
the current context and considering possible trends in the next few years (international funds are
expected to continue to shrink while needs will be similar of increasing – agencies are expected
to “do more with less”). It also refers to the review of a framework of accountability between the
different structures - and the matching of authority vs. responsibility. When evaluating the
sustainability, it is useful to consider the following questions:
Is the current structure sustainable considering current and projected developments in
context, needs and financial support?
What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of
sustainability of the programme or project?
Coverage
How well is the field office emergency response reaching the affected population in
terms of total coverage and vulnerable groups within affected populations?
Do all groups have equal access to services provided?
How are protection, gender issues and the socially excluded adequately addressed?
Are field offices able to identify most vulnerable groups within their area of operation?
How do field offices collect, manage, analyze and share data and information?
Coordination
How well is the emergency response coordinated, with partners within clusters/sectors
and cross-sectorally?
What other coordination mechanisms exist that have facilitated response?
Connectedness
To what extent is the emergency response shaped by commitment to addressing longer
term development issues and goals?
What linkages are being made to disaster and conflict prevention activities and other
cross-cutting issues such as gender and human rights?
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The proposal for action will specifically relate to the following aspects:
Rationale and strategic vision determining needs and subsequent structure (considering
both external and internal factors);
Options on modality for programming in areas/states with no field offices;
Functions and scope of delegation of authority- responsibilities and accountabilities;
Structure and oversight arrangements, including internal communication;
Cost and funding modalities;
Cost-benefit analysis;
Risks and mitigation measures;
Closure and exit strategy.
Methodology for the consultancy:
1. Literature review: The exercise will be informed and initiated by a literature review of
relevant reports and assessments:
o External factors including analysis of context – main trends affecting operations and
capacities both at national and state/locality level as well as a review of best practices in
other UNICEF country offices in similar settings, other agencies’ practices and systems
in Sudan and key partners structures (government in particular). Special attention will be
paid to identifying potential innovative and creative approaches;
o Internal aspects: UNICEF requirements, procedures and internal factors affecting the
structure and set up for the country, including general vision and CDP, global policy and
process issues, identified tasks etc. The consultant will also review key planning,
monitoring and reporting documentation pertaining to UNICEF Sudan operation. This
will include CO documents in addition to relevant materials from Regional and HQs
offices. The desk review will also look at broad contextual issues and trends affecting the
needs and challenges of UNICEF CO and its field offices. The literature review will set
the chronology, essential events and associated actions and measures taken as recorded.
The CO will need to locate and assemble primary materials in advance to expedite this
aspect of the exercise. Analysis of recent directives in relations to effectiveness and
efficiency in particularly the creations of a central operations center and its implications
for country offices.
2. The initial desk review will be complemented with a staff survey looking at perception of roles
and responsibilities within the country office, including delegation of authority, areas requiring
strengthening, work load, team management, work processes (select those most in need of
review), perceptions and internal communication. A detailed analysis of the survey results will
help evaluate areas that require attention as well as level of clarity in distribution of tasks and
overall understanding of the structure by CO staff members. Results of the survey and analysis
will inform discussions and interviews below.
65
3. Interviews: The exercise will be informed by interviews with all key staff involved in
UNICEF field operation so as to inform the understanding essential to the drawing of initial
findings. This will include Senior Management, Section Chiefs, Key Section Staff at Khartoum,
Field Offices and Hub levels. In addition, key partners may be interviewed from within the UN,
NGOs, donors, key central and state counterparts and ideally local communities. This highlights
the importance of and value added of field visits to qualify the participatory aspect of the review.
The CO is advised to draft an essential list of key partners and counterparts and support
organization of discussions around sector and thematic aspects relevant to the review.
4. Stakeholder workshop(s) a stakeholder discussion(s) could be considered to share preliminary
findings with key partners and to obtain feedback with view to rough validation. These could be
organized at the state level and/or Khartoum. They will be organized in an informal manner to
prompt discussion and further strategic inputs to the exercise. CO support will be required in
locating a venue and related logistical and admin assistance. This will need to be planned and
managed with care.
Deliverables and period
Task Deliverable Timeline:
10weeks
16 March – 25
May 2014
Preparatory Phase
Review/Clarification of TORs An inception report following
discussion on the terms of
reference and agreement on how
the evaluation will be conducted
(Draft outline of report structure,
interview protocol, tools, calendar
etc.)
Week 1-2
Review of Documentation Week 1-2
Development data collection
calendar (including
meeting/interview schedule)
Data collection phase
Key Informant Interviews
followed by interim feedback to
UNICEF
Week 3
Direct Observation in the field Week 3
Data analysis and interpretation,
preparation of workshops
Week 4
Consultations with key
stakeholders using preliminary
findings from prior data
collection activities
Week 5
Analysis/Report Preparation
Preparation/Submission of First
draft of Report highlighting key
findings and concrete
First draft of report Week 6-7
66
recommendations
Review of draft report Week 8
Integration of Feedback from
stakeholders
Week 9
Submission final report Final report Week 10
Expected Background and Experience
International and Sudanese firms are encouraged to apply for this evaluation exercise. Individual
experts are also encourage to apply, either directly for any of the below positions or as a team
with other candidates:
Senior Team Leader: a senior expert at the P5 level at least with extensive experience in
running/managing country operations with field offices/structures. Knowledge of and experience
in operating in Sudan would be an advantage. Strategic thinking, facilitation and communication
skills, familiar with the UN system (with UNICEF an advantage). The team Leader will in be in
charge of designing and leading the evaluation process, oversight of the experts in the team,
consultations with experts, partners and counterparts, facilitation of discussions and responsible
for the inception and final reports.
The consultant to undertake the work will have the following profile:
- Advanced university degree in Political Sciences, Sociology, Law or related field
- At least 10-12 years experience in international development, including management
experience of offices/programmes.
- Experience in context affected by complex emergencies, including conflict/post conflict with
security constraints.
- Leadership skills, strong communication and presentation skills
- Excellent analytical, conceptual and writing skills
- Excellent command of English, both written and oral
- Knowledge of Arabic an asset
- Knowledge of Sudan an asset
- Experience in evaluation an asset
- Familiar with the UN system, in particular UNICEF would be an asset
Evaluation expert: an international expert at the P4 level familiar with
organizational/institutional evaluations, preferably in complex fragile contexts. Experience with
and deep knowledge of UNICEF internal processes and systems a requisite. The evaluation
expert will report to the team leader and be responsible, inter alia, for the methodological design
and implementation of the process, learning and linking with UNICEF internal practices and
requirements and assisting in the evaluation as required by the team leader. It is expected for the
evaluation expert to play a key role in the inception report and have major contributions to the
final report.
67
The consultant to undertake the work will have the following profile:
- Advanced university degree in Political Sciences, Sociology, Law or related field
- At least 5-7 years experience in evaluations in the area of international development and/or
emergencies
- Experience in context affected by complex emergencies, including conflict/post conflict with
security constraints
- Excellent analytical, conceptual and writing skills
- Excellent command of English, both written and oral
- Knowledge of Arabic an asset
- Knowledge of Sudan an asset
- Familiar with the UN system, in particular UNICEF would be an asset
National consultant: a senior Sudanese with consultancy, preferably with international/UN
experience and exposure, good knowledge of Sudan, its actors and dynamics at the national and
local level. The national consultant will be fundamental in providing contextualization and
general advise on Sudan, key stakeholders etc. He/she will also facilitate organization of
interviews, support facilitation and translation when necessary, and play a key role in
consultations overall. The consultant is expected to contribute to both inception and final reports
under the supervision of the Team Leader.
The consultant to undertake the work will have the following profile:
- Advanced university degree in Political Sciences, Sociology, Law or related field
- At least 10-12 experience in development/humanitarian assistance
- Excellent analytical, conceptual and writing skills
- Excellent command of English, both written and oral
- Excellent command of Arabic, both written and oral
- Extensive knowledge of Sudan
- Familiar with the UN system, in particular UNICEF would be an asset
Management and Technical Guidance
The exercise will be undertaken and led by the Sudan CO based on the day-to-day supervision of
the Chief PM&E, in close coordination with the Senior Emergency Coordinator, the Deputy
Representative and the Chief of Operations. Additional technical support will be provided by
MENARO and as need be HQ if/as required.
General Conditions
The consultants will be responsible for drawing as much information out of UNICEF
programme staff as possible and will work independently, though in consultation with the
programme group.
State if the SSA consultancy will include other benefits: No
State if consultant has right to stay in UNICEF property: Yes
Should consultant provide his/her materials: The consultant should be responsible for needed
materials(Laptop computer)
Is he/she authorized to have access to UNICEF transport: Yes
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Under the consultancy agreements, a month is defined as 21 working days, and fees are
prorated accordingly. Consultants are not paid for weekends or public holidays.
State if flight costs would be covered and at what standard: Should be included in cost of
field work
Consultants are not entitled to payment of overtime. All remuneration must be within the
contract agreement.
No contract may commence unless the contract is signed by both UNICEF and the consultant
or Contractor.
Consultant will be required to sign the Health statement for consultants/Individual contractor
prior to taking up the assignment, and to document that they have appropriate health
insurance.
The Form 'Designation, change or revocation of beneficiary' must be completed by the
consultant upon arrival, at the HR Section.
Funding:
The exercise is expected to have a general budget of around 100,000 USD, including
consultants’ fees, international travel and DSA where applicable, local travel.
Annexes:
Overview of Strategic Process of Reflection
Overview of Efficiency and Effectiveness Focus
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Annex B: Data Collection Instruments
Questionnaire for Chiefs of FOs & Senior FO Officials
EVALUATION OF SCO FIELD DELIVERY STRUCTURE:
Questionnaire for Chiefs of FOs & Senior FO Officials
The following questions are designed to help The Bassiouni Group’s Evaluation Team secure the
necessary insights to further enhance the Findings and improve the Recommendations in the
Draft Report.
1. What are some of the key achievements at your Field Office over the last 2 years of the
programme cycle?
2. What were some of the key achievements prior to 2012?
3. What do you consider to be the most impactful and sustainable achievement at your Field
Office over the last few years?
4. What are the three (3) most critical challenges or contextual issues that you face when it
comes to service delivery?
5. In terms of improving service delivery, what do you need most in terms of support (e.g.
technical resources, financial resources, human resources/manpower, changes in
operational coordination) from the Khartoum Office?
6. What are some of the key recommendations that would you make to improve service
delivery at your Field Office? How would you prioritize this list of recommendations?
7. What things should the Khartoum Office do (to support the Field Offices) that it
is not already doing right now?
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Online Staff Survey
Sudan Country Office Staff Survey 2014
August, 2014
71
Introduction
This survey was conducted within the course of the evaluation of “Sudan Country Office Field
Delivery Structure”. The purpose of this survey is to solicit staff views on strengths and
setbacks of the Sudan Country Office, Khartoum and Field Offices, regarding the offices’
performance, to achieve better results, and to have staff satisfied functioning in an optimal
work environment. When staff is satisfied, it can lead to higher productivity and better
workplace.
The survey is conducted online, using SurveyMonkey software, with multiple choices and
easy electronic response system. It was implemented during the period of 30 July till 14
August 2014. The survey covered a wide range of topics, including accountability and
transparency, office efficiency, linkages and communication, knowledge management,
monitoring and reporting as well as career development and work life balance. The spirit of
this survey is entirely constructive and its utilization for the office change is prospected. The
dimensions covered in the survey are:
1. Demographics
2. Transparency and Accountability
3. Work Efficiency
4. Communication, Coordination and Connectedness
5. Knowledge Management
6. Career development and Job satisfaction
7. Work Life Balance
8. Reporting and Monitoring
In implementing the survey, the following issues were considered:
Principles of confidentiality are considered to ensure full transparency. A third party
was responsible for collecting and analyzing the data to confirm impartiality.
