~ o o k s by Robert C. Tucker

philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx

he Soviet Political Mind

p he Grent Purge Trial (Co-Editor) The Marxian Revolutionary Idea

The Marx-Engels Reader (Editor) Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929:

A Study in History and Persoilality

The Lenin Anthology (Editor)

STALINISM Essays in Historical Interpretation

Edited by Robert C. Tucker, Princeton University

with contributions by

W . W . NORTON & COMPANY. INC . NEW YORK

t' -' 76

'1'. 11. Ri& re la~ i i~e ly I C [ , ( I ~ chief exec~~ l i ve role. This prohnhly rcflects ilirotective me:lsures taken w i l l i i ~ ~ the r)ligarchy itsell; wl~usc nic~libers recog. nize that a strong chief execolive might quickly rn:ikc l i i n~re l f dictator i n ;I system , lacking serious x)ciclal cl~ccks o t ~ the supreme eclielot~ o f powcr. I t re~iiainc Stalinism as prirhlcniatical. Iiowevcr, w l ~ e t l ~ c r the oligarcl~ic;~l stri lcll irc o f Ilowcr could sur. : vive a profound or prolonged crisis situation requiring expeditious and dccisive Revolution from Above leadership.

Should sonie future chief executive attempt "to escape frcrni the control ofthr : collective," as Kl~rushchev was alleged to be doing o r the eve o f his removd, he w i l l need speedily l o assume the powers and methods o f a tyr:mt i f he i s to ., escape a similar fate. Such an uutccrnie may now sertn i ~ ~ ~ p n i h n h l e hut cannot ; be ruled out. Should i t occur, we \\suuld ag;lin havc "a ~~i,~~~t i~ns o f the tasks facing the con~munist state-these md many specilic traits are entirely Lel~itl ist." 1 Froni sucli a standpoint, there l ~ d s no special pri>blem o f interpretive t~ndersta!~ding o f "Slali l~isti~."

Although S t a l i ~ ~ never, not even at the l ie ig l~t o f his personality cult, tolerated beuseortlie tern1 "Stalinis~n," he and his party allies o f the mid-1920's employed (or, as Trotsky maintailled, concocted) the term "Trotskyism" as the emblem ofa system o f political heresy agninst 1,enitiisni. For Trotsky and his followers, however, the heresy was the political line that Stalili and his associates were

I. Alfred G. Meyer, LC)INII.?!II (Catnbridp~. Mass.. 1957). pp. 282-83. 77

!. 78 Robert C Tuck pursuing and ll ie ideological tenets, l ike "social is~i~ in one country." wliich thq were using ill justification o f the line. So i t is i n the Trotskyist poletnical literatulr , that we fitid the earliest interpretive and critical discussio~~ o f Stali~iism. In !hi ; interpretation, Slalioisni appeared as lhe practice, and i ls rellectio~i in the0ry.d a cot~scrvative bureaucratic takeover o f t l ~ e Bolshevik Revolutior~, a Soviet Thcr. , midor, o f which Stalin himself was merely the represe~~tative figure and symbol? :

I n c~~t~trndist inct ion to the lirst o f the two positiotls just mentioned. I hold thr~ 1 S la l i~~ is rn niust be recognized as an l~islorical ly d i s t i ~ ~ c t and specilic phenomenon ' whicll d id !rut flow directly from Leni~rism, a l thougl~ Leninist11 was an iti~portanl : contributory factor. I n contradistinction to the secotid, I wi l l argue here (I)thsl : Slal i~i ism, despile conservative, reactiot~ary, or cout~ter-I-evolulio~~nry elcnienti 1 i t1 its makeup, was a revolutior~ary p l ~ e n o n ~ e n o ~ ~ i n essence; (2) that the Stalinin I revolutior~ f rom above, wl~atever the con t i ~~ge~~c ies i t ~vo l v td in i ls inceptiot~ and : pattern, was an integral phase o f the Russian revolut ioi~ary process as a wholq j a11d (3) that ilotable anlottg the causal factors explaining why the Staliriist pharr ; occurred, or why i t took the form i t did, are the heritage o f Bolshevik revolutian. ! ism, the lieritage o f o ld Russia, and the mind and perso~~al i ly o f Stalin. i

Decaosc o f the presence and significant c o t ~ l r i h u l i < ) ~ ~ o f I l l is I;~sl, the prrsod 1 factor, wliich may he see,, as all 11isloric;tl accidettt (Slillin, lilr exan~ple, ntigh! , easily have died, l ike Jacob Sverdlov, in the great flu epidetiiic of 1918-I"!, m). t l~esis that the Stalinist revolution f r o n ~ above was an " i~~tegl-al phase" of tk Russia11 revolutionary process as a whole is nut tlleallt to imply that the Stalinia 1 pliase was an unavoidable one given the nature o f the l~olshevik rnovenienl, d i Russia, and o f the historical circumstances which prevailed i n the prelude. Giva : the diversity o f currents in the Bolshevik nioverllent o f 1l1e niid-1920's, we must j allow that a different. IIOII-revolutiotiary f o r n ~ o f further Soviet de\,elopnimtd ; niovenlent was a possibility. That such a possibility d id lot ti~alerialize i s a lacL : but i t could have-given such an easily inlagillable dilfcrence i n the historical situatioti as the rise o f some other political leader than Stalin to power in succa- j siun to Lenin. On tlle other hand, nly stress here 011 the culturalisl Cdctorsin tk , Stalinist revolulion from above implies that Stalin's personality alone niusl na : be seen as (he expla~~at ion o f why Soviel developn~ent proceeded i n the revulution. ary tnatiner that i t did under his leadersl~ip i n the 1930's.

j

Tlie distinction between a palace revolutioti or coup d'Ctat and a full-scale sod. ; apolitical revolution is familiar and generally accepted. In Ihe one, a swifi and , more o r less violent chat~ge o f a society's polil ical leadenl~ ip lnkes place without far-reaching inroads into the character of t l ~ c society itself. 111 lhe other, a chanp :

W n i r m nq Rc~vI18tios lrnnn ,\hnre 79

$political learlcrsl~ip, wllich may witness a coup

f SO Rcbl,crl C. Turks rary willingness to r e s p o ~ ~ d to revolutionary leadership in tlic 1917-1921 uplieaval went along wi th a tenacio~~s underlying resistance to tlle resh;tpi~~g of their way of lire and t l iougl~ l . The peasants who burned down nlanor l~ollsesin .. 1917 and parceled out thc estates had, for example, l i l t lc ; ~ ~ l i n ~ u s against thc Russian Orthodox religio~r and, stil l more irnportal~t. 110 w i s l ~ to live and work i n agricultural conimunes under the Soviet regime. Wltence their eloquently

.

erlwessive s:tyirig, qu,~tcd by L r ~ l i r ~ OIIC occasio~l. "LCMI~ live l l te ilolslieviks down will1 l l ie Con11nu1iisls1"-the former be i~ lg tllosc w l ~ o Itad b id then1 lakc the landow~lers' land and the latter those who [low wanted l o deprive thentof : it. By early 1921 the Bolsheviks found that their continoed tenurc of potvcr (lepended 11pcr11 l l ~ e sul~pression of t l ie Comn~unisls illside thcmselves to l l~r extent of legalizing private prt,duction and trade under tl le N E P i n t l ~ c rural economy. small industry, and coriinierce. To niake peace witt i l l ~ e nver \v l~e l l~ i i~ ig rnajorily o f lhe populat io~~, to reestablish the link, or snzyclrko. hetween workers and .. peasants, they had to desist from herculean elforts toward rapid socialist transfor. mation o f thecountry's economic way o f l ife and tolcratc, i f not actively encour. : age, that small-scale comn~odi ty production o r which Lenin wrote i n 1920 that i t "e,~gendcr.~capital is~~l arid l l i e bourgeoisie con l i n~~ ,~~ ts l y , rl:rily. I~ourly, sponta : ~leuusly, a ~ ~ r l OII ;I mass scale." "

The N E P Russia that emergecl from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1111: .21 : coold he described as a society w i th two uneasily cucxist i~lg cultures. There s8.S an olTicially dorninant Soviet culture comprising the Revolutiot~'s tnyri;~d innova. tions i ~ t ideology, goverr in~e~ital structure, political llrocedures. ecot~otnic organi- . zation, legal order, educatioti, tile intellectual p~~rsu i ts , values. itrt, daily life, and ritual. Side by side wi th i t was a scarcely suvictizcd Russian culture that l id on from the pre-1917 past as well as in the stnall-scale rural : ~ r ~ d ~ l rban privaa enterprise that flourished under the NEP. I t was a Russia of c l ~ t ~ r c l ~ r s , tile villagt mir, the patr iarcl~al peasant ramily, old valucs, old pastinles, old oullooks along wit11 widespread illiteracy, niuddy roads, and all tliat Trotsky liad ill mind WIIO Ile wrote that: "Essentially tl ie Revolutioo means the people's final break with the Asiatic. with the Sevel i tee~~t l~ Cetttury, \ v i l l ~ l l o l y Russia, \*it11 icolls and cockronclles." 7 I l ~ e coexistcncc of cultures mas conipetilive i n a one-sided way: i t was the declared objective of the new one to transforni the o ld one, so !ha& as L e n i ~ ~ declared in addressing the M(,scow Soviet 011 Nove~nber 20. 1922. "oul o f N E P Russia wi l l come socialist Russia."

Doubts o f this existed i n some quarters, including the emigre Russian intells- : luals associated wi th the syn~pos iun~ Stnola vekh (Change of Landmarks). FM : IJstrialov and his fellow smer~avekhovry. the N E P was !he beginning o f theend , o f Russian C o m m u ~ ~ i s m as a revolut iol~ary culture-transfor~i i i t~g inovenlent, iB incipient deradicalization, and Russia's imminent return l o naliunal foundationi . On the Rolsl~eviks' behalf, Lenin anathematized that perspecti\,e. And replying ,

6. ..Lcfl-Wlnp" Conlrnullisll8-An lnfanlile Dirordcr, i n T11r Lerri,, Aalholow cd. Rokr l C Tucker (New York. 1975). p. 553 .

