evaluating merger enforcement - cresse panel … · identifying the impact of competition policy...
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Evaluating MergerEnforcement1
CRESSE Panel Discussion:Identifying the Impact of Competition Policy
Luke M. Froeb†
† Owen School of Management, Vanderbilt
1-3 July 2016
1This version: 27 June, 2016 CRESSE Conference in Rhodes [email protected]
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Acknowledgements: colleagues
Michael Doane, Competition Econ., LLC
Arturs Kalnins, Cornell University
Mike Shor, University of Conneticut
Steve Tenn, Bates-White
Steve Tschantz, Vanderbilt Mathematics
Greg Werden, US Dept of Justice
FTC and DOJ Economists and Attorneys
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Talk Outline
Question: How to measure effects of policy?Decision Analysis:
False Convictions?2000 Baby Food merger2000 Parking lot merger2005 Paris Hotel Cartel
False Acquittals?2011 Ice Cream Merger2013 Rental Cars2009 Hospitals
Enforcement R&D: How do we getacademics to do this?
Replication is crucial, but ...will journals publish?
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What should we measure?
Enforcement: number or revenue of “wins”
Political Legitimacy: is antitrust asubstitute for price regulation?Deterrence: under-deterrence vs.over-deterrence
compared to what?
Decision Errors:False convictionsFalse acquittals
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How do we measure Decision Errors?
Decision Errors:False convictions are hard to observe
Use failed challenges or small mergers
False acquittals (easier to observe)
ToolsNatural “experiments,” but ...Ironically, we need structural models to interpretthem
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2000 Heinz & Beech-nut ��������XXXXXXXXMerger
Market SharesFirms 2000 2003 2006
Gerber 73 80 81*Beech-nut 13 10 11
*Heinz (Del Monte after 2002) 11 7 4
*Merging Firm
Synergy ClaimHeinz’s new factory + Beech-Nut brands
vs. 3 → 2 Merger“Not a mistake,” Dagen & Richard (2006),“The Baby-Food Case Reconsidered”
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Gravity Choice Model: Parking Merger
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Structural Modeling
Models tell us:What matters: Location of demand, locationsof merging and non merging lots, travel costs,and capacity constraints.Why it matters: these factors determinestrength of substitution; mergers internalize this.How much it matters: compute price effectsof mergers, divestitures, efficiencies, capacityconstraints.
Concern: Does the model “fit” theindustry?
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1999 Central Parking & Allright ������XXXXXXMerger
(merger challenge → divest 74 lots in 18 cities)
Critique: divestitures in 16-block square“markets”
taxi-cab distance metric implies iso-distance“diamonds”
Critique: ignored effects of capacityconstraints:
non-merging constraints amplify, but...merging constraints attenuate, and...latter effect is much bigger than former
Froeb et al., “Mergers Among Parking Lots,”J. Econometrics
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2005 Paris Luxury Hotel Cartel
France’s Conseil de la Concurrence: :“Although the six hotels did not explicitly fixprices, . . ., they operated as a cartel thatexchanged confidential information which had theresult of keeping prices artificially high”
Info: occupancy, price (avg. revenue)
Justification: “to bring more people to the areaand to maximize hotel utilization”
Shared info → better forecasts → fewerpricing errors → higher occupancy
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60 80 100 120 140PRICE
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
PROFIT
TARGET PRICEOPTIMAL PRICE
Abbildung: Information Sharing Increases Price: Expected(solid line) and target (dashed line) profit functions,exaggerated variance
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60 80 100 120 140PRICE
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
PROFIT
OPTIMAL PRICETARGET PRICE
Abbildung: Information Sharing Decreases Price: Expected(solid line) and target (dashed line) profit functions,exaggerated variance
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Evidence from US Hotel MergersLike parking, another Rev. Mgt. industry
small MC; big Fixed Cost
But demand less certain
898 Hotel MergersDifference-In-Differences: (Pre- vs.Post-merger) vs. (In- vs. Out-of-market)
to remove merger effects not related tocompetition
Result: occupancy, price increasebut only in capacity constrained andhigh uncertainty markets
–Kalnins et al., “Can Mergers Increase Output?,”RAND
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Ice Cream Merger
With respect to a price increase by:Brand A Brand B Brand C Brand D
Brand A -1.67 0.08 0.13 0.03(0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Brand B 0.20 -1.76 0.16 0.03(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01)
Brand C 0.13 0.06 -1.61 0.02(0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00)
Brand D 0.16 0.07 0.14 -1.90(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07)
Question: is super-premium a relevant market?What: Elasticity matrixWhy: measures lost competitionHow much: → merger-to-monopoly raisesprice by 5%.
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Ice Cream Merger (cont.)
Question: Tenn et al., Mergers when firmscompete using Price and Promotion, IJIO
Promotion makes demand more elasticPost-merger promotion goes down→ merger-to-monopoly raises price by 12%.
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Car Rental Mergers
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Car Rental Data
Abbildung: Ownership Concentration Varies by Market
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Hertz/Budget-Thrifty Merger Predictions
Abbildung: Merger Predicitons by Market
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2009 FTC’s Hospital MergerRetrospectives
Courts found BIG markets: made it difficultto block hospital mergers
→ lots of consummated hospital mergers tostudy
Methodology: D-I-D
Vita and Sacher (2001), Competitive Effectsof Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers, JIE
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2009 FTC’s Findings
Courts found BIG markets: made it difficultto block hospital mergers
Mergers between not-for-profit hospitals canresult in substantial anticompetitive priceincreases
Mospital competition can be highly localized
Allows us to evaluate methodology forevaluating proposed mergers
Elzinga-Hogarty is not a good structuralindicator of hospital competition
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Rise of Bargaining Models
Between providers and payers
How do provider mergers create marketpower?
Big idea: payers create competition amongproviders by threatening to “steer” patients tohospitals with lower pricesMergers can eliminate this competition.
Bargaining theory: If merger makes payersmore eager to reach agreement (by makingthe alternative worse) then merger createsmarket power.
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Predicting hospital merger effects
Estimate Hospital Choice Model using“travel time” as a proxy for the “price” thatpatients “pay”
Hospitals’ bargaining power is measured bypatient’s willingness to pay (WTP) forinclusion into network, measured in minutesof travel time.
Estimate relationship between hospital WTPand negotiated prices (Price Model)
Use Price Model to simulate price effect ofproposed merger given predicted change inWTP.
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Example: Hospital 1 is worth 12.5 min.
(1) Choice
(2) Travel Time (min)
(3) Pr (hospital chosen)
(4) = (2) × (3) Expected Travel Time
Hospital 1 10 0.6 6
Hospital 2 20 0.3 6
Hospital 3 30 0.1 3
Total 1.0 10
(1) Choice
(2) Travel Time (min)
(3) Pr (hospital chosen)
(4) = (2) × (3) Expected Travel Time
Hospital 1 10 0.6 6
Hospital 2 20 0.75 15
Hospital 3 30 0.25 7.5
Total 1.0 22.5
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Two hospitals in Philadelphia
Draw Area
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Two hospitals in Philadelphia (cont)
Change in WTP of 14%
0 200000 400000 600000
Thomas Jefferson
U Penn
Combined
WTP
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Conclusion: Enforcement R&D is aprocess
Follow up on decisions
Publish results
Replication
Debate
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