europe's challenge: the return of the foreign fighters
DESCRIPTION
This report considers the presence of transnational volunteers, otherwise known as foreign fighters, in the Syrian conflict and the security implications of returning radicalised fighters to home countries. Additionally the report briefly reviews the unique challenges European countries face regarding domestic terrorism attacks.TRANSCRIPT
This report considers the presence of transnational volunteers, otherwise known as foreign fighters, in the Syrian conflict and
the security implications of returning radicalised fighters to home countries. Additionally the report briefly reviews the unique
challenges European countries face regarding domestic terrorism attacks. Related information is available at
www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.
Introduction
Rebel fighters battling the Syrian regime of President Bashar al Assad now number between 100,000 and
120,000, according to defence consultancy IHS Jane’s and Aram Nerguizian, a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Nearly fifty to sixty thousand are considered to be jihadist and hard-line
Islamists intent on establishing an Islamic state upon the ousting of the Assad government, reports The Telegraph.
Of that fifty per cent, approximately 10,000 fighters, including foreign fighting elements, are considered to be
jihadist1.
While the US and its allies continue to fund the rebel Free Syrian Army, many observers warn that the growing
presence of jihadist and militants from beyond Syria is creating a dangerous new conflict within the Syrian civil
war, according to Christian Science Monitor (CSM). The increasing number of radicalised young Muslims travelling
to Syria to fight against the regime has raised Western concerns over what might occur once those fighters return
home, according to Bloomberg. Matthew Olsen, director of the US National Counterterrorism Center says that the
Syrian war is providing both “a rallying point and a training ground for radical Islamists from other nations”.
Richard Barrett, former coordinator of the UN al Qaeda Taliban Monitoring Team, says the risks of returning
jihadists are real, while acknowledging that not all those retuning home will be inclined to engage in terrorist
activity.
Europol reports that terrorist attacks
and related arrests in the European
Union (EU) “significantly increased in
2012” compared to previous years. Its
findings lend credibility to concerns
that terrorism threats remain strong
and varied throughout Europe. In
2011, there were 174 reported
terrorist attacks in EU member states.
In 2012, 219 terrorist attacks were
documented (Figure 1.). Terrorist bomb
attacks at Burgas airport in Bulgaria
and shootings by a lone gunman in
France claimed the lives of fourteen
people in 20122. Separate attacks in Belgium, France and Northern Ireland killed three others. Director of Europol
Rob Wainwright says, “[t]here is growing concern about the threat posed by [foreign fighters] given the possibility
of their returning to the European Union intent on committing acts of terrorism”.
1 Charles Lister from IHS Jane’s offers variations in these numbers. In August 2013, Lister indicated that al Qaeda-linked jihadist fighters such
as those associated with Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) numbered 12,000. Lister also indicates that
the larger and more powerful rebel group Ahrar al Sham has approximately 15,000 to 25,000 fighters and is also strongly Islamist. 2 According to the Europol report, there were no terrorism related deaths in 2011.
November 2013
Comprehensive Information on Complex Issues
Linda Lavender Complex Coverage Desk Officer
Europe’s Challenge:
The Return of the Foreign Fighters
C I V I L - M I L I T A R Y F U S I O N C E N T R E
M E D I T E R R A N E A N B A S I N T E A M P R E S E N T S
Source: Europol
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Terrorist attacks
Individuals arrested
Deaths
Figure 1: 2013 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
2012
2011
November 2013
Page 2
This report considers the current level of terrorist threats in the EU, provides an overview of a select number of
countries of origin for foreign jihadists now fighting in Syria, and discusses the on-going debate on how best to
address jihadists returning to their countries of origin.
Foreign Fighters in Syria
According to Newsweek, the Syrian civil war is the third-largest foreign Mujahideen3 mobilisation in history,
following Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq in the past decade. “Syria is the new epicentre for the global jihad
with would be ‘martyrs’ arriving from across the Islamic world to fight Assad (Figure 2.). They are getting
experience in the terror arts they will bring home”, according to Bruce Riedel, former CIA official and member of
the White House National Security Council, cited by The Washington Times. The newly-appointed head of the UK
Security Services, Sir Andrew Parker, issued a stern warning in October 2012 when he said that jihadi fighters
migrating to Syria are a major security threat to the UK, Europe and beyond, reports Newsweek. Parker reports
that “a growing proportion of our casework now has some link to Syria, mostly concerning individuals from the UK
who have travelled to fight there or who aspire to do so. Al Nusrah [Jabhat al Nusra] and other extremist Sunni
groups there aligned with al Qaeda aspire to attack Western countries”.
Precise information is difficult to gather and verify. Foreign Policy reports that foreign fighter groups operating in
Syria have integrated themselves into the social fabric of host communities, particularly in the northern
governorates of Aleppo, northern Idlib, Raq’a and in eastern Deir al Zour. Aaron Zelin of the Washington Institute
states that in the early stages of the Syrian conflict, most foreign fighters joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA) but this
was prior to any jihadi group announcing its presence in Syria. In the autumn of 2011, there were only a small
number of foreign fighters in Syria. This changed after January 2012 when Jabhat al Nusra (JAN4) announced its
formation, resulting in a greater number of foreign fighters travelling to Syria to engage in the fight. Since 2012,
there has been a steady stream of foreign fighters entering Syria. This is significant as the majority of jihadists
come from the Arab world5, states Zelin,
3 Mujahideen is an Islamic-Arabic term for Muslims guerilla warriors engaged in jihad. 4 Jabhat al Nusra (JAN) is an al Qaeda linked militia fighting against the Assad regime. 5 “The Arab world”, Zelin’s description, includes Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia.
Figure 2. Deaths by Country of Origin (May 2013)
Source: NBC News
November 2013
Page 3
JAN quickly became one of the most effective fighting rebel forces in Syria. According to Zelin, since the summer of
2011 when the Syrian uprising became an armed insurrection, the jihad in Syria has become “the du jour locale
for fighters who want to topple the ‘apostate’ al Assad regime for a variety of strategic, geographic and religious
reasons”.
Foreign fighters in Syria have varying motivations for engaging in the conflict. Some foreign fighters view the Syrian
conflict in jihadist terms. That is, they see the fight within Syria as an opportunity to establish an Islamic state
based on Sharia Law with intent to undertake jihad in the West. The hope of instituting a “Caliphate State” is one
of the most significant motives to enter the fight, and it is often linked to the Islamic sect of Salafism, a strict
interpretation of Sunni Islam. The rise of al Qaeda worldview fighters can be traced back to the fall of 2011,
according to Zelin, who also authored Deciphering the Jihadist Presence in Syria: An Analysis of Martyrdom
Notices.