7. Lcun Trotsky. Lilerorurc ond Revohrio,t (Ann Arbor, Mlch.. 1960). p. 94,

lo lllose Metisl~evik-111i11ded Marxists ("1111r European [)Iiilistines") who argued, like Sukhanov, ~II:II i t had been a n~istake for socialists to seize power in so culturally backw:~td :i caontry as Russia, Lcnio defiai~t ly replied i n one of liis last articles, " W l ~ y could we not lirsl create such prereqtlisites o f civilization in our country as tlle exp l l l s io~~ o f the lando\vners and the Russia11 capitalists, and then start movitig tou'ard socia l is~~i? ' I f a definite level of c ~ ~ l t o r e was needecl. a they said, L I ~ 1111. 1>11ildiug ~ ~ l ' s ~ c i i ~ l i s ~ n , " W l ~ y ci~ntiot we bcgir by l i r s t ;~cllicv- ing l l ~ e prerequisilcs l'or that definite level o f culture i n a revolutionary way, and {hen, wit11 the aid o f the workers' and peasants' govertilnent and tl ie Soviet systcnl, proceed to overtake l l ie other nations?" 8

Wllile op l~ [~ lc l i r~g l l lc hislnrical correctncsv o f l l ~ c Birlsl~evik decisim lo takc power i n 1917 and 10 pursuc thc revoluliu!iary political course Il lat il d id subse- qucntly, Lenin ill 1'121 alld after redelinell the moven~e!it's objective and strategy in the new situal iot~ marked by retreat at home and delay o f otlier Marxist revolutions abnr:~d. The transcendi~~g of the N E P was to take place within the framework oS thc NEP, by evolution 1101 revolutioti. Lenin could not have been more explicit (III l l~i\ point. Rcvo lu t in~~, he explained, "is a cllange wltich breaks the old orrlcr 10 if, urry f o ~ t n ~ l n l i ~ ~ r ~ s , i l l id ~ i u t OUU t l ial C~III~~IISIY. slowly i ~ r~c l gradually ren~otlr ls i t . takiug a r c l o bl.ci~k as l i t t le 11s pc~ssiblc..' War CO~III~~I- nisnl, wi lh its forcible Suod requisitioning, had represented a "revolulionary approach" l o t l ~ r hu i ld i~ lg o f ;i socialist sociely; i t liad suugltt to break up thc old social-ecor~o~nic systcni cotnpletely at one stroke and substitute fur i t a new one. The N E P signified an a h a n d o n ~ n c ~ ~ l o f Illat i n favor o f a "reformist ap- proach" wl~osc n iet l~od was "11ot to break rip the o ld social-economic systenl- trade, petty pn,r l~~ctiol i , petty pn~prielorsl i ip, capitalism-but to revive trnrle, pctty proprietol-sltip, cnpitalisnl, wlli lc cautiously and gradually getting the upper hand over thcni, or tnakitig i t possible to subject tl1e111 to slate regulation UII@ lo ihc extent l l lal lltey revive.'' "

Tlie transfer cullure, as Lenin now envisaged it, was t l ~ e "cooperating (koopcrirovank) of Russia" alorig wit l i the development o f a popularly admi~l is- lered. ~~otl-bure;ruc~;~tizerl society with a large-scale, adv;~nced inacl~inc i~~dus l l -y bawd heavily on c lcc l r i l ic i l t io~~ and operating according to plan. The cooperal i~~g of Russia meatit l l ~ e involve~ncnt of the entire popu la t i o~~ i n cooperative forrns of\\,ork. This wuuld realize the utopian dreams a f the "old cooperators" l ike Rol,erl Owell, wlrorc error l ~ a d been 1101 the vision o f a cooperative socialism bul the belief that il ccn~ld be put into practice witl iout a polil ical revolution sucll a the one that I l ~ c Uolsl~eviks had carried out. '1'0 acliieve ti le cuoperated Russia through tlie NEI', hy the reforniist methods that tiow defined the transfer culture in 1.enin's n~ ind , wnuld be the work o f "a whole l~istorical epoch" comprising

8 . "Our R r v ~ ~ l ~ ~ l i n ~ ~ li2pmpcns nr N. Suk l ta~~nv 's Nola)." in l%< icnirr A~irholo~y, pp. 705~6. Fur I*sfs's a~~alhenla on Illr .Stnow vrkh l en r le~>rg see this report lo #be Elcvrnll~ I'arly Congress III 1!122. h l i i ~ Leri8 A,irhokr8: p p 525-26 Uslrisltcllwlual leader of lhr a t ~ r , , n v e l l i o ~ ~ i ~ y .

q A l l quutalionr H I I l l i s pasqape arc rrom "Tllr lrnportroce of Gold Now snd Aner !he Cumpletc V$rlory of Sc,cialisni," I I I Ihc I.e!,i,! A , r rboio~, p. 512. The csray rvvr \vrillen in Navcnlhcl 1920.

82 1. Oukborin orrd !he Bnrr,rent

Rswliirio,>:A A,lrrirol Oiogropl?y(New York. 1973). Chap. VI: atld Mo~llc Lewi81. PoIilic.ol Uoderev~ Cuhen and Morhe Lewin in 718,,.Tl,,,vrr Rei,iciviIto~te. 1973). Huntcr'r rcferc!>ce lo (he wild Inreel incresxq appcan on p. 239.

14. For a rel>rerenlvlive slaLenlcn1 of this belief, see C. H. Carr aud R. W. Davits. ~ounrloiioar ofa Plonncd Econo,n)r 192629, \'"I Osc. Purl I (London, 19b9). pp. 269-70, wbrrr the aulllo~s wile. inter olio. "If ir~duslriali~.rlinr~ was a ro~~dition of col1cctivii;tliun. colteclivirafion was a candilion or i~tduslrializatiol~ "

84 Robert C. Tucks at the titoe; col lect iviza~io~i was ellvisaged as the presupposition o f a form ol industr ia l izat io~~ geared to tlie priority of heavy industry and war induslry ova the cot~sunier-goods i~~dus t r ies whose greater dcvelopmet~t w < ~ u l d have heert a sins quo nun o f a Soviet industr ia l izat io~~ wi lh in the frame of a continuetl rural NEP. I n llre event, howcver, the economic co~isequcr~ces o f collcctivizntior~ were ul calastrophic that recent researches by Weslerr~ scliolars. supporled by archival data published i n 1968 and 1969 by the Soviet fiistoriar~ A . A. Barsov, have reached the conclusior~s that (I) "mass col lect ivizat io~~ o f Soviet agriculture must be reckoned as an unmitigated ecol~omic policy disaster," axid (2) "the oppressive state agricultural procurement system, rather than serving to extract a inet contri. bution iron1 agriculture as a whole, should be credited will1 preventing the collectivization disaster from disrupting the i~~dusl r ia l izat ion drive." Ii

Only two major aspects o f the Stalinist revolution fro111 above have been discussed here. Any adequate account, even o f fundaniet~rals, would have to consider also the state-building process which went on pari parrrr wi th mass collectivization and induslr ial izst io~~: tlie expar~siun o f the bureaucratic state alrp;iratus, the huge growl11 of the systen~ o f forced labor, the c o ~ ~ c o ~ n i t ; ~ n t growl l i o f the politic economic police elripire which adni i~~is lered it, and t l ~ e exlrcme centralizati o f t he state power. Something more wi l l be said about this below. Concelltrati for tl ie present on col lect ivizat io~~ and industrialization, I want to ask why they took place i n the Stalinist way.

Accordilig to a view which draws part o f its i ~ ~ s p i r a t i o ~ i f rom Trotsky's thinking and which achieved wide i l i f l ue~~ce owing t o its espousal hy Isaac Deutscher, S ta l i ~~ i s t i~~dustrinlieatiost-cum-collcctiviz;~tioli (wh ic l~ i>culscl~cr calls "lhe s t t . ond revolutio~i") was a l~ecessitaled response to a "grave social crisis" o f the lata 1920's. Citing Stalin'sstatistics, Deulscher states that in January 1928, in particu. lar. government grain purchases fell short by two mil l ion lolls o f [ l ie ~ni~~in iurn needed l o feed the urban populat ionl6 Emergency measures were applied by the gover~~meot to extract grain that was being wi t l~t ie ld fro111 the marker. The peasants were not, for the most part, polil ically motivated against the Sovid regime, but were driven by eco~iomic circumstances, i n that the small farm produced only enough to meet the peasants' own food needs while the "big farn~ers" w i th surpluses were charging prices beyond the ability o f the town population to pay and also were demanding concessioos to capitalist fartiiin& In this dilemma, yielding to the peasants would antagonize the urban working class, and refusal t o yield would also bring a threat of famine and urban u l ~ r a t A "radical salutioo" was demanded, and Stalin, having unt i l the very lasl rnw

f Winism nr Rcut,lsli;wkrl ro,ll

t 86 Rubrrt C T u r k

Soviel repirile ill these cond i t i o~ i s , G e r s c l i e ~ i k r o ~ i asserts, atir l "it was under the pressure o f I l ia1 threat that S la l in undcrwcn l :I r:idic;il c l l ; ~ ~ i g e o f riiitid and erl ibarked upur i the gamble o f the F i rs t Five-Year I'li~~i." 2 1

111 Deulsc l~er 's rers ion o f the c i r c u ~ ~ ~ s t a ~ i t i a l e x l ~ l a t ~ a t i o ~ ~ , as l ias been not& - Slalit i . l l i e po l i t i ca l leader o f t l ~ e rev~, lu l iu t~ f ro t i i : ~ b ~ v e , :ll>l)ears as a gre! / improv iser w h o responded to tile pressure o f extreti iely adverse nat ional circum. ' stances i n "at] unpremeditated, pragmaric ~ i ianner . " 111 consollance with thin view, Deu tsc l~e r calls S t a l i ~ ~ a rn;iui of";~lrnosr i ~n l?c rseutscher :llso ~lerl;trcs. and r ip l l l ly so i n I l l i s illsl;lllvc. I hn l " l l lcrc was 11tr q t ~ c s t i o ~ i , ill l l t c v icw r r f l l l e kf t Bolslieviks, u f d r i v i t ~ g the peasants i l l t o collective farms b y force. 'l 'he switc l l - over from pr ivate 111 col lecl ive Sarmitlg mas t u be carr ied out gradual ly, w i t h the pcasa~its' own co~~sen l . " 2" T h e strange upshot i s lh:~l Slalit! is tre:~ted both as a leader w l io actcd u l ider rclcrltless pressure o fc i l -cumsts t~ces wi lhou l precoli- k v e d idcas, and as o r ~ e w l l ~ r acted will! o r o,r certain ideas which, however, were not his OWII. Bu t t l lose whose ideas tllese presumably were d i d 1101 think. ill the Slalinist w:ly, u f col lect iv iz;~t ion as a r e v o l u l i o t ~ a ~ - y leap wl i i c l i the state wou ld ac~onlplisl i b y cuercive meatis. 111 sllorl, whatever ide;~s S l e l i t ~ l o o k l i u m the cn lw l~ i le L d t r~ppost ion, the idca o f a cuercive revo lu t i o r~ Srum above \vas nut one o f them.

