european comission and its burocratic autonomy

www.cambridge.org/9781107023215

The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy

The European Commission is one of the most powerful bureaucra-cies in the world, affecting the lives of 500 million Europeans. In the past two decades, the Commission has found itself on the defensive as its political masters have sought to tame its authority. This book examines the struggle of the bureaucracy to sustain its autonomy from its political overseers. Using a survey of nearly 200 top offi-cials of the Commission, this book disentangles the complexity of this organization and makes a contribution to the study of international bureaucracies.

Antonis A. Ellinas is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Cyprus. He received his PhD from Princeton University and his BA from Hamilton College. He has been a postdoctoral Fellow at the Reuters Institute and Nuffield College of Oxford University and a Fulbright Scholar. He studies political organizations and specializes in political parties, the mass media, and public bureaucracies. He is the author of The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe, published by Cambridge University Press in 2010. His work has appeared in Comparative Politics, the Journal of European Public Policy, and the Journal of Common Market Studies, among others.

Ezra Suleiman is the IBM Professor of International Studies and Professor of Politics, as well as the founder and former Director of the Program in European Politics and Society, at Princeton University. He received his BA from Harvard, continued his graduate work at the Universities of London and Paris, and received his MA and PhD from Columbia University. Professor Suleiman has lectured and taught at many European universities and was a professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris for more than a decade. He has been a visiting scholar at numerous institutions, including the C.N.R.S. (France), Louvain-La-Neuve (Belgium), Nuffield College (Oxford), the European University Institute (Florence), and the University of Turin (Italy). He has received numerous awards from, among others, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the ACLS, the Fulbright Commission, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin, The American Academy in Berlin, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, and the Collegio Carlo Alberto (University of Turin). He has published numerous books on European politics covering areas of policy making, com-parative bureaucracy, elites, and executive leadership. He has also contributed articles to Time Magazine, The Los Angeles Times, Le Figaro, Le Monde, Liberation, and The Wall Street Journal, among others. He serves on the boards of several journals, academic institu-tions, and think tanks, as well as corporations.

The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy

Europe’s Custodians

AnTonis A. EllinAsUniversity of Cyprus

EzrA sulEimAnPrinceton University

cambridge university pressCambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City

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www.cambridge.orgInformation on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107023215

© Antonis A. Ellinas and Ezra Suleiman 2012

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First published 2012

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication dataEllinas, Antonis A., 1975–

The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy : Europe’s custodians / Antonis A. Ellinas, Ezra Suleiman p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-1-107-02321-5 (hardback)1. European Commission. 2. European Union. 3. Bureaucracy – European Union countries. I. Suleiman, Ezra N., 1941– II. Title.JN33.5.E49 2012341.242′2–dc23 2011049971

isbn 978-1-107-02321-5 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For

Daphne and Susan

vii

List of Tables page viiiList of Graphs xAcknowledgments xi

1. Introduction 1

2. The Autonomy of National and Transnational Bureaucracies 6

3. Surveying Top European Bureaucrats 36

4. Autonomy at the Top of the European Bureaucracy 56

5. Political Attempts to Alter Bureaucratic Behavior 89

6. Cultural Impediments to Political Control 124

7. Custodians of “Europe” 151

8. Bureaucratic Attitudes Toward Controversial Policies 180

9. Conclusion 195

Appendix A: Distribution of Sample by Directorate-General or Service 211

Appendix B: Contact of European Bureaucrats with the European Parliament 213

Bibliography 215

Index 233

Contents

viii

3.1. Interviewee Sample page 433.2. National Origin of Interviewees 513.3. Length of Employment 523.4. Education of Top European Bureaucrats 533.5. Previous Career Path of Top Officials 554.1. Activities on Which Most Time Spent 624.2. Main Sources of Information Top Officials

Consider Necessary to Execute Their Job or to Formulate Policy 65

4.3. Initial Relationship Between Senior Officials and Commissioners 66

4.4. Responses of Top Officials to Degree of DG Influence Over the College 73

4.5. Relationship of Top Officials with Council and Parliament 76

4.6. Role of Interest Groups in Policy Making 825.1. Progress in Implementing the 2000 Action Plan

of the Kinnock Reforms 1045.2. Responses of Top Officials on Whether They

Agree or Not that the Commission Is Too Hierarchical 107

5.3. Is the Commission Too Hierarchical? 1095.4. Is Recruitment and Promotion in the Commission

Fully Merit Based? 110

Tables

Tables ix

5.5. Remarks of Top Officials on Whether Promotion Is Fully Merit Based 112

5.6. Is the Commission Too Rule Bound? 1155.7. North-South Divide in Question of Whether the

Commission is Too Rule Bound 1175.8. Sources of Obstacles to Accomplishing Tasks 1195.9. Alternative Reforms Proposed 1206.1. Is There an esprit de corps or Common Culture

Across DGs in the Commission? 1326.2. Is There a Common Culture in the Commission,

by DG Type? 1346.3. Where Do Innovative Policies Originate? 1356.4. Is There a Common Culture (by years of service)? 1376.5. Is There a Common Culture or an esprit de corps

within DGs? 1386.6. Change in Commission Culture Over Time 1427.1. Sources of Euroskepticism 1567.2. Vision of the EU 1647.3. Vision of the EU and National Origin of Top

Officials 1697.4. Years of Service and Vision of Where the EU

Should Be 1737.5. Vision of the EU and DG Type 1747.6. Position in Commission and Vision of Where the

EU Should Be 1758.1. Was It a Good Idea to Propose a European

Constitution? 1828.2. Reaction of Top Officials to Bolkestein Directive 1868.3. Support for Bolkestein Directive and Political

Orientation of Top Officials 1878.4. Attitudes to Turkish Accession 189B.1. Frequency of Contact with EP 213B.2. What Forms Does Contact with EP Take? 213B.3. With Whom in the EP Do You Have Most

Contact? 214

x

7.1. Scatter plot between “Where Officials Think the EU Stands Today” and “Where Colleagues Think the EU Stands Today” page 166

7.2. Scatter plot between “Where Officials Think the EU Should be in 10 Years” and “Where Colleagues Think the EU Should be in 10 Years” 166

Graphs

xi

This book is the product of a harmonious collaboration between the two authors. The joint effort was rendered somewhat more complicated because they were often on different continents, but it was always pleasant and uninterrupted.

Of course, any work that entails penetrating an institution – studying its organization, its leaders, its multiple relations to other institutions – that functions within an international con-text and that involves a survey is going to require the help of many talents.

This large undertaking was originally begun by Suleiman. Two Princeton University graduate students, Maia Davis Cross, now at the University of Southern California, and Quinton Mayne, now a postdoc at Harvard University, helped test and carry out the survey, spending much time traveling to and from Brussels. Maia and Quinton contributed enormously to the undertaking in long discussions on the many different aspects of the project. When the survey phase was over, Maia and Quinton needed to devote their attention to pursuing their own careers.

In the course of the work on this project and during its many phases, we had the help of many scholars. At the earliest phase, in clarifying the objectives and developing the survey, the help of Juan Linz was critical. He brought to bear his vast knowledge of surveys and of European institutions and helped us overcome

Acknowledgments

Acknowledgmentsxii

numerous difficulties that we became aware of when we started testing the questionnaire. Suleiman has often expressed in earlier books his indebtedness to Juan, not only for his intellectual help over several decades but for his unstinting kindness and generos-ity. It is a source of pleasure for him to express his indebtedness to Juan once again.

We called on our friends and colleagues at subsequent phases of the project, some of whom read all or parts of the manuscript. We are particularly grateful to Dinsha Mistree who not only read the manuscript but also helped us clarify some of its the-oretical underpinnings. His contributions were indispensable to strengthening many parts of the book. Quinton Mayne also read the entire manuscript and, given his familiarity with the proj-ect, provided us with important suggestions and insights. Herma Gjinko was responsible for the bibliography and served as a research assistant during the last phase of the project. Iasonas Lambrianou helped strengthen the data analysis, and Costas Constantinou, Marios Constantinou, and Stavros Tombazos helped clarify the theory. Erik Kuhonta highlighted theoretical linkages of our project with other scholarly literature, pushing us to engage with theories of the state.

We are also grateful to Maia Cross, William Genieys, Sabine Saurugger, and the anonymous reviewers who read the manuscript and not only saved us from errors but also made an important number of positive suggestions. Parts of this book were presented at different institutions and conferences and we benefited from the criticisms and suggestions made by several colleagues, in par-ticular Michael Bauer, Dimitri Gondicas, Harold James, Liesbet Hooghe, Georgia Mavrodi, Sophie Meunier, Andrew Moravcsik, and Caspar van den Berg.

Each of us received institutional help that made it possible to undertake and complete the work on this project. Suleiman was able to begin work on this project thanks to financial help from Princeton University’s Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences and from the Bobst Center for Peace and Justice. A fellowship from the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) and an award as a Bosch Fellow at the American

Acknowledgments xiii

Academy in Berlin allowed him to undertake the bulk of the initial work. A subsequent Guest of the Rector Fellowship at NIAS in 2009 and a fellowship at the Collegio Carlo Alberto (the University of Turin) in 2010 allowed Suleiman to complete the project. For Suleiman, much of the work was thus begun or ended in three marvelous and welcoming institutions where little is asked of you (besides doing your work) and much is given to you (ideal conditions for work and almost no obligations). He is grateful to Gary Smith, the director of the American Academy in Berlin since its founding; to Wim Blockmans, the director of NIAS during Suleiman’s two residencies; and to Pietro Garibaldi, the director of the Collegio Carlo Alberto. All devoted themselves to making it possible for Fellows to just do their work.

Ellinas began working on the project as a graduate student at Princeton University and, later, as a postdoctoral Fellow at Oxford University, with financial assistance from Princeton’s Program in Contemporary European Politics and Society and Oxford’s Reuters Institute as well as Nuffield and St Antony’s Colleges. The College of the Holy Cross provided Ellinas with a superb working environment, excellent students, and supportive colleagues that allowed him to work on the book while teaching. Financial assistance from the Research and Publication Committee of Holy Cross in 2008 and 2009, the Robert L. Ardizzone Summer Fellowship in 2010, and a junior leave gave him the opportunity to write. The students in the “European Integration” class taught in Spring 2009 provided useful feedback on drafts of the book. Thanks are also due to Ellinas’s colleagues Donald Brand, Loren Cass, Jennifer Lieb, and Ward Thomas, for their encouragement and mentoring at critical phases of the project.

We thank Lew Bateman, our editor at Cambridge University Press, for his professional shepherding of the manuscript through the review and publication process.

Chapters 5 and 7 are based on articles published in the Journal of European Public Policy and the Journal of Common Market Studies, respectively. We are grateful to the publishers and edi-tors for allowing us to reproduce parts of these articles in this book.

1

1

Introduction

In his parting reflections from his Brussels posting in July 2010, the author of a widely read column in The Economist describes at some length the “Brussels elite” as a unique group of indi-viduals sharing a strong belief in the value of European inte-gration. For Eurocrats, as he calls the officials of the European Commission, “Europe is a faith-based project” and “nationalism is the greatest of evils.” Multinational, multilingual, and cosmo-politan, European bureaucrats have chosen to serve “the dream of a united Europe” instead of pursuing a career like most of their compatriots, in a national capital. Writing in the midst of the Eurozone debt crisis, this close observer of the Commission notes that European bureaucrats think of Europe as some form of higher ideal and, hence, dismiss – somewhat undemocrat-ically – those who criticize their mission for deeper integration.1

The image of Brussels bureaucrats as a rather coherent group serving the ideal of European integration sharply contrasts with scholarly analyses of the Commission. Academic obser-vers of the European bureaucracy often describe it as a frag-mented organization with centrifugal tendencies that limit its capacity to act coherently. To some extent, this fragmentation is

1 Charlemagne, “Before the Alter of Europe: Some Parting Reflections from this Columnist on the Faith and Folly of the Brussels Elite,” The Economist, July 1, 2010.

The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy2

typical of bureaucracies: Public agencies tend to be torn apart by interdepartmental rivalries, budgetary feuds, and administrative politicking. European bureaucrats, though, have much more that divide them than administrators in national bureaucracies. They come from twenty-seven countries with distinct cultures and tra-ditions and dissimilar administrative practices. They have been through different educational systems, they have been trained in a wide range of professional fields, and they have had diverse professional experiences before joining the Commission. More importantly, European bureaucrats are thought to remain loyal to their home governments, in part because the governments help officials advance to the top echelons of the Commission. An unofficial quota system and intergovernmental bargaining helps “push” senior bureaucrats to the top ranks of the Commission. Once they get there, senior officials are thought to be acting as agents of their home countries, instead of serving the ideal of a supranational Europe – an ideal that some of their home govern-ments of course do not necessarily share.

Is the Commission, then, a Babel-like bureaucracy that lacks coherence, or is it a hotbed of supranationalism made up of European integration devotees? This is the critical question that needs to be answered if one is to accurately assess one of the most defining elements of public bureaucracies: their autonomy from the political sphere. The unity or fragmentation of an orga-nization can be a source of strength or weakness regardless of its formal institutional authority. The European bureaucracy is often viewed as one of the most powerful bureaucracies in the world. It can propose legislation, monitor compliance, and reg-ulate competition in ways that affect the lives of 500 million Europeans. European Union (EU) treaties grant the Commission much more formal autonomy from the political sphere than most public bureaucracies – both national and international – tend to have. The alleged power of the Commission is a constant issue of contention for its critics, who see it as an obscure, obtuse, and opaque organization with extraordinary authority over the affairs of member states. The influential role of the Commission in the EU policy nexus is not only derived from EU treaties but it is

Introduction 3

also because of the institutional setting of the Union. Unlike most public bureaucracies, the Commission is accountable to multiple political masters. As in the case of the American bureaucracy, the multicephalous structure of political oversight complicates efforts to control the behavior of the Commission, thereby enhancing its capacity for autonomous behavior. The institutional “space” the Commission has to exercise its authority, though, largely depends on its capacity to act as a coherent organization and in accor-dance with its mission. The degree of organizational unity, then, is a critical component of the power the European bureaucracy has to influence the lives of European publics.

The question of organizational unity or fragmentation is even more critical to answer today because of the political environ-ment the European bureaucracy now operates in. In the past decades, the EU has been shaken by the active opposition, grow-ing doubts or simply the indifference of European publics toward the European integration project. European publics, journalists, and politicians have targeted their concerns about the direction of integration against the bureaucracy, questioning its autonomy and challenging its legitimacy. Confronted with a broader legit-imacy crisis for the European polity, the political overseers of the EU have not been shy about attacking the Commission to enhance their own legitimacy. The Commission has found itself, then, in an increasingly more hostile political environment and under persistent political accusations for runaway or unaccount-able behavior. Moreover, the European bureaucracy has been operating in a more fluid political environment. The financial and debt crises have exposed sharp divisions among major European countries about the institutional architecture of the European polity and, more importantly, about the future of the EU. How has this hostile and fluid political environment affected the coher-ence of the European bureaucracy? Has it reinforced the centrif-ugal tendencies some see in the organization? Alternatively, has it shaken the conviction that European bureaucrats are reported to have in European integration?

This book examines the struggle of the European bureau-cracy to maintain its autonomy in an increasingly more complex


institutional setting and more adverse political environment – an environment that challenges its legitimacy. We conducted a survey of nearly 200 top European officials – mostly directors general, deputy directors general and directors – which suggests that the Commission remains a rather coherent organization that shares a common culture of supranationalism. The multi-cephalous structure of political authority in the EU limits the capacity of European politicians to curb the autonomy of the Commission but tends to undermine the legitimacy of the organi-zation, which finds itself under persistent political attacks. These attacks inadvertently help the organization bolster its cultural defenses against the external threats and trigger internal legiti-mation processes that reinforce the devotion of its employees to its institutional mission. Instead of curbing the autonomy of the organization, political adversity helps bureaucrats close ranks, thereby helping the bureaucracy uphold its mission.

To understand the struggle of the European bureaucracy to maintain its autonomy, Chapter 2 brings together a number of distinct theoretical approaches to identify the main factors affecting bureaucratic autonomy. In addition to the formal insti-tutional mandate of a public bureaucracy, the chapter discusses three other dimensions: the degree of system fragmentation, political legitimacy, and cultural coherence. It first examines each of these three factors in national political settings and then examines how they affect the autonomy of international bureau-cracies. The same framework is then applied to the European Commission. When it comes to autonomy, the Commission benefits from the fragmented structure of political oversight but suffers from the legitimacy challenges this structure helps gen-erate. The degree of cultural coherence becomes, then, the most critical factor affecting its autonomy.

Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of our survey, discusses the political context in which it took place, and sketches the pro-file of our interviewees, highlighting their diverse origins, train-ing, and experience. Chapter 4 examines the autonomy of these senior bureaucrats by asking them to describe their role in the EU policy nexus, their sources of information, their relations

Introduction 5

with their political overseers, and their interaction with interest groups. Chapter 5 examines one of the most important attempts to curb the autonomy of European bureaucrats by assessing the effects of the Kinnock reforms. Chapter 6 reports the findings of our survey on the culture of the European Commission, and Chapter 7 analyzes the internal legitimation processes of the Commission. Chapter 8 reports the views of top Commission officials on some of the most controversial policy initiatives of the EU. Chapter 9 concludes by summarizing and discuss-ing the main findings of the book and by positing venues for future research. It suggests that the supranational ethos of the Commission will allow it to capitalize on the divisions caused by the Eurozone debt crisis to push for deeper integration.

6

2

The Autonomy of National and Transnational Bureaucracies

The term “bureaucratic autonomy” is often used to denote different things. By autonomy we mean the capacity of a bureau-cracy to “take sustained patterns of action consistent with [its] own wishes, patterns that will not be checked or reversed by elected authorities, organized interests, or courts” (Carpenter 2001: 14). To possess the capacity for autonomous action, bureaucracies must have a high degree of insulation from other actors in the political system like elected politicians, organized interests, and societal groups. For the purposes of this book, it is particularly important to demonstrate that a bureaucracy has homogenous preferences that set it apart from its political over-seers. A bureaucracy can be thought to be autonomous when it has the capacity to influence policy independently of the pref-erences of its political masters and in accordance with its own wishes, especially when political and bureaucratic preferences diverge. Bureaucrats want autonomy either because they want to see their own policy preferences adopted or because they want their bureaus endowed with greater resources. “Autonomy gives an organization a reasonably stable claim to resources and thus places it in a more favorable position from which to compete for those resources. Resources include issues and causes, as well as money, time, effort, and names” (Wilson and Clark 1961: 158, cited in Downs 1967: 8; italics in original). Autonomous

The Autonomy of Bureaucracies 7

bureaucratic organizations are much more powerful political players than those lacking the capacity to undertake action that is inconsistent with the preferences of their overseers. In this sense, the autonomy of public bureaucracies strikes at the heart of “who governs” (Dahl 1961) and captures the very essence of “politics” – the strife to share power or to influence the distribu-tion of power (Weber 1946: 78).

Autonomy goes beyond the formal institutional authority granted to a public bureaucracy by administrative procedures, legislative statutes, or constitutional design. If bureaucratic autonomy purely rested on institutional foundations (e.g. Huber and Shipan 2002), there would be less of a need to understand how it occurs. The task of controlling public agencies would sim-ply be a function of the contractual arrangement between polit-ical principals and bureaucratic agents. The autonomy of public bureaucracies often takes center stage in political controversies because it is thought to be external to this contract (Carpenter 2001: 17).1 By having and acting on a distinct set of preferences, bureaucracies go beyond their institutional mandate, thereby challenging the political power of their overseers and creating the need to control them. Hence, in the same way that bureaucrats are trying to maintain their autonomy, their political overseers are struggling to exercise effective oversight over their bureau-cratic agents.

The struggle between politicians and bureaucrats for power is well documented in various strands of political science litera-ture (e.g. public administration, American political development,

1 Autonomy does not necessarily mean independence, although the two are interrelated. Independence indicates a sharper separation between the admin-istrative and the political sphere, which is usually associated with regulatory bureaucracies and safeguarded through formal institutional mechanisms (e.g. by a country’s constitution). Political principals have much more limited means to exercise control over independent bureaucratic agencies (e.g. they usually lack control over the budget of independent agencies). The Commission is in some ways a regulatory bureaucracy, but it is also a more typical bureaucracy in that it is formally and directly accountable to executive and legislative over-seers (e.g. Haftel and Thompson 2006, 255–257; see also Abbott and Snidal 1998; Majone 2001; Venzke 2010).


comparative politics) and rooted in the uncomfortable coexis-tence of administrative and representative institutions. “The problematic relationship between these two institutions is per-haps the distinctive puzzle of the contemporary state, reflecting as it does the clash between the dual and conflicting impera-tives of technical effectiveness and democratic responsiveness” (Aberbach et al. 1981: 3). The clash between bureaucracies and governments constitutes one of the most reliable vote winners for politicians, who often present bureaucrats as usurpers of political power at the expense of elected officials and unsuspect-ing publics. Their fears about runaway bureaucracies and their attempts to control them have led to the deprofessionalization of public agencies (e.g. Suleiman 2003; Lewis 2008) and the place-ment of political appointees and loyal advisors to top bureau-cratic positions (Page and Wright 1999: 275–279).

Political fears of autonomous and uncontrolled bureaucracies are often overblown, of course, because representative institu-tions tend to have more authority over bureaucracies than they are willing to admit. As British Labour ministers found out in the mid-1940s, newly elected governments in modern democracies can go a long way in implementing their policies without having to fill top bureaucratic posts with “their own” (Wilson 1989: 257). That being said, even in those systems where political authority is somewhat centralized, one must not underestimate the autonomy of public bureaucracies. Hugh Heclo’s analysis of social policy in Britain and Sweden, for example, suggests that public officials had more input in the policy-making pro-cess than political parties or interest groups (Heclo 1974, as dis-cussed in Skocpol 1985: 11–12). As Theda Skocpol points out, “collectivities of administrative officials can have pervasive direct and indirect effects on the content and development of major government policies . . . even within constitutional polities nomi-nally directed by legislatures and electoral parties” (1985: 12).

Varying structures of political authority can have a distinct effect in the capacity of public bureaucracies to act in accordance with their own preferences. The degree of control politicians have over bureaucrats can be higher in political systems where


political authority is concentrated in a single political overseer; it is arguably lower in fragmented political systems in which polit-ical authority is dispersed. As James Wilson suggests in his study of government agencies, “it is only a slight exaggeration to say that what Prime Minister Thatcher wants she gets.” Even in par-liamentary systems in which the prime minister relies on a coali-tion of parties, “political authority is concentrated in one set of hands, those of the executive” (Wilson 1989: 297–298). By con-trast, the American political system – which is characterized by a strong legislature and by the access it gives to private interest groups at various phases in the policy process – limits the capac-ity of the executive to control the bureaucracy. As Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman note in their study of the Nixon bureaucracy, “The problem remains, however, as to which elected leaders are to be followed. The framers of the Constitution designed a gov-ernment of separate but shared powers. The rise of an immense bureaucracy with its own constituencies, not visualized in the original design, has further complicated a system that was not designed to give any branch of government or major actor a clear mandate to lead” (1976: 468). In this system, “the bureau-cracy is far from the helpless pawn of whatever control measures the president seeks to put in place. In this respect it welcomes the fact that it has two masters, for though it may prefer one that is benevolent and supportive, it prefers two if one turns out to be hostile or meddlesome” (Wilson 1989: 274). Based on these insights from the American political system, it can be expected that the degree of fragmentation of political authority can have an important effect on bureaucratic autonomy. The more frag-mented a political system is, the larger the scope for bureaucratic autonomy. Should such autonomy emerge, it is more likely to be an unintended consequence rather than the intended outcome of institutional design.

In addition to the likely effects of system fragmentation, the discussion of bureaucratic autonomy must also take into consid-eration the degree of political legitimacy a bureaucratic organi-zation enjoys. As Daniel Carpenter suggests, “legitimacy is the foundation of bureaucratic autonomy in democratic regimes”


(2001: 14). In his study of American political development, he argues that “autonomy prevails when agencies can establish political legitimacy – a reputation for expertise, efficiency, or moral protection and a uniquely diverse complex of ties to orga-nized interests and the media – and induce politicians to defer to the wishes of the agency when they prefer otherwise” (Carpenter 2001: 4). Legitimacy is defined here as the “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the exist-ing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society” (Lipset 1959: 77); or similarly, as “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are bet-ter than any other that might be established, and therefore can demand obedience” (Linz 1988: 65). The legitimacy of a bureau-cratic organization is important for a polity, because as Robert Dahl (1977) suggests with his reservoir metaphor, as long as the level of legitimacy is maintained at a certain level, stability can be maintained. People will not oppose the organization, nor will they reject the actions of its agents.

To establish legitimacy, bureaucracies rely on legal authority, which gives them the power to rule:

Our modern “associations,” above all, the political ones, are of the type of “legal” authority. That is, the legitimacy of the power-holder to give commands rests upon rules that are rationally established by enactment, by agreement, or by imposition. The legitimation for establishing these rules rests, in turn, upon a rationally enacted or interpreted “constitu-tion.” Orders are given in the name of the impersonal norm, rather than in the name of a personal authority; and even the giving of a command constitutes obedience toward a norm rather than arbitrary freedom, favor, or privilege. (Max Weber 1946: 294–295)

According to Weber (1946: 299), “bureaucratic rule was not and is not the only variety of legal authority, but it is the purest.” Bureaucracies gain their normative capacity to rule by claiming to apply the general and impersonal rules formulated by their political masters.

Apart from legal authority, bureaucracies also gain legitimacy from their technical expertise. The possession of technical knowl-edge gives bureaucracies the authority to command the obedience


of their subjects. At one level, bureaucracies claim to know the intricacies of the law they apply. When bureaucrats announce to exasperated citizens that “this is the law” or that “this is what the procedure is,” they essentially profess to know details that most people are unaware of. At a different and more important level, bureaucrats possess specialized knowledge that goes beyond the mere understanding of the law and its application. Central bank-ers, food scientists, and environmental engineers gain much of their legitimacy from their technical training and expertise. The possession of this expertise grants bureaucratic organizations the aura of objectivity and neutrality that enhances their authority. Specialization depoliticizes bureaucratic decisions by giving the impression they result not only from elaborate rules and proce-dures, but also from the objective and rational utilization of a rare body of knowledge bureaucrats possess.

Bureaucratic organizations establish legitimacy not only through their claim to legal authority or as a result of their technical expertise, but also through the function they are set to perform. Organizations that perform necessary functions that no other organization can carry out are likely to enjoy more legit-imacy than those agencies performing tasks for which there is competition from other actors. As Carpenter points out, func-tional uniqueness can be a critical feature of bureaucratic legiti-macy: “Autonomous agencies must demonstrate uniqueness and show that they can create solutions and provide services found nowhere else in the polity” (2001: 5). Bureaucracies having a functional monopoly, like the police or the army, can find it eas-ier to legitimate their authority than those executing tasks for which there is competition from other agencies, public or private (e.g. post delivery).

The degree of system fragmentation and the possession of political legitimacy can help explain the scope for bureaucratic autonomy, but not exhaustively. The consideration of bureau-cratic autonomy is incomplete if it fails to take into account the effects of organizational culture. By organizational culture we mean the existence or not of a “pattern of beliefs and expecta-tions shared by the organization’s members that create norms that


powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and groups in that organization” (Schwartz and Davis 1981, cited in Meek 1988: 456; see also Allaire and Firsirotu 1984). Organizational culture “defines the self-understanding of an agency”; it is “a metaphor or a set of metaphors that constructs an analogy between the actual organization and a model organization” (Carpenter 2001: 23). “Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual. Like human culture generally, it is passed on from one generation to the next” (Wilson 1989: 91). Not all orga-nizations can boast having an organizational culture, but those that do have “a sufficiently large number of organizational members ‘buy into’ a metaphor such that their identification with the organization is governed by it.” Organizational cultures can hence “strengthen bureaucracies by the cohesion, coordi-nation, and commitment they foster among agency personnel” and can help bureaucracies distinguish themselves from other public organizations. These “features of bureaucratic culture account for its causal relationship to bureaucratic autonomy and administrative capacity” (Carpenter 2001: 24). By strengthening public bureaucracies, organizational cultures can affect the way they respond to external stimuli. Organizations with a common culture can be expected to be less malleable to the will of their political masters. Shared norms, beliefs, and expectations grant organizations autonomy from their political overseers and make them harder to control, even in adverse political environments. In fact, instead of bringing about the desired outcomes, polit-ical challenges to the authority of public bureaucracies might hinder their reform by strengthening the cultural predispositions of an organization. To the extent, then, that the cultural traits of a bureaucratic organization have a net effect on its behavior, one can expect this behavior to continue, despite the growing adver-sity in their political environment.

The Autonomy of International Bureaucracies

Even though the autonomy of public bureaucracies has received considerable scholarly attention, academic work on autonomy


has largely focused on national rather than international admin-istrations. In part, this is because analyses of international sec-retariats are rare. With only a few exceptions, international bureaucracies have remained on the margins of comparative politics or international relations despite the notable expan-sion and proliferation of international institutions (e.g. Gould and Kelman 1970; Mathiason 2007; Vilbert 2007: Chapter 10). This negligence can largely be attributed to the dominance of state-centric approaches to international relations, which priv-ilege the role of national governments in interstate politics and downplay the role of bureaucratic organizations – both national (but see Allison 1969) and international. To the extent that the literature acknowledges the effects of international institutions in interstate effects, it mostly treats them as mere facilitators of interstate cooperation, not as autonomous actors with a capac-ity to affect political outcomes (e.g. Keohane 1984; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Karns and Mingst 2004). According to this logic, states set up international organizations to benefit from their expertise; to deal with large policy externalities; to overcome collective decision-making problems and to resolve conflicts; to enhance the credibility of their policy commitments; and to “lock in” policy bias (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006b: 13–23).

In treating international bodies like the United Nations, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as mere aggregators of state preferences, many students of international relations fail to fully appreciate the risks of delegating tasks to administrative organizations. To appreciate these risks, one must treat international institutions as actors with preferences of their own, not simply as sets of rules (Hawkins et al. 2006b: 5). Once treated as such, it becomes more evident that, like national bureau-cracies, transnational secretariats are almost certain to have dif-ferent preferences than those of their political masters. Students of principal-agent theory, for example, have suggested that public bureaucracies want to maximize their resources and authority instead of blindly execute the will of their political overseers (e.g. Moe 1990; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Additionally, empirical work on international organizations suggests that their


officials often have independent agendas that set them apart from member states (e.g. Ascher 1983; Ferguson 1990, for the World Bank; Ross 1995, for the European Commission). On account of these examples, it is plausible that international bureaucracies can use the informational asymmetries present in their politi-cal environment as well as the rational-legal authority that they enjoy (e.g. Barnett and Finnemore 1999) to further their inter-ests, even at the expense of their principals.

The autonomy of international secretariats goes beyond the utility maximizing behavior of transnational bureaucrats. As in the case of national administrations, the very structure of political oversight of international bureaucracies compli-cates political efforts to control them. At the most basic level, the chain of command between the political overseer and the bureaucratic agents is more elaborate, thereby increasing the possibility for bureaucratic slack or slippage. The delegation of authority to international bureaucracies tends to increase the distance between the ultimate political overseers, the citizens, and the bureaucratic agent, granting the latter more autonomy than they generally enjoy in the domestic political setting (e.g. Vaubel 2006). More importantly, the political master of interna-tional bureaucracies is potentially more complex than the typ-ical master of a national administration, thereby exacerbating problems of control. Most international secretariats derive their authority to execute policy from a collective principal, which is “overwhelmingly the most common type of principal that we observe when analyzing international organizations” (Lyne et al. 2006: 44). Alternatively, they could be accountable to a multiple principals, a structure that tends to enhance the auton-omy of the bureaucracy – especially when the principals have conflicting preferences (Lake and McCubbins 2006: 345; Lyne et al. 2006). The structure, then, of political authority – its degree of fragmentation – can give international bureaucracies more room for maneuver than their overseers had originally planned to allow. The major expectation here would be that the rela-tive complexity of the political oversight of international secre-tariats determines the scope for bureaucratic autonomy. To the


extent that the political principal of international bureaucracies is more complex than the overseer of national administrations, as we perceive it to be (but see Lake and McCubbins 2006), the scope for autonomy is larger in international, than in national, administrations.

The autonomy of international secretariats not only comes down to the structure of political oversight, but also is associated with the bureaucratic agents’ own characteristics. As principal-agent theorists acknowledge, to fully understand the interaction between the bureaucracy and its master, one must not only ana-lyze the characteristics or strategies of the principal, but also take into account the basic attributes of the agent (e.g. Hawkins and Jacoby 2006; Hawkins et al. 2006b). In line with the earlier dis-cussion on national administrations, it is important to consider two different characteristics of bureaucratic agents.

The first one is whether the international bureaucracy has political legitimacy. International secretariats are bound to have political legitimacy because they possess legal authority, techni-cal expertise, and functional uniqueness. The establishment of international organizations is subject to interstate agreements from where the secretariats derive their mandate to undertake executive tasks. The delegation of authority to the secretariats is based on the consent of all founding members, and subsequent changes to the delegation contract require either unanimity or a supermajority (see also Lyne et al. 2006: 44–45). The level of consent necessary to delegate to international secretariats can help legitimate their authority. Moreover, most secretariats recruit the best professionals from a global or regional pool of candidates through highly competitive recruitment procedures, and are hence known to employ top-notch experts. This highly specialized knowledge and technical expertise of transnational bureaucrats enhances their image of objectivity and neutrality, thereby facilitating the establishment of political legitimacy. Finally, international bureaucracies derive legitimacy from their functional uniqueness – by providing services to their members for which there is usually no competition from any other actor in the international system.


On the basis of these considerations, one would expect trans-national bureaucracies to enjoy high levels of political legitimacy. This, however, is not always the case. Although international orga-nizations have all the basic elements to establish political legit-imacy, they seem to have a much harder time sustaining it. The transnational agreements delegating authority to international organizations tend to remain out of public sight, and the govern-ments that sign them are often replaced by less benign principals with political incentives to question the delegation contract of their predecessors. When the political overseers of a bureaucracy or public opinion become aware of the delegation terms, they can easily use their own political legitimacy to attack the bureau-cracy. Unlike national bureaucracies, most international bureau-cracies have little interaction with national societies, are much less involved in the direct delivery of services to ordinary citizens (e.g. welfare provisions), and are largely removed from domestic policy-making processes that Daniel Carpenter links with coali-tion and network building (2001). They are, hence, more vulner-able to political attacks than national administrations because there seem to be fewer possible actors in the system to defend them. Moreover, although international secretariats are thought to have more robust recruitment procedures than most national bureaucracies, their legitimacy is sometimes challenged when they find themselves in the public spotlight for their hiring prac-tices (e.g. the World Bank). Finally, although international orga-nizations have a monopoly over the execution of certain tasks, their reputation can easily be tarnished when they fail to deliver what is expected of them.

The second characteristic of international bureaucracies that affects their autonomy is whether or not they have a common organizational culture. Claims about the cultural makeup of administrative organizations constitute a useful remedy to the treatment of bureaucracies as purely rule-based agents whose social constitution is irrelevant to the understanding of their behavior. However, these claims must be substantiated with empirical evidence if they are to convincingly link the cul-tural traits with the behavior of bureaucratic organizations.


Establishing this link is not an easy task. Looking “inside” bureaucracies brings attention to many sources of diversity in administrative organizations, which limit their capacity to act as a unified whole. As Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore point out (1999: 724), “organizational coherence is an accom-plishment rather than a given. Organizational control within a putative hierarchy is incomplete, creating pockets of autonomy and political battles within the bureaucracy.” The distinct train-ing and educational background of public officials, different professional trajectories, pay differences, and, of course, subunit interests and divisions limit the coherence of public organiza-tions. In the case of international secretariats, one must also add differences arising from the diverse national background, ethnic composition, and administrative styles of bureaucratic officials. Once taken into account, the diversity one finds inside bureau-cratic organizations makes it harder to attribute their behav-ior to the “social stuff” of which they are made (Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 719). For, if the social constituents of inter-national organizations cannot add up to a unified whole, then it is less plausible that the behavior of the entire organization is associated with a broader organizational culture. The diversity within international organizations reduces their capacity to act in accordance “to their own wishes” – a key element in the def-inition of autonomy. Arguably, then, those organizations with-out a common culture are less likely to be autonomous. When it comes to the possibility of a runaway bureaucracy, the political masters of an international bureaucracy are less threatened by a diverse, divided, and fragmented secretariat than by one with a common organizational culture.

Given the strong centrifugal tendencies one can expect to find in international organizations, is the existence of a common cul-ture even possible? Barnett and Finnemore (1999) assert that it is and that bureaucratic culture can, in fact, go a long way to explain the pathological behavior of international organizations. International organizations display a number of unifying elem-ents that help reduce the centrifugal forces that pull them apart. First, because of their function, some international secretariats


recruit people with similar professional training and educational background from a small pool of advanced industrialized coun-tries. The IMF, for example, is known to recruit economists from Europe and North America mostly trained in the United States. One of the challenges the IMF has had to address in the past decades was not the extreme diversity in the organization but the lack thereof (IMF 2010). Second, international organizations are set up to perform unique functions and to fulfill missions like “fighting poverty with passion,” “securing financial stability,” “maintaining international peace and security,” and “reducing obstacles to international trade.”2 The missions of these orga-nizations are likely to attract people who, at least at some basic level, share similar beliefs about the general objectives of the organization despite their diverse backgrounds. These sources of unity in international secretariats make it easier for them to develop common cultural traits that shape how they respond to external environmental stimuli. Organizations with such traits are more likely to be autonomous from their political principals than those divided by internal feuds, “Babel-like” diversity, and intense segmentation.

The Autonomy of the European Commission

Having sketched the basic theoretical parameters of the inquiry into the autonomy of international bureaucracies, it is now time to turn to what is thought to be one of the most powerful secre-tariats in the world. How do the three factors discussed earlier in this chapter – the degree of system fragmentation, political legitimacy, and cultural coherence – affect the autonomy of the European Commission?

Serving Multiple MastersA 1996 monograph on the Commission began by noting the dearth of scholarship and the “severe academic neglect” of the

2 These are the stated missions of the World Bank, the IMF, the UN, and the WTO (retrieved from the organizations’ Web sites on May 30, 2011).


organization by students of the European Union (EU) (Cini 1996: 1; see also Edwards and Spence 1994: 1). Since then, the Commission has been the subject of much academic inquiry (e.g. Peters 1992; Cram 1993, 1999; Ross 1994, 1995; Cini 1996; Hooghe 1999, 2001, 2005; Nugent 2000; Majone 2002; Pollack 2003; Dimitrakopoulos 2004; Smith 2004; Edwards 2006). Inspired by the integration drive of the Delors years, the revival of scholarly interest in the Commission coincided with its perceived decline (e.g. Cram 2001; Kassim and Menon 2004; Edwards 2006: 2–4). The now voluminous literature on the European Commission has shed light on the unique features of this organization. Arguably, the European bureaucracy is man-dated to perform a unique set of tasks that no other adminis-tration – national or international – is asked to perform. The European bureaucracy has authority to initiate policy and to draft legislative proposals; it has considerable input in all phases of the legislative process; it can regulate and monitor the imple-mentation of EU laws; it serves as the guardian of EU treaties; it is the representative and negotiator of the EU abroad; and it serves as an impartial broker between the conflicting interests of various EU actors (e.g. Cini 1996: 13–35; Nugent 2001: 10–15; Edwards 2006; Larsson and Trondal 2006).

The unique nature of the organization, however, goes beyond the impressive array of functions the European bureaucracy has the “formal” authority to perform. Its uniqueness is intrin-sic to the peculiar institutional architecture of the EU: To the extent that the Commission is an unparalleled organization, it is because the Commission possesses this enormous authority in a highly fragmented political system in which multiple political principals are struggling to keep the bureaucracy under control.

Even within the universe of international secretariats, the European Commission stands out because it is accountable to a unique structure of political oversight. Whereas most national bureaucracies are mandated to execute the will of a single political master and whereas international bureaucracies usu-ally receive orders from a collective principal, the European bureaucracy is accountable to multiple political overseers. The


polycentric nature of the EU system is duly recognized by stu-dents of EU agencies who attribute delegation outcomes to the “peculiarities” of the EU setting. “The most important of these [peculiarities] is the absence of a clearly defined ‘principal’ since European institutional architecture has been carefully designed to avoid any concentration of power” (Dehousse 2008: 790). “[I]n polities such as the US or EU, which fragment political power between a number of veto players, the need for political compromise between multiple principals influences the politics of delegation” (Kelemen 2002: 96). Concentrating on the effects of polycentrism on delegation outcomes, these insights have yet to be fully utilized to analyze bureaucratic autonomy (Kassim and Menon 2003: 134).

Once we acknowledge that the “multiplicity of principals” is a feature of “the central, anti-hegemonic principle that repre-sents the cornerstone of the European institutional architecture,” we are then confronted with the puzzle of how this architecture affects the autonomy of the European bureaucracy (Dehousse 2008: 795). It is beyond the scope of the book to analyze in depth the complexity and particularities of the EU architecture, a topic adequately discussed elsewhere (e.g. Sbragia 1992; Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Dinan 2006; Peterson and Shackleton 2006; Spence with Edwards 2006; Bomberg, Peterson, and Stubb 2008; Kelemen 2011). It is important, though, to highlight some features of this system that indicate how its complex structure affects the capacity of EU principals to exercise effective political oversight over the European bureaucracy.

