eto, the field artillery observation battalionreakt . on . study . of . the bdld . lrtlllery...

REaKT

ON

STUDY OF THE BDLD LRTLLLERY OBSERTLTION BATTLLIOIi

KISSION: ZTepare Repwt and Recoimendations on t h e Employment

F ie ld A r t i l l e r y Obserwt ion Bat ta l ion. -?

The General Board was establ ished by General Orders 128, Headquarters Earapean Theater of Operations, US Griiy, date6 17 June 1945,a3 amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 A u g u s t 1945,ar.d General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945,Eeadqmrters M i t e d S t a t e s Forcas, European Theater, t o prepare a f a c t u a l analysis of t h e s t r a t egy , t a c t i c s , and administration employed by t h e United S ta t e s forces m t h e European Theater.

Study Number 62

THE GENERAL BOARD UNITED STATES FORCES 9 EURO€EAN THEATE3

APO 408

mepared byr

Brig Ge.n J , D. Balmer--------Chief , A r t i l l e r y Section

Col L. JI' Compton------------Executive, f z t i l l e r y Section

Lt Col JI G, Harding---------lsltillery Section

Prj l lc ipal Consultantsi

Col E, T I OwenI 015488, L r t i l l e r y Sect ion, The General Board European Theater of Operations.

Lt Col C, A, L. Dickey, 0308702, 8 t h F i s l d f z t i l l e r y Observation Battalion,

L t Col R. P, Gregory, 0294998, 13th Field lxtillely ObservEtion Battalion.

Lt Col GI E, Tucker, (Ser ia l Number Unknown), 1 4 t h F i e ld fst i l lery Observation Battalion

Lt Go1 E. A , Deily, Kl00028, 17th Field Arti l lery Observation Battalion,

Lt Go1 Am F, Freund, 016125, 283th F i e l d i s t i l l e ry Observation Battalion,

Lt Col HI E. Kuhlman, 0296959, 286th F i e l d Lrtillery Observation Bat t a lion,

Lt 001 L. Spinks, 0228785, 29lst F i e l d Ar t i l l e ry Observation Battalion,

T B L E QF CD7ENl"T

SUBJECT PfGE

Chapter 1: F i e l d I i r t i l l e ry Observation Battalions in Combat. . . 1

Section $ - Introduction. + .; *.. *. . + 4 1

Section 2 - Employment.. , -. m * .. I I * I b . I 2

Section 3 Sound w g i n g e 4 . D I ~ * e * . b Q I 4 4 .. b 4 e

Section 4 - Illash Ranging.. . . . . I . .. . I , . . .. Seotion 5 - S W V ~ Y . , . + +. 4 I . b + I .. . 0 . . 0 - *

Section 6 6 Meteorological service, . . @ . @ . . I * . . . Section 7 - Communications.. + I . .. ., * 0 4 4 .. . +

Section 8 - Radar , , . . , . , . , , , + . . . @ . . . . . . , . . . e

Section 9 - Suitability of Organization.. . e . . e . . 4 0 b

Chapter 2: Conclusions and Recommsndations., . . . . - . . . . Section 1 - Conclusions. . .. . . D e D e -.. . . .m Section 2 - R e c o m n d a t i o n s . ... . . 1 + 0 0 8 0 a . 9

B i ~ l i o g r a p h y , , . a ~ . . r 4 ~ . ~ . . + ~ ~ 4 ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ = . . ~ . w * ~

4

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

17

19

1. P”?. The purpose of t h i s s t u & i s t o prepart , a repor t covering:

a. The cmployment of t he f i e l d a r t i l l e r y o b s e r v e t i o n bot. t a l i o n s in combat i n t h e Ewepeen Theater of Operations.

b. Recomnendations f o r cha@,es i n organiza t ion and e q u i p m n t based on combat experience.

2 . Organization. The f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observation b a t t a l i o n i s an outgrowth of t he f i r s t a t t e x p t s a t l o c a t i n g a r t i l l e r y by sound and f l a s h ranging during Borlcl ‘;far I. quarters and headqwrters ba t te ry an2 two obscrvatiorA batteries. b a t t e r i d s of the. b a t t a l i o n have tha fol lowing spec ia l s e c t i o n s :

Thd b a t t a l i o n c o n s i s t s of a head- Tho

a. Hecdhuartsrs Eattere.

(1) One meteorological s;ction.

( 2 ) One topozraphical platoon cons is t ing of a survey headquarters and four survay sections.

b. Observation Battery.

(1) One sounc. ranging platoon cons is t ing of one opero t ions s e c t i o n , sound r a n g i n g , anu tiro survey sections.

One f l a s h rahging platoon cons is t ing of one opera t ions section, flash ranCinL, and two s u r v e y s e c t i o n s .

(’2)

3. Missions. The missions of t h e f i e l d a - t i l l e r y o b s o r v a t i o n b a t - t a l i o n s are:

a . Location of enemy a r t i l l e r y .

b.

c. Col lect ion of information.

d . Coordination of survey,

e . Coxpsrative c a l i b r a t i o n of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y ,

f .

Regis t ra t ion and adjustniont of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y .

1-ovidipg t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y meteorological messace.

4. LssiRnmnt. One f i e l d e r t i l l i r y observation b a t t a l i o n i s assigned t o eech corps. t a r s and heedquarters b e t t e r p coa,pri.se the only organic p a r t s of the corps artillery, In the 3uropeAh Theater of Operations t h e r e was one

Th i s b a t t a l i o n and tha corps a r t i l l s q haadquer-

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addi t iona l b a t t a l i o n f o r each arlq'.

SECTIODi 2

EM?LOylolEhT

5. General. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y observat ion b i t t a l i o n s were employed throwhout the combet period i n t h e Europesn Theater of Operat ions. They were s u c c e s s f d i n accomplishing t h e i r ver ious missions. counterbattar; f i r e s , besad t o a grea t e x t e n t on tha serv ice f c rn ished by thesa b a t t a l i o n s , force6 the German a r t i l l e r y t o adopt a p o l i c y of freque1,t displacement. L l 2 1 ' 2 3 .

The

'6 . rkvai labi l i ty , F i e l d a r t i l l e r y observct ion b a t t a l i o n s u s u a l l y a r r ived i n thd European Theater of Operations a t thr. same tim a s t h e Coris with which they were t o operate, among the orgonic corps ba t ta l ions . The n r q y b a t t a l i o n s did n o t begin t o a r I i v e un t i l September 194k. 11 241

There icas nevm a shor tage

7. Coverage. Corps f r o n t s 'were f requent ly between 3O,OOO and

The f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observF,tion b a t t a l i o n s 40,000 yards i n width. Irre8ular f r o n t l i n e s f u r t h e r conplicoted t h e problem of observat ion. were not ab le t o , ive complete observat ion coveragb on t