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Anders B. Bak EU and the Arctic May 2014

EU and the Arctic - A comparative analysis on interests and motives for Arctic involvement

By Anders B. Bak (AB94099)

Thesis supervisor: Lars S. Hovbakke

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Aarhus University – School of Business and Social Sciences


Abstract The Arctic is beginning to look like the next geopolitical hotspot in international politics and it is easy to see why. After a period of demilitarization following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region has once again attracted the attention of major international actors. This revival of the Arctic has not been left unnoticed in Brussels and the European Union has published its own strategy towards the High North. This thesis will seek to explore the interest and motives behind the EU’s Arctic involvement by analyzing and comparing its Arctic strategy to those of the Arctic states.

Methodical, this is done by comparing the EU to two selected cases, Norway and Russia, which both have interests in the region. Following the identification of the interests of the three actors, the interests are discussed in the light of the international relations theory, neoliberalism. This discussion provides theoretical explanations for the interests of the different actors. Neoliberalism succeeds to provide explanations to all of the EU’s interests in the Arctic and the majority of the Russian and Norwegian interests. It does fall short in explaining the increased militarization of the region sufficiently; however, a neoliberal explanation to the phenomenon is presented.

Conclusively, the two main interests of the EU’s Arctic involvement are considered to be the economic potential of the region and concerns for the environmental implications of climate change and the increased human activity in the region. Further, EU’s approach to gaining access to Arctic governance fits perfectly into neoliberalism’s notion of international cooperation caused by the increasing interdependency between the actors. It is further concluded that the EU shares interests with Norway and Russia and that the economic interdependency between them is likely to contribute to fulfilling EU’s interest in becoming a larger actor in Arctic governance. It is, however, noted that the two cases, especially Russia, prefers to deal with the other littoral states of the Arctic in questions on Arctic governance. Norway and Russia is arguably more state-centric than EU as a consequence of the political body of the European Union, however, it is concluded that cooperation is considered vital in the governance of the Arctic by all actors.

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Table of contents

1.0 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 2

2.0 Thesis statement .................................................................................................................................................. 3

3.0 Method ................................................................................................................................................................. 3

3.1 Structure of the thesis .............................................................................................................................................. 3

3.2 Aim and scope of the thesis ...................................................................................................................................... 4

3.3 Literature used ......................................................................................................................................................... 5

3.4 Reflection on literature ............................................................................................................................................. 5

4.0 Theory .................................................................................................................................................................. 6

4.1 Neoliberalism ............................................................................................................................................................ 6 4.1.1 Complex interdependence ................................................................................................................................ 7 4.1.2 International regimes ........................................................................................................................................ 7 4.1.3 Soft power ......................................................................................................................................................... 8

5.0 Arctic strategies .................................................................................................................................................... 8

5.1 The European Union ................................................................................................................................................. 8 5.1.1 The Arctic interests of the European Union ...................................................................................................... 9

5.2 Norway ................................................................................................................................................................... 10 5.2.1 The Arctic interests of Norway ........................................................................................................................ 11

5.3 Russia...................................................................................................................................................................... 12 5.3.1 The Arctic interest of the Russian Federation ................................................................................................. 13

6.0 Comparison of interests .......................................................................................................................................14

6.1 Reflections on theory .............................................................................................................................................. 14 6.1.1 Sovereignty and Security................................................................................................................................. 14 6.1.2 Economic Development and Transportation .................................................................................................. 15 6.1.3 Environment .................................................................................................................................................... 16 6.1.4 Search and Rescue .......................................................................................................................................... 16 6.1.5 Indigenous People ........................................................................................................................................... 17 6.1.6 Knowledge and Research ................................................................................................................................ 17

7.0 Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................................18

8.0 List of abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................20

9.0 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................................21

Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................................................................24


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1.0 Introduction The Arctic or the High North1 is beginning to look like the next geopolitical hotspot in international politics and it is easy to see why. After a period of demilitarization following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region has once again attracted the attention of major international actors. This revival of the Arctic has not been left unnoticed in Brussels and the European Union has published its own strategy towards the High North. This thesis will seek to explore the interest and motives behind the EU’s Arctic involvement and doing so by comparing them to those of the Arctic states. A comparison is particularly useful in order to examine whether the EU shares the ambitions and interests of other actors in the Arctic. After the comparison, a discussion based upon the theory of neoliberalism will seek to explain these interests. This will be elaborated further, but first an introduction to the region and its institutional setup. Climate change has been proceeding at a higher rate at the poles than in the rest of the world and the combination of a retreating icecap and significant technological progress has opened up for new sea lanes of communication and the possibility of extracting valuable resources far sooner than expected. (Blunden, 2009, p. 122) The region has transformed from being solely of military importance for anyone outside the region to attracting attention for its sizeable fraction of the world’s remaining reserves of oil and gas. This has sparked a boom of interest from multinational companies looking to exploit the resources of the region, non-governmental organizations concerned with the ecological consequences or the impact on the indigenous population, and states and institutions wanting to contribute to development of the Arctic. (Young, 2011, pp. xxi-xxii)

Järvenää and Ries (2011) have identified two main interests in the Arctic. The first is financial; the extraction of vital and rare natural resources is of great importance for both corporations and states. The second is political power; controlling key parts of the global economic production chain provides political power. (Järvenpää & Ries, 2011) As a consequence of these differing, yet interrelated interests, the actors in the Arctic have established institutions and arenas in which they can deal with potential conflicts. Most importantly are the Arctic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Arctic Council offers an arena, where member states and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) can cooperate in order to pursue common interests and resolve potential disputes. BEAC is restricted to European cooperation and has contributed to an increased cooperation between the member states and emphasize its synergy with the Arctic Council. (BEAC, 2013) The IMO contributed to the first legally binding instrument of the Arctic Council, an agreement on search and rescue, which all 8 states signed. (Arctic Council, 2011) The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a regime in which territorial claims can be dealt with. All members of the AC with the exception of the United States have agreed to respect the decisions of UNCLOS. (Petersen, 2011, pp. 151-153) The Arctic states have all published strategies on their approach to Arctic governance. These strategies are of great importance, if one wants to understand the different approaches to governance in the Arctic

1 These two terms will be considered equivalent in this paper, as the purpose is not to define precise scientific nor legal definitions of the Arctic. Further, the Arctic region will be considered to be the area north of the Arctic Circle, which circles the globe at 66°33" N. This circle marks the latitude above which the sun does not set on the summer solstice and does not rise on winter solstice. (NSIDC)


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region. Hence the formulation of an Arctic Policy in 2008 was a significant indication that the EU had turned its attention towards the High North. The policy is built around three main policy objectives; protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, promoting the sustainable use of resources and international cooperation. (European Commission, 2008) In relation, Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, stated in a speech to the EP in April 2013 that, “The next steps we plan will make the European Union's contribution to Arctic cooperation even more meaningful.” Furthermore, he pointed to three key components of the EUs Arctic policy: Knowledge, responsibility and engagement. (Füle, 2013)

2.0 Thesis statement The attention towards the High North and the formulation of an EU Arctic policy raise a question of what the EU wants from its Arctic involvement. Therefore, this paper will be based upon the following thesis:

Why is the EU interested in becoming a larger actor in Arctic governance and are these interests consistent with the interests of Arctic states?