The data collected from this survey is added together to give an agency-wide view.
Thus, all results are compiled together and analyzed as aggregate.
Equity was considered in this survey, while highly considering the desegregation of
data with location (Khartoum office/ Field Office), type of position (National Officer,
General Service, International staff, UNV) and gender (male/female).
All staff members were encouraged to take the survey. 93 staff members, from all
offices, responded to the survey with a percentage of nearly 35% of the total number of
staff members.
Following survey completion, data was entered and analyzed using the “Statistical
Package for Social Science” (SPSS). Analysis also considered the equity dimension.
Survey results were represented in tables with desegregated data.
Finally, tables highlighting significance in comparison or analysis were depicted to be
integrated into the Evaluation Report, with a purpose to provide evidence triangulated
with the qualitative data collected. All staff are expected to have access to the results
72
of the survey, and to optimally use it together to contribute to undergoing system and
institutional development, human resource and knowledge development to eventually
achieve the development and protection of the children of Sudan.
1) How many years have you worked in your present country Office?
Total >3 – 5
years
1-3
years
Less
than one
year
More
than 5
years
General Service 24 12.5% 20.8% 16.7% 50.0%
International
staff
23 8.7% 52.2% 39.1% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National Officer 40 10.0% 22.5% 5.0% 62.5%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field office 62 14.5% 22.6% 19.4% 43.5%
Khartoum Office 31 3.2% 41.9% 22.6% 32.3%
Female 26 7.7% 34.6% 30.8% 26.9%
Male 67 11.9% 26.9% 14.9% 46.3%
Total 93 10.8% 29.0% 20.4% 39.8%
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2) How many years have you worked in you worked in your position?
Total >3 – 5
years
1-3
years
Less
than one
year
More
than 5
years
General Service 24 16.7% 20.8% 16.7% 45.8%
International staff 24 0.0% 45.8% 45.8% 8.3%
International UNV 2 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
National Officer 40 5.0% 37.5% 10.0% 47.5%
National UNV 5 0.0% 40.0% 60.0% 0.0%
Field office 62 9.7% 30.6% 21.0% 38.7%
Khartoum Office 32 0.0% 43.8% 31.3% 25.0%
Female 27 0.0% 40.7% 33.3% 25.9%
Male 67 9.0% 32.8% 19.4% 38.8%
Total 94 6.4% 35.1% 24.5% 34.0%
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3) Before joining your current position, did you hold a position in any other organization?
Total
Govm
t
Did
not
work
Int’l
org.
Local
NGO
Private
Sector
General
Service
24 4.2% 8.3% 75.0% 0.0% 12.5%
International
staff
24 8.3% 16.7% 62.5% 8.3% 4.2%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0
%
0.0%
National
Officer
41 19.5
%
2.4% 78.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National UNV 5 20.0
%
0.0% 80.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Field office 63 14.3
%
6.3% 76.2% 1.6% 1.6%
Khartoum
Office
32 9.4% 9.4% 65.6% 6.3% 9.4%
Female 27 7.4% 14.8% 70.4% 7.4% 0.0%
Male 68 14.7
%
4.4% 73.5% 1.5% 5.9%
Total 95 12.6
%
7.4% 72.6% 3.2% 4.2%
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4) Do you have any experience outside of Sudan?
Total No Yes
General Service 24 79.2% 20.8%
International staff 24 0.0% 100.0%
International UNV 2 0.0% 100.0%
National Officer 41 70.7% 29.3%
National UNV 5 80.0% 20.0%
Field office 63 68.3% 31.7%
Khartoum Office 32 25.0% 75.0%
Female 27 48.1% 51.9%
Male 68 57.4% 42.6%
Total 95 53.7% 46.3%
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5) I am knowledgeable about all the work plans and the results of the programme of my
Office
Total Fully Not at
all
Only
for my
sector
Partially
General Service 23 39.1% 4.3% 30.4% 26.1%
International staff 22 72.7% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1%
International UNV 2 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0%
National Officer 39 71.8% 0.0% 5.1% 23.1%
National UNV 5 80.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0%
Field office 60 65.0% 0.0% 10.0% 25.0%
Khartoum Office 30 60.0% 10.0% 16.7% 13.3%
Female 26 50.0% 11.5% 19.2% 19.2%
Male 65 69.2% 0.0% 9.2% 21.5%
Total 90 63.3% 3.3% 12.2% 21.1%
77
6) I clearly understand the results I am expected to deliver
Total Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 23 0.0% 47.8% 52.2%
International staff 22 9.1% 27.3% 63.6%
International UNV 2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National Officer 39 0.0% 28.2% 71.8%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 80.0%
Field office 60 0.0% 33.3% 66.7%
Khartoum Office 30 6.7% 33.3% 60.0%
Female 26 3.8% 38.5% 57.7%
Male 65 1.5% 32.3% 66.2%
Total 90 2.2% 33.3% 64.4%
78
7) In my office, programmes are managed transparently according to UNICEF's rules and
regulations
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 23 4.3% 8.7% 52.2% 34.8%
International
staff
21 0.0% 9.5% 42.9% 47.6%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
39 0.0% 5.1% 56.4% 38.5%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 80.0%
Field office 60 1.7% 8.3% 41.7% 48.3%
Khartoum
Office
29 0.0% 10.3% 62.1% 27.6%
Female 25 4.0% 8.0% 48.0% 40.0%
Male 65 0.0% 9.2% 49.2% 41.5%
Total 89 1.1% 9.0% 48.3% 41.6%
79
8) In my office, staff is held accountable by their supervisors for delivering/ not delivering
results
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
23 0.0% 13.0% 56.5% 30.4%
International
staff
22 0.0% 18.2% 40.9% 40.9%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
39 2.6% 7.7% 53.8% 35.9%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 60 1.7% 10.0% 51.7% 36.7%
Khartoum
Office
30 0.0% 13.3% 50.0% 36.7%
Female 26 0.0% 15.4% 38.5% 46.2%
Male 65 1.5% 10.8% 55.4% 32.3%
Total 90 1.1% 11.1% 51.1% 36.7%
80
9) In my Office, employees at all levels comply with the standards of conduct of the United
Nations
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree
Strongly
Agree
General Service 23 4.3% 21.7% 43.5% 30.4%
International
staff
22 0.0% 18.2% 50.0% 31.8%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
39 0.0% 7.7% 66.7% 25.6%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0%
Field office 60 3.3% 13.3% 51.7% 31.7%
Khartoum
Office
30 0.0% 23.3% 56.7% 20.0%
Female 26 3.8% 19.2% 50.0% 26.9%
Male 65 1.5% 15.4% 55.4% 27.7%
Total 90 2.2% 16.7% 53.3% 27.8%
81
10) My Office maintains very high standards of quality?
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service
23
4.3%
13.0%
52.2%
30.4%
International
staff
22 0.0% 22.7% 54.5% 22.7%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
39 0.0% 15.4% 53.8% 30.8%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Field office 60 3.3% 15.0% 41.7% 40.0%
Khartoum
Office
30 0.0% 23.3% 70.0% 6.7%
Female 26 3.8% 19.2% 50.0% 26.9%
Male 65 1.5% 18.5% 50.8% 29.2%
Total 90 2.2% 17.8% 51.1% 28.9%
82
11) In my Office, in my opinion, resources are used to achieve optimal results for children.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
22 0.0% 4.5% 54.5% 40.9%
International 21 0.0% 19.0% 57.1% 23.8%
International
UNV
2
0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 2.7% 70.3% 27.0%
National UNV 5 20.0% 0.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Field office 58 1.7% 3.4% 55.2% 39.7%
Khartoum
Office
29 0.0% 17.2% 72.4% 10.3%
Female 26 0.0% 23.1% 46.2% 30.8%
Male 61 1.6% 1.6% 67.2% 29.5%
Total 87 1.1% 8.0% 60.9% 29.9%
83
12) In my Office, tasks are completed in a timely manner.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
22 4.5% 18.2% 45.5% 31.8%
International
staff
21 4.8% 33.3% 47.6% 14.3%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 2.7% 21.6% 67.6% 8.1%
National UNV 5 0.0% 40.0% 40.0% 20.0%
Field office 58 3.4% 15.5% 62.1% 19.0%
Khartoum
Office
29 3.4% 44.8% 41.4% 10.3%
Female 26 3.8% 19.2% 57.7% 19.2%
Male 61 3.3% 27.9% 54.1% 14.8%
Total 87 3.4% 25.3% 55.2% 16.1%
84
13) My Office manages the workload efficiently so that it can provide quality services.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
22 4.5% 31.8% 40.9% 22.7%
International
staff
21 4.8% 23.8% 61.9% 9.5%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 35.1% 56.8% 8.1%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 20.0%
Field office 58 1.7% 31.0% 51.7% 15.5%
Khartoum
Office
29 3.4% 31.0% 58.6% 6.9%
Female 26 7.7% 42.3% 46.2% 3.8%
Male 61 0.0% 26.2% 57.4% 16.4%
Total 87 2.3% 31.0% 54.0% 12.6%
85
14) Technical support is being provided to the staff at FO level frequently to enhance
performance and improve results.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 15.0% 25.0% 50.0% 10.0%
International
staff
18 5.6% 27.8% 61.1% 5.6%
International
UNV
1 0.0% 0.0% 100.0
%
0.0%
National
Officer
34 2.9% 32.4% 52.9% 11.8%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 51 7.8% 33.3% 43.1% 15.7%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 14.8% 74.1% 7.4%
Female 22 4.5% 36.4% 45.5% 13.6%
Male 56 7.1% 23.2% 57.1% 12.5%
Total 78 6.4% 26.9% 53.8% 12.8%
86
15) KO provides frequent technical visits and support to FOs for better performance and
results.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 20.0% 55.0% 15.0%
International
staff
International
UNV
20 5.0% 35.0% 60.0% 0.0%
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0
%
0.0%
National
Officer
37 5.4% 45.9% 35.1% 13.5%
National UNV 5 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 7.0% 36.8% 40.4% 15.8%
Khartoum
Office
27 7.4% 33.3% 55.6% 3.7%
Female 26 7.7% 30.8% 53.8% 7.7%
Male 58 6.9% 37.9% 41.4% 13.8%
Total 84 7.1% 35.7% 45.2% 11.9%
87
16) The sections in my office cooperate to get the job done and to provide a comprehensive
set of rights-based programming for children.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongl
y
Agree
General
Service
22 0.0% 4.5% 63.6% 31.8%
International
staff
20 10.0% 25.0% 45.0% 20.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 5.4% 81.1% 13.5%
National
UNV
5 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 80.0%
Field office 57 0.0% 5.3% 66.7% 28.1%
Khartoum
Office
29 6.9% 20.7% 58.6% 13.8%
Female 25 8.0% 8.0% 56.0% 28.0%
Male 61 0.0% 11.5% 67.2% 21.3%
Total 86 2.3% 10.5% 64.0% 23.3%
88
17) KO: The current office structure brings optimal results – FO: Reporting to the Chief
of Field Office brings optimal results.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongl
y
Agree
General
Service s
21 4.8% 14.3% 57.1% 23.8%
International
staff
19 5.3% 31.6% 42.1% 21.1%
International
UNV
1 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
34 0.0% 20.6% 55.9% 23.5%
National
UNV
5 40.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Field office 52 5.8% 9.6% 50.0% 34.6%
Khartoum
Office
28 3.6% 42.9% 50.0% 3.6%
Female 23 4.3% 26.1% 47.8% 21.7%
Male 57 5.3% 19.3% 50.9% 24.6%
Total 80 5.0% 21.3% 50.0% 23.8%
89
90
18) My Office maintains a strong internal monitoring system, and supervisors give useful
feedback to their supervisees
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongl
y
Agree
General
Service
22 4.5% 9.1% 54.5% 31.8%
International
staff
20 10.0% 25.0% 50.0% 15.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 16.2% 78.4% 5.4%
National
UNV
5 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 20.0%
Field office 57 1.8% 14.0% 66.7% 17.5%
Khartoum
Office
29 6.9% 20.7% 62.1% 10.3%
Female 25 12.0% 16.0% 44.0% 28.0%
Male 61 0.0% 16.4% 73.8% 9.8%
Total 86 3.5% 16.3% 65.1% 15.1%
91
19) In my office, all sections have a common reporting system.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 4.8% 4.8% 66.7% 23.8%
International
staff
19 10.5% 57.9% 31.6% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 29.7% 51.4% 18.9%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0%
Field office 57 3.5% 14.0% 54.4% 28.1%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 55.6% 40.7% 0.0%
Female 25 8.0% 20.0% 52.0% 20.0%
Male 59 1.7% 30.5% 49.2% 18.6%
Total 84 3.6% 27.4% 50.0% 19.0%
92
20) My Office is focused on results rather than procedures and processes.