Jihadi Tourism
Jihadi Tourism is a term often used to
describe travel to foreign destinations
with the object of locating and engaging
in terrorist training. As early as 2009,
British and US counterterrorism officials
voiced concerns that British Somalis
could return to the UK after participating
in jihad training in Somalia, according to
CBS News. Counterterrorism expert Anat
Berko asserts that “the overwhelming
desire of many Muslim adolescent boys,
even those educated in the West or who
are converts to Islam, especially those
living in countries where there is no real
governance, is excitement [performing
jihad]. To that end they stream into
confrontation zones like Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Chechnya, Libya, Iraq, Africa
(such as the recent terrorist attack in
Kenya), and Syria to experience the mission, the excitement and promise of being a shaheed6 as the ultimate in
self-realization”.
As of July 2013, reports suggested that “thousands of foreign terrorists” have travelled to Syria in order to wage
jihad (Figure 3). Jihadists that once used similar routes to access the insurgency in Iraq, now use those routes to
join jihadists in Syria. Ibrahim Talib, head researcher and deputy director of the Center for Strategic Studies in
Damascus indicated the same month that Tunisians in Syria number 15,000 followed by Libyans, Saudis,
Egyptians, Palestinians and Lebanese, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In September 2013, Syrian
Foreign Minister Walid Muallem told the UN General Assembly that “terrorists from more than 83 countries” were
operating in Syria, according to BBC. Jihadists have travelled to Syria at rates not even experienced during the
height of the Iraqi insurgency, according to the Washington Times. In March 2013 UK Foreign Minister William
Hague said, “Syria is now the number one destination for jihadists anywhere in the world today”. One senior
French counterterror official who requested anonymity stated, “Imagine this: Between 2001 and 2010, we
identified 50 jihadists who went from France to Afghanistan, surely there were more, but we identified 50. With
Syria, in one year, we have already identified 135. It has been very fast and strong”, reports Pro Publica.
At the Syrian border town of Atmeh near Turkey, one journalist described the scene as a “set for a movie about al
Qaeda”, reports Der Spiegel. New jihadists arrive pulling suitcases searching for their emirs. Africans and Asians
can be seen on the streets. Long-haired men dressed in traditional Afghan clothing walk around wielding AK-47s.
Atmeh was once considered a “sleepy smugglers” nest on the Turkish border. Now, it has become “mecca for
jihad tourists from around the world”. More than 1,000 jihadists were staying in and around the village in
6 Shadeed is a martyr for the sake of Allah. It is an Arabic term for holy martyrs.
Figure 3: Routes into Syria
Source: Truth Frequency Radio
November 2013
Page 4
September 2013, making it the densest accumulation of jihadists in Syria. Responding to the influx, Atmeh shops
now carry shalwar kameez, traditional Afghan clothing. New restaurants are opening and a new company,
International Contacts, books flights and serves as a currency exchange. In June 2013, a third Internet café
opened in Atmeh in order to accommodate the many jihadists looking to communicate with relatives and friends.
Atmeh has become the transit point for international jihadists arriving at the nearby airport in Hatay, Turkey. Some
jihadists will remain in the area, while others will travel on to Aleppo, Latakia to Raqa'a.
Jihadists in Atmeh consider Syria a staging ground. A young jihadist from the UK explains, “First there is jihad here,
until we achieve victory! Then we will liberate Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine”. According to Der Spiegel, in June
2013 there were at least five jihadist groups in and around Atmeh. The five groups are discussed below:
i. Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wa bilad al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
The name means “those who believed and migrated”. The al Qaeda-affiliated group continues to grow and has
more than 200 members. ISIS has played an important role in fighting on the outskirts of the city of Aleppo and in
the surrounding countryside. Recently, ISIS has sought to expand and consolidate control over outlying towns in
Aleppo and Idlib governorates – especially those with strategic importance along the border with Turkey. According
to Joshua Landis, an expert on Syria, ISIS martyrs are overwhelmingly foreign. Fighters from Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,
Libya, Jordan have been killed while members of ISIS.
ii. Jaysh al Muhajirin wal Ansar (The Army of Emigrants and Helpers)
“The Army”, a Chechen jihadist group, is fighting primarily in Aleppo and is one of the most prominent groups
fighting in the Syrian Jihad. The group integrated several Syrian fighting units into its ranks. “In March 2013, a unit
of Mujahideen of Kataeb al Mujahideen, or Brigade of Emigrants, under the command of Abu Omar al Chechen
was joined by several brigades of Syrian Mujahideen, including Kataeb Khattab, or the Brigade of Khattab, and
Jaish Muhammad, or the Army of Muhammad, after which it was decided to reorganise the structure of Kataeb”,
Kavkaz Center reported. One report suggests there are over 1,000 in the group originating from different
countries, including the Caucasus Emirate, Russia, Ukraine, Crimea and other Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS7) countries. Formed in the summer of 2012, it is headed by an ethnic Chechen Abu Omar al Chechen.
As of June 2013, there are approximately 170 foreign fighters belonging to Jaysh al Muhajirin wal Ansar.
iii. Abu al-Banat
A group of an estimated seventy fighters, it is named after its emir and consists of Chechens, Dagestanis and
Azerbaijanis. The group’s numbers are in decline. Few additional details about its capabilities and activities are
known.
iv. Abu Musab al Jazairi
The group takes its name from the founder, an Algerian financier, and comprises sixty members. Few additional
details about its capabilities and activities are known.
v. Jahbat Al Nusra – JAN (Front of Defense)
Most of the foreign jihadists now fighting in Syria express loyalty to al Qaeda-affiliated Jahbat al Nusra (JAN).
Reports suggest that while fighters are coming from around the world. JAN ranks are largely comprised of Saudis,
Iraqis, Libyans and Tunisians. By all accounts, JAN is the best organised and ideologically motivated armed
opposition group operating in Syria, after the secular Free Syrian Army (FSA). According to Foreign Policy, JAN
maintains an operational presence in eleven of Syria’s thirteen governorates.
Jihadists in Europe
To date, counterterrorism measures are largely relegated to the individual European countries. However, the EU
Terrorism Chief Gilles de Kerchove anticipates EU member countries becoming more cooperative over security
measures and setting joint objectives in order to address the threat. Kerchove indicated a high priority for the EU
to engage with the Turkish government in order to more closely monitor suspicious travel of EU citizens. European
leaders express great concern over the return of foreign fighters, who arrive equipped with deadly military skills,
trained in the tradecraft of international terrorism and immersed in the extremist anti-Western ideology of al
7 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries are an association of former Soviet republics that were establish in December 1991 by
Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus to help ease the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Other members include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
November 2013
Page 5
Qaeda. Of the large number of European Muslims who have received training overseas and fought in places such
as Somalia, Libya and Syria, few have actually conducted attacks after returning to Europe, according to Stratfor.
