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Space Policy 28 (2012) 222e224

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European thoughts on the new US defence strategy: A major repositioning ina difficult budgetary context

Bertrand de Montluc*, Vincent BonniotCommission strategie et affaires internationales 3AF, Paris, France

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 3 March 2012Accepted 7 August 2012Available online 27 October 2012

* Corresponding author.E-mail address: bertranddemontluc@yahoo.fr (B. d

0265-9646/$ e see front matter � 2012 Elsevier Ltd.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2012.09.006

a b s t r a c t

The USA adopted a new defence strategy in 2012 which responds to the changing geopolitical landscapeand straightened economic circumstances. The emphasis is on leaner, more flexible and diversifiedoperations, while priority areas have shifted from Europe to the Asia-Pacific (in acknowledgement ofChina’s growingmilitarymight) and theMiddle East. Thiswill have consequences for Europe,which is nowexpected to take a greater share of the strategic burden. The major developments in the strategy e such aseschewing the pursuit of lengthy engagements on more than one front, and using the military tocomplement diplomatic and economic initiatives e are discussed. Europe is urged to respond by main-taining its national strategic and industrial autonomy, including in access to space and missile defence.

� 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

On 5 January 2012 the USA adopted a new defence strategy ina particularly delicate budgetary context and in the wake of radicalstrategic changes that are accelerating. Presented personally byPresident Obama, the strategy constitutes a change of course whichwill have important geopolitical consequences in the years to come.Relatively unnoticed by the media, little commented on by punditsand presented above all as an adaptation of the military to growingbudget austerity, the strategy will nevertheless have major conse-quences for theglobal balance. ThenewUSstrategyessentiallymakesofficial the primacy of the Asia-Pacific region for the defence of vitalAmerican interests, to the detriment, it would appear, of Europe. Theimportance of theMiddle East is confirmed at a timewhen terrestrialoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan have ended or are soon to do soand when US forces are reorienting themselves around the threatfrom Iran. A transition period is thus opening up in order progres-sively to implement thispassing fromone situation to another:weareat a turning pointewhich the Americans want to anticipate in orderto control its speed anddirection. A fundamental reorganisation ofUSforces is going to take place, reducing their size but making themquicker to react, more flexible and more modern (‘smart defence’).

Mission reorientation will be achieved by disengaging fromcertain areas in favour of new set-ups elsewhere. Of course, it is allabout ‘doing more with less’, but above all it is about maintainingglobal leadership and stifling any inclination or attempt to contestthis leadership.

It is clear that the challenges posed by China, regularly called onby Washington to provide more transparency about its strategic

e Montluc).

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ambitions, are at the heart of the new US defence strategy. The USAis reorganising itself to deter China and to project its power intothat region (the Asia-Pacific) which is at the heart of the new globalpolitical and economic competition. Having pacified Europe byputting an end to Soviet ambitions and ensured a lasting presencefor itself in the Middle East e the epicentre of an arc of crisis andheart of the USA’s energy suppliese the USA is henceforward in theposition of being able to confront the rise of Chinese power byfixing its attention on the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. “Projectpower and deter threats to peace” is how Obama put it in a speechto the Australian parliament in November 2011, making no attemptto hide the fact that US intentions are to stay for the long-term. Thisambition has started to take concrete form with the establishmentby the US Marines of a new military base for the training ofAustralian forces of modest size and ambition but which willconstitute an important relay in the South Pacific.1

In the Middle East the aim has been to organise an orderlywithdrawal from Iraq, and later Afghanistan. However, we shouldrather be talking of a redeployment, given how strongly theimportance of the region is confirmed by the new defence strategy.At a time when US forces have withdrawn to leave control in thehands of the Iraqi authorities, and are aiming to do the same inAfghanistan, more troops are reinforcing those already installed atthe many US bases in the Gulf. In this region, dominated by thepresence of Israel, the goals are threefold: reinforcing regionalalliances directed against Iran; protecting the Israeli ally; andsupporting the fragile reforms underway in the countries of the

1 In particular it will allow US Marines to train in the region alongside Australianforces.

5 Which may also include outer space and cyberspace.6 K. Parrish, ‘Chairman explains Joint Operational Access Concept’, American

B. de Montluc, V. Bonniot / Space Policy 28 (2012) 222e224 223

Arab Spring. The USA is doing everything in its power to avoidbeing drawn into a major conflict with Iran, favouring diplomaticinitiatives. By relying on its regional allies, it will also do thenecessary to guarantee Israel’s security and energy supply routes,as illustrated by the recent deployments in response to Iranianmanoeuvres in the Straits of Hormuz. This is a policy that needsdelicate management against the background of the growing mil-itarisation and radicalisation of the region.