Total Strongl
y
Disagre
e
Disagr
ee
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
22 13.6% 22.7% 54.5% 9.1%
International
staff
20 5.0% 40.0% 50.0% 5.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 8.1% 40.5% 45.9% 5.4%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field office 57 10.5% 36.8% 45.6% 7.0%
Khartoum
Office
29 3.4% 34.5% 55.2% 6.9%
Female 25 8.0% 32.0% 52.0% 8.0%
Male 61 8.2% 37.7% 47.5% 6.6%
Total 86 8.1% 36.0% 48.8% 7.0%
93
21) I am satisfied with the information I receive about what is going on in my Sector,
including Khartoum Office (KO).
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
21 4.8% 42.9% 42.9% 9.5%
International
staff
20 10.0% 20.0% 60.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 43.2% 43.2% 13.5%
National
UNV
5 20.0% 0.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 5.3% 38.6% 42.1% 14.0%
Khartoum
Office
28 3.6% 32.1% 53.6% 10.7%
Female 24 8.3% 41.7% 37.5% 12.5%
Male 61 3.3% 34.4% 49.2% 13.1%
Total 85 4.7% 36.5% 45.9% 12.9%
94
22) The support given from KO to the relevant technical sectors in FOs is effective
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree
Strongly
Agree
General
Service
21 4.8% 23.8% 66.7% 4.8%
International
staff
20 5.0% 25.0% 60.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 29.7% 56.8% 13.5%
National
UNV
5 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 57 3.5% 28.1% 50.9% 17.5%
Khartoum
Office
28 0.0% 21.4% 75.0% 3.6%
Female 24 4.2% 25.0% 62.5% 8.3%
Male 61 1.6% 26.2% 57.4% 14.8%
Total 85 2.4% 25.9% 58.8% 12.9%
95
23) There is enough knowledge in my office/Sector about my responsibilities for a)
UNICEF programming versus b) Cluster Lead Agency responsibility
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
21 4.8% 4.8% 52.4% 38.1%
International
staff
20 0.0% 30.0% 60.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 2.7% 8.1% 67.6% 21.6%
National
UNV
5 0.0% 40.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 3.5% 14.0% 52.6% 29.8%
Khartoum
Office
28 0.0% 17.9% 71.4% 10.7%
Female 24 0.0% 16.7% 58.3% 25.0%
Male 61 3.3% 14.8% 59.0% 23.0%
Total 85 2.4% 15.3% 58.8% 23.5%
96
24) I am satisfied with the flow of information between KO and FOs.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 9.5% 28.6% 42.9% 19.0%
International
staff
20 10.0% 70.0% 20.0% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 40.5% 43.2% 16.2%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 3.5% 38.6% 38.6% 19.3%
Khartoum
Office
28 7.1% 57.1% 32.1% 3.6%
Female 24 12.5% 50.0% 33.3% 4.2%
Male 61 1.6% 42.6% 37.7% 18.0%
Total 85 4.7% 44.7% 36.5% 14.1%
97
25) The members of my team/unit communicate effectively to carry out duties.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 0.0% 14.3% 57.1% 28.6%
International
staff
20 5.0% 20.0% 50.0% 25.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 16.2% 67.6% 16.2%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 57 0.0% 14.0% 59.6% 26.3%
Khartoum
Office
28 3.6% 25.0% 53.6% 17.9%
Female 24 4.2% 20.8% 58.3% 16.7%
Male 61 0.0% 16.4% 57.4% 26.2%
Total 85 1.2% 17.6% 57.6% 23.5%
98
26) There is a strong feeling of teamwork and coordination in my Office.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
21 0.0% 14.3% 42.9% 42.9%
International
staff
20 5.0% 30.0% 30.0% 35.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 8.1% 16.2% 64.9% 10.8%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 3.5% 15.8% 50.9% 29.8%
Khartoum
Office
28 7.1% 28.6% 46.4% 17.9%
Female 24 4.2% 25.0% 41.7% 29.2%
Male 61 4.9% 18.0% 52.5% 24.6%
Total 85 4.7% 20.0% 49.4% 25.9%
99
27) In my Office, I feel comfortable approaching Management to discuss job-related issues
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
15 0.0% 13.3% 40.0% 46.7%
International
staff
11 9.1% 18.2% 9.1% 63.6%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0%
National
Officer
26 3.8% 3.8% 46.2% 46.2%
National UNV 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Field office 39 2.6% 5.1% 35.9% 56.4%
Khartoum
Office
18 5.6% 22.2% 27.8% 44.4%
Female 12 8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 66.7%
Male 45 2.2% 8.9% 40.0% 48.9%
Total 57 3.5% 10.5% 33.3% 52.6%
100
28) Between KO and FOs, I feel comfortable approaching Management to discuss job-
related issues
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 14 7.1% 21.4% 57.1% 14.3%
International
staff
14 14.3% 28.6% 42.9% 14.3%
International
UNV
1 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
28 3.6% 35.7% 46.4% 14.3%
National UNV 3 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3%
Field office 42 7.1% 28.6% 45.2% 19.0%
Khartoum
Office
18 5.6% 27.8% 61.1% 5.6%
Female 20 10.0% 25.0% 45.0% 20.0%
Male 40 5.0% 30.0% 52.5% 12.5%
Total 60 6.7% 28.3% 50.0% 15.0%
101
29) My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Government partners
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 0.0% 0.0% 38.1% 61.9%
International
staff
18 0.0% 11.1% 55.6% 33.3%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National Officer 35 2.9% 2.9% 31.4% 62.9%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Field office 56 1.8% 0.0% 26.8% 71.4%
Khartoum
Office
25 0.0% 12.0% 64.0% 24.0%
Female 22 0.0% 0.0% 45.5% 54.5%
Male 59 1.7% 5.1% 35.6% 57.6%
Total 81 1.2% 3.7% 38.3% 56.8%
102
30) My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Local NGOs and
CBOs
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 18 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 66.7%
International
staff
16 6.3% 12.5% 68.8% 12.5%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 5.6% 55.6% 36.1%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Field office 55 1.8% 1.8% 43.6% 52.7%
Khartoum
Office
22 4.5% 13.6% 68.2% 13.6%
Female 22 4.5% 4.5% 50.0% 40.9%
Male 55 1.8% 5.5% 50.9% 41.8%
Total 77 2.6% 5.2% 50.6% 41.6%
103
31) My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with International NGOs
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 18 0.0% 0.0% 27.8% 72.2%
International
staff
17 5.9% 11.8% 58.8% 23.5%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
33 0.0% 0.0% 48.5% 51.5%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0%
Field office 54 0.0% 0.0% 35.2% 64.8%
Khartoum
Office
21 4.8% 9.5% 71.4% 14.3%
Female 21 4.8% 4.8% 47.6% 42.9%
Male 54 0.0% 1.9% 44.4% 53.7%
Total 75 1.3% 2.7% 45.3% 50.7%
104
32) My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with I UN agencies
Total Disagree Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 18 0.0% 27.8% 72.2%
International
staff
19 5.3% 63.2% 31.6%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 55.6% 41.7%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Field office 55 0.0% 38.2% 61.8%
Khartoum
Office
25 8.0% 72.0% 20.0%
Female 23 4.3% 47.8% 47.8%
Male 57 1.8% 49.1% 49.1%
Total 80 2.5% 48.8% 48.8%
105
33) My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Young People
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 17 0.0% 23.5% 47.1% 29.4%
International
staff
15 6.7% 40.0% 46.7% 6.7%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
33 9.1% 36.4% 36.4% 18.2%
National UNV 4 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Field office 49 4.1% 32.7% 40.8% 22.4%
Khartoum
Office
22 9.1% 31.8% 45.5% 13.6%
Female 21 4.8% 19.0% 52.4% 23.8%
Male 50 6.0% 38.0% 38.0% 18.0%
Total 71 5.6% 32.4% 42.3% 19.7%
106
34) My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Media, Academia
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 16 12.5% 25.0% 31.3% 31.3%
International
staff
15 0.0% 60.0% 40.0% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
32 6.3% 59.4% 25.0% 9.4%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0%
Field office 50 6.0% 44.0% 28.0% 22.0%
Khartoum
Office
20 5.0% 55.0% 35.0% 5.0%
Female 21 0.0% 47.6% 33.3% 19.0%
Male 49 8.2% 46.9% 28.6% 16.3%
Total 70 5.7% 47.1% 30.0% 17.1%
107
35) My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Private Sector
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 16 18.8% 18.8% 37.5% 25.0%
International
staff
13 15.4% 61.5% 23.1% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
32 12.5% 59.4% 21.9% 6.3%
National UNV 3 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Field office 47 12.8% 48.9% 25.5% 12.8%
Khartoum
Office
19 15.8% 47.4% 31.6% 5.3%
Female 20 10.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0%
Male 46 15.2% 52.2% 26.1% 6.5%
Total 66 13.6% 48.5% 27.3% 10.6%
108
36) Knowledge management concept and practices are clear in my office.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 0.0% 19.0% 66.7% 14.3%
International
staff
20 5.0% 35.0% 55.0% 5.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 33.3% 55.6% 8.3%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field office 57 1.8% 28.1% 57.9% 12.3%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 29.6% 63.0% 3.7%
Female 24 4.2% 29.2% 58.3% 8.3%
Male 60 1.7% 28.3% 60.0% 10.0%
Total 84 2.4% 28.6% 59.5% 9.5%
109
37) My office is perceived by partners as the key organization that generates and
manages knowledge on children.
Total Disagree Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 4.8% 47.6% 47.6%
International
staff
20 35.0% 60.0% 5.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 5.6% 58.3% 36.1%
National UNV 5 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 57 7.0% 50.9% 42.1%
Khartoum
Office
27 22.2% 66.7% 11.1%
Female 24 16.7% 58.3% 25.0%
Male 60 10.0% 55.0% 35.0%
Total 84 11.9% 56.0% 32.1%
110
38) My office supports partners in the development of their databases/management
information systems.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 0.0% 14.3% 57.1% 28.6%
International
staff
20 5.0% 15.0% 70.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 0.0% 22.2% 63.9% 13.9%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field office 57 0.0% 21.1% 57.9% 21.1%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 11.1% 77.8% 7.4%
Female 24 4.2% 12.5% 66.7% 16.7%
Male 60 0.0% 20.0% 63.3% 16.7%
Total 84 1.2% 17.9% 64.3% 16.7%
111
39) Key documents exist in the office and they are easily accessible (i.e., MTSP, WFFC,
CRC, CEDAW, CCCs, UNDAF, CPAP… etc.)