It is a central thesis o f # l i e present essay that the c i rcumstant ia l explan;ition. n a ~ w i t l ~ s t a t i d i ~ ~ g a c e r l a i ~ l speciuus plausil) i l i ly, is f i i t :~ l ly Hawed, and t l iat we shall not al1:1i11 a tetlable view o f S ta l i r~ isn i i n i ts fu t ida~ i ie l~ l : i l abpcct as r e v o l u l i o ~ ~ f ron i above u l i l i l this is utrdel-sloud. T h e circutr~sl ; ln l iz~l e x p l a l ~ a t i o t ~ is fl:~wcd, first, ill theutterly u l lp rovc l l i la turc of i l s a s s u l i l p t i ~ ~ t ~ ~II:II cullectivi7atio1i i t 1 i l i c terroris- tic Torni that il took =,as the o t ~ l y realistic alternative Sor the Soviet regimc ill 1929, niucl i less a sitre qrro ~ lo r r of i l s survival as Gersc l icnkron suggests. Evet i

nccurale lo say 1I1al l l l e slsill lpurpo-e oft l le Brsl Plrn \va\ 111 i l lc!ra\c roo\o!#lrl.-gllodr pnrdaclim ill nrly e%,elll, lhc Illrust ofthe i~~duslni~lizuti(m drivcirn 1929 13 wil l t~>\,icrrlurlry. and cotlran,er-goods supply decli~~erl i o n Russia bnp011 I I ~ c I ~ t t r l ! ! ~ i ~ l i ~ ) # l (sf IIIC NCP,

22. Sri,li,i: A Poli i in~l Bio~mopity. p. 273. Trotrky'r influore is rellwted ill Deutscher'i pond ul Slatit) ;a a prsgn~atirt and ~tnproviser who would a r l w!llnottl pre!,trd6t;ction under prarurrd cirrumrlunces. See, for example, Trotsky's characteristic de%rriplios of Slillfn i s "a nlan ill w h a ctlerpy, wiil and reralutc~~ers are conthincd witla nlq>irici%sl. ~m).opia. an organic tnclirlalion 16 oppoMuc~irt decisio>~r ibi great qorrtiu~~s, personal mdcut-5s. di4oy;llty itrmd i s rri~dinew larhusr pm i t ! older to ?uppress l l l e party " Leon Trulrky, "A Contnhution lo llnr t'olitirsl MiographgofSlalio.. in Tlrt Stolirr Schuoi ofFi~Is$coriot> (Ncw York, 1'162). p. 198. 'The h o k w.ls nriglnally puhlirhol is 1937.

23. E. H. Csrr, So~.io/ism in Oliv Coi,,zrry 1924-/926(Nrw York. 1'4681, Vol I, p p 177. I S 5 . T k characlerization is repeated with only very slight nlodilicnlio8l in fourrdorio,>r ofo Plorzned Econcm~ (Vol. 11. p. 448) where Carr and Dsvies dese~.ihr Sli,lio as "lhe repres~erllali~e figure oilhe pcr ic adding: "Slalin's personalily, combined with lhe primiliveand cruel tr8dllioor oflhe Kusian burmu. racy. imparted to llle revolutia~~ from nbove a parliculnrly hrutal cl>aractrr, which lhar romcilna ohrcurrd the fut~damortal historical prnblenm iovolrcd." l h e aulhorr do not ray what they maa by "the fundamental hirlorical prr,blenlr involved." hut vile tllc ilifere81cc lhar ihey are i,>vuk~ng what wr have called the eircsn,stantial expla!>nlin~> of the revolulior> frolri ahovr.

~ -

allowing that l l te regirrie was faced ill 1027-28 wit11 SOIIICI~I~I~~ l i ke a 1,c;rs;trlt "grain strike" (10 use t l ~ c lo:~dcrl Slrorr (i>arrc tcrmi~~r, logy), ~hel-c is IIO seritrtls evidence o f i n c i p i c ~ ~ t ~x l l i l i c ; i l rehc l l iuus~~ess i n l l ie cuu r~ f r ys ide n l I l la t l i ~ n c ; i l t id there is evidence o f gctieral pensallt :icceplallce the Soviet regime, wl la levcr hespecilic griev:lncer l l l a l ci l l lsed peasat!ls l o g rumb le or t o w i t h h o l d grain fro111 Ihe niarket ill e x p e c t a t i ~ ~ t ~ o f more return. Nor , as already i t ~d i ca ted has i t lheet~

, showt~, i ~ o r is i t true, t l iat l l ~ e terror ist ic col lect ivat ion was a tieccssily fnr the I

; 24. Yoii,!: A Palli!kol Ifioyrr~~p~~.y. 11. 295. ; 25. lhid.. 1,. 319, Slalil,. 1)e~rtrchrr c~hserver. 11 lhal earlier lime disnlirsed t.arivt's itaiun 8% n

?tanks 1de;t:' 1 26. Ihid.. p 303. Elsewhere Deutrcher expands OIL the relauol~ ofllle Stal~r>isl course l o the Lefts'

potrant as follo~vs "The Oppoqitiorl w;t!lted i~~duslrialiiatio~t and collectivirolion to he carried out rn lhc hnmd dayliplit o l proletarian denlocracy, with the cu~~rent or the rnnrres aod frce initcativr

, Ymm hlaw': wltcrc:.;lr Slalis !cliecl 1111 lhc I i t o l II, , lhm " rht, PropI~eI Or,rrorl, p. 7U.

88 Rnhcrt C. TUC~I results achieved i n the it~duslriali;.alion ellirrl during l l ~ c Plnt~ ycars. As for the secnrity motive ro which Carr referred, growi~tg out o f l l ~ e exlernal ~e~~s ions of 1926-27, a recent and carer111 scholarly rcvicw o f the facts, while i t indicates l l t a l the war scare was niore than a mere s11at11 and conlriv;~ncc o f iolra-party co~~tlicls of the tinlc and probably enjoyed a certain credence on l l ~ e par1 o f uarious Soviel leading fignres, also corlcludes lltat "thc war score was in facl grossly and crudely manipulated by Sovict politiciatts ill 1!)27." 2' There were. as I would put it, grounds for Soviet concerli about external re la l io~~s in Europe, ;llthough nut, at that liltte, for serious fear of an onconling crralilion war against lhe USSR; but thepnr.ribilityof war was brandisl~ed as a just i l icat io~~ for the developing Slalinisl orientation ill inlernal policy.

T l lc c i r c u ~ t l s l ; l ~ ~ ~ i : ~ I cxp lano l io~~ of fi,racrl 11las9 ~ ~ ~ l l e ~ l i v i 7 i 1 l i 0 1 1 Ililrtlly s(luare3 with the tiow de~~~ot ts t~ .a ted conclusiun, cited carlier f r o n ~ Millar, l l tal thiscourse proved ill practice a11 "unrr~itigated e c o ~ l o ~ ~ l i c policy disaster," nor is i t cogenl that a policy which directly and indirectly produced l l ~ e worsl fanline i n Russia's famine-plagued history. that of 1932-34, wltich cost a conservatively estimated five rn i l l io~t lives,ZR was necessitated by l l ~ e need to aver1 a famine. Altltough historical "~nigl~l-11ave-bee~~s" are just as d i f icu l t to cs~ab l i s l~ as arc argumena of the "(here-was-oo-other-possible-course" type, the i~~sistet i t ly emerging con- clusion from scholarly researches based on the more abundanl data now available from Sovict sources is that "a co~ i l i nua l i o~ i o f the New Econonric Policy ofllte 1920s would have pcrmitted at least as rapid a rale o f iridustrialization n'ith leu cost to the t~ rba r~ as well as to thc rural populaliun o f the Soviet U~t ion." '' In effect, infor~lted and t l iougl~tf t t l ltislorical l i i~idsiglt t is c o l ~ l i r ~ ~ l i t t g the basic ec* noniic real isn~ of the program for a bala~tced i~tdustrializaliott policy within the frame o f a colttinuing N E P that Bukharin presented in his Provdo article of Seplcrltber 30, 1928, "Notes o f an Economist." ' 0 The Bukharinist non-revolu. tionary alternative for Soviet i~~dustr ia l iza l ion policy at the close rrf the twe~~lia, an alter~tative illspired ill large part hy the Le~~ i l t i s t tl l inking o f 1921-23 discussd earlicr hcre, was real. Had i t been adopted, i t could well have worked; had it worked poorly, the cosl to the Soviet econorny could tot have curnparcd with

27. Jrlhn P. So!>lrg, "Tile Snviel War Scare of 192627," Tire Ruaian Revieis: Inltuary 1971. p. 77. See also Leonard Schitpiru. The Co,n,nu,iirr Puny vjrhv Soviri U~rio,, (New Yurk, 19591, p. 111. where it is staled: "There war little prorpcct of any kind of invasion ill 1928."

2%. Dana 0. Dalrympl,le. "The Soviel Famine of 1922-34," Sovir~i Siiidirr. Janonry 1964, 13. b l . 29. Milliw, up. cil., p. 766. One of the sources cilrd by Millar in I l l i s rrvicw essay is a s ailick

hy Karr, who writes chat "thc dnmsgc done to agriculture within the first three years ofthe indunntl. iration drive was so revere that it affwled adversely i t * .hilily 10 cnnlrihute rigtly to furlhs e~o!~~mic dcvelopmmt:' Karz concludes that "lhcre i s a sig~~ifi~nnl probability" II1aI l l l e Savh dilcmntil in agrarian policy toward the end of NEP was not one thal hod lo he rerulvd b collcclivira~ion atad ihcaunciatcd con>pulrnry procurement offarm products or by the nbasdonmml ofa sendhle nnd innitial induaridliwliun dnve"Sre Jerzy F. Karz, "Frorn Slnlin to Brrzl~ncu:SnwO ~gricultural Policy is) Historical Pe'enpcctive:' in TheSovier R~trol C,~i>rt,izmit,: cd. Ja!ner R. Milk (Urbana. 197th pp. 41. 51.