Among the major doctrinal changes, the ability to wage twolengthy wars simultaneously has now been abandoned in favour ofa less ambitious goal. While such a change might appear to bea backward step, it does fit perfectly into the logic of reinforcing theflexibility of the troops, while relying on allies and partners whowillincreasingly be called upon to take part in coalitions during ad hocmissions. Within Pentagon strategic thinking US disengagementfrom the domain of conventional warfare will thus be compensatedfor by a stronger commitment from its allies. We must expect to seeincreased pressure for thesee by and large Europeane countries tobe ready to equip themselves with capabilities that will graduallytake over from conventional US forces, and to make a greatercommitment, especially in areas like the Mediterranean, where theUSA will have less of a presence. The Libyan conflict, marked bya voluntary withdrawal of American strike power in favour of polit-ical and logistical support, precisely illustrates this new approach.

In another development the USA has abandoned the conduct of‘major operations of long-term stabilisation’, thereby drawinglessons from 10 years of engagement, with results that are all toowell-known. Thus the entire notion of counterinsurgency opera-tions (COIN) has been called into question.2 Prolonged commitmenton the ground among local populations has clearly not producedthe results anticipated and there is a need to move away from thistowards more specific and better targeted actions. The missions onwhich American forces are going to focus will thus be ever morecomplex, ranging from anti-terrorism to the fight against weaponsof mass destruction, via operations aiming at high-value humantargets. Faced with such a spectrum of missions, the emphasis willbe on the use of special forces. More mobile, more efficient, lesscostly, these are the big winners in the new strategy. Their role canonly grow in an increasing variety of places.3

A reduction in the nuclear arsenal is also on the agenda, but inthe spirit of advancing multilaterally towards a one day de-nuclearised world, without compromising either the existence ofone of the strategic layers (terrestrial, maritime or airborne) or thepresence of tactical nuclear weapons on European soil. This ex-pected progressive reduction does in fact go hand in hand with theUS desire to keep developing modern conventional strike capabil-ities. By diversifying the range of response possibilities, the aim is togive the president a larger number of military options, therebyallowing for a more nuanced scale of reactions and actions. Beyondthe well-known concept from the Rumsfeld era of the Triad(nuclear strategy/conventional weapons systems/advanced space-and ground-based CCS means) and of missile defence, now beingactively deployed around the world,4 we should highlight two less

2 Such operations utilise a combination of political, military, economic andpsychological methods to fight against local guerrilla movements and establisha lasting presence.

3 W. Pincus, ‘The Pentagon’s new view of warfare’, Washington Post, 7 February2012. The strategy involves some 60,000 men spread across 100 countries, with thebudget of the Special Forces Command (Socom) in the region of around $10 billion.

4 The 3AF Commission for Strategy and International Affairs has undertakena study and made proposals on this subject, adopting the privileged viewpoint ofEurope and of its technological and industrial assets in this increasingly importantfield. A draft of this work was presented on the occasion of the 8th 3AF MissileDefense Conference held in Paris, 3e6 July 2012.

discussed but key concepts which have a front-rank place in thenew US strategy: the joint operational access concept (JOAC) andcomprehensive approach.

Having noted a growing tendency for certain countries todevelop conventional capabilities aimed at denying US forcesaccess to certain spaces,5 the Pentagon has developed the conceptof JOAC.6 This combines a strong preoccupation with the rise inpower of state and non-state actors securing new areas of combat,and the resolve to pursue anti-access and area denial (A2/AD inPentagon jargon) initiatives. It encompasses a whole series ofhighly diverse means that, once linked into a network and acting insynergy to multiply their efficaciousness (cross-domain synergy),should allow the USA to overcome the barriers erected by anadversary and guarantee freedom of access.7