Still, in an era when jihadist ideologues are urging individual jihad in the West, these trained individuals pose a
very real threat to Europe’s security.
Foreign Fighters from European Countries
Foreign Policy indicates that the UK, France, Germany, and Ireland are among the countries from which up to
1,000 European transnational volunteers8 have left to join Syrian rebels against the Assad regime. Zelin reports
that European countries have growing concerns over the number of European Muslims joining the Syrian rebels
(Figure 4.). In February 2013, the UK-based Independent claims that more than 100 Britons had gone to Syria. Le
Figaro estimated 50 to 80 people came from France. Der Spiegel reported “dozens” of Germans, and Jyllands-
Posten reported 45 Danes. Without question, the picture on the ground in Syria is far from complete and will likely
change as the conflict continues to morph. As a result, accurate figures vary considerably, but do reveal the
European countries from which citizens have travelled to Syria to engage in the fight.
Figure 4. European Nationalities Represented in Syrian Opposition Forces (as of Feb 2013)
Albania Austria Belgium
Britain Bulgaria Denmark
Finland France Germany
Ireland Iceland Kosovo
Netherlands Spain Sweden
Source: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation
The threat of battle savvy, foreign fighters returning to Europe from combat in Syria and North Africa is fuelling
debate over immigration and integration policies throughout Europe, says an August 2013 Stratfor report. EU
Counterterrorism Coordinator de Kerchove estimated in April 2013 that 500 Europeans were fighting in Syria
mostly from the UK, France and Ireland; the ICSR reported up to 600 Europeans.
The challenge of monitoring returning fighters is complex. EU cross-border travel restrictions are minimal and
some European officials report they do not want to provoke reaction from Muslim communities. Compounding the
problem, according to Stratfor, is that returning fighters are in fact European citizens and are not flagged by
current immigration mechanisms. Hence, returning European fighters can receive support from people and groups
in the Middle East and North Africa largely undetected. Further, the networks made on the battlefield can be
leveraged to plan and execute attacks on Western targets. This potential threat posed by radicals has emerged as
an important policy issue, likely one reason both the UK and France have been reluctant thus far to arm Syrian
opposition fighters, suggests Stratfor.
Additionally, Thomas Hegghammer, an expert on terrorism and political violence, discovered that approximately
one in nine returning foreign fighters attempt to launch a Western attack. While the percentage is low,
Hegghammer asserts that the plots are more likely to succeed. Attacks planned by returning foreign fighters are
twice as likely to be lethal than those planned by terrorists who have never fought abroad. While Hegghammer’s
research reveals that most foreign jihadists prefer to attack abroad, the one in nine radicalisation rate
demonstrates that the foreign fighting experience is one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in
domestic operations. Hegghammer also emphasised that the vast majority of returning foreign fighters will resume
their “former, peaceful lives-albeit perhaps with enhanced prestige” among home country Islamists. Research also
suggests that some foreign fighters will never return home. Of course, some foreign fighters will die in battle but
some could move to other locations to fight9, and some may settle in Syria.
For those monitoring radicalism in Europe, Caucasian converts to radical Islam is of great concern. Patrick Poole, a
private counterterrorism analyst indicates that terrorist groups welcome Americans that join their ranks. These
new recruits facilitate fundraising and recruitment in the West, demonstrated in recent years with al Shabaab
8 Foreign fighters have also been referred to as transnational volunteers and transnational insurgents. 9 Thomas Hegghammer asserts that some of the battle seasoned jihadists currently fighting in Syria “cut their teeth” battling against Muammar
Qaddafi in Libya.
November 2013
Page 6
recruiting and fundraising in US Somali communities10. Al Qaeda has been attempting to recruit Americans and
Europeans as terrorists for years assuming that they would be capable of “more easily evading western security
monitoring”.
EU and US Case Studies
The following section demonstrates some of the internal challenges facing European countries as they encounter
returning foreign fighters and the threat of extremism. This section is not an exhaustive treatment of the legal
implications or the complex issue of foreign fighters within a respective country
Belgium
Belgium no longer conducts a national census; however, the population of Muslims in the country is estimated at
between 320,000 to 450,000 persons, translating to approximately four per cent of the population, reports Euro-
Islam. Almost 35 per cent of the Muslim population consists of Turkish or Moroccan immigrants. The Council of
Europe (COE) shows that since December 2003, Belgium has enacted counter terrorism legislation. The Terrorist
Offences Act transposed into Belgian law the Council of the European Union Framework Decision of 13 June
200211 on combating terrorism. Later, in 2004 Belgium incorporated the financing of terrorism12 into its Act of 11
January 1993 on prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering.
According to reports, Belgian authorities have found it difficult to prosecute jihadists in Belgian courts, as the
uprising against Assad is “generally regarded as legitimate”, according to Gatestone Institute. In a recent De
Standaard reported court case; thirteen Muslim extremists were acquitted of having membership in a terrorist
organisation. While the Belgian court claimed the existence of proof that the jihadists travelled to Chechnya, there
was no evidence that they fought in Chechnya as members of a terrorist group.
Relating to Syria, an outlawed Belgian extremist Muslim group, Sharia4Belgium, indicated that at least seventy of
its members are fighting in Syria. According to the De Standaard, the Belgian jihadists are “young people, between
the ages of 17 and 25, who grew up in [Belgium]. They are young people without qualifications and often with
criminal records. They come from Antwerp, Brussels, Mechelen and Vilvoorde”. Pro Publica places the number of
jihadists who have journeyed from Belgium to Syria between 100 - 300 persons.
In April 2013, the New York Times reports that authorities conducted 48 raids on suspected jihadi recruiters
allegedly affiliated with Sharia4Belgium, and who are believed to be “luring Belgians to the Syrian front”.
According to Al Jazeera, eighteen-year-old Jejoen Bontinck was arrested on 18 October for allegedly fighting
alongside Syrian rebel forces following a recruiting call from Fouad Belkacem, leader of Sharia4Belgium. BBC
reports that Bontinck did not deny he was in northern Syria for eight months, but asserts he only provided
humanitarian support in Syria as a hospital transport. On 23 October, the young man was remanded into custody
by an Antwerp court while police investigate the case further. The case underscores Europe’s growing concerns
over returning foreign fighters and what kind of security implications the returnees bring with them. De Standaard
reports that the Belgian security services are “particularly concerned about what will happen when the military-
trained ‘drop-outs,’ after the war from Syria, return to our country”.