30. For recenl arguments lo this cfTmt, see Cohcn. B~kllorin ond the Uoirhevik RevoIriio,l. Chap 9 and Epilogue, and Lewin. Polrrrcol Undercurrents. pp. 52-61.

Slslinirnn ss Rorolutivt~ fro", Aborc 89 that which l ~ a d to bc paid ibr tile SL;~lit~ist soluliur~. Suclt, also, is tlie pos i t i o~~ of an i~~f luet l l ia l scltool of colttentporary posl-Sfalin Soviel politico-eco~~ontic lhougl~l whose "scarcely veiled eodorsentent of Rukharin's induslrializalion strategy" has been persuasively argued and documented by Moslie Lewirt.)l

At this poillt, a ~nud i f i cn t i o~~ of l l ~ e circurnstat~tinl exp l ;~~~at io r~ ntighl suggest itself: if Stalit~isrn was riot the necessary or sole practicable course tltat i t o~tcc reenled l o be, i t was t~evel-llleless so perceivedat tlte time by tlte decision-ntakers, who after al l had l o act w i t l~oo t forek~~owletlge of the wllole sequence of erects, including catastrophic cunsequenccs, w l ~ i c l ~ their decisions would bring ah1111l. The dilliculty with such n hypothetical fitllback position (and lltis 111ay explai~t why still-livin! a r l l ~e re~~ l c nf tile circumstanlinl expl:i~tatic~tt have not lakc11 i t ) i s [hat nuoicrous Dolshrvik 111inds ill Mcrscow and a r t ~ u r ~ d t l ~ c coulltry, i ~ t c l u~ l i ng some and possibly even a majori ty ill tlie Polilburo, did trur perceiw rhe Sfo1i111:sr course as the only possible nclion ru toke irr rhe circ~,~ii.rmnces rhor oblni/r;~ly. Bukharin, in a c landesl i~~e conversalion of July 1928 wit11 Kame~tev wlr ic l~ be- canie widely known ill party circles. clearly lirresaw the catastropl~ic coltse- quences of Stalin's c o ~ ~ l e ~ l ~ p l a t e d rur:%l revolutior~ from ahovc. 11 was, he s;~id. aruinous policy cnurse s i g ~ ~ i r y i ~ ~ g a rel l l rn 10 War C o n ~ ~ i t t ~ ~ ~ i s n ~ , a cclurse leitding to civil war, l o an t~prising lh;~t \\,\.oold have l o be drowned i n bloud.32 Hi* prevision proved well founded i n essence if not i n specific detail.

Thc hypothetical fallback position cannot save llte c i r c u m s ~ a ~ ~ t i a l explanatiort because i t leaves open and u~lexplained I l le facl lha l the r u l i ~ ~ g party was divided in its appraisal of the c i rcun~sta~~ces in 1928-29 and t l ~ a l an i t ~ f l u e ~ ~ t i a l scctioti of Soviel political o p i n i o ~ ~ opted for a course i n ag ra r i a~~ policy and indusrrializa- lion that would l ~ave been cvolulionary, ill accord;~~~ce with the lalcr Lenin's counsel, rather t l i a ~ ~ rcvolulionary. 'l'l~e i~~ev i lab le next queslion-wl~y d id {lie cvoluliu~~ists go down l o defeat i n l l ~ e party slrugple, o r why d id Slalinisn~ win?--ca~tnol be answered by refere~~c'e l o the socioeco~lon~ic circu~itsla~lces nvcr which I heqn~~ r re l ragcd i n nolsl~evik circles. 11 can be answered o ~ ~ l y by rcfcrencc to the factors lltal deterntinerl tlte Slolir~i.sr rcrpu/r.rr l o 111c circu~t~slnnccz and i ls polilical victory. Tlle circuti~stnr~ces as such c a ~ ~ ~ ~ o t f u r ~ ~ i s h the explana~ion o f Ihe revolulio~i fro111 above.

One of tlic forccs ct~n(lucive to 3 Slalit~ist r evo l t ~ t i u~~a ry respolise anlong 110I- shevik politicians was l l ~ e other Lcn i~ l - l l~c still very i ~ ~ l l t ~ e o t i a l revolulioriary Lenin of the War Cununut~ism period and t l i r heritage o f Bolshevik revolulionism [hat the oilier Leltin syn~bulized. 1( is ttndersla~tdable that Bukharin, involved

-

11. L.ewil>, I'olirb~~I U,rdcrcvrro~l.?, Chap. 12. 32. Tllr Bukhari!l-Knnlenev co~tversstiaa i s Ducurne~ll TI 897 in the Trotsky Archives at Hiward

Univsrily. Funher llislorirnl tcslimul~y la the eficl tlanl the disaslrour consequence< o l lhr Stalinist murx were rore.icnl by sonic well.knuw!i Soviet solton~islr ill lltr later 1920's is given by N. Vslentinov, "17 lpll~slllogo," So~sio/i.ricikii vermik, April 1961, pp. 68-72.

911 Ruherl C. 'I'wker

as lie was ill a politicel struggle agait~st Stalin :~nd ll ie p ~ l i c i ~ h IIC W ~ S ad\.ucit l~~~g i n 1928-29, trealed Lc~titt 's 1;ist writings as Iiis " l~ol i t ical testii~iic~it." ;III~ 11131 is certailily what L e ~ t i n hiniself itttct~ded illern to be. 13111 ihr l l ie 13olsllevik Iiiovetiletlt a ~ ~ d part)', L~II~II's p i ~ l i t i ~ . i ~ l I es Ia i i ~e~~ t W:IS l l tc c111i1.e corpus (11 his I l~oug l i t atid \vriling, the whole record o f his revolutionsry learlersltip of the niovctnent up to, during, aud alter [l ie Octobcr Revnlulint~: and Leilirl's political lestilrtient ill tl i is tilore conipre l~e~~sive selise, or Le~t i~ t i s tn as ;I wliole. co~~ts i~ ied very 11i11cl1 I l i i t t Stalin :>!id Sta l i t t is t~~ had goorl c l a i n~ 10 as ;a11 autltoritative text slid warralil fur tlie policies followed i n tile revolution lion1 above.

Tlte very idea o f ;I process o f "revolulio~t from nhove." 1skc11 ill the must gcner;il ternts. h;ls a Leninist pedigree. Evcn i t1 o11e o f l ~ i s lost a r t i c l e cited ahore, Le1ti11 spoke o f uvcrtaking other nations " ~ i t h tlie aid 01' thc workc~s' and pc;~sants' govcrtiiiient." Uut the idea o f revo lu t io~~ from ahove liaz ;I deeper place i n Leni~t 's thought. When he conte~~ded i n TIreSrure orrd Reloiririon i n 1917, and in s ~ c l i si~hsequent works as Tile Pro l~~ror i~ , r Revolrr/iu,r and rhe Reliegode Karrtsky, that tlie doctrine o f proletarian dictalorshil> was l l ic core idea of Marr. is111 atid t11;tl Marxisni callcd for a seizure o f power followed by rlictatol-ial rule by violcnce against the i~ l te r l~ ; t l bourgeoisie and associ;tted social rnrccs, he was say i~~g: Tile revolution docs not end \vitli the pnrly's taking i>fpower: tliat i s only a ~ n o m e t i l o ~ ~ s point o f historical transition beyolid which the party cottlinues i ts revoluliotiary deslruction o f the o ld order froni above, i .c, by wielding the coerci\'e instruments of state power against the revolution'? class rncn~ies. Lenin- ist r evo lu t i o~~ frnm above meant tlie use o f state power for tlie continuation or class war of/cr the revolutiotiary party lias achieved sucli pouaer and furnled i ts gover~tt~ient under tlie t i t le orUpn,letariat~ dictatorship." 3 3 T11is basic idea round i ls sharpest, tltouglt by 110 means its only, later expressioli i r t Lenin's prospectus o f 1919 for a work (never conipleted) on the proletariar~ dictarorsliip. Two pas. sages are especially ~lolahle: "The dictatorsllip o f [l ie prulctariat is the cotrri~rrro. riot1 or t l ie class struggle i n nea'forrns. That is tl ic crux o f the ~ i i i i l ter : tltnt is whal they do 1101 uliderstand." And: "The state is only a nrupurr o f tlie proletariat in its class struggle. A special k ind o f cudgel (~/uluDi~rka), riel1 dc plus." i4 Whether Leni i i cver used tlie phrase "from above" i t1 arguing tl i is i~ot iot t o f the proletarian dictatorship as a co~ i t i t~u i t ig revolutionary struggle l ion1 tlte van1;tge-point of state power is o f 110 consequence; the idea was unrtiistakably present ill his thougllt.

I t is lrue that as early as 1919, at the lieigli l o f the Civ i l War sl id War Corniitu- rcisttt, we find inti~nariorts ill Lenin o i the transition to the later reformist approach to the building o f socialism tliat has been described earlier i n these pages. Tltis

33. For ao argunlrnl by ihr young S t d i n slung thew liues, srr Itis esiey o l 1906, "Anarchiui? or Socialinn7" in I. Stali,t. Sochi,~e,!,~ri ( M u s o w . 1954), 1. 34546. Hc ci ted as hlr aulllorlly lherc no1 Lc~~ in but lhe passage in TI,@ Conit,!unirr Monfcsroaboul lhe pralclsn:!l's becouli8lg l l le raliog clsrr and using its polilical powcr to deprive the bourgeoisie of i l s capitol slcl~ hy slcp, r l c .

34. 7%c Lrniin AsrhuP,gy, p. 4'M. The prorpcctur waq firs1 publ~shrd in 1925 it8 Lrttt+~rkiiShornzk I l l . Tllr "lhey" who "do not understand were not idenlkfied: Lcnili t r ~ i i y Irilve had in nliud such people as Knutsky and the Russian Mcnrhevikr.