First, the services of the Commission execute the will of the College of Commissioners, which serves as the political executive of the organization. Although not a typical principal, because it is itself accountable to the legislative organs of the European Union, the College constitutes an additional link in the already long chain of command. There are two different ways in which this link is important for the discussion of bureaucratic auton-omy. The first one is that the College is formally independent of the Council of Ministers, which gives the political leadership of the European bureaucracy more scope for autonomous action


than international secretariats generally have. Recent scholarship suggests that the organization of political leadership outside the intergovernmental Council of Ministers makes the Commission unique among international bureaucracies (Curtin and Egeberg 2008: 649; Trondal 2010: 111–112; Trondal 2011: 802).

The second way in which the College adds to the complexity of decision making in the EU comes down to the actual capacity of the political arm of the Commission to exercise direct – or effective, for that matter – control over the administrative arm. As Commissioners occasionally complain the College has trou-ble dealing with the Services: “The Commission has not been led from the top down. . . my guess is that power within the Commission has shifted to the Services” (Mandelson 2006, cited in Spence 2006: 64; see also Peterson 2008). The increased reli-ance of Commissioners on their cabinets suggests that such com-plaints are not mere political talk but capture the real difficulties the College faces to exercise effective political control over the European bureaucracy. Such difficulties were exposed in 1999 in the reports of the Committee of Independent Experts who accused the political arm of the Commission of not knowing what its administrative arm was doing. To some extent, the chal-lenge of controlling the European bureaucracy has been exac-erbated by the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, which added to the diversity of the College. Having twelve new Commissioners increased the heterogeneity of the College, making it more dif-ficult to ensure its coherence – even by the more “presidential” Barroso (Peterson and Birdsall 2008).

Second, the Commission is accountable to the European Parliament, which has acquired significant legislative, budget-ary, and dismissal powers over the years and has used them to scrutinize the activities of the Commission. In its early years, the Parliament was thought to be a loyal ally of the Commission in the promotion of the “Community interest,” but as its legislative authority expanded, it has been using its newly acquired influence to distance itself from the European bureaucracy (Kelemen 2002: 97). The co-decision procedure expanded the legislative author-ity of the Parliament putting it almost on par with the Council


on an increasing number of issue areas. The Parliament has also gained the right to request an initiative from the Commission thereby challenging its sole right of initiative. In addition, the Parliament has “the power of the purse” (Dinan 2005: 275), and in recent years it has been using it to exert increasingly more influence in the budgetary procedure, thereby having the capac-ity to affect the Commission’s policy priorities. Moreover, the Parliament has the authority to control how the Commission executes its approved budget through its Budgetary Control Committee. Its refusal to grant discharge for the management of the 1996 budget by the Commission precipitated the crisis that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. Indeed, the ability of the Parliament to force the resignation of the Commission through a motion of censure is probably the most powerful – and oldest – tool in the hands of Strasbourg par-liamentarians to control the Commission, though one limited to the relationship of the Parliament with the College.3 In 2004, the Parliament had also used the nomination procedure to enhance its control over the appointment of individual Commissioners (e.g. Westlake 2006: 265).

The Parliament is becoming an increasingly more powerful and assertive political actor but its ability to exercise effective political oversight over the Commission is limited by its grow-ing size as well as fragmentation. There is, of course, evidence to suggest that the Parliament is not as diverse and unpre-dictable as one might expect by the presence of 735 parlia-mentarians with different national, cultural, linguistic, and partisan backgrounds. The political groups in the Parliament are shown to be relatively cohesive, and parliamentarians tend to vote on the basis of the traditional Left-Right axis (Hix et al. 2007). Moreover, while increasing the size of the legisla-tive body, the recent enlargements do not seem to have had a

3 Also, while the Parliament can censure the entire Commission as a body, it cannot appoint a new Commission in its place. Mark Pollack (2006) wonders whether these institutional constraints qualify the European Parliament as a “multiple principle” as defined by Lyne et al. (2006).


major effect on this typical Left-Right voting pattern (Donnelly and Bigatto 2008; Hix and Noury 2009). Few, however, would doubt that the European Parliament has more sources of frag-mentation than a national parliament and that national origin adds directly or indirectly to this fragmentation (e.g. Hix 2002). There is also considerable evidence showing that party cohesion tends to be lower in the European Parliament than in national legislatures (e.g. Hix and Lord 1997: Chapter 6). The increased number of Members of the European Parliament (MEP) along with the advent of euroskeptic or extremist parties in European elections further reduces the capacity for collective action thereby undermining the budding institutional strength of the Parliament (Peterson 2006: 517). The unwieldy structure of the Parliament, then, complicates efforts to control the European bureaucracy, granting the Commission more autonomy than the enhanced authority of its political overseer would otherwise suggest.

Third, the Commission is accountable to the Council of Ministers, which is made up of the political executives of mem-ber states and thought to be the most powerful actor in the insti-tutional nexus of the European Union. The degree of oversight the Council exercises over the Commission varies considerably among the many theoretical approaches used to analyze the pro-cess of EU integration. On one side of the theoretical spectrum lies intergovernmentalism, which considers member states to be the prime movers of the integration process, especially the bigger states (e.g. Moravcsik 1998; 1999). This is especially the case in the “big bangs” of European integration, or as Stanley Hoffman put it, in “high politics” (1966).4 On the other side of the spec-trum sit neofunctionalist claims about the entrepreneurial role

4 On such occasions of high politics, of course, it is the European Council and the heads of state, not the Council of Ministers, that take center stage. Even though the European Council is thought to be at the political apex of the European Union, its role in the EU institutional architecture is somewhat vague (e.g. de Schoutheete and Wallace 2002; Dinan 2005; Wessels 2008). The combination of its towering yet vague presence further complicates the institutional archi-tecture of the EU by adding another link to the chain of command between the political principals of the EU and their bureaucratic agent.


of the European bureaucracy (e.g. Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Stone Sweet et al. 2001). The Commission is thought to help “upgrade” the common European interest (Haas 1961: 369–371) by exercising effective policy leadership, which tends to limit the range of choices available to its political overseers (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). Not only in “low politics” but also in criti-cal moments of the integration process, like the mid-1980s, the Commission is thought to have a net effect on policy outcomes that is distinct from the preferences of powerful member states. Rational choice and multilevel governance models of European policy making recognize the limits to bureaucratic autonomy noted by intergovernmentalism but also note the significant degree of discretion the Commission enjoys in certain policy areas, stages of the policy-making process and institutional con-texts (e.g. Pollack 1997a; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). The discretionary authority of the Commission is also noted by more recent literature that views the European bureaucracy as a key component of a much broader and complex “executive order” consisting of various dynamics that include but are not limited to intergovernmental or supranational ones. Using organizational theory, this budding literature incorporates departmental and epistemic dynamics to the analysis of the dense network of executive institutions governing Europe (Egeberg 2006; Curtin and Egeberg 2008; Trondal 2008; 2010).

These latter approaches have helped establish a near consen-sus in the literature that, despite efforts of the Council to control the Commission, there is still significant leeway for autonomous bureaucratic action. This leeway is generally strengthened by the extension of qualified majority voting to increasingly more issue areas and by the enlargement of the Council to twenty-seven member states. The combination of institutional and arithmetic factors tends to increase the heterogeneity of state preferences leaving more room for autonomous bureaucratic action. Hence, even the most powerful and well-established political overseer of the Commission seems to have increasing difficulty to effectively control the behavior of its bureaucratic agent.


The relation between each of these political masters and the European bureaucracy has certain peculiarities related to the nature of the EU, but it is not necessarily atypical of relations between national representative institutions and public bureau-cracies. What makes the Commission rather peculiar in the uni-verse of both national and international bureaucracies is that it finds itself in a nexus of multiple political overseers with over-lapping authority to control it. In combination with the broad range of functions the Commission is asked to perform and the important input it gets to have in the policy-making process, the multicephalous nature of the EU institutional architecture gives the Commission considerable scope for bureaucratic autonomy.

Lacking LegitimacyThe multicephalous structure of political oversight in the EU reinforces the autonomy of the Commission but undermines its legitimacy. To the extent that legitimacy comes down to legal authority, technical expertise, and functional uniqueness, one would have expected the Commission to enjoy high levels of legitimacy. First, the policy input of the European bureaucracy is based on European treaties, thereby granting it the legality necessary to legitimate its authority to govern. Even the most contentious institutional prerogatives of the Commission, like the capacity to initiate legislation, are firmly grounded in the treaties bearing the signature of all member states (e.g. Horeth 1999: 251). “The constitutional role of the Commission gives the organization a degree of legitimacy in political controversies rarely given to the permanent administrative organizations of nation states” (Page 1997: 147–148, cited in Barker 2003: 168). Second, the Commission has a reputation for technical expertise and political impartiality. This, again, relates to the legal author-ity granted to the Commission, which commands the European bureaucracy to be independent and to serve “the general inter-est” (Nugent 2001: 12), but it also relates to the knowledge and specialization it has to fulfill its institutional role. The reputation of neutrality and political impartiality relies on its knowledge


of EU legislation and decision-making mechanisms and on the expertise of its highly trained bureaucrats in the various policy areas, where the Commission has the authority to get involved in. Third, the Commission provides a necessary service that no other entity can provide without losing the normative author-ity the Commission commands. Intrinsic to the very nature of the European edifice, the functional uniqueness of the European Commission makes it necessary and important for the smooth functioning of the European Union. The combination, then, of these legal, technical, and functional considerations should have granted the Commission considerable legitimacy – perhaps more legitimacy than most national bureaucracies tend to enjoy.

On account of the potential sources of legitimacy the Commission has, it might be somewhat puzzling that it is gen-erally thought to suffer from a legitimacy crisis. Its legitimacy deficit is less puzzling though when one considers the overall legitimacy problems the European integration project confronts (e.g. de Burca 1996; Abromeit 1998; Carter and Scott 1998). Although there is little agreement on the nature of these prob-lems, it is generally accepted that the EU lacks the levels of popular approval or institutional legitimization that modern democracies are thought to have. Often using normative criteria for assessing the legitimacy of the European polity, scholars of the EU note a legitimacy deficit “either because the institutions do not meet the criteria which the observer deems necessary to a legitimate order, or because an absence of public information, enthusiasm, or support (which democratic expectations would demand) disqualifies the EU and hence, in the immediate or near future, threatens it with instability or failure” (e.g. Barker 2003: 163). If the entire European edifice lacks legitimacy, why would we expect one of its institutional organs, the Commission, to have less trouble legitimating its existence, especially if this par-ticular institution is led by political appointees and administered by faceless bureaucrats? To some extent, then, the legitimacy def-icit of the Commission cannot be isolated from that of the EU.

The legitimacy crisis of the Commission is also less puzzling when viewed as a symptom of the challenges modern states


confront. Elites in Western democracies are asked to deal with increasingly more complex and, in many cases, insurmount-able policy problems that tend to undermine their capacity to meet citizens’ expectations. Their failure to resolve pressing policy issues undercuts their legitimacy and opens the way for “counter-elites,” who try to capitalize on these problems to shake the institutional equilibrium in their favor. It also creates a sharp division between representative elites, who seek to bolster their legitimacy by investing in symbolic politics, and bureaucratic elites seeking to affirm the legitimacy of the state by devising con-crete policy solutions (Genieys 2010: 190–192). To bolster their own legitimacy, political elites often turn against bureaucrats, blaming them for many of the policy problems and for the legit-imacy issues modern democracies face. In this adverse political environment, bureaucratic autonomy can become the focal point of political attacks and can turn into a liability for bureaucratic organizations. This is especially the case in institutional settings where legitimacy is scarce. International secretariats are much more vulnerable to political attacks than national administra-tions because they are much more distant and remote and might, hence, lack the legitimacy national administrations enjoy.

When it comes to legitimacy, the Commission finds itself in a particularly precarious position. To understand why, it is impor-tant to return to the multicephalous political structure of the EU. Being scarce, legitimacy is the object of contention among the various institutional organs of the European Union. Each of the major institutions of the EU realizes that legitimacy is the means for sustaining and extending their institutional authority. This is especially the case for the European Parliament, which witnessed a remarkable enhancement of its institutional power within the European edifice by capitalizing on its electoral legitimacy. This is also the case for the Council of Ministers, or even, the College of Commissioners. The constant struggle of these bod-ies for institutional legitimacy turns them against the European bureaucracy. The Commission is the ideal target for attacks by legitimacy-seeking political executives for some of the same rea-sons that national politicians lament their own bureaucracies.


Unlike political executives, bureaucrats are not as capable of defending themselves against political attacks, either because they have more limited access to communication resources or because the very nature of their authority relies on them being apolitical. The Commission is more vulnerable to these attacks because “on the whole it has few direct contacts with citizens” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 234) and, hence, a limited capacity to form networks with key societal actors.

The Commission is even more vulnerable to political attacks than are national or other transnational bureaucracies because the interinstitutional struggle for legitimacy creates incentives for its political overseers to turn against the bureaucracy. The Commission is more susceptible to attacks than most national and international administrations because of the relative scarcity of legitimacy in the European Union and the subsequent competi-tion to gain legitimacy, which turns the institutional overseers of the Commission against it. The vulnerability of the Commission is also due to its relatively large authority. Although legally grounded, the formal authority granted to the Commission by the architects of the European edifice makes the European administration a much easier target than national bureaucracies. In combination with the complex structure of political oversight, the authority of the Commission frustrates its political masters who might often feel that their policy preferences are ignored and their control mechanisms fail. Also, it makes it easier to hold the bureaucracy responsible for policy failures because the Commission has extraordinary input at various phases of the policy process. Overall, then, the polycentric nature of the EU system is a double-edged sword: It reinforces the autonomy of the Commission but tends to help undermine its legitimacy. The fragmented structure of political oversight gives the bureau-cracy autonomy from the political sphere but also subjects it to a rather adverse political environment that challenges this auton-omy. This environment is probably more adverse than it would have been had the structure of political authority been less frag-mented – in other words, if there was not so much competition among the multiple masters of the bureaucracy for legitimacy.


A Common Commission Culture

If the autonomy of the European Commission were to be assessed solely on the basis of the degree of system fragmentation and political legitimacy, the picture would be mixed. The fragmented nature of political oversight allows considerable room for bureaucratic autonomy but frustrates the political masters of the bureaucracy, creating a hostile political environment that seeks to curb this autonomy. The Kinnock reforms that sought to change the internal workings of the organization serve as a good exam-ple of how the political masters of the European bureaucracy sought to sanction its behavior and control it. To fully assess the capacity of the Commission for autonomous behavior, then, it is important to turn to the cultural coherence of organization. Do Commission officials share a common culture that allows them to sustain the autonomy of their organization in this fragmented, albeit hostile, political environment?

The existence or absence of a common culture is significant to the understanding of bureaucratic autonomy in all national and international administrations; however, it is particularly impor-tant for the assessment of the Commission. This is because this particular bureaucratic agent seems to be so diverse and divided that its coherence cannot be assumed a priori in analyses of bureaucratic behavior. Those who went out of their way to analyze the relative coherence of the Commission have, in fact, found the exact opposite. As early as 1970, long before the series of enlarge-ments turned the Commission into the Babel-like organization it is today, one of the first studies of the European bureaucracy wondered whether there are “natural limitations to bureaucratic leadership” in the European Community (Coombes 1970: 39). Pointing to the notable differences he observed in the adminis-trative styles and “normative approaches” in the Commission, David Coombes described it as a “porous organization” in which these various tendencies compete for domination (1970: 291). Even though the Commission Coombes described could not exercise the supranational role envisaged by its creators, in the next couple of decades and under the leadership of Jacques


Delors, it assumed a major role in the push for deeper European integration (e.g. Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Ross 1995). Did the integration push and the enhanced role of the Commission help generate a common culture in the organization? A team of anthropologists set out to investigate exactly this: “The existence or not of a specific Commission culture, plus the weight of the different languages and national cultural traditions and their impact on working relationships, and how a European identity might emerge in such a context.” Pointing to the multiple lin-guistic, national and administrative backgrounds of European bureaucrats, the study noted the “strong centrifugal tendencies” in the Commission that undermined the cohesion of the orga-nization and the conformity of its employees to “the European idea” (Abélès et al. 1993: 5). Similarly, another study noted that the “existence of divergent administrative cultures” constitutes a threat for coherence and autonomy of the Commission (Spence 1994, cited in Shore 2000: 173; see also Page 1997). And a monograph on the European bureaucracy concluded that “there is little expectation that the Commission will be able to develop in the near future a common cultural identity when all evidence seems to point to further organizational fragmentation, and an absence, even within the institution, of an across-the-board con-sensus on the values underlying the Commission’s European vocation” (Cini 1996: 225). Overall, then, it seems that the multiple departmental, national, cultural identities of European bureaucrats as well as their administrative styles make it hard to establish a common bureaucratic culture in the Commission. Absent a common culture, the Commission could be expected to be more acquiescent to the pressures of its political masters to alter its behavior.

Despite these centrifugal forces, though, it might be too quick to dismiss the Commission as a “Babel-tower” that lacks the cul-tural coherence necessary to safeguard its autonomy. The three anthropologists who undertook the examination of the internal workings of the Commission acknowledge in their study that

there are several senses in which there could be said to be a culture proper to the European Commission. A sense of conforming to shared


concepts and values is one of these. There exist intellectual systems at the centre of which L’idée européenne (or the “European idea”) has its place and participation in these systems that could be said to be ingrained in the world of the Commission. (Abélès et al. 1993: 5; see also Shore and Black 1992: 11)

In his own research on the culture of the Commission, Cris Shore similarly “found evidence of a strong sense of community and esprit de corps among staff – even among new recruits” (2000: 131). Shore traces the existence of these cultural traits among Commission officials to the legal basis of the organization and to the deep commitment of the bureaucrats to European ideas – both of which have their historical origin in the founding days of the organization. But beyond the proclamations of his interviewees to be the custodians of the European interest, Shore also notes “the development of an informal system based on patronage, cronyism and fraud” – a system, he argues, that led to the path-ological behavior that caused the 1999 crisis (2000: 214–215). His conclusion is similar to that of the independent experts that sought to examine the allegations for fraud, mismanagement, and nepotism in the Commission and to propose how to tackle them. Their second report associated the organizational weak-nesses that created the 1999 crisis to a “particular administrative ‘culture’ prevailing in the Commission” (CIE 1999b: 110).

The conflicting views about the cultural traits of the Commission necessitate the reexamination of the topic. One of the main findings of this book is that top Commission offi-cials have a common culture and display a strong sense of mis-sion that augments the capacity of their organization to act in accordance to its own wishes. The cultural coherence of the Commission suggests that its behavior is less likely to change, even in the face of political adversity. Faced with a hostile polit-ical environment bureaucrats can use their cultural capital to deflect pressures against their autonomy. Instead of submitting to the wishes of their overseers, bureaucrats might simply close ranks and become more insular to demands for enhanced polit-ical control. Political assaults might therefore reinforce the cul-tural traits of an organization, even against the wishes of their


political overseers. In organizations like the Commission, where cultural coherence is constantly under pressure from successive enlargements and from the diverse backgrounds of new recruits, the legitimacy challenges might in fact serve as a mechanism to bolster the cultural predispositions of the organization, thereby enhancing, instead of curbing, its autonomy. Hence, the political push to curb the autonomy of an organization might inadver-tently strengthen it.

An example of how political sanctions might fail to deliver the outcomes desired by the political overseers of public bureau-cracies are the reforms undertaken by the Prodi Commission in 2000 (a topic discussed at length in Chapter 5). Triggered by the avalanche of events that caused the resignation of the Santer Commission and inspired by new public management (NPM) ideas, the reforms sought to change the internal workings of the Commission to achieve the dual objective of bureaucratic effi-ciency and political control. This dual objective of efficiency and control, though, proved difficult to achieve, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the reform efforts. The pressure to respond to its legitimacy problems – exacerbated in 1999 by the attacks of its political overseers – made it more difficult for the reformers to bring about improvements in the efficiency of the organization. The attempt to modernize the organization and to improve its managerial capacity inadvertently led to its bureaucratization. It helped to unite senior bureaucrats against the efforts by their political overseers to curb its autonomy.

Challenges to the legitimacy and autonomy of bureaucratic organizations do not only reinforce their internal culture but also strengthen their attempts to legitimate themselves from within. According to Weber, bureaucrats “have an interest in seeing that the mechanism continues its functions and that the societally exercised authority carries on” (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1946: 228–229). Bureaucrats acquire an acute survival instinct, which helps their organizations endure the challenges of an adverse political environment. To survive, then, bureau-cracies and bureaucrats need to justify their authority and their existence. To do so they might seek to forge alliances with their


political overseers and ask for their support (Carpenter 2001). In those cases, however, when such alliances are difficult to forge, it is only to be expected that bureaucracies will seek to shield them-selves from political adversity by legitimating themselves. When politicians are unwilling to offer bureaucrats the support neces-sary to address their legitimacy problems, bureaucratic organi-zations need to generate legitimacy from within. This internal legitimation process constitutes a critical mechanism through which organizations seek to sustain their autonomy from polit-ical control. As Rodney Barker nicely puts it, “self-legitimation is an inherent and characterizing activity of government, just as worship is one of the characterizing activities of religion, or singing one of the characterizing features of choral music” (2001: 30). Joseph Rothschild reminds us that “discussions of legitimacy and legitimation risk irrelevancy if they overlook this crucial dimension of a ruling elite’s sense of its legitimacy” (1977: 491; see also Bensam 1979; Pakulski 1990). When this sense is shaken and when elites lose their confidence in the legitimacy of their authority, they invite outsiders to question this legitimacy – and in more extreme cases – to revolt against them (Kecskemeti 1961, cited in Rothschild 1977: 491). Self-legitimation, then, is integral to the cultural makeup of bureaucratic organizations and needs to be taken into account in any discussion of bureau-cratic culture. The internal legitimation processes of bureaucratic organizations constitute fundamental cultural traits that affect the relation of these bureaucracies with their political overseers.

How do Commission bureaucrats legitimate themselves? What sort of narratives do they advance to convince others but also themselves of their rightful authority? A major source of legitimation is the claim that the European bureaucracy repre-sents future Europeans. Unable to legitimatize their authority from the present political overseers of the bureaucracy, European bureaucrats seek to derive their authority by claiming to serve future generations of European citizens. In terms of democratic theory, government officials do not simply serve the interests of the current citizenry. They are also supposed to be concerned with the interests of the future citizenry. If government officials


believe that the current citizens faithfully represent the interests of the future citizenry, then officials should defer to the voice of the current citizens, ceteris paribus. If officials believe that mod-ern day citizens are not faithfully representing the interests of the future, officials will have occasion to justify seemingly unpopular directives. Because the preferences of future generations cannot be accurately ascertained, they serve as ideal political masters for bureaucratic officials interested in maintaining autonomy. In claiming to represent the interests of future Europeans, then, Commission bureaucrats seek to make themselves subservient to a voiceless political master, one that provides the necessary legitimacy to the organization without curbing its autonomy for action.

Intrinsic to the claim that the European bureaucracy is serv-ing future Europeans is the desire of European bureaucrats for deeper integration. Because they are serving future generations of Europeans, Commission officials can be expected to share a supranational vision of the EU. This vision of a future Europe might be linked, of course, with the institutional mission of the organization to promote European integration. It is only reason-able to expect European bureaucrats working in a supranational bureaucracy to share a supranational vision. Beyond the institu-tional mission, though, supranationalism also relates to the jus-tification the bureaucrats themselves put forth to defend their autonomy. Supranationalism serves to legitimate the authority of the European bureaucracy in an adverse political environment. European bureaucrats have a preference for deeper integration regardless of their national origin, length of service, and organi-zational position because the very existence of their organization is intimately connected to its claim to serve future Europeans.

The narrative of a bureaucracy serving future Europeans might have significant policy consequences if it is used as a justification for the widening gap between the Commission and the European citizenry. Convinced that they can best serve the interests of the next generations of Europeans, bureaucrats might not consider it as important to initiate and execute policies that match the pref-erences of current citizens. The conviction of supranationalism


might encourage the introduction of unpopular policies with the justification that these policies are serving the interest of future Europeans. This means that even in an increasingly worsening political environment, the bureaucracy will continue to under-take and pursue policy initiatives to strengthen European inte-gration, however unpopular these initiatives might be.

36

3

Surveying Top European Bureaucrats

Although the many decisions taken daily in the Berlaymont and the other Commission buildings affect the lives of 500 million ordinary citizens, there are only a few systematic studies of those decision makers at the apex of the European administration (e.g. Page 1997; Hooghe 2001; Bauer 2008b; Trondal 2010; Kassim et al., forthcoming). This is a bit odd given the near consensus in the various strands of the European integration literature that the Commission has an important role in EU policy making (e.g. Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Pollack 1997a; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001).

Our book seeks to build on and add to earlier studies of the European Commission. By focusing on the European bureau-cracy and its top employees, we take issue with a notable strain in the literature on European integration, which tends to down-play their role. For some scholars of the EU, the analysis under-taken here is perhaps not terribly relevant because, in their view, the decisions taken in Brussels reflect the preferences of powerful member states – the political masters of the European Commission – and European bureaucrats are merely executing their will. When viewed through intergovernmentalist lenses, the exasperation of political executives with bureaucrats in Brussels and their frequent calls against a runaway European bureaucracy are political in nature, like many of the calls against

Surveying Top European Bureaucrats 37

national administrations. In this sense, the seeming frustration of the College, the Council, or the Parliament with the European bureaucracy is part of a political blame game rather than an indicator of bureaucratic behavior. If this approach is taken at its word, political horror stories about runaway bureaucracies do not say much about bureaucratic behavior, and hence, the emphasis should be on political executives, not bureaucrats.

A voluminous literature on public administration provides a firm basis for moving away from the main tenets of intergov-ernmentalism. Utilizing the analytical insights of this literature, we conceive the Commission as a public bureaucracy – one that has a power instinct that helps it sustain and expand its administrative tasks (Weber 1946: 232) even against the will of its political masters. In treating the Commission as a bureau-cracy, we accept Max Weber’s critique of modern bureaucracies and acknowledge the insights of public administration scholars that bureaucracies cannot merely be treated as agents of polit-ical principals. Far from being the mere executors of the will of their masters, bureaucracies have their own distinct interests, and they also have the resources (e.g. information and expertise) to pursue them (e.g. Weber 1946: 228–229; Moe 1990; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). This does not mean that attacks against public agencies are devoid of political content – surely, many of the recent calls to reform national administrations are part of a broader political agenda about the size and role of the state (e.g. Suleiman 2003). Beyond the political dimension of frequent cri-tiques against bureaucracies, bureaucratic organizations are by nature inclined to pursue interests that do not necessarily match the preferences of their political overseers. As Weber and Robert Michels (1915) suggested nearly a century ago, and as many oth-ers have subsequently confirmed, it is in the very character of bureaucratic organizations to defy their political masters – be they elected governments or socialist voters.

If Weber were to update his work on national administrations to include international bureaucracies, his reservations about bureaucratic rule would probably be even stronger. For, many of the problems he identified are exacerbated by international


secretariats. Unlike most national administrations, international bureaucracies do not have a single, powerful overseer and are better able to ignore the will of their “collective” master. To some extent, then, the analysis of bureaucratic organizations is more pressing for international organizations than it is for national administrations because the very structure of their political over-sight is more complex, creating more room for bureaucratic autonomy. In this sense, the Commission is an ideal bureaucracy to study because, in the universe of national and transnational bureaucracies, it faces the most “complex” political overseer. As Chapter 2 suggested, this structure of political oversight grants the Commission considerable scope for autonomous bureau-cratic action but burdens it with legitimacy challenges that tend to undermine its autonomy. To fully understand, then, the behav-ior of the European bureaucracy, it is necessary to examine its internal workings and to appreciate the internal limitations to autonomous bureaucratic action.

One set of limitations seems to be intrinsic to the trans-national nature of international bureaucracies: Unlike their national counterparts, bureaucrats in international secretariats come from different national and administrative backgrounds. This diversity potentially limits their coherence. Moreover, international bureaucrats might be more loyal to their home countries than to their employers, thereby reproducing and serving national interests, instead of serving the common inter-est. This issue might be particularly troubling in those organiza-tions that employ seconded national bureaucrats (e.g. Cortell and Peterson 2006), but it is also pertinent to the Commission, which is known to be subject to pressures from member states to appoint their own to high level positions (e.g. Page 1997). Another set of limitations is more common to public bureau-crats in general: Their behavior might be influenced from outside groups that serve particularistic interests that do not necessarily match the collective interest. Interest groups might compromise the cohesion and autonomy of bureaucratic organizations and compel them to diverge from the policy trajectory set out by their political principals. Overall, then, there are many sources


of influence over the Brussels bureaucracy that tend to limit the autonomy granted to it by the broader institutional structure of the EU. Analyses of this structure alone cannot fully explain the behavior of the Commission unless one is able to penetrate the organization.

The need to go beyond the institutional architecture of the EU to better understand bureaucratic behavior requires a focus on the people working within the Commission and an appreciation of the impact the political context is having on how they think and operate. An analysis of their own views can facilitate a better understanding of how their organization behaves in the changing political environment. It is impossible, of course, to analyze the views of nearly 25,000 Commission officials; therefore, we have chosen to examine those who sit at the top of the organization. As the next section shows, we have achieved this by undertaking nearly 200 semistructured interviews with the power elite of the European bureaucracy.

The attitudes of European bureaucrats and their institutional capacity to shape policy outcomes do not exist, of course, in a political vacuum. Bureaucratic behavior takes place in a political context that needs to be assessed alongside the institutional and attitudinal factors that might get to affect the way an organiza-tion operates. By political context, we mean the various compo-nents of the political environment that might affect bureaucratic behavior at a given point in time – the constellation of forces and actors in the political universe. This context can have a net effect on what bureaucracies do – one beyond what is institutionally permissible and beyond the attitudinal or cultural predisposition of bureaucrats – by determining the range of what is feasible. A bureaucracy, for example, that is under persistent and visible political pressure might behave differently than one that is not, even if the two have the same institutional mandate and if their employees share similar views, beliefs, and culture. In certain political environments, bureaucrats might have more autonomy from their political masters than in other environments where they find themselves under public spotlights because of major scandals or fiscal pressures.


The next section of the chapter examines the methodology of our survey. The subsequent section discusses the political context in which our top officials operated at the time of our research. The chapter ends with an analysis of the basic biographical data of our interviewees highlighting the diversity one finds in the top echelons of the organization.

Interviewing Top Officials

To assess the role of the Commission in the galaxy of EU institu-tions, we largely rely on a survey we conducted in 2005–2006 of nearly 200 European bureaucrats. Owing to their senior posi-tions, most of our respondents have decades of work experience in the Commission, some dating back to the early days of the European integration project. References to the “early days of the Commission” or to the period “when the Commission was smaller” were common during our interviews in Brussels. Such long tenure in the organization gives our respondents unique perspectives on how the Commission has evolved over time. The high-ranking positions of our interviewees presuppose an intimate knowledge of the internal workings of the organiza-tion and the European policy-making process. Our elite group is responsible for managing the 25,000 permanent officials of the European bureaucracy, for interacting with other EU bodies and stakeholders, and for formulating and implementing poli-cies. They have a rare understanding of the Commission and are fully aware of the power games played out among the various EU institutions. Having direct contact with the political masters of the European bureaucracy, our interviewees have clear views on the classical question their national counterparts are asked by researchers like us: whether the Commission is a usurper of political power or a docile executor of political wills.

Elite groups possess scarce and precious knowledge, and our aim, as is the case with all elite studies, was to extract as much of that information as was relevant to our purposes dur-ing our interaction with them. At the same time, we wanted to be able to codify most of this information in a way that would


help give us a broader picture about the views of high level European bureaucrats. We, hence, developed a questionnaire that combined both open-ended and precoded questions. The semistructured interview generally facilitates the gathering of precious information because it establishes a rapport, or cer-tain complicity, between interviewer and interviewee. It allows the interviewee to expound freely and at some length on par-ticular questions. It facilitates discussion of complex issues in some depth and provides the opportunity for the elaboration or clarification of ambiguous responses. At the same time, our carefully planned questionnaire included a series of close-ended questions that called for shorter and more categorical responses that facilitated the quantification of the findings. The combina-tion of the conversational mode of the semistructured interview and open-ended questions, together with the close-ended ques-tions, allowed us to gain a better understanding of what top bureaucrats think, how they view their jobs, how they conduct their interactions with EU stakeholders and specific constituen-cies, and what values they hold.

Interviewing elite groups is not without challenges, of course. After all, bureaucrats have well-defined occupational interests that they are most likely to defend by revealing infor-mation selectively. Moreover, they are unlikely to be too crit-ical of their organization for fear of the consequences, should their remarks become known. In previous years, a number of Commission whistle-blowers had found themselves in trouble for publicly criticizing the organization. By penalizing internal critics, the Commission sent a strong signal to potential future critics. On the whole, we found that the officials at the apex of the Commission hierarchy were no different from other elite groups. They do not possess a shortage of self-confidence and so were generally willing to provide considerable information. It is not just a matter of self-confidence but also the knowledge that the interviewer has asked the same questions of their colleagues. Hence, a respect for the interviewer’s knowledge or for the infor-mation that he or she might possess becomes a strong incentive to be frank and forthcoming. Other factors also come into play


when interviewing senior officials. The seniority of many of our respondents meant that many of them were too close to retire-ment to fear retribution for their opinions or values. Also, their high ranks meant that they were less likely to find themselves in trouble than bureaucrats in lower ranks and, hence, more likely to speak their mind. Finally, the fact that our respondents were very critical and rather frank about various aspects of the orga-nization tends to indicate that there was a certain pride in being able to freely express their views.

That being said, the most challenging task was obtaining the interviews. These officials, like all elites, are inundated with requests for interviews. They are obliged to respond on a daily basis to their multiple constituencies, whether their hierarchical superiors, their subordinates, the organized interests they over-see, a less docile European Parliament, or the press. Faced with these demands, it is understandable that a request to be inter-viewed for an academic study has little claim on their priorities. There is no immediate benefit as the results are generally not available for quite some time and will almost certainly not make headline news or gain any publicity by the media. Nevertheless, there is almost always a way to enlist the participation of an elite group. We started by requesting of all directors-general, deputy-directors general, and directors of the Commission as well as heads of unit a one-hour interview, briefly describing the general aim of the study and guaranteeing anonymity to our interviewees.

Almost immediately, a significant number of top European bureaucrats responded positively to our request. A combina-tion of factors account for this outcome. In the first place, the Commission is what might be described as a “little village” where there are few secrets. Once we had interviewed several directors-general, word got around very quickly. It became evident that not participating in the study would constitute a missed opportunity to make one’s views known in a context, which included guaranteed anonymity. We also had the support of key people in the Commission who laid the groundwork for our interviews.


Ultimately, we were able to conduct interviews with 19 out of 28 directors-general, 12 out of the 21 deputy-directors gen-eral, and 102 out of the 195 directors (Table 3.1). To this sig-nificant pool of 133 senior European administrators, we added a sample of 55 heads of unit to determine whether the views of top bureaucrats vary across the hierarchy of the Commission. The response rate from the heads of unit was much lower than that of their superiors, partly no doubt because we were less per-sistent, but also because they are generally less experienced in handling prying outsiders.

The Political Context

All elite studies take place within a political context, whether it is during a time of an economic boom or bust, a political scandal, or a major crisis within the particular institution. Such an event may color the reaction of the participants in a study. These issues cannot be dismissed out of hand for the obvious reason that they will be affecting policies as well as the current thinking of those in charge.

Our interviews with top European bureaucrats took place in Brussels in a turbulent political context. During our frequent vis-its to the Belgian capital, the busy lobbies and corridors of the Berlaymont and surrounding buildings where most of the inter-views took place gave the impression of business as usual in the

TABLE 3.1. Interviewee Sample

Position Number of Interviewees

Total Number in This Position

Response Rate (%)

Directors-general 19 28 68Deputy-directors general 12 21 57Directors 102 195 52Heads of unit 55 227 24

Note: At the time of the interviews, the number of heads of unit totaled 868. We only contacted those who had their fax numbers online, reducing the number to 227. We were unable to accurately record the position of 6 respondents and excluded them from the table.


European bureaucracy. Under the façade of normalcy, however, the European project found itself at a critical juncture, struggling to sustain the momentum generated by the eastward enlargement and to recover the waning legitimacy of European institutions.

In 2005, the European Union had recently completed the biggest enlargement ever, granting accession to eight former Communist east European countries, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The May 2004 enlargement was hailed by almost every-one as the true reunification of the European continent and as the most decisive step toward the consolidation of democracy and the advancement of prosperity in Eastern Europe. This opened the door for other East European countries to join the Union and set the stage for the initiation of Turkish accession talks. The commencement of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 was one of the landmark events during the course of our field research in Brussels. The recommendation of the Commission in October 2004 for initiating accession talks and the definition of the negotiating mandate by the Council in December were received with considerable enthusiasm by some of our interviewees but exacerbated the concerns of others about the future direction of the European project.

Fears of Turkish accession were reinforced by the gloomy eco-nomic picture that dominated newspaper headlines for much of that period. In France and Germany, unemployment exceeded 10 percent for the first time in decades, highlighting the inability of EU members to stimulate growth and to generate employ-ment. Halfway through its decade-long implementation period, the Lisbon Strategy, set forth in 2000 to make the EU the world’s most competitive, knowledge-based economy, was in trouble. Member states had failed to put forth the necessary reforms to enhance the competitiveness of their economies and to increase their capacity to respond to the challenges posed by globaliza-tion. In 2005, European and national policy makers came to realize the failed implementation of the Lisbon Strategy and, amidst the general economic gloom created by the generally low growth in some of the biggest European economies, they sought to simplify and relaunch it.


In March 2005, the Lisbon Strategy was not the only European policy troubling political leaders and threatening the legitimacy of the European project. Economic stagnation had helped create significant shortfalls in the French and German budgets, pushing their fiscal deficits beyond the levels accepted by the Growth and Stability Pact. The Pact was put in place in 1997, at German insis-tence, to keep the finances of other member states in order after their entry into the Eurozone. By 2005, Germany and France were two of the biggest offenders of the Pact, running deficits above the 3 percent ceiling after which the EU could launch a corrective procedure and even fine a country. In a summit held in Brussels around the same time we started our interviews, the two coun-tries used their political weight to facilitate changes in the Pact. The changed Pact introduced more flexibility in the treatment of delinquent countries, giving many observers the impression that EU rules were tweaked to match the economic conditions of its two most powerful members, thereby undermining the rationale that led to its initial adoption in 1997.

If the failure of the Lisbon Strategy to deliver jobs and of the Growth and Stability Pact to impose budgetary stringency were not enough to generate concerns about the future of the European integration project, the ratification of the European Constitution gave enough reasons for pessimism. The Constitution was the result of a long period of discussion for the institutional reform of the European Union dating back to the late 1990s when EU members realized the need to change the institutional structure of the EU in light of upcoming eastward enlargement (e.g. Dinan 2005). The Constitutional Treaty was the main suggestion of the European Convention, which had convened for seventeen months under the leadership of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, delivering its proposals in July 2003. The proposals became the basis of nego-tiation at an intergovernmental conference that convened until June 2004, and the heads of member states signed the resulting treaty in October 2004. In part because the Constitution came about through a more inclusive and more transparent process of public deliberation than through the usual, solely intergov-ernmental route, it presented the EU with an opportunity not


only to reform its institutional structure but also to enhance its legitimacy. The agreement on the Constitutional Treaty created hopes for a push toward deeper integration at a time when it was most needed.

Once again, the assessment of European politicians and bureaucrats proved far too optimistic. Unlike Spaniards, who voted in favor of the Constitution, the French and the Dutch delivered a devastating blow to the new treaty in May and June 2005, respectively. The campaigns that preceded the “no” votes exposed a deep rift between Eastern European countries and the “older” European Union members, as well as between elites and citizens, on issues ranging from Turkish accession to the myth-ical “Polish plumbers” who would be coming over to steal jobs and obtain welfare payments that they were scarcely entitled to. Contrary to the arguments of those who favored ratification of the new treaty through referenda, the campaigns served as opportunities for the political mobilization of Euroskepticism or Europhobia instead of providing a forum for a genuine debate on the various institutional reforms embodied in the Constitution. So shocking was the rejection of the Constitution by the pub-lics of two founding members that European leaders decreed a 2-year period of reflection on the outcome. Capturing the trauma of Europhiles at the ratification outcome, Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, who held the EU’s presidency in the first half of 2005, declared that the European project was in “deep crisis.”

In addition to the handling of the constitutional debacle, the European leaders who met in June 2005 for their regular summit also had to deal with an unraveling row over the new EU budget for 2007–2013. The French president, Jacques Chirac, asked the British to make a “gesture of solidarity towards Europe” by giv-ing up most of their rebate to help finance budgetary transfers to Eastern Europe.1 In return, the British asked for a restructuring of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which accounted for almost half of the EU budget and which mostly rewarded French farmers. Although the subsequent row over the British rebate

1 “The European Union Budget: About a Rebate,” The Economist, June 16, 2005.


and the CAP is not unusual in EU politics, its timing reinforced the impression that the European project seemed to be stalling.

The Commission in the Eye of the Storm

On account of these series of policy setbacks, the new College of Commissioners, put together in late 2004 by the former Portuguese prime minister José Manuel Barroso, found itself entangled in the web of unusually tense EU politics. The cri-sis of the European integration project exacerbated the legiti-macy challenges facing European institutions at the expense of the European bureaucracy, which was already struggling to sustain its autonomy in an increasingly more adverse political environment. The political row over the appointment of individ-ual Commissioners was a sign of the interinstitutional struggle for legitimacy and of the difficult times that lay ahead for the Commission. Flexing its growing political muscle, the European Parliament challenged the authority of the incoming president by rejecting Rocco Buttiglione, the Italian politician nominated as justice and security Commissioner. For the first time in the European Parliament’s history, the civil liberties committee voted against Buttiglione’s nomination, compelling Barroso to replace him. The Parliament also succeeded in making Neelie Kroes, the Dutch former business executive nominated as the competition Commissioner, to resign from previous corporate engagements to avoid any potential conflict of interest (Spence 2006: 36–37; Westlake 2006: 267–268). The assertiveness of the European Parliament constituted yet another indication of the growing frustration of European politicians with the Brussels bureau-cracy. As one of the most important institutional organs of the EU sought to strengthen its electoral legitimacy at the expense of another, the Parliament’s response to the appointment of the Barroso College highlighted the deepening interinstitutional rift.