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 0.0% 19.0% 61.9% 19.0%
International
staff
19 5.3% 15.8% 63.2% 15.8%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 25.0% 58.3% 13.9%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Field office 56 1.8% 25.0% 57.1% 16.1%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 11.1% 66.7% 18.5%
Female 24 4.2% 16.7% 62.5% 16.7%
Male 59 1.7% 22.0% 59.3% 16.9%
Total 83 2.4% 20.5% 60.2% 16.9%
112
40) Ideas and initiatives by staff are encouraged by management and peers.
Total Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%
International
staff
20 30.0% 50.0% 20.0%
International
UNV
2 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 27.8% 66.7% 5.6%
National UNV 5 20.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Field office 56 28.6% 58.9% 12.5%
Khartoum
Office
27 33.3% 48.1% 18.5%
Female 23 30.4% 47.8% 21.7%
Male 60 30.0% 58.3% 11.7%
Total 83 30.1% 55.4% 14.5%
113
41) I am able to influence decisions that affect my performance and expected results.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 30.0%
International
staff
20 0.0% 40.0% 40.0% 20.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 19.4% 52.8% 25.0%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 20.0%
Field office 56 5.4% 23.2% 44.6% 26.8%
Khartoum
Office
27 0.0% 29.6% 51.9% 18.5%
Female 23 4.3% 30.4% 34.8% 30.4%
Male 60 3.3% 23.3% 51.7% 21.7%
Total 83 3.6% 25.3% 47.0% 24.1%
114
42) My office cares about my career advancement and capacity development.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 35.0% 45.0% 10.0%
International
staff
20 15.0% 35.0% 50.0% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 47.2% 47.2% 2.8%
National UNV 5 0.0% 60.0% 20.0% 20.0%
Field office 56 7.1% 41.1% 46.4% 5.4%
Khartoum
Office
27 11.1% 40.7% 44.4% 3.7%
Female 23 17.4% 34.8% 43.5% 4.3%
Male 60 5.0% 43.3% 46.7% 5.0%
Total 83 8.4% 41.0% 45.8% 4.8%
115
43) My office management recognizes my good work.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree trongly
Agree
General Service 20 5.0% 20.0% 35.0% 40.0%
International
staff
20 5.0% 15.0% 60.0% 20.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 5.6% 13.9% 58.3% 22.2%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Field office 56 7.1% 12.5% 50.0% 30.4%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 25.9% 51.9% 18.5%
Female 23 8.7% 17.4% 34.8% 39.1%
Male 60 5.0% 16.7% 56.7% 21.7%
Total 83 6.0% 16.9% 50.6% 26.5%
116
44) In reference to staff development, I would be interested in a short-term secondment
to one of the other field offices.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 0.0% 0.0% 30.0% 70.0%
International
staff
20 10.0% 10.0% 55.0% 25.0%
International
UNV
2 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 13.9% 22.2% 61.1%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field office 56 3.6% 7.1% 28.6% 60.7%
Khartoum
Office
27 7.4% 14.8% 48.1% 29.6%
Female 23 4.3% 21.7% 34.8% 39.1%
Male 60 5.0% 5.0% 35.0% 55.0%
Total 83 4.8% 9.6% 34.9% 50.6%
117
45) I feel motivated to work at my full capacity.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 5.0% 50.0% 35.0%
International
staff
20 5.0% 30.0% 35.0% 30.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 0.0% 5.6% 50.0% 44.4%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 0.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 5.4% 8.9% 41.1% 44.6%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 22.2% 48.1% 25.9%
Female 23 13.0% 21.7% 21.7% 43.5%
Male 60 1.7% 10.0% 51.7% 36.7%
Total 83 4.8% 13.3% 43.4% 38.6%
118
46) I feel the following:
Total I am actively
looking for a
job outside
UNICEF/SC
O.
I am
extremely
proud to tell
people that I
work for
UNICEF/SC
O.
I am proud
to work for
UNICEF/S
CO even if
am not
happy in my
current post.
I have
applied
for other
jobs in the
past six
months.
General
Service
19 0.0% 57.9% 36.8% 5.3%
Internation
al staff
20 5.0% 60.0% 25.0% 10.0%
Internation
al UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 58.3% 33.3% 5.6%
National
UNV
5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field
office
55 0.0% 56.4% 36.4% 7.3%
Khartoum
Office
27 7.4% 51.9% 33.3% 7.4%
Female 23 4.3% 34.8% 47.8% 13.0%
Male 59 1.7% 62.7% 30.5% 5.1%
Total 82 2.4% 54.9% 35.4% 7.3%
119
47) Work pressures in my job are at an acceptable level.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 30.0% 50.0% 10.0%
International
staff
20 0.0% 30.0% 65.0% 5.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 5.6% 50.0% 41.7% 2.8%
National UNV 5 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0%
Field office 56 8.9% 33.9% 42.9% 14.3%
Khartoum
Office
27 0.0% 48.1% 51.9% 0.0%
Female 23 4.3% 52.2% 34.8% 8.7%
Male 60 6.7% 33.3% 50.0% 10.0%
Total 83 6.0% 38.6% 45.8% 9.6%
120
48) My job’s responsibilities allow me to take care of my family and personal
obligations.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 35.0% 45.0% 10.0%
International
staff
20 0.0% 40.0% 50.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 8.3% 44.4% 47.2% 0.0%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 5.4% 35.7% 48.2% 10.7%
Khartoum
Office
27 7.4% 48.1% 40.7% 3.7%
Female 23 0.0% 52.2% 43.5% 4.3%
Male 60 8.3% 35.0% 46.7% 10.0%
Total 83 6.0% 39.8% 45.8% 8.4%
121
49) Management in my Office has taken steps to improve work/life balance.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 0.0% 30.0% 65.0% 5.0%
International
staff
20 10.0% 35.0% 45.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 50.0% 36.1% 11.1%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 1.8% 35.7% 46.4% 16.1%
Khartoum
Office
27 7.4% 48.1% 40.7% 3.7%
Female 23 13.0% 34.8% 39.1% 13.0%
Male 60 0.0% 41.7% 46.7% 11.7%
Total 83 3.6% 39.8% 44.6% 12.0%
122
50) I am satisfied with the security measures taken by my office.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 5.0% 5.0% 60.0% 30.0%
International
staff
20 5.0% 20.0% 65.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
35 2.9% 22.9% 68.6% 5.7%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 20.0%
Field office 55 5.5% 18.2% 61.8% 14.5%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 14.8% 70.4% 11.1%
Female 23 13.0% 17.4% 56.5% 13.0%
Male 59 1.7% 16.9% 67.8% 13.6%
Total 82 4.9% 17.1% 64.6% 13.4%
51) My Management Team actively supports UNICEF's policies that promote gender
123
balance in my Office.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 15.0% 25.0% 50.0%
International
staff
20 5.0% 0.0% 70.0% 25.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
34 0.0% 11.8% 64.7% 23.5%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 40.0%
Field office 54 3.7% 11.1% 50.0% 35.2%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 3.7% 70.4% 22.2%
Female 23 13.0% 13.0% 52.2% 21.7%
Male 58 0.0% 6.9% 58.6% 34.5%
Total 81 3.7% 8.6% 56.8% 30.9%
124
52) I receive constructive feedback on the reports I share:
Total Always Never Rarely Someti
mes
General Service 20 15.0% 15.0% 5.0% 65.0%
International
staff
20 15.0% 5.0% 20.0% 60.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
National
Officer
36 8.3% 8.3% 33.3% 50.0%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 0.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 10.7% 12.5% 25.0% 51.8%
Khartoum
Office
27 14.8% 3.7% 11.1% 70.4%
Female 23 13.0% 13.0% 8.7% 65.2%
Male 60 11.7% 8.3% 25.0% 55.0%
Total 83 12.0% 9.6% 20.5% 57.8%
125
53) In the past twelve months, I experienced smooth reporting between management at
the FO level and my sector in the KO.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 5.0% 5.0% 85.0% 5.0%
International
staff
18 5.6% 38.9% 55.6% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 5.6% 22.2% 63.9% 8.3%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 40.0%
Field office 55 3.6% 12.7% 72.7% 10.9%
Khartoum
Office
26 7.7% 38.5% 53.8% 0.0%
Female 23 17.4% 21.7% 60.9% 0.0%
Male 58 0.0% 20.7% 69.0% 10.3%
Total 81 4.9% 21.0% 66.7% 7.4%
126
54) Between my FO and KO, there are clear lines of supervision.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 0.0% 25.0% 55.0% 20.0%
International
staff
19 10.5% 31.6% 47.4% 10.5%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 33.3% 47.2% 16.7%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 1.8% 28.6% 51.8% 17.9%
Khartoum
Office
26 7.7% 30.8% 42.3% 19.2%
Female 23 8.7% 17.4% 56.5% 17.4%
Male 59 1.7% 33.9% 45.8% 18.6%
Total 82 3.7% 29.3% 48.8% 18.3%
127
55) Management in my office effectively manages risks and conflicts.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 5.0% 20.0% 50.0% 25.0%
International
staff
20 0.0% 15.0% 75.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 0.0% 22.2% 69.4% 8.3%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 40.0%
Field office 56 1.8% 16.1% 66.1% 16.1%
Khartoum
Office
27 0.0% 25.9% 63.0% 11.1%
Female 23 0.0% 21.7% 56.5% 21.7%
Male 60 1.7% 18.3% 68.3% 11.7%
Total 83 1.2% 19.3% 65.1% 14.5%
128
Brief Overview of the Online Staff Survey and Highlights of Major Outcomes
1. Management Issues
1.1 Maintaining quality standards
Survey question: My Office maintains very high standards of quality?
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service
23
4.3%
13.0%
52.2%
30.4%
International
staff
22 0.0% 22.7% 54.5% 22.7%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
39 0.0% 15.4% 53.8% 30.8%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Field office 60 3.3% 15.0% 41.7% 40.0%
Khartoum
Office
30 0.0% 23.3% 70.0% 6.7%
Female 26 3.8% 19.2% 50.0% 26.9%
Male 65 1.5% 18.5% 50.8% 29.2%
Total 90 2.2% 17.8% 51.1% 28.9%
The issue of quality of technical products and results is important, not just to ensure effectiveness
and efficiency, but rather to ensure better impact on children. 20% of staff members disagree or
strongly disagree that quality standards are maintained in the office. Qualitative analysis states
that standards are seriously considered with operations but not necessarily with programming
issues. SCO is recommended to delineate standards of quality for programme and this largely
falls on the M&E section.
129
1.2 Results versus processes
Survey question: My Office is focused on results rather than procedures and processes.
Total Strongl
y
Disagre
e
Disagr
ee
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
22 13.6% 22.7% 54.5% 9.1%
International
staff
20 5.0% 40.0% 50.0% 5.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 8.1% 40.5% 45.9% 5.4%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field office 57 10.5% 36.8% 45.6% 7.0%
Khartoum
Office
29 3.4% 34.5% 55.2% 6.9%
Female 25 8.0% 32.0% 52.0% 8.0%
Male 61 8.2% 37.7% 47.5% 6.6%
Total 86 8.1% 36.0% 48.8% 7.0%
44% of staff members do not agree or strongly disagree that their offices are focused on results,
and rather complained of the complex processes that are taking place in the office. This is
accentuated, as they stated, with the security procedures and processes that are enforced by the
Sudanese government. It is worth mentioning that this percentage scored very similarly between
KO and FOs, between female and male and between national and international officers, which
proves that it is a strong result that is recommended to be explored.