Slolinirnl as Rcve l l l l i ~~n from Al,c,rr 91 t ra~ ts i t i~ t~ was associatec wil l t the idc:~ tliat the f u ~ t d i ~ ~ i i r r ~ l i ~ l obstacle to soci;~lisn~ was fhe body of lhabit left over frotn the past a ~ ~ d that the revo lu t i ~~~ i i z i ng of habit-in ol l icr words, of culture-was o i l Jbrld an educatior~al task riltlter t l ~ a n one to be resolvcil by n lcru i rc inieil!~s. 111 I i is article of May 1919, "A C;rc;it Beginni~~g," LCII~II hailed a workers' iniliativc ofvulu~t tary u ~ ~ p a i d Saturday work (Ihe Communist rrrbhr~r~lik) ;is ;I dcvclopment of enornious historical sigtiificaiice. and observed ill Ill is con~~ro t io t i l l ~ a l "the dictat

P. 92 Rnherl C. T u c h Wlnirm RS Re~nlotion from A b ~ w 93 tive time ill tlic Soviet culture's history was rnart i i~l zeal, revolu l iu~~ary volunh In seeking to refulc 111e "circumstat~tial enpla~li~tion" o f the i t ~ i l i i ~ l pliase of tllr r ism and elon, readiness to resort to coercion, rule by adniinistralivefial (fldlninu. SIdinisl revolutiotl, i t is !lot l l le i t ~ l r n l ofthis essay to deny 1 1 i ~ t ~ ~ i ~ ; ~ l rrirovorri[,)), ccetralizcd administration. summary juslice, atid no slllall dosed , to the circomstences lhcing the Soviet regiri~c i n 1927-29, tllost llofah~y [he that Conlmunist arrogance (kor~rchvansrvo) tlnit L e ~ l i n later inveighed agaim. ~ n - c o l l e c t i o n diWcultics. ' l . l~e poilit is i l lat thcse c i r c u n ~ s t a ~ ~ ~ ~ did ,,,,I cilrry I t was not simply the "heroic period of the greal Kussiall Revolution," as LO a single unn~istakable d e l i ~ ~ i t i o l ~ o f the s i t u a ~ i ~ n and implicit prescril,[ion for K r i t z~na t i christened i t in the title of the book about War Coliilnunism that he plicy. That widely dilferenl dt+nitiotts of the situation and wi~le ly lv,iio,t, p. 215.

77 94 Rcnlbert C. Turk Wbbm nr Hevotulion from ~ h o v r 95 ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ,,I Kro.Xo~o? O t l ~ c r evidellce i~icludes: Slalill's i'ruw{a article d :o the leadership itselS."' St i l l atlier, major diUerences call for lllcrl~ioll: lllc ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ b ~ ~ 7, 1925, ill wh i c l~ 11e d e l i ~ ~ c d the present perio(l as all o~ ro lo~oc o/lhfl ~:olkhoz system itself. w l l i c l ~ hore sniall resembla!~cc to tl lc agricultural coni- p,.~,.~)l.lo~pr 1 ~ 1 7 , i.e., the preludc to a llew revt)lutiollary slurnl; and rnunes inilialed during the Civi l War period; l l ~ e use ufpol ice terror as a llrinle

studied i-eslatemc,lt o f th is thcn~e, wi th added dct;~il, i n 1926. Moreover. there inslrun~ellt o f gove r l~n~e r~ l ill a rnarlllcr sl~arply dilTere~~tiated fruni the Red terror w;ls a tlieoretical dilTerc~ice betweeti I ~ u k h i ~ r i ~ l a l l ~ l Stalill ill their w a P sponsored by Letlilt via tl lc o r i g i ~ ~ a l Cheka: and illc inter-relntionsllip betweell (,(.arglliIlg t11~~~~i~ l isn1- i1 i -o11e-cou11iry notioli. Buklinrin llwelt I I ~ r l i c u l a r l ~ Upon internal and exler11~1l policy. Tlir brrsic u,r~icrlyi,~/"cr co,!fr,i,r/ilr ic lhur ,,,ho, i llle a,lllellt ol' lllis socialism as all "agrarian-couperz~tive socialis~ii" of llle kind ! rhRus.riua revo lu~ io r~u ryp r r r~~s .~ rr~u,,red i n [he S~a/it,;sr slr,gr. ;I hod d l ~ r e r r ~ Ixojected ill ilellill.~ last articles; Stali~i's emphasis fell l l eav i l ~ 011 the "one ! rharacrer/itlt~r the revo/ulio,rary procrrr of desmrr,crjo,t of /he old rno~e. b coulllry'. t l l m ~ e ill a spirit of truculent Soviet Russia11 ~~ i i l i una l i sn l relllilliscenl rhijr crlit ical scelle even 1 axlll ially a destructivc process, a tearing dowtl of theold order rrolll the vatltagc. durillg the l~eyday oSR~~kharinisrn. '~This is 1101 l o d c ~ ~ y Il lat S l a l i ~ ~ showed plenty

' i paintofslate power; Stalinist revolution frornabove used destructiveor repressive polilic;~l opportunism at i l lat lime, or at olllers. But l o treat opportu l l i~ l i~ I meatls, among o l h c l ~ . sor what was, both in intent and i n reality, a coiistructive

bctlavior ill pul i t ic iai~ as i~~compal ib lc wi th deeply held beliek is to.tate a !, (as well as destructive) process. I ts slogan o r ideological banner was tl ic building Sillll,]is~ic (,f lloliti~iil iiii~ll. The ~ i c t u r e o f Sta l i l~ :IS ;I 1c:ldcr wl11l reprc~~lltcd ofa socialist society. Hilt ill substi~t l~e. Sta l i l~ isn~ BS r evo l~~ t i o l l f ro r l l above wi l~ orgallizntiollal power without policy idc:~s atid who embarked upon the revolu. I stale-buildillg process, the c o ~ ~ s t r u c t i o l ~ o f a pnwerrul, highly ceutra l i~,~d, tiull frool above ill "o l~~ren~ed i ta ted , pragmatic r~~anaer " a ~ ~ d will1 "110 vision bureaucratic, n l i l i ta ry - i~~dus t r i i~ l Soviet Russian state. Although i t was pro- of wllere i t would lead" is a f i ~ ~ ~ d a m e ~ i t a l nlisaollceptiull. : claimed "socialist" in the i l l id-IY~O'S, i t dilfered i n v a r i ~ u s vital ways lion) whtlt

most socialist thinkers-Marx, Engels, and L e ~ i i r ~ among them-had utidcntood VI sxialisrn l o mean. Stalinist "socialisni" was a social is^^^ o f mass poverty rather

: lhan plenty; of sharp social s t ra l i f icat io~~ rather than relative equality: of u l~ iver- uut if tile surviuirlg spirit o r War C o ~ n ~ ~ ~ u l i i s n ~ il lf laencc~l t l ~ e way ill whicl~ the lal,constalit fear r a l l ~e r that1 emancipation ufperson;~Iity; ofnariollal c h a u v i l ~ i s ~ l drives fur c(illectivization atid iodustrializatio~i wcre col~ceived a l ~ d carricd out, rather t h~ ln brotherliood o f man; and o f a n~orrstrously hypertrophied state power i t does llrit follow tliat the Stalinist r evo lu l i o~~ repeated 1917-21 or that llle new rather Il lan the decreasingly statified commune-state delil~eated by Marx in Tile Slalinist order which look shape i n the 1930's was a retjival of the System ofwar Civil War ill prance and by Leoilt in Tfrr Slare atrd Revolr~rion. Comlnunisni. T o be sure, the start o f the new decade saw such renlillders of the i t was not, however, by mere caprice or accident that this happened. Stalinist lleroic period as food rationing, and other rese~nblal~ces appeared. As Mashe : revolutiollisrn fro111 above had a prel~istory i n the political culture o f Russian Lewin has pointed out, however, theearly Stalillist pnicess showed lrlarly distinc- ISarism; i t e~ is ted as a patterrl in the Russiall past and hence could be seen by l ive trails that differe~iliated i t from its pre-NEP predecessor: ttie feverish itidus- i a twelltieth-celitury stalesmall as both a precedent and legitimation of a political trial expansion. the emergence of anti-egalitarian tel~dencies i n cotllrast lo the : murse that would, i n essentials, recapitulate the liistorical pattern.42 egalitarinnist~~ of tlic Civ i l War period, the rise uf new elites c o ~ i ~ b i l ~ e d with the ! loss o f the relatively indepe~idel~t political role of the lesser leadersl~ip ranks at ' 41. Pol;licul U!zlrrurres,r pp. 98-99. the earlier l inlr , and the political rnuzzl i~ig of the party rank-and-li lt i n relation f

; 41. This argumcnr. along will) theview !hat Stalinism i!~ essence war such n rccapvnllalion o r t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t : molulinnirm from abuve, liar becn prcvnled in nly ssag "The Image of Dual Russia." in 76r

40. his .nrpnmes~ and the docurncnlatiot~ of lhr evidcncc addseed ie i lr supporl have bco, ; Twn$nrlurnrorion cfRurrroti Society, e d . C. E. Dlnck (Cambridge. Mass.. 1960). The essay is repr in~~ prcsrstd in SluIi,, or R~~vlrrrionow. CLat,. I I. 1 h Roberl C. Tucker. The Sovim PolNicul Mitrd, 2nd cd. (New York, 1971). Chap 6~

r 96 Rnhrrt C. Tuck Wbbm ar Revolution frow Ahevc 97

I t was not, l~owever, by mere caprice or accident that this I~appe~~ed. Stalind ' mVes~ecial poi1lt to this ~crcel> l io l l . 01le was tl ial the ko/lchozycanie to operate revolutionism from above had a prehistory ill the politicel culture o f Russian imrd i l lg to arrallgenlellts under wllicli the pcasant owed the kolkhozall allnllal tsaristn; i t existed as a patter81 i n the Russian past and lierice cu~ r l d be seen by *ligatory nlinilllulll, s~ccifiecl by Saviel lalv, of "work-day o ~ ~ i t s " (rrvdm/,ri);this a twe~~tiet l i -ceolury statesnlan as bo lh a prccedcnt and legitit~iation of a political ; YYarefUrll lo 6u1'.s/lchfll(l. Second, when the internal passport sytern, a11 ilistitu. course tbat would, ill essentials, recapitulate the historical patteni. Col~fronted 1 imnoftsarist Russia, was revived ill Soviet Russia by a gover~~ l i ie~ i ta l decree of ill the aftermath of tl ie two-century-long Mollgo1 dorn i~ ia t io~ i wi t l i liostile and : December jl, 1932, as a 11le;llls of bureaucratic control over the movenients of ill sorile cases more adva~tced neiglibor-slates i n possessioti of po r t i o~~s of t k i citizerls. Ihe film1 l P ~ ) l ~ ~ l l a t i ~ t l wils lint issued 1)assports. The deprivalioll extensive territories Il lat had made up the loosely coufcdcraled Kievan RUT: t k o f ~ a s s ~ o r t s l l le Peasallt l o the soil u f the k u l k l ~ o r o r sovkhozas securely princes-later tsars-f Muscovy uridertook the building of a powerful "military i his serf had heell ntfaclled l o the soil o f the l a ~ ~ d e d estate.