The difficulties encountered in the nomination process sig-naled the adversity of the political environment the Commission faced and constituted a prelude to the backlash created by the directive for the liberalization of the services sector. Originally


proposed by Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, the direc-tive was incorporated into Barroso’s program for “growth and jobs,” his agenda for reinvigorating the ailing European econ-omy. The directive sought to open competition in the service sec-tor by allowing service providers to trade across borders if they adhered to the rules and regulations of their country of origin. A study suggested that the potential economic gains from a liberal-ized service sector would be the generation of 600,000 new jobs and the increase in output by approximately €37 billion.2 The country of origin principle included in the proposed directive, however, meant that Eastern European service providers could employ people from their countries of origin and sell cheaper ser-vices in Western Europe, at the expense of their West European competitors. Critics of the proposal pointed out that the direc-tive could eventually lead to social dumping: Competition from Eastern Europe would undercut income and welfare levels in Western Europe. This is what gave rise to the symbol of the Polish plumber, a figure Polish politicians assured was not going anywhere because he was so desperately needed in Poland.

At a time of high unemployment, when West Europeans were losing jobs as a result of the relocation of firms to Eastern Europe and to Asia, the directive was bound to create a backlash against the European Commission. Even though the proposal had the unanimous support of the Prodi Commission, his successor con-fronted insurmountable obstacles in the subsequent discussion of the proposal in the European Parliament. It did not help that the discussion of the directive coincided with the tarnished record of the Lisbon Strategy in delivering growth and employment. More importantly, the directive became a major issue in the campaigns for the European Constitution in a number of member states. The forces campaigning against the Constitutional Treaty used the Bolkestein proposals as evidence of Anglo-Saxon capitalism

2 “Economic Assessment of the Barriers to the Internal Market for Services,” Copenhagen, Copenhagen Economics. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/docs/services-dir/studies/2005–01-cph-study_en.pdf (accessed January 21, 2011).


creeping into Europe and threatening to undermine the European social model by leading to a downward spiral in standards of liv-ing. The political profile of Bolkestein, who was a leading mem-ber of the Dutch liberal party, proved to be a visible target for trade unionists and leftist politicians who, by 2006, managed to bring about important modifications to the final text, moderat-ing its planned impact.

In the midst of the crisis created by the rejection of the European Constitution, the backlash against the services liberal-ization directive exacerbated the existing legitimacy problems confronted by the European Commission. European politicians from both the Left and the Right put the Commission on the spot by accusing it of promoting a neoliberal agenda against their will. The head of the European Socialists, for example, former Danish prime minister Poul Rasmussen, accused Barroso of pro-moting neo-conservatism. French President Chirac criticized the European bureaucracy for its lack of consideration for French workers when the American firm Hewlett Packard announced a plan to lay off a number of its employees in France. Convinced about the liberal image projected by the Commission, Chirac discouraged Barroso from campaigning for the Constitution in France, for fear that his presence would facilitate the mobiliza-tion of “no” voters.

To defend itself from what it perceived as populist attacks against the European integration project and to respond to the legitimacy challenges it confronted, the Commission had already embarked on a major reform effort that sought to improve its internal workings. This effort was undertaken by the British vice president of the Commission Neil Kinnock in 2000, after the damaging allegations for fraud, mismanagement and nepotism that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999. Our field trips to Brussels coincided with the completion of the nearly 100 tasks associated with the Kinnock reforms. Although the Commission initially hailed the completion of the tasks as a major accomplishment, other assessments were much more critical (e.g. Levy 2006; Bauer 2008b; Ellinas and Suleiman 2008). Internal critics and whistle-blowers were more scathing


in their critique, noting that despite the reform efforts, the orga-nization remained vulnerable to fraud. The damning critiques of Commission insiders, which had received wide coverage by some European media, reinforced stereotypes of inefficiency and corruption that many Europeans use to describe the Brussels bureaucracy. Five years after the launch of the ambitious reform efforts, the Commission still seemed unable to address the exter-nal legitimacy challenges it faced.

The combination of factors outlined in this chapter created a very challenging political environment for the European bureau-cracy. Frustrated with what they perceived as a runaway bureau-cracy, the political masters of the Commission seemed determined to place it under control. The combination of policy setbacks, the constant demonization of the organization by European politi-cians, and its perceived failure to effectively address concerns over mismanagement and corruption reduced the political capi-tal of the Commission at a time when it was most needed to take the EU out of the “deep crisis” created by the rejection of the Constitution. The political environment the Commission faced at the time of our interviews provided a fertile ground to exam-ine how public bureaucracies respond to political adversity.

Diversity at the Top

Having described the political context within which our field research took place, it is now time to return to the main actors in our story. This section sketches the biographical profile of our interviewees, presenting data on their national origin, work expe-rience, educational background, and their career trajectories.

The total sample includes 194 officials from all directorates and from most of the Commission’s general and internal ser-vices (Appendix 1). The geographical distribution of the sample is also balanced and roughly corresponds with the national com-position of the top ranks of the European bureaucracy docu-mented elsewhere (e.g. Spence and Stevens 2006). More than half of the officials come from the five most populous member states: Britain (13.4 percent), France (12.9 percent), Spain (10.8


percent), Germany (9.8 percent), and Italy (9.8 percent). The Belgians make up 9.3 percent of the sample; the Dutch, 6.2 per-cent; and the Greeks, another 6.2 percent, while only 2.6 percent come from the 10 new members states (Table 3.2).

We interviewed people who were best positioned to provide insights about the workings of the European bureaucracy. As previously noted, many of our interviewees had worked at the Commission for long enough to be nostalgic for the “early days”

TABLE 3.2. National Origin of Interviewees

Country No. %

Austria 4 2.1Belgium 18 9.3Cyprus 0 0.0Czech Rep. 2 1.0Denmark 6 3.1Estonia 1 0.5Finland 4 2.1France 25 12.9Germany 19 9.8Greece 12 6.2Hungary 1 0.5Ireland 5 2.6Italy 19 9.8Latvia 0 0.0Lithuania 0 0.0Luxembourg 2 1.0Malta 0 0.0Netherlands 12 6.2Poland 0 0.0Portugal 5 2.6Romania 0 0.0Slovakia 1 0.5Slovenia 0 0.0Spain 21 10.8Sweden 8 4.1UK 26 13.4Non-EU/missing 3 1.5

Total 194 100


of the organization. Nearly a sixth of our respondents (17 percent) had worked in the organization for more than 30 years and joined the Commission before 1976 – a few had been in the organization since the early 1960s. Another 28.2 percent were recruited the subsequent decade – between 1976 and 1985 – and had between 20 and 30 years of experience to share with us. Throughout sev-eral of our interviews in Brussels there was special mention of the Delors Commission and the excitement, energy, dynamism, enthusiasm, and devotion it had generated. An additional 40.1 percent of the top officials we interviewed were recruited during the Delors era in the period between 1986 and 1995. Only 14.7 percent of our respondents were more recent recruits and had been on the job for less than a decade (Table 3.3).

Educational ProfileIn modern states administrative elites tend to be well-educated individuals with “Oxbridge” degrees in Britain, Grandes Ecoles training in France, and law degrees in Germany (e.g. Suleiman and Mendras 1995; Page and Wright 1999). Like their coun-terparts in national bureaucracies, top European officials are a highly educated group, with training in the social and natural sciences as well as law. Those with social science degrees seem to be best fit to rise to the top echelons of the organization, especially economists. As Table 3.4 shows, those with training in the social sciences make up the largest number of people in the top echelons of the organization: 73, or 40.8 percent, of our interviewees majored in the social sciences. Legal training also

TABLE 3.3. Length of Employment

Years Number %

0–10 26 14.711–20 71 40.121–30 50 28.2>31 30 17.0

Total 177 100


provides the skills necessary for advancement to the top of the Commission hierarchy, with 50, or 27.9 percent, of our respon-dents stating that they had law degrees. Similarly, another 43, or 24 percent, had a natural sciences background. Interestingly, the top ranks of the European bureaucracy do not have many historians, linguists, or classicists, and almost no artists. Only 11 people, or 6.2 percent, had such a background (Table 3.4).

Top European bureaucrats are also a cosmopolitan group, having received much of their education outside their home countries before joining the European Commission. Our sur-vey shows that 73, or 41 percent, of our respondents have an international degree. In all the cases we recorded, officials with international degrees spent at least a year in another European country or in the United States to get a master’s or a doctoral degree.

Prior Experience and ExpertiseOfficials who advance to the top ranks of the Commission have considerable prior work experience in diverse settings. More than three-fourths of our respondents, 149 out of 194, had worked in the public and private sectors in non- and for-profit organizations before joining the Commission. About a third of those with prior work experience had worked in the public administration of their home countries. The CVs of our intervie-wees are suggestive of the diversity one finds in the top echelons of the bureaucracy: A Dutch official had spent twenty years in

TABLE 3.4. Education of Top European Bureaucrats

Number %

Natural sciences 43 24.0Humanities 10 5.6Arts 1 0.6Social sciences 73 40.8Law 50 27.9Other 2 1.1

Total 179 100


the foreign ministry; a Spanish official had been a mayor; and a Slovak official had been an advisor to the Prime Minister. Many officials had served in the finance and trade ministries of their home countries, and others held senior positions in national cen-tral banks. Some of the individuals had held positions in inter-national bureaucracies, like those of the World Bank, the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund. Overall, 50, or 33.6 percent, of those with prior working experience had been in the public sector. Another 20, or 13.4 percent, of this group of 149 officials had experience in both the public and the private sectors. Interestingly, most top officials with prior work experi-ence had been solely employed in the private sector before join-ing the Commission. Those officials made up 79, or 53 percent, of the total number of officials who pursued other careers before their recruitment to the Commission.

Even though most of our interviewees had worked in the pri-vate sector, their experiences are not typical of private sector employees. Although a number of them had worked as managers or consultants in major corporations, a significant number of top European officials held positions in nonprofit organizations such as universities, civil society groups, and research institutions. The breakdown of top officials by type of experience shows that a clear majority of them had worked entirely in nonprofit orga-nizations. In total, 85, or 57 percent, of all officials with prior work experience had followed such a professional trajectory. By contrast, those with prior experience in for-profit organizations total 40, or 26.8 percent. Another 24, or 16.1 percent, of top European bureaucrats had both types of experience (Table 3.5). Interestingly, most of them made a transition from for-profit to nonprofit institutions.

Conclusion

Top European officials are a diverse group. They come from dif-ferent countries, with different political institutions, traditions, and cultures. They have been exposed to different educational systems and have followed distinct career trajectories. Their


diverse experiences set them apart from their counterparts in some of the best-known national administrations and complicate efforts to treat the Commission as a homogeneous organization with a recognizable set of preferences. The degree of diversity at the top echelons of the European administration makes it sim-ilar to other international secretariats, like the United Nations, which employ bureaucrats with dissimilar national, educational, and professional backgrounds.

The question, then, is whether the diversity of the organiza-tion limits its coherence and, hence, its capacity for autonomous behavior. We return to this question in subsequent chapters. First, we seek a prior question of some importance: What do senior European administrators make of their role in the institutional nexus of the EU? Do they see themselves as autonomous policy innovators or as tame executors of political wills?

TABLE 3.5. Previous Career Path of Top Officials

N %

Career in the Public and Private SectorsPublic sector experience only 50 33.6Public and private sector experience 20 13.4Private sector experience only 79 53.0

Total 149 100

Career in Non- and For-Profit OrganizationsFor-profit experience only 40 26.8Non- and for-profit experience 24 16.1Nonprofit experience only 85 57.0

Total 149 100

56

4

Autonomy at the Top of the European Bureaucracy

The ideal bureaucracy described by Max Weber is an apolitical organization separated from the political sphere. In line with this ideal type, early academic observers of bureaucracy like Woodrow Wilson maintained that “administrative questions are not political questions” (1941: 494). Subsequent work on bureaucracy has used this “ideal type” bureaucracy as a point of departure for discussing the range of interactions between bureaucrats and politicians. According to one of the best-known analyses of this relationship, classical bureaucrats have a disdain for the “noisy, incompetent, partisan practices of poli-ticians” believing that “public issues can be resolved in terms of some objective standard of justice, or of legality, or of technical practicality” (Putnam 1973: 259). Put simply, Weberian offi-cials merely administer the policies politicians make and simply implement their decisions (Aberbach et al. 1981: 4). This model is so dominant in the conception of modern bureaucracy that it has become the normative standard against which bureaucratic behavior is assessed. Much of the criticism leveled at the demo-cratic shortcomings of modern administrations is largely based on this very conception of bureaucracy as a docile executor of political wills (Peters 1987: 256).

Weber himself recognized of course that classical bureaucrats are a rare species unlikely to be found outside the ideal type he

Autonomy at the Top of the European Bureaucracy 57

masterfully described. In his essay on bureaucracy, he notes “the pure interest of the bureaucracy in power” and its “pure power instinct” (1946: 233). Like Weber, much of the subsequent work on bureaucracy has parted from the dated notion of the classical bureaucrat. Economic theory had much to do with this depar-ture, nurturing the intellectual ground for viewing bureaucracy as an organization that seeks to maximize its own utility rather than that of its masters. Using basic economic assumptions of rationality, bureaucrats have been conceived as utility maximiz-ers, looking after their own interests rather than those of the public they are supposed to serve (e.g. Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971). The acceptance of rational egoism as the basic premise for understanding political behavior turns bureaucrats from submissive executors of political orders to servants of their own interests. Their self-serving behavior turns public bureaucracies into usurpers of power that are constantly seeking to maximize their resources (e.g. Peters 1981: 58–60).

To acquire and to sustain their power, bureaucrats rely on their knowledge and expertise, which are superior to those of their political masters. As Weber put it, “Under normal condi-tions, the power position of a fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The ‘political master’ finds himself in the position of the ‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert,’ and faces the trained official who stands within the management of administration” (1946: 232). The superior knowledge of bureau-crats, according to Weber, sets the basis for the runaway behav-ior public bureaucracies are prone to display. For even powerful monarchs, as Weber noted, are

powerless opposite the superior knowledge of the bureaucratic expert – in a certain sense more powerless than any other political head. All the scornful decrees of Frederick the Great concerning the “abolition of serfdom” were derailed, as it were, in the course of their realization because the official mechanism simply ignored them as the occasional ideas of a dilettante. (1946: 234)

The functional expertise of modern bureaucrats has become an even bigger source of bureaucratic power in modern times because of the growing complexity and technicality of the tasks


bureaucracies are asked to perform. Whether dealing with a financial crisis or a new pandemic, the level of expertise required to deal with contemporary issues is such that it further blurs the line between political and administrative authority. As national studies of German, French, and Norwegian bureaucrats have well documented, the very nature of the issues that contem-porary bureaucracies are asked to handle turns even the few remaining Weberian administrators into political bureaucrats (e.g. Luhmann and Mayntz 1973; Suleiman 1974; Mayntz 1984; Christensen 1991).

Based on this more pragmatic conception of the bureaucratic profession, European officials can be expected to be powerful political bureaucrats seeking to further the interests of their orga-nization and willing to disregard the preferences of their polit-ical masters, especially if these preferences conflict with those of their organization. Deriving power from some of the same sources Weber described (e.g. information, expertise, knowledge, etc.) but also from the particularities of the political edifice they are supposed to serve, Brussels bureaucrats can be expected to be eager to use it to further the interests of their organization and to safeguard their autonomy. This, at least, is what standard bureaucratic theory would suggest. Is this how senior bureau-crats really think? What do they make of their relationship with their political overseers? How much autonomy do they think they have from the political sphere? Should we expect their daily routines to conform to this conventional model of the political bureaucrat?

Relying on our survey of nearly 200 senior officials, this chapter documents the views of top Brussels administrators on bureaucratic autonomy. Using attitudinal and experiential data, the chapter analyzes how senior European administrators describe their jobs, their policy input, and their relations with other EU institutions and external actors. The first section of the chapter examines the office routine of Brussels bureaucrats to test whether it matches that of political bureaucrats. The second section looks at bureaucratic autonomy and reports the sources of information – internal and external – bureaucrats identify as


important for their job. The subsequent sections focus on the relations of senior administrators with their political overseers: the College, the Council, and the Parliament. The last section explores a different aspect of bureaucratic autonomy by investi-gating the relation between bureaucrats and interest groups.

Political Management at the Helm of the Commission

European bureaucrats have very demanding work schedules. Their daily routines involve hundreds of decisions about such varied tasks as solving conflicts between feuding employees and formulating directives that affect the lives of half a billion Europeans. One of our first tasks, then, was to understand the office lives of these busy individuals and to get a sense of the tasks they perform. To get a glimpse of their routines, we asked them to rank the tasks they considered most important for their job and to then indicate those on which they spend most of their time. We first showed them a list of fourteen different tasks and told them to rank those they deemed most important for their job. Using the same list, we then requested they isolate those tasks they spend most of their time on.

At first glance, life in the bureau for our senior officials is not that different from that in any other managerial office, public or private. Even though European bureaucrats are often described (e.g. Bauer 2008b) and sometimes describe themselves (e.g. Shore 2000) as policy entrepreneurs, only a few of their daily activi-ties seem to match this prestigious profile. For example, 83 offi-cials included the ratification or control of decisions in their top picks of what they deem important to do, and 82 respondents deemed the explanation of decisions as one of the most impor-tant tasks. These tasks made up 15 percent and 14.9 percent of all top responses, respectively. In an organization that is almost by definition hierarchical, it should not be surprising that 55 of our respondents included giving orders in their list of important tasks, about 10 percent of the total number of picks. As in almost any organization – from academic departments to Fortune 500 conglomerates – dealing with interpersonal conflicts is part of the


busy schedule of almost all managerial elites. Not surprisingly, then, the resolution of problems resulting from personal rela-tions was deemed important by 43 interviewees, or 7.8 percent, of all top picks. Studying technical details was a task chosen by another 34 bureaucrats, or 6.2 percent, of all the responses.

Upon closer examination, the daily routine of top European officials matches that of powerful political managers who strat-egize about the future of Europe. Their routine tasks might involve exploring the terrain for new policy initiatives, consider-ing broader policy directives and strengthening existing alliances to push for new ideas. Given what we know from bureaucratic elite studies about the important role of modern administra-tors in the policy-making process, it is reasonable to expect top European officials to place a premium on these more strategic tasks, those that best match the profile of political managers. Working on longer projects, then, was the task deemed by most of our respondents to be important for the job. Long-term plan-ning was included in the top three responses of 114 officials, and it constituted 20.7 percent of the 552 responses we received from our interviewees. The number of officials valuing long-term planning exceeded that for any other task. Many officials also considered their involvement in broader policy planning to be important. Establishing norms and general directives was considered important by 44 respondents, or 8 percent, of all responses.

Although European bureaucrats highly value the political nature of their job, for the most part, they do not seem to be directly involved in the detailed drafting of policies. The actual drafting of policies requires more involvement in the nitty-gritty of policy dossiers than their busy schedules can afford them. The immersion into policy technicalities for weeks or months rests with lower level officials, which is in line with what a number of scholars have suggested (e.g. Cini 1996; Nugent 2001; Peterson 2006, cited in Bauer 2008b: 692–695). This might explain why only 38 of our interviewees – mostly middle ranking officials – included the drafting of proposals in their list of the three most important activities for their job. Their


responses constituted a mere 6.9 percent of the total number of 552 responses.

Are top bureaucrats happy with the allocation of their time in the bureau? Do they get to spend their time on those tasks they mostly value? Perhaps not surprisingly, we did not find sub-stantial variation between the tasks senior civil servants consider most important and those they report spending their time on. Top European bureaucrats think they largely allocate and prioritize their time efficiently. The one notable discrepancy we identified between what bureaucrats prefer and end up doing relates to the political nature of their work. Many more officials would prefer dealing with strategic projects instead of devoting their time at the bureau to the usual managerial tasks. Whereas working on longer projects and establishing general directives made up 28.7 percent of all responses in the first question, it made up 21.2 percent in the second. The discrepancies in the other tasks our bureaucrats value and do are more limited. Some senior European executives, for example, spend more time than they would have liked to con-trol and explain decisions. Doing this task made up 29.9 percent of all responses about what officials deem important but 34.3 percent of the responses about the actual routine of our officials. The figures for studying and drafting proposals were 13.1 and 15.2 percent, respectively (Table 4.1).

Bureaucratic Autonomy and Information

Senior European officials are political managers whose daily routine at the bureau involves a combination of managerial and political tasks. How much discretion do these bureaucrats think they have to influence policy? How much political power do senior bureaucrats feel they possess? Does their own understand-ing of their role in the governance of the EU match that deduced from the analysis of EU institutions? We explore these important questions in more detail in the remainder of this chapter. Our goal is to get a sense of the degree of autonomy European bureaucrats think they enjoy from their political masters and of their capacity to influence policy. The examination of bureaucratic discretion


requires an appreciation of the way bureaucrats interact with other policy actors, both within and outside the Commission. It would be impossible, of course, to examine the views of our interviewees in all kinds of interactions taking place among such a large pool of actors. Thus, we focused on some basic interac-tions that give insight into the role European bureaucrats play in the complex network of EU institutions.

To get a sense of the perceptions European officials have of their influence in policy making, we first focused on one of the most potent weapons bureaucrats are thought to have at their disposal: information. Bureaucracies are thought to possess inside information, which grants them the capacity to defend

TABLE 4.1. Activities on Which Most Time Spent (Top three activities ranked by each respondent)

Most Important Most Time Spent

Number % Number %

Giving orders 55 10.0 41 7.9Ratifying or controlling

others’ decisions83 15.0 93 17.9

Explaining decisions already taken or to be taken

82 14.9 85 16.4

Studying technical proposals 34 6.2 41 7.9Drafting proposals 38 6.9 38 7.3Obtaining information on

the activities within the Commission

23 4.2 28 5.4

Solving conflicts and problems involving personal relations

43 7.8 41 7.9

Working on long-term plans and projects

114 20.7 83 16.0

Establishing norms and general directives

44 8.0 27 5.2

Obtaining information on activities outside the institutions of the EU

15 2.7 18 3.5

Others 21 3.8 24 4.6

Total 552 100 519 100


particular policy preferences and to discard others. Informational asymmetries turn bureaucrats into knowledgeable experts and their political overseers into the dilettantes Weber describes. The informational resources bureaucrats possess are central to their conception as “informal policy entrepreneurs” or, simply, as powerful agents or actors with a capacity to shape political outcomes (e.g. Pollack 1997a; Moravcsik 1999: 271–274).

Although the existence of informational asymmetries between political principals and bureaucratic agents constitutes a point of departure for scholarly work on bureaucratic auton-omy, rarely do analyses of bureaucratic behavior thoroughly examine the sources of this information. Yet this is critical to empirically verify if one is to accurately assess the capacity of bureaucratic agents to act in accordance with their own wishes: Where does the information a bureaucracy use come from? Does the European bureaucracy generate internally the information necessary to formulate policy? Or is the information generated externally, thereby subjecting the policy formulation process to the influence of outside actors like interest groups, national administrations, or even, political executives? These are crucial questions to be addressed if we are to get a sense of the capacity bureaucracies have for independent behavior. For, arguably, the autonomy of a bureaucratic organization depends on its ability to generate information on its own, without having to rely on sources that threaten its independence from the political sphere or from organized interests.

To examine the true ownership of bureaucratic information, our survey asked officials to identify the three most important sources of information for executing their job. We had our respondents choose from a list of internal and external sources and then aggre-gated their responses. We found that when it comes to extracting information, senior European bureaucrats cast their net as wide as possible. They rely on a combination of sources ranging from the mass media to academic advisors. Depending on the range of functions their directorates serve, some officials rely on interna-tional organizations like the IMF or the World Bank, while others hire external consultants and field officers.


First and foremost, however, top European bureaucrats rely on information coming from within the Commission. The majority of senior officials, 126 in total, stated that they rely on their own research staff for the information they need do their job. This corresponds to 32.7 percent of the 385 responses we received. Top officials also rely heavily on their colleagues in national administrations. To the extent that member states have an input in the informational chain that feeds the policy process, this comes from national bureaucracies. Of our inter-viewees, 69 identified national administrations as the source of their information. Their responses made up 17.9 percent of the total. Interest groups and nongovernmental organizations also have an important role in the policy-making process by supply-ing the European Commission with relevant information. Of our respondents, 83 consider groups like trade unions, business federations, and environmental organizations among the top sources of information for formulating policy. This amounts to 21.6 percent of the total number of responses. Universities, think tanks, and research institutes also supply top policy makers with information, sometimes on commission. Of our interviewees, 33 (8.6% of all responses) told us that they get their information from academic or scholarly organizations, some by participat-ing in academic conferences and attending scholarly seminars. Interestingly, other international organizations are not as impor-tant sources of information, as only 15 interviewees included them in their list. Not surprisingly, the European Parliament has a limited role when it comes to producing information senior bureaucrats can use, and only 6 individuals identified it as a main source of informational input. Like most European legislative bodies, the Parliament has a limited capacity to influence the policy process through the supply of information. Apart from these sources, some respondents mentioned other directorates, Eurostat, and individual corporations as additional sources of information (Table 4.2).

The sources European bureaucrats use to extract the informa-tion necessary for their jobs reinforce the degree of autonomy they enjoy from other actors. The informational chain at the top


echelons of the Commission, however, is probably not atypical of most public bureaucracies. To better understand the degree of influence bureaucrats have over policy, we examined their rela-tions with their political masters.

Brussels Bureaucrats and Politicians

One of the most important sets of interactions between top European bureaucrats and political executives is that of senior administrators and Commissioners. What do top bureau-crats make of their relationship with their immediate political superiors? What are the main characteristics of this relationship, and how do they differ from the relationship civil servants in national administrations have with government ministers? Our respondents are well qualified to describe this relationship because they meet with Commissioners on a regular basis – most of them several times a month, and some more than once a week.

As many of our respondents were quick to point out, their relationship with Commissioners is indeed comparable to that between senior bureaucrats and government ministers. This is especially the case at the very beginning of their political tenure in the commission when they need “the machinery” – a term a

TABLE 4.2. Main Sources of Information Top Officials Consider Necessary to Execute Their Job or to Formulate Policy (top three responses)

Number %

Your own research staff 126 32.7The administrations of member states 69 17.9Interest groups 51 13.2European Parliament 6 1.6NGOs 32 8.3Universities, research institutes, etc. 33 8.6International organizations, such as the OECD, WTO, UN, etc.

15 3.9

Other 53 13.8

Total 385 100


number of interviewees used to describe the Services – to carry them through. Nearly all of our interviewees told us that ini-tially Commissioners generally lack a clear understanding of the practices of their particular directorate general and rely on them to realize their goals (Table 4.3). Commissioners are often not experts in the policy portfolios to which they are assigned and lack the technical training necessary to immediately take charge. Newcomers to the College might also lack sufficient knowledge of how EU institutions work, and top officials there under-take the task of explaining the institutional set up of the EU, and more importantly, of the Commission. As a director in DG Regional Policy describes, “when Commissioners arrive, we have a ‘pedagogical’ role to play.”1 A director-general suggests that “most Commissioners do not know how the organization works. Therefore, there is a period of ‘mentoring.’ The Commission services guide the Commissioners. They are not left alone.”2 European bureaucrats think that the process of “indoctrinating” new Commissioners is identical to that in national administra-tions. One of the most senior officials in DG Agriculture consid-ers the “coaching” of officials to be part of the job description of top European bureaucrats. “That’s our job description. We are here to coach the Commissioners where necessary, as civil

TABLE 4.3. Initial Relationship Between Senior Officials and Commissionersa

Number %

Yes 134 89No 17 11

Total 151 100a State whether the following description is generally valid:

When Commissioners assume their position, they some-times lack a clear understanding of the practices of their particular directorate general. As a result, it is officials like you who make it possible for them to realize their goals.

1 Interview #95.2 Interview #92.


servants do in national administrations.”3 “What we do is the same in any government including that of the United States.”4

This early learning period seems to be critical for the subse-quent relations between Commissioners and the Services. One of the most important issues during the introductory phase is that of trust. Upon their appointment, Commissioners join the directorates without knowing how much they can rely on senior officials. This is an issue with any bureaucracy, but it is a bit more complicated in Brussels because of the transnational nature of the European bureaucracy. As a director of the secretariat gen-eral explained,

When Commissioners arrive they do not know if they can trust the Services. It is not easy at the beginning. After a certain period, we reach an equilibrium and the relationship is normalized. This does not mean that things are always easy. Although the Commission administration and Services are loyal to the Commissioner, they sometimes think they know better. Moreover, nationality differences constitute a source of distrust.5

Apart from the issue of trust, top officials point out that this initial period serves as an opportunity for both politicians and bureaucrats to explore the changing policy terrain. Senior bureaucrats get a sense of the preferences of political executives, but they also get to explain to them what they consider feasi-ble. One of our respondents working in DG Humanitarian Aid describes the arrival of Commissioners in Brussels as “a reality check for us. It is a fundamental component of any democratic, any representative system. Just like government ministers, new Commissioners come in with their own version of reality, which keeps us in touch with citizens.”6 Although important, the real-ity check for senior bureaucrats does not necessarily translate into fundamental changes of policy priorities. Officials are quick to point out that one of most important tasks they per-form upon the arrival of newly appointed Commissioners is

3 Interview #64.4 Interview #70.5 Interview #113.6 Interview #90.


to explain to them the range of possibilities. As put by a top official in DG Research, “a Commissioner comes in with fresh ideas and is able to ascertain which of these are possible through the advice of officials.”7 A director-general describes this pro-cess nicely: “Commissioners are politicians and they come in with political objectives. We try to identify what their goals are and we adapt to that. We try to establish a very open relation-ship with Commissioners and to inform them what is possible and what is not possible. There is certainly a learning period in the process.”8 This process often exposes the gap between the expectations with which Commissioners come into their new job and the reality that top officials describe. “Officials lay out the implications and consequences of Commissioners’ schemes. Commissioners are often a bit frustrated because their ideas are shot down. The ideal is to be open and to explain why this is possible but that is not.”9

Cabinets comprising the personal staff of the Commissioner are particularly useful during this early period in helping the bureaucracy understand what the incoming Commissioner wants and in explaining to the new Commissioner what is feasible. Many of our officials mentioned the important role Cabinets play during this transitional phase, providing continuity between the outgoing and incoming political heads. Cabinets help to build trust between the political executives and the senior bureaucrats and to reduce the initial tension between them, when the ideas of Commissioners get shot down by the bureaucracy. A typical description of the role of Cabinets was the one given to us by a director in DG Employment: “The Cabinets are very impor-tant. They are very close to the Commissioners and they are their principal instructors.”10 Because Cabinet members can be chosen by the Commissioners themselves and often come from their home countries, they help reduce the uncertainty that

7 Interview #154.8 Interview #194.9 Interview #54.

10 Interview #68.


characterizes early dealings with the bureaucracy. In some cases, they also bring to the table technical knowledge and expertise, as they are staffed by seasoned commission bureaucrats. As was pointed out to us, “Cabinets are a bridge between the Services and the political level of the Commission. The cabinet explains to Services what the Commissioner wants and then informs the Commissioner about what Services considers feasible.”11 During this initial interaction, “there is a dialogue between Directors, the Director-General, the Cabinet and the Commissioner.”12 The hearing of each Commissioner in the European Parliament is probably the most critical test of the familiarity of the new appointee with the job at hand and of the working relationship these different parties seek to establish. Senior officials collabo-rate with Cabinet members to help prepare the Commissioner for the grilling of MEPs. Some of them consider the hearing in the Parliament to be a useful exercise that helps bring the Commissioner, the Cabinet and the bureaucracy closer together, as they face a common challenge by the Parliament.

The learning period for new Commissioners takes from a few weeks to several months, with most of our respondents putting it at about a year. Once incoming Commissioners familiarize themselves with the workings of the organization and with the functions of their DGs, their relationship with top bureaucrats changes. Within a year, Commissioners “start making their views known.”13 Our interviewees listed a number of factors determin-ing this new relationship, the most important of which is “the personality of the Commissioner.” This was probably the most common phrase we came across in our interviews in Brussels. Despite the significant input of the commission bureaucracy in the policy process and despite the informational and technical advantages it enjoys over its political masters, top officials are convinced that over time individual Commissioners can make a big difference in advancing their policy portfolios.



Who is the ideal Commissioner for top European bureau-crats? Many of our respondents expressed their preference for a “strong” Commissioner who knows how to play the polit-ical game and has the ability to see policy proposals through the various stages of the policy process. As a director in DG External Relations suggests, “Commission officials want a polit-ical master to sell proposals.”14 Top bureaucrats want strong Commissioners because they can help them realize the policy objectives of the DG by selling proposals to the College, the Council, and the Parliament. The advantages of leadership are captured by the response of another director in DG Transport and Energy: “The Commissioner should be a leader. A Commissioner needs a good nose, a good gut feeling, a vision. The personali-ties of Commissioners matter a lot. They need to be leaders and to know the tricks of the political trade. They need to be able to take strong positions.”15

Is the strength of a Commissioner merely a function of polit-ical skill, or is there more to it? The responses of our senior offi-cials suggest that they do not simply value the political craft of their Commissioners, but they also appreciate their knowledge on the various issues. Once the learning period is over, those with sufficient knowledge are thought to be more likely to take the lead than those who do not. Some of our interviewees told us, for example, that agriculture Commissioners are more likely to start exercising leadership earlier in their term because they have usually had experience as agriculture ministers in their home countries. And there are other Commissioners who also come to the post with considerable prior knowledge. Apart from being knowledgeable, Commissioners need to be genu-inely interested in the topic. As some of our interviewees pointed out, “Commissioners are not always interested in the topic.”16 “The strength of the Commissioner depends on the level of their interest” in the policy area of the DG.17 How much knowledge



and how much interest is enough? According to our respondents, not too much. While they appreciate knowledgeable and inter-ested officials, they do not like Commissioners who get involved with the technicalities of policy proposals. “We are supposed to know the technicalities, not the Commissioner. He would be a bad Commissioner if . . . What I mean, is that the Commissioner has to find the correct level of knowledge.”18

Even strong political executives with the “correct level” of knowledge about their policy portfolios can find dealing with the bureaucracy challenging. After all, permanency gives bureaucrats the luxury of time to shelve proposals they deem unfeasible and to frustrate the policy objectives of their political masters. The responses of some bureaucrats clearly point in the direction of an overtowering bureaucracy with considerable input in the pol-icy process. One of them bluntly reminded us that “The Services survive the Commissioner! Therefore, the Commissioner needs to convince the Services first.”19 This turns the classical Weberian bureaucrats that like to get told what to do into the political bureaucrats Robert Putnam described (1973). Senior bureaucrats brought up a number of examples to make their point about the political roles they often get to exercise. Comments like “the new Commissioner relies heavily on the DG” and “the previ-ous Commissioner let the DG run the show” indicate the scope of the involvement of the bureaucracy in the politics of policy making.20 As one director of the DG Budget pointed out, senior bureaucrats need to master both the technical and the political aspects of policy making:

Senior officials are indispensable. We need to be dedicated to the cause and put in long hours. Twelve-hour days are standard here! On the one hand, senior officials need to be very good technicians. But they also need to be very good at anticipating the Council, the Parliament as well as other DGs. This means being political – in the good sense, though. We need to be able to find solutions to make policies possible.21



To what extent do senior bureaucrats think that their involve-ment in this high stakes political game is effective? Does the political role they get to play yield the desired results? To exam-ine the perception of top officials on their capacity to exercise influence over their political masters, we asked them about the degree of influence their DG has over the College. Nearly 1 in 2 officials (69 or 47 percent) think that they are pretty influ-ential over their political executives and told us that their DG influences the College more than the College influences them. In their remarks, they mentioned a number of factors affecting the degree of influence their DG has in the policy process. For some officials, the influence their DG has in the Commission is simply a function of the economic weight of the DG. As put by a direc-tor in DG Agriculture, “we have 30% of the budget, that is the reality.”22 Other officials were keen to mention the broader pol-icy environment as a factor of relative influence in policy making. “The political context is very important. It depends whether the policy area is fashionable.” Yet others mentioned the technicality of policy domains: “The more technical the area, even if political, the more influence technicians get to have.”23

For some of the same reasons, some officials think that the input of their DG in the policy process is much more limited. About a fifth (32, or 22 percent) of senior bureaucrats pointed out that the College exercises more influence over their DG than vice versa. Such responses were common among officials work-ing in smaller DGs that do not have a major policy portfolio or in the internal or general services of the Commission: “Policy DGs are more important. We implement.”24 The emphasis placed earlier on the personality of Commissioners is clearly reflected in this set of responses as well: About a third (45, or 31 percent) of officials thought that the Commissioner can have a net effect on the policy process (Table 4.4). Senior bureaucrats value the “political authority” of their Commissioners, their experience in



the College, and their ability to sell policy proposals and persuade their colleagues. Some were complimentary about the achieve-ments of their political masters, yet others were quite critical: “Commissioners in the past did not do a good job in defending the DG and in understanding and selling its policies.”25

The Commission and the EU Legislators

Having discussed the relations between top bureaucrats and the political leadership of the Commission, we now turn to their interaction with other EU institutions. We will be focus-ing on the two legislative bodies of the European Union, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. What do top bureaucrats make of their interaction with these institu-tions? How do they describe their relationship with the Council and the Parliament, and on what grounds? To get answers to these questions, we included two different questions in our survey, one about the Council and one about the European Parliament, and asked them to point out whether their “current relationship works well.” We were particularly interested to gauge their perceptions of the relative autonomy they have from the two legislative bodies of the EU, and we therefore encour-aged them to describe the relation “in terms of independence or dependence.”

TABLE 4.4. Responses of Top Officials to Degree of DG Influence Over the College

Number %

We influence the College more than it influences us

69 47

The College influences us more than we influence it

32 22

It all depends on our Commissioner 45 31

Total 146 100

25 Interview #175.


Relations with the CouncilContrary to popular perceptions, we found that most of our interviewees held positive opinions about their relationship with the Council; 63 or 52.1 percent of all respondents made posi-tive remarks about the current relationship of the Commission or their DG with the Council (Table 4.5). The reasons they mentioned vary, but the single most important parameter they used was how the relationship affected the autonomy of the Commission. Some officials think that despite institutional con-straints, the Commission continues to set the policy agenda. In fact, some think that despite obstacles raised by the Council, the Commission has the capacity to shape policy outputs. An official in DG Agriculture noted with confidence, for example, that “in the last five years, the legislation passed achieved 80% of our objectives.”26 “We have a manipulative attitude toward the Council. We can usually push through the Council our own policies”27 claimed one of his colleagues in the same DG. International bureaucrats working in DGs that seemingly enjoy informational advantages over officials from national adminis-trations point out that the nature of their policy portfolio helps enhance their relationship with the Council. “We have a fairly good relationship with the Council perhaps because by and large DG Environment is seen as technical.”28 A director in the Internal Audit Service pointed out that it is not only a matter of expertise, but also one of resources: “We have more knowledge than the Council, more staff, more resources: this helps the quality of our relationship.”29

Those officials who reported negative attitudes understand that the Council’s overall policy approach limits the discretion left to the Commission to pursue its integrationist agenda. “The relationship does not work well. The Council has too much power over the Commission. This reduces the possibility of having a



real European agenda.”30 Others are critical of the policy input of the Council, seeing it as merely a reactive organ for defend-ing national interests: “Without the Commission, the EU would be nowhere. The Council is very poor at producing policies.”31 Overall, nearly a fourth (32, or 26.4 percent) of all officials made negative remarks about their relationship with the Council.

We were surprised that only a few officials were willing to express deference to the Council, as classical Weberian bureau-crats ostensibly do to their political master. Some noted that the tension between the two institutions is “creative,” “constructive,” or “healthy.” They disagreed with those who consider the Council to be an impediment to the fulfillment of their policy objectives. In the words of a director in Internal Market and Services, “the Council is not an obstacle. It is the way it is supposed to be.”32 A number of top officials see a “logical and healthy rivalry between the Commission and the Council” and point out that the impres-sion of bitter turf battles is exaggerated.33 A director of the Secretariat General of the Commission suggests that “working relations are a lot better in reality than on paper. Senior officials in the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament have no ill feeling toward each other. They realize that they are in a check and balance relationship. It is only from the outside that things seem different.”34

Our interviews in Brussels took place a year or so after the expansion of the Council to accommodate the ten new mem-ber states from Eastern and Central Europe as well as Cyprus and Malta. How did the biggest ever enlargement affect the rela-tionship of the Commission with the Council? Perhaps not sur-prisingly, senior officials welcomed the expansion of the Council because it created an opportunity for increasing bureaucratic dis-cretion. As a director of DG Development put it, “they will not be able to get things done with 25 members, and what this means

30 Interview #38.31 Interview #3.32 Interview #61.33 Interview #74.34 Interview #109.


is they would have to delegate.”35 Echoing the concerns of some academic observers of the effects of enlargement on the Council, another director noted that “sheer numbers do play a role. Since the enlargement and the expansion to 25 member states, it is harder to get things done.”36

Relations with the ParliamentTop European officials were more reserved in their descriptions of relations with the other legislative arm of the EU. Even though the Parliament is thought to be the supranational ally of the Commission, senior bureaucrats were less positive about their relationship with the Parliament than they were about their rela-tionship with the Council. Their interaction with the Parliament usually takes the form of briefing parliamentary committees or individual MEPs upon request or, less frequently, when senior bureaucrats take the initiative to seek feedback on draft legis-lation. Throughout a normal year in office, the vast majority of our protagonists get to have some kind of contact with the EP. Some DGs have interinstitutional working groups that inform and seek feedback from MEPs on a systematic basis (see related


TABLE 4.5. Relationship of Top Officials with Council and Parliament

Council Parliament

Number % Number %

Positive 63 52.1 47 38.5Negative 32 26.4 35 28.7Neutral 26 21.5 40 32.8

Total 121 100 122 100

Question: If we think about the current relationship your DG and or the Commission more generally and the Council/Parliament, and we characterize that relationship in terms of independence or dependence, would you say the current relationship works well?


data in Appendix 2). Senior European officials seem to have a love-hate relationship with the Parliament, and the remarks of many were so ambivalent that we coded them as neutral. This uneasy relationship of top bureaucrats with the Parliament reflects the evolution of the latter into an increasingly more pow-erful actor in EU politics, one that has considerable authority to exercise control over the Commission. Many of our interviewees welcomed the increasing institutional strength of the Parliament, however, they also noted their discomfort with the way it goes about using this enhanced authority. The heterogeneity of prefer-ences characterizing the EP makes it an unreliable supranational partner for the European bureaucracy, which seems to be more comfortable dealing with the more “predictable” Council.