Due to the limitation on the thesis, the Arctic states will be exemplified by Norway and Russia. The Arctic policies of these two states will thus serve as the foundation for the comparison in order to explore whether the interests of the EU are consistent with those of the Arctic states.

3.0 Method This paper will seek to make a comparative analysis of the three strategies. A comparative analysis is considered as a qualitative case-oriented approach. The comparative method specifically used in this analysis can be described as a few-country comparison, in which at least two cases are compared. Most importantly, in a few-country comparison cases should be intentionally selected. The intentional omission of the rest of the Arctic states in the thesis will in some degree reduce the broad generalizations made possible if all of them could be analyzed; on the contrary, the selected method will provide a deeper understanding of the cases examined. (Landman, 2008, s. 68-69)

3.1 Structure of the thesis Paragraphs prior to this will not be included in the account of the structure as they need no further presentation. Following this paragraph a presentation of the aim and scope of the thesis will be made, in which considerations on the chosen cases, theories and delimitation is presented. Afterwards, the most important literature used in this thesis is accounted for. The last paragraph of the method section will consist of a reflection on the literature used. Next, the theoretical framework is presented; this will consist of a brief introduction to liberalist assumptions in the field of international relations followed by a presentation of neoliberalism based upon theorists such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Then the thesis will move on to present the Arctic strategies of the European Union, Norway and Russia, followed by an analysis of the interests of each actor. Following the presentation of the strategies, a brief comparison arranged in tabular form will be made in order to analyze whether or not the interests are corresponding between the three actors. The comparison will be inspired by Bailes and Heininen’s (2012) classification of


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the priority areas of the Arctic actors. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 22 & 98) See appendix 1. These findings will then be discussed and reflected on in the light of neoliberalism in an effort to explain the interests behind the Arctic involvement of all three actors from a theoretical perspective. Lastly, a conclusion will be made in which thoughts on the theory’s explanation of the interests behind Arctic involvement will be outlined. Furthermore, the conclusion will present considerations on the thesis as a whole, its theoretical framework and the possibilities for further research.

3.2 Aim and scope of the thesis

This paper is inspired by a comparative study by Bailes and Heininen on strategy papers of the Arctic states and the EU. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012) The study compares the strategies of the eight members of the Arctic Council and the strategy of the EU. Their analysis is based upon a theory of realism within the study of international relations, which does not, as they state themselves, propose solutions to all of the issues and/or priorities of the actors in the Arctic. They propose that the theory of social constructivism might be able to find solutions, yet there is no mentioning of another major stand within international relations theory, liberalism. Therefore, this paper will seek to make a comparative analysis based upon neoliberal institutionalism, also known as neoliberalism. However, as a consequence of the limitations of this paper the empirical data analyzed (the strategies) will be reduced to three instead of nine. Obviously, the strategy of the EU will be one of them, while the two others will be the Norwegian and the Russian Arctic strategies. These two are not randomly selected, but instead chosen as both Norway and Russia have significant relations with the EU in terms of economy, transportation and energy among others, as well as being littoral states in the Arctic and connected to the European mainland. Denmark, while fitting into the abovementioned criteria, has been left out as it is an EU member and because its connection to the Arctic primarily consists of its relation with Greenland.

By analyzing the three strategies and applying the theory of neoliberalism, this thesis should be able to explain reasons for the EU’s involvement in the Arctic and by comparing them to those of Norway and Russia, it should be able to provide a more accurate picture of the political situation in the High North and the motives for Arctic involvement. The argument is that neoliberalism is more suitable to explain the increasing cooperation in the Arctic than realism and social constructivism is. With that said, this thesis will not be able to explore all the interests in Arctic politics; as a: the theory of neoliberalism has its limitations and b: because not all states with interests in the Arctic are covered in the analysis. Yet, it will be able to give an in-depth insight to the priorities of the EU and the two littoral states. Applying realism or a theory of social constructivism would definitely contribute to a more comprehensive conclusion, however, due to the limitations on this paper, it cannot be justified to make three separate analysis’ as it would result in deficient and inadequate answers to the questions. Furthermore, applying a different theory could be a point of departure for others interested in analyzing the Arctic strategies.


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3.3 Literature used This section will introduce the most significant literature used in the thesis. However, this does not mean that the literature not presented here is less important. The presentation will consist of a short, objective review of the most significant literature in relation to theory and empirical data.

Power and interdependence by Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye (Keohane & Nye, 1989) is one of the major contributions behind the emergence of different strands in liberal international relations, Power and interdependence is a classic of the genre. It confronts and challenges some of the faults of realism in international relations. It proposes the concept of “complex interdependence”, which emphasizes that international actors are intertwined by complex connections between states, as well as organizations, institutions and multinational corporations. It does not reject that military force can occur; however, it argues that the use of force is not a superior tool in dealing with conflicts between states. Another classic within neoliberalism, After Hegemony, by Robert O. Keohane (Keohane, 2005) from 1984 argues that a decline in hegemony does not make cooperation impossible and stresses that institutions can be used to facilitate cooperation among egoistic actors. It argues that realism does not need to be discarded; however, international regimes are key to establish cooperation among actors. Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen’s (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012), Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, offers an introduction to the study of International Relations. It introduces all the most important theories within the academic field and it does so in an exhaustive manner. It emphasizes that no theory is the best to explain a subject, but that the different theories interact with each other. Thus, theories of international relations are not interested in the truth, instead they seek to understand and explain the behavior of actors in world politics. Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change by James Kraska (Kraska, 2011) explores how Arctic states are adapting their foreign policy to the transformation occurring in the Arctic. It contains a comprehensive coverage of perspectives from all the eight Arctic states. Lastly, Alyson JK Bailes & Lasse Heininen’s (Bailes & Heininen, 2012) article, Strategy Paper on the Arctic or High North: A Comparative Study and Analysis, seeks to explore and analyze the Arctic strategies of the eight Arctic states and the European Union. It does so by comparing the different priorities of each actor’s Arctic strategy. Realism is applied as the theory. The article states the complexity of the Arctic is unlikely to be captured by any single theory; hence it will seek to explore and test the applicability of realism.