130
1.3 Cooperation to help achieve rights-based programming for children
Survey question: The sections in my office cooperate to get the job done and to provide a
comprehensive set of rights-based programming for children.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongl
y
Agree
General
Service
22 0.0% 4.5% 63.6% 31.8%
International
staff
20 10.0% 25.0% 45.0% 20.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 5.4% 81.1% 13.5%
National
UNV
5 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 80.0%
Field office 57 0.0% 5.3% 66.7% 28.1%
Khartoum
Office
29 6.9% 20.7% 58.6% 13.8%
Female 25 8.0% 8.0% 56.0% 28.0%
Male 61 0.0% 11.5% 67.2% 21.3%
Total 86 2.3% 10.5% 64.0% 23.3%
The staff members have a strong sense of the rights-based approach and the significance of
cooperation to help fulfill these rights to children. Qualitative results positively triangulate this
high consciousness of the concept and practice of rights-based programming for children.
Particular emphasis on this was clear especially among FOs that work directly with families.
Interestingly enough, discourse on rights came highest in interviews with Child Protection
sections and partially with Nutrition, while discourse on services came highest with Health and
Education. WASH was mostly centered with emergency response and the basic requirement for
life.
131
1.4 Management-staff relationship
In my Office, I feel comfortable approaching Management to discuss job-related issues
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
15 0.0% 13.3% 40.0% 46.7%
International
staff
11 9.1% 18.2% 9.1% 63.6%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0%
National
Officer
26 3.8% 3.8% 46.2% 46.2%
National UNV 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Field office 39 2.6% 5.1% 35.9% 56.4%
Khartoum
Office
18 5.6% 22.2% 27.8% 44.4%
Female 12 8.3% 16.7% 8.3% 66.7%
Male 45 2.2% 8.9% 40.0% 48.9%
Total 57 3.5% 10.5% 33.3% 52.6%
The survey reveals promising results regarding the levels of comfort staff has toward
approaching management to discuss job-related issues with a grand total of 52% strongly
agreeing and 33% agreeing. However, disaggregated data shows that the highest agreement
comes from the national staff of which 92% agreed and strongly agreed, while disagreement
comes from KO with a percentage of 28%, directly followed by international staff and UNVs
who scored 27%. Nearly 25% of female staff members either disagree or strongly disagree with
feeling comfortable to approach management. It is recommended that the Gender focal point
takes this into their consideration to induce gender empowerment and freedom of discussion.
132
1.5 Lines of Supervision
Survey question: Between my FO and KO, there are clear lines of supervision.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 0.0% 25.0% 55.0% 20.0%
International
staff
19 10.5% 31.6% 47.4% 10.5%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 33.3% 47.2% 16.7%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 1.8% 28.6% 51.8% 17.9%
Khartoum
Office
26 7.7% 30.8% 42.3% 19.2%
Female 23 8.7% 17.4% 56.5% 17.4%
Male 59 1.7% 33.9% 45.8% 18.6%
Total 82 3.7% 29.3% 48.8% 18.3%
More than 30% of respondents disagree that supervision lines are clear, while 48% agree and
18% strongly agree. Although organizational structures demarcate this clarity, staff members in
the FOs were not yet clear about administrative and technical supervision, especially that Chiefs
of FOs are not necessarily specialized in the same sector. Staff in the FOs is aiming for better
supervision in terms of technical monitoring and assistance to solve work-related problems and
not every day procedures.
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1.6 Efficient management of workload
Survey question: My Office manages the workload efficiently so that it can provide quality
services.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
22 4.5% 31.8% 40.9% 22.7%
International
staff
21 4.8% 23.8% 61.9% 9.5%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 35.1% 56.8% 8.1%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 20.0%
Field office 58 1.7% 31.0% 51.7% 15.5%
Khartoum
Office
29 3.4% 31.0% 58.6% 6.9%
Female 26 7.7% 42.3% 46.2% 3.8%
Male 61 0.0% 26.2% 57.4% 16.4%
Total 87 2.3% 31.0% 54.0% 12.6%
Nearly 30% of the staff members disagree that the workload is managed efficiently, which will
eventually impact the quality of results. As triangulated with the qualitative data, some staff
members mention examples of inefficiency regarding the following:
Cost of using office cars especially in remote emergency locations, where a field visit
could cost up to $2000 including staff member per diem, cost of gasoline, and cost of an
escort. An option remains of hiring field coordinators in remote areas;
Over-hiring of international staff in some sections that is, according to them, not
necessarily needed or not programmatically vital;
Use of staff time in a plethora of meetings, while often electronic communication can still
achieve good results in some cases;
Not using results of research, surveys and evaluations produced, or not even
disseminating them.
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2. Coordination and linkages between KO and FOs
2.1 Technical visits to from KO to FOs
Survey question: KO provides frequent technical visits and support to FOs for better
performance and results.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 20.0% 55.0% 15.0%
International
staff
International
UNV
20 5.0% 35.0% 60.0% 0.0%
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0
%
0.0%
National
Officer
37 5.4% 45.9% 35.1% 13.5%
National UNV 5 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 7.0% 36.8% 40.4% 15.8%
Khartoum
Office
27 7.4% 33.3% 55.6% 3.7%
Female 26 7.7% 30.8% 53.8% 7.7%
Male 58 6.9% 37.9% 41.4% 13.8%
Total 84 7.1% 35.7% 45.2% 11.9%
43% of staff members disagree or strongly disagree that technical support is sufficiently given
from KO to staff members in the field, while only 12% strongly agree that is being provided.
Many staff members in KO are dissatisfied (40%) of the support provided from them to their
respective FO. The most satisfied category is the general services with 70% either agreeing or
strongly agreeing, while the most dissatisfied are the national officers (51%).
The weak provision of technical support from KO to FOs, added to the limited capacity
development opportunities can jeopardize the quality of performance and achieved results. It is
recommended to establish a structured mechanism for technical support, either based on fast
assessment on areas needed for support, or based on the technical areas of expertise. Evaluation
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results reveal that technical support is needed in areas of communication and outreach,
monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management.
2.2 Flow of information between KO to FOs
Survey question: I am satisfied with the flow of information between KO and FOs.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 9.5% 28.6% 42.9% 19.0%
International
staff
20 10.0% 70.0% 20.0% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 40.5% 43.2% 16.2%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 3.5% 38.6% 38.6% 19.3%
Khartoum
Office
28 7.1% 57.1% 32.1% 3.6%
Female 24 12.5% 50.0% 33.3% 4.2%
Male 61 1.6% 42.6% 37.7% 18.0%
Total 85 4.7% 44.7% 36.5% 14.1%
Nearly 50% of staff members are dissatisfied with the flow and level of information from KO to
FOs. They expressed their feeling of detachment and of only being contacted if KO needs
information from them. According to the interviewees, this includes information materials,
research results, mission visit reports, as well as lessons learnt and best practices. Information
becomes especially important if it is seen from the perspective of learning and investment on
results. Otherwise, this will definitely affect the efficiency of achieving results.
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2.3 Communication and connectedness in the same Unit/Office
Survey question: The members of my team/unit communicate effectively to carry out
duties.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 0.0% 14.3% 57.1% 28.6%
International
staff
20 5.0% 20.0% 50.0% 25.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 0.0% 16.2% 67.6% 16.2%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0%
Field office 57 0.0% 14.0% 59.6% 26.3%
Khartoum
Office
28 3.6% 25.0% 53.6% 17.9%
Female 24 4.2% 20.8% 58.3% 16.7%
Male 61 0.0% 16.4% 57.4% 26.2%
Total 85 1.2% 17.6% 57.6% 23.5%
80% of the staff members either agree or strongly agree that the communication goes well
amongst the same unit, and that there is a sense of team spirit that is prevailing. 75% of staff
members said that this team spirit is amongst the whole office, not only the unit. SCO could
optimize the benefit of this team spirit to strengthen technical coordination and sectoral linkages.
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3. Emergency Issues
Knowledge on UNICEF programming versus Cluster-Lead Agency (CLA)
Survey question: There is enough knowledge in my office/Sector about my responsibilities
for a) UNICEF programming versus b) Cluster Lead Agency responsibility
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General
Service
21 4.8% 4.8% 52.4% 38.1%
International
staff
20 0.0% 30.0% 60.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
37 2.7% 8.1% 67.6% 21.6%
National
UNV
5 0.0% 40.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Field office 57 3.5% 14.0% 52.6% 29.8%
Khartoum
Office
28 0.0% 17.9% 71.4% 10.7%
Female 24 0.0% 16.7% 58.3% 25.0%
Male 61 3.3% 14.8% 59.0% 23.0%
Total 85 2.4% 15.3% 58.8% 23.5%
The Evaluation reveals that knowledge of staff members on their responsibilities for UNICEF
programming versus CLA is high. Nearly 82% of staff members reported that they either agree
or strongly agree on their knowledge of responsibilities, versus 18% who reported not having
enough knowledge about their responsibilities for UNCIEF programming versus CLA. The least
knowledgeable are the UNVs, the international UNVs and the international staff. SCO is
recommended to enhance knowledge and learning on this issue, especially if it is often leading
nearly four clusters: WASH, Education, Nutrition and mostly Child Protection.
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4. Partnership with youth, media and academia and private sector
4.1 Partnership with youth
Survey Question: My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Young
People.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 17 0.0% 23.5% 47.1% 29.4%
International
staff
15 6.7% 40.0% 46.7% 6.7%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
33 9.1% 36.4% 36.4% 18.2%
National UNV 4 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Field office 49 4.1% 32.7% 40.8% 22.4%
Khartoum
Office
22 9.1% 31.8% 45.5% 13.6%
Female 21 4.8% 19.0% 52.4% 23.8%
Male 50 6.0% 38.0% 38.0% 18.0%
Total 71 5.6% 32.4% 42.3% 19.7%
Although SCO witnesses a very good relationship with the government (95% agreed), UN
agencies (97%) and NGOs (93%) results scored much lower in its partnership with young people
(38% disagreed), Media and Academia (53%) and private sector (62%). These are serious results
to be considered if UNICEF is heading toward a policy/ advocacy organization that promotes
rights of children though the development recovery perspective. Focusing on youth and using the
media and private sector as channels for promoting rights, disseminating knowledge and
capitalizing on resources is highly recommended.
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4.2 Partnership with Media
Survey Question: My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Media,
Academia
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 16 12.5% 25.0% 31.3% 31.3%
International
staff
15 0.0% 60.0% 40.0% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
32 6.3% 59.4% 25.0% 9.4%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 80.0%
Field office 50 6.0% 44.0% 28.0% 22.0%
Khartoum
Office
20 5.0% 55.0% 35.0% 5.0%
Female 21 0.0% 47.6% 33.3% 19.0%
Male 49 8.2% 46.9% 28.6% 16.3%
Total 70 5.7% 47.1% 30.0% 17.1%
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4.3 Partnership with Private Sector
Survey Question: My Office is effective in enhancing working relationships with Private
Sector
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 16 18.8% 18.8% 37.5% 25.0%
International
staff
13 15.4% 61.5% 23.1% 0.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
32 12.5% 59.4% 21.9% 6.3%
National UNV 3 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Field office 47 12.8% 48.9% 25.5% 12.8%
Khartoum
Office
19 15.8% 47.4% 31.6% 5.3%
Female 20 10.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0%
Male 46 15.2% 52.2% 26.1% 6.5%
Total 66 13.6% 48.5% 27.3% 10.6%
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5. Knowledge Management
Survey question: Knowledge management concept and practices are clear in my office.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 21 0.0% 19.0% 66.7% 14.3%
International
staff
20 5.0% 35.0% 55.0% 5.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 2.8% 33.3% 55.6% 8.3%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%
Field office 57 1.8% 28.1% 57.9% 12.3%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 29.6% 63.0% 3.7%
Female 24 4.2% 29.2% 58.3% 8.3%
Male 60 1.7% 28.3% 60.0% 10.0%
Total 84 2.4% 28.6% 59.5% 9.5%
31% of staff members reported not being clear on the concept and practices of knowledge
management, and only 10% strongly agree that they are. The desk review and interviews even
highlight this lack of clarity in spite of the dire need to improve these practices that enhances
efficiency and use of resources. It is worth mentioning that SCO did not develop a knowledge
management strategy and does not optimally use the knowledge management officer. No visits
or guidance were conducted to FOs to illuminate knowledge management and improve the
management information system, though evaluation results revealed that FOs are weak in this
sector.