' Theculminating pllascoftsaris~ii as a dy~inmic polil ical supcrstructllreellgaged ~ ~ a t i o n a l state" capable o f gatheritig the Russiari lands under itu aegis. Given the primacy of the concern for ex te r~~a l defense and expansion arid the country's . lube transforrniltillll of Russia11 society and developnlent o f its ecoriuriiic base relative economic backwardtiess, the goverririient proceeded by remo~lrlitig the 'Or state-ordair1ed Purposes canle ill the lollg reigll of Peter I, that "crowned soci;ll slructurr, at times by forcible nieatls, i n sucli a way il lat all classes ofthe : "O1utio"ar~~" as H e r ~ e ~ l liltel. called him. Now the pattern o f rcvolot io~i iton1 population werc bound i n one or atrother for111 ofcon11,ulsory service to theslatr hove enler~ed lllosg d is l i l l c l l~ , olle its i~~Olll i l lc111 aspects being all i~~dustr i ; l l "The fact is," writes Miliukov, "that it1 Russia the state exerted enormous influ. j mOIutioll above ainled at b ~ i l d i l i g a puwerful Russian war-industrial base. elice upon the social organization whereas i n the West tlte social organization 1 lMensifying serfdom. Peter clnployed state-owlled serfs a lor~g wi t l i prisoriers of cu~idit ioned the state system. . . . I t was the e leme~~tary state of tlie ecoriornic 1 frlr illcluslrial projects as well as the conslruction of canals (111 'base' (fundurt~e,rr) which ill Russia called forth the hypertrophy of thr stale Lakes Ladoga, Oncga, alld c)tller.;: rllld 1111 rlccasion moved enlire townullips 'superstructure' (nadsrroiku) aiid conditior~ed the powerful counter-influence d : P"pIe lo the constrllctioll sites [f tile llew ellterpriscs i n wll;it are descril~cd as this superstructure upon the 'base' itself." 4' i "Peter's forced labour camps." '(1

A salient expression of t l le tsarist patter11 of revolutionism from above was the *g"", 'lie parallel \vitll the S~al i l l is l industrial revolution from above is strik. legalized imposition of serfdom upon tlie Russiari peasantry io the sixteelilli and I i%s 'lie "lajor direrelice beillg the greatly expanded scale o f the use of forced seventee~itli ce~itories, the peasa~it's attaclirne~it by law to the soil, together wilh

,

labor in llle Stalillistcase. 1.0 what has been said above abqut the relati011 hetweerl the system of bar.rhchi~ra (the cnrv6c) t ~ ~ l n e r which the peasant was b o u ~ ~ d to : mllectivizatitlll itldusIria1izatioil. sornetliing o f importa~ice here ,iceds lo be contribute a certain t iu~i iber of days of work on the la~ ido iv~~er 's (or state's) land

,

added. Durillg First Five-Year plall, the SIO~~III a110111 "liquidation of the during tlie agricultural year. The Russian village cornniune, itself an archaic as a class" was ~lscd *s a P rc l e~ t k)r del~ortat iun o f peasant families c ~ i inst i tut io~i, was transformed by governmental aclion into a "coercive organiu. ma"e-a Process made all the Inore massive by the extrelne looseness wi th which lion" for ellsurirlg each nietnber's fulfillment of state-imposed obligalio~is unda . Ihe label :11)17lied-to relllolc areas l ike the Urals, Siberia ;~nd the the principle of mutual responsibility (krugovui(r porrrka).+4 The Stalinist r u d far North lliey ~ c r e set (0 work i n timbering or on the c o ~ l s t r u c t i o ~ ~ of revolutioti from above was ill essence aa accelerated repelilion uf this tsarin plants, such as the M; l~. l l i togonk iron atid sleel complex i n tl ie Urals. The ";,st developn1etital patter^^. I t 11as bccn lloted ahtive t l ~ a t tl ie kollchoz as i t cnlcrgd ea~ansiutl or Ille lilrcect-l;lhllr Cnl l l l~ elllpire dates f r n n ~ l l i is time. T o cite So17.11e. from the col lect ivizat io~~ process was a coopcrative only i t1 its f o r ~ i ~ a l fal;ade "i's~ll, "In 1'329-15'30. Ihillowed and gushed the mult imil l ion wave ofdispossec.yed Underueatli, i t bore a far from superficial resen~blarice to the latided estate is ihc . . . In size ll l is llullrecurring tidal wave (it was an ocean) swelled period of scrfdom; arid i t is a l ~ i g l i l y fact tllat the holkltozwas actually ' bolld (lie bounds o f a l l ~ t l l i l l g file 11ellal sYsIe111 o f even an inirne~ise state call perceived by maliy Russiall peasarlts as a revival o f serfdom. Westertters who F' "~~ There was notll i l lg to be colilpared wi th i t in al l Russiari history. traveled in rural Russia in the early 1930's have reported that i t was a conirnoa : I' lhe of a wllole people, an ethnic catastrophe." 47 Uut peasant practice t o refer to "V.K.P." (the initials t i f V'~,r,~irtznaiu ko,~rr,~un&i. 3 size Ihere was l lol l l i l lg ill Russian llistory to compare wi th it, this l r i ; ,~~ cheskuiu parriia. the Al l -Union Communist party) in the esoleric nleanilig d f "seco~id serfdom" (vroroe kr

use of deportation and forced labor for i ~~dus t r i a l i za t i o~~ had a definite l~istorial precedent in Yetrine Russia. I n the Stali~iist i r~dustr ial revolution fro111 abovc, therefore, just as i n the rural revolution f r o n ~ above, there were eleznents ola revival o f l l ~ e tsarist pattern o f revolutionisn~ from above. I n l l ~ i s respect, Stalin. ism showed the influence not simply of the hislorically recent Witte system of slate-spo~~sored industrializalior~, hut o f the IIIIICII earlier systcn? of direct exploi. tation o f servile labor in the Russian state-building

Here a brief comnietlt is called for 011 l l ~ e view, someti~l~es encountered in Weslert~ thought, that sees the Stalinist revolutio~t f rom above under the aspsl o f "moder~~izatiun." The difficulty wi th this posilion-apart from the nebulow character o f the very concept o f modernization-is its oblivious~~ess o f the strong element o f "archaiziition" it, Stalinism, its resurrection o f the historic tsarist pattern o f building a powerful n~ i l i ta ry -~~a l ioua l state by revolutiot~ary means involving the extension o f direct coercive controls over the populatior~ and ihc growth of state power in the process. Unless "nioderoization" is reduced in meaning m a i ~ ~ l y to industrialization and illcrease o f the urban population (in which cnse [he tern] becomes supcrlluous), the use of i t to characterize Stalinism is n~isleading. I f a formula for the state-building prcrcess is t~ccded, i t n ~ i g l ~ t k t be t l ~ e one that Kl iucl~evsky.provided ia his sun~rna t ic i~~ o f n~odern Russian history from the sixteenth to the ~ ~ i r ~ e l e e r ~ t h century: "'The slate swelled up; the people grew lean." 49

The Russian historical perspective can co~l l r ibute in st i l l a furtller irnpurlanl way to our understanding o f Stalinism: i t helps l o make intelligible the relalion- ship between the first and s e c o ~ ~ d phases o f the Stalinist revolution. Following the phase that took place from 1928-29 to 1933, there was a k ind of pause in 1934, after which the revo lu t i o~~ from above moved into its second phase. Sigsal- ized by the murder of the party leader Sergei K i rov i n Leningrad i n December 1 9 3 6 x 1 event conceived and organized frorn the center of power in Moscow as a pretext for w l ~ a t followed-the mass terror o f the Great Purge enveloped the party and country i n the later 1930's. T l ~ e Great I 't~rgc destroyed a generation not simply of O ld Bolshevik veterans ofthe anti-lsarist struggle but o f very many of their juriiors who had joined the movement after 1917 and served as active irnplementers of Stalinism i n its first phase. I t virtually transformed the composi- tion of the Soviet regime and the managerial elite i n all fields. This in turn was accompanied by stil l other maoifestations o f the revolutior~ f rom above in its

48. Sergsi Witle war the Russian minister of finance hot" 1893 until 1903 0s the "Witte system" : and its inspiration it, Friedrich List's teaching that backward cou~>lrirr could overcome "lhc p i 1 ; of remaining behind" by giving priority lo #he machinc-building it~durtria in industrialiratiat. sn i Theodore H. Von Laue. S r a ~ i Wirreo,tdlhe Indu.lriolr2oiion ofRuuio(New York. 1973), especially : pp. 58-60.

49. V. 0. Kliuchevrky, Kun rurrkoi isrurii(Moscow, 1937). Vol. Ill, p. l I. 'l'llis is a Soviet-iuur ,

of a pre-rcvulutionary treatise based on Professor Kliuchevsky'r lectures at Moscow lltliverrily. In : rupporl uf Ihc modernizalian hypothesis, HClkne Carrere D'Encausre pointed nut during uur Bellagto discussion that Stalinism promoted nmdernily in the following inlportant dimension: an i!,tegralcd : Soviet Russian nalio!lhd. Her argunlcnt calls for careful consfideralio!~.

W B m as Revnlkrtion from Ahovc 99 a n d pl~ase, sllcll ;IS the destruction crf the Pokrovsky school of Bolshevik hirtoriogrepl~y, the conc~~mi tan t re-npporpriation nf major elements o f ihc Rus- -tan past as part of the olliciel Soviet cul lural herilage, the restoraliul~ ofpre-I917 pttertls ill arl, cducal io~~, law and tllc L n ~ i l y . 111 thcse aspects, which entel~dcd inlo the 1910'r, there were (listioctly reactio~~ary o r cou~~ter - revo lu t io~~ary over- tons in the revci lut io~~ f ro l?~ ;ihove.

I t has been said, r i p l ~ t l y in my view. 111i t l "Stiili~l's ~e\,oIution in i tgr icu l tur~ md industry and his assaull on the party which consunl~naled I l l is revolution must be seen as integrated parts o f one a11rcvet\l SI:lliu fro!^^ Iosillg puwer. Yet. I l lc poi111 about the two ph;tses lwiltg " i !~ l~ .g r i ! l~ ' I piil.ls (11.01111 an11 IIIC S:!IIIC III.IICCSS" ~ . i $ r r i c ~ wnvic l io~~.