3.4 Reflection on literature The literature chosen to support this thesis is primarily academic. This increases the creditability of the literature; and therefore it increases the creditability of this thesis. The theoretical works presented above have got some age to them and in the case of Keohane & Nye, the fact that they are being referred to as foundational for neoliberalism makes them ideal as a point of departure for the theoretical framework in the thesis. The book by Jackson and Sørensen (2012) provides comprehensive introduction to the theory of international relations and it is intended for students and scholars of international relations. Kraska (2011) and Bailes and Heininen (2012) are two contemporary pieces of literature on the Arctic region and the foreign policy approaches of the actors in the region. Being fairly new contributions to the study of the Arctic, the two pieces of literature can be considered to be mostly up-to-date; this should help to reduce the risk of the thesis being based on false or factual wrong information. Being aware of this risk, I have been cautious in the process of collecting data. Nevertheless, relying on scholars of Arctic politics is considered to be the best approach in order to ensure an unbiased and credible paper.


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The strategies are official policies of the three actors, however, Kremlin has not published the Russian Arctic policy in English. As a consequence, the thesis will refer to a translation of the policy. (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2009) The translation has been retrieved from a database developed by Centre for High North Logistics based in Norway. The Center is an international, non-profit organization with the intention of, “sharing of available know-how and information between all the eight Arctic states and various stakeholders.” (Centre for High North Logistics, 2013) With any translation, one needs to acknowledge the risk of omission of information, however, in this case the source is considered to be reliable, as it does not differ significantly from other translations, it is hosted on a website by a credible organization with no political motives and the database, “Arctic Policies of the Arctic States”, is edited by Dr. Willy Østreng from the University Centre in Svalbard, who is President of The Norwegian Scientific Academy for Polar Research. (Arctis Knowledge Hub, 2013)

In general, official publications by states or the EU need to be approached with skepticism. It is not likely that the information is incorrect; however, there is a possibility that official documents might portray the actor’s accomplishments too positively or, on the contrary, focuses too little on policies and areas in which the actor has not succeeded. Therefore, I have a sound skepticism towards information that might be biased. This is not meant to exclude information, but instead indicating that I am aware of the pitfalls of potentially biased information.

4.0 Theory In this section, the theory of neoliberalism will be presented. It will be based upon the understandings and concepts developed by Keohane and Nye. This strand is sometimes referred to as interdependence liberalism; however, as this thesis is not a theoretical discussion of neoliberalism and in order to reduce risk of ambiguity, the theory will be referred to as neoliberalism. It is important to note that the two concepts are not separate, but interdependence liberalism is rather a strand within neoliberalism. In fact, Keohane’s contributions have earned him a position as a leading neoliberal. (Smith, 2000)

4.1 Neoliberalism Neoliberalism originates from liberalism; therefore a short presentation of liberalism is needed. Liberalism holds more optimistic view of international relations than its counterpart, realism. Liberalism believes that humans are rational, share interests and can therefore engage in cooperation with each other, when applying this rationality to international affairs greater cooperation will be the result. (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, pp. 96-98)

Despite its foundation in liberalism, neoliberalism agrees with realism on states being the main actors in international politics and that the world is anarchical in its nature. Neoliberalism, however, does not believe that states are the only actor in international relations, but that they are affected by international institutions and regimes. Further, neoliberalism differs from realism as it does not view the anarchical nature of the world as a hindrance to cooperation, on the contrary, it emphasizes that cooperation can be developed and sustained. (Keohane & Nye, 1989) As Keohane (2005) states, “Realism should not be discarded, since its insights are fundamental to an understanding of world politics, but it does need to be reformulated to reflect the impact of information-providing institutions on state behavior, even when rational egoism persists.” (Keohane, 2005, pp. 245-246)


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4.1.1 Complex interdependence Keohane thus sets the stage; states are rational actors, but they are intertwined in a system of international regimes in which military force does not dominate the agenda. Further, states are connected through other international actors such as transnational organization and multinational corporations which increases the interdependence between states. (Keohane & Nye, 1989, pp. 24-27) The concept of complex interdependence will now be presented. The concept has three main characteristics:

Multiple channels Societies are connected via informal and formal ties between governmental as well as nongovernmental elites and via multinational corporations and banks. These different actors contribute to an increased interdependence between the states. (Keohane & Nye, 1989, pp. 25-26) Absence of hierarchy among issues Interstate relationships consist of several issues that are cannot be arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. Thus, military security does not dominate the agenda. Domestic policies raise many issues between states and the distinction between domestic and foreign policy is blurred. As a consequence, no issue can be claimed to be more important than others. (Keohane & Nye, 1989, pp. 25-27) Minor role of military force As a result of complex interdependence, states are less likely to use force in order to achieve their goals. The economic consequences are too widespread. However, a military conflict among advanced industrial countries with complex interdependence is not impossible. Changes in the social or political environment is not unthinkable, however, it is highly unlikely. (Keohane & Nye, 1989, pp. 27-29)

To sum up, complex interdependence states that the increasing transactions between states, their domestic actors and institutions will lead to a decline in military security as the dominant goal. As a consequence, military force will no longer be the most efficient instrument of state policy as realism suggests. Instead manipulation of interdependence between states, international organizations and transnational actor will be major instrument. It further emphasizes the importance of international organizations, which are seen as arenas for political action for weaker states. This will erode hierarchy rather than enforce it, thus making international organizations an important political resource. (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p. 37)

4.1.2 International regimes According to Keohane (2005), interdependence in the world political economy will generate conflict. State will be motivated to reduce these conflicts, as they have complementary interests. Therefore, they establish international regimes, understood as international organizations or collective binding agreement such as treaties. These regimes enhance the likelihood of cooperation by:

• Reducing the costs of transactions between states by institutionalizing procedures and processes. • Creating condition for multilateral negotiations and facilitating linkages among issues within

regimes and between regimes.