Denmark
While there is no official census of Muslims in Denmark, some reliable data is available, reports American Foreign
Policy Council (AFPC). Between 1999 and 2006, the proportion of Muslims in the total population grew from 2.9
per cent to 3.8 per cent (207,000), resulting from Iraqi and Somalia refugee resettlement, in addition to a limited
number of family reunifications among Turkish and Pakistani immigrants. Denmark’s Muslim community is
ethnically diverse. The largest group is Turkish (24.7 per cent), followed by Iraqis, Lebanese and Pakistanis “(11.7
per cent, 10.7 per cent and 8.3 per cent, respectively)”.
Since 2001, the Danish parliament has passed two Anti-Terrorism Acts, first in 2002 and subsequently in 2006.
According to the Misson of Denmark to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) ,the first
10 The 23 September attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi Kenya shines new light on the recruitment practices of al Shabaab in Somali
communities in the US, Canada and Europe. 11 The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 can be accessed at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002F0475:20081209:EN:PDF 12 The Law of 11 January 1993 can be accessed at:
http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/HalbantHon/docs/Lawof11January1993onpreventinguseofthefinancialsys.pdf
November 2013
Page 7
Act de facto amended the Danish penal code by introducing a separate terrorism provision (Chapter 13, §114)
that increased the punishment for a variety of previously-proscribed actions if carried out with the intention of
“frightening a population, unduly forc[ing] Danish or foreign authorities to act or abstain from acting,” or
destabilising “the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an
international organization”. The maximum sentence for committing an offense under the new terrorism provision
was raised to life in prison. A report commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council in 2013 states that in 2006 Denmark also introduced additional
offences, including the “provision of financial support or the making of money, other financial assets of financial or
other similar services available indirectly” to a person or group that commits or intends to commit terrorist acts.
The Anti-Terrorism Act similarly equipped authorities with new tools to fight terrorism, including secret searches;
the logging of telephone and Internet communications; easier access to computer surveillance; expanded ability to
refuse or withdraw residence permits.
Following the 07 July 2005 London subway bombings, Danish authorities began re-focusing on “home-grown”
terrorism threats, according to Extremis Project. State antiterrorism policies soon focused on preventing the
“radicalisation” of Danish Muslims, leading to the establishment of a comprehensive Danish counter-radicalisation
Action Plan adopted in 2008-2009.
With regard to Syria, on 03 March, the Danish newspaper Politiken reported that a Danish convert to Islam had
been killed in fighting near the Syrian city of Homs. The death of Abdel Malik came two weeks after another
Danish citizen, Slimane Hadj Abderrahmane, was killed while fighting with the Syrian opposition. Interestingly,
Abderrahmane spent two years in the US prison at Guantanamo after his capture in Afghanistan in 2001. Politiken
also reported that 65 Danish nationals had fought alongside Syrian rebels, with at least five of them having been
killed as of June 2013.
In efforts to bolster security, Danish intelligence services inform Danish authorities of trips made by the country’s
citizens to Syria and the source of any funds used for this purpose, reports Politiken. The government is
considering sanctions against returning fighters, ranging from a suspension of welfare benefits for immigrants to
criminal charges of terrorism.
France
France has an estimated six million Muslims, while according to the NYT, the number of Muslim converts has
doubled in the past 25 years as conversions to Islam are becoming more commonplace. French antiterrorism
authorities have been warning for years that the conversion of French nationals to Islam could be a critical issue in
the Europe-wide terrorist threat, as the converts “do not stand out” with Western passports. Muslims relate they
are regularly discriminated against, demonstrated by the 2010 law banning the full-face veil from public spaces.
France responded to the 9/11 attacks, with the 15 November 2001 passing of the Everyday Security law. The law
is considered controversial as it extends beyond the “boundaries of what normally could be considered counter-
terrorism” according to Euro-Islam. France has continued to adopt specific anti-terrorist laws including the Acts of
18 March 2003, 09 March 2004 and 23 January 2006 which have reinforced the basic legislation and procedural
regulations, according to COE. France deported 129 suspected terrorists between 2001 and 2010, reports The
Telegraph.
In October 2012, French police conducted a series of antiterrorism raids which resulted in twelve arrests including
three French citizens who had recently converted to Islam, reports NYT. Again in March 2013, CNN reported that
three citizens were Chechens suspected of Islamist terrorist activity.
French Interior Minister Manuel Valls claimed that only a “handful” of French jihadists had travelled to participate
in the recent unrest in Mali. However, it is widely believed that “at least fifty and as many as eighty” French
citizens departed the country to fight in the Syrian conflict as of March 2013. Travel to Syria is relatively
uncomplicated for French citizens. According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey does not require a visa
for French citizens. Upon arrival, it is relatively easy to cross the porous Syrian-Turkish border in order to join the
Syrian conflict.
Germany
Germany is home to the highest number of Muslim citizens in Western Europe and is described by AFPC as “a
hotbed of Islamist activity”. With a total Muslim population of 4.3 million, Salafists are the fastest growing Muslim
November 2013
Page 8
sect in Germany with 4,000 adherents. AFPC reports that the attacks of 9/11 were organised in part in Germany
by the “Hamburg cell” headed at the time by Mohammed Atta13, one of the 9/11 hijackers. Abu Hajer, one of
Osama Bin Laden’s deputies in Sudan and head of his computer operations and weapons procurement, was
arrested in Germany shortly after the 9/11 attacks, according to the 9/11 Commission Report.
Germany’s counter-terrorism provisions are located within the German Criminal Code (section 129a, b and 89a ff)
as well as a growing number of sections of the Code of Criminal Procedures14. The COE country profile asserts that
Germany recognises the importance of working on an international level to address terrorism.
German security services closely monitor extremism, reports The Guardian. The Bundesamt fϋr Verfassungsschutz
(BfV15) estimates that there are 20 Islamist groups active in Germany with approximately 35,000 members or
supporters who desire to establish a “Koran-state” in Germany. As of May 2013, German intelligence suggested
that up to forty people had left Germany to fight in Syria and up to sixty militants had left Germany for Egypt where
they were traced to training camps in Somalia, reports The Guardian. In the 08 June 2013 interview with Die Welt,
Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich said, “Radical Salafism is like a hard drug. All of those who succumb to her
become violent”. On 22 October, Germany's BfV secret service suspects there are some two hundred jihadists
from Germany in Syria, reports Deutsche Welle. The majority of fighters come from the western state of North
Rhine-Westphalia, followed by Hesse, Berlin, Bavaria and Hamburg. More than fifty per cent are German citizens.