A partial e s p l t ~ ~ ~ a t i o r ~ o f this linkage C;III be derived r r o ~ ~ ~ the thesis that the Stalinist revolution from above reuspitulated ill essc~~lials iln tsarisl predecessor's ptlern. The latter involved t l ~ c binding izahreposl~chenie) o f all classes o f the populatiot~, from thc lowest serf to the Ihighest noble, i t1 compulsory service to theslate. As the Ml~scovite autocracy grew in power, the hereditary land-owning nobility was tr; t~~sforn~ed i l l to a serving clilss (s11izhilyi kl

Robert C. 'luckcr ?~

100 SWlnirrn sr Revolutier~ frcm i\horr 101 193rs; llc had to view IVX,I ( i ro r~ ty a d in11 :nlu~~c l'clcl l l le Great as a allenlpted to ~~III~III cli~ss war i n n ]he coontryside by ,nakillg (lie pcanallls

slatcslnall orscnria~ist ibrmation. With very few encepti~llls, the illdeler'd- (bedniakil its allies i n 111ass collectivization. what lhis policy was a ellt.lnillded o l d Bolsl~eviks were cast as his hoyars. success i s not entirely pbin, as tllere is evidence, illcludillg documentary evillc,lce

~h~ per t i l~e~~ce of this to the problem of the nexus b c t ~ e c n Ihe two phaws is lrom t l ~ e Smolensk party arcl~ives, that mass c o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ i ~ ~ t i ~ ~ was rlol o,lly ~ 1 , ~ crcal purge was at ollce the crucible of l l ~ e rc.;lol;llioll ;lbsulute

. . posed by the w e l l - u K i ~ ~ ~ d ~nidcllc peasants in their greal but ulll,upu~ar i l t Russia-under Stalin lluw-alld cmconl i ta l l t l~ a col'tllluatlall 1 U well arnollg 1111 few of tile hpdn;(,ki.S2 E~~~ (,pd,,iak grasl, wllal of formatioit o f Stalin.9 neo-tsarisl vrr.;i~)n or t l le com~bl'sor~-servicc j "V.K.P." nlcarll and 110, l ike it. for worker l,arliC~pBtiorl ill m~~~tiViZRticl,,,

slate, all Illat may properly be called "totalital.iall." 'Tile pllasc 1 we have the case o f the twe~~ty- f ive tllousa1,d illdustrial workers who ell- revolut io~~ rrorn above had seer! the bitlditlg of tile Peasalltry workillg 'lass mlled by l l le party tu go into the villages as collectivizers. ~~t also ill servitude to t l ~ e ever s\relling, every more centralized. ever lnore bureauera f that at least sotrle portion of the utwe~~ty-fivc.thousaI1derSSS joille,j this lnnvelllellt tized, ever more police-dominated Stalinist slate; this mkrepOs'lc'icnb . under pressure of dire Cimily neerl colllbincd Illaterial illcenliv~s lo grew tigtller in later years. The seco~ld phase brortgl~l lllr party i~selland j i the collectiviei,,g. tile illlelligelllsia ill illat grcally cxpanded Soviet sellse of Ille Ier1l1 ( ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ em. ; In llle secoud phijse. the ~ u c i a l c l ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~ d sigllificalrtly. wl1ile ,,o,od braces managers, omcials, specialists, technicians, and profcssiollals Of inmained basically passive-indeed more pas i ve (I,~,, in the early 1930.s-large illto line wit11 the rest of society. They too became a ser'villg whose : dements of the first-phase o k r i v e x c l ~ a ~ g ~ d the role ,,rilnplenlenters re,,olu~ as such was tangible and visible will1 the introductiofl ill tile later 1930'3 cion for that i ls victinls. very nlaIly tllese lreople died or went to and 1940.~ ,,fa Stalinist table of ranks that bore a distillct resemblance-as did

'

during the Great Purge. 'To a far grenter ertcnl tllall tile first ,,llape, seco t ,~ the ullirorms and insignia-to t l ~ e correspon(1ing lsarlsl sct-up. Colople'i'gthe . was a police ope~tltion, 2nd t l ~ e suprcnlr co~ tc r t i ve viclin, was ll,c ~l,l,l,llll,lisl process idculogically, the St~ l in is t order devclo~led its i)wlt idec)log). of