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• Increasing and improving the quality of the information that governments receive. The increasing interaction between states will reduce incentives to cheat and enhance the value of reputation, thus reducing the uncertainty between states. (Keohane, 2005, pp. 243-245)

4.1.3 Soft power Twenty years after Keohane and Nye introduced their concept of complex interdependence, they wrote an article in which they stated that, “the information revolution has vastly increased the number of channels between societies”. (Keohane & Nye, 1998) They argue that the increased accessibility to information has changed the nature of power. Military or economic power is no longer the central element of power. They characterize these powers as hard power, which they describe as, “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threats or rewards.” (Keohane & Nye, 1998) Instead they argue that information technology is likely to be the most important power resource, a power they characterize as soft power. Soft power is the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than through coercion. This is done by getting others to agree to norms or institutions, and this is considered less costly than using the traditional economic and military powers. Thus the ability to persuade other states is largely dependent on information and controlling Medias are therefore an essential part of soft powers. (Keohane & Nye, 1998)

5.0 Arctic strategies This section will contain a presentation of the chosen Arctic strategies. A strategy will be considered to be the actors approach to the Arctic region, outlined in official documents and statements. First off, a presentation of the EU’s Arctic strategy will be conducted, followed by presentations of the strategies of Norway and Russia. After each presentation an analysis of the interests will be conducted.

5.1 The European Union The first interaction between the EU and Arctic region was established through the Northern Dimension. The policy was designed primarily for relations with Russia and the EU’s members and candidate members in the Baltic Sea area. However, prior to late 2007 the Arctic region had not attracted much attention from the EU. This changed when a debate in the European Parliament made the region a priority policy area. This eventually led to the Commission publishing a communication in late November 2008, in which the EU’s interests were outlined (Archer, 2010, pp. 6-7) These interests were portrayed in three main policy objectives: (European Commission, 2008)

• Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population • Promoting sustainable use of resources • Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance

Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, this objective is divided into three areas: Environment and climate change, the indigenous population and Arctic research. The EU is a leader in fighting climate change and it wants to emphasize the importance of preventing negative impacts on the Arctic climate by coordinating efforts with Arctic states and other stakeholders among other proposals. The second part of this objective is to support the indigenous population in correspondence with EU development policy and EU regional policy. A much-criticized part of the EU’s Arctic policy is the condemnation and regulations on the hunting of marine mammals in the Arctic by the European Parliament. (European Commission, 2008)


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This has been the primary reason why we have yet to see the EU gain a seat in the Arctic council, as Ottawa have continued to block the EU’s application for observer status. However, a recent resolution indicates a shift in the EP’s attitude towards seal hunting, which might improve the possibilities of the EU getting admitted into the Arctic Council. The European Parliament, “urges the Commission to follow up on the remaining seal products ban issue with Canada and to duly inform the European Parliament on that process; regrets the effects the EU regulation on the ban of seal products has produced on parts of the population and in particular the indigenous culture and livelihood.” (European Parliament, 2014)

As to the second objective of the Arctic strategy, promoting sustainable use of resources, what is most interesting here is the focus on hydrocarbons. The increasing dependency of imported energy resources has become a concern for the EU. In 2007 it was projected that there would be a 93% dependence on imported oil and 84% on imported gas by 2030. (Offerdal, 2009, p. 32) Other important features of this objective are the new possibilities of transportation and commercial fishing in the Arctic as the ice retreats.

The third objective, contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance, revolves around the notion that the EU shall seek to contribute to enhanced cooperation in the Arctic based on the provisions of the UNCLOS as well as through inputs to the institutional framework in the Arctic, especially the Arctic Council.

In 2009, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on Arctic issues in which it stated that an EU policy on Arctic issues should be based upon measures; to mitigate climate change in order to preserve the Arctic, to reinforce multilateral governance through relevant agreements and frameworks, to implement and formulate EU actions and policies which do not impact on the Arctic negatively; and to maintain the Arctic as an area of peace and stability. (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 1)

Adding further to the development of an EU Arctic Strategy, the Commission and the High Representative of CFSP published a communication, in which they accounted for the progress since 2008 and formulated the catchphrase: knowledge, responsibility and engagement. (European Commission, 2012a) This communication emphasizes the protection of the Arctic environment as a cornerstone of the EU’s Arctic policy and states that, “The EU will therefore target its actions on knowledge: to further our understanding by investing in Arctic Research.” (European Commission, 2012a, pp. 5-6)

As to responsibility, the communication states that the EU will seek to use the various funding initiatives at its disposal to maximize sustainable development for the local and indigenous population. (European Commission, 2012b) Further, the resources in Arctic region are of interest for the EU, as it is a major consumer of and technology provider for the extraction of energy and raw materials. (European Commission, 2012a, p. 10)

Lastly, the 2012 communication emphasizes the EU’s engagement in bilateral dialogues with the Arctic states as well as it acknowledges the importance of the UNCLOS and the Arctic Council in Arctic governance. Iceland’s application to an EU membership is also mentioned as providing, “an additional framework to discuss certain policies relating to the Arctic.” (European Commission, 2012a, p. 11)

5.1.1 The Arctic interests of the European Union The EU’s motivation for involvement in the Arctic can be divided into external and internal interests. Most obviously is the protection of the Arctic environment, EU is the frontrunner in combating climate changes and these changes are especially visible and measurable at the poles. The environmental concerns can be


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linked with resource extraction. The Arctic is rich in fossil fuels and with the EU being a major importer; it wants to ensure that the extraction happens without damaging the fragile environment of the High North. The fact that the EU is so dependent on energy supplies from particularly Norway and Russia further strengthens the EU’s motivation for Arctic involvement. The EU wants to secure that it receives a steady supply of energy that is not threatened by the risk of conflict, which explains its emphasis on the development of multilateral agreements and institutions, while at the same time acknowledging the importance of bilateral agreements. Bailes and Heininen (2012) identify Greenland’s progress towards independence as another external reason for EU’s Arctic involvement. They note that the latest communication (European Commission, 2012a) directed a substantial amount of attention towards Greenland. Besides improving relations with the indigenous population, Bailes and Heininen argues that, “Creating direct institutional links with Greenland improves the odds on its staying politically in the European orbit even in the case of full independence; while for the Greenlanders facing a rapidly changing future, it may be reassuring to have backup from Europe’s strongest economic bloc rather than a lone Nordic state.” (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 96) Another motive for EU to develop an Arctic strategy was arguable caused by international events prior to 2008. A Russian submarine planted a flag at the North Pole and while it only had a symbolic meaning it attracted the Medias’ attention to the Arctic. At the same time, Norway had already published its first strategy and Russia was developing its own. In addition, the five littoral states of the Arctic met at Ilulissat in May 2008 and set the pace for Arctic governance for the time being. EU’s only link to the Arctic five was Greenland and its increasing insistence on independence left EU worried that they might be left out of Arctic governance. (Archer, 2010, p. 10)