In Syria the majority of German jihadists congregate in a so-called “German camp”.
A spate of Salafist-led attacks on German police in 2012 has many concerned of rising extremism in Germany. In
the aftermath, German authorities launched a major crackdown on radical Islamists suspected of working against
the interests of Germans. In March, 2013, the Ministry of the Interior banned three Salafist organisations as anti-
democratic, reports Reuters. DawaFFM, Islamische Audios and An-Nussrah16 were deemed incompatible with
Germany’s “free democratic order”. Evidence collected in country-wide raids involving over 1,000 German police
in June 2013 could enable the German government to outlaw some of the dozens of Islamist groups still operating
in the country, reports Gatestone Institute. Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich, in May 2013, raised the
issue of “home-grown terrorism” and pledged to address it at meetings of EU governments. Friedrich proposes a
controversial two year re-entry ban to the EU for suspected terrorists.
Netherlands
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) reported in 2012 that 951,000 Muslims reside in the Netherlands, accounting for
5.7 per cent of the total population. However, this accounts for legal residents while the illegal Muslim population
is reported to be “quite substantial” and more difficult to quantify. Turks account for 37 per cent of the Muslim
population and Moroccans an additional 36 per cent. Other large Muslim communities come from Afghanistan,
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. Additionally, there are several thousand native Dutch converts and children of
second-generation Muslim immigrants. For example, “Dutch Islamophobe” Arnoud Van Door a onetime anti-
Islamic filmmaker and member of the anti-Islamic Geert Wilder’s party, converted to Islam in April 2013, reports
The Guardian.
The Dutch judicial system, like many other Western countries, lacks the authority to prevent Dutch foreign fighters
from travelling to foreign battlegrounds. In many instances, the cases are highly controversial. For example, three
Dutch Kurds were arrested in November 2012 under charges they were “taking preparatory actions for the
purpose of committing terrorist offenses”. The case is pending and two of the three Kurds have been released
from jail. In another case, on 23 October 2013, a Dutch court convicted two men of “preparing to commit murder”.
It set a legal precedent in the Netherlands for people planning to fight in Syria, reports Al Jazeera. The Court’s
ruling suggested that the two men planned to join rebel fighters in Syria; both men were Dutch citizens and
arrested in November 2012. Suspicions were raised after one of the men purchased an airplane ticket to Turkey,
terminated his apartment lease and told social service he was going abroad. Prosecution spokesman Paul van der
Zonden said the decision, “is the first time that the Netherlands hands down such a judgement and this helps
clarify the fact that it’s illegal to go to Syria to fight. This means that we now have a legal precedent and can
prosecute other people wanting to go to Syria or coming back”.
13 Spiegel reports that the al Qaeda Hamburg-Cell, was headed by Mohammad Atta. Atta and cell-member Marwan al Shehhi piloted the planes
that rammed into the World Trade Center. Ziad Jarrah, also a cell-member had skyjacked the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania. 14 An extensive listing of Germany’s codes that address aspects of counter-terrorism efforts can be accessed at:
http://legislationline.org/topics/country/28/topic/5 15 The Bundesamt fϋr Verfassungsschutz is the domestic intelligence agency of the Federal Republic of Germany. 16 An-Nussrah is reported to be part of the Millatu Ibrahim group that was outlawed in Germany in June 2012.
November 2013
Page 9
The 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the European response that followed, motivated the Dutch government to
step up its own counterterror infrastructure. A new central body, the National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism
(NCTV), was created and tasked, “to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands and to take prior
measures to limit the potential impact of terrorist acts”. NCTV efforts focus on the issue of counter-radicalisation,
launching a joint government and law enforcement operations to “disrupt” the work of the main Salafi centres in
the Netherlands, reports AFPC.
Despite NCTV efforts, the Dutch government raised the terrorism alert level from “limited” to “substantial” in
March 2013 stating that the “chance of an attack in the Netherlands or against Dutch interests abroad has risen”.
The same month, the Dutch public broadcasting system, NOS television, reported that the Netherlands had
“become one of the major European suppliers of Islamic jihadists”. According to NOS, an estimated 100 Dutch
Muslims were fighting in Syria, most with JAN. NCTV shared that the individuals had left the Netherlands for
various countries in Africa and the Middle East, especially Syria. The agency cautioned that individuals fighting for
Islam abroad could return and “inspire others in the Netherlands to follow in their footsteps”.
Spain
According to the AFPC, 1.6 million of Spain’s 47.4 million inhabitants are Muslim. Seventy-five per cent of the
Spanish Muslim population lives across the Mediterranean Sea in two territories that border Morocco, Ceuta and
Melilla (Figure 5.). On the mainland, Spanish Muslims are concentrated in three regions: Catalonia (427,000),
Andalusia (253,000), and Madrid (242,000). According to Gatestone Institute, Catalonia, an autonomous region in
northeastern Spain, is home to the biggest concentration of radical Islamists in Europe. Spanish authorities are
particularly concerned over the threat to security posed by Salafism which seeks to re-establish an Islamic empire
across the Middle East, North Africa and Spain17. Catalonia is home to potentially hundreds of Salafists.
In Spain’s fight against terrorism, both the “general provision
of the Spanish juridical regulations established to prevent all
kinds of crime, including terrorism and the specific
provisions” adopted to fight terrorism can be applied.
According to the Council of Europe, Spain has no specific anti-
terrorist legislation. In Spain, the legal concept of terrorism is
closely aligned with Article 55.2 of the 1978 Constitution that
allows for the restriction of certain procedural rights in
connection with the acts of armed gangs or terrorist cells;
however, the Penal code does not contain a precise definition
as to what is meant by the term “terrorist group”.
In July 2013, Spain’s Secretary of State for Security Franciso
Martinez Vazquez suggested that Europe was witnessing a
new kind of terrorism “characterised by self-radicalisation and self-training mainly through the Internet, which is
absolutely different from what we knew before”, reports the Independent.