The largest number of our interviewees reported that the rela-tionship with the Parliament is generally positive (Table 4.5). As in the case of relations with the Council, one of their main criteria for assessing their interaction with the elected legislators of the EU was how the enhanced strength of the Parliament affects the institutional interests of the Commission. “We have always had a very cozy relationship. We need each other against the Council” said one official.37 Or, “the Parliament is a strong supporter of the Commission.”38 Others were positive because they value the help the EP can give the Commission in defending the common European interest. One official pointed out, for example, that there is a “historical desire by the Commission to have the EP empowered for the sake of Europe.”39 And another remarked that the EP has “overall a similar outlook as the Commission in push-ing for European, rather than national, policies.”40 Yet another group of bureaucrats value the enhanced role of the Parliament because it helps add legitimacy to the European integration project. As a director in DG Taxation noted, “the Parliament is gaining more power and this is normal and good.”41 A director



of EuropeAid framed his response in democratic terms: The “increase in Parliamentary control would increase democracy and increase popularity.”42 A director in DG Freedom, Justice and Security focused on the issue of legitimacy: “The Parliament is asserting itself more. This is good. It gives more legitimacy.”43

Many of those who reported negative relations with the Parliament did so for reasons that are probably typical of any interaction between senior bureaucrats and professional politi-cians: Because politicians tend to lack expertise and knowledge, they are thought to make decisions that disregard technical con-siderations. Indeed, one of the most frequent comments top offi-cials made about MEPs is that they lack the technical knowledge necessary to make the right decisions. “Sometimes we feel that the EP doesn’t understand properly because of technicalities.”44 Or, “the Parliament does not have technical competence. Parliament should make general principles and stay out of the rest.”45 In part because of this perceived lack of knowledge, top bureau-crats complain that the European Parliament easily falls prey to interest group manipulation. “They lack knowledge . . . In devel-opment issues, this makes them hostage to NGOs and interest groups” was a typical response.46 Many of the top officials we interviewed think that one of the biggest problems with the EP “is that lobbies play a big role in forming MEPs’ opinion.”47 Or, that MEPs “act as a mouthpiece of interest groups.”48 Some offi-cials acknowledge, of course, that the EP does not have expertise because it lacks resources. A director in DG Trade describes the perceived difficulty of the EP to catch up with the Commission on trade policy: “The EP is trying to find its role in trade policy. The Commission has tried its best to involve the EP as much as possible in trade policy, but the Parliament does not and

42 Interview #171.43 Interview #147.44 Interview #103.45 Interview #25.46 E.g. Interview #56.47 Interview #134.48 Interview #40.


cannot have the resources to follow trade policy properly.”49 For other officials, though, the informational asymmetry between the Commission and the Parliament is not simply a matter of resources but also a matter of effort:

It is normal to be accountable to the parliament. But there is a lack of knowledge of the people there. They do not have the background knowledge to understand the policy issues and they are not sufficiently informed. On our part, we try to inform MEPs. We organized infor-mation sessions for them, for example. But there was bad attendance from MEPs so we stopped organizing them. MEPs have a lot of things to do. It is a pity that they serve on a committee but do not inform themselves.50

The frustration of European officials with the Parliament, though, goes deeper than the usual quibbles bureaucrats have with politi-cians. The main concern of senior bureaucrats relates to the way the Parliament is using its newly acquired powers to exercise control over the Commission. For one thing, our interviewees were embittered by the efforts of European legislators to change the workings of the Commission. The highly critical stance the Parliament has taken against the Santer Commission but also, more recently, the rejection of the Buttiglioni appointment that compelled Barroso to replace him, frequently came up in our discussions with top officials. Some officials think that MEPs are “concerned with short term gains from scandals” at the cost of making substantive contributions to the policy process.51 At a different level, European officials think that the Parliament is becoming increasingly more difficult for the bureaucrats to handle. Senior officials consider themselves as participants in a political game that requires the players to foresee the moves of the other actors. Many of the bureaucrats who reported neg-ative or ambivalent views about the Parliament noted that its enhanced control powers are turning it into an unreliable part-ner for the European bureaucracy. The term unguided missile



came up several times in descriptions of the EP and seems to be the one characteristic that senior bureaucrats find most troubling about this legislative branch of the EU. Some of our respondents consider the reactions of the EP to their proposals to be unpre-dictable. The response of a director in DG External Relations highlights the responses in a number of our interviews: “The EP is still somewhat of an unguided missile at times . . . There is certainly a lack of depth and professionalism. Their reactions are random. In the past few years there has only been a slight improvement in professionalism.”52 Another official pointed out that “the Council is more predictable. In the EP, individuals and political families increase the risk of confrontation.”53 Because of this perceived unreliability, some officials want more auton-omy from the EP. “The Commission sometimes does things to satisfy the Parliament and this is a mistake. It puts the empha-sis on means, not on results. There is a weakness in our leader-ship. We should just tell them that we are running the show. The Parliament is less and less of an ally.”54 Some officials view this as a transitional phase in their relations with the Parliament. “For many years the EP was unimportant and it was ignored. It had the least standing among the institutions of the EU. It is under-going a process of transition – gaining power and knowing how to use it.”55

Bureaucratic Autonomy and Special Interests

Bureaucratic autonomy is defined in this book in terms of the relationship of bureaucrats with their political masters, but this relationship is only one dimension of autonomy. Much of the lit-erature on the autonomy of the state is a reaction to a much more complex understanding of relations between the state and society (Evans et al. 1985; Skocpol 1985; Poulantzas 2000). Neo-Marxist



or pluralist accounts of state relations with society focus on a variety of social actors – for example, classes or interest groups – that could potentially limit the autonomy of the state. It is, hence, important to explore not only the relation between bureaucrats and politicians but also the relation between bureaucrats and special interests. In the “pluralist” American political system, pri-vate interests groups have a prominent and institutionalized role and interaction with the bureaucracy, but in Europe their pres-ence has been viewed with much more skepticism, and in the case of some countries like France, with suspicion. As a result, in continental Europe lobby groups have had much more limited formal access and acceptance in national political systems, and their influence has largely been through informal mechanisms that often raise questions about transparency.

Given their limited formal role in most European countries, it is interesting that lobby groups have thrived in the EU. In the past decades, Brussels has become a hub for thousands of lobby-ing firms, interest groups, and advocacy coalitions that realized the need to provide their input in the various stages of the pol-icy process. Unsurprisingly, the Commission has become the epi-center for much of this activity, as pressure groups recognize its importance in the policy-making process, in part as a result of its right of initiative. In turn, the Commission has come to recognize the special role interest representatives play in policy making and has set out specific rules for how these groups should deal with the European administration and how the Commission itself should deal with them.56 The relationship between the European bureaucracy and interest groups has naturally become the focus of considerable scholarly attention (e.g. Hull 1993; Mazey and Richardson 2001, 2006; Broscheid and Coen 2003; Greenwood 2003; Grossman 2004; Coen and Richardson 2009; Bouwen 2009; Tanasescu 2009). Taking into account the importance of interest intermediation in the EU policy-making process, we

56 European Commission, “The Commission and Interest Representatives.” http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/interest_groups/index_en.htm (accessed October 14, 2010).


asked our interviewees to comment on their relationship with interest groups.

We first asked them to describe the role of these groups in policy innovation. We divided the policy-making process roughly into two stages – those of policy generation and formulation – to get a sense of possible variation in the perceptions of policy input across the duration of the process. In line with our earlier findings, top officials appear quite appreciative of the role inter-est groups play in policy innovation. A clear majority of them think that this role is important in both stages of the policy pro-cess, although many officials pointed out that interest groups are more influential in the earlier stages of policy making. This vari-ation across the two stages also comes up in the aggregate data. Nearly two-thirds, or 63 percent, of our top bureaucrats think that interest groups play a very important role in the generation of policies, while the equivalent figure for policy formulation is 54 percent (Table 4.6).

The question about the role of interest groups in policy innovation prompted our interviewees to elaborate on their relationship with organized interests. Many officials took the opportunity to spell out the beneficial effect interest groups have in policy making, especially in the early stages. One major ben-efit interest groups bring to the table is information. Given the relatively limited resources of the Commission, the added input could be critical for the generation of new policies. As a director

TABLE 4.6. Role of Interest Groups in Policy Making

Generating Formulating

Number % Number %

Very or quite important 112 63 86 54Not that important 48 27 52 33No role at all 18 10 21 13

Total 178 100 159 100

Question: What role do interest groups play in generating/formulating innova-tive policies?


in the DG Internal Market and Services put it, “Because of lim-ited resources and data, they help us a lot.”57 “Interest groups are on the ground. They know what’s going on and this makes them very useful,” according to another director, in the EuropeAid Cooperation Office.58 Despite the negative perceptions many have of lobbying groups in Europe, top officials view them as useful identifiers of policy problems. As a head of unit in DG Agriculture and Rural Development points out, “Lobbies follow very closely what is going on. They are full of ideas; they tell you what doesn’t work and know all the problems. They bring all the information.”59

In addition to information about what is happening on the ground, interest groups are also known to have technical exper-tise that helps top officials better appreciate the policy issues at stake. As some of our officials pointed out, this is especially the case with professional groups rather than idea-motivated groups. A director of the secretariat general highlighted the need to dis-tinguish between the various types of interest groups, in part because of the resource gap that exists among them.

There is a whole range of types of interest groups. The more organized and professional groups can be very successful in having a substantial policy input. This type of interest group includes trade unions, business groups, etc. Now, ideas-based interest groups (e.g. those dealing with environmental issues) do not have as many resources and are less suc-cessful at the “formulating” stage of the policy process.60

Apart from information or expertise, interest groups can also serve as sounding boards for the proposals of the European bureaucracy. Top officials use interactions with stakeholders to test their ideas before they make them public. European pol-icy proposals often have distributional, not just Pareto-efficient effects (Follesdal and Hix 2005), which help galvanize social reactions against them. By seeking reactions from interest



groups, European bureaucrats get useful feedback about the way their ideas are likely to be received from those affected by them, thereby reducing the uncertainty about their possible out-come in the policy process. As one director put it, “We test out our ideas in our various interactions with interest groups. They help us tinker or even change in important ways a proposal.”61 Along the same lines another director said that “Interest groups play an important and supportive role, hence we have lots of consultations with them. Impact assessment is now a required component of the policy process and this depends on feedback of external world. If interest groups say they want a policy then I can get somewhere.”62 After all, said a deputy DG, “Public opinion does not really exist. We are hence dependent on the lobbyist for feedback.”63 Senior European civil servants realize the need to generate social consent over their policy proposals and, hence, value interest groups as being “necessary for consen-sus building.”64 For top bureaucrats in Europe, policy formula-tion is largely a matter of “synthesizing the wishes” of different constituencies. By expressing their own views on particular pol-icy initiatives, interest groups are thought to help the process of “bringing in as many possible inputs as possible” and, therefore, help the synthesis of ideas.65 Their input to planned policy out-puts is considered to be “speedy” and helps expedite the policy process.

Although we encountered considerable sympathy for the role of interest groups in the European policy process, we also came across many officials who were quite critical of them. Whereas some officials appreciate the role of interest groups as provid-ers of information, expertise, and feedback, others view them as being too partial, predictable, and critical. Their partiality, or as some put it, “parochialism,” means that the information they provide is not necessarily objective. A senior official in the DG



Economic and Financial Affairs summarizes the impression of many officials: “Interest groups come with ideas, but these ideas are naturally biased. Interest groups are experts in their own fields, but very partial ones.”66

Apart from the issue of bias, senior civil servants frequently complain that interest groups are a conservative and reactive force in the process, seeking to stifle innovation and sustain the status quo. A director in DG Information Society and Media sug-gested, for example, that in his own experience “stakeholders do play a role but they are more conservative and defensive. Usually it is those who want the status quo unchanged that are most active and outspoken.”67 Indeed, the terms conservative, defensive, and reactive came up a number of times during our interviews. Senior bureaucrats are not only critical of the per-ceived conservatism but also by the selfishness of interest groups. Interest groups are by definition stakeholders serving particular constituencies and defending specific interests, which might be antithetical to the collective or public interest bureaucrats claim to protect. This insistence on narrowly defined interests with-out due consideration of the ramifications for their demands for other segments of society seems to frustrate some of the senior officials. Asked about the policy input of interest groups, a direc-tor of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities made no secret of his frustration: “I am very disappointed by the quality of interest groups. They are very selfish.”68

Despite marked distinctions in how different DGs value the policy input of interest groups and despite the criticisms many interviewees expressed, the overall picture emerging from the top echelons of the organization about interest groups is positive. Senior bureaucrats are appreciative of what stakeholders have to offer to the process and try to make the best of it. This positive assessment of their role partly explains why “the Commission is rather open to interest groups” and why there is a continuing



attempt to increase the involvement of stakeholders in the pol-icy process.69 That being said, top officials are aware of the need to keep a professional distance from interest groups. Realizing the limitations of interest group involvement in policy making, many officials want to get as much out of them as possible, while reducing the potential risks associated with such interactions. In the words of a deputy director-general, “Interest groups are important players in the policy process, but we are not co-opted by them . . . We listen to them, we talk to them, but their inter-ests are always taken in mind along with the interests of other groups.”70 Another respondent explained that the “skill of the official is to get information from interest groups but to keep them at arm’s length.”71

Conclusion

In some ways, Brussels officials are typical bureaucrats spend-ing much of their time dealing with a range of managerial tasks like giving orders, solving problems, and handling interpersonal relations. They derive their power from the permanency of their positions and from their information and expertise. The combi-nation of knowledge and permanency allows them considerable scope for autonomy from their immediate political supervisors who often lack the experience or the technical skills necessary to control bureaucratic decisions. Not surprisingly, then, European officials report that they get to have considerable autonomy from Commissioners, especially in the first year after their arrival in Brussels – the bedding-in phase – when their political superi-ors are still finding their way around. Like most bureaucrats, European officials are also wary of scandal-seeking politicians and of political attempts to curb their autonomy. They claim to get along with the Council and welcome the growing power of the Parliament but also see it as a threat against their autonomy.



If European bureaucrats are different from their counterparts in national or international secretariats, it is in how confident they are about the political power they have. In a political envi-ronment that questions this very power, only a handful of our bureaucrats seemed uncomfortable with the degree of their involvement in the political process. Far from being deferential to the authority of their political masters, senior European officials see themselves as major players in a power struggle involving other EU actors. They easily admit having considerable influence over their immediate political superiors and report that they mostly get what they want from the College of Commissioners. Most of them report to be on good terms with the Council in part because they feel they can get their policies through or because the issues are technical enough to warrant bureaucratic discretion. Senior bureaucrats are more ambivalent about their relation with the Parliament because it makes the political game much less predictable than it used to be, thereby limiting their capacity to use their political power. Viewing the growing insti-tutional strength of the Parliament in political terms, some see it as a future ally of the Commission against the Council, while others call it an “unguided missile” that often lands in the back-yard of the European bureaucracy. Interestingly, others tend to view this growing strength as an opportunity for playing one political master against the other.

The confidence European bureaucrats have in their political power might explain their generally positive attitudes toward interest groups. Whereas in many member states, interest groups are viewed with considerable skepticism, European bureaucrats easily acknowledge their important role in the policy-making process. Although interest groups could be selfish and narrow focused, most Brussels officials report to use them as sounding boards for their proposals, as sources of information and exper-tise, and as substitutes for the almost nonexistent public opinion. Officials acknowledge the danger of being co-opted by interest groups but claim to keep them at arm’s length. To some extent, the confidence in being able to keep a safe distance from interest groups comes from the bureaucrats’ capacity to generate and


to rely on information generated from within the bureaucracy. Although interest groups and national administrations are also important sources of policy-relevant information, most officials confidently report that they rely on their own staff for this pre-cious information.

89

5

Political Attempts to Alter Bureaucratic Behavior

Political bureaucrats are not a Brussels phenomenon but the result of a much broader trend of the past century – the bureaucrati-zation of politics. The bureaucratization of modern democracies has undoubtedly been one of the most distinctive phenomena of the twentieth century, one that has gradually shifted power away from political executives to bureaucratic officials (e.g. Dogan 1975). This shift raised fears among some that democracy would be the big loser of this struggle with bureaucracy (e.g. Burnham 1945; Djilas 1957; Lipset 1960; Galbraith 1967). Bureaucracy was viewed by some as an impediment to democratic rule, and bureaucrats were seen as usurpers of power from legitimately elected politicians. This very conception of bureaucracy created the intellectual, normative, and political grounds for an attempt to enhance political control over public agencies (e.g. Aberbach and Rockman 1976; Moe 1985; Suleiman 2003: Chapter 9).

Not surprisingly, politicians have been at the forefront of efforts to reclaim authority from bureaucrats. In part because bureaucratic authority posed a threat to the exercise of politi-cal power in modern states, political executives tried to restrain the autonomy of public bureaucracies and place bureaucratic Leviathans under stricter political control. Their efforts to con-trol runaway bureaucracies have facilitated the politicization of bureaucracy. Even in countries where the separation between


politics and administration seems to be sharper, as in Britain (e.g. Page and Wright 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000), there has been an attempt to reassert political control and to make public bureaucracies more responsive to political executives.

The politicization of public bureaucracies has taken different forms in modern democracies. In Southern Europe, where pub-lic bureaucracies have always been at the whim of the govern-ment of the day, politicization has meant the recruitment and promotion of even more partisan loyalists (e.g. Sotiropoulos 2000). Elsewhere, though, where the practice of partisanship was less prevalent, politicization has meant the inundation of top administrative posts with trusted political advisors or managers. Politicization has also been achieved by holding positions vacant or, simply, by excluding permanent civil servants from policy-making networks (Pfiffner 1992; Suleiman 2003: 224–225). The politicization of public bureaucracies was thought to increase bureaucratic responsiveness, making bureaucracies less cumber-some and more efficient. The key to such appointments was the proven loyalty of the new appointees to political power hold-ers – regardless of their ability or competence. The United States became the prime example of political attempts to reclaim con-trol from bureaucratic usurpers of power (e.g. Suleiman 2003: Chapter 9). The Nixon presidency was certainly an unusual example of politicization, but his successors showed that it was not necessarily an outlier in terms of the overall objective. In one way or another, nearly all presidents – especially Republican presidents but Democrats as well – contributed to this pro-cess of politicizing the federal bureaucracy (e.g. Aberbach and Rockman 1976; Heclo 1977; Moe 1985; Schultz and Maranto 1998; Aberbach and Rockman 2000). While political executives in the United States have led attempts to reclaim power from career bureaucrats, similar trends have been evident in most modern democracies, even in political systems like the French or the British where the civil service might still retain the aura of nobility and seek to project the image of neutrality.

By the time the idea of responsiveness started being frowned upon, political executives in a number of advanced industrialized

Political Attempts to Alter Bureaucratic Behavior 91

democracies began embracing a different approach of political control. Responsiveness of bureaucracies to political executives remained the overarching goal of this new approach, but it was couched in the politically neutral terms of economic efficiency and public management. Not surprisingly, part of the inspira-tion for new public management came from students of new institutional economics who noted the runaway tendencies of bureaucratic agents (e.g. Niskanen 1971). If bureaucracy cannot be placed under control by political-loyalists-turned-bureaucrats then the solution might be the reinvention of government, in part through the transformation of old bureaucratic structures to new organizations ran with novel managerial practices. Seemingly apolitical, New Public Management (NPM) sought to introduce such practices to public bureaucracies in order to make them more efficient. In effect, NPM remained a political exercise – or at least, an approach to bureaucratic control that has important political consequences – seeking to transform the relationship between the state and its citizens (Suleiman 2003). NPM turns “the market” mechanism into the main arbiter between citizens and states and private agents into a buffer that shields political executives from political accountability when things go wrong. That both the Left (e.g. in New Zealand and in Australia) and the Right have embraced NPM is evidence that it is part of a broader political, rather than ideological, agenda – one that seeks to give greater powers to political executives and at the expense of career bureaucrats.

To these various forms of politicization, one must add the uti-lization of the most potent of political weapons, that of pub-lic denunciation. Nearly all attempts to reclaim political power away from public bureaucracies have been preceded or supple-mented by verbal attacks against them. Overcoming their infor-mational handicap with superior communication resources, politicians have managed to make bureaucracy synonymous with inefficiency and unresponsiveness and to identify it as one of the major problems that contemporary politics should seek to address. Political executives have managed to turn bureaucracy into the prodigal son of democratic governance thus preparing


the ground for challenging the political power and the auton-omy bureaucrats get to enjoy. Political attacks against public bureaucracies have mostly come from the political Right, but not entirely. Forces that are not traditionally identified with the Right have jumped on the “reinvention” bandwagon identifying the state as the problem. Again, we cannot fully appreciate the political rationale of the antibureaucracy movement, if we solely treat it as an ideological project – it is not merely that.

The jury is still out, of course, regarding the relative success of political efforts to regain control of public bureaucracies. Even in such policy areas where the political stakes are high, it is unclear whether political executives have managed to place bureaucratic organizations under their control. As Hugh Heclo pointed out as early as the 1970s, a “government of strangers” is not necessarily a more responsive or more efficient government (1977). The parachuting of political advisors at the top echelons of public bureaucracies did not necessarily make bureaucracies more responsive. Have NPM reforms been more effective, then? Such reforms have taken place across many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in the past three decades but also with questionable success (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). There are many reasons for the divergent results of political control efforts. Certain political systems are more resistant to administrative change, and some social settings have proven to be less receptive to new manageri-alism. At the dismay of political executives, the attempt to regain control over public bureaucracies has proved hard to achieve. It also created a series of new problems (e.g. the demoraliza-tion of public agencies) while exacerbating the relations between bureaucrats and politicians.

Perhaps ironically, political efforts to curb the autonomy of national bureaucracies have coincided with the proliferation of international bureaucracies. The past decades have witnessed the establishment of many international organizations (see Ikenberry 2001) to handle an increasingly wider array of tasks. The expansion of international agencies is perhaps comparable to the growth of national bureaucracies in the early postwar


years. According to one study, in the period between 1955 and 1994 the staff of the IMF and the World Bank increased at a rate of 6.8 and 4.3 percent per annum, respectively (Vaubel 1996: 196). How have political executives dealt with the growing influence of international bureaucracies? How have the relations between politicians and transnational bureaucrats evolved in the past decades? To what extent do international administrations display similar trends toward politicization as those evident in national political settings? How has politicization been mani-fested in transnational bureaucracies and with what results? We return to our discussion of the Commission in an effort to explore these broader questions.

The Commission and Political Control

European politicians have never come fully to terms with the autonomy granted to the Commission. As in national political settings, political executives have, at times, displayed signifi-cant degrees of skepticism and suspicion, if not outrage, about the discretionary powers granted to the European bureaucracy. Although not always as vocal as De Gaulle or Thatcher, politi-cians have often lamented the Commission for what they per-ceived as runaway behavior. Nevertheless, political attempts to control the European bureaucracy have differed from those in national political contexts. European politicians have been as frustrated with the discretionary power of the Commission as they have been with national administrations, but the way they have gone about dealing with the bureaucracy displays notable differences that merit some attention.

The very nature of the European “bureaucratic beast” can help account for these differences. First, unlike most bureaucra-cies, the Commission is supposed to be relatively autonomous, its discretionary power (e.g. to propose legislation) being derived from, and reinforced, by EU treaties. Hence, attempts to limit the autonomy of the Commission have largely focused on changing these Treaties in ways that empower other EU institutions, like the Parliament, at the expense of the Commission. In national


political systems, attempts to curb the autonomy of public bureaucracies have generally not taken the form of broader con-stitutional changes. Second, the Commission is in some – albeit not all – ways a regulatory bureaucracy with limited budgetary or implementation power but considerable authority to monitor the activity of both public and private agents in key policy areas. The regulatory nature of the Brussels bureaucracy sets it apart from most national bureaucracies, in part, because regulatory bureaucracies need minimal budgetary resources and can, there-fore, more effectively resist attempts to control them through legislative appropriations. As Giandomenico Majone puts it, “An important characteristic of regulatory policy making is the limited influence of budgetary limitations on the activities of regulators” (1994: 87). Regulatory policy also requires higher levels of tech-nical expertise, which grants bureaucrats more administrative discretion and makes their political overseers more likely to accept this discretion. Moreover, the functional need for regu-lation shields regulatory bureaucracies from the attacks faced by other public bureaucracies, which are not deemed as neces-sary enough to merit their existence – at least, not in the public realm (e.g. Majone 1994). The third factor accounting for the differences in how political executives have sought to control the European and national bureaucracies relates to the polycen-tric structure of political oversight in the EU, discussed in the Chapter 2. This structure makes it harder to mobilize the polit-ical resources necessary to curb this autonomy. Political control requires a certain degree of centralized authority that the multi-cephalous EU structure lacks.

All these factors place limits on the capacity of European politicians to use conventional control mechanisms to curb bureaucratic autonomy. Take politicization – probably the most widely used control mechanism – as an example. While it has been prevalent in most established democracies, it is much less common in Brussels. Undoubtedly, member states have sought to have “their own” in top bureaucratic posts and, as many studies have suggested, there is an unofficial “national quota” system for such posts – the equivalent of party political appointments


in national administrative systems (e.g. Page 1997). The Cabinet system (personal staff) serves as a mechanism of political con-trol, mirroring the political advisors network set up by national governments to make bureaucracies more responsive (e.g. Spence 2006). As some of our respondents noted, political cri-teria remain important in promotion to the top echelons in the society, though national origin is only one of these criteria.

However, one must not go too far in comparing these prac-tices to the politicization that occurs in national bureaucracies. It is true that the Cabinet system has expanded in recent years both in scope and in numbers: Although early Cabinets had two mem-bers, a secretary and a typist (Donnelly and Ritchie 1997: 44), a quick survey of current Cabinets shows that their average size is closer to 7.5 members, excluding personal assistants, speech-writers, spokespersons, drivers, and so forth.1 Nevertheless, the Cabinet system has also been institutionalized in ways that limit the capacity of Commissioners to use it solely as a mech-anism for political control. Along with the expansion of the Cabinet system, there has been an introduction of rules regard-ing Cabinet size, composition, and financing. This facilitated the bureaucratization of relations between the Commissioner, Cabinet members, and the Services, thereby limiting the possi-bility that Commissioners use Cabinets to enhance their political control over the administration. The growth of the Cabinets has also created resentment among civil servants, who are unwill-ing to accept their authority and who question their expertise (e.g. Donnelly and Ritchie 1997: 50). The resentment of Cabinet members makes it even more difficult to exercise effective con-trol over the Commission bureaucracy. Similarly, the unofficial national quotas and member state interventions to have “their own” placed in key administrative positions are of questionable importance. Although senior officials acknowledge the use of political criteria in promotions in the Commission, there is no evidence to suggest that once top bureaucrats fill these prized posts, they serve the interests of their home countries.

1 Analysis using Commission Directory, September 3, 2010.


More importantly, there is a fundamental difference in the very meaning of politicization in national and in the EU setting. At the heart of efforts to politicize public bureaucracies is the desire to make them more responsive to the government of the day. At the EU level there is no equivalent to the government of the day – “the EU does not have a government analogous to a national govern-ment” (Dinan 2005: 187). The complexity of the EU structure and the intricacy of the EU policy-making process disperse authority to many more actors, with more diverse preferences, that necessitate more fluid alliances than those found in national political settings. This means that even if member states had stronger incentives to politicize the European bureaucracy – as a result of its importance in the policy-making process, its regulatory function, and so forth (Christiansen 1997) – they encounter insurmountable institutional obstacles to doing so. When governments appoint their own top officials in a DG and when Commissioners choose their politi-cal confidants to staff their Cabinets, they cannot hope to change the behavior of the entire European bureaucracy or to bring the Commission to heel. The best a European government can do is to place a few trusted officials in key posts and hope that they will serve – or, merely represent – its interests. While European bureaucrats are skillful political players, they cannot even be com-pared to party political appointees or trusted political advisors who are there to merely serve those in power. Overall, then, the Commission seems to have escaped the trend toward politiciza-tion evident in most advanced industrialized democracies.

The limited extent of politicization, though, does not mean that European political executives have accepted the discretion-ary power of the Commission. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the political heads of Europe have always been uncomfortable with the degree of autonomy the Brussels orga-nization enjoys. What this means is that the very nature of the European bureaucracy limits the range of possibilities politicians have to curb bureaucratic autonomy. Given these limitations, how do European politicians go about keeping the bureaucracy in line? Public denunciation remains one of the most powerful weapons European politicians can use to alter the behavior of the


Commission. The past decades have witnessed a growing pro-pensity by politicians to associate the Commission with every-thing that seems to go wrong in the European project. To some extent, the unpopularity of the European bureaucracy grew after the early 1990s, at the same time when the Commission was thought to be losing institutional clout and policy influence (e.g. Dinan 2005).

In addition to public denunciation, European politicians have also sought to reform the internal workings of the Commission. As we will see in the next section, such reform has been con-stantly on the agenda of European politicians, but it only gained momentum in the latter half of the 1990s, after the rapid growth of its administrative tasks during the Delors presidency. It took the cataclysmic events of the late 1990s and the crisis of the Santer Commission to accelerate political attempts to control the Commission. The runaway tendencies of the European bureau-cracy were at the heart of this crisis and, hence, prepared the ground for the administrative reforms undertaken in the past decade. Random events, crises, or scandals are always likely to boost the momentum of reformers for changing public bureau-cracies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000: 32–33). Such random occurrences reinforce political denunciations of bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, and once amplified by the media, they give momentum to reform efforts. Charges of nepotism and accusations for fraud do not match the Challenger disaster that led to the overhauling of NASA or the faulty breast can-cer screening programs that bruised the reputation of the British National Health System. In the case of the Commission, how-ever, they helped reinforce calls for administrative changes and empowered political executives who wished to shift the balance of power away from the bureaucracy. Hence, even though the very nature of the European bureaucracy makes it more difficult for politicians to effectively curb bureaucratic autonomy, crises like that of the late 1990s help mobilize political constituencies who desire taking political power away from the bureaucracy. The critical question, for our purposes, is whether the attempts to curb the autonomy of the European bureaucracy have been


successful – whether, in other words, political executives have succeeded in any meaningful way in changing the relation with the bureaucracy in their favor.

To address this question, the rest of this chapter examines the most important of recent political efforts to alter the behavior of the European bureaucracy, the Kinnock reforms. The next sec-tion briefly describes previous efforts to reform the workings of the organization and the crisis that catalyzed the most recent modernization efforts. The subsequent section provides a brief overview of the Kinnock reforms and is followed by an analy-sis of an “on paper” assessment of the reform and its ultimate consequences.

Continuity, Crisis, and Change

While there have been numerous calls for and attempts to reform the Commission, reform efforts did not leave a distinctive mark on the organization because they lacked political muscle.2 The Commissioners championing administrative changes failed to impress the Council about the necessity of reform, and the Parliament did not show interest in the administration of the Commission until much later, when the issue presented signifi-cant political benefits. In part because of the remoteness of the European administration from national political discourses, the issue of reform did not present any obvious and immedi-ate political benefits to European legislators and was, hence, deemed unimportant. Moreover, as Pollitt and Bouckaert rightly observe, in political systems where political authority is dis-persed and where the decision-making process is complicated, it

2 Such calls and attempts for reform include the Spierenburg Report of 1979 (Spierenburg 1979), the “Report of the Three Wise Men” (Biesheuvel et al. 1979), Richard Hay’s effort to eliminate “Eurocracy” (Hay 1989: 42–46), and the Santer Commission’s attempts to modernize the structures of the organi-zation (Commission 1999). It is beyond the aims of this book to offer a com-prehensive review of these reform efforts, a subject that has already attracted considerable scholarly attention. (e.g. Metcalfe 1999; Stevens and Stevens 2001; Kassim 2004; Bauer 2007).


can be expected that it will be difficult to bring about adminis-trative change (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000: Chapter 2). In such systems, where bureaucracies have multiple political overseers, the threshold of political mobilization necessary to bring about reform is much higher than in systems where political authority is more concentrated. In the EU, the reform threshold is probably the highest than in most other bureaucracies around the world, both national and international.

On account of the past record and the inherent difficulty of reforming the European bureaucracy, it is worth exploring in some detail the circumstances setting the ground for the Kinnock reforms. While the issue of reform had failed to attract the inter-est of the Council in the previous two decades, the growing strength and concerns of the Parliament about the unaccountable behavior of the Commission gradually turned the political lime-light onto the Commission. In the latter half of the 1990s, the Parliament became increasingly more vocal about the internal workings of the Brussels bureaucracy, linking it with misman-agement, nepotism and fraud. These allegations led to a motion of censure by the Parliament against the Commission in January 1999, which failed by a margin of sixty-one votes. In response to these pressures from the Parliament, the Santer Commission agreed to let a Committee of Independent Experts investigate the allegations and to report back within six weeks.

The basic problem identified by the report was the runaway behavior of the administration and the loss of political control by Commissioners. The first report of the experts noted “an admission of a loss of control by the political authorities over the Administration that they are supposedly running” (CIE, 1999a: 137). The reason for the loss of control was the reluctance of Commissioners to acknowledge their responsibility for the way the Commission is run. In a much quoted phrase, the report noted that “it is becoming difficult to find anyone who has even the slightest sense of responsibility” (1999a: 144) and pointed to the democratic perils of this situation. The prescribed solution, then, was to make European officials more responsible through the enhancement of management practices. Moreover, in light


of some evidence of favoritism, the Committee also suggested that Commissioners abide by “minimum standards of public life.” Overall, although the Committee found no evidence of direct involvement of the Commissioners in fraud, it held them responsible for failing to prevent it. Its damning critique led to the immediate resignation of the Santer Commission on March 15, 1999, and to its replacement by the Prodi Commission.

The institutional crisis turned the issue of administrative reform into a politically salient and visible theme that helped mobilize political support for enhancing the organizational struc-tures of the Commission. The ultimate goal of the growing reform constituency was to curb bureaucratic autonomy by improving mechanisms of political control. In light of the findings of the Committee of Independent Experts, both the Parliament and the Council gave the incoming College a strong mandate to modern-ize the workings of the organization largely by strengthening its managerial capacity and financial controls. Responding to politi-cal pressures, Prodi made administrative reform one of his top pri-orities. Signaling the strong commitment of the new Commission to reform, Prodi appointed a vice president, the former Labor Party leader Neil Kinnock, in charge of the modernization pro-ject. Only a few months after taking office, the Commission published a white paper that detailed its reform proposals. The modernization effort drew from the findings of the two reports published by the Committee of Independent Experts and from a series of internal reports, including that of the Williamson group and the DECODE assessment.3 This gave a sense of continuity between the Kinnock and earlier reforms (Christiansen 2004: 112–113) as a number of the proposed measures had been either initiated or suggested by previous Commissions. As the white paper rightly noted, the scope and ambition of the Prodi initia-tive far exceeded that of any previous reform exercise (European Commission 2000b: 6), for not only were some of suggestions

3 DECODE is the French acronym for Designing Tomorrow’s Commission and refers to the comprehensive review of administrative practices in the Commission, published in 1999 (Metcalfe 2000; Cini 2004).


novel but they also came with tight deadlines for completion and clear assignments of tasks to the various directorates or units. More importantly, though, the Kinnock reforms were part of a comprehensive and cohesive reform strategy that was driven by a conscious and visible political attempt to alter what was perceived by some – including the Committee of Independent Experts – as bureaucratic misbehavior.

The Kinnock Reforms

The reform initiative of the Prodi Commission was launched in March 2000 with the approval and publication of the white paper. The overall reform strategy of the Commission was divided into four themes set out in the first part of the white paper. The sec-ond part detailed an action plan of ninety-eight measures, dead-lines for their implementation, and the actors responsible for their execution (European Commission 2000a; 2000b). The first and overarching theme of the modernization push was the devel-opment of a “culture based on service” (European Commission 2000a: 7). As soon as it took office, the Prodi Commission agreed on new standards of behavior for Commissioners and on a code for “good administrative behavior” (European Commission 2000b: 4). Moreover, it sought to enhance public access to EU documents, to improve the dialogue with civil society, to speed up payments to contractors, and to build up the technological infra-structure of the organization. There was also an effort to codify relations with the EP, in light of institutional changes brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty. Most of the eleven measures detailed under the culture theme were improvements on actions initiated by previous Commissions. As Kinnock admits, the emphasis on culture was largely a “convenient, spray-on label to summarize inherited organizational custom” (Kinnock 2004: 8).

Efficiency has been at the heart of all administrative reforms, and not surprisingly, it was also one of the most crucial elements of the Kinnock reforms. The second theme of the reforms, then, focused on the efficient allocation and use of resources based on the prioritization of policy outputs. Echoing NPM-type ideas


implemented earlier in Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Hood 1991; Suleiman 2003), the white paper proposed a reassessment of exist-ing Commission priorities and the establishment of new ones. This would set the basis for the diversion of resources to those areas to which they were likely to give the best policy outputs. The overall goal was to encourage the various directorates and departments to focus more on results, rather than procedures – what the white paper termed Activity-Based Management. To facilitate this, the Commission would formulate an annual policy strategy to set the basis for the work program of each individual administrative unit. The assignment of work programs would help decentralize decision making and promote personal respon-sibility. It would also make it easier to determine the amount of resources required to achieve specific policy outputs. To encour-age the more efficient allocation of resources, the white paper proposed the formulation of a comprehensive framework for externalizing activities – for instance, outsourcing.

The third theme of the reform initiative was the improvement of financial management and control as well as the establish-ment of more robust audit procedures. This part of the mod-ernization project was tightly connected to the previous one. Activity-based management would facilitate the determination of a work program for each official, specify output expectations, and devolve responsibility for their completion. Those officials making operational decisions involving expenditure would also assume financial responsibility. To deal with criticism about lack of responsibility and to address problems related to the increas-ing number of financial transactions – which doubled to 620,000 per year in five years – the Commission proposed the decentral-ization of financial control. Directors-general would be made responsible for adequate controls of their departments, and managers would be held accountable for the financial decisions they make. According to this scheme, each unit would develop an independent audit capability. Moreover, the Commission proposed to set up two additional bodies, the Central Financial Service and Internal Audit Service, to advise and assist the man-agers and directors with financial control. In addition, an Audit


Progress Committee would control audit processes, oversee the implementation of audit recommendations and assess the qual-ity of audit work. Finally, there would be measures to maximize the prevention of financial irregularity through improvements of existing procedures.

The last and lengthiest theme of the reform project related to the modernization of human resources policy from recruitment to retirement. In line with its earlier proposals, the Commission sought to strengthen the middle management by devolving granting heads of unit autonomy for operational and financial decisions. Moreover, it identified management ability as the most important criterion for appointments. With regards to recruit-ment, the white paper proposed to improve the organization of open competitions and tests by taking into account the best practices in national and international administrations. One of the most notable suggestions regarded the establishment of a more linear career structure that would increase the incentives for improving performance. Appraisals would be made with the attribution of points, and consequently, promotion would depend mostly on merit, rather than seniority. Overperformance would be rewarded, and underperformance would be dealt with more systematically. To improve the working environment, the Commission would grant the right to family leave, introduce more flexible working hours, and strengthen the existing equal opportunities scheme. The white paper also suggested improving the disciplinary and whistle-blowing systems.

The Commission hoped to complete the ninety-eight reform-related actions outlined in the white paper within two years and to review the progress of the reform in 2002. By February 2003, when it published its first comprehensive analysis of the reform effort, it could claim the completion of eighty-seven out of the ninety-eight actions – the few delays related to the development of the new procurements and accounting systems. There was also some lag with work programs, internal controls, and pro-ject management. Unsurprisingly, personnel policy proved to be the most contentious issue causing significant tension between the Commission and the unions. The new set of staff regulations


was adopted in May 2004 after a prolonged period of negotia-tions with staff representatives. Nevertheless, some of the most innovative aspects of the reform, like the new appraisal system and the new structure, were adopted much earlier. By 2005, the Commission claimed the completion of all ninety-eight actions (Table 5.1).