Differing motives and interests within the EU also played a role in the development of a strategy towards Arctic. Archer (2010) explains the initial interest as inter-agency rivalry. The interest was sparked by the European Parliament, who pushed for a strategy towards the Arctic and as a consequence the Commission responded by developing an Arctic strategy. (Archer, 2010, p. 11) Bailes and Heininen (2012) agree with this observation, but emphasize the setback for the Parliament as they offended more experienced Arctic actors with the import ban of seal products. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 93) Member states within the EU have different interests and level of interest in the Arctic. Finland has been pushing for a more active EU in order for it to achieve its own goals; on the contrary Sweden has been reluctant towards a common policy and Denmark’s Arctic strategy clearly indicates that it prefers the Arctic Council and the Ilulissat declaration as its primary multilateral arenas for Arctic cooperation. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, pp. 41 & 94) In 2007, the Eastern enlargement ended for the time being, which meant that the EU’s attention could now be focused towards other region and therefore increased the interest towards the High North. Bailes and Heininen (2012) argues that if the Arctic is considered a neighbour region, then an EU Arctic strategy in the light of the European Neighbourhood Policy would be more legitimate and thus strenghten the EU’s foundation when dealing with Arctic-related issues. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 93)

5.2 Norway Norway was the first actor to publish a document dubbed a “strategy”. It was launched in 2006 in which former Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, introduced the key words: presence, activity and knowledge. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, p. 6) The strategy states that the High North is the most important priority area of Norway. It emphasizes a variety of policy areas including sovereignty, environmental management, knowledge, sustainable utilization of resources, economic development, safeguarding the indigenous people and bilateral relations with Russia.


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Norway’s economy is dependent on the petroleum sector, as the majority of the extracted oil and gas are exported. The retreating ice-cap in Arctic has made it possible for further extraction in the Barents Sea. Obviously, this poses a risk for the Arctic environment, which has led to an establishment of an international center of climate and environmental research in Tromsø. The center shall conduct research and develop knowledge in fields like search and rescue and environmental protection. (Tamnes, 2011, pp. 59-60) Besides the economic potential and environmental responsibilities following the exploitation of the Arctic, the strategy of 2006 particularly focuses on the relationship with Russia, and emphasizes the interest in strengthening cooperation with Russia, economically, politically and culturally. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, pp. 9-10)

According to Jens Stoltenberg, the 2009 strategy was developed as a response to other Arctic actors’ increasing engagement in the region. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 3) The 2009 strategy was not intended to replace the first, but rather add to it, hence its name “New Building Block in the North”. It outlines seven objectives with a time horizon of 10-15 years, yet it does not exclude the possibility of completing them prior to this. The strategy states that Norway intends to develop knowledge about climate and the environment; improve search and rescue systems; promote sustainable development of offshore petroleum and renewable marine resources; promote onshore business development; further develop the infrastructure in the north; exercise sovereignty firmly and strengthen cross-border cooperation in the north and finally, protecting the culture and livelihoods of indigenous peoples. Thus, the 2009 strategy outlined the next steps for Norway’s Arctic involvement. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 7)

5.2.1 The Arctic interests of Norway As a littoral state in the Arctic region, Norway has been engaged in developing the High North longer than most. Its interests and incentives for Arctic involvement are many; some seem self-explanatory, others are far more complex. The economy of Norway is dependent on the petroleum sector, in 2011 oil and natural gas accounted for almost half of Norway’s export of goods and services amounting to 568 billion NOK, more than a fifth of its total GDP. Further, employment in the industry and in related supply industries is likely to contribute to this dependency. (OECD, 2014, p. 11) The strategy also emphasizes other industries which need to be developed such as fishing, bioenergy, mineral extraction and tourism. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009) All these industries are likely to have an impact on the environment, the risk of an oil-spill and overfishing are just some of the potential consequences of economic development in the Arctic. As the environmental concerns are many, the 2006 strategy states that, “Norway intends to play a leading role in monitoring climate change, environmentally hazardous substances and the marine environment in the region.” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, p. 8) It further emphasizes that environmental considerations will prevail over other interests.

The concerns for the environment and economic development are linked with another interest, knowledge. Investing in research is a priority for Norway in order to expand its presence in the Arctic, the 2006 strategy states that research should be built upon existing knowledge of people. This leads to protection of the indigenous population, rather than subsidizing the peoples of the North for any inconvenience, the 2009 strategy suggests that developing the knowledge of the indigenous population will contribute to meet “future challenges related to ecological, economic, geopolitical and other forms of social change.” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 42) Issues concerning the indigenous population are also


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central in its relation to Russia and the 2009 strategy emphasizes the intention to increase cultural cooperation between the two states.

The Russia relation is one of the most visible priorities in both strategies. The emphasis on the regional cooperation is consistent throughout both strategies. Norway’s primary area of interest can be ascribed to the Barents Sea region. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 35) Bailes and Heininen see the focus on Russia as a continuation of the major shift in Norwegian foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the shift has led to closer cooperation between Kremlin and Oslo on the approach to governance in the Barents Arctic region. This has led to cooperation in fields like search and rescue, environment and even joint military exercises. (Pettersen, 2013) In 2010, the two sides signed a treaty resolving an outstanding border dispute and introducing measures to deal with potential conflicts on the resources in the Barents region. (Nilsen, 2010) Bailes and Heininen describe this as a remarkable success story in international politics. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 34)

Norway’s focus on the Barents region can be analyzed as regionalism, and while its primary objective(s) of securing its sovereignty and economic growth have been achieved partly by cooperation and integration with Russia, other arenas are of great importance as well. The Arctic Council, UNCLOS, the Ilulissat declaration, BEAC, the Northern Dimension and IMO are all regimes in which Norway seeks to exert its influence. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, pp. 37-38) Yet these institutions and regimes are primarily dealing with low politics. Geir Flikke(2011) argues that securitization of the Arctic started to build up speed in 2007, when Russia emerged as a state focusing on security in the Arctic. (Flikke, 2011, p. 66) As a consequence, Norway has increased its attention and investments in security. Despite its membership of NATO, Norway seems to be dedicated to handling the exertion of its sovereignty by itself. Military presence in Northern Norway is also stressed in the 2009 strategy, yet it does so while taking considerations towards Russia and it keeps referring to the importance of cooperation. (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 37)