In Valencia Spain, according to Agence France-Presse, Mohamed Echaabi, a 22 year old Moroccan, was taken into
custody February 2013 for planning terrorist attacks in Spain and elsewhere in Europe. A year earlier, In March
2012, police in Valencia arrested Mudhar Hussein Almalki, a Saudi suspected of running jihadist Internet forums
and sharing documents with extremists. In August 2012, three suspected al Qaeda terrorists were arrested by
Spanish police for the alleged planning of an airborne attack on a Gibraltar shopping mall and another plan
against a US-Spanish naval base at Rota. The suspects were Chechen-Russians and a Turkish national. More
recently, in June 2013, BBC reported eight suspected members of an al Qaeda network based in Ceuta, and in the
city of Fnideq, stand accused of training, funding and facilitating travel for jihadist fighters. In an issued statement,
the Spanish Ministry of Interior said “dozens of people, some of them under eighteen, had left both Ceuta and
Moroccan territory under the cover of the al-Qaeda-linked network”. The Ministry indicated that some of them had
taken part in suicide attacks, while others had joined training camps to prepare for armed action. Several groups
of jihadists were still expecting to travel from Spain to Syria, the ministry statement said, adding that the
investigation was ongoing. Diaz said, “We are aware that they [al Qaeda network] facilitated the travel of a number
of persons from Ceuta, Morocco and other places in Spain, via Turkey”. Later in September, Spanish police
17 Salafists view Spain as a Muslim state that must be reconquered for Islam.
Figure 5. Spanish Ceuta and Melilla
Source: BBC
November 2013
Page 10
arrested the suspected leader of an al Qaeda-linked militant group that recruited and sent militants to fight in
Syria, according to Agence France-Presse. Yassin Ahmed Laarbi was arrested in the Spanish territory of Ceuta and
is charged with leading a group that sent an estimated fifty jihadists to Syria.
United Kingdom
According to the 2011 census, approximately 2.7 million Muslims live in the UK. Since the 7/7 attacks18, home-
grown terrorism remains a central concern for the country’s security services. Just recently, UK native Samantha
Lewthawaite, the widow of one of the 7/7 bombers Jermaine Lindsay, has been sought by Interpol for her
suspected role in the Kenyan Westgate Mall attack, reports The Telegraph. In October, Scotland Yard arrested four
men under the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism,
reports The Telegraph. Earlier in September, British police arrested four people as part of an on-going investigation
into suspected terrorism in Syria, reports NBC News. Two of the suspects were apprehended as they entered the
country at the port of Dover. The arrests were made in connection to the “commission, preparation or instigation
of acts of terrorism in Syria”.
In 2000, the UK passed the Terrorism Act that provides the legal basis for prosecuting terrorists and proscribing
organisations. Since then, the UK has passed a series of laws19 to address the evolving threat of terrorism. In
October 2010, the government published a new National Security Strategy which identified terrorism as one of the
four highest risks facing the UK. In May 2013, the Economist reports that Secretary of State for the Home
Department of the United Kingdom Theresa May announced that the UK government could withdraw the
passports of those suspected of involvement in foreign terrorist activities. British intelligence justified the move
with three primary concerns: (i) British fighters may have already been inclined to carry out attacks on British soil
but lacked the expertise they might gain in the Syrian theatre; (ii) foreign fighters may be exposed to al Qaeda
ideology in Syria and recruited as potential leaders; and (iii) the prospect of a large, ungoverned space closely
situated to Europe could be the ideal staging groups for attacks in the UK and other European countries.
Authorities surmise that more than one hundred British Muslims have departed the UK to fight in Syria. After
kidnapped British freelance photographer John Cantlie was released by British jihadists near the Syrian city of Idlib
in July 2012, Cantlie expressed his shock at the number of “disenchanted young Britons” fighting in Syria.
According to a King’s College of London study, the largest contingent of jihadists originates from the UK with
estimates between 28 and 134 foreign fighters from the UK.
In October 2013, Secretary of State for the Home Department of the United Kingdom Theresa May claimed that
UK jihadists, receiving “live training in the Syrian civil war and then returning home” are already considered to be
security threats by UK security agencies. In July 2013, the annual report of the Intelligence and Security
Committee of Parliament concluded that “al Qaeda elements and individual jihadists in Syria currently represent
the most worrying emerging terrorist threat to the UK and the West”. Also, “large numbers of radicalised
individuals have been attracted to [Syria], including significant numbers for the UK and Europe [who] are likely to
acquire expertise and experience which could significantly increase the threat posed when they return home”.
Further, the report states that the UK threat level from international terrorism is “SUBSTANTIAL, indicating that an
attack is a strong possibility”. Of particular interest, is the “a growing trend for UK-resident extremists to join
Islamist elements of the opposition in Syria which is likely to form part of the terrorist threat picture for years to
come”.
United States
The US hosts the most diverse Muslim population in the Western world and is estimated to have 2 to 3 million
Muslims identifying with different sects of Islam, reports AFPC. Sixty per cent of native-born Muslims identify
themselves as Sunnis, 5 per cent as Shi’a, and 24 per cent as having no specific affiliation. Immigrated, foreign-
born Muslims identify 68 per cent Sunnis, 14 per cent as Shi’a, and 10 per cent as non-specific. A large proportion
of Muslims in the US are first generation immigrants (63 per cent), native born (37 per cent) and second
generation (15 per cent). Foreign-born Muslim Americans have come from at least 77 different countries. Twenty-
six per cent of Muslim immigrants to the US come from the Middle East and North Africa, 9 per cent from
Pakistan, 7 per cent from other South Asian countries including India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, 7 per cent
18 7/7 Attacks refer to the 07 July 2005 London bombings, in which four suicide bombers killed 52 people and injured more than 770 in
central London. 19 The UK has numerous terrorism laws, secondary legislation and case-law addressing the legal response to the terrorism threat.
November 2013
Page 11
come from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 per cent come from Europe, and 3 per cent come from Iran. Eighty-one per cent
of all Muslim-Americans are US citizens.
In the months following the 9/11 attacks, the United States created the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. The Act
was directed towards the detection and investigation of terrorist activities. Since 2001, a plethora of legislation
has been passed regarding counterterrorism activities. Additional policy measures have also been implemented.
For instance, in December 2009, Daniel Benjamin, then the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
announced the rollout of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The policy shares some commonalities with UK’s
Preventing Violent Extremism strategy. CVE focused on local communities prone to radicalisation. CVE attempts to
address underlying conditions for at-risk populations, seeking to improve moderates ability to express views and
strengthen opposition to violence. CVE, which now operates under the Department of Homeland Security, is
considered an important component of President Barack Obama’s 2011 National Strategy on Empowering Local
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism. Internationally, CVE collaborates with partners in Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, in addition to international law enforcement
organisations such as Europol.
In May 2013, the Daily Mail reported that American Nichole Lynn Mansfield of Flint, Michigan was killed in Idlib
province, Syria. Nicole Mansfield, a single mother was the first known American to be killed in Syria’s civil war.