Assessing the Reform

The swift completion of the action plan has largely been taken as a mark of its success in changing the internal workings of the Commission. The Kinnock reforms have come to be regarded as “a historic accomplishment” (Kassim 2004: 33) or as a remarkable achievement that far exceeds previous moderniza-tion efforts (Bauer 2007: 52). Indeed, on a number of fronts, the Commission has managed to make substantial progress. For example, the average number of days it took for the Commission to make a payment decreased from 54 in 1999 to 42.9 in 2003. In 2003, between 80 and 90 percent of public mail was replied to within the standard deadline compared to 70 percent in 2002. Moreover, the number of days spent for employee train-ing increased from 6.9 in 2001 to 8.32 by 2003. There was also progress in the implementation of the equal opportunities

TABLE 5.1. Progress in Implementing the 2000 Action Plan of the Kinnock Reforms

Reform Actions Planned

Actions Completed by

2003 2004 2005

Service-based culture 11 9 9.5 11Priority setting and resource allocation

9 8 9 9

Financial management, audit, and control

42 38 42 42

Human resources 36 32 35 36

Total 98 87 95.5 98


scheme: The number of female top managers increased from 22 in 1998 to 39 in 2003, and the number of incoming female A-grade officials increased from 27.6 percent in 2002 to 33.3 percent (European Commission 2003; 2004).

Apart from the progress achieved on these specific areas, the overall impact of the reform on the workings of the organi-zation is harder to assess. This is largely because a consider-able number of reform-related tasks involved the drafting of proposals, reviews, or rules and the setting up of new institu-tions, systems, or committees. The completion of such tasks set the basis for changing, but it did not necessarily improve the workings of the Commission. Moreover, the reform has largely been assessed on the basis of task completion rather than actual performance. Despite the emphasis of the reformers on output, there is a peculiar absence of specific indicators for measuring the relative success of the reform. The few indicators used by the Kinnock team to assess progress in the implementation of the reforms have mostly been put in place after the reform was well on its way. Using different criteria, Levy (2006) presents a strikingly different picture of the modernization effort than the one given by the Commission. He argues that the reform increased the workload of the officials and created more depen-dency relationships through the establishment of new processes. His “on-paper” analysis suggests that by 2004 the Commission implemented fully or partly only half of the actions it claimed it had completed. This negative assessment of the modernization effort confirms insiders’ claims that the reform failed to bring about the desired effects. One of them, former chief accoun-tant Marta Adreasen, was suspended in 2002 after blowing the whistle on the Commission’s financial control mechanisms. Her claims were substantiated by a leaked report from the internal auditor who noted many procedural or systemic deficiencies on reform-related tasks that were marked, in the 2003 review, as completed (European Commission 2004: 63–69). Further doubt about the effectiveness of the reforms was cast by the financial irregularities discovered in Eurostat during 2003.


The View From the Top

Our survey presents another view of the attempt to alter the behavior of the European bureaucracy. A battery of questions in the survey dealt specifically with the organizational structure of the Commission and with the Kinnock reforms. The timing could not have been better: The survey followed the completion of all reform-related actions and anticipated the internal delib-erations about the future of the modernization drive. The sur-vey struck the ideal balance between not being conducted too early before the effects of the modernization drive fully mate-rialized – or too late, when the reform effects are forgotten by the respondents. Top Commission officials had experienced first-hand the intense efforts to change the workings of the organi-zation and were best placed to assess its outcome. Along with the middle management, top officials lifted the heaviest burden of the modernization drive: They had to follow new appraisal procedures, implement financial controls in their units, and over-see the shift to activity-based management. The survey sought to tap into their firsthand knowledge by asking them to com-ment on the overall workings of the Commission and to assess the most contentious part of the Kinnock reforms, that relating to the management of human resources. During a time when the Barroso Commission was discussing the future of the reform initiative, the survey also asked officials to sketch the contours of future reforms. The remainder of this chapter records their responses. The aim is to assess the effectiveness of the reforms by asking those in charge of implementing them, and more broadly, to examine how the reforms have changed relations between the European bureaucracy and its political masters.

Not a Hierarchical BeastControl in any public or private organization relies on the exis-tence of hierarchical structure, “a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones” (Weber 1991: 197). The Commission is generally acknowledged as a strongly hierarchical organization


modeled after the continental European Weberian bureaucracies, especially those of France and Germany. Although, on paper, the Commission seems to be a rigid hierarchical organization, in practice, “the extent to which the hierarchical model is actu-ally implemented is left largely to the discretion of senior offi-cials within specific directorates or units” (Cini 1996: 116). To get a sense of control mechanisms within the bureaucracy, it is, hence, important to gauge the views of these senior officials on the nature of their organization.

Top officials do not generally consider the Commission to be a highly hierarchical organization. Out of the 189 officials who responded to this question, 110, or 58 percent, “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” with the notion that the Commission is “too hierarchical.” Views about the structure of the Commission cut across rank, but not across levels of seniority (Table 5.2). Unsurprisingly, newer employees are more likely to view the Commission as being hierarchical than those who have worked for the Commission longer.

Of course, and as many observers often note, in such a multi-cultural organization, perceptions of hierarchy are likely to vary

TABLE 5.2. Responses of Top Officials on Whether They Agree or Not that the Commission Is Too Hierarchical

%

No Yes

Position (N = 183)DG/DDG 58 42D 63 37HU 50 50

Total 58 42

Length of Service (N = 172)0–10 years 46 5411–20 53 4721–30 71 29>30 72 28

Total 60 40


significantly depending on one’s national basis for comparison. Many of the respondents explicitly compared the Commission with national administrations. As one of them put it, “Yes, I agree it is hierarchical, but only because I am Swedish. Having lived and worked in France, I would say that it is not that hierarchical.”4 A number of the respondents associated the hierarchical nature of the Commission with its resemblance of the French and German administrative models, or with the emphasis that south and conti-nental administrations place on strict hierarchy. Others presented a much more nuanced picture, relating the degree of hierarchy to the size, function, and culture of each individual directorate. Another frequent response was that it largely depends on the per-sonality of the person in charge and – again – his or her national background. In the words of one director, “The degree of hier-archy depends a lot on the culture of the specific DG and on the person who heads it. In DG Agriculture, successive Directors General have been French and therefore brought about hierarchi-cal culture.”5 Interestingly, while many officials despise the hierar-chical nature of the institution, others think it is “a necessary evil,” as there is no other way to run a “big complex organization.”6 Despite other misgivings with the workings of the organiza-tion, many officials think that the Commission has become less hierarchical over time. Out of 109 extensive comments on the question about hierarchy, 13 were about the organization becom-ing less hierarchical over time, mostly in terms of accessibility to the top as well as flexibility. None of the officials suggested that the Commission became more hierarchical (Table 5.3).

Merit-Based RecruitmentOnce we got a sense of the general view of top officials about the structure of the Commission, we then asked them to com-ment on personnel policy. Personnel policy is usually one of the most contentious issues in any administrative reform, and not



surprisingly, Kinnock met stiff resistance from employee unions when he proposed to revise staff regulations. The survey sought to tap into the experiences of top managers in the implementa-tion of these contentious personnel reforms. To do so, it focused on one of the most sensitive components of the reform pack-age, the new staff appraisal and promotion system. After a ref-erence to the Kinnock reforms, we asked top officials whether the promotion system was fully merit-based. To have a basis for comparison, we asked a similar question about a much less sen-sitive issue, the recruitment of new officials.

The views of top officials on the recruitment procedures of the Commission are generally positive. More than half of the respon-dents think that recruitment is “fully merit-based” and another 40 percent think that it is “mostly merit-based.” Only 7 percent think that recruitment is “not merit-based at all.” Interestingly, the views of top officials vary considerably depending on their rank and experience. The higher up on the hierarchy and the more their years of service in the Commission, the more likely they are to think that the recruitment process is fully merit based. Hence, only 36 percent of heads of unit consider recruitment to

TABLE 5.3. Is the Commission Too Hierarchical?

Responses N

Less hierarchical than (national) administrations 6As hierarchical as (national) administrations 10More hierarchical than (national) administrations 6Improved from before 13Same as before 1Depends on directorate 8Depends on D/DG/Commissioner 11Hierarchy is necessary 10Easy access to top 8Flexible 6Other 30

Total 109

Note: Some respondents touched on several themes, and their remarks were counted more than once.


be fully merit based compared to 73 percent of directors-general; and only 40 percent of the newest officials think so compared to 72 percent of the officials with the lengthiest service (Table 5.4). Although most officials think that recruitment is based on

TABLE 5.4. Is Recruitment and Promotion in the Commission Fully Merit Based?

Recruitment Merit Based (%)

Fully Mostly Not at all

Position (N = 183)DG/DDG 73 27 0D 56 35 9HU 36 55 9

Total 52 40 7

Length of Service (N = 172)0–10 years 40 48 1211–20 49 42 921–30 55 39 6>30 72 28 0

Total 53 39 8

Promotion Merit Based (%)

Fully Mostly Not at all

Position (N = 183)DG/DDG 29 68 3D 17 74 9HU 10 69 21

Total 16 72 12

Length of Service (N = 166)0–10 years 8 68 2411–20 17 69 1421–30 14 80 6>30 36 57 7

Total 18 70 12

Question: One of the most important set of reforms in the recent past, the Kinnock reforms, dealt with the issue of recruitment/promotion. Do you think recruitment/promotion in the Commission is fully merit based?


merit, many think that the open competitions might be reward-ing the wrong types of merit. As one of the respondents noted, “Recruitment is fully merit-based, but the wrong merit is being tested. People who are recruited can often lack the skills neces-sary to complete particular tasks.”7 Moreover, many interviewees distinguished between recruitment for lower and higher ranks: “The higher you get, the less merit-based the system becomes, and the more important political and nationality considerations become.”8 For many top officials, there is a significant element of randomness in the procedure, as the Commission hires only a tiny fraction of the 50,000 people who take its exams. For oth-ers, the process is too bureaucratic and rigid, causing delays in resourcing units.

Promotion: Mixed PictureThe responses of top officials to the question about promotion paint a less rosy picture than the one given by their thoughts on recruitment. Whereas half of the survey respondents think that recruitment is “fully merit-based,” only 16 percent view promo-tion to be so. The vast majority of them, or 72 percent, think that promotion is “mostly merit-based,” and 12 percent think that the process is not merit based at all. Naturally, the percent-age of those who hold positive views of the promotion process decreases along with rank and seniority. The higher officials are on the ladder, the more favorable their view of the process that got them there. Hence, even though 29 percent of directors- general view promotion as being fully based on merit, only 10 percent of heads of unit think so. Interestingly, 21 percent of middle managers think that the system is not merit based at all, compared to a mere 3 percent of top managers (Table 5.4).

Many top officials think that, apart from merit, various other considerations are taken into account when promotion is decided. The list of factors mentioned in the elaborate responses of our interviewees is probably similar to those in any other bureau-cracy. Among those who gave extensive responses to the question



about promotion, a significant number noted that seniority is still important, in part because of the concessions Kinnock had to make to the trade unions. Political considerations are also thought to be important for promotion to the higher echelons of the Commission. As a head of unit noted, “I know I will never be a Director-General because there are already three Spaniards.”9 A large number of officials (55) responded to the question by comparing the current state of affairs with the previous one. The majority of them (31) noted an improvement from before, 16 said that things stayed as before, and only 8 of them said that things had become worse (Table 5.5).

9 Interview #28.

TABLE 5.5. Remarks of Top Officials on Whether Promotion Is Fully Merit Based

Remarks N

Mostly merit based but . . .. . . nationality also important 10. . . connections also important 7. . . seniority also important 19. . . politics also important 16. . . gender also important 1. . . visibility also important 3. . . only up to a certain rank 9

Comparison across timeImproved from before 31Same as before 16Worse than before 8

Positive and negative aspectsMore transparent/more accountability 18Point system has negative effects 14More rigid/cumbersome/ bureaucratic/complicated 28Other 34

Total 214

Note: Some respondents touched on several themes, and their remarks were counted more than once.


Commenting on specific aspects of the new appraisal and pro-motion system, top officials painted a mixed picture. Many of them said that the new system increased transparency and helped make senior bureaucrats more accountable for their decisions. A typical response was that “the Kinnock reforms made things more transparent but at the top of the organization nationality still counts.”10 Another respondent noted: “Yes to Kinnock! The system is more transparent now and it is easier to explain deci-sions to the staff.”11 Similarly another remarked, “Indeed, it is more merit based now than in past. The old system wasn’t that bad. But this one is more transparent.”12

Many officials also noted negative aspects of the new pro-motion system. Many were particularly critical of the point-based appraisal system. The words and phrases used to describe it should suffice to give the overall picture: stressful, awful, demotivating, poisonous, tension-creating, bad for teamwork. Moreover, a number of officials pointed out that the increase in transparency came at the cost of cumbersome procedures that overburden managers. “Now the system is clean and clear. But the exercise is very complicated and heavy and the process has become very time-consuming.”13 Others think that the adminis-trative cost has come at no extra benefit: “The Kinnock reforms did not improve things. They haven’t really changed things. . . The old system was merit based; the new system just made things more cumbersome.”14 Yet others were even more negative: “This Anglo-Saxon, private-sector system is probably making things less efficient. It is making things worse, much more cumbersome. Most private companies are abandoning this system.”15

A number of officials frankly stated that instead of changing the behavior of the bureaucracy, the new promotion system merely formalized existing behavioral patterns within the Commission.

10 E.g. Interview #102.11 Interview #112.12 Interview #133.13 Interview #150.14 Interview #58.15 Interview #166.


According to a head of unit in EuropeAid, “Promotion has never been merit-based. The new system is a complete waste of time. You simply choose people to promote and then, given them the points.”16 A head of unit in DG Information similarly noted that “merit points can make a difference, but their giving out is largely discretionary, as before. Therefore, there has been no change . . . the Kinnock reforms did not change that much and did not live up to the expectations they had created.”17 To some extent, the persistence of the older practices in the system is related to per-ceptions about the importance of nationality in promotions. As a Director in DG Enterprise and Industry put it, “The reforms did not improve the system but simply made it more sophisti-cated. In the past, we understood that promotion was justified by nationality considerations. We now know that still plays a role but it is not that there is a box to check relating to the national-ity factor.”18 Another head of unit in EuropeAid put things even more bluntly: “The Kinnock reforms have been useful but they are all fake. The forms you fill out now give the impression of objectivity but the same forces are at play. An example is the creation of new units, with new directors and director general to fulfill nationality demands. We need to find a job for a Cypriot, for example.”19

Administrative Overdrive?The misgivings of top European officials about the cumbersome-ness of the new personnel policy are largely in line with their views about the expanding body of rules that governs the Commission’s workings. The majority of our interviewees (60 percent) “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement that the Commission is “too bound by rules.” As shown before, this contrasts with their views on the overall structure of the Commission. The cross tab-ulation of their responses on rule boundedness shows that they cut across rank or seniority (Table 5.6). Top officials criticize the



“tendency toward the bureaucratization” brought about by the Kinnock reforms, especially with regards to financial rules. As a director-general complained, “Financial controls were weak; now they are too strong. Regardless of whether you are a big or a small spender, you have the same rules.”20 According to some officials, the Kinnock reforms have brought about an “adminis-trative overdrive” that led to the “proliferation of controllers” and put officials on guard to protect themselves. As one offi-cial noted in exasperation, “it has gotten out of hand! There are too many cooks. There’s a ‘security’ mania. Everybody is afraid of taking risks.”21 Some officials see the expansion in the body of rules as necessary in order to thwart pressures from member states against the Commission, particularly after the Santer res-ignation. Although they understand this as a necessary step to respond to public criticism, they complain that the “reform pen-dulum swung too far” and that “exaggerated controls have been put in place” to “overcompensate for the previous crisis.”22

20 Interview #2.21 Interview #17.22 E.g. Interviews #91, 106, 111, 148.

TABLE 5.6. Is the Commission Too Rule Bound?

No Yes

Position (N = 183)DG/DDG 38 62D 37 63HU 45 55

Total 40 60

Length of Service (N = 166)0–10 years 25 7511–20 44 5621–30 42 58>30 36 64

Total 39 61

Question: Some say the Commission is too bound by rules. Do you agree? (%)


The general sense among top Commission officials about an administrative overdrive does not only cut across rank and seniority but, interestingly, also cuts across the distinct adminis-trative cultures one finds in the organization. Although not eas-ily defined, administrative culture is thought to be one of the main sources of fragmentation in the Commission, especially the divide between Southern and Northern European administrative systems. Southern Europeans are thought to rely more on infor-mal rules, patronage networks, and personal loyalties to carry out their administrative functions, whereas northern Europeans have an image of going by the book, conforming to formal rules, and resisting rule bending (Abélès et al. 1993: 40–46). It is of course difficult to group countries in accordance with these very crude perceptions. Even within countries (e.g. Italy), one can expect to find considerable differences in administrative cultures that complicate efforts to use this divide as a parameter for com-parison; and some countries, like France, do not easily conform to this north-south logic. With these caveats in mind, we tried to explore whether there are any marked differences in how Northern and Southern European administrators see the reforms especially whether “the Commission is too rule bound.” After grouping officials by their country of origin – which we used as a proxy for administrative culture – we did not find any sub-stantial differences between them. North Europeans were just as likely to characterize the Commission as being too rule bound as South Europeans (Table 5.7).23

Overall, then, the general view emerging from the top of the organization is that the Kinnock reforms have achieved prog-ress in some areas but at the cost of introducing burdensome rules and cumbersome procedures. The top management thinks that the Commission is not as hierarchical as it is often por-trayed and that in recent years it has become less hierarchical.

23 In the South European administrative culture pool, we included respondents from Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain, and Portugal (N = 55); and in the North European administrative culture pool, we included the officials from all the remaining member states (N = 126).


The majority of the interviewees also think that the Commission uses recruitment and promotion systems that are largely merit-ocratic, despite the various national or political considerations that it is compelled to take into account. These positive devel-opments, however, should not conceal what appears to be a general trend toward the bureaucratization of the Commission. Most surveyed officials think that the organization is too bound by internal rules at the detriment of individual initiative. They view the procedural turn of the past few years as an adminis-trative overdrive that undermines the willingness of officials to take risks. Moreover, the growing body of rules and regulations is thought to be burdensome, frustrating, and demotivating. An example is the introduction of the new promotion system, which created lengthy bureaucratic procedures.

The bureaucratization brought about by the Kinnock reforms can explain why most officials think that the most impor-tant impediments to doing their job come from within the Commission. As we saw in Chapter 4, many officials are critical of the Parliament, and a number of them think that the intergov-ernmental approach of the Council or particular member states raises obstacles to deeper European integration. To our surprise, though, the largest number of officials sees these external obsta-cles as relatively small compared to those that come from within the organization. When asked to rank the sources of obstacles they come across in their job, 41 percent of top bureaucrats told us that these problems are internal. It is not unusual of course for bureaucrats to look inside their own organization for problems

TABLE 5.7. North-South Divide in Question of Whether the Commission is Too Rule Bound (N = 181)

Administrative Culture No Yes

North European 41 59South European 40 60

Total 41 59

Question: Some say the Commission is too bound by rules. Do you agree? (%)


that keep them from doing their job. Like their colleagues in national administrations, a handful of our sample complained about the lack of human and financial resources as hindrances to their policy-making capacity. Also, some people mentioned the turf wars going on between various DGs. However, most of those who mentioned internal problems noted the rigidification of rules as the most important obstacle they face in their job today. As a director in DG Research put it: “There are obstacles from everywhere, but the major obstacle is the body of rules and regulations. There are new layers of rules and regulations. Their origin is political of course. You spend more money these days controlling and checking.”24 A head of unit in DG Information similarly identifies the source of the obstacles with the aftermath of the Santer resignations: “Obstacles come from everywhere. Member states are always blaming the Commission. There has been a rigidification of rules since the Santer resignations. This has created a number of obstacles in working on the content of policies.”25 A director-general told us that the real obstacle is the fear that the Santer crisis has created fear of making mis-takes. “These four layers of auditing have made people afraid. The obstacle is the fear of making mistakes and the defensive culture this has nurtured. I have to push people.”26 A director in DG Enterprise and Industry similarly thinks that “the obstacles are procedural in nature. The pendulum has over-swung. There is endless paperwork these days. For every penny there are so many people involved. There are so many signatures. Nobody is trusted and zero mistakes are allowed”27 (Table 5.8).

The trend toward the bureaucratization of the Commission has generated strong demands among its top management for simplifying and streamlining the expanded body of rules that have been set in place the past few years. This demand was expressed unequivocally when we asked officials which reforms



they would like to see implemented in the future. Out of the 242 suggestions we recorded, more than a third (35.5 percent) were about the simplification of the rules or procedures governing the organization. Another 14 percent regarded the streamlining of the organization and its rules (Table 5.9).

The extensive remarks of some officials express consider-able exasperation: “In the future, the Commission has to sim-plify procedures. I can’t go to a meeting without getting 50 signatures!”28 “We need to simplify things a lot!”29 “Much more simplified, logical, practical rules are needed. To control one Euro you spend a lot of money, it’s ridiculous.”30 The admin-istrative reforms of the past years are not only threatening effi-ciency, but more importantly, they seem to be undermining the capacity of the Commission to take risks and to innovate. Many officials note that the introduction of so many rules has made people “obsessed with risk.” They believe that “there is a tremen-dous amount of risk aversion in the Commission.” “People have


TABLE 5.8. Sources of Obstacles to Accomplishing Tasks

Number %

The Council of Ministers 42 18.5The European Parliament 18 7.9Other DGs 83 36.6Own DG 10 4.4The Courts 7 3.1Member states 31 13.7Cabinets 1 0.4Other 29 12.8All 4 1.8None 2 0.9

Total 227 100

Question: To the extent that you encounter obstacles in doing your job, where do they mostly come from?


become afraid of fraud and this fear is paralyzing” as fewer are willing to take initiatives.31 “We need to be able to take risks. We need to distinguish between errors and fraud. We now want zero errors, which can’t work.”32 At the same time, the enforcement of lengthy procedures seems to diffuse responsibility and to under-mine the autonomy European officials are thought to enjoy. This might explain why 9.5 percent of the suggestions were about empowering employees by granting them more autonomy. In thinking about future reforms, many officials noted that “the responsibilization or the empowering of officials” is the way for-ward.33 For others, though, this might still be a risky approach. A considerable number of officials argued that no more reforms should be undertaken before the organization is given time to digest the previous changes. As one official characteristically put it, “the past eight years have witnessed permanent reform. The behavioral rules of the game are changing every two years.

31 E.g. Interview #43.32 Interview #141.33 E.g. Interview #156.

TABLE 5.9. Alternative Reforms Proposed

Reforms Mentioned Number %

Streamlining 34 14.0Simplifying 86 35.5Devolve responsibility/ More autonomy

23 9.5

None 23 9.5Don’t know 14 5.8Outsourcing 8 3.3Resourcing/Increase resources 4 1.7Flexibility 9 3.7Coordination 8 3.3Other 33 13.6

Total 242 100

Question: What kind of reforms, if any, would you like to see implemented in the future? (N = 182)


The biggest future reform, then, would be to have a pause in the reform process. We need to stop for a while.”34

Conclusion

Bureaucracies have been under fire in the past decades, blamed for many of the failures of modern states to deliver outcomes that match the growing expectations of their citizens. For most of this time, the Commission managed to escape from the polit-ical storm that sought to undermine the old bureaucratic struc-tures in advanced industrialized democracies. The very nature of the European bureaucracy can go a long way to explain why. The legal grounding of its influence has meant that attempts to change its behavior focused on changing the architecture of European institutions, instead of reforming the organization – for instance, by empowering the Parliament. Its regulatory nature has also been an obstacle to increased political control: Regulatory bureaucracies are almost by definition more differ-entiated from the political sphere than other types of bureaucra-cies. Moreover, the multicephalous nature of political oversight makes it harder to mobilize the political resources necessary for control, and the fragmentation of political authority in the EU complicates efforts to control the bureaucracy by politicizing it.

By the 1990s, though, the Commission had to operate in an increasingly more adverse political environment. The Santer cri-sis pushed the European bureaucracy to the very center of the political storm that had been developing for decades against public bureaucracies. To some extent, the remedies offered to alter the runaway behavior of the Commission have been dif-ferent than in national political settings. The EU bureaucracy has avoided the trend toward politicization evident across even the most Weberian of its member states. Nevertheless, political attempts to curb the autonomy of the Commission have also dis-played some similarities to those witnessed in national contexts.

34 Interview #184.


As remote as the Commission is from national political dis-courses, by the late 1990s, it attracted much criticism, as political executives saw an opportunity to enhance their political capital by publicly denouncing the Brussels bureaucracy and trying to reform it. In seeking to alter the behavior of the organization, the reformers of the Commission borrowed as much from the new public management toolset as those in New Zealand, Australia, or Britain. They sought to make the European bureaucracy more efficient by improving managerial practices.

This chapter has suggested that the progress achieved by the Kinnock reforms in modernizing the organizational structures of the Commission has come at the expense of increasing bureau-cratization. The Kinnock reforms are probably unique in the universe of NPM-inspired administrative reforms in that they are thought to have reduced efficiency instead of enhancing it. It is not only our senior bureaucrats who think so. Middle man-agers have also been reported to have similar concerns about the outcome of the Kinnock reforms (Bauer 2008b). By the end of the reforms, the Commission itself recognized the con-cerning trend toward bureaucratization and the need to strike a “better balance between the costs and benefits of control.” It set the “simplification of procedures and working methods” as its “cross-cutting objective” and sought to streamline some of the newly introduced controls “to achieve productivity gains” (European Commission 2005: 12).

How can we explain the outcome of the reform? Why has the attempt to make the Commission more efficient yielded the opposite results? To fully understand the outcome of the reform effort, it is important to appreciate the political context in which it took place. The adverse political environment the Commission confronted made it inevitable that any change in its internal workings would be to make it more accountable, not just more efficient. The Santer crisis turned the decades-long discussion about reforming the Commission into an exercise of political control. Viewed through the experience of the Kinnock reforms, the introduction of cumbersome rules and exaggerated controls is the price the organization had to pay for its autonomy.


The ultimate question to ask, of course, is whether this bureau-cratization of the Commission will make it more responsive to its political masters – whether, in other words, political execu-tives have managed to curb the autonomy of the Commission and to reduce the power of Brussels bureaucrats. There are some reasons to doubt this. The first one relates to the very nature of bureaucratic organizations. However tiresome or even demoral-izing, rules constitute a source of power for bureaucrats shield-ing them from political intervention. The rules introduced by the Kinnock reforms might enable bureaucrats to deflect political pressures (for example, for top appointments or promotion), thereby shielding the Commission from direct political interven-tion. The second reason relates to the complex nature of the EU. Political attempts to control the Commission by altering its inter-nal workings are based on the premise that the problems related to the European bureaucracy are internal. This is only partly true. As suggested in Chapter 2, the behavior of the Commission is largely owed to the structure of political oversight. While changes in the organization can help make it more responsive to its political masters, the fact that there are several of them makes it harder to control it. The third limit to political attempts to control a bureaucracy is that they might backfire by making the organization more insular to the preferences of its political mas-ters. The evidence presented here shows that, instead of altering the behavior of the bureaucracy, the attempted reforms helped generate general resentment against them. Is this resentment part of a broader culture in the Commission that reinforces its auton-omy from its political overseers? Chapter 6 begins to explore this issue.

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6

Cultural Impediments to Political Control

Political attempts to alter the behavior of a public bureaucracy are less likely to succeed in organizations having a distinctive culture. Organizational cultures are made up of beliefs, values, and norms that shape the behavior of bureaucratic officials and, hence, the behavior of an organization (e.g. Schwartz and Davis 1981; Allaire and Firsirotu 1984; Meek 1988). Culture is the “personality” of an organization shaping the way it interacts with its external environment. Organizations with a strong personal-ity or a distinctive culture might be less malleable to changes in their environment, especially if this culture is associated with a broader mission. As James Q. Wilson points out, “When an orga-nization has a culture that is widely shared and warmly endorsed by operators and managers alike, we say the organization has a sense of mission. A sense of mission confers a feeling of spe-cial worth on the members, and enables the administrators to economize on the use of other incentives” (1989: 95, italics in original). Relying on Philip Selznick’s work, Ernst Haas similarly considers the values of an organization to be important for its autonomy: “The organization’s viability in future periods will continue to depend on the autonomy of the elite associated with it, its high belief in its own standards and task, and its ‘exclusive-ness.’ The organization’s specific values must therefore be given an opportunity to mature” (Selznick 1984, paraphrased in Haas

Cultural Impediments to Political Control 125

2008: 113). When employees really believe in the overall purpose of their organization, the political overseers of this institution will have a harder time altering its behavior. A strong bureau-cratic morale might frustrate attempts to make the organization more responsive to its political masters, even in the face of an increasingly more adverse political environment. A common cul-ture might shield the organization from political attacks and, in this sense, enhance its autonomy from political oversight.

Bureaucratic Culture and the European Commission

Does the European bureaucracy have a common culture that complicates political efforts to make it more responsive? There are good reasons to think so. The first one relates to the legal foundations of the European bureaucracy. The overarching objectives of the European bureaucracy are clearly laid out in EU treaties, which grant the organization a clear mission to pro-mote European integration. It is only to be expected that this strong organizational mandate facilitates the establishment of a common culture within the European bureaucracy pushing for integration. EU treaties also safeguard the autonomy of the Commission granting European bureaucrats a sense of auton-omy from political executives. Anyone seeking a position in the European Commission is reminded in the vacancy description of the obligation that “an official shall carry out his duties and conduct himself solely with the interests of the Communities in mind; he shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person outside his insti-tution. He shall carry out the duties assigned to him objec-tively, impartially and in keeping with his duty of loyalty to the Communities.”1 The legal grounding of the administrative space granted to European bureaucrats reinforces the natural predis-position bureaucrats are thought to have to ignore the will of their political masters.

1 Staff Regulations, Article 11, I-8. http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf (accessed October 18, 2010).


A second reason relates to the functional uniqueness of the organization. The unique nature of the organization could argu-ably be a source of pride for its employees, boosting their morale and helping to nourish an esprit de corps in the Commission. In the universe of international bureaucracies, there is proba-bly no other bureaucracy with such far-reaching authority over sovereign states and with such an extensive range of functions (e.g. Hooghe 2005: 862). The supranational character of the Commission gives the organization prestige that most national and international bureaucracies would envy. The combination of prestige and authority can cement a common sense of belonging for European officials.

A third factor possibly affecting the cultural makeup of the organization is the location of the European bureaucracy. The remoteness of the Commission from European citizens – for which critics often lament the Commission – can be an additional element that binds European officials together. Being away from their home countries and somewhat despised by the locals might help bring Brussels bureaucrats closer to each other than they would otherwise be. “Established for better or worse, and enjoy-ing good living conditions in Brussels, Commission officials are aware that they are outsiders and that they are criticized by the Belgians, with whom many feel that they have no more than super-ficial relations. This reinforces their feelings of belonging to a spe-cial world” (Abélès et al. 1993). Moreover, “many are married to partners from another country (and divorced from a spouse from still another country, come to that). They have multilingual, mul-ticultural children who think of Europe as their nationality.”2 This intermingling of bureaucrats outside the organization can conceiv-ably reinforce the organizational culture of the Commission.

Although there are several factors suggesting that the Commission has a strong organizational culture, there are also considerable forces pulling the internal constituents of the organization apart. The strongest of these is the multinational

2 Charlemagne, “Before the Alter of Europe: Some Parting Reflections on the Faith and Folly of the Brussels Elite,” The Economist, July 1, 2010.


composition of its employees. At one level, the transnational nature of the organization means that the policy input of bureau-cratic officials is possibly influenced by their home countries – an issue we deal with extensively in Chapter 7. As Neill Nugent points out, this might not necessarily mean that European bureaucrats favor their countries. It means, however, that the way officials define policy problems and devise policy solutions is affected by their intimate knowledge of their country of origin (2001: 186). It can also mean that there is a limited scope for socializa-tion of European officials in the Commission because they are socialized prior to their recruitment by national political norms, institutions, and structures (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). At a different level, international bureaucracies like the Commission recruit officials from very diverse cultural or ethnic background and from different national administrative traditions. Although the institutional setting of the European bureaucracy might help mold its employees and nurture a degree of occupational con-formity, transnationality makes it much more difficult to attri-bute the behavior of the entire organization to the multiplicity of customs, norms, and traditions shared by its workforce. Casual and academic observers alike often point out, for example, the variation of administrative cultures one finds between Northern and Southern European bureaucrats. Northern Europeans are thought to favor more transparency than Southern Europeans; and the Germans are stereotyped as lovers of formal rules – more than the Portuguese (see Chapter 5 for a brief discussion). There is also an issue related to the existence of national subcultures in units overrepresented by particular nationalities. The east-ward enlargement, which brought in hundreds of administrators from twelve new member states, has reinforced the multinational nature of the organization and its cultural diversity. The size of the new recruits might have helped dilute any cultural coherence the Commission might have previously enjoyed, further com-plicating attempts to use cultural variables to explain bureau-cratic behavior. Some have suggested that the enlargement has made the European bureaucracy more intergovernmental than it once was, diluting its supranational nature (e.g. Peterson 2008).


Overall, then, the transnational nature of the Commission makes it look to some like a Babel-like institution rather than a coherent organization “infused with value.” Instead of an institution with a “distinct identity” – to use Selznick’s terms (1984: 40) – the Commission is an amalgam of different cultures and traditions, which complicate any analytical effort to treat the organization as a unitary, or even less, an autonomous actor.

To this Babel-looking institution, one must add the fragmen-tation, compartmentalization, and conflict inherent in all big and complex bureaucracies, national and international, public and private alike. In large organizations it is only natural to have turf wars between various departments, especially those with overlapping responsibilities. In the case of the Commission, the policy process requires the close collaboration of several DGs with conflicting interests and agendas. Not surprisingly, close observers of the European bureaucracy often note the clash between various DGs, especially among those with overlapping responsibilities. Some of the most noted ones are those between DG Competition and other DGs, like Transport and Energy, which are said to have resisted the approach of Competition in the liberalization of the sectors. Another example is the tension between DG Environment and DGs concerned with the estab-lishment of a competitive business environment. Or, the inherent conflict between the DG Employment, which is thought to have a vested interest in protecting employment, and DG Transport and Energy, which was more reluctant to allow state assistance to ail-ing industries (e.g. Nugent 2001: 159, 183–184). The contrasting interests, agendas, or even, ideological inclinations of the various departments cast doubt on any effort to attribute the behavior of this vast organization to the shared culture of its employees.

These notable impediments to the establishment of a common bureaucratic culture have not escaped the attention of schol-arly observers of the Commission. The first monograph on the Commission described the Brussels bureaucracy as a “porous organization” confronting “natural limitations to bureau-cratic leadership” (Coombes 1970: 291 and 39, respectively).


Coombes was particularly concerned about the existence of different administrative styles and normative approaches in the Commission. The subsequent enlargement of the organization to include the three Southern European democracies reinforced the diversity of administrative cultures. Along with the rapid expan-sion of the bureaucracy in the 1990s, the enlargement of the EU put strains on the coherence of the organization and worried Delors, who thought that the culture of the Commission was critical to pursuing its integrative role. A team of anthropolo-gists sought to examine these concerns by investigating the effect of different languages and cultures on working relations in the European bureaucracy and on the prospects of forging a com-mon European identity. Their unpublished report contrasts the Commission with national civil services, “which are there to serve an existing state with clearly defined frontiers and a long history.” By contrast the Commission seems to be more like “a vast building site” undertaking a project “of which completion is always being postponed” (Abélès et al. 1993: 4–5).

One of the key points raised by the anthropologists in their study of the Commission culture is that, unlike in national admin-istrations, there is an “absence of a centralized political author-ity at Community level.” Lacking such authority “the executive that the Commission represents is fragile, a prey to the skirmishes characterizing relations between the Member States (Abélès et al. 1993: 4–5).” Can the “European idea” protect the organiza-tion from the particularistic interests of member states and from the attacks against the legitimacy of its authority? Even though the authors find traces of this idea in the European bureaucracy, they also note that it is not enough to counterbalance the centrifugal tendencies set in motion by the diversity characterizing this trans-national institution. They, hence, conclude that “there is no doubt that this pluralism is also felt to have a centrifugal effect which counterbalances all the more classic understandings of adminis-trative integration. It does not lend itself to conventional forms of administrative hierarchy. It can even be a source of instability and confrontation” (Abélès et al. 1993: 69).


Other studies of the Commission have reached similar con-clusions, noting the existence of divergent administrative and national cultures as an impediment to the coherence of the orga-nization (e.g. Page 1997). Going beyond this particularity of this international bureaucracy, others have also noted the standard bureaucratic limitations to organizational cohesion, such as the fragmentation of the bureaucracy and DG-specific cultures that made it harder to establish a common Commission culture. Even during Delors, who is thought to have provided the leadership necessary to bring organizational unity, senior officials talked about the prevalence of DG- or dossier-specific cultures over Commission culture (Cini 1996: 193). In light of these weak-nesses, Michelle Cini concluded her study of the Commission by noting that

There is only a shadow of a cohesive Commission culture, and that organizational features of the institution seem to work against the emer-gence of either a European public service ethic or the re-emergence of a basic belief system, based perhaps on some notion of the European ideal – that is, an emotional (as opposed to pragmatic) commitment to further European integration. (1996: 223)

If everyone accepted the Commission lacks a common cul-ture, there would be no need to revisit the issue; however, there is some dissensus among the few scholars who have explored this issue, which necessitates more research. For example, when acknowledging the divisiveness caused by national diversity, Edward Page also remarks that “there is strong evidence that European Union officials share an enthusiasm for building the institutions of Europe and thus a sense of common purpose unlikely to be found in member state bureaucracies” (1997: 39). Similarly, Cris Shore found “evidence of a strong sense of community and esprit de corps among staff – even among new recruits” and a “highly developed sense of solidarity and con-sciousness of kind” (2000: 131).

Although the cultural predispositions of the European bureaucracy have been the subject of considerable debate among experts, systematic studies of the Commission culture tend to be lacking. This chapter seeks to fill this gap by reporting the


views of European officials themselves on the existence or not of a common culture in the European bureaucracy. The chapter records the views of senior administrators on the cultural profile of the Commission and asks them to comment on the various manifestations of this culture. The first section examines how Commission officials view the culture of their organization as a whole, and the second section analyzes organizational subcul-tures. The third section looks at how European officials under-stand the evolution of organizational culture across time. The fourth section seeks to link the views of top officials with the political environment in which they have been operating.

A Common Bureaucratic Culture

To gauge the views of our interviewees on the cultural attributes of their organization, we first asked them to tell us whether they think “there is an esprit de corps or a common culture across DGs.” Their responses took us by surprise. Contrary to most schol-arly assertions, nearly three out of four top European bureaucrats thought that there is a common culture in the Commission cutting across DGs; 29, or 16 percent, strongly agreed, and another 109, or 60.2 percent, agreed with this statement. Of our interviewees, 32 officials, or 17.7 percent, disagreed with this statement, and 2, or 1.1 percent, of our interviewees strongly disagreed (Table 6.1).

Although officials generally agree that there is a common cul-ture in the Commission, they emphasize different manifestations of this culture. Another question, then, sought to examine the various aspects of the Commission culture that senior officials valued the most. The elaborate descriptions of our interviewees give a good sense of what senior bureaucrats think binds them together. The mission of the organization stands out as one of main components of the Commission culture. Unlike most pub-lic agencies, the Commission has a clear mission to promote the integration of Europe, and this seems to be a significant source of cultural cohesion for the organization. Many of our intervie-wees described this mission in the brightest of colors. A direc-tor in DG Research captured in his comments what many of


interviewees felt: “Working for the Commission is like working for a cause.”3 What is this cause? For a director in DG Trade, this common cause is political and relates to the historical legacy of war and conflict on the continent. “We work for a common purpose, that of constructing a new Europe. We think of giving up sovereignty as a new form of cooperation. People here are aware of this and it binds us together.”4 Similarly, some officials emphasize their loyalty to the ideal of European integration. “There is a common sense about our role here. There is a sense of commitment to European integration. There is a common and shared purpose.”5 Or, as another official put it: “There is com-mitment to the European project. We are all for a particular type of Europe.”6 “We are an administration with a mission. We feel like the avant garde.”7 Part of the overall purpose of this avant garde is to make European citizens support the European proj-ect. A senior official in DG Environment put this very lucidly: “In Procter and Gamble, they are trying to sell soap. Here, we are selling Europe.”8

Another contributor to the existence of a common culture in the Commission relates to the input it has in the policy process. A

TABLE 6.1. Is There an esprit de corps or Common Culture Across DGs in the Commission?

Number %

Strongly agree 29 16.0Agree 109 60.2Disagree 32 17.7Strongly disagree 2 1.1Don’t know 9 5.0

Total 181 100

3 Interview #6.4 Interview #62.5 Interview #67.6 Interview #85.7 Interview #104.8 Interview #21.


number of our interviewees went out of their way to emphasize that, unlike their national counterparts, they are more heavily immersed in the drafting of policies that affect the lives of half a billion Europeans. Their involvement in policy making is a source of pride and prestige for senior European bureaucrats who are eager to defend the right of initiative granted by the founding European Economic Community Treaty. According to some of our officials, the job of the Commission is to produce innovative ideas about Europe by “defending its autonomy and the right of initiative.”9 The importance European bureaucrats ascribe to their policy-making role might explain the notable differences we found among officials working in administrative and pol-icy units, in responses about the existence of a common culture. Although there is a widespread consensus that the various DGs share a set of cultural attributes, in those departments related to the administration of the bureaucracy – like the Secretariat General, the DG Budget, the Internal Audit Service and the DG Personnel and Administration – this view is much less prevalent than in the policy-related units. Perceptions of a common culture are most widespread in those units dealing with external affairs and in DGs dealing with supply-side and market-oriented poli-cies (Table 6.2).