5.3 Russia The Russian Arctic stretches nearly 7,000 kilometers from east to west, accounts for 58% of the total Arctic Coastline and encompasses six of the eight Arctic seas. (Parks, 2014) Yet only in recent history have the Arctic region and its seas attracted attention from policy areas besides national security in Russian politics. Traditionally, Russia’s lack of access to the open sea has been its primary weakness. The changing climate and the retreating ice cap have thus been welcomed in Moscow, as Russia will transform from being landlocked in the Eurasian heartland to becoming an Arctic Coastal state in the coming decades. (Antrim, 2011, p. 108)

The first Russian Arctic strategy was adopted in late 2008 and publicly released in March 2009. (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2009) Yet its foundation can be traced back to the Murmansk Initiative by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. His objective was to transform the Arctic from a region of conflict and militarization to an international zone of peace. This should be accomplished through the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone, restrictions on naval activities, increased transborder cooperation in areas such as resource development, research, protection of the indigenous peoples, environmental protection and marine transportation. (Åtland, 2008, p. 289) Åtland (2008) argues that a majority of the wide range of


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international and regional regimes in the Arctic stems, directly or indirectly, from the processes following the Murmansk Initiative. (Åtland, 2008, p. 305)

Returning to the current Russian Arctic strategy of 2008, it is evident that some of the objectives still exist. The strategy emphasizes the importance of developing and utilizing the resources available in the Arctic zone, specifically as a solution to the socio-economic issues of the country. This was not an objective in the Murmansk initiative, but this can be explained by the political reality of Russia today. During the reign of Putin, Russia has experienced an economic boom, primarily fuelled by the rich oil and gas fields in Northern Russia and foreign investments. The focus on preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation, protection of the environment and the development of the marine transportation are, however, consistent with objectives of Gorbachev’s initiative. (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2009) Military security is still of great importance in the Russian Arctic strategy. It states that its national security is linked to the military capabilities in the North. Katarzyna Zysk (2011) concludes that, “the Russian leadership will continue to communicate the message of reassurance about Russia’s willingness to abide by international law…(but) At the same time though, the nation will continue to signal its capability and readiness to protect its national interests with various means.” (Zysk, 2011, p. 106)

5.3.1 The Arctic interest of the Russian Federation The development of the Arctic region is an essential part of both the domestic and foreign policies of Russia. Climate change increases the accessibility to the Arctic Seas and controlling these have significant political and economic potential. This is essential in understanding Russia’s interest in developing the infrastructure of the region. This potential is inextricably linked with the Russian interests in fields like energy supply, fisheries, transportation and security. In relation to security, it is not only to be understood as national security. While it is an integral part of Russia’s Arctic strategy, security also entails priorities such as search and rescue in the Arctic, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing and environmental disasters.

The interest in energy can be explained through Russia’s dependency of exporting primarily gas, which has been a key component of the resurrection of Russia’s economy. Today Russia is widely regarded as an energy superpower. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 46) Antrim (2011) notes, that the resources of the Russian Arctic fund the domestic development and economic growth. (Antrim, 2011, p. 123) Arguably, the Arctic region and its valuable resources are considered key to develop the infrastructure and other socio-economic areas of the Russian Federation.

While the primary focus of the Russian strategy seems to be targeted at domestic policies, it also states that the Arctic region shall remain a zone of peace and cooperation. Russia’s ratification of UNCLOS in 1997 and its close bilateral cooperation with Norway indicates that Russia is willingly accepting and contributing to the development of institutional regimes in Arctic governance. The strategy also mentions the importance of the Arctic Council, BEAC and the EU partnership. However, contradictory to this is the rearmament of the Russian military, in February 2011 First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin announced that Russia would spend the equivalent of US$730 billion on advanced weaponry. (Åtland, 2011, p. 268) The rearmament greatly exceeds the plans of any other Arctic state. (Huebert, 2010, p. 18) Arild Moe (2014) argues that the rearmament is not an aggressive action; on the contrary, it is a response to the exposure of the Russian Arctic coastline caused by the retreating icecap. (Korsby, 2014)


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6.0 Comparison of interests Following the previous section’s exploration of the strategies, this section will seek to compare the interests of the three actors in order to explore which interests are consistent between the EU and the two cases. First, inspired by Bailes and Heininen’s (2012) table (see appendix 1), the interests have been classified into eight priorities in the table below. The human dimension area in Bailes and Heininen’s table will be considered to fall under the category, indigenous peoples and governance will be excluded, as it is considered to be the overall objective rather than an interest itself. Additionally, only rhetorical changes will be applied to the classification. After the short classification, the theoretical framework will be used to explain the why the actors hold an interest in each of the priority area. Further, if they do not have an interest in a specific area of the Arctic, the theory will be used to explain why this might not be the case.

Table 1. Interests highlighted in the Arctic strategies

Sov/Sec Econ/Trans Envir Res Ind Kno EU /(x) x/(x) x (x) x X Norway x/x x/x x x x X Russia x/x x/x x x x X Key to abbreviations:

Sov: Sovereignty Envir: Environment Sec: Security Res: Search and Rescue Econ: Economic development Ind: Indigenous peoples Trans: Transportation Kno: Knowledge and research x marks a clear interest, while (x) marks a vague interest or a mentioning in the Arctic strategy.

6.1 Reflections on theory In this section a discussion based upon the theoretical framework will be conducted. The eight areas of interests will be dealt with in six paragraphs, as sovereignty and security as well as economic development and transportation is considered adequately interrelated and can thus be discussed as one. This should result in an understanding of why the actors share interests in some areas, but not in others.

6.1.1 Sovereignty and Security The EU does not have any territorial claims in the Arctic, and this explains its lack of concern for sovereignty. Also, sovereignty concerns within the EU have primarily been left to the individual member states to deal with. Military force is traditionally not used as a tool for the EU to gain power and military operations led by the EU have been few and primarily been short, peacekeeping operations in the Balkans or in former colonies in Africa with no relation to sovereignty claims. (European Union External Action, 2014) The EU is sui generis as an institution and the stability and peace it has created in a region, in which states have waged war on each other for millenniums, is remarkable. On a theoretical basis this fits the predictions of the term soft power, which emphasizes that the ability to reach an objective through


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attraction is a more powerful tool than through coercion. Its soft powers are far more capable of achieving goals than its military power. Yet, because an armed conflict in the Arctic will have implications for the EU, it is interested in a stable Arctic, which is why the security is marked in brackets. The strategy emphasizes that security and stability should be obtained through UNCLOS. This emphasis on dealing with conflicts within an established international regime is a neoliberal notion. The Norwegian strategy stresses the exertion of sovereignty and security in the Barents region. The securitization increased when Russia started expanding its military capabilities in the Arctic. Yet while what seems to be an increasing militarization in Norway and Russia, both states continues to insist on the importance of their bilateral relationship. Arguable cooperation between the two states has increased significantly. Following neoliberalism, this indicates that military power is not the most important factor in Norway and Russia’s relationship. Further, the fact that the Norwegian and Russian societies have established closer ties despite the militarization is a testament to neoliberalism’s notion of complex interdependence.