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6. Policies that promote gender
Survey question: My Management Team actively supports UNICEF's policies that promote
gender balance in my Office.
Total Strongly
Disagree
Disa
gree
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 15.0
%
25.0% 50.0%
International
staff
20 5.0% 0.0
%
70.0% 25.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 0.0
%
100.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
34 0.0% 11.8
%
64.7% 23.5%
National UNV 5 0.0% 0.0
%
60.0% 40.0%
Field office 54 3.7% 11.1
%
50.0% 35.2%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 3.7
%
70.4% 22.2%
Female 23 13.0% 13.0
%
52.2% 21.7%
Male 58 0.0% 6.9
%
58.6% 34.5%
Total 81 3.7% 8.6
%
56.8% 30.9%
Staff members are actually satisfied of the gender balance in the office, where nearly 86%
reported that UNICEF policies promote gender balance in their office. It is worth mentioning
that more than half of the staff members were exposed to gender and ethics training.
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7. Work-life balance and work motivation
7.1 Work-life Balance
Survey question: My job’s responsibilities allow me to take care of my family and personal
obligations.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 35.0% 45.0% 10.0%
International
staff
20 0.0% 40.0% 50.0% 10.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 8.3% 44.4% 47.2% 0.0%
National UNV 5 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 5.4% 35.7% 48.2% 10.7%
Khartoum
Office
27 7.4% 48.1% 40.7% 3.7%
Female 23 0.0% 52.2% 43.5% 4.3%
Male 60 8.3% 35.0% 46.7% 10.0%
Total 83 6.0% 39.8% 45.8% 8.4%
Staff members were divided between those who positively assess their work-life balance (54%)
and those who assess that work responsibilities do not allow them to take care of their familial
and personal obligations (46%). When we look at the desegregated data, we will find that those
who are not satisfied of the burdens of work responsibilities that affect their work-life balance
are the females (52%), followed by international UNVs (50%) and the national officers (44%).
As for the comparison between KO and FOs regarding the jobs responsibilities, results indicate
that KO scores 48% which is quite higher than the FOs which scored 36%.
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7.2 Work motivation
Survey question: I feel motivated to work at my full capacity.
Total Strongly
Disagre
e
Disagre
e
Agree Strongly
Agree
General Service 20 10.0% 5.0% 50.0% 35.0%
International
staff
20 5.0% 30.0% 35.0% 30.0%
International
UNV
2 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
National
Officer
36 0.0% 5.6% 50.0% 44.4%
National UNV 5 20.0% 20.0% 0.0% 60.0%
Field office 56 5.4% 8.9% 41.1% 44.6%
Khartoum
Office
27 3.7% 22.2% 48.1% 25.9%
Female 23 13.0% 21.7% 21.7% 43.5%
Male 60 1.7% 10.0% 51.7% 36.7%
Total 83 4.8% 13.3% 43.4% 38.6%
Promising results were revealed regarding work motivation, even if the work-life balance is not
high for some staff. More than 80% of staff members feel motivated for work, a percentage that
is recommended to be tapped into and invested in to achieve results. Staff members are mostly
motivated for children and are happy to be in a position to contribute to fulfilling their rights.
Motivation for work correlates with 71% of staff members attesting that their management
recognizes them when doing good work. Nonetheless, having a percentage of 18% who are not
motivated is alarming. Management should be encouraged to explore reasons for motivation or
to induce factors that mobilize this sense of motivation, to achieve the best interest of children.
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Reports of Stakeholder Meetings
El Fasher Stakeholder Meeting
Relevance of interventions in El Fasher
More than 90% of the meeting participants agreed that the El Fasher FO was compliant
with the Government’s mandate and responsibilities toward children at the local level, as
well as priorities regarding children’s rights issues. Participants stated that UNICEF
followed a multi-disciplinary approach in the area of children and women and its
interventions compliment other partners’ activities.
The workshop found that the UNICEF programme is relevant and vital in El Fasher, and
its continuation a necessity particularly to the most disadvantaged (IDPs, Returnees and
host communities). Participants requested increased investments in remote areas. Due to
deficiencies in public sector service delivery there is a huge demand for the El Fasher FO
to work in multiple districts especially in places of high emergency. Social protection is
completely missing within the UNICEF programme. There is a major need in poor areas
to develop safety net programmes, conduct vocational training for women and young
people and to work hand in hand with the government to improve the economic situation.
UNICEF needs to strengthen its role in policy/advocacy and knowledge management.
Most of the interviewees reported that they do not frequently receive knowledge
management products from UNICEF on children and women. When UNICEF does
disseminate knowledge management, it is typically written in English instead of Arabic.
NGOs and community groups reported UNICEF possessed limited capacity in the area of
planning; stating the government too often imposes its agenda. Participatory planning is
needed at the community level; given the lack of alternatives UN agencies and
international organizations typically align with the government.
Effectiveness of UNICEF’s interventions in El Fasher
Achievement of results
UNICEF strengthened systems within the MoH resulting in the institutionalization of a
Nutrition Surveillance System. This System houses a national database for all surveys
and Feeding Center data, with routine surveys every 2 months, and the Sudan Health
Bulletin being published every year.
WES partners praised UNICEF interventions particularly in the area of hygiene
promotion. It also established community based WASH Committees composed of 5
women and 5 men. WASH services have had success when approached from a
community participatory approach; as is evident after the success of the CATS initiative.
UNICEF is gradually increasing and improving partnerships with local and international
organizations. El Fasher developed several partnerships during 2013 and 2014, including
cooperation with local partners such as Fasher Rural Development Network, Zolfa,
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Ahnar as well as with international NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières, Relief
International, GOAL, Plan, COOPI, Oxfam and others.
UNICEF is undertaking efforts to improve its reach to the most vulnerable populations
but there is still room for improvement. UNICEF needs the CO to increase support to the
FOs through the allocation of funds for emergency response as well as human resources.
Populations under the control of armed groups have limited or no access to services and
the workshop found that UNICEF and the UN need to improve efforts to reach these
populations. NGOs stated that gender mainstreaming is well reflected in Nutrition,
WASH and Child Protection programmes. The majority of data for surveys as well as
programmes are disaggregated by sex to ensure that there is no bias in providing services.
The section also engages with community members, especially in social mobilization, by
ensuring equal participation of males and females in programme discussions in order to
identify their needs. However, improvements need to be made in monitoring of the scope
and level of integration of gender into programming.
NGOs stated that advocacy efforts are limited. The Evaluation Team found that advocacy
priorities are imposed by the government resulting in INGOs having limited access to
vulnerable populations, for example, organizations like ICRC and MSF have been facing
extensive permit issues. In addition, due to political sensitivities, limited capacities and
skills are affecting the implementation of advocacy campaigns. Advocacy could be
improved if communities were to receive appropriate support and capacity development.
Some UN agencies stated that information sharing protocols are unclear and little
information is provided by OCHA.
Structure and Coordination with UN Agencies
Clusters that proved to be highly successful in El Fasher are Nutrition, Child Protection
and Health. Cluster coordination meetings are held every two weeks with the Ministry of
Health (Nutrition) and Child Protection (with Child Protection Networks under the
auspices of the Social Welfare). The Education cluster is staggering, some UN partners
see that UNICEF is not always committed in the area of education and to the provision of
planned services and products.
UNHCR is functionally and nearly absent in Sudan due to its limited physical existence.
This has left a burden on the El Fasher FO, and it is currently taking the lead in all child
protection issues and counteracting the challenges of the Darfur areas. However, partners
see that UNICEF is successful in this area, it has succeeded in responding to emergency
requirements and is also successful in institutionalizing a child protection mechanism
which is integrated within the government and dealing with advocacy issues such as
FGM, early marriage, birth registration and the legal protection of children.
Coordination with UN agencies in El Fasher is better than in other places, especially with
WHO and WFP, however the FO could still benefit from improvements in coordination;
the Team believes that the KO could help the FO improve coordination mechanisms.
Stakeholders were mainly satisfied with the results achieved thus far by UNICEF.
However, they see room for improvement in the following areas:
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Capacity building:
Effective capacity building efforts were mainly successful with government partners,
such as capacity building in surveillance – IYCF – Cluster approach, capacity building of
WES and partially with Child Protection. Local NGOs received limited capacity building
trainings and workshops.
Stakeholders requested that the El Fasher FO give more attention to capacity building of
partners, particularly in areas of networking and child rights, project management,
volunteer management and monitoring and evaluation.
Participants noted that the current NGOs existing in El Fasher leave a local gap that
cannot be filled by any other partners. This challenges the success of humanitarian
initiatives because it is easier for local NGOs to access communities and reach remote
areas particularly in the security-heightened situation in El Fasher.
Various training programmes should be geared toward developing the capacities of
frontline workers who play a major role in the implementation of activities of various
flagship programmes at the field level.
Building local networks:
Stakeholders praised community-based initiatives, as inter-social support and
collaboration has previously strengthened programming. Stakeholders noted that
UNICEF should contribute to building local networks and help in conducting strategic
plans for community-based interventions. The workshop revealed that conducting
periodic community based meetings would help to promote community issues and to
enhance relations between the government and community-based organizations.
Coordination with international organizations:
The El Fasher FO should improve coordination with international organizations working
in the same field, and advocate for more resources to be advanced by the government.
Partners recommend joint projects, as this will help to save resources and to maximize
results delivered. In addition, they expressed interest in building networks with
community groups to bring better results and increase ownership of the UNICEF
programme in El Fasher.
Emergency preparedness:
Stakeholders assess that emergency preparedness and response needs to be separated
from sector wide approaches. Stakeholders claimed that resources are consumed in
emergency and very little remains for recovery and development.
Developing unified standards for sectors especially education:
Stakeholders noted that UNICEF needs to develop standards and guidelines to which all
its partners should abide. UNICEF needs to improve in sector monitoring based on
standards.
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Efficiency of El Fasher Field Office’s Use of Resources
Stakeholders in El Fasher noted that the short-term contracting period of agreements
between themselves and UNICEF does not leave sufficient time and space for
comprehensive implementation. They also added that the transfer of funds is delayed, so
expenses become compressed in the second half of the funding period. This sometimes
coincides with the rainy seasons, and eventually has negative effects on project activities
especially with regards to the construction of sanitation facilities, education activities and
others.
Knowledge management and social mobilization
Partners confirmed that UNICEF needs to develop itself as a leading organization
overarching all issues pertaining to children, where currently it mainly relies on national
sources of information. UNICEF’s level of conducting first had research is being
reduced.
Social mobilization is done on a programmatic basis, according to the responsible officer.
Yet, there is no social mobilization strategy or plan for UNICEF in the field.
Kadugli Stakeholder Meeting
Relevance
There is a good level of consensus among stakeholders with regards to the relevance and
appropriateness of the programme to the local priorities. The programme’s tasks and
functions are consistent with the intended results in the CPD and other sector strategies.
Still, policy level is fragile in FOs and the expectation from UNICEF KO to take over
this role is evident in the majority of FOs.
Basic services have stretched resources and UNICEF’s role is divided between
emergency response, direct service delivery and development requirements.
Stakeholders praised UNICEF’s participatory process in drafting plans. Nearly all
stakeholders interviewed confirmed that they took part in the drafting of the plan.