The pride European officials take in their job and especially in their policy input is also evident in their responses to a dif-ferent question, about policy innovation. Asked “who on the whole generates innovative policies,” a large number of officials named their own organization. Ninety-eight, or 39 percent, of all responses chose the Commission services as the most reliable source of innovation, pointing to the importance to teamwork being done across levels. Another 26 officials, or 10.4 percent, of all responses pointed to the units of the Commission, and 8 respondents, or 3.2 percent, identified the directors themselves as the leaders in policy innovation. Most officials view the European bureaucracy as a source of original input and fresh ideas but some also recognize the contribution of their immediate political

9 Interview #171.


superiors. A few officials noted the role of the College, individ-ual Commissioners, or Cabinets in the generation of innovative ideas. The real political masters of the bureaucracy, the Council, and the Parliament were named by a much fewer number of offi-cials. In line with our findings in Chapter 4 about the importance of special interests in the policy process, many more European officials named interest groups and stakeholders as generators of policy innovation. Overall, though, European administrators take considerable pride in their own capacity to come up with groundbreaking ideas (Table 6.3).

Even though many officials consider the policy-making role of the organization helps bind them together, others go beyond the institutional and functional mandate of the Commission to account for its common organizational culture. Many of the offi-cials pointed out that what goes on outside the Commission is as important for nurturing a common sense of belonging, and ulti-mately, making European bureaucrats feel closer to one another. In particular, some officials pointed out to the significance of social life in Brussels. A senior official in DG Research captured in his comments what many of his colleagues described when

TABLE 6.2. Is There a Common Culture in the Commission, by DG Type?

Agree Disagree Don’t Know

Total (%)

Total (N)

Administration 62.5 31.2 6.3 100 16External affairs 83.7 11.6 4.7 100 43Market-oriented 74.2 22.6 3.2 100 31Supply-side 78.7 19.2 2.1 100 47Provision and redistribution

70.8 20.8 8.3 100 24

Social regulation 72.2 16.7 11.1 100 18

Note: Administration = 24–37; External affairs = 18–23; Market-oriented = 2, 3, 6, 11, 16; Supply-side = 7, 10, 12, 15, 17; Provision and redistribution = 1, 8, 14; Social regulation = 4, 5, 9, 13. Each number refers to a directorate or service. See Appendix A. Categorization of directorates or services based on Hooghe 2001.Question: Do you think there is an esprit de corps or common culture across DGs?


asked about the manifestations of a common culture: “We are quite isolated civil servants, away from home, with a lot of privi-leges. Belgians have a negative image of European civil servants and do not interact with us that much. Hence, social life revolves around the EU here. When we go out at social events and gath-erings we interact with other EU employees, with people from embassies, etc.”10 For a number of officials, the lack of interac-tion with the Belgians pushes European civil servants to interact with another or, as one put it, “to stick together.” “The common culture comes out of being foreigners in a foreign land. We are enthusiastic about our work and determined to make a success of the job we are doing.”11

Although the majority of the officials thought that there is a common culture in the Commission, we also came across a few people who disagreed with this idea. The most frequent objection related to the typical bureaucratic turf battles going on among the various DGs. Some officials mentioned bitter

TABLE 6.3. Where Do Innovative Policies Originate?

Number %

The Council of Ministers 13 5.2The Parliament 6 2.4The College of Commissioners 8 3.2Individual Commissioners 13 5.2Commissioners’ Cabinets 15 6.0Commission/Services (teamwork across levels)

98 39.0

Units 26 10.4Directors 8 3.2Interest groups, NGOs, trade unions 36 14.3Stakeholders 7 2.8Other 21 8.4

Total 251 100

Question: Who on the whole generates innovative policies?



budgetary and competency disputes among DGs as evidence for the lack of a common culture. Others mentioned mul-tinationality as a source of division and disconnect among European bureaucrats. Instead of nurturing an esprit de corps, one official thought that multinationality helps promote an “esprit national.” Another official pointed out that although he would hope for a common culture, it is now lacking. “We do not operate like an international organization. We are more like national bureaucracies put together.”12 Overall, though, only a small minority of our respondents thought that the Commission lacks a common culture. A large majority of European officials feel a sense of common belonging that brings them closer to their organization.

Does the way officials think about the culture of the Commission vary by the length of their service in the organiza-tion? Should we expect longer-serving officials to have substan-tially different views about the cultural makeup of the European bureaucracy than more recent recruits? One could arguably expect more experienced officials to have a different sense about the cultural profile of the organization than their younger col-leagues. Longer-serving officials had more time to absorb the cultural ingredients of the organization they work for, and their experience equips them with the ability to distil those cultural elements that are shared across the bureaucracy. Our data shows that, for the most part, the views of European officials about the existence of a common culture in the Commission cut across their years of service in the organization. Those working at the organization since its very early years are as likely to think that the Commission has a common culture as the more early recruits, including those of the Delors era (Table 6.4). Only the very recent recruits, those of the past decade, are slightly less likely to report that there is a common culture in the Commission. Even in this group, however, a large majority believes that there is a shared culture in the organization.

12 Interview #122.


Subcultures in the Commission

The existence of a common culture across the entire European bureaucracy does not mean that there are no subcultures in this vast and complex organization. Senior bureaucrats are con-vinced that there is a common culture across the Commission but they also acknowledge the parallel existence of strong cul-tures within their DGs (Table 6.5). Asked this exact question – whether there is an esprit de corps or common culture within their DGs –121, or 78.1 percent, said that there is. Interestingly, more people “strongly agreed” with this statement (25.2 per-cent) than with the one about an overall Commission culture (16 percent). The parallel existence of an overall organizational culture and departmental subcultures suggests that the two are not necessarily antithetical. Departmental subcultures might not necessarily conflict with – and could even reinforce – the overall culture of an organization (e.g. Hooghe 2005: 868). This find-ing is consistent with work on the “European Executive Order” showing the coexistence of distinct decision-making dynamics within this order (Trondal 2010).

Just as the overall culture of the European bureaucracy is thought to be shaped by its integrative mission, subcultures of the Commission seem to be molded by the policy function of individual DGs. The policy domain of a DG helps attract bureaucrats who might feel a similar inclination toward serv-ing those policy goals and objectives. Many of our interviewees attributed the common culture of their DG to its broader policy

TABLE 6.4. Is There a Common Culture (by years of service)?

Years of Service

Agree Disagree Don’t Know

Total (%) Total (N)

0–10 69.0 27.6 3.4 100 2911–20 77.6 15.8 6.6 100 7621–30 77.1 20.8 2.1 100 4831– 76.2 19.0 4.8 100 21


mission. One official suggested, for example, that “people work-ing for development DGs have a more ethical esprit, that of working for the poor and for the suffering. They have a more adventurous approach to life.”13 Similarly, another bureaucrat noted that in DG Development “people are ethically committed to development.”14 An official working in the DG Humanitarian Aid likewise suggested that so much is the commitment of his colleagues to the mission of this DG that “when a crisis arises in some part of the world, people come into the office even if they do not have to. We help each other out all the time. People from one unit do favors for people in others units. People are committed to humanitarianism.”15 In DG Internal Market and Services the cul-ture is very different from that in DG Humanitarian Aid because their missions seem to attract people with different values. As one director of this DG observed, “we definitely have a different culture in this DG. People come here because they have a cer-tain bias. Most people are liberals – in the European sense of the word. They are more individualistic, more ambitious . . . We have a reputation of being in favor of competition.”16

The culture in a DG is not only because of its specific pol-icy function but it is also because of the type of expertise it

TABLE 6.5. Is There a Common Culture or an esprit de corps within DGs?

Number %

Strongly agree 39 25.2Agree 82 52.9Disagree 31 20.0Strongly disagree 0 0.0Don’t know 3 1.9

Total 155 100



attracts. Elite studies have long been interested in the training of bureaucratic officials highlighting, for example, distinctions between the generalist training of British bureaucrats and the juridical training of German officials. Professional training does not only furnish bureaucrats with knowledge and expertise but also helps shape the way they approach various policy prob-lems. As Barnett and Finnemore put it, professional training “actively seeks to shape the normative orientation and world-views of those who are trained. Doctors are trained to value life above all else, soldiers are trained to sacrifice life for cer-tain strategic objectives, and economists are trained to value efficiency” (1999: 722–723). Barnett and Finnemore apply their insights to the study of international bureaucracies, like the World Bank, which are likely to recruit professionals with training in economics. The concentration of professionals with a particular training generates organizational mind-sets that are different from those of the larger environment. The Commission is a much more complex bureaucracy than most of its inter-national counterparts, with a much broader set of functional competencies. As such, it seems to recruit people with a more diverse professional training (see Chapter 3) than that found in international bureaucracies. The importance of professional training is much more evident, though, in specific DGs. Some of our officials suggested, for example, that their DGs have a high concentration of economists who “are much more individ-ualistic and like to work much more on their own.”17 The DG Economic and Financial Affairs is one of the examples of direc-torates, which according to our interviewees, recruits a higher concentration of economists than the average. As we were told by one of them, “Economists think alike and their training takes over the nationality issue.”18 Others point out that some DGs recruit “technicians” who are more likely to share a common culture because they share a similar understanding of the issues at stake.



The existence of a common culture does not only depend on the policy mission of a DG or on the professional training of its employees but also on a function of its relative size, resources, competence, and age. A number of officials pointed out that in smaller DGs it is easier to form a common culture or an esprit de familie than in bigger ones, like those dealing with trade or agriculture. As a director in DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries remarked, “We are a relatively small DG, very interesting and lively. We have direct contact with the fisheries industry. People want to stay in fisheries, feeling that they have more responsi-bilities here than they would have elsewhere. We are only 350 people, so there is less anonymity.”19 A director in DG Transport and Energy, which employs nearly three times that many people, also emphasized the importance of size: “The esprit in this DG is not like Krazy Glue. Esprit is very dependent on size. There is a difference between living in a village and living in a city. We are a big DG.”20

The size of a DG must not be viewed in isolation with other DG-specific attributes affecting the formation of subcultures, like resource availability, policy competence, and organizational maturity. Bigger DGs, like DG Agriculture, could also be those with larger resources at their disposal, with more precise and clearer missions, and with enough institutional history to allow the nurturing of particular subcultures. Resources allow bureau-cratic units to develop organizational autonomy by creating their own subunits, which limit their reliance and interaction with the central bureaucratic machine. A topmost official in DG Agriculture describes how resources, competence, and age can turn a DG into “an entity in itself”: “Our DG has clear com-petence, clear vision, a long history, lots of money and lots of power. We get almost 45% of the EU budget, after all. We have our own legal service, budget and finance department, as well as an external relations unit.”21 DG Competition is not as large and



does not have as many resources as DG Agriculture, but it has the power to fine global conglomerates like Microsoft or Intel and to block transatlantic mergers. These powers grant senior bureaucrats working in the DG considerable visibility, which serves as the common driver and forms the basis of a common culture. One of the most senior officials in DG Competition explains how the policy competence of his DG helps energize officials, creating a dynamic culture based on outputs: “This DG has a lot of power. We have direct dialogue with outside actors and we can sanction and fine large companies. People here are very highly motivated, in part because our decisions get very high public visibility.”22 Of course, subcultures do not develop overnight. A number of officials attributed the lack of a common culture to the young age of their DG. A director in the recently founded European Anti-Fraud Office, for example, pointed out that it lacks an esprit “because it is very young. We are working on this but we are still a very young organization.”23 For the same reason, a number of officials pointed out that the reorga-nization – breakup or merger – of DGs has taken a toll on the culture. Those working in such DGs point out that such reorga-nization affects their culture not only by changing their human makeup but also by modifying their competencies and reducing their resources. Similarly, some officials note that the rotation policy for senior European officials, which sets limits to their length of service in a particular DG, seems to be an impediment in the formation of new cultures, especially in the newer DGs where employee turnover seems to be higher.

A Weakening Culture?

Senior European officials think that there is a common culture across and within DGs but also feel that this culture is weaker now than what it was in the past. Most of those who think there is a common culture appeared nostalgic of previous eras, or the



“heroic times” as one official called them, when pride and loy-alty to the organization seemed to be stronger. Sixty-nine, or 56.1 percent, of those who thought there is a common culture in the Commission pointed out that this is “weaker now than in the past.” Only 12 respondents, or 9.8 percent, thought that it is stronger, and another 25 officials, or 20.3 percent, pointed out that the culture of the organization is as strong as it was before (Table 6.6).

Why do top officials feel that the common culture of the European Commission is eroding? As expected, senior bureau-crats were apprehensive about the effect of the recent eastward enlargement on the cohesion of their organization. Although many officials appreciate the ideas generated by colleagues from different national backgrounds, they also worry that the suc-cessive enlargements are weakening the common culture of the Commission. “In the Commission the esprit is founded on the notion that we push a neutral, genuine European interest. We cultivate the spirit of pushing integration forward. Because of enlargement, however, there has been an increase in the num-ber of nationalities represented in the Commission. This has made the process of promoting the European interest less auto-matic and has, hence, weakened the esprit.”24 For some offi-cials, though, this is just a transitional period during which

TABLE 6.6. Change in Commission Culture Over Time

Number %

Weaker now than in the past 69 56.1Stronger now than in the past 12 9.8As strong as before 25 20.3As weak as before 4 3.3Don’t know 13 10.6

Total 123 100

Question: Regarding the existence of common culture across DGs, respondent told that “there is a common culture but it is . . .”

24 Interview #56.


the Eastern European recruits will assimilate the culture of the Commission.

Some of our interviewees sense a shift in the motivations for joining the organization, which has diluted the devotion and loy-alty to the original mission of the European bureaucracy. Some of the more experienced officials feel that the early recruits of the organization were people who were more attracted to the European ideals of peace and security than to the economic priv-ileges that are now associated with the office. They point out that when the Commission was a nascent organization, there was a lot of uncertainty about its future, and hence the economic attrac-tion of joining was less obvious than it is now that it has become an established bureaucracy. A director in DG Environment has described this change in motivations for joining the organiza-tion: “All the officials joined in the past for idealistic reasons motivated by their will to redress World War II divides. They were ready to fight together against external elements for the sake of European integration. Today the motivation to join the Commission is an economic one.”25 A director in DG Economic and Financial Affairs was equally nostalgic of the good old days of idealism: “It would be nice if the esprit was stronger across the Commission, but this is difficult. The first generation of European civil servants were idealists but the new recruits are not.”26 For one of the directors-general we interviewed, this loss of idealism is the inevitable result of organizational expansion: “When I first arrived there was definitely an esprit. But we were merely 2.200 officials back then while now we have 23.000. Today, people join the Commission for different reasons, not out of idealism.”27

For some of the more optimistic officials, the weakening of organizational culture is not necessarily tied to bureaucratic expansion, but to the very success of the European integration project. As European integration has progressed and has spread across many policy areas, the European bureaucracy is thought



to have become a victim of its own success. As some officials put it, “The institutional dream has become a reality.”28 “The ideal of European integration has occurred and the dream has been realized.”29 Having achieved its major goal of deeper integration, it now lacks a new vision that would sustain the “institutional patriotism” previously shared by its top employees. According to these officials, the Commission is undergoing a process of nor-malization that makes it increasingly more similar to national administrations. The reality of European integration is thought to reduce the effect that the overall mission of the Commission has on its organizational culture. As Chapter 7 shows, this does not mean that the European bureaucracy has lost its strong sense of mission but that officials are less attached to this mission than they used to be.

For other officials, the dilution of organizational culture was less a matter of institutional accomplishment, but more an issue of leadership. A number of our respondents pointed out that dur-ing the Delors presidency the Commission had a clearer vision, which helped create a sense of purpose among European bureau-crats that has since been weakening. Subsequent presidents, point some bureaucrats, have lacked a clear sense of direction, and this has affected the common culture nurtured during the Delors era. According to a director in DG Information Society and Media, “The common culture got weaker since the senior management changed and since Delors left. He had a drive . . . a vision, and this brought people together. The past few Commissions have lacked a strong leader. There has been no sense of an overall frame-work or direction.”30 The importance of having a clear direction is closely related of course to the institutional mandate of the European Commission to act as the engineer of European inte-gration. What Delors was thought to bring to the Commission is clarity about the institutional role the Commission was supposed to play. “Delors created a sense of shared motivation. You had the clear idea that you are working for European integration.”31



Bureaucratic Culture and Political Attacks

Bureaucratic culture is not only affected by factors that are endogenous to the organization but also shaped by the broader political environment in which the bureaucracy operates. For more than a decade, the Commission has been operating in an adverse political environment as its political masters have been less willing to accept its autonomous role in EU policy making. During the Santer crisis, the European bureaucracy found itself on the defensive struggling to fight off political accusations for runaway tendencies that caused fraud, mismanagement, and nepotism. How has this changing political context affected the organizational culture of the bureaucracy?

The events of 1999 created a sense among our officials that their organization is under attack from the outside. “We are under attack from all quarters, by our own mother and father. People feel abandoned.”32 Senior bureaucrats think that the allegations for fraud, nepotism, and mismanagement demoti-vated the civil service by creating the impression to outsiders of corruption and incompetence. “The Santer Commission was a knock for the culture of the organization. Officials have less of a feeling of security now. Instead the staff feels that they are not looked after.”33 An official in DG Industry and Enterprise sim-ilarly considered the Santer resignation to have been a “strong blow for the Commission. Lots of staff were treated in an unde-served and appalling manner by outsiders. People feel they have been unfairly treated. There is a need to differentiate between bad and good officials, instead.”34

The sense bureaucrats share that their organization is under attack from the outside has helped bring them closer together to confront external challenges. Their comments suggest that the institutional setbacks might have inadvertently enhanced the cohesiveness of the European bureaucracy by making bureaucrats identify against a common organizational threat. Describing the



culture of the Commission as one of “a big law firm,” one offi-cial suggests that “having a common enemy motivates officials and clarifies their goals and objectives.”35 At a time when the Commission found itself in the center of political controversy over the services liberalization directive or the failed European Constitution ratification drive, some officials thought that these setbacks were making their organization stronger. “When we are attacked from the outside, we close ranks.”36 A number of offi-cials noted that the solidarity European bureaucrats feel among them is particularly evident in their interaction with outside actors. “When you are outside and you meet somebody from the Commission you feel solidarity.”37 “People are largely integra-tionist here. When we are criticized from the outside, there is a spontaneous feeling of solidarity.”38 Another official pointed out that although the common culture is getting weaker, it is still a fact that “when a Commission official is in the outside world, and is being attacked, we defend the Commission.”39 “People try to present a united front externally and they willingly try to help colleagues achieve their objectives.”40 “You can recognize an esprit in how Commission officials address each other and converse with each other in the outside world. European officials have a common approach to problems; they have an open mind, they are internationalist and they are committed to European ideas.”41 “I do not know how to define this esprit . . . You sense it when you meet outsiders and there are people from other DGs.”42 Capturing the mood we came across in many interviews, another official points out that European bureaucrats “have a common desire to serve the European project. Perhaps because of difficul-ties we have become stronger in our convictions.”43 The adverse

35 Interview #192.36 Interview #151.37 Interview #137.38 Interview #133.39 Interview #107.40 Interview #114.41 Interview #63.42 Interview #74.43 Interview #97.


political environment, then, seems to be a source of unity for the European bureaucracy. Instead of making the bureaucracy more responsive to the preferences of its political overseers, political attacks against the Commission seem to reinforce the cultural coherence of the organization, thereby making it less malleable to the changes in its political environment.

Conclusion

To outside observers, the European Commission seems like a modern bureaucratic Babel – a “porous” organization employing people from very diverse cultural backgrounds, administrative traditions, and professional training. In combination with the bitter turf wars that take place in any bureaucratic organiza-tion, the diversity that characterizes the personnel of the bureau-cracy constitutes an obvious impediment to the formation of a common organizational culture in the Commission. According to most observers, the impact of this diversity on cohesion is strong enough to overshadow the influence of other factors, like the distinct mission of the organization and its uniqueness. Even though both of these could be the constituents of a common bureaucratic culture, their influence on the cultural makeup of the organization is thought to be limited by its very diversity.

Scholarly observations about the cultural profile of the European bureaucracy sharply contrast with the views of those at the helm of the administration. Contrary to scholarly assertions, senior bureaucrats think that they share a common culture or an esprit de corps despite their diverse backgrounds, traditions, and training. The clear mission of the organization to promote European integration stands out as one of the most important factors binding European officials together, but it is not the only one. The degree of involvement of European bureaucrats in policy making is a constant source of pride for their work and makes them feel different than their national counterparts. Distance from their home countries and from the Belgian society is another factor that helps push European bureaucrats closer than most scholarly observers think. According to our officials,


this distance makes social life in Brussels revolve around the Commission and provides an additional bond among European bureaucrats that national administrators lack.

The culture of the entire European bureaucracy coexists with strong subcultures within individual DGs. Based on the descrip-tions of senior bureaucrats, these subcultures are not shaped by the national composition of individual DGs or by the dif-ferent administrative cultures most scholars identify as sources of organizational disunity. The existence of these subcultures is largely affected by the policy mission the various DGs serve – for instance, helping the poor or opening markets. The formation of subcultures within DGs is also because of the concentration of bureaucrats with similar professional training. Although the Commission as a whole recruits bureaucrats with very different expertise, within DGs one can find people who share a similar understanding of the issues at stake and of possible solutions – for example, economists or lawyers. Finally, subcultures are also related to the size, resources, competence, and age of a DG. For example, new DGs are less likely to have a common culture than those who have been around for decades, unaffected by reorga-nization and restructuring.

Most senior bureaucrats think that they share a common cul-ture, however, they also acknowledge that the culture of this organization has been weakening over time. Undoubtedly, it will take some time for the new recruits from Eastern Europe to internalize the culture of the European bureaucracy. In the meantime, this remains a source of division within the organi-zation diluting its common culture. Regardless of the enlarge-ment, the motivations of younger recruits are also thought to be changing. Older recruits note that the idealism that character-ized those who entered the organization during its early years is now being replaced by economic motivations for joining the Commission. For yet others, it is a matter of leadership: Delors provided a clear sense of direction to the Commission that is now lacking. Nevertheless, the weakening culture might also be a result of the very success of the European project. In its founding days, the Commission pursued the dream of European


integration that is now more of a reality. The growing accom-plishment of its founding mission is gradually normalizing the Commission, turning it into a more conventional bureaucratic organization than it once was.

A fading organizational culture is likely to increase bureau-cratic vulnerability to external challenges. Bureaucrats sharing a common culture can better resist exogenous threats to their authority than those without common cultural bonds. A com-mon culture can serve as a bulwark against political attempts to alter the behavior of a public bureaucracy. In this respect, the perceived deterioration of the Commission’s cultural coherence could plausibly limit its capacity to exercise political leadership and to undermine its autonomy from its political overseers. Put simply, the erosion of cultural coherence could be interpreted as a signal of organizational weakness, exposing the organization to political interference that could otherwise be resisted. This cul-tural “reading” of the current predicament of the Commission is not that different from that of institutional analyses, which note the dwindling political weight of the organization in the past couple of decades albeit for different reasons. In combination to its decreasing clout in the EU institutional nexus, the loss of cul-tural coherence might be seen as yet another indication that the Commission is speedily conceding ground in the face of external political pressure to become a normal bureaucracy.

The responses of many senior officials suggest that this con-clusion would be premature. The adverse political environ-ment seems to provide a source of internal unity reinforcing the organizational culture of the Commission. The frequent polit-ical attacks against the Commission encourage bureaucrats to close ranks against those who challenge their autonomy and undermine their legitimacy. The external challenges have helped bureaucrats rely on the basic cultural traits of their organization to come together and defend it. At a time, then, when the culture of the bureaucracy seems to be weakening, the adverse politi-cal environment facing the Commission helps to strengthen its cultural coherence and its capacity to effectively address exter-nal challenges. Political attacks against the bureaucracy trigger


organizational reflexes that help the bureaucracy reinforce its defense mechanisms to buttress its authority. In the midst of polit-ical doubts about the role of the Commission and the European integration project in general, the European bureaucracy can be expected to dispel the concerns of its critics and to firmly back its institutional mission. Chapter 7 examines in more detail how the political challenges affect the attitudes of European officials toward the European project and the supranational mission of the organization.

151

7

Custodians of “Europe”

Public bureaucracies have an acute survival instinct that allows them to hold on to their power even in the face of political adver-sity. In fact, a hostile political environment might help sharpen this instinct by encouraging bureaucrats to close ranks to face the external challenges. As Chapter 6 suggested, the persistent political attacks against the European bureaucracy have inad-vertently reinforced the cultural coherence of the organization, thereby strengthening its defenses against those who challenged its autonomy and its legitimacy. Building on the findings of the Chapter 6, this chapter examines in more detail various mani-festations of organizational culture and further explores how European officials respond to external political threats. An important dimension of bureaucratic culture and of bureaucratic responses to political challenges relates to how administrators seek to legitimate their own authority by discounting the prefer-ences of their current principals and by claiming to defend the interests of future Europeans.

Self-legitimation is in the behavioral repertoire of all bureau-cratic organizations. As Barker points out, self-legitimation is an intrinsic element of government just as worship is of religion (2001: 30). If this is true of all public bureaucracies, it is even truer for international bureaucracies, which sometimes lack the legitimacy national administrations enjoy. Public conviction


about the appropriateness of political institutions is easier to maintain for national bureaucracies than for international sec-retariats that are often remote from society and far too complex for citizens to understand or appreciate (see Chapter 2). In the case of the Commission, the need for self-legitimation is even more pressing than for most international secretariats because of its extraordinary authority and because of the pressing chal-lenges to this authority by other EU actors, like the European Parliament. As discussed in Chapter 2, the struggle for institu-tional legitimacy among the various EU actors turns the European bureaucracy into an easy target for European political executives who seek to enhance their own legitimacy at the expense of the Commission.

Faced with external challenges to its legitimacy, the Commission has a pressing need to generate legitimacy from within – to show that it is the most appropriate institution for European society. The main suggestion of this chapter is that European bureaucrats seek to legitimate their authority by discounting the preferences of their political masters and by claiming to serve future Europeans. Unable to derive legitimacy from their current political masters, European bureaucrats tend to downplay the wisdom of their direct and indirect political overseers – politi-cians and citizens – and allege to be serving the interests of a voiceless master – the future European. The preferences of future European citizens cannot be ascertained, of course. Hence, the “future European” is an ideal political master for the bureau-cracy granting it the necessary justification to push through an integrationist agenda in line with the mission and interests of the organization. The claim that they are looking after the interests of the next generation of Europeans constitutes an intellectual device that bureaucrats employ to generate legitimacy for their organization – the legitimacy that the masters of the bureaucracy deny it. This self-serving legitimation effort constitutes a means for bureaucrats to maintain their autonomy from their current political overseers.

There are several manifestations of bureaucratic efforts to enhance the legitimacy of their organization. One aspect of such

Custodians of “Europe” 153

efforts relates to how bureaucrats interpret the external chal-lenges the organization faces. What do they make of the political adversity the Commission confronts? What is their take on the increasing public skepticism against the European integration project? Another aspect of self-legitimation relates to the atti-tudes senior bureaucrats have about the integration project itself. Intrinsic to the claim that they are serving future Europeans is a broader supranational vision about the future of the European Union – a vision that is so widespread that it cuts across the nationality, seniority, and position of officials. Senior European bureaucrats can be expected to share a supranational vision about the future of the EU, which is consistent with their claim that they are serving the future generations of European citizens. The remainder of this chapter documents the views of European officials on Euroskepticism and supranationalism to show how these bureaucrats seek to legitimate their authority by discount-ing the preferences of their current political overseers and by claiming to know best the interests of future Europeans.

The Views of Senior Bureaucrats on Euroskepticism

To gain more insights on the attitudes of senior European bureaucrats toward the broader political environment in which they operate, we asked them to comment on the sources of Euroskepticism. Their responses on public attitudes toward the European project offered a rare opportunity to examine what bureaucrats make of the preferences of European citizens and of public reactions to integration. As discussed in Chapter 3, the timing could not have been better for examining the take of European bureaucrats on Euroskepticism. The fate of the European constitution brought to the surface popular apprehen-sion about the European project pushing the EU in what politi-cians termed as a deep crisis. In the midst of the saga created by the rejection of the constitution by French and Dutch voters, we were curious to know what our respondents made of this crisis. We, hence, asked them to identify the sources of Euroskepticism and recorded their responses. Most of our interviewees think


that the sources of Euroskepticism lie outside their organiza-tion. While identifying different causes for public skepticism, they agree that the problem mostly lies with the skeptics them-selves. The skeptics are thought to be the victims of European politicians who blame Brussels for everything that goes wrong in Europe. In this way, politicians are also thought to cover their own ignorance about what the Commission does and how the EU operates. As the coding of the responses on Table 7.1 shows, only a few officials blame the Commission itself for the state of European affairs and for the political crisis of the European Union.

Given that no politician ever lost votes by attacking a bureau-cracy (Wilson 1989), it is hardly surprising that bureaucrats con-sider challenges to their authority to be part of a political game that has less to do with bureaucratic performance than with the way politicians themselves behave. The most common response of our officials is that Euroskepticism is a result of the blame game politicians play against Brussels. Senior European officials think that their political masters do not stand up to the task of taking responsibility for their decisions and resort to blaming the European bureaucracy for things that go wrong either domesti-cally or in the EU. The remarks of a director in DG Personnel and Administration were typical of the reaction our question elicited among top European officials: “Euroskepticism is the politicians’ fault. When things go bad, Brussels becomes the scapegoat – blame Brussels. Then people get to think that it is the EU’s fault.”1 Senior Commission officials strongly feel that “national politi-cians are giving a negative and false picture of the EU” that gets to affect what people make of it.2 They are also frustrated by the tendency of European political executives to claim that difficult decisions “have been imposed by Brussels, which is false.”3 For a number of officials, the political treatment of the Commission is characteristic of the political behavior Wilson notes (1989). As one official bluntly put it, “Politicians are politicians. If things are



going well, they say it is because of them. If things go badly, they blame others, like the EU. It is a very common phenomenon.”4 Some officials think that the blame game played against the Commission is similar to that played against national bureau-cracies – that the very nature of bureaucracy makes it an easy target for politicians. Others note, however, that the special char-acteristics of the European bureaucracy make this blame game much more damaging for the Commission than it is for national administrations. The remoteness of the European bureaucracy from ordinary citizens and the complexity of the tasks it handles make it a much easier target for its political masters – both at the national and the European level. As many of our respon-dents noted, the nature of the Commission makes it an ideal bureaucratic target for political executives (Table 7.1). The lim-ited implementation powers of the European bureaucracy mean that it does not have direct contact with people, while its regula-tory function gives it an intrinsic complexity that many national administrations lack. As a director in DG Employment put it, “We are paid to be a scapegoat. We are very remote from the people. Citizens, even members of national parliaments, do not realize how complex of a job it is to run an open market in 18 languages. Our ‘weird’ rules always have some utility. Trying to harmonize rules through regulation is difficult.”5 In addition to the special characteristics of the Commission, some bureaucrats also associate the blame game with the successful integration run of the Delors Commission. “Delors’ successful push has put the fear of God in national politicians.”6

Senior bureaucratic officials also attribute Euroskepticism to the failure of European citizens to appreciate the benefits of European integration. As Table 7.1 shows, a large number of our respondents associate Euroskepticism with a general lack of appreciation for the gains the EU delivers to Europeans. For a considerable number of our interviewees, this failure is a result



of nationalist sentiments as well as the fears of European citi-zens about the loss of national identity. As the introduction of this book pointed out, European officials are often thought to consider nationalism to be one of the greatest threats to the European integration project. This perception outsiders have about European bureaucrats seems to be valid. In their extensive remarks, senior officials portrayed European citizens as victims of nationalism that undermines the capacity of citizens to appre-ciate the rewards of integration. In the words of an Irish director, “It is difficult to extinguish nationalism. The flag is the enemy of

TABLE 7.1. Sources of Euroskepticism

Remarks N

Blame game of member states 91Cultural protectionism/Nationalism/Fear of globalization 29

Lack of informationFailure of Commission to explain/inform 5Failure of politicians to explain/inform 20Ignorance of EU citizens 50Citizens forget benefits of integration 12Communication problems 47Media 32Complexity of EU 21Lack of transparency 8

Nature of CommissionDistance 21Bureaucracy 9

Expectations gap/Failure of EU to deliver 17Lack of political leadership/political responsibility 11General political malaise/crisis/alienation 11Economic situation 19Integration process/speed 9Own mistakes/arrogance 4Other 20

Total 436

Note: Coding of textual responses to question “What would you say are the main sources of Euroskepticism that we see across the EU, and obviously more clearly in some member states than in others?” (Most people mentioned more than one source).


mankind working together. The residue of the flag makes peo-ple’s blood boil.”7 A Dutch director similarly noted: “People are extremely selfish. They turn to nationalist and rightist parties and their common enemy is Brussels. Not the Soviet Union, as it once was; not poverty; but Brussels.”8 For some officials the national-ist sentiments generating Euroskepticism are not necessarily tied to European integration per se but to globalization. “People feel lost because of globalization. There is a fear of losing identity.”9 In this sense, some officials see Euroskepticism as “the equivalent of the anti-globalization movement. We should have been able to explain that the EU is the answer to globalization.”10

Most European officials also think that negative public atti-tudes toward European integration are because of the lack of adequate information. One of the most common responses to our question about the sources of Euroskepticism was sim-ply “ignorance.” In their comments, senior officials seemed frustrated with what they consider as “avoidable” ignorance of European citizens about what the EU does and about the role of the Commission. One of the most frequent remarks of European bureaucrats was that “people do not know what the EU is about.” Many of our respondents attribute public igno-rance to the lack of understanding about the workings of the EU because of its complexity. For others, it is a much more general symptom of modern democratic malaise. “There are concerns about the European Union. After all, who loves a government? Who loves authority? Beyond this, though, citizens are gener-ally ignorant when it comes to domestic politics let alone EU politics.”11 A large number of senior officials associate this igno-rance with the failure of national politicians to generate interest in the European project. “National politicians are failing to take responsibility, explain the EU and demonstrate that it is a good force.”12 In the words of a director-general: “The main cause of




Euroskepticism is ignorance. This is the responsibility of national governments which are rarely able to explain the role of the EU. They see the EU as a scapegoat that makes decisions they cannot make. Unfortunately, this is the general formula national politi-cians adopt.”13 For a few officials, the responsibility lies with the Commission itself because it does not adequately explain and inform citizens about its decisions.

Senior European bureaucrats also associate the negative atti-tudes of European citizens to their tendency to forget the most important achievements of integration. Even some of the youn-ger officials note that people take for granted the peace and stability that the European integration project has achieved. As a director in DG Regional Policy put it, “People are forgetting that the EU has brought about peace and stability. People’s memory is short. In the absence of a big crisis, it is difficult for people to accurately evaluate the benefits of the EU.” Some officials deride the easiness with which people forget the ben-efits EU policies have granted to European citizens. “People for-get what the Community has achieved such as the elimination of passport controls.”14 Or, as another official noted, “People tend to forget the positive progress that European integration has achieved and are more influenced by the various negative aspects.”15

For a considerable number of senior bureaucrats, Euro-skepticism is not merely a result of the ignorance or forgetfulness of European publics but also a result of misinformation. Many of our interviewees had a bone to pick with the media about the “rubbish that gets published about the EU.”16 The remarks of a director in DG Employment capture quite well the attitudes of many senior officials toward the media: “The press in the UK, run by a few people, frequently wages war on Europe.”17 Similarly, a director in DG Information Society and Media noted that “the



press is to blame for Euroskepticism – the gutter press.”18 And others attribute Euroskepticism to the “media that is feeding the public with falsities about Europe.” According to some officials, the media “feed this skepticism about Europe because it sells. It is convenient for commercial reasons.”19 European bureaucrats generally think that their organization is an easy target for the media for some of the same reasons that make it an ideal target for politicians: It is a remote, complex organization that lacks the communicative resources necessary to defend itself by mak-ing its own distinct interventions in the national discourses.

Many senior European bureaucrats agree that many of the problems associated with Euroskepticism are because of the lack of effective communication with European citizens. Throughout our interviews in Brussels, we came across a general feeling among top officials that the Commission lacks a clear commu-nication strategy that would allow it to have a stronger voice in the public discourse and “counter the falsities” that are published in the media. Their comments were in line with the analysis of the newly appointed Barroso Commission, which assigned the difficult task of changing the communication strat-egy of the Commission to vice president Margot Wallström. One of her key objectives was to help resolve the institutional crisis of 2005 by bringing the EU closer to European citizens and by making the Commission a partner instead of a scape-goat of member states and the other major EU organs. In their comments, senior European officials agreed with her diagnosis. According to a director in DG Information Society and Media, for example, Euroskepticism is owed to “a massive communica-tion failure.”20 “We need a stronger communication policy and program. We should more effectively communicate what we are about, what our successes are. For example, we should make more of the advancements made in telecommunications, in air aviation, etc.”21 One of his colleagues similarly remarked that the

18 Interview #102.19 Interview 177.20 Interview #59.21 Interview #102.


Commission has had a structural communication deficit because the Commission does not have a direct say in the political dis-course. “We have always had a really bad communication policy. We have failed to explain to citizens how decisions are made. We have left it to the national governments to do so and have been paying the price for this.”22

The absence of the Commission from national political dis-courses constitutes, of course, a typical problem bureaucracies have. Unlike their political masters, they generally lack a public voice. Because of the significant involvement of the European bureaucracy in the policy-making process and its remoteness and complexity, however, European officials note the need for the Commission to have more direct involvement in how EU policies are communicated to European citizens. Hence, some of our offi-cials noted that Commission delegations in member states should take a more active role in national political discussions or, even, in the policy-making processes. Others have noted the impor-tance of Commissioners spending more time in member states to directly communicate the position of the European bureaucracy in policy issues. “To remedy Euroskepticism we can improve our communication. We have to send Commissioners home! We need to improve our media strategy. Also, national politicians have a hundred times more legitimacy. We should involve them more effectively in the policy making process. . .”23 Some of our respondents were more skeptical of the likely effectiveness of the new communication strategy of the Barroso Commission. They thought that member states still have the capacity to determine the basic parameters of the political discourse. “Our hands are tied. Wallström could do an excellent job but member states still have the power.”24 In part because of the inherent advantages national and European politicians have, a few senior officials noted that for the new communication strategy to work, there needs to be an attempt to directly engage with citizens. This

22 Interview #175.23 Interview 29.24 Interview #103.


might mean taking a more political role and “addressing what people want to hear.”25

Although most of our respondents seem to associate Euroskepticism with a general lack of information and with the behavior of European politicians, some officials are willing to go beyond these factors to explain the negative attitudes toward the European project. A few mentioned, for example, that EU has been promising much more than it has delivered, thereby causing the alienation of European publics. Some bureaucrats mentioned the “undelivered promises” of the Union, especially in relation to what people care about, like jobs. “The EU promised too much, much more than it can deliver. It is not delivering jobs, which is what people really care about. It is wasting money on agriculture while others are out of jobs,” said a director in DG Information Society and Media.26 An example of the expecta-tions gap that came up in our discussion was the evolution of the Lisbon Strategy, which had to be revised and extended when it became obvious that member states would not meet the ambi-tious targets they had set. As another director in the same DG noted “the Commission should be realistic about its goals and what is achievable. The Lisbon Agenda promised much more than we can deliver. We should be able to show how we have benefited citizens.”27

Some officials also associated Euroskepticism with the broader political and economic conditions. In light of the nega-tive outcome of the French and Dutch referenda on the European Constitution, some bureaucrats were quick to note a broader “political malaise” in modern democratic systems and a wider public alienation with politics. They noted that the political cri-sis of the EU is a symptom of a fundamental crisis of contem-porary democracies and of public discontent. Similarly, others linked Euroskepticism with the challenging economic conditions emphasizing the persisting unemployment and the low economic



growth. A few officials were also nostalgic for the Delors years, when the European integration project was at its peak. They attributed Euroskepticism to the lack of effective political lead-ership both in the Commission and in Europe in general.

It is somewhat surprising that after a year of rapid develop-ments in Europe – including the biggest enlargement, the rejection of the Constitution, and the subsequent political crisis – few of our respondents were willing to question the integration process. Those who did acknowledge some problems noted that the pace of European integration is “too fast” and that the integration process should slow down. Even in those few cases, however, the problem was quickly left at the doorsteps of European publics, who are unable to cope with globalization either because they feared the loss of national identity or, simply, the loss of jobs. According to a director in DG Environment, “The EU is per-ceived by citizens as a mechanism for increasing competition and thereby threatening jobs. It is no longer perceived as an institu-tion providing security.”28 Although a number of officials were critical of the EU for failing to meet the expectations it created and to effectively communicate its achievements, very few senior bureaucrats were willing to admit that their own organization ought to bear some responsibility. The one director-general who was openly self-critical attributed Euroskepticism to “a certain arrogance in that it does not have to explain.”29 Nevertheless, he also referred to the College of Commissioners and to member states noting that the administration is largely the scapegoat. A director in DG Internal Market and Services put this in equally stark terms: “The main source of Euroskepticism is our distance and failure to connect with citizens. We are guilty of arrogance, of thinking we know best. Euroskepticism is also a result of our approach to regulation which is too detailed and intrusive or, even invasive, without leaving enough room to locality.”30 These remarks were quite rare in the nearly 200 responses we got about



Euroskepticism. For the large majority of our officials, the rea-sons for public skepticism toward the European project largely lie outside the Commission and reside with their current political masters – politicians and citizens alike.

Senior Officials and Supranationalism

The attitudes of European bureaucrats toward Euroskepticism are indicative of a broader consensus in the top ranks of the Commission about the integration process. Putting aside pub-lic reservations and political reactions, European officials seem eager to push ahead with deeper integration. Despite the setbacks to the European integration project, senior bureaucrats share a consensus about the future direction of Europe that is consistent with the founding mission of their organization. The remainder of this chapter examines the attitudes of Commission bureau-crats about the future of Europe demonstrating the clear tilt of the organization toward supranationalism.