Syrian state television reported that Mansfield was fighting with JAN while another Islamist group, Ahrar al Sham,
also claimed that she was fighting with them. In October 2013, a North Carolina man was arrested after a
Facebook posting said that he was on his way to “join al Qaeda fighters in Syria”, according to NBC News.
Intelligence suggested that at least ten US citizens have signed up with al Qaeda-related groups in Syria, reported
Newsweek’s Daily Beast in September. An October Newsweek article argues that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) estimates as many as 700 American Muslims are fighting in Syria.
The Collective Threat in Europe
A report published by the European Union indicates that seventy per cent of terrorist attacks in 2012 were related
to separatist terrorism20. However, eight people were killed in six religiously inspired terrorism21 attacks in 2012.
In comparison, there were no deaths in 2011. Arrests related to religiously inspired violence increased from 122
incidents in 2011 to 159 in 2012. Key conclusions in the Europol report revealed that the terrorist threat in the EU
remains strong and varied.
In July 2013, six people were killed in a French train accident when a train derailed shortly after leaving Paris. On
24 July 2013, a train crashed on the approach to Santiago de Compostela Station in northern Spain killing eighty
people when it jumped the tracks and crashed into a wall. Santiago de Compostela is a Christian pilgrimage
destination and the crash occurred on the eve of one of Europe’s biggest Christian festivals. While investigators
indicated that the crash was unrelated to terrorist activities, the Spanish crash stirred memories of a train
bombing in Madrid 2004 when Islamist terrorists killed 191 people. In August 2013, the German newspaper Bild
20 Separatist terrorism is violence carried out by separatist groups with the goal of separation from existing entities through independence,
political autonomy or religious freedom or domination. Typically the ideologies separatists subscribe to include social just or equity, anti-
imperialism, and the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power. 21
Religiously inspired terrorism is on the rise. While Islamic terrorists and organisations have been the most active, all of the major world
religions have extremists that have reverted violence to further their perceived religious goals. Religiously motivated terrorists see their
objectives as holy writ, and therefore infallible and non-negotiable.
Figure 6: Failed, Foiled and Completed Attacks in EU (2012)
Source: Europol
November 2013
Page 12
reported that al Qaeda leaders have been plotting attacks on high speed rail systems throughout Europe. An
intercepted conference call between al Qaeda operatives revealed that the targeting of trains and tunnels, or
planning to sabotage railway tracks and the electric cabling serving them, was a central topic of conversation.
European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy
The EU, as it moves towards full European integration, has long sought to harmonise policies among its members
in the areas of justice and home affairs (JHA22). These policies seek to foster common internal security measures
while at the same time protecting the rights of EU citizens. The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports
that JHA includes countering terrorism and cross-border crimes, police and judicial cooperation, border controls,
immigration and asylum issues. In the past, EU efforts have been hampered by member state concerns that
cooperation could impinge on a country’s legal system and sovereignty. According to CRS, the September 2001
terrorist attacks, followed by the March 2004 Madrid and the July 2005 London bombings, provided a sense of
urgency to harmonise counterterrorism efforts.
Member states in 2008 expanded the common
definition of terrorism to include terrorist
recruitment, training and public provocation to
commit terrorism. Also in 2010, the EU issued
its first ever internal security strategy which
highlights the threat introduced by terrorism.
While most observers note that the EU has
made rapid JHA progress since 2001, the
relatively slow-moving JHA Council, has lagged
behind adaptable, versatile terrorism
organisers. The implementation of policies in
the JHA field resides with member states. Efforts
promoting greater EU-wide cooperation against
terrorism and other cross-border crimes largely
remain a work in progress.
In efforts to make Europe more secure, the EU’s Internal Security Strategy seeks to eliminate international
criminal networks, prevent terrorism and address radicalisation, increase cyber security for citizens and
businesses, strengthen security through border management and increase Europe’s resiliency to crisis and
disasters. The EU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy outlines four focus areas in order to effectively address potential
terrorist threats within the EU (Figure 7). Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond requires work at national,
European and international levels in order to reduce terrorist threats. This report considers the first three
components of prevent, protect and pursue.
Prevention
The EU recognises that assistance to and cooperation with North African, Middle Eastern and South East Asian
countries is vital. Beyond collaboration, the EU has identified key priorities in order to prevent terrorism.
Developing common approaches to spot and address problem behaviour, in particular the misuse of the Internet,
address incitement and recruitment in prisons, places of worship through legislation that makes these behaviours
offences, develop media and communications to better explain EU policies, develop inter-cultural dialogue with
and outside the EU, implement a non-emotive lexicon for discussing these issues and to continue to research,
share analysis and experiences in order to better understand issues. Collectively, the EU encourages a more
rigorous transport security process in order to protect airports, seaports and at the same time increase the
effectiveness of border security.
Protect
Key protect initiatives include improvements to the security of EU passports through the introduction of
biometrics23. Establishment of the Visa Information System (VIS), which allows Schengen States to exchange visa
data through a central IT system and communication infrastructure that links to the central system of member
states. Also the newly implemented second generation Schengen Information System (SISII) (Figure 8) increases
22 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is more fully considered at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/council-configurations/justice-et-
affaires-interieures-(jai)?lang=en
23 Biometrics or biometric identifiers are an objective measurement of a physical characteristic of an individual which, when captured in a
database can be used to verify identity or check against other entries in the database.
Figure 7: EU Counter Terrorism Strategy
Source: EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy
November 2013
Page 13
security and facilitates free movement within the Schengen area. The SISII provides “easy exchange of information
between national border control authorities, customs and police authorities on persons who may have been
involved in a serious crime. It also provides alerts for missing persons, as well as information on certain property
such as banknotes, cars, vans, firearms and identity document that may ben been stolen misappropriated or lost”
according to the EU.
Further, protection can be enhanced through Frontex24
effective risk analysis of the EU external border and through
implementing common standards on civil aviation, port and
maritime security. Finally EU member states affirm that action
must be taken to protect critical infrastructure.
Pursue
While much of the terrorist threat to Europe currently
originates outside the EU, member countries must recognise
that pursue must include a global dimension and will work
with the UN Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism to
achieve dialogue and agreements. Instruments such as the
European Arrest Warrant25 are proving to be important but
controversial tools in pursing and investigating terrorists
across borders. Critics lament that it violates rights such as
due process and rules of evidence.