Emphasis has also been placed on the ‘comprehensive approach’dear to Barack Obama. The military is to be used to complementdiplomatic and economic tools and to assist in development. Theaim is 1) to weave a network of partners, notably from among theemerging countries of Southeast Asia8; 2) to cooperate ona regional basis; and 3) to advise and train rather than to staystationed in expensive fortresses. The USA must be in a position tolaunch vast humanitarian operations to bring American aid tofriendly nations. Further, a globalised, open economic system is tobe maintained, supported by a globally accepted internationalorder. Thus the global commons, the mix of physical (maritime,airspace and outer space) and virtual (cyberspace) spaces andinternational norms (legal, economic and financial) are the areasthat must be protected without fail, keeping their international andopen character (thereby incorporating the JOAC concept). In short,the need is to organise a rapid, fluid movement which will allowthe USA to remain permanently ahead of potential rivals, some-thing which implies the maintenance of a comfortable level oftechnological and scientific advance by massively investing ininnovation.

Of course, we cannot ignore the economic considerations andbudgetary preoccupations that are at the heart of US decisionmaking. Washington intends to save $490 billion in the defencebudget over the next ten years, which is going to necessitate drasticcuts in all areas. The recently approved budget for fiscal year 2013 is$30 billion lower than for 2012,9 and the size of the armies will besignificantly reduced.10 Seven thousand personnel will be with-drawn from Europe (around 10% of the 80,000 soldiers currentlyspread around 28 bases), and wherever possible the preference willbe for rotating forces; programmes are going to be halted orreduced, large amounts of equipment will be prematurely retiredfrom service. For all this, however, US military supremacy will notbe in question e quite the contrary.

A reorganisation of this magnitude is doubtless an opportunityfor Europe but also a formidable challenge and we must now take

Forces Press Service, 18 January 2012.7 These include anti-submarine means (ASM), a new long-range bomber, floating

bases able to host special forces, ISR systems, combat aircraft, helicopters and long-range conventional strike methods (new cruise missiles).

8 The ten ASEAN countries in particular will find themselves courted and urgedto enter a cooperative network. India, with whom a long-term partnership is beingsought, will also be the object of intense attention.

9 The total budget is $614 billion; the cut has essentially been to the budget foroperations, thereby demonstrating the reality of US disengagement from the majortheatres of operation.10 In keeping with the maxim, ‘A force that is smaller, leaner, but also agile, ready,flexible’. The reduction in size anticipated is of 5.5% over five years, which translatesinto the loss of 130,000 men and women (half from the US army) out of a currenttotal of 2,270,000.

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stock of it. Assuming the reconfirmation of the principle of collec-tive security (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) and with theassurance, expressed once again by Defense Secretary Leon Panettaat the Munich conference on security in February 2012, that thetransatlantic link remains fundamental, it seems clear that fromnow on the USA will do everything to maintain political andindustrial domination over Europe, while compensating for itspartial disengagement by the installation of an anti-missile shieldand by unilaterally reinforcing the USA’s political and militaryinfluence within NATO.11 These are initiatives which will havemajor strategic repercussions for the continent’s future. On theother hand, as we have seen, this withdrawal will be accompaniedby additional pressure on Europe to take a greater share of thestrategic burden, especially in its immediate environment, and topractise ‘smart defence’.

In this context, it would seem that at least two important routesneed to be followed without delay, namely:

� Really developing the European pillar of NATO while at thesame time guaranteeing to preserve and improve the tools of

11 Notably through Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD)initiatives for the establishment of an extended anti-missile defence and through‘smart defence’ for the pooling of European capabilities.

the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose utilityhas been proven on many occasions. Such a position wouldallow us to reconfirm the transatlantic solidarity required inthe current period of major evolutions, at the same time as thecontinent works to build a future strategic European identity.

� Keeping our national strategic and industrial autonomy, inparticular in the complementary areas of deterrence (asprovided by ballistic missile defence) and of access to space.Although these may not seem to provide direct or immediatebenefit to our fighting forces, these pillars are the keystones ofthe vault of a strategic building which could collapse if we donot take enough care of it.

Acknowledgements

The authors express their warm thanks to Frances Brown, Editor,who kindly translated and rewrote for publication in Space Policyresearch work originally done on behalf of the Paris-based non-profit organization Défense Nationale.