To gain insights on how top officials envision the future direc-tion of the EU, the survey asked them to locate themselves on a scale that gauged their views on where authority lies within the European Union. A brief description introduced the respondents to the two main scholarly conceptualizations of the EU: the “intergovernmental” vision that places emphasis on power being vested in member states and the “community-oriented” vision, which was used as a proxy for supranationalism. The survey then asked officials to place themselves on a 1– to 10 scale rep-resenting the two visions, 1 standing for intergovernmentalism and 10 for supranationalism.31 Top officials generally acknowl-edged the interplay of these two visions within the Commission, but only a minority of them (23 percent) thought that power within the EU today is mostly vested with member states. A clear majority (58 percent) placed the EU on the supranational side of the scale, and about 19 percent, in the perceived middle of the

31 Time was taken, where necessary, to ensure that interviewee understood the working definition of both terms.


scale.32 On average, senior Commission officials placed the EU at 5.58, higher than the middle of the scale (Table 7.2).

The picture emerging from the top of the Commission changed when we asked our interviewees to state where the EU should be on the scale 10 years down the road. The average response was 6.99 out of 10. Only 12.8 percent chose a spot lower than the middle of the scale, and only 2.3 percent chose a number lower than 3. This contrasts with 47.1 percent who thought that the EU should be at 8 or higher, suggesting that there is a widely shared supranational vision in the top echelons of the organi-zation. Is this vision realistic? Most officials seem to realize that there are important constraints to the realization of their vision and recognize that there is a gap between preferred and likely outcomes. Hence, when we asked senior bureaucrats where the EU would be in 10 years the average response dropped from 6.99 to 5.91 out of 10.

In line with our earlier attempt to determine whether there is a common culture in the Commission, we also wanted to examine

32 Technically, the middle of the scale is 5.5, but the interviewees seemed to per-ceive 5 as the middle. Hence, only one respondent placed themselves at 5.5 compared to 34 respondents who located themselves at 5.

TABLE 7.2. Vision of the EU

Vision On: Mean Std. Dev. N Min Max

Where the EU stands today

5.58 1.38 179 2 8

Where the EU should be in 10 years

6.99 1.92 172 2 10

Where the EU will be in 10 years

5.91 1.5 158 2 10

Where colleagues think EU stands today

5.72 1.42 124 1 8.5

Where colleagues think EU should stand in 10 years

6.88 1.98 116 2 10

Note: Respondents asked to locate EU on 1–10 scale, 1 being intergovernmental and 10 being community oriented.


whether officials thought that their views about the current state and future direction of the EU are shared within the Commission. We, hence, asked the respondents to point out where on the scale their colleagues in the Commission would place the EU today and to speculate on where other officials thought the EU should be in the future. Although we did not get to ask all our inter-viewees these two extra questions, their responses suggest that top officials consider their views to reflect a broader consensus within the Commission. Their average response to the question of where their colleagues think the EU stands today was 5.72, which is very close to where the interviewees would place the EU today (5.58). Similarly, the average response to the question of where their colleagues think the EU should stand in the future was 6.88, which approximates their own preferences (6.99). The proximity of these values is in line with our earlier findings about the existence of a common bureaucratic culture: Senior officials think that there is a general culture within the Commission favoring integrative solutions to European problems.

At the aggregate level, the evidence clearly supports that senior officials share a common culture of supranationalism but does this still hold when we move to the individual level? To answer this question, we plot (see Graph 7.1) the responses for the question “Where the EU stands today” against those for the question of “Where colleagues think the EU stands today.” The graph shows that the responses of European bureaucrats on the question of where the EU stands today are relatively concentrated between values 5 and 7. The box plot on the bottom of Graph 7.1 shows that 50 percent of all responses fall within this rela-tively small range. The responses of top officials on where their colleagues think the EU stands today display a similar distribu-tion (box plot at the left side of the scatter plot). Moreover, there is a very strong positive and statistically significant correlation between the two sets of responses (ρ = 0.69, p < 0.01). Graph 7.2 presents similar results for the second set of responses about where the EU should be in 10 years. The normative stance we asked our officials to take on the future direction of the integra-tion project did not taint the relative coherence we observed in


the previous questions. The box plot on the bottom of Graph 7.2 shows that half of the responses on the question of where the EU should be are concentrated between values 6 and 8. As before, the responses on where on the scale their colleagues think the EU should be are similarly distributed. The correlation between

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GRAPH 7.1. Scatter plot between “Where Officials Think the EU Stands Today” and “Where Colleagues Think the EU Stands Today.”

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GRAPH 7.2. Scatter plot between “Where Officials Think the EU Should be in 10 Years” and “Where Colleagues Think the EU Should be in 10 Years.”


these two responses remains very strong, large, and statistically significant (ρ = 0.70, p < 0.01).

Overall, our evidence shows that top Commission officials want to see authority within the EU shift to community institu-tions and away from state governments. Senior bureaucrats real-ize the limitations to the implementation of the vision but tend to think that these are exogenous, as they are under the impression that their colleagues within the Commission share their vision. The clear inclination of top managers toward supranationalism does not mean that their views are in perfect harmony. The stan-dard deviations of the responses suggest that there is a diver-gence of preferences among top officials. Dissension in the top echelons of the Commission is only very marginally higher when senior bureaucrats discuss the future direction, rather than the current state, of the EU. The standard deviation on the two ques-tions about where the EU should be in the future is 1.92 and 1.98, whereas the average difference of responses on where the EU stands today is 1.38 and 1.42.

National Background and SupranationalismThe notable divergence of EU visions among top officials draws attention to the sources of relative discord within the Commission. What shapes their vision of Europe?

Do the views of senior Commission bureaucrats match those of their countries of origin? If so, this would be a major blow to our earlier finding about the cultural coherence and auton-omy of the Commission. If the views of senior officials merely match those of their countries of origin, then the argument about autonomy would be flawed. Senior officials would merely repre-sent the preferences of their home countries rather than their own.

Alternatively, though, the divergence of opinion might cut across the national backgrounds of top managers. In that case, the supranational vision of top officials might be harder to reduce to the preferences of their home countries.

To examine how the views of top managers on the future direction of the EU relate to their national background, we


examined a number of hypotheses, most of which are drawn from earlier work on this topic (e.g. Hooghe 2001). The first hypothesis was whether officials who are more attached to their country of origin have substantially different views than those who are less attached. The basic premise of arguments viewing international bureaucrats as agents of their states is that they remain loyal to their countries of origin instead of transferring their loyalty to the supranational organization they work for. They are, hence, inclined to look after the interests of their home countries instead of those of their employer. The degree of per-sistence of national loyalties is, of course, difficult to measure, but it might be roughly gauged by how closely officials follow developments at home, especially national political discourses. We, hence, asked officials two experiential questions: whether they follow national politics closely and whether they still vote in national elections.

Our general finding was that despite their long absence from home, officials remain quite attentive to developments at home. The vast majority, or 74 percent, of our interviewees follow national politics “very closely” or “closely.” Only 9 individuals, or 5 percent, told us that they do not follow national politics “that much,” and no one stated “not at all,” although it was one of the options we gave. Moreover, less than a fourth of our top bureaucrats said they do not vote in national elections.33 Intergovernmentalists should not take comfort in these gen-eral findings, however, because the examination of our specific hypothesis shows that our proxies for national attachment have a limited, if any, effect on international bureaucrats’ views about the future direction of the EU. In contrast to our hypothesis, those following national politics are more supranational than those who do not. The average response of those most attentive to national political developments was 7.12, whereas that of the least attentive was 6.93 (Table 7.3). Similarly, the views of those who vote in national elections do not differ substantially from

33 This figure includes British officials who are not eligible to vote because of national voting restrictions.


those of nonvoters. In fact, in line with our previous finding, voters are more supranational than nonvoters, though margin-ally so.

To further examine how the national affiliation of top officials affects their views on European integration, we also looked at their international experiences. We hypothesized that those with such experiences are likely to have more supranational views than the rest. We focused on international education, expecting those studying abroad during the formative years of their lives to have more multicultural and internationalist perspectives than those who spent their young adulthood at home (Hooghe 2001). This hypothesis was premised on the understanding

TABLE 7.3. Vision of the EU and National Origin of Top Officials

Respondent Yes N No N Yes-No Total No

Follows national politics closelya

7.12 126 6.93 41 0.21 167

Still votes in national elections

7.06 139 7.03 29 0.03 168

Has international education

7.33 63 6.9 93 0.43 156

From original member state

6.83 86 7.18 84 –0.35 170

From net beneficiary 7.38 60 6.78 109 0.60 169From state, where

citizens think EU “a good thing”

7.07 129 6.78 41 0.29 170

From state, where citizens think EU “beneficial”

7.07 135 6.71 35 0.36 170

From state, where citizens satisfied with democracy in EU

7.20 63 6.88 107 0.32 170

Note: Data on public opinion from Eurobarometer 63, Sept. 2005, pp. 94–98. “Yes” includes all countries in which over 50% of respondents thought the EU is a “good thing” or thought it was “beneficial” for country.a “Yes” includes those who said they follow politics in their own country “very

closely” and “closely.” The rest said “pretty much” or “not much.” No one said “not at all.”


that international education breeds cosmopolitanism, making officials more supportive of the idea for a multinational union (e.g. Fligstein 2008: Chapters 5 and 6). Moreover, interna-tional education can arguably facilitate the pre-socialization of Commission officials and to breed integrationist attitudes among those attending international universities like the College of Europe in Bruges (e.g. Abélès et al. 1993: 16; Trondal 2007: 1116–1117). To gauge the effect of international education, we calculated the average response of the 63 officials who hold international degrees and compared it with that of the rest of our respondents (93). In all the cases we recorded, officials with international degrees spent at least a year in another European country or in the United States to get a master’s or a doctoral degree. Our main finding is that there is no substantial differ-ence in the views of international and home degree holders on the future course of the EU. Although holders of international degrees held, on average, more supranational views, the differ-ence between the two groups is only 0.43 on the 1 to 10 scale. The average response of those educated abroad was 7.33 com-pared to 6.90 of the rest (see Table 7.3).

The most immediate way of understanding the relationship between national background and the views of our interviewees on European integration is to see whether responses vary sub-stantially across countries. Do officials from certain countries view the integration process differently than their colleagues from other countries? To answer this question, we compared the responses of officials from the original six and from the rest of the member states. On account of the apprehension expressed by some of our interviewees that the eastward enlargement diluted the supranational vision within the Commission, we hypothe-sized, more generally, that officials from the original members are likely to have more supranational views than those from countries that joined later (see also Beyers 2005: 914). Officials from countries with longer tenure in the EU have longer expo-sure with European institutions and are likely to be more accepting of their existence and more at ease with the idea of a supranational union. To the extent that socialization requires


time, it is plausible that these officials had more time to acquire a sense of “European” belonging. Our findings do not yield any support to this hypothesis, as supranationalism cuts across the two groups. In fact, bureaucrats from newer member states have more supranational views (7.18) than those from the founding states (6.83).

We found this result to be somewhat puzzling because coun-tries like Germany and the Netherlands are thought to be among the most loyal supporters of deeper European integration. We, hence, considered a fourth hypothesis: whether the divergence of views among top bureaucrats can be attributed to the actual economic benefit their home country receives from the EU (Hooghe 2001). Arguably, the important changes to the EU bud-get brought about by the eastward enlargement might have gen-erated bitterness among top bureaucrats, especially to those who come from net-contributing countries. To gauge the effects of national economic interest on the preferences of top managers, we compared the views of those coming from net beneficiaries of and net contributors to the first budget of the enlarged Union. Indeed, we found that the views of officials from net- beneficiary countries were considerably more supranationalist than those from net-contributor countries. In fact, this was the most “supra-national” group among all the groups we examined. The dif-ference of 0.60 on the 1 to 10 scale between officials from net beneficiaries and net contributors was the largest one we found in our different measures but not enough to point to any signif-icant pattern. Although bureaucrats from net contributors are less supranational in their responses than their colleagues from net beneficiaries, they are firmly on the supranational side of the scale (6.78).

The examination of a fifth hypothesis delivered weaker results. We examined whether the preferences of top Commission offi-cials on the future of the EU are affected by public opinion in their home countries. Attitudes toward European integration vary considerably across member states in part because of the differ-ent national histories and cultures as well as the contrasting ways people frame European integration (Medrano 2003). Because


officials follow national politics rather closely, we hypothesized that top officials take important cues from the citizens of their home countries. We examined whether the views of our inter-viewees were shaped by those of their compatriots. Looking at aggregate responses to Eurobarometer questions on the EU, we divided countries based on whether the majority of their citizens thought that the EU was a “good thing” and “beneficial” for the country and on whether they were “satisfied with democracy in the EU.” In their responses to all three questions, officials com-ing from countries where public opinion is positive were slightly more supranational than the rest of their colleagues. Again, the differences between the two groups are too small to suggest any firm association between domestic public opinion and the views of senior Commission managers on European integration.

Organizational Experience and SupranationalismThe evidence in the preceding section shows that the suprana-tional tilt of the Commission has little, if any, association with the national affiliation of senior bureaucrats. Can other factors, then, explain the preferences of senior civil servants on European integration? One plausible factor is the length of service of senior officials. Arguably, the longer one serves in an organization the more likely he or she is to internalize its values (e.g. Hooghe 2005: 866–868). This is especially the case with organizations that are “infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick 1957: 17, emphasis in original; cited in Trondal 2004: 74). In the case of the Commission, which has an institutional mandate to act in the interest of European integra-tion, this means that seniority might predispose officials toward supranationalism. After all, even national civil servants who are temporarily seconded to Brussels are thought to, under certain conditions, “take on supranational identifications” (Trondal 2004: 80). To examine, then, this hypothesis, we averaged the responses of top officials who had served the organization for 0 to 10 years; for 11 to 20 years; and for more than 20 years. Our basic finding is that supranationality does not increase with the length of service in the Commission. The most supranational


views were recorded among those bureaucrats who had joined the organization between 1986 and 1995, not the longest serv-ing officials. The responses of this former group of officials – roughly recruited during the Delors presidency – averaged 7.33 on the 1 to 10 scale, while those of the latter was 6.88. Our data partly validate the concerns expressed by a vocal minority of our interviewees that the Commission is increasingly becoming more intergovernmental, as the youngest serving bureaucrats are the least supranational (6.43). At the same time, however, the notable difference between the least and the more senior civil servants must not divert attention from the clear inclination of younger serving officials toward supranationalism (Table 7.4).

Apart from seniority, another plausible explanation for the preferences of top Commission managers is their policy area or function (see also Egeberg 1996). Recent work on “sectorally defined programmatic elites” shows that “a new type of elite has emerged and affirmed itself within the power structure of the state” holding institutional positions of authority, special-izing in a particular policy sector, and having the capacity to act as a coherent actor to promote a specific policy program (Genieys 2010: 189). Based on these findings, one could expect that the preferences of top EU officials would vary by policy sector. As our interviewees remarked, officials working in cer-tain directorates are known to have different views on specific policies than their colleagues working elsewhere. Those focus-ing on regulating competition, for example, can be expected to have stronger preferences for integration than those working in areas like social or foreign policy, where authority is largely vested with member states. Moreover, different directorates have

TABLE 7.4. Years of Service and Vision of Where the EU Should Be (N = 166)

Years of Service Avg. N

0–10 6.43 3111–20 7.33 7121– 6.88 64


distinct subcultures, which are largely formed by their function – for instance, those dealing with environmental issues have been called “environmental freaks” by their colleagues.

To examine the effect of policy function on the preferences of top officials on integration, we grouped the directorates and services of the Commission in accordance with their broader purpose (see also Hooghe 2001). For example, we distinguished between those directorates dealing with the common market (competition, internal market, and so forth) and those dealing with social regulation (health and consumer protection, justice, freedom and security, and so forth). We then sought to examine whether the preferences of top officials varied by policy func-tion. As before, we did not find any significant variation across policy areas. In line with our basic expectations, those work-ing in market-oriented directorates held the most supranational views (7.24), and those in social regulation (6.83) or social pro-vision and redistribution (6.86) were the farthest away from the supranationalist pole of the scale. Overall, the differences among the various subgroups suggest that the preferences of top Commission managers cut across policy areas (Table 7.5).

We finally explored whether the degree of supranational-ity observed at the top echelons of the Commission varies by rank. We, hence, compared the preferences to top and middle

TABLE 7.5. Vision of the EU and DG Type (N=171)

Avg. N

Administration 6.92 14External affairs 7.00 40Market-oriented 7.24 31Supply-side 7.03 45Provision and redistribution 6.86 26Social regulation 6.83 15

Note: Administration = 24–37; External affairs = 18–23; Market-oriented = 2, 3, 6, 11, 16; Supply-side = 7, 10, 12, 15, 17; Provision and redistribution = 1, 8, 14; Social regulation = 4, 5, 9, 13. Each number refers to a directorate or service. See Appendix 1


managers on the future direction of the EU. Given the preva-lence of “national balance” and “national flag” consideration at the most senior ranks of the organization, we expected the topmost officials to be less supranational in their views than their colleagues in middle management. Unlike senior bureau-crats, who are often thought of as flag bearers of individual states, the heads of Commission units are considered the real “policy entrepreneurs” (Bauer 2008b), those in charge of exe-cuting the integrative function of the Commission through the formulation of innovative policies. To our surprise, we did not find substantial variation in the preferences of top and middle managers regarding the future direction of the European Union. In fact, contrary to our original expectations, directors-general and directors were slightly more supranational (7.05 and 7.20, respectively) than their more junior colleagues (6.67). Both groups, though, want to see a more supranational Union in the next decade (Table 7.6).

Conclusion

Senior European officials consider themselves to be the custodians of the future European polity. They share a teleological vision of Europe, one that sees deeper integration as the means to achieve peace and prosperity for the future generation of Europeans. On account of this vision, European bureaucrats fervently defend the European project, and more importantly, they are keen to guard their own organization against growing Euroskepticism. They attribute the negative public attitudes toward “Europe” to the ignorance of the skeptics and to the selfish behavior of

TABLE 7.6. Position in Commission and Vision of Where the EU Should Be (N = 167)

Position Avg. N

DGs 7.05 29Directors 7.20 89HoU 6.67 49


politicians and journalists. As our survey showed, European offi-cials think that those searching for the sources of Euroskepticism must look beyond their organization and must question the crit-ics themselves. Their views on Euroskepticism are consistent with their clear preference for a more supranational Europe, one that vests authority to supranational organizations like their own. These views are so widely held that they cannot be reduced to the nationality, experience, or position of European officials. They constitute part of a strong consensus within the organiza-tion about the future direction of the European project.

Should we be surprised about the existence of such a con-sensus at the top echelons of the bureaucracy? Is the custodi-anship that bureaucrats claim of the European project a unique attitudinal phenomenon only to be found in the top ranks of the European administration? Students of public bureaucra-cies might not be as surprised by the attitudinal profile of top European administrators. After all, bureaucrats are known to have a “power instinct” (Weber 1946: 232) that facilitates the preservation and expansion of their administrative tasks. Once the Commission is viewed as a bureaucracy, the preferences of its top employees for deeper European integration and their ten-dency to disregard public criticism as ignorance or politicking are only to be expected: Through deeper integration European bureaucrats can sustain and expand their power. EU scholars could also be unsurprised by our findings. The Commission has a clear institutional mandate to promote integration, and hence, it is reasonable to expect its officials to defend this mandate. Given the organizational mission of the Commission, it would in fact be surprising if the opposite were true, if top officials wanted to see power vested in national political authorities.

We find the results puzzling for two different reasons. The first one relates to the broader political environment in which the Commission operates. At a time of political questioning of the discretionary powers of the European bureaucracy and, more generally, of the European integration project, one could have expected that senior officials would critically reflect on the pace or scope of integration. It would have been reasonable to expect


that the cues from the political environment would compel European officials to second-guess their commitment to supra-nationalism and to have a more accommodating understanding of public skepticism.

The second reason why the findings of our survey might be a bit surprising is because the Commission is an atypical bureau-cracy, one with many sources of fragmentation. As a number of Commission scholars frequently note, the professional advance-ment of senior officials – at least, partly – on the basis of national origin limits the cultural coherence of the organization and under-mines its capacity to act as a true supranational force in the EU institutional nexus. In addition to the departmental, functional, and professional fragmentation that is typical of any bureau-cracy, the Commission also has to deal with the distinct cultural backgrounds of its senior officials. The transnational nature of the Commission is not merely an issue of cultural diversity. More than merely an issue of diversity, the European bureaucracy con-stantly faces the possibility that because of their reliance on their home countries for the advancement to the top of the European bureaucracy, top officials are obliged to serve the national inter-ests of their home countries rather than the supranational goals of their organization. Our survey shows that even at the top ech-elons of this transnational organization, where national balance and national flag considerations are thought to be important, this is not the case: National origin has little bearing on what top civil servants think about the future of the EU. The vast majority of senior bureaucrats want more power to be vested in community institutions regardless of where they come from. Top officials are not as sensitive to the preferences of their home countries, their political masters, or European citizens as they are to the supranational mission of their organization.

On account of the limited effect the political environment or the national origin of top officials seems to have on the attitudes of top officials, it is worth speculating about the factors affecting the commitment of European officials to deeper integration. One possibility is that bureaucrats joining the Commission are already predisposed to supranationalism, viewing the organization


as the defender of deeper integration. This is not because the Commission selects officials on the basis of their views. Like Liesbet Hooghe (2005), we do not find much evidence support-ing this claim: Officials who joined the Commission during the Delors era are only slightly more supranationalist than everybody else. It is more likely that the clear mandate the Commission has to promote European integration makes it most attractive to those who are already favorably predisposed to this integra-tive function. Given that these bureaucrats could have had (or already had) successful careers elsewhere, they might have cho-sen to work for the Commission because they already share a supranational vision of Europe. As the Chapter 6 suggested, this vision is linked to a general understanding within the organiza-tion that the Commission works for a cause. That this cause is clearly signalled by the institutional architects of the European Union makes it plausible that the Commission attracts an over-proportionate number of “believers.”

Alternatively, the organizational culture of the Commission might be a reaction to the questioning of the EU enterprise and of the Commission itself. Instead of pointing to the sources of public apprehension about the European project, integration set-backs like the rejection of the constitution might have turned the Commission into a more fervent defender of supranation-alism. As suggested in Chapter 6, the external challenges con-fronted by the organization might have helped the European bureaucracy close ranks, enhancing the cohesiveness of the orga-nization against its external challengers. The adverse external environment, then, might inadvertently make it easier for the Commission to counter those trends that are seemingly caus-ing its decay. Although the 2004 enlargement and administra-tive reforms might be pushing the Commission toward a more intergovernmental outlook (Peterson 2008), the institutional and policy setbacks might moderate these effects, enhancing orga-nizational solidarity and allowing the Commission to continue serving its integrative function. At a time when the political mas-ters of the bureaucracy are challenging its autonomy, the seeming commitment of its top officials to the institutional mission of the


organization might simply serve as an intellectual device to sus-tain this autonomy. By claiming to serve the interest of the future “Europe,” senior administrators are legitimating their authority and their discretionary power.

This latter explanation introduces a factor that the scholarly debate on socialization tends to miss. Once we take into account the adverse political environment the Commission faces, it becomes plausible that the supranationalist attitudes of European officials are not solely the outcome of various social-ization processes (e.g. Christoph 1993; Hooghe 2001; Beyers 2005; Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005; Trondal 2007; Beyers 2010; Trondal 2010) but also the result of bureaucratic perceptions of organizational threat. Political threats to bureaucratic auton-omy might strengthen integrative attitudes in the Commission by developing a sense of organizational belonging among offi-cials that would otherwise be weaker. The political challenges to the legitimacy of the organization reinforce the self-legitimation mechanisms of the bureaucracy and strengthen its supranation-alist outlook.

These two explanations would lead us into contrasting accounts of the organizational consensus we discovered in Brussels about the future direction of the European project. The first would be that European officials have a genuine devotion to integration, and the second suggests that, as an interested party, they are pro-integration because they want to sustain their priv-ileged position in the EU institutional nexus. Our data does not allow us to adjudicate between these two contrasting hypothe-ses; however, our analysis shows that the Commission remains a rather autonomous organization despite the attacks and criti-cism of its political masters.

180

8

Bureaucratic Attitudes Toward Controversial Policies

The previous chapters have highlighted the autonomy of the European Commission by showing the cultural coherence of the organization. This autonomy persists despite political efforts to curb it. In fact, the political attacks against the bureaucracy tend to reinforce its autonomy by inducing bureaucrats to close ranks to deflect the pressures from their political overseers. The attacks helped reinforce the organizational culture of the Commission bringing senior bureaucrats closer to the integrative mission of the European bureaucracy. Instead of altering the “runaway” behavior of the bureaucracy, political adversity strengthened the organizational coherence of the Commission at a critical time when the enlargement of the EU seemed to create centrifugal ten-dencies in the organization and to undermine this coherence. As Chapter 7 showed, European bureaucrats remain committed to the supranational mission of the Commission disregarding public skepticism toward the European project as public ignorance and cheap politicking. They present themselves as the custodians of the future European polity serving the interests of the next gener-ation of Europeans. Their claim to be the custodians of “Europe” offers them the necessary autonomy from their current political masters whose preferences can be characterized as shortsighted and self-serving and, hence, disregarded.

Bureaucratic Attitudes and Policy Outputs 181

Our sketch of the attitudinal profile of top European bureau-crats has relied on a survey of their views on a wide range of topics – from their input in the policy-making process to their opinions on the future of the European enterprise. Relying on a considerable amount of attitudinal as well as experiential data, it largely gauged the beliefs of officials on European integration, not their actual influence on specific policies. An analysis of the actual input of the Commission in the policy-making process would require a different approach that lies beyond the scope of this book.1 In line with the approach undertaken in this book, this chapter examines, instead, whether apart from the broad consensus for deeper integration, there is also general support among top civil servants on individual policies.

To examine the views of top Commission officials on individ-ual policies we asked our officials to comment on some of the most controversial policy initiatives undertaken by the EU in the mid-2000 period: the proposed Constitutional Treaty, the direc-tive for the liberalization of the services sector, and the accession of Turkey. The European bureaucracy had considerable input in all three, and as the policy process unraveled, each of them met considerable public resistance (see Chapter 3). On account of this resistance we sought to probe what top officials made of these policy initiatives. Do European officials support the policies their organization promotes? What do they make of the public oppo-sition? Does resistance to these policies shake the attitudes of senior officials toward such policies? As the remainder of this chapter shows, we encountered considerable support for each of the three initiatives despite the visible opposition encountered by significant segments of European citizens.

1 We take comfort, of course, in the significant body of scholarship suggesting and documenting the actual input of the Commission in the policy-making process. Despite the inherent difficulty in demonstrating the net effect of bureaucratic activity, a number of theoretical and empirical works point out that, under certain circumstances, it is important (e.g. Nugent 1995, Marks et al. 1996, Pollack 1997, Sandholtz 1998, Wendon 1998, Jabko 1999, Schmidt 2000, Tsebelis and Garrett 2001, Beach 2005).


European Officials and the Failed Constitutional Treaty

In the midst of the crisis created by the rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the top management of the Commission stood firmly by the ratification initiative. Asked if “it was a good idea to propose a European constitu-tion,” four out five respondents – 80.4% – answered “yes.” Only 15.8 percent of our interviewees thought that it was not a good idea, and 3.8 percent said they “do not know” (Table 8.1).

For many of our respondents, the Constitutional Treaty pro-vided an opportunity to sustain the momentum for European integration. In the words of a director-general, the Constitution would “strengthen the coherence of the EU and its capacity to act.”2 As another director-general noted, the treaty “would introduce dynamism and revitalize EU activity.”3 A head of unit in DG Education remarked that “we have to go forward. We need the Constitution to keep the momentum going.”4 Some offi-cials noted that the enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe created the risk that the widening of the Union would dilute the depth of integration. For these officials, the Constitution pro-vided the means to sustain the depth of the integration when dealing with a widening Union. As a director in DG Economic and Financial Affairs put it, “the Constitution is necessary so that we do not lose the depth of integration with the broadening

TABLE 8.1. Was It a Good Idea to Propose a European Constitution?

Number %

Yes 148 80.4No 29 15.8Don’t know 7 3.8

Total 184 100



of the EU. The Treaty brings the necessary cohesion to the EU.”5 Some officials saw gains not only for the European project in general but also for the Commission itself. According to a direc-tor in DG Enterprise and Industry, “the Constitution expands the competencies of the EU.”6 A director in DG Enlargement pointed out that the proposed treaty would “strengthen the EU approach and the community method.”7 It was “a move toward unity. The EU is a system of checks and balances.” For some bureaucrats, the Constitution also had symbolic advantages, it was “a means for people to feel more united.”8 It was important “in terms of fostering a common European identity and identification with the European project.”9 It provided “a general reference point for the courts and the people.”10

A large number of bureaucrats also noted the importance of the Constitutional Treaty for the institutional architecture of the EU. They pointed out the efficiency gains that the new treaty would bring about in the decision-making processes of the EU. Revealing their scorn for the Treaty of Nice – which some characterized as a “monster” because of the “many com-promises it embodied” – they maintained that the Constitution “provides an improvement in the functioning of the EU” or that “it would make things work better.”11 A director in DG Budget saw the treaty as a means “to consolidate earlier treaties. It is more readable than earlier treaties. It is certainly more workable. And more importantly, it is designed for an enlarged union.”12 Some thought that in terms of content, the treaty does not mark a radical departure from the status quo but it is important in terms of improving the functioning of the EU. “There is noth-ing radically new in it in terms of policy areas, except perhaps


10 Interview #46.11 Interviews #7, 21, and 37.12 Interview #54.


in terms of foreign policy. Nevertheless, we need to improve the institutional efficiency of the EU.”13 Some bureaucrats noted that this efficiency was at threat because of the enlargement and that, hence, what the Constitution did was to bring about “certain housekeeping changes to accommodate this enlargement.”14 For others, though, it was an important departure because of the pro-posed extension of qualified majority voting across a larger num-ber of policy areas. A number of officials made a special note of how this extension would improve decision making in the EU by limiting the influence of the “intergovernmental approach.”

In their accounts of the failed drive to ratification, senior offi-cials focused on the communication of the treaty to European publics perceiving the problems the Constitution encountered as “labeling” issues. Consistent with the remarks we noted in Chapter 7 about the sources of Euroskepticism, European bureaucrats observed that the Constitution “was a good idea badly sold.”15 “This is consolidation of previous treaties, not a constitution; we were not clear enough about the realities, we did not explain this well,” said a Belgian official who stated he was still in favor of the Constitutional Treaty.16 The reaction of a British director was similar: “It is not a constitution! This is a pompous title, which is bound to be provocative.”17 A number of officials similarly noted that the word constitution should not have been used because it carried a symbolic meaning and because “it creates expecta-tions that are counterproductive. You cannot go back from a constitution.”18 A director in the Internal Audit Service remarked that the ratification “process was not managed properly. It was a bit amateurish. It spurred a confrontation between the intergov-ernmental and the community approach, which led to its failure. Our communication was really bad. We have failed.”19 Along

13 Interview #59.14 Interview #86.15 Interview #5.16 Interview #104.17 Interview #61.18 Interview #53.19 Interview #55.


the same lines, a director-general noted that ordinary citizens could not understand the technical advantages of the new treaty: “Europe has dragged on from Maastricht onwards. We needed a new agile structure. Maybe its name was wrong. It creates cer-tain expectations. Technically it is good, but hard for ordinary people to understand.”20 Overall, then, officials attributed the failure of the Constitution to the way it was labeled rather than to substantive issues related to its content. The top management of the Commission largely thought that that the constitution was a step in the right direction that needed enhanced packag-ing, more simplification, and better timing. Interestingly, only a handful of officials perceived the ratification problems as a signal from European citizens about the speed or depth of EU integra-tion. And only one blamed the Commission for the outcome, in these terms:

The Commission might have been more sensitive to public opinion and to what ordinary people wanted and felt. The Constitutional Treaty is a perfect example of this. Perhaps it should not have been called a con-stitution. Officials did not factor in what sort of feelings this would evoke. This is usual, though. We are certainly not in tune with ordinary citizens.21

The Bolkestein Directive

Top Commission officials were also supportive of the Bolkestein directive for the liberalization of services across the EU (see Chapter 3 for more details). Originally tabled in 2004, the direc-tive caused a furor among stakeholders feeding into the subse-quent debate about the ratification of the constitution, especially in France. It was eventually adopted in 2006 with hundreds of amendments by the European Parliament that seriously limited its scope. In the midst of the debate stirred in 2005 by the drive for the liberalization of the services sector, we told officials that the Bolkestein directive is one of the big controversies at this



moment in several EU countries and then asked whether they would like to see it adopted. Despite the strong reactions against the directive a majority (70.5 percent) of top officials said “yes.” Only 15.4 percent of top European bureaucrats said “no,” and 14.1 percent said they had no opinion (see Table 8.2).

When the controversy over the directive erupted, one of the arguments put forth by its critics was that the drive for the lib-eralization of the services sector was a neoliberal scheme for undercutting social rights. It was criticized by the politicians on the Left and the Right, like Jacques Chirac, as an unaccept-able proposal that risked dismantling the European social model and introducing elements of the American economic model (e.g. Crespy 2010). The Bolkestein directive, which coincided with the ratification process of the European Constitutional Treaty, led to one of the biggest trade union mobilizations in Europe across a number of European cities including Brussels. Painted in strong ideological colors, we thought that the directive would cause considerable dissensus among top Brussels officials who would be divided on the issue along political lines. Table 8.3 shows that the political orientations of senior bureaucrats have some, but limited, bearing on how they view the Bolkestein directive. Although officials on the Left are more resistant to the directive, nearly two out of three support it. More specifically, 64.6 percent of officials that place themselves on the Left of the political scale

TABLE 8.2. Reaction of Top Officials to Bolkestein Directive

Number %

Yes 110 70.5No 24 15.4Don’t know 22 14.1

Total 156 100

Question: Respondent told that one of the big controver-sies at this moment in several EU countries is the so-called Bolkestein directive, and asked if he or she would like to see the directive adopted.


stated that they would like to see the directive adopted. Support for the directive is notably higher among those who place them-selves in the perceived center of the scale and among those on the Right – 76 and 76.3 percent, respectively.

In their supplementary remarks to the question about the Bolkestein directive, European bureaucrats noted their dis-may at the public and political reactions it had caused. As a director- general put it, “The furor over the Bolkestein directive is nonsense.”22 A director in DG Employment similarly remarked that “there are many good things in the directive” and that it “was unfairly presented out of context.”23 As in the case of Euroskepticism, a number of officials attributed the reactions to the directive to the failure of its critics to understand. “There is a lot of misunderstanding about it” was a typical response from top bureaucrats.24 For some European officials the reactions were also a “clear illustration of the protectionist inclination of states.”25 Even those who were less supportive of the directive clearly stated that they are in favor of services liberalization. Their reservations related to the timing of the proposal and to

TABLE 8.3. Support for Bolkestein Directive and Political Orientation of Top Officials

Position on Left-Right scale

Support for Bolkestein directive

Yes No Don’t know Total

N % N % N % N %

Left (1–4.5) 53 64.6 16 19.5 13 15.9 82 56.6Center (5) 19 76.0 3 12.0 3 12.0 25 17.2Right (5.5–10) 29 76.3 4 10.5 5 20.0 38 26.2

Total 101 69.7 23 15.9 21 14.5 145 100

Note: Cross tabulation of responses to questions about self-placement on a 1–10 left-right scale and about support or not of Bolkestein directive.

22 Interview #64.23 Interview #37.24 E.g. Interview #92.25 Interview #109.


the reactions it had already created. They pointed out that the directive must be amended and introduced in the future because now “it will be politically difficult to realize its aims.”26

Turkish Accession

The rejection of the constitution coincided with a debate across Europe about the initiation of accession negotiations with Turkey, decided in December 2004. Capitalizing on the timeliness of the issue, the survey sought to record the views of top officials on this contentious issue, asking them whether or not they favored Turkish accession to the EU. In contrast to their responses to the questions about the Constitutional Treaty and the Bolkestein directive, their remarks on this important question were much more varied: 60.6 percent of respondents stated that they were in favor of accession, another 32.7 percent stated that they oppose it, and 6.7 percent could not make up their mind (Table 8.4).

Although the majority of our officials expressed their support for Turkish EU accession, their extensive responses highlighted a lot of hesitation at the top echelons of the organization about the issue. A large number of supporters of Turkish accession would typically state “yes in principle” and then start outlining the con-ditions that should be met before this is possible. Turkey could join the EU “with a lot of conditions” or “with a realistic time table.” Top European bureaucrats frequently mentioned the need for Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria – stable democratic institutions, a functioning market economy, and the acceptance of the Community acquis. A number of officials noted that this would take some time to achieve, “at least a generation.” As a director in DG Trade put it, “A lot of conditions have to be met and this will take a long time. We have to be very careful and prudent that we do not overstretch.”27 Some officials noted that this 20-year period would be sufficient for Turkey to meet these conditions, and others pointed out that “it is very difficult to



see how the requirement for EU entry will be met.”28 Optimists and pessimists alike seemed to agree that the long wait period would give not only Turkey but also the EU the time necessary to build the institutional capacity to deal with this enlargement. “The EU has enlarged considerably in a very short period. At the same time, there are obvious problems in its decision making processes and it has not worked on resolving them. The deci-sion making mechanisms have to catch up before there is more enlargement.”29

Bureaucratic support for Turkish accession is the result of a wide variety reasons. For some senior bureaucrats, Turkish EU entry is a matter of honoring the commitments made to the Turks. As put by a director in DG Trade, “We have to be pragmatic. We have to live up to our commitments and promises.” Another director in DG Development similarly points out that “we have to be in favor. We have to live up to our commitments.”30 For other officials, Turkish accession is a way to bring about inter-nal changes in Turkey. “It is likely to be a lengthy process. But the benefits outweigh the drawbacks. Accepting Turkey is a way of getting Turkey to become more liberal and more sensitive to human rights.”31 Others mentioned the geopolitical benefits of Turkish entry into the EU, as it would help the Union have a


TABLE 8.4. Attitudes to Turkish Accession

Number %

Yes 100 60.6No 54 32.7Don’t know 11 6.7

Total 165 100

Question: Respondent asked whether he or she is in favor of Turkish accession.


stronger presence in the world, especially militarily. As a direc-tor in the Secretariat General noted, “I cannot understand how this would work. But political and military necessity dictates that Turkey becomes a member.”32 A few officials also mentioned the importance of Turkish accession for sending the right signals to the Muslim world. “Accepting Turkey into the EU would help create a bridge with similar countries that have large Islamic populations.”33

The question of Turkish accession goes to the heart of what the Union is about and, not surprisingly, the discussion of the issue with senior European bureaucrats brought to the surface their varying conceptions of the European integration project. For supporters of the Turkish candidacy, the EU is largely an economic union revolving around the convergence of economic interests. “The EU is a union of strong common interests, not values.”34 As a director-general noted, the EU is mostly about economic integration, and hence, Turkey has a place in the Union. “I hesitated a lot. Without Britain we could not do the politi-cal integration of Europe. So we did economic integration.”35 By contrast, opponents of Turkish accession stressed the impor-tance of European values. Going beyond the economic aspects of European integration, another director-general responded: “This is the question: what is Europe? Europe is not about race but it is about values. Europeans have common values. Is the major-ity of the large Turkish population ready to share these values? It is simply a question of sharing values.”36 Similarly, a number of European administrators went beyond the “technocratic line” of the Commission to stress the cultural differences with Turkey. “Europe is a Christian club and denying it makes no sense” was the comment of one official. “Turkey is also fiercely nationalist,” he quickly added. 37 A director in DG Enlargement had similar



reservations: “I am against Turkish accession – at least for the moment. It has to do with culture. There is no cultural link with Turkey. There is no shared culture.”38

The issue of Turkish accession raised concerns among European officials about the limits of EU widening. A number of bureaucrats pointed out that Turkey lies outside the geograph-ical boundaries of Europe and that, if it joined, it would make it hard to include other neighboring countries on the Eastern and Southern borders of Europe. The remarks of a director in DG Taxation were typical of the reactions we got from these officials: “Turkey is not in Europe. Turkish accession would open the door for membership to the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and even Georgia.”39 Other officials pointed out that “only 3–5% of Turkish territory lies in Europe” or simply, that “Turkey is not in Europe” and that “you have to stop somewhere.”40

The majority of officials who opposed Turkish accession were less concerned with European values and geography and more apprehensive of its impact on European integration. Bureaucrats worried that it would be “a massive shock” for EU institutions undermining the capacity of the Union to deliver. For a director in EuropeAid the question “is very difficult to answer. We need to absorb a Muslim country to send the proper signal to the Muslim world. The problem with Turkey is that it is a very big country with a lot of poor people.”41 Indeed, the size of the coun-try came up a number of times during discussions with European bureaucrats. In the words of a deputy director-general, “Turkey is too big and it would be irresponsible to bring Turkey in.”42 A director-general was particularly concerned with the economic dimension of the issue: “I am against accession because we can-not afford Turkey. Economically, I mean. After all, why do we need Turkey to become a democracy?”43 Another director, in DG



Agriculture, noted that because of its size it would be impossible to integrate it, “agriculturally speaking.”44

Most concerns focused on the possible effect on Turkish accession on the functioning of the Union. A director-general described the dilemma that many of his colleagues expressed: “I am more concerned with the question of the functioning of the Union. We cannot be open to the whole world. We do not know where it will end.”45 The concerns of European bureaucrats with the widening of the EU to include Turkey are directly linked with the question of deepening. A director in DG Internal Market and Services was clear about this: “I am against Turkish accession for pragmatic reasons. If we want to create a united Europe, enlarg-ing to Turkey is not a good idea.”46 European officials are wor-ried that Turkish accession would “change the character of the EU,” diluting the integrative potential of the Union.47 A director in the Secretariat General put this in stark terms: “It all depends on what you want Europe to look like in the future. If the EU will be turned into a free trade union, then it certainly makes sense to bring Turkey, Israel or Morocco in. We have to be clear on this: We cannot take Turkey in and still deliver.”48 Officials noted that they “fear what Turkish accession means in terms of integration” and how “the EU can absorb Turkey” as “there are so many unknowns.”49 Having just gone through the biggest enlargement in its history, some European bureaucrats remarked that the entry of Turkey would “complicate the enlargement, which itself was not thought through.”50 Not surprisingly, some think that the EU should have the time to reflect on the recent changes before taking Turkey on board. “We are already too many. We need to reflect on where we are going, and right now it is too early for this. We have to wait and see what happens with

44 Interview #154.45 Interview #8.46 Interview #101.47 Interview #11.48 Interview #113.49 Interview #156.50 Interview #4.