In June 2013, the Joint Communication to the European
Parliament, the COE, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions published a
report that addressed ways to prevent radicalisation. In the
report, the EU affirmed its need to remain vigilant over potential threats of returning EU citizens from Syria. The
Commission indicated that it has initiated the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network,26 seeking to prevent and
counter violent extremism. The Commission encouraged member states to make better use of the Second
Generation Schengen Information System that could assist in better movement monitoring of foreign fighters. Also
the Commission will continue to work with the European Parliament and the Council towards implementing a
proposed EU Passenger Name Record (PNR27) Directive as the data will provide an additional tool to track foreign
fighters who leave or return to the EU via air travel. While most EU countries already collect such data, it is often
not shared due to the European Parliament concern of privacy rights.
Additionally, the body could increase use of EU-instruments and tools available under international agreements
such as the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP28) to track payments related to terrorist movements. With
border controls inside the European Union largely abolished, radicalised Islamists can easily threaten multiple
countries, making collaboration among EU members more important. Working in conjunction with EU intelligence
Analysis Centre (IntCen29), Europol30 and Frontex, The EU will continue to identify the major security risks for the
EU and the identification of possible mitigation measures.
24 Frontex’s mission is to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter
applying the concept of Integrated Border Management. 25 The European Arrest Warrant has come under criticism that it violates human rights. 26 The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is part of the “Prevent” portion of the EU Counter-terrorism strategy and is guided by the EU
Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. 27 On 01 August the European Parliament was urged by nine member countries to review plans for an EU-wide passenger data list that could
help prevent suspected extremists traveling to fight in Syria. Earlier attempts to introduce legislation requiring airlines to share personal data
on passengers failed in April 2013, reports RT. Lawmakers concerned about privacy issues, failed to approve the proposed the introduction of
Passenger Name Record (PNR). PNR would provide detailed flight information to member states of passengers entering or leaving the EU. The
petition advanced by France, Belgium. Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Britain and Sweden underscored “the importance
for the security of the European Union and those who live within it, of being able to quickly have at our disposal a PRN system offering a high
level of privacy protection”. 28 According to the European Commission, the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) has been successful in generating intelligence that
has helped detect terrorist plots and trace their planners. A new EU-US TFTP agreement signed in August 2010 improves appropriate
safeguards to address concerns over security, privacy and respect of fundamental rights. 29 IntCen monitors events both inside and outside the EU in order to provide “intelligence analyses, early warning and situational awareness” to
EU institutions and member states in the realm of security, defence and counter-terrorism. 30 Europol is the EU’s law enforcement agency whose mission is to “achieve a safer Europe for the benefit of all EU citizens”.
Figure 8: Schengen States (as of Dec 2011)
Source: Europa
November 2013
Page 14
However, the management of public assets within the EU is challenging and complex. The density and
transnational character of many European critical infrastructures as well as the interdependency of border
security, transport and other cross-border infrastructures have only increased the opportunities for multifaceted
crisis, posits Javier Argomaniz, expert in European terrorism and political violence. Unfortunately, Argomaniz
concludes that while the EU recognises the need to better secure infrastructure against attack, EU actions to date
have not yet matched the ambitions outlined in its programmes and declarations. This is partly due to the fact that
there are long-running tensions related to security and the notion of national sovereignty versus the trans-border
character of European critical infrastructure (ECI). EU member states are aware of the necessity of enhancing
cross-border cooperation but remain reluctant about “delegating powers to the EU”. While Argomaniz
acknowledges a few notable instances of “swift and firm EU action”, he suggests the EU still has not moved far
from the discussion stage of enhanced protection.
Efforts to Counter Radicalisation
Without question, the UK has taken the lead in prevention strategies, according to the Centre for Security Studies
(CSS), launching its first incarnation of a prevent strategy in 2003 with several countries following suit. In 2005,
the EU launched its own counter-radicalisation strategy and has since encouraged member states to adopt their
own measures. Today, only Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and the UK have issued a comprehensive national
counter-radicalisation strategy detailing a budget, goals, methods, and responsibilities. Broadly speaking, counter
radicalisation efforts can be divided into two categories; general prevention initiatives and targeted
interventions31.
Preventative initiatives seek to help the target group32 become less vulnerable or, more “resilient”, to radical
ideologies, according to Washington Institute’s Matthew Levitt. Preventive initiatives vary significantly in
characteristics and underlying philosophy. Some have a strong religious component such as the Radical Middle
Way, a British government-sponsored project that brings traditionalist Muslim scholars to speak to young British
Muslim audiences and denounce terrorism from a theological perspective. Other projects focus on integration,
seeking to provide employment and education for young Muslims. Many initiatives seek to foster critical thinking
and the ability to deal constructively with opposing views. Stephen Jones at the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity
and Citizenship at the University of Bristol argues that government funded initiatives such as the Radical Middle
Way risk being discredited because “everyone assumes that point of view is being pushed for political reasons by
the same politicians that support Israel and smashed up Iraq”.
In order for EU members to better address the threat of jihadist attacks at home, security along the bloc’s borders
will likely need to be tightened, reports Stratfor. This tightening will affect not only potential terrorists but also
other Muslim and European travellers. This could add pressure on countries such as the Balkan states to increase
their overall security efforts, many of which are not EU members, though they border EU territory and reportedly
have seen extensive outflows of fighters to Syria. Western European countries will probably provide aid in the form
of money, personnel and hardware to those that need it, according to Stratfor.
Conclusion
According to the EU, the international dimension associated with terrorism and other types of organised crimes
must be addressed through international cooperation. However, the intensification of cooperation among states,
which have differing standards on the subject of fundamental rights, puts these rights at risk. Member states tend
to infiltrate terrorist organisations by employing special methods of investigation that may constitute potential
threats to privacy, particularly when they are used proactively before an actual offense has been committed. Legal
tools to prevent potential jihadists from engaging in Syria are lacking throughout Europe. EU initiatives to protect
member states from terrorism have been strong on rhetoric but weak on implementation. While there is political
commitment of EU leaders to promote cooperation in the JHA field and to improve the EU’s ability to better combat
terrorism, forging common internal security polices remains a challenge. As such, EU member states face an
adaptable and resilient opponent. Some analysts assert that al Qaeda franchises, and foreign fighters, now control
more territory and can call on more fighters than at any time since 1988 when Osama bin Laden created the
organisation. The EU, while making calculated advances, remains vulnerable to terrorist activity.
31 According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), European countries have developed
schemes “that seek to identify individuals that have displayed clear signs of radicalisation but have not yet committed a crime. Authorities
assess each case” and specifically tailor targeted interventions aimed to sway the individual away from militancy. 32 In this particular the “target group” consists, de facto, of Muslim youth.