To sum up, a military conflict between Arctic actors is not impossible, but unlikely which the strategies of Norway and Russia seem to emphasize. Yet, both states do not want to be unprepared for a conflict, but since the economic consequences will be massive and devastating, they are more inclined to increase cooperation. According to neoliberalism, soft power and the use of international regimes are attractive ways to establish peace and security in the Arctic. Despite neoliberal explanations on the exertion of sovereignty and the increased militarization in the Arctic, the theory of realism might be more suitable to explain Norway’s and Russia’s interest in security and sovereignty. However, if a conflict should arise in the Arctic, it seems more likely that it will be a spillover from a conflict between Arctic actors in other regions. Conclusively, the realist claim that the Arctic is experiencing a militarization is only half the truth, as the militarization does not seem to be aggressive. It should rather be seen as protection of the increasing the development of non-military activities in the region.

6.1.2 Economic Development and Transportation Economic development entails all industries in the Arctic, however, as natural resource industries have the largest importance and potential, these will be considered dominant. The EU is largely dependent on imported energy, especially Norway and Russia, which on the contrary are very dependent of the European market for export and investments. All three strategies state the economic potential of the Arctic as one of their main interests. The EU wants to secure a steady supply of energy from the Arctic, further it wants easy access for European corporations to the developing markets of the North. Economy is fundamental part of liberalism, therefore interests in economic development and transportation fits perfectly into the theoretical framework of neoliberalism. Adding to the applicability of neoliberalism is the fact that the EU is connected with other actors through multiple channels, and it insists on further developing the institutional framework of the Arctic.

Norway and Russia’s interests are similar. The Russian strategy states that the economic prosperity of the North shall contribute to lift the entire nation. Its economic growth is ascribed to its extraction and export of oil and gas from the Arctic and Russia is the actor who is most concerned with transportation; a new sea lane of communication across the Northeast Passage will have a great impact on the maritime industries in


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Russia, yet despite its inward-looking policies, the Russian strategy indicates that there is an understanding of the need for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in order to develop the economy of the Arctic region. Norway’s economic interests are primarily in hydrocarbons and fisheries, as its economy is largely dependent on its export, but tourism and the supply industries are also emphasized in its strategy. The three actors are all highly motivated by the economic potential of the Arctic, however, for different reasons. Russia wants to use the resources to improve the social conditions of its population, Norway wants to use its resources to sustain the same level of prosperity and the EU wants access to the resources, either through European companies or through import. The common denominator is institutions and trade agreements; Norway is a part of the European Economic Area (EEA), while bilateral agreements exist between Russia and the two other actors. (European Commission, 2013) The three actors engage in different institutions in order to fulfill their economic interests. This is a fundamental argument in neoliberalism and possibly one of the strongest arguments for the theory’s applicability. The three actors are highly interdependent, as they are important markets for each other. As neoliberalism predicts, the actors are interested in reducing uncertainty and they agree that interaction in international regimes can contribute to achieving this.

6.1.3 Environment At the core of EU’s foreign policy are concerns for the environment. It has been on the forefront of battling climate change, and is a self-declared leader in the field. (European Commission, 2008, p. 3) Consequently, the EU’s Arctic strategy is very attentive to the environmental implications in Arctic caused by climate changes. It insists on the importance of strengthening coordination and cooperation through bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as the importance of technology from European industries. According to neoliberalism, the EU is trying to exert its soft power. The EU does not use military or economic powers in its attempt to exert its influence on environmental questions, rather it relies on its good reputation and its knowledge on battling climate change. Therefore, the EU is likely to be regarded as a valuable partner in the environmental governance of the Arctic. Norway’s approach to environmental management is adding to this argument. The Norwegian strategy is aware that an environmental disaster can lead to conflict and proposes to reduce the risks through international cooperation, as the strategy argues that a disaster is not limited to state boundaries. According to neoliberalism, interdependence will lead to conflict, yet as states and actors have complementary interests, they are motivated to reduce the risk of conflict through cooperation. This is arguably the case in the environmental governance of the Arctic. Russia’s strategy indicates that conflicts should be avoided and in the field of environment, this is best achieved through cooperation. All three actors thus commit themselves to multilateral governance as the approach to minimize the impact on the environment caused by the increasing activity in the Arctic.

6.1.4 Search and Rescue The mentioning of search and rescue in the EU’s strategy is sparse, it did not appear in the 2008 publication and the attention to it in the 2012 communication is limited. Yet it mentions the importance of the discussions in the IMO and the AC as the primary forums for international cooperation in relation to search and rescue. Furthermore, it highlights the usefulness of its observation satellites. Yet admittedly, the EU


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does not have significant interest in search and rescue in the Arctic. Its contributions can be viewed as merely symbolic. Theoretically, this can be explained through the EU’s support for institutions such as the IMO and the Arctic council. Multilateral regimes are already in place in this area, thus reducing the incentive for the EU to get involved.

Norway and Russia have both signed the agreement on search and rescue, and they have significant bilateral cooperation on the matter. Being coastal states of the Arctic does increase their incentive to cooperate in search and rescue. Neoliberalism states that regimes enhance cooperation by facilitating linkages among issues within and between regimes. The Arctic Council’s linkage with the IMO in the establishment of the search and rescue agreement is a testament to this statement. To recapitulate, the EU does not hold significant interests in search and rescue, because international cooperation already exists within established regimes, while Norway and Russia holds interests in this area, because they are coastal states and because they are members of the institutions in which Arctic search and rescue cooperation are conducted.