[then candidates] Romania and Bulgaria, and see where we want to go from there.”51

In addition to their concerns regarding European integra-tion, some European bureaucrats expressed their apprehension with the effects of Turkish accession on public opinion. When discussing the Constitutional Treaty or the Bolkestein directive, Commission officials largely dismissed public reactions as a labeling issue, a communication failure, or simply, a lack of com-prehension. In the case of Turkish accession, officials seemed to accept public opinion as the ultimate judge of the future direction of Europe. A director in DG Environment described the Turkish dilemma in clear terms: “In principle, I am in favor. I am gener-ally in favor of exporting our institutions. But public opinion cannot swallow it.”52 A director of DG Enterprise and Industry, who claimed to have intimate knowledge of the Turkish candi-dacy, was similarly apprehensive of the reactions from European publics. “We have to give Turkey a chance to change as much as it needs to for people in the EU to accept them.”53 Another direc-tor in the same DG remarked that Turkish accession is only pos-sible in 20 years’ time. “We have to prepare ourselves but also our public opinion and our economies. Turkey itself has a long way to go.”54 A director in the Internal Audit Service linked the issue with the outcome of the referenda for the Constitutional Treaty: “I am in favor of Turkish accession – in principle. But I am against it in terms of practicality. The constitutional debates have shown that citizens think we are moving too quickly. We have to consolidate first before we enlarge to Turkey.”55

Conclusion

European officials share a common vision about the future of the European project. This chapter has suggested that this vision is

51 Interview #14,52 Interview #161.53 Interview #83.54 Interview #114.55 Interview #55.


much more than an abstract sense of what Europe is about and where it is going. Apart from their shared vision of a suprana-tional Europe, bureaucrats also display clear support for some of the most controversial policy initiatives undertaken by the EU in the past decade. These initiatives witnessed considerable pub-lic reactions either at the ballot box or in the streets. European bureaucrats seemed unshaken by these reactions and strongly in favor of these policies. Even in the face of the outcome in France and the Netherlands, European officials came out in favor of the Constitutional Treaty because it would strengthen European integration and enhance institutional effectiveness. They con-ceived the reactions against the Constitution as a labeling or an informational issue, rather than an indicator of public prefer-ences toward integration. Similarly, in the midst of trade union mobilization against the Bolkestein directive, European bureau-crats signaled their support for the liberalization of the services sector. They dismissed the furor over the directive as misinformed overreaction. European administrators also noted their support for Turkish accession, although their responses here were much more mixed than those for the other two policies. Opposition for Turkish accession was twice that for the Constitutional Treaty or the Bolkestein directive, and even those in favor expressed considerable reservations about its impact on the broader inte-gration project. The marked difference in the views of senior administrators about Turkish accession and the other two pol-icies should not be surprising. As the custodians of European integration, bureaucrats are naturally more at ease with policies that deepen integration and less welcoming of widening.

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9

Conclusion

In the midst of the sovereign debt crisis engulfing the Eurozone, the president of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, stated in November 2010 that the EU is “in a survival crisis.” As European governments were squabbling about the new eco-nomic government structures of the Eurozone, his words seemed more than a headline-grabbing plea to European leaders to get their act together. The debt crisis managed a blow not just to the legitimacy but also to the very logic of European integration, giving a further boost to the already widespread Euroskepticism. The debt woes in the Eurozone “periphery” brought back to the mainstream political discourse the nearly forgotten prediction that monetary integration would exacerbate rather than elim-inate conflict in Europe (Feldstein 1997). Is this the beginning of the end for the Europe we know? Although the unfolding crisis makes it hard, if not impossible to predict the future of the EU, we can safely expect that, despite these setbacks for the European project, the Commission will continue pushing for deeper European integration and that, in the face of these enormous challenges, the European bureaucracy will probably emerge more powerful than ever. The remainder of this conclud-ing chapter summarizes the findings of the book and elaborates on these ideas.


An Autonomous Bureaucracy

Even though the Commission is in many ways a typical Weberian bureaucracy, it is also a unique administration with features that set it apart from most national and international public bureau-cracies. The uniqueness of the European bureaucracy is intrinsic to the European project itself and to the institutional architec-ture of the EU. To best serve the goals of supranational Europe, the political masters of the Commission have granted it consid-erable discretion and an exceptional range and type of functions. The uniqueness of the European bureaucracy, however, goes beyond its institutionally mandated authority and its impressive array of functions. The Commission is an unparalleled organi-zation because it serves multiple political masters. The admin-istrative leg of the Commission serves a fragmented political executive, the College, whose mere size and diversity limits its capacity to control the European bureaucracy. The Commission is also accountable to an increasingly more powerful but also more disjointed European Parliament and to a rather hetero-geneous Council whose capacity to control the Commission is limited by some of the same coordination problems that have troubled the EU during the Eurozone debt crisis. In this multi-cephalous or polycentric polity, the Commission has consider-able leeway for autonomous behavior.

Although this fragmented structure of political oversight enhances the autonomy of the Commission, Chapter 2 highlighted two characteristics of the European bureaucracy that could potentially limit its capacity to take action in accordance to its own wishes. The first characteristic relates to the legitimacy of the European bureaucracy. In part because of the general legitimacy problems the European project confronts, the Commission finds itself attacked as a faceless, distant, and wasteful bureaucracy that unjustly determines the lives of half a billion Europeans. The institutional mandate of the European bureaucracy turns it into an easy target by its political overseers who are eager to gain the lost legitimacy of the EU, even at the expense of one of its most vital organs. The predicament of the Commission is partly

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a function of the structure of political oversight. The polycen-tric nature of the EU grants the Commission leeway for auton-omous behavior, but at the same time, it helps undermine the legitimacy of the organization. The legitimacy problems of the EU generate antagonism between the various political masters of the Commission for legitimacy that turns European politicians against bureaucrats. In the past decade or so, the Commission has become a punching bag for politicians of all political strides. At the heart of these attacks – be they about the response of the Commission to the Hewlett Packard layoffs in France or the neoliberal industrial policy of the Barroso College – is the very autonomy of the Commission. These attacks aim to curb what is thought to be a runaway behavior – the perceived tendency of the Commission to ignore the preferences of its political masters.

Political efforts to curb bureaucratic autonomy are of course a much more general phenomenon, not limited to the European Commission. In the past decades political executives across every democratic corner of the globe have sought to reassert political control and to make public bureaucracies more responsive to political executives. Chapter 5 argued that the regulatory nature of the Brussels bureaucracy and the multicephalous structure of the EU have largely shielded it from trends observed in most democratic states like that of politicization. Instead of politiciz-ing the European bureaucracy, European politicians tried to cap-italize on the 1999 crisis to reform the Commission. The goal was to modernize the Commission and to make it more respon-sive to its political heads, but as Chapter 5 showed, the reforms bureaucratized the organization. More importantly, the attempts to curb bureaucratic autonomy created considerable resentment among European administrators making them more insular to the preferences of their political overseers. Confronted with an unfavorable political environment, European bureaucrats closed ranks to defend their organization against outside challenges.

The second feature of the European bureaucracy that can potentially limit its autonomy relates to its transnational nature. Top European officials are a very diverse group coming from countries with quite different political systems, national


traditions, and administrative practices. As Chapter 3 showed, they have a wide range of professional experiences in the private and public sectors, working for high profile corporations and nonprofit organizations. Unlike bureaucrats in other transna-tional bureaucracies, senior European officials are trained across a broad array of fields. The diversity one finds at the top echelons of the Commission can potentially limit its autonomy in two different ways. The transnational composition of the European bureaucracy limits its cultural coherence, thereby restraining its capacity to behave as a homogeneous organization. All orga-nizations suffer, of course, from some fragmentation, but the Commission is thought to be more vulnerable to fragmentation because of the very diverse composition of its employees. Even before this organization expanded to recruit officials from new member states, outside observers noted strong centrifugal ten-dencies that undermined its coherence and the commitment of its officials to its integrative mission. A different limitation to the autonomy of the Commission relates to the possibility that European officials serve the preferences of their member states instead of serving the supranational mission of their organiza-tion. The existence of national flags and national quota systems for senior positions in the European administrative suggests that there is more than an imaginary bond between top officials and their countries of origin. This bond could potentially turn the supranational agents of the Commission into agents of member states, thereby limiting the capacity of the organization to serve the collective European interest and to take action in accordance with its own wishes.

Chapter 6 showed that the diverse cultural backgrounds, administrative traditions, and professional training of senior officials are not an impediment to the formation of a common organizational culture. Contrary to most scholarly suggestions and in line with more recent work on the autonomy of the Commission (Trondal 2010), European bureaucrats think that they share a common organizational culture or an esprit de corps that keeps the organization together, counterbalancing the cen-trifugal tendencies outside observers see in the Commission. The

Conclusion 199

clear mission of the organization to promote European integra-tion seems to bind senior officials together and to be a source of pride for the work they do. Away from home and even, from the Belgian society, European officials seem to have a lot more that unites them than outsiders see. The cultural coherence is thought to be coming under some pressure in recent years due to the eastern enlargement and to the perceived loss of idealism from new recruits. Undoubtedly, it will take some time for the new-comers to internalize the culture of the European bureaucracy. If scholarly assertions about socialization are correct, this might never happen because the sources of socialization are mostly “national” (e.g. Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). That being said, the adversity of the political environment in which the Commission operates seems to inadvertently help reverse the weakening of the bureaucratic culture. As our interviewees pointed out, the persistent political attacks against the bureaucracy have helped officials come together and close ranks to defend their organiza-tion against the external challenges. Faced with political hostility, bureaucratic officials are becoming increasingly more attached to the basic cultural traits of the organization and are more will-ing to defend its integrative mission. Political adversity helps strengthen the cultural coherence of the organization, thereby limiting its vulnerability to those challenging its autonomy.

Chapter 7 reinforces these findings showing that European officials share an integrative vision of Europe, wanting more authority to be vested in supranational organizations like their own and away from member state governments. European bureaucrats are not naïve about the potential limitations to the realization of their vision of Europe. They mostly believe, however, that these limitations largely lie outside the confines of their organization, thinking that their colleagues share their vision of “more” Europe. More importantly, the views of top officials cannot be reduced to the preferences of their countries of origin. Having tested a number of plausible links between the integrative preferences of top officials and their home coun-tries, we found no evidence justifying concerns or claims that senior officials get strong policy-making cues from home states.


Interestingly, we also found no evidence linking the suprana-tional vision of European officials with their tenure, specializa-tion, or rank in the Commission. It could be that upon joining the Commission, European officials are already predisposed to supranationalism and that therefore, the views of their home countries and their organizational experiences have no sub-stantial impact on their attitudes toward Europe. It could also be that support for European integration is a response to the external challenges facing the organization – simply, a reflexive reaction to the perceived threats to the survival of their orga-nization. Close observers of the Brussels bureaucratic elite, like the Charlemagne column of The Economist, are convinced that it is the former: that “the average Eurocrat is not primarily in it for the money.” And that, “unwilling to seek a career in a hated national capital like Madrid or London, they instead latched onto the dream of a united Europe.” Critics, like the leader of the UK Independence Party are convinced that it is the oppo-site: European officials want “more Europe” because they want “more money” for themselves.1 Our data does not allow us to determine whether European officials are idealists or egoists – genuine believers in European integration or rational guardians of their well-paid jobs and power.

Regardless of their true motive, European officials see them-selves as the custodians of the emerging European polity and claim to be serving the collective interest of European citizens. Why are their views so different then from those of European publics? The results of our survey indicate a general consensus among European officials that they are defending the interests of future Europeans. Unable to derive legitimacy from their current political masters – politicians and citizens alike – senior officials claim to be serving the future generations of Europeans. This voiceless political master grants European officials the authority to undertake even the most controversial and unpopular policy initiatives. As Chapter 8 showed, senior officials are supportive

1 Charlemagne, “Before the Alter of Europe: Some parting reflections on the faith and folly of the Brussels elite,” The Economist, July 1, 2010.

Conclusion 201

of the Constitutional Treaty, the Bolkestein directive and, to a lesser extent, Turkish accession. Their support contrasts with the views of their fellow Europeans who loudly opposed these policy initiatives. Public reactions against these policies did not seem to shake the belief of senior bureaucrats in the righteousness of these initiatives. Top bureaucrats are similarly unshaken by the growing skepticism about the European project. They attribute negative public attitudes to the blame game played by irrespon-sible politicians, to the misinformation of European media, and to the ignorance of European citizens.

Overall, then, the supranational ethos of European offi-cials serves as a source of internal legitimacy for the European bureaucracy and as a bulwark against political attempts to curb their autonomy. Faced with an increasingly more adverse polit-ical environment, senior bureaucrats seem determined to push European integration forward because they think that this is in the best interest of European publics.

Bureaucratic Autonomy in Comparative Perspective

Even though we are drawing from a rich comparative literature on national public administrations, our discussion of bureau-cratic autonomy has almost entirely focused on a single interna-tional bureaucracy. To what extent can we generalize from this bureaucracy to others? What kind of expectations can we deduce from our analysis about the degree of bureaucratic autonomy in other international organizations? Despite the proliferation of such organizations and notwithstanding a budding litera-ture on international bureaucracies (e.g. Hawkins et al. 2006a; Trondal 2010: Chapter 6; Trondal et al. 2010), we still have little comparative knowledge about their capacity to take action in accordance to their own wishes. Although not exhaustive, our treatment of bureaucratic autonomy offers the basic analytical tools for a comparative analysis of the autonomy of interna-tional secretariats. Such analysis must go beyond the institutional design and resource availability of bureaucratic organizations. As Chapter 2 suggested, the formal mandate, budgetary limitations


and informational advantages of a bureaucracy fail to capture the dynamic nature of bureaucratic behavior.

An institutional feature that seems to be worth more atten-tion is the structure of political oversight. Chapter 2 has argued that the fragmentation of political oversight in the EU makes the Commission accountable to multiple political masters, thereby enhancing its de facto autonomy and exacerbating the problem of political control. To the best of our knowledge, this feature makes the European bureaucracy unique in the universe of inter-national secretariats (see also Lyne et al. 2006: 45). Comparative work on international organizations can gain considerable ana-lytical leverage by examining in more detail how the institutional architecture of these organizations affects the capacity of their secretariats for autonomous behavior. This examination, how-ever, must go beyond the initial institutional set up of such orga-nizations. We agree with Daniel Carpenter’s critique of studies of American bureaucracy: “It reduces political development to insti-tutional creation, to the neglect of institutional transformation (2001: 11, cited in Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 227; italics in original). To fully assess the capacity of bureaucratic agencies for autonomous behavior, future work must be able to capture their evolving nature and, more importantly, to gain an appreciation of the interinstitutional dynamics of political control. A static analysis of the number, preferences, or characteristics of polit-ical principals will fail to uncover the political determinants of bureaucratic autonomy.

Future work on international secretariats must also pay more attention to the characteristics of the bureaucratic agents them-selves. The capacity of international bureaucracies to pursue their own wishes and to disregard those of their overseers is higher when they possess political legitimacy. Right after their estab-lishment, nearly all international bureaucracies can be expected to have political legitimacy, but policy failures, political scandals, and pushy principals can erode the legitimacy of international secretariats. Unless they can supplement their “external” legiti-macy shortfall with “internal” legitimacy, they will be unable to capitalize on their informational or functional advantages.

Conclusion 203

Future research on international secretariats must also take into account whether these organizations have a common orga-nizational culture. The culture of an international organization can help mould its preferences and, hence, its behavior in the political environment. Bureaucracies staffed with professionals who share a basic understanding about the aims of their orga-nization are more likely to be autonomous than those working in a highly fragmented, incoherent, and disjointed organization that lacks a common vision. One can expect that international secretariats vary considerably in how coherent they are because of the multiple factors affecting their organizational culture. As suggested in Chapter 2, the transnational nature of international secretariats constitutes an intrinsic difficulty in establishing a common culture in these organizations. Secretariats in organiza-tions with intentionally vague or much forgotten missions are also less likely to establish a common culture. At the same time, however, some of these organizations are staffed by individuals with less diverse professional, educational, or even national backgrounds than the Commission and, hence, might be bet-ter able to create and sustain a common culture. This culture might be reinforced by the fact that like European bureaucrats, the staff of international secretariats live away from home and, in some cases, is secluded from local societies. Given the multi-tude of factors affecting the internal workings of an organiza-tion, the existence or absence of organizational coherence must be subjected to rigorous empirical inquiry, than assumed a priori. To accumulate comparative knowledge about the behavior of international bureaucracies, we need to use conventional public administrations tools to study those who run them. Unless we can show that these bureaucracies are culturally coherent, we have to remain skeptical of assumptions made about their pref-erences or strategies.

Although it expands the tool set for the comparative analysis of bureaucratic behavior, this book does not offer the last word on the bureaucratic autonomy of international organizations. It possibly represents the beginning of a new research program that seeks to enhance our understanding of international


bureaucracies. Drawing from public administration and other literatures, this basic bureaucratic approach presented in this book can facilitate the accumulation of comparative knowl-edge on international secretariats. Given the growing influence of international organizations, we certainly need to know more about those at their helm. The treatment of the Commission as a bureaucracy can also help resolve the “N = 1 issue” plagu-ing certain strains of EU scholarship (see Caporaso 1997; Marks 1997; Moravcsik 1997; Pollack 1997b, for a discussion). The Commission is in many ways a unique bureaucracy but it is by no means incomparable to other bureaucracies.

Bureaucracy in Decline?

The image sketched in this book of the European bureaucracy as a rather coherent organization driven by a mission to inte-grate Europe departs from the conventional wisdom in a num-ber of ways that are worth exploring. The first departure relates to a general sense among many bureaucracy experts that public administrations have been losing the battle with their political overseers. As Chapter 5 has pointed out, the past decades have witnessed political attempts to enhance the political control of public bureaucracies and to curb what many politicians – from the Right but also the Left – perceived as runaway behavior. Such attempts led to the politicization of public bureaucracies and, less directly, to attempts to reform them through the introduc-tion of new public management. In the past decade or so, the European Commission has confronted similar pressures to yield more control to its political masters but has managed to sustain its autonomy despite the strength of the political opposition it constantly faces.

There are at least three main reasons that explain the capac-ity of the Commission to successfully resist political challenges to its autonomy. The first one relates to the multicephalous structure of the EU institutional set up: The fragmentation of political authority makes it harder for the political overseers of the Commission to exercise effective political control over the

Conclusion 205

European bureaucracy. The second one relates to the regulatory nature of the European bureaucracy, which limits the capacity of political executives to use budgetary limitations as means to alter its behavior in part because the Commission possesses technical expertise and executes necessary functions for which it needs some level of administrative discretion. The third factor that allows the Commission to resist political challenges to its autonomy relates to the fact that it is a bureaucracy with a clear mission to facilitate the integration of Europe. The clear man-date of the European bureaucracy to promote integration seems to facilitate the recruitment of officials with supranational pre-dispositions. When faced with external political challenges, this multinational lot seems to rely on this mission to come together and close ranks to defend the organization. The supranational mission has helped sustain the coherence of the organization, limiting the effect of centrifugal forces that are bound to exist in transnational bureaucracies. Overall, then, the institutional set up of the EU, the regulatory nature of the Commission, and the clarity of its mission has helped the European bureaucracy shield its autonomy from frustrated political overseers.

Our findings also mark a departure from analyses that view the Commission as losing its capacity to act as the motor of European integration. Since the Maastricht Treaty, there has been an increase in Euroskepticism and a resurgence of inter-governmentalism that is thought to have limited the scope for supranational solutions to European problems, thereby under-mining the moral authority the Commission used to command. Moreover, the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 has dealt a major blow to the confidence and morale of the Commission, and the leadership of the organization seems to remain weak – at least, when compared with Delors. In the face of these challenges, close observers of the EU seem to agree that the Commission is in institutional decline. Writing the eulogy of the glory days of the European bureaucracy, for example, scholars note that “the decline of the Commission, evident since the early 1990s, has continued . . . and there seems little possi-bility that the situation will be reversed” (Kassim and Menon


2004: 102, cited in Peterson 2006; see also Hill and Smith 2005). Along the same lines, another scholar noted that “it is difficult for the Commission to regain its old authority and promote the overriding goal of deeper political and economic integration” (Dinan 2005: 222). In addition, the Commission is also seen as the loser of the changing balance of power within the EU. Since the Single European Act, the European Parliament has undoubt-edly been gaining institutional power nearly matching the leg-islative authority of the Council. The Parliament now has a say at various phases of the decision-making process and can ask the Commission to draft legislation. As Chapter 4 has shown, European officials are uneasy about the expanded political role of the Parliament in part because this power is increasingly more often used to challenge the authority of the European bureau-cracy. At the same time, however, they also suggest what most analyses tend to miss: that the enhanced institutional authority of the Parliament provides an opportunity for European officials to use this legislative body of the EU as leverage to extract conces-sions from the other – to play one master against the other. The expanded legislative authority of the Parliament has exacerbated the fractious nature of the EU polity, thereby leaving more scope for administrative input in the policy-making process. This input would have been less important if the European bureaucratic corps was a disjoined group merely serving the interests of indi-vidual member states or if they were discouraged by the adverse political conditions the European project seems to be facing. It is important because, rather than a porous organization, the senior management of the Commission seems to be a rather coherent lot serving the goal of an “ever closer union.”

Far from being a bureaucracy in decline, the Commission has managed to sustain its autonomy in the face of political adversity. As it stands today, the European bureaucracy is one of the most powerful bureaucracies in the world enjoying more autonomy than most national and international administrations. Despite the constant pressure facing the Commission, we expect that it will be able to maintain this extraordinary authority in the years to come. There are a number of factors pointing in this direction.

Conclusion 207

The first relates to the institutional changes undertaken by the EU in the past two decades. Seeking to address the problem of legitimacy, EU treaties have been granting power to an increasing number of political masters – an enlarged Council, the European Parliament, national parliaments, and citizens. This has com-plicated efforts to resolve another major problem of the EU – that of institutional efficiency – leaving the Commission in the privileged position of aggregating and reformulating the prefer-ences of European politicians and publics. Instead of curbing the autonomy of the European bureaucracy, institutional reforms are creating multiple points of political authority thereby enhancing the role of the Commission as power broker between the polit-ical actors involved in EU policy making. This role would not have been as important if the Commission was a neutral broker, merely aggregating the preferences of its political overseers. It is important because European officials are not neutral adminis-trators of the European project: They have a strong inclination toward supranationalism that privileges certain policy solutions over others. To the extent that the Commission can keep and enhance this role in the EU institutional nexus, it can be expected that it will be able to sustain its extraordinary power.

A second factor favoring the persistence of bureaucratic power relates to the general political environment the Commission oper-ates in. For over two decades, there has been a growing tendency to blame Brussels for many of the problems European coun-tries are facing. In national political settings, the Commission has been blamed for unpopular policies, and in the EU, the European bureaucracy has been taking fire from those seeking to legitimate the European project even at the expense of the European bureaucracy. We do not expect this to change in the years to come. It is only natural for bureaucracies to find them-selves under political fire in part because they lack the commu-nication means their political masters have at their disposal. International bureaucracies like the Commission might even be easier targets than national administrations because they are opaque and obscure organizations, most of them out of public sight. In this sense, the Commission can be expected to continue


to serve as an ideal target for Europhiles and Euroskeptics alike. As we have suggested, political attacks against the European bureaucracy have tended to produce the opposite result. In the face of political adversity, European officials tend to close ranks to defend the values of their organization. In the case of the Commission, then, political adversity might reinforce the basic strengths of the organization – the commitment of its officials to its supranational mission.

Bureaucratic Power at a Time of Crisis

This brings us back to the survival crisis of the European project. The persistence of bureaucratic power rests on the assumption that the European polity will remain intact. In light of the debt crisis plaguing the Eurozone “periphery,” the endurance of the EU as we know it can no longer be taken for granted. The crisis has exposed significant – and to some extent, irreconcilable – differences in the fiscal positions of Eurozone members that put into question the very logic of monetary integration. More importantly, the crisis has generated bitter tensions between creditor nations like Germany and the most indebted nations, like Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Once the front-runner of European integration, the German government is now accused both at home and in the rest of Europe for lacking solidarity and for selfishly looking after its national interest, even at the risk of exacerbating the debt crisis – as some think happened in the case of Ireland. Economic adversity is thought to be pushing member states apart and reinforcing intergovernmentalism that risks the very survival of European supranationalism. Is it paradoxical, then, to discuss bureaucratic power in a polity facing the risk of collapse? Does the supranational orientation of the European administration mean anything when the political masters of the European polity are questioning the virtues of European integra-tion and second-guessing their membership in the EU?

Students of national and international administrations point to one major reason why the findings of this book may be more relevant today than ever: Bureaucracies can thrive during crises.

Conclusion 209

Crises generate uncertainty about the prescribed course of action, and as Michael Crozier points out, uncertainty can be a source of power for bureaucratic organizations (2010: 108–109). Scholars of international secretariats similarly note that in times of crises, bureaucratic officials are best positioned to influence the content of policy programs – for instance, the IMF staff during an interna-tional financial crisis (Martin 2006: 143–144). This is especially the case for bureaucracies enjoying considerable degree of dis-cretion: The capacity the Commission has to propose legislation means that, at a time of high uncertainty, it can provide ideas on how to address crises. It is also the case for bureaucracies with a sense of mission: The supranational consensus in the top eche-lons of the European bureaucracy means that its proposed policy solutions are likely to be in line with the institutional interests of the organization. Using its institutional prerogatives and relying on its organizational coherence, the Commission can capitalize on the divisions among its political overseers to sustain, or even, to enhance its bureaucratic power.

At a time of gloomy predictions about the future of the European project, our suggestion is scarcely an abstract theo-retical proposition without any substantive grounding in reality. Although the crisis is still unfolding, there is already evidence to suggest that the Commission is capitalizing on this crisis to fur-ther its own institutional interests. The financial crisis, for exam-ple, has undoubtedly extended the regulatory reach of the EU by compelling its political masters to set up new Europe-wide bodies to regulate banks and other financial firms. Similarly, the debt crisis is gradually leading to the establishment of new mechanisms for the economic governance of the EU, giving the Commission more authority over the monitoring of fiscal poli-cies and the imposition of penalties on the spendthrifts.

Further research ought to and certainly will be done to assess the power position of the European bureaucracy before and after the crisis. Our expectation is clear: The crisis will allow the Commission to strengthen its position in the EU’s institutional nexus. The prediction for the persistence of bureaucratic power suggests that the EU will not only manage to weather the crisis


but also emerge from it more integrated than ever. If this turns out to be the case, one must not only thank the political heads of Europe, who are now squabbling about the future direction of the Union, but also its senior bureaucrats, who remain devoted to the mission of their organization to promote European inte-gration. Somewhat ironically, the much hated European bureau-cracy seems to present today one of the best hopes for Europe to overcome its problems.

The European bureaucracy can help prevent the disintegration of Europe, but it cannot help resolve the legitimacy problems of the European polity. In fact, the persistence of bureaucratic power is likely to exacerbate the legitimacy crisis of the EU, reinforcing the self-legitimation mechanisms of the European bureaucracy and increasing the distance between the Brussels elite and European publics. Those seeking to curb the auton-omy and power of the European bureaucracy will continue to invest their political capital deriding the runaway behavior of the Brussels elite. And scholarly critics of bureaucratic power – on both the Left and the Right – will keep on complaining about the excessive authority granted to unelected officials. For the reasons outlined, one can doubt if this will suffice to change the behavior of the European bureaucracy. For as long as the EU sustains its multicephalous structure of political authority, the custodians of Europe in Brussels will continue to serve this conveniently voice-less political master – the future European.

211

Appendix A

Distribution of Sample by Directorate-General (DG) or Service (N = 194)

DG or Service No. %

Agriculture and Rural Development 17 8.8Competition 8 4.1Economic and Financial Affairs 7 3.6Education and Culture 3 1.5Employment, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities 8 4.1Enterprise and Industry 10 5.2Environment 14 7.2Fisheries and Maritime Affairs 4 2.1Health and Consumer Protection 3 1.5Information Society and Media 16 8.2Internal Market and Services 6 3.1Joint Research Centre 2 1.0Justice, Freedom, and Security 4 2.1Regional Policy 7 3.6Research 13 6.7Taxation and Customs Union 3 1.5Transport and Energy 3 1.5Development 3 1.5Enlargement 6 3.1EuropeAid – Co-operation Office 17 8.8External Relations 11 5.7Humanitarian Aid Office – ECHO 3 1.5Trade 7 3.6

(continued)

Appendix A212

DG or Service No. %

European Anti-Fraud Office 2 1.0Eurostat 0 0.0Publications Office 0 0.0Secretariat General 7 3.6Press and Communication 0 0.0Budget 4 2.1Informatics 0 0.0Interpretation 0 0.0Legal Service 0 0.0Personnel and Administration 2 1.0Translation 0 0.0Bureau of European Policy Advisers 0 0.0Infrastructures and Logistics 0 0.0Internal Audit Service 2 1.0Missing 2 1.0

Total 194 100

213

Appendix B

Contact of European Bureaucrats with the European Parliament

TABLE B.2. What Forms Does Contact with EP Take?

(Top 2 responses) Number %

Through committees 105 54.4Responding to MEP letters 24 12.4Briefing parliamentarians 52 26.9Other 12 6.2

Total 193 100

TABLE B.1. Frequency of Contact with EP

Number %

Once or twice a year 63 33.9Once or twice a month 74 39.8Once or twice a week 18 9.7Never 31 16.7

Total 186 100

Appendix B214

TABLE B.3. With Whom in the EP Do You Have Most Contact?

(Top 2 responses) Number %

The corresponding parliamentary committee 110 47.2Leaders of parliamentary groups 8 3.4Leaders of national party delegations 6 2.6Individual parliamentarians 82 35.2Legislators closely identified with interest groups, NGOs

2 0.9

Other 7 3.0Not applicable 18 7.7

Total 233 100

215

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233

Index

Abélès, Marc, 30, 31, 116, 126, 129, 170

Aberbach, Joel, 8, 9, 56, 89, 90administrative culture, 116, 127Adreasen, Marta, 105Allison, Graham, 13Australia, 91, 122Austria, 51

Barker, Rodney, 25, 26, 33, 151Barnett, Michael, 14, 17, 139Barroso Commission, 106, 159,

160, 197Barroso, José Manuel, 21, 47, 49, 79Bauer, Michael, 36, 49, 59, 60,

104, 122Belarus, 191Belgium, 51Beyers, Jan, 127, 170, 179, 199Bolkestein directive, 47–49,

185–188, 201and political orientations of

officials, 186Bolkestein, Frits, 48Bouckaert, Geert, 90, 92, 97, 98Britain, 50, 122Bulgaria, 193bureaucratic autonomy

and interest groups, 80–81

and international secretariats, 18and legitimacy, 9–11, 15–16, 202and organizational culture, 11–12,

16–18, 124–125, 203and political control, 89–93and political environment, 39and structure of political oversight,

8–9, 15, 202definition of, 6–7, 17during crises, 208–210

Burnham, James, 89Buttiglione, Rocco, 47

Cabinets, 68–69, 95, 134Caporaso, James, 204Carpenter, Daniel, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16,

33, 202Chirac, Jacques, 46, 49, 186Christiansen, Thomas, 96Cini, Michelle, 19, 30, 60, 107, 130College of Commissioners, 20, 37,

134, 162College of Europe, 170Commissioners, 65–71, 99, 134Committee of Independent Experts,

21, 31, 99, 100Common Agricultural Policy, 46Constitutional Treaty, 45, 48,

182–185, 201

Index234

Coombes, David, 29, 128Copenhagen criteria, 188Council of Ministers, 20, 23–24, 37,

70, 71, 73, 77, 134, 206and enlargement, 75

Cram, Laura, 19Crozier, Michael, 209Cyprus, 44, 51Czech Republic, 51

d’Estaing, Valéry Giscard, 45Dahl, Robert, 7, 10De Gaulle, Charles, 93Dehousse, Renaud, 20Delors Commission, 52, 97, 155, 162,

178Delors, Jacques, 30, 129, 130, 136,

144, 148, 205Denmark, 51DG Agriculture, 66, 72, 74, 83, 108,

140, 141, 192DG Budget, 71, 133, 183DG Competition, 128, 140, 141DG Development, 75, 138, 189DG Economic and Financial Affairs,

85, 139, 143DG Education, 182DG Employment, 68, 85, 128, 155,

158, 187DG Enlargement, 190DG Enterprise and Industry, 114,

118, 183, 193DG Environment, 74, 128, 132, 143,

162, 193DG External Relations, 70, 80DG Freedom, Justice and Security, 78DG Humanitarian Aid, 67, 138DG Information Society and Media,

85, 114, 118, 144, 158, 159, 161DG Internal Market and Services, 75,

83, 138, 162, 192DG Maritime Affairs and

Fisheries, 140DG Personnel and Administration,

133, 154DG Regional Policy, 66, 158DG Research, 68, 118, 131, 134DG Taxation, 191

DG Trade, 78, 132, 188, 189DG Transport and Energy, 70,

128, 140Dinan, Desmond, 20, 22, 23, 97, 206Djilas, Milovan, 89Dogan, Mattei, 89Downs, Anthony, 6, 57

Edwards, Geoffrey, 19, 20Egeberg, Morten, 21, 24Ellinas, Antonis, 49enlargement, 24, 44, 75, 127, 142,

182and the College of Commissioners,

21and the European Parliament, 22

Estonia, 51EuropeAid, 78, 83, 114, 191European Anti-Fraud Office, 141European Commission

and Council of Ministers, 23–24and enlargement, 21and European Parliament, 21–23,

47and political control, 93–98and political environment, 43and politicization, 94, 96, 197and regulation, 94, 96and structure of political oversight,

196and the Kinnock reforms, 97–105,

197and the media, 50, 160autonomy of, 18–35bureaucratization of, 123decline of power, 204–208educational profile of officials,

52–53internal legitimacy, 32–35, 201national origin of officials,

50–51, 198organizational culture of, 29–35,

198political legitimacy of, 25–28, 196

European Commission officials and Cabinets, 68–69relationship with Commissioners,

65–71

Index 235

relationship with Council of Ministers, 23–24

relationship with European Parliament, 76–80

relationship with interest groups, 80–86, 134

social life of, 126, 135supranational attitudes of,

163–175, 199views on Bolkestein directive,

185–188views on Euroskepticism, 153–163views on evolution of

organizational culture, 141–144views on media coverage, 158views on organizational

subcultures, 141views on promotion, 114views on Turkish accession,

188–193views toward Constitutional Treaty,

182–185European Council, 23, 195European Parliament, 21–23, 37, 47,

64, 69, 70, 71, 73, 76–80, 93, 121, 134, 152, 206

and administrative reform, 99Euroskepticism, 46, 153–163,

195, 205Eurozone crisis, 196Evans, Peter, 80

Feldstein, Martin, 195Finland, 51Finnemore, Martha, 14, 17, 139Fligstein, Neil, 170fragmentation of political system, 8–9France, 49, 50, 81, 107, 108,

185, 194Frederick the Great, 57future Europeans, 34, 152, 200, 210

Galbraith, John, 89Garrett, Geoffrey, 24, 36Georgia, 191Germany, 51, 107, 171, 208Greece, 51Growth and Stability Pact, 45

Haas, Ernst, 24, 124Hawkins, Darren, 13, 15, 201Heclo, Hugh, 8, 90, 92Hewlett Packard, 49, 197Hix, Simon, 22, 83Hoffman, Stanley, 23Hooghe, Liesbet, 19, 24, 36, 126,

127, 137, 168, 169, 171, 178, 179, 199

Hungary, 51

Ikenberry, John, 92Intel, 141interest groups, 64, 80–86, 134Internal Audit Service, 74, 133,

184, 193international bureaucracies,

37–39, 207and legitimacy, 202and organizational culture, 203and structure of political

oversight, 202autonomy of, 12–18, 201–204

International Monetary Fund, 13, 18, 93, 209

international organizations, 14Ireland, 51, 208Israel, 192Italy, 51, 116

Juncker, Jean-Claude, 46

Kassim, Hussein, 19, 20, 36, 104, 205Kelemen, Daniel, 20, 21Keohane, Robert, 13Kiewiet, Roderick, 13, 37Kinnock reforms, 29, 32, 49–50,

97–105, 197description of, 103

Kinnock, Neil, 49, 100Kroes, Neelie, 47

Lake, David, 14, 15Latvia, 51Levy, Roger, 105Lewis, David, 8Linz, Juan, 10Lipset, Seymour Martin, 10, 89

Index236

Lisbon Strategy, 44, 48, 161Lithuania, 51lobbies. See interest groupsLuxembourg, 46, 51Lyne, Mona, 14, 15, 202

Majone, Giandomenico, 7, 19, 94Malta, 44, 51Mandelson, Peter, 21Marks, Gary, 24, 36, 204Martin, Lisa, 209McCubbins, Mathew, 13, 14, 15, 37Medrano, Juan Diez, 171Menon, Anand, 19, 20, 205Michels, Robert, 37Microsoft, 141Moe, Terry, 13, 37, 89, 90Moldova, 191Moravcsik, Andrew, 23, 63, 204Morocco, 192

national administrations and information, 64and legitimacy, 9–11and organizational culture,

11–12and structure of political

oversight, 8–9national subcultures, 127Netherlands, 51, 171, 194New Public Management, 32, 91,

101, 122, 204New Zealand, 91, 122Nielson, Daniel, 13Niskanen, William, 57, 91Nixon, Richard, 9, 90NPM. See New Public ManagementNugent, Neill, 19, 25, 60, 127, 128

Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 92

organizational culture, 11–12, 16–18, 124–125, 203

and political environment, 145–147

and subcultures, 141

and the European Commission, 29–35

evolution of, 141–144organizational mission, 18, 131, 205organized interests. See interest groups

Page, Edward, 8, 25, 30, 36, 38, 90, 95, 130

Peters, Guy, 19, 56, 57Peterson, John, 19, 20, 21, 23, 38, 60,

127, 206Pfiffner, James, 90Poland, 51political bureaucrats, 56–58, 71political context, 39, 50political legitimacy, 9–11, 15–16, 195,

202, 210and European Commission, 25–28and functional uniqueness, 11and legal authority, 10and structure of political

oversight, 28and technical expertise, 10–11definition of, 9–10internal legitimacy, 32–35,

151–153, 210political principals

characteristics of, 14–15politicization, 89–93, 96, 197

and the European Commission, 94, 96

Pollack, Mark, 19, 24, 36, 63, 204Pollitt, Christopher, 90, 92, 97, 98principal-agent theory, 13–15Procter and Gamble, 132Prodi Commission, 32, 100promotion, 114public opinion, 84Putnam, Robert, 8, 56, 71

Rasmussen, Poul, 49regulatory bureaucracy, 94, 155,

197, 205Richardson, Jeremy, 81Rockman, Bert, 8, 9, 56, 89, 90Romania, 51, 193Rothschild, Joseph, 33

Index 237

Sandholtz, Wayne, 24, 30, 36Santer Commission, 22, 32, 79, 97,

99, 205resignation of, 100, 118, 122

Sbragia, Alberta, 20Secretariat General, 67, 75, 83, 133,

190, 192Self-legitimation. See political

legitimacy, internal legitimacySelznick, Philip, 124, 128Shore, Cris, 30, 31, 59, 130Skocpol, Theda, 8, 80Slovakia, 51Slovenia, 51socialization, 127, 170, 179, 199Southern Europe, 90

administrative culture, 116Spain, 50special interests. See interest groupsSpence, David, 19, 20, 21, 30, 95Stone Sweet, Alec, 24structure of political oversight,

8–9, 202subcultures, 141Suleiman, Ezra, 8, 37, 49, 58, 89,

90, 91supranational attitudes, 35, 163–175,

199and national background of

officials, 172

and organizational experience of officials, 172–175

Sweden, 51

Thatcher, Margaret, 9, 93Tierney, Michael, 13Treaty of Nice, 183Trondal, Jarle, 19, 21, 24, 36, 137,

170, 179, 198, 201Tsebelis, George, 24, 36Turkey, 44, 188–193Turkish accession, 44, 188–193, 201

UK Independence Party, 200Ukraine, 191United Nations, 13

van Rompuy, Herman, 195

Wallström, Margot, 159, 160Weber, Max, 7, 10, 32, 37, 56, 57,

106, 176Weberian bureaucrats, 56–58, 71, 75Wilson, James Q., 8, 9, 12, 124, 154Wilson, Woodrow, 56World Bank, 13, 14, 16, 93, 139World War II, 143Wright, Vincent, 8, 90

Zysman, John, 24, 30, 36

european comission and its burocratic autonomy

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