The security constraints hinder the monitoring process; delays in permits add to cost and
reduce the time spent on monitoring. UN agencies need to advocate for easier access and
faster procedures.
Stakeholders noted that a collective role for UN agencies should be advocated for;
strategies and actions should be looked at according to short, medium and long-term
goals. Stakeholders should be brought in to coordinate efforts, build partnerships, and
share lessons learned, experiences and information.
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Effectiveness
Achievement of results
Partners overall are satisfied with the results achieved by UNICEF so far, but the
following are further recommended:
o Ministry of Health commended the role UNICEF plays in the area of nutrition,
preventive care (especially malaria and TB) and in providing services for IDPs
and Nomads.
o Ministry of Health requested that UNICEF increases its work on Hepatitis
(viruses C and B) in accordance with the HIV/AIDS programme due to the lack of
such a programme. Kadugli FO requested UNICEF intervenes to deal with
increasing cases of Belharzia.
o Ministry of Education requested an increased role for UNICEF in the area of
educating disabled children, as they are affected by Health, Protection and
Education issues.
o WES highly values UNICEF’s Community Approach to Total Sanitation (CATS).
They assured that such a programme/strategy encapsulates different
complementary approaches to community-based sanitation. WES staff felt it was
important to allow for variable sequencing and the integration of hand
washing/hygiene into sanitation programmes. WES praised the M&E training that
took place targeting governmental, NGOs, UN and sector partners. This training
allowed sectors to consolidate information showcasing project progress,
contributing to transparency and accountability, and it allowed stakeholders to
assess outcomes and impacts more easily.
o Ministry of Social Welfare requested that UNICEF contributes to establishing
social care institutions to protect and rehabilitate children as currently there are no
institutions in Kadugli for children without care.
o The Ministry of Finance (MoF) stated that the social policy programme is still
developing; and noted that there is no specific programme UNICEF is working on
in Kadugli. The increasing level of poverty would need more attention on social
protection during the coming period, especially with more children dropping out
of schools. The MoF and other partners expressed concern about the reasons for
discontinuing the CFCI programme. They stated that this programme achieved its
greatest support and commitment at the community level, following its
participatory processes; strong monitoring capabilities and far-reaching results.
The NGOs expressed their appreciation on the partnerships developed with UNICEF,
especially in areas of Health and Education and partially in Child Protection. The Kadugli
FO has limited partners working on child protection and the quality and intensity of
interventions is questioned. UNICEF is taking a major lead in Child Protection in this
area, and again stakeholders raised the issue of CFCI and demanded its replication.
NGOs were concerned with the issue of security and their inability to reach children in
conflict areas. NGOs stated that it is difficult to monitor projects in the conflict areas due
to security complications and to conflict eruptions. NGOs noted that capacity-building
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efforts, are not consistent at the Kadugli FO and the FO does not have a specific strategy.
UNICEF’s leading role requires more intervention in the area of systems strengthening,
especially given that UNICEF maintains good relations with the government.
NGOs expressed their dissatisfaction with the late delivery of funds from KO, especially
to the WASH sector. UNICEF mainly transfers the funds during the period from July to
October, and this is during the rainy season; funds would be better received in advance of
the season.
Child Protection partners stated that there were successful initiatives in the training of
social workers, psychological workers and lawyers to support areas of legal and psycho-
social support.
Partners requested more efforts in the area of psychosocial support for children.
Stakeholders asserted that Kadugli has 456 street children and 233 children who are
completely unaccompanied.
NGOs stated that the missing role of UNAMIS negatively affected the provision of
services, especially in the area of Child Protection. At that time, UN agencies worked
together on humanitarian coordination with UNAMIS. When UNAMIS left the country,
this role collapsed. OCHA does not have the authority to lead Child Protection partners
and stated that there were successful initiatives in the training of social workers,
psychological workers and lawyers to support areas of legal and psychosocial support.
NGOs noted that education of nomads is still very low and efforts need to be increased.
Equally, the area of protection and rehabilitation of disabled children needs significant
investment. Stakeholders and staff members agreed that the delivery of state services is
problematic, due to the weak or nearly missing infrastructure. As noted, approximately
150,000 children are out of school and do not have access to a learning space.
Stakeholders suggested building a low cost classroom, where a school can be built for the
cost of two classrooms. In this case, UNICEF can adapt its standards and resources to the
areas that are being served.
Monitoring and Evaluation
UNICEF is highly represented through international or local NGOs. It responds early to
emergencies and has diverse and complementary interventions. However, the issue of
coverage remains a problem due to the conflict/ rebel areas, where children in these areas
could not be calculated or reached.
Monitoring the situation of children and women in the Kordofan region is feasible in
North Kordofan, West Kordofan and some parts of South Kordofan. However, the
situation of approximately 350,000 children in the mountainous SPLA/M-occupied areas
is unknown (according to UNICEF Kadugli).
It is recommended to have staff members visit the field for longer periods of time. Visits
can then give a complete overview of the situation and have sufficient time to build
connections and network with different stakeholders in these areas.
NGOs stated that UNICEF’s role in monitoring needs to be strengthened. The provision
of services and products are not always well monitored, leaving space for weak
151
performance of local partners, inequity in distribution, and wasting of resources.
Monitoring will improve quality of services and products provided by UNICEF to the
government.
Agencies sometimes overlook the Abyei region as the population is small but it is still in
need and requires more attention. There is no government yet in this area. Partners are
operating in vacuum.
Capacity Building of local partners
The level of capacities in local partners is limited, as most of them require assistance to
undertake big projects and the networking amongst them is limited. Building local
partner capacities is indispensable and will greatly improve service delivery and the
amount of population reached. UN needs to strengthen the capacities of local partners.
Workshops held by OCHA, WFP and HAC were conducted but they do not necessarily
tackle the institutional strengthening or performance problems of the NGOs. UN
organizations have noted this issue but have yet to take action on improving the capacity
of local NGOs.
Stakeholders noted that a capacity gap analysis was conducted by HAC but was never
disseminated to UN agencies or the NGOs themselves.
Capacity building of local partners often leads to higher turnover from NGOs to
international NGOs. Technical support is sometimes paid from a distance to local
partners, due to the difficultly in reaching some areas.
UNICEF was much more active in developing the capacities of government partners,
especially with MoH, MoE and Ministry of Social Affairs. UNICEF supported MoH to
expand the provision of IMCI and malaria services through building capacity of health
cadres and community volunteers on IMCI standard case management and malaria
home-based management. Developing capacities was also supported by providing health
and nutrition services through the provision of IMCI kits, materials for deliveries and
ANC, obstetric surgical drugs and kits. Stakeholders highlighted the importance of
multi-sectoral action for the prevention of malnutrition.
Structure and coordination between UNICEF and UN agencies
The Kadugli FO, uses sectors instead of clusters, these sectors involve more partners and
are led by the government and not the UN.
OCHA’s role in Kadugli FO is limited; there is only one representative in the office and a
heavy burden is placed on UNICEF.
UNICEF’s role is highly recognized in leading several sectors (Education, Nutrition,
WASH) as well as for its role in Child Protection and Health due to other UN
organizations’ limited work in these areas.
152
UNICEF and UNHCR are advocating for the creation of a Child Protection Sector to be
led by the Ministry of Social Welfare. UNHCR can participate to fill gaps; however
UNICEF would be the lead agency.
Stakeholders noted that it is worth testing a UN premise in El-Foula (WFP and OCHA
suggested). This will open opportunities for better coordination amongst UN agencies,
whether for multilateral or bilateral collaboration. This would also give UN agencies
more weight and strength to increase attention and support to communities. WHO sees
this as a wise decision, as a collective UN existence would raise expectations from
national partners, especially if the capacity to respond programmatically and
operationally is limited in West Kordofan.
UN must improve its ability to target equitable services to poor populations in post
conflict areas.
UN organizations rarely have joint initiatives implemented together. Collaboration
mainly takes place well directly in post-emergency situations.
Stakeholders highlighted the importance of multi-sectoral action for the prevention of
malnutrition. The policy brief that was supported by UNICEF led to an early agreement
that stunting will be considered as criteria for eligibility of social safety net services and
an expanded maternal and child health (MCH) package. One joint initiative was the UN’s
interventions (6 agencies) with regard to the treatment and prevention of malnutrition.
UNICEF is working closely with WFP and FAO to develop a resilience programme in
the East of Sudan.
Efficiency of use of resources
Stakeholders were mainly satisfied with the cost-effectiveness of UNICEF activities and
processes in Kadugli, though not all activities were achieved on time due to conflict
eruptions that frequently take place. They stated that the staff members are relatively
overloaded and burdened with response to emergencies, and so their availability and
provision of technical assistance is not always possible. They stated that there is a need to
benefit from their expertise and technical assistance. Stakeholders reported that there is a
frequent delay in the provision of resources and of supplies, which sometimes affect the
efficiency of the interventions.
Sustainability of results and local ownership
Stakeholders see that the current structure is recommended to be sustainable as the UN
role, and specifically of UNICEF, and it is very important to advocate for needed
strategies and actions to be taken at the short, medium and long term and also to bring
stakeholders together to coordinate efforts, build partnerships, and share lessons learned
and experiences.
UNICEF partners are aware that UNICEF resources are stretched thin, whether human or
financial; however they perceive no alternative at the current time.
153
Successful programmes that stakeholders see as sustainable and pertain to local
ownership are CATS although the government cannot fulfill its financial promises to
date. Child Protection Networks are another sustainable programme, where the
government has institutionalized its structures and approaches within the Ministry of
Social Welfare.
Preventive care that has been successful in the Kadugli FO is mostly owned by the
government. A major factor that influenced non-achievement of results is security issues.
UN partners (WFP, OCHA, UNPA, WHO and IOM) should collaborate and advocate for
facilitating their field presence and demand for lighter security rules from the
government.