6.1.5 Indigenous People The indigenous peoples of the Arctic have established several international organizations. These organizations play an important role in the Arctic Council, as witnessed in the rejection of the EU’s application for observer status. The EU’s interest in these indigenous populations is complex, on one hand they recognize the need of cooperation with them as a means to gain access to Arctic governance and other the hand, the EU notes the political and economic importance of Greenland. As mentioned in an earlier section, creating institutional links to Greenland is important to keep it in the European-orbit, if it should become entirely independent from the Kingdom of Denmark. Neoliberalism can be used to explain this interest. The EU relies on its soft powers to attract the indigenous population, confident that its concern for the environment, being an advocator of human rights and its development and regional policies will sway the indigenous peoples’ organizations in favor of the EU with time. Further, it seeks to establish complex interdependence through multiple channels (formal ties as well as informal ties) and by not using military force to gain influence.

Russia and Norway are more concerned with the indigenous people within its own borders. Yet both strategies emphasize the cultural band between indigenous groupings across borders as important for the Russian-Norwegian relationship and especially Norway considers its indigenous population a valuable resource. This adds to the argument that the indigenous peoples of the Arctic have been important for the establishment of complex interdependence. They contribute by interacting across borders with other societies and actors in the Arctic, thus establishing multiple channels. They possess knowledge and information about the environment that makes them important partners in Arctic governance. Since they do not possess any significant economic or military powers, they rely on their soft powers to attract nation-state actors-

6.1.6 Knowledge and Research In EU’s 2012 communication, knowledge is highlighted as one of the key priorities. It states that EU’s funding of research and development in the Arctic is a statement to its involvement and responsible approach to the region. (European Commission, 2012a, p. 8) Once again the EU emphasizes the importance of international cooperation in order to develop knowledge and conduct the necessary research to combat the challenges facing the Arctic region. This is arguable another interest which fits into the theory of


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neoliberalism as knowledge and research fits the classifications of being soft power and because they create links between the actors in the Arctic.

The Norwegian and Russian strategies also mention scientific research. Norway’s strategy indicates a more complex relationship to knowledge and research, it underlines the need for research in areas such marine, climate, hydrocarbons, education and a general strengthening of the knowledge infrastructure of the High North. To do so, it acknowledges the need for international cooperation in order to build competences. Russia seems to have two priorities in relation to knowledge and research. The first is related to UNCLOS, Russia has invested heavily in research in the Arctic in order to document its territorial claims, and the other is the importance of international cooperation in scientific research. (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2009) Russia’s use of research to back up its territorial claims should not be seen as way to exert its sovereignty in region, which is what realism would claim. Rather it should be considered as a measure to improve its economic potential and Russia’s acceptance of the UNCLOS ultimately deciding the territorial claims is definitely a strong argument for applying neoliberalism to the Arctic region.

7.0 Conclusion The three Arctic strategies studied in this thesis reveal a set of basic interests for Arctic involvement. Most importantly seem to be the economic potential in the region and its possible impact on the world political economy. The actors’ emphasis on international cooperation in this field seems logical; they agree that the most efficient way of fulfilling the economic potential is by continuing to develop a liberal market, in which investments and development can be conducted without economic restrictions. The importance of cooperation is fundamental in the theory of neoliberalism and its explanation of the three actors’ interest in economic development is arguable the strongest claim to the applicability of neoliberalism when analyzing Arctic interests. Adding to this is the increased cooperation in many other policy areas. Neoliberalism seem to offer an extensive and reasonable explanation for the EU’s approach to Arctic governance; that its access to Arctic governance can best be achieved through the institutional regimes in the Arctic and its insistence on cooperation and investments in policy areas such as scientific research and climate change are key to achieving this.

The applicability of neoliberalism in relation to EU’s Arctic involvement has not been surprising, however, it being suitable to explain the majority of the two other cases’ interests was not expected. Most Russian policies have a domestic focus and the Russian strategy’s emphasis on using the Arctic resources to improve the socio-economic situation of the state is a testament to this, yet its close bilateral cooperation with Norway, its acceptance of the UNCLOS and its involvement in establishing regimes in the Arctic do fit into neoliberalism and the same is the case with Norway, however, this is less surprising. Norway and Russia’s attention towards military security seem to fit more into the theory of realism, yet as argued previously, the militarization does not seem to be aggressive, but rather a response to change in the region’s importance as a consequence of the climate change. Furthermore, it is importance to note that neoliberalism does not reject the importance of military power, but rather reducing it. Neoliberalism attention to the power of information explains Russia interest in research as a tool to justify its territorial claims, while Norway and the EU are seemingly more interested in accumulating knowledge in order to protect the Arctic environment. The insistence on cooperation in most areas of the Arctic governance illustrates the actors approach to the region. They do not possess zero-sum mentality, rather the actors are


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interested in absolute gain. Traditional state-centric hard power can therefore not be perceived to be dominant in the region, instead regional cooperation and soft powers seem to play a large role in the governance of the Arctic.

Conclusively, this thesis will argue that the EU is interested in becoming a larger actor in the Arctic, because of its increasing significance in world politics. The region contains a substantial amount of resources, which will be of great importance for the European countries. Furthermore, EU is concerned with the environmental impact the extraction of these resources is likely cause. Not surprisingly, the environmental concern is shared by Norway and Russia, being littoral states an environmental disaster will affect them the most. In relation to governance, especially Russia does not seem to embrace increased EU involvement in the Arctic. Russia seems to prefer Arctic governance being managed by the five littoral states as the Ilulissat declaration indicated, nevertheless Russia dependency on export to the European Union might lead to ease the Russian resistance. Despite several rejections from the Arctic Council, the EU seems inclined to pursue its approach with emphasis on institutions and cooperation.

This thesis has contributed to an understanding of the three actors’ interests in the Arctic and the application of neoliberalism has revealed the importance of international regimes and cooperation in the Arctic region. The omission of the importance of cooperation in Bailes and Heininen (2012) was an inspiration for this thesis, yet the results presented here should be seen as complementary rather than contradictive to the conclusion in Bailes and Heininen’s analysis. This perception follows the argument in their conclusion; no single international relations theory can thoroughly explain the contents of the strategies of Arctic actors. (Bailes & Heininen, 2012, p. 113) Consequently, this thesis would like to call for further research on these strategies. This thesis has only analyzed three strategies in the light of neoliberalism, applying the structure of this thesis to other strategies would make a generalization possible. Furthermore, the environmental concerns and interests in soft powers are significant in the region, which the theory of social constructivism might be able to elaborate on and contribute with other perspectives than those presented in this thesis.


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8.0 List of abbreviations AC – Arctic Council

BEAC – Barents Euro-Arctic Council

IMO – International Maritime Organization

UNCLOS – The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

EP – European Parliament

EEA – European Economic Area


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Appendix 1 (Source: Bailes & Heininen 2012: 22)

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