. Parly itselras curlsliluled ill the early 1!)30.s. B~ this very however, a

~~~~i~~~ starism, which was epitumized by Sta1in.s courtier. Georpi Maletl"v, . many whodid llot aclively participate i n the second phase, tlley belollged \"hen he to a party conference io 1941: "We arc all scrvallls the state." tothe okrivor the ~ a r o d nevcrtlteless became its beneficiaries, F~~ decinla. ~ t ~ l i ~ ~ given the cue two years before, whefl, at tile Eidlteellth Party Con. lio11 ofthe pre-1934 regime, party. and intelligerltsia in tile ~~~~t porge opelle,. grcss, he Eligels' (and by impticaliot, Marl 's) rnist3kerz idea "la' i career oP(wrt11llities on a vast scale to thWe from] below ,.,lIo %how* ism meall( the withering away of the state. ' mmbillcd with the acquiescent, state.oriented, and ~ t ~ l i ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d Illat

.I.* wllal extent was the Stalinist revolution "li-oln below" as as. lrom . were hallmarks o f the chirruvnik under full Stalillisrll. hi^ ill~llx largely above? ~~t until the social history of tile period is u'rittell this questlo"' . i . influx of the peasant-hnm or of tliosc wllo llad ixc,, childrer, ofpeasallts, ~ i ~ , ~ , ~ fully a,,swera~lc. Undoubtedly, we shuuld avrlid two ulllcllable, pm" Baris Pihiak's stalen~ent of 1922 that '*the dark waters lnuzl,ik ~~~~i~ lriive tiolls: that taken i n tile above-cited passage ill Stalin's Slzorr course . . that lhc ! swept and swallowed the Petrille empire," ~ i ~ h ~ l ~ ~ vakar llas argued that revolulinn fronl abovewas "directly supported from below by Illc mil'ions. . . ," '' Slalinisl revolution, by li l l ing l l ~ e Snviet hierarclly persolls peasalll slot. alld tile oppo)site view that the process had f~ suPI1ol.t final lhelow. Rut given .

. and illfusillg age-old pea :~ r~ f moles values into tllc sovier l,121r~e(~

tl,c [r;,g,,lrn(ary state o f our kllowledpe, dimerencer r l f(~l~i l l ion alld elllpllss i lomplele PPf ls~ l l l r i z~r i~ r~ OF the Russian Revolll(ioll,53 illevilable we beyond thisobviuus elartitlg-poilll. pcrl la~s it

he useful, as a settillg for arlalysis and discossiot~, l o obcerve two distilrctioni ~ i ~ ~ t , the diStillction hetween the two pliases (1929-33 alld 1gA4-j9). i VII

distinction between two direrent possible ~neanillgs of "below": Pennns In : This essay has advallced a cultllralist i!~terpretation of the Russ ia~~ low~level roles ill orclosely associated with it, notnhly LIle nlenlbenhip . VrWess as ofle Illat took place ill two 111;tio stages wit11 an interval of quiesccllce oftlle ,-onlmullist party alld the Komsornol; and the t,oi)ulati~)ll at large. Using Soviet we may call tilem the ukriv and the !lord ; '2, Forcolleclivirariun aq r?llecled in I I ~ archive, EPF MC~I* 9,iu/uni~ u,,dcrsovie, ~ l t l ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ llu~nerically substantial, therornrer was no Inore a ativelr small i mew 'Or', 1958). C 1 l a ~ 1 2 1x1 Hursior~ Proronlr olid Sbl,icr Power fp 488). I.ewin implies a ; H i v e , posilive 1,articit~aliotl I,T thc village pour: .-I,, lu u,,ders~s,,d pr,,ceas I,r allolesalc millority o f the latter. aulakinl ion. il is also essential to hear i n mind ihc ,,,isrry ill ~ 1 , i ~ h ,,,iiliunr ,,r bed,,yilrr lived

flkl;r: or large elements of it, including contirlgerlt or you''', . , dl lm "rm !he). werll 1,ongr~: lbey hild neilher slloes o shin^, a,,y ulj,Er .jUIIITy jlU,,lS.. ,.be a vitally inlportant iastrurnelltality of the regime in lhe first pllase oftheStallnB : m i o n wllich hllill up in the cuunlrysidc, and ~ l l e eagerness 1,) dispossess kulaks, ill revolution, Many in alllectivlzation and industrialization driva bgcmeasure cuntribuled (0 by the arotcl~cdnesr olzlre bednynk?' cilndi~iuns, and ,he llarrrd whici,

only actively but entllus,astically all,j selr.sacriflci~~gly. But i t is llut clear ! '5 capab1e Or reeling un orcasioll for llleir more L~nu~t~%lc ~ ~ c i ~ h b ~ , , ~ ~ , ~ 1 , " rxl,lo,red ,he,,, pllnrlg wbeacver they bni l the C ~ B I I C C t o do whet l~er any a,ndderablc podion of the rzorod gavc "le regi1ne its volunlaq . 53. Nicholas Vakar, Tire Topruor ojsovier s ~ ~ ~ ~ , , , ( N ~ ~ york, itjhl). ,.he by Pil,,iL,k, sllpport during tllis phase. AS i n the time of War Communism, tllc r e ~ i m dcd by Vilknr al p. 16, rronl !,is novrl Go!v80d

6 102 Ilobert C. l a rks S(ltinirm nr He?ululinn fnm Absrc 103 durillg NEP. ~h~ first i t was held. produced a s i l t l a l i o~~ c l~arac ter i~~d that make rcfetrncc l o the .;peci;rl I~istorical role 01' ;, ~ e a ~ ~ ~ ~ . l , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l i ~ ~ . hy tile uneasy co-existence of two cultures, a llew S[lviet cultore Srowir1gout

' cultural anthropolngists have p o i ~ ~ t e ~ l out, .'culture" :\lid "perrr,nality" I,, the Reuolulinn and n dl l-survivir lg nld l ~ u s ~ i ~ l l cultltrc with i t s s'n"lgbutd in ~ I collsiderahle dcpree, twn ways u f viewillg one alltl [Ile sanle p~lellonlcnoll, [Ile Tlie Soviet culture itself illlderwent collsiderable challge 'luril1g 'I1'

'

culture being s o i n c l l ~ i ~ ~ g wliich has its lheirlg inaillly i~iil,i,, l > c ~ p l e . ~ ~ In lcrllls ~ ~ p , .l.lIe second, sta!inist, ~1.g~ of 111c Rcvolulion yielded. as llns hen more irno)e~liatcly ~ ~ c r l i l ~ e r l l to uur arguniel1l, ;I learjcrll,crsollnlilq.)~la~ity bce~l,lles i,o[jli. indicated, an anialganlaled Slal i l~ist Soviet cultllre Illat ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l l y illvolvd . a l ly acculturated t hn~ug l i his life-experience both ill cally years an(! duritlg at ullce the full-scale sovietirario~l of Russia11 ~( lc iety o l ld the itassiliciltirlll or'h' manhood. Thus. 1917 :tlld (Ile Civi l War a fo,l,l;,~ive :,cculluraling life. soviet culture. The Soviet Ul l io l l \*'as re-Russified ill the

. experience for Stalin axid many nthcrS of llis parly gerleratioIl, leavillg a deep thal purported l o complcle Russia's s ~ ~ v i c t i ~ i l l g , lo tralalbrm NEP raidue of the rcvoluti

dictaled on December 30-31, 1922 and in which he characterized Sta l i~~ a, foreriiost anlong those Russified minority represe~ltatives ill the party w l ~ o tended l o err on the side o f "true-Kussiar~is~i," (i.s/irrrro-rrr.~.~kie ~~msrrorniiu) and "Greal Russian chal~vinism." UII~~~II~WII to L e ~ i i ~ l , Stalin's sense o f Russian ~iationality, if not his true-Russia~~ism, had dated iron] his yo11111ful conversion to Le11in.s lcadersl~ip and to Bolsl~evisn~, w l ~ i c h he s t~w 11s thc "Koss ia~~ faction" in the Empire's Marxist Party, Menshevism being the "Jewisl~ faction." I t was 011 this foundation that Stalin, during the 1920's. went forward i n his thinking and appropriative self-acculturatio~~, as the generality o f his Russia~i-nationalist-ori- euted party comrades did ilot, to envisage the tsarist state-building process a, a model for the Soviet Russian stale in its "building ofsocialis~n." r " And i t was the great personal power that he acquired by 1929, will1 tl ie ouster o f l l ~ e opposi. t ior~s from tlie parly leadership, that made i t possible for l ~ i ~ r i l o proceed tocarry out his design.

I f tl ie thesis c o n c e r ~ ~ i ~ ~ g tlie recapitulatio~l of tlie state-building process placer heavy emphasis upon persollalily even in the context o f a culturalist approach. a final explanatory consideration concerning the Stalinist phenomenon narrows the focus o ~ ~ t o perso~~al i ty to 11 stil l greater dcgrec. U l ~ l i k c any othcr llolshevik, t o my knowledge, Stalin, as we have noted. defined the Soviet situation in 1925 and 1926 i n eve-of-October terms, in~pl ic i t ly presaging tllereby a revolutionary assault against the existing order, i.e., the NEP, i n the drive to bui ld socialism. Then, looking back in the Sl~urr Corrr.scof 1938 on the a c c o ~ n p l i s l ~ ~ ~ i e ~ l t s or the Stalinist decade, he described thcm, and collectivizatior~ i n particular, as eqoiva- lent in consequence to the October Kevolutiori o f 1917. U ~ ~ d e r l y i n g both the definition of the situa~ioo in t l ~ e mid-1920's and t11c retrospeclive satisfaclion expressed i n the late 1930's was Stalin's con~l,ulsive psychological need, born of nei~rosis, to prove hin~self a revolutionary hero o f Lenin-like proportions, lo match or surpass what al l Bolsheviks considered IRII~II'S soprenle historical cnploil, t l ~ c leadersliip nf the party ill i l ~ e world-l~isloric revolut io~~ary success of October 1917. ' l ' l~c great revolutionary drive t o c11;111gu Kusqia i n tlie early 1930's was i t i te~~ded as Stalin's October.

In practice i t achieved certain successes, notably in i~~dus t r ia l i ra t io~ i , but at a cost o f such havoc and misery ill Russia that Stalin, as the regi~ i~e 's supreme leader, aroused condemnation among many. This helps t u cxplail~, in psychologi- cal terms, the lethal vi~~dictiveness that he visited upon rn i l l i o~~s of his party comrades, fellow countrymen, and others in the e ~ ~ s u i ~ i g years. I t was his way o f trying t o con~e t o terms wi th the repressed fact that he, Djugashvili, had failed t o prove hinlself the charismatically Lenin-like Stalin that i t was his lifelollg goal to he. If t l ~ i s interpretatior~ is well fouoded, he was l ~a rd l y the most impersonal o f great historical figures.

56. The dernottslrslion aad documentation of this lhais is onr dthe aims ormy work i n progresr. Slolin o,ld rlre Rewlurio,r/rum Above. 1929-1939 A Study in Hi.~lory ond l'crorio/i(v Io Sliilin or Revolu,ionory, 1879-1929. I have sought lodcmonrlra~e the tl~rrir concer!~i#>g Stalin'r Greal Kurrian nnliol,alirs> and i t s youll>rul origins.

VIII Having sketched here a primarily culturalist i ~~ te rp re ta t i o~ l o f Stalinism as revolu- lion iron] above, hasetl 011 l l ~ e Soviet 1930's, i t remailis to co~iclut le wi th a comment on the hislorical scquel. I wish to indicate in p i ~ r t i c ~ ~ l a r the relevance ofthe arlalysis to the Stalinisl ~ ~ l ~ e ~ i o ~ i ~ e r ~ o ~ ~ ill its suhseque~~l develop~r~ent. We may dislinguish two suhsequellf iwriods: Il lat of the Soviet-Germall c o ~ ~ f l i c t of. 1941-45 and that of puslwar S t i ~ l i l l i s l ~ ~ (1946-53). In this sequence. 1945 fo rn~s a sort of historici~l pause or I i iat~ls, rather as 1034 d id betweell ti le two phases ofthe revo lu t io~~ from alrovc o f the 1930's.

Thesecond World War was, ill a way, an i r~ ler im i n Stalinism's deve lopn~e~~t . Not that the "Great Fatherland War," as i t was callcd i n Stalin's Russia, had no serious impact or1 Stalinist Soviet C o ~ n n l u ~ ~ i s t n as a sociopolitical culture, hut that n ~ a i ~ ~ l y i t reinforced tendelicies already present before the war began. Thus, the war gave a p ~ ~ w e r f u l fur t l~er impetus to the Great Russia11 ~~at ional ism w l ~ i c l ~ had becon~e evident i n Slalin's perso~lal political niakeup by the beginning o f (he 1920's ;tnd a ~ ~ r n l l l i l l r n t rno l i l i n Slnliuist 11101~g111 and polilics i n tile 1970's. The official glorification o f n i ~ l i o ~ ~ a l K u s s i a ~ ~ tnilitary I~eroes o f the prc-Soviet past, notably Ge~~erals Savorova~id Kutuzov and Admiral Nakhi~nov, and t l~eopening of special Soviet officers' t r a i l ~ i r ~ g i~cadeniies oarned after them, were among tile many manifesli~lions o f Il l is t r e ~ ~ d . ~ ~ Too, the war inte~isil ied the inil itsrist strain in Stalinism, which has here bee11 traced hack to the t i ~ i ~ e o f War Con~n~un i sn~ . Ilstrengthened and further dcvelolled the l~ierarcl~icalstruclureof Stalinist Soviet society as recollsti lutal clllrillg the revolution from above o f 111e 1930's, and augmented the alrcady far- rc ;~chi~~g Sta l i~~ is t hypertrophy of tlie slate machine. There were also covert lrcnds st Ihst l ime toward tl ie oflicial a n t i - S e ~ ~ ~ i t i s n ~ which became blatant ill the poslwar Stalinist ca t~~pa ign against "rootless cosrnopoli- tans," the murder IIF large t~u~nhers o f Soviet Jewish inlellectuals. and 111e infa- mous "doctors' arair" o f S l i ~ l i ~ t '% I~ISI IIIOIII~IS ill 1Y53.511

I n the pol\\,al- perin11 aflcr 1945, we see a situation w l ~ i c h appears lo ronflict with a revolulionary interpretatic~n of the Stalinist p l ~ c ~ ~ o n ~ e n o n . The d o ~ r ~ i ~ ~ a n l note i n Soviet internal policy during lhose years was conservatisn~, the recotl- solidati~sg of the Stalinist order that had taken shape i n l l ~ e 1930's.FqAn example ofsuch conservatisr~~ was the early post-war action of Stalin's regime i n cutting

57. On Stalinism nud Russiacl satio~lnlism aller 1919. see in parliculvr the informative accnslrl by F. Barghuarn. "Stalinism and the Russian Cullural Herifape," Review o/Puli~icr, Vol 14, No. 2 (April. 1952), pp. 178-201: and his So~.ier Rur.cion Norionol~m (New York, 1956).

58. In "New Bic,grnphie.i orSlalin." Sovie1 Jlrwirh AffnR,. Val. 5. No. 2 (1975), p. 104. Jack Miller has called alterllion to "Slalill's owen usc of antiscmitis~n nguiltrt Trolsky, Kanlenev and Zinouiev, when in conlilion with Rtokllarin be was rumling tttem in 142527." and add?: "The exlent to which &ntiselnitism appeared is llte Psrly rnachir~c d~trirtg this phase or Slalin'r rise 10 suprenne power i s of special ihlleresl in the 'nssiryinp' nf Mariism."

59. In '711e Slalin Heritage in Soviet I'olicy" (7'lte Sovie1 Politico1 .Wind. Chap. 4), 1 hnvc vrgucd !ha1 Slrtin turned conservative in lhis pos~-w~tr illterlnnl poliUcr.

Rol~ecl C. Tuck# .~*:

106 -Ism as Re*elution Iron, Above 101 hack tile p r i ~ ; ~ t ~ garilcn l , l o ~ ~ wllicli-for purlr,se\. o f h r t t l~ w:~l--ti~lle inorole and trkol place ill llusui;~ ill tlic l')1O's. l ' l ic y:~r,le I,l;,y he silicl