I. Management Issues
II. Coordination and linkages between KO and FOs
III. Emergency
IV. Partnerships with young people, media and the business sector
V. Knowledge Management
VI. Gender
VII. Work-life balance
154
Annex C: List of Stakeholders
Federal Level (Khartoum)
Ms. Ikhlas Mohamed Ali Director, UN Cooperation, F.M. of Finance &
Economy
Dr. Ibtisam Mohamed El Hassan Director, Educational Planning, F.M. of Education
Mr. Hisham Al Amir National Coordinator, WES
Ms. Wafa’a Muzumil Deputy National Coordinator, WES
Ms. A’atifa Policy and Strategy Unit, F.M. of Education
Yngvil Foss OCHA, OIC (CERF)
Mads Uhlin Hansen OCHA, M&E Officer
Jorg Kuhnel Team Leader, UNDP
Isabel Candel Consultant, UNICEF
River Niel State (Al Damer)
Dr. Samir Ahmed Osman DG, S.M. of Health
Ms. Hafsa Mahjoub Director of Preventive Health, S.M. of Health
Dr. Abdel Rahman Bahar DG, S.M. of Education
Mr. Essmaeil Elazhari Elbushra Director of Planning, S.M. of Education
Mr. Abdel Raheem Ali Ahmed Director of Nomads Education, S.M. of Education
Mr. Abu Bakr Abdalla DG, Water Corporation, S.M. of Public Utilities
Mr. Abdel Rahman A. Hassan PM, WES Project, S. Water Corporation
Mr. Omer Mohamed Kheir Health Officer, S.M. of Health
Ms. Manal Musa WES project
Ms. Ghada Ali Osman WES Project
155
El Fashir FO (North Darfur State)
Ms. Ruqui Mohamed State Ministry of Education
Mr. Mugasub Omar State Ministry of Education
Mr. Haroun Youssef State Ministry of Health
Ms. Hikma El Hafiz State Ministry of Health
Mr. Omar Mohamed State Ministry of Social Affairs
Mr. Ahmed Abdelgasim WES Project, NDS
Mr. Mohamed Salih State Ministry of Education
Ms. Shema Mohemed State Ministry of Health
Ms. Fatima El Sharif State Ministry of Health
Mr. Hassan Yousif Abdealla State Ministry of Education
Ms. Mira Badawy State Ministry of Education
Mr. Osman Ali Swielam State Ministry of Education
Mr. Mustafa Mahmood State Ministry of Education
Mr. Abu El Azm Rahman State Ministry of Education
Mr. Omar Abubakar Musa State Ministry of Health
Mr. Ahmed El-Doma State Ministry of Health
Ms. Khadega Adam State Social Welfare
Mr. Hassan Yousif Abdalla State Ministry of Education
Mr. Mohamed Ahmad Sudan DDR Commission (SDDRC)
Ms. Ekhlas Adam Idriss Anhar NGO
Mr. Amair Ibrahim Fasher Rural Development Network (FRDN)
Ms. Houida Hamid SAEDER Chartable Society (SCS)
Mr. Adam Sabeel Adam FRON
Mr. Ahmed Abdelmageed Mashroua’t National NGO
Mr. Khalid Adam Yahlia Auttash National NGO
Mr. Abdel Rahman Head of Office, WFP, NDS
156
Mr. Al Hadi Deputy Head of Office, UNHCR, NDS
Simon Tarr Programme Officer, WFP
Oriano MIcaletti OIC Director Humanitarian Protection Strategy
Sara Karimbhoy Humanitarian Officer, OCHA
Isha Dyfan Director UNAMID Division of Human Rights
Filipo Tarakinikini Head of Security, UNDSS
Nyala FO (South Darfur Stat)
Mohamed Omar S.M. of Health
Nagat Adam Secretary for State Council for Childhood
Mostafa Eissa WES Project, SDS
Amir Hussein Calma, Youth Committee NGO
Mohamed Salem World Vision, SDS
Mohamed El – Tayeb Care Switzerland, SDS
Irene Refugee International Committee, SDS
Al Geneina FO (West Darfur State)
Adam Suleiman Secretary, State Council for Childhood
Mr. Hamad Abdalla Mohamed DG, Water Corporation, S.M. of Public Utilities
Mr. Yahia Ahmed Omer War Child Canada (WCC)
Mr. Khalid Hassan Rural Community Development Organization
(RCDO)
Mr. Nazeer Hassan UNHCR, West Darfur
Mr. Mohamed Manzoul Deputy HAC Commissioner, WDS
Mr. Mohamed Abubaker WES PM, WDS
Mr. Gamal Ishag Mohamed S.M. of Social Affairs
Mr. Hassan Abdalla A/Razag DG, S.M. of Education
Dr. Younis Khamis Adam DG, S.M. of Health
157
Al Damazeen FO (Blue Nile State)
Mr. Azhari Medani D.G., S.M. of Education
Mr. Abdel Whaled A/Rhaim Director, Planning, S.M. of Finance
Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim Hamid Director, S.M. of Social Affairs
Ms. Neimat Adam Khalik Secretary, State Council for Child Welfare, BNS
Mr. Mahjoub A/Rahman Coordinator, S.M. of Education
Mr. Ahmed Hassab Allah Manager, WES Project, BNS
Mr. Altaif Hadrawi Deputy Director, HAC,BNS
Mr. Mohamed Ali Babiker National Field Coordinator, OCHA BNS
Mr.Badr Eldeen Bob Officer, UN Dept. of Staff Security, BNS
Mr. Hassan Yousif Eissa OIC, WFP Office, BNS
Kadugli FO (South Kordofan State)
Ms. Gada Adam Rahama Director Planning Department, S.M. of Finance
Mr. Suleiman Hamad Hassan PM, WES Project, South Kordofan State
Mr. Mohamed Kuku Gumbail Director Educational Planning, S.M. of Education
Dr. Alam el Deen K. Bakheit Director Preventive Health, S.M. of Health
Mr. Alzubair Ibrahim Kurshoum DG, S.M. of Social Affairs
Mr. Alzaki Tuto Elko Concern World Wide, SKS
Mr Rudwan Osman Ando SCS, SKS
Mr. Haney Ahmed Abdalla ASSIST National NGO, Kadugli
Mr. Mohammed Ali CARE International Switzerland (CIS)
Mr. Moamed IREG CIS
Mr. Hindowa Lebbie Programme Officer, WFP, SKS
Mr. Taj Elsir Awadalla Al Doma National Field Coordinator, OCHA, SKS
Mr. Fathi A/Aziz Essmaeil Field Officer, UNHCR, SKS
Dr. Aggrey Basegereza Team Leader, WHO, Transitional Area (SKS, BNS,
Abyei)
158
Dr. Gawda Salih Medical Officer, WHO, SKS
Mr. Faisal Alagab Field Officer, IOM, SKS
UNICEF Sudan Country Office
Representative, Deputy Representative, Section Chiefs and some staff
Staff in FOs of Nyala, El Fasher, Al Geneina, Zalengi, Al Damazeen, El Obeid, Kadugli and
Kassala, who were available during the teams’ visits.
159
Annex D: List of Documents Consulted
Documents Provided by
SCO in beginning of
project
Documents provided post Validation workshop
Annual Reports: 2009,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013
(Draft)
Annual Review 2013: NOSP Quarter Century Strategy, 1st and 2nd
Strategic Plans and 3 year Economic Program; Child Protection Annual
Review Presentation ver 1 2013; Education Annual Review for 17 Dec
2013; Final Education Sector Annual Review Report; Health Annual
Review Presentation; National Annual Review Presentation SPPME;
Nutrition National Annual review; WASH (too long) Annual Review
Presentation Draft; WASH Annual Review Presentation Final; Youth
Annual Review Presentation; Youth National Annual Review
Presentation Template; Annex 1 Annual Review Meeting; ARM Report
Dec 17 2013
Country Programme
Documents: 2013-2014
SCO IMEP, 2013-2016
SCO CPAP, 2013-2016
SCO CPAP Results
Matrix, 2013-2016 SCO
CPD, 2013-2016 SCO
CPD Summary Results,
2013-2016 SUDAN
UNDAF, IMEP 2011-
2012 Sudan spreadsheet
FO MYR Reports 2014: El Fashar; Geneina (W. Darfur MYR/ Central
Darfur MYR); Kadugli: MYR (S. Kordofan/ N. Kordofan/ W. Darfur);
CP (N. Kordofan/ S. Kordofan/ W. Kordofan) Education (N. Kordofan/
S. Kordofan/ W. Kordofan), Greater Kordofan RWP, WASH (N.
Kordofan/ S. Kordofan/ W. Kordofan); Kassala: Initial (Gedarif,
Kassala, Red Sea State), Revised: (Gedarif, Kassala, Red Sea State) ;
Nyala (E. Darfur/ S. Darfur)
2010 SHHS Final Report
RWP 2013-14: Child Protection; Education; Health Cover page; Health
Planned Budget; Health; MER; Nutrition; SPPM&E; WASH Cover
Page; WASH; Youth; Youth Arabic
2011 Sudan SITAN
Document Consolidated MYR Reporting 2014
2012 Sudan Interim
Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper
CPMP 2008-2012 Sudan Final
160
A Situation Analysis on
Basic Social Services in
the Darfur States
MICS Indicators Data 2010-2006
Annual Review Meeting
2013
MYR Presentation: C4D MYR; Child Protection MYR; Education
MYR; Health MYR, MER MYR; Nutrition MYR; Operation MYR;
SPPME MYR; WASH MYR; Youth MYR
County Analysis 2012
Health Section Documents (10/22 from Saeed): Health Section Briefing
2012; Brief on Health Section Interventions Sudan 2013; 3 Mid-Year
Review Final Report 31, July 2014; 4RAM Entry End Yea 2013;
FGMC Sudan final 2013
Annual Workplans 2012 Health Sector: National; North Darfur; South
Darfur; West Darfur; South Kordofan; North Kordofan; Kassala;
Gedarif; Blue Nile; Other States; 2012 AWP Cover Pages
MENA SitAn Regional
Lessons Learned Report
Final
Education AWP 2013-2014: North Darfur; Blue Nile; Red Sea, South
Kordofan
Reproductive Health
Gender, Population and
Development Situation in
Sudan
Education Rolling Workplans 2013-2014: Kassala Education RWP;
Sector Policy and Planning RWP
UNDG 2012 Country
Analysis
Education Sector Documents (10/22 Saeed): 2012 AR Input - Indicators;
Final Education Repot on IRS 2012;
Education AWP 2012: National Policy Support Education; North Darfur
Education AWP; South Darfur Education AWP; Blue Nile Education
AWP; Kassala Education AWP
161
National Nutrition RWP 2013
Nutrition 2012 AWP: Abyei Area; Sennar; White Nile; South Darfur
Draft 1; Blue Nile; West Darfur North Kordofan; South Kordofan
AWP 2011 Nutrition Format Nutrition North Kordofan Draft 2; AWP
2011 Format Nutrition South Kordofan Draft 2sl
Rolling Workplan Nutrition 2014-2015: Blue Nile; Central Darfur; East
Darfur; North Darfur; South Darfur; West Darfur
Annual Review Presentation Nutrition 2013: East Darfur; South Darfur;
Blue Nile; Central Darfur; North Darfur (1); North Darfur (2); Gedarif;
Kassala; Red Sea State; North Kordofan; South Kordofan; West Darfur
State of the Worlds Children 2014.
State of Emergency
Profiles (SMoH & FMoH
2014)
Kassala, North Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red Sea, River Nile, Gedaref, West
Korodofan, South Kordofan, North Darfur, South Darfur, Central
Darfur, West Darfur
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Annex E: Field Mission Plan
DATES DEPLOYMENT
FIELD
OFFICES
COVERED
Travel
July 5-7 Team arrives in Khartoum
July 7 - 12 Preparation and meeting with CO officials
July 13 – 20
El Kabbag in Nyala FO (South Darfur) 13-15 July
Awadalla and Buescher in Elfasher FO (North Darfur) from Geneina
16-20 July
El Kabbag in Elfasher FO (North Darfur) coming from Nyala 16-20
July
Al Geneina
Nyala
El Fasher
Air
July 14
Awadalla and Buescher in Geniena FO(West Darfur) 14-15 July
Awadalla and Buescher in Elfasher FO (North Darfur) coming from
Geneina 15 July
El Kabbag in Elfasher FO (North Darfur) coming from Nyala 15 July
Al Geneina
Nyala
El Fasher
Air
July 16 Stakeholder Workshop in Elfasher
July 21 Buescher to Khartoum FO
Awadalla to Blue Nile FO
El Kabbag in Elfasher FO (North Darfur)
Khartoum
Blue Nile
Al Fasher
Air
Road
Air
July 24 Team in Khartoum to convene meetings with KCO and partners Khartoum
Aug 4-9 Awadalla and El Kabbag to Kadugli FO (invite Al Obeid and Abye to
join meetings)
Road
Aug 6 Stakeholder Workshop in Kadugli FO (South Kordofan)
Kadugli,
Abyie and
Al Obeid
Aug 9 Nivine to Khartoum (end of in-country mission on 9th August, 2014)
Awadalla to River Nile State 9-11 Aug
River Nile Road
Aug 9-11 Buescher to Kassala FO Kassala Air
August 12-
14
Team in Khartoum
Buescher and Awadalla hold final meetings with UNICEF Sudan CO
including Representative (August 12th)
Khartoum Air
August 13 Brief Meeting with SCO Representative Khartoum
August 14 End of in-country mission (Gabriella Buescher on 14th August, 2014) Khartoum Air
September
16
Validation workshop with SCO management and selected partners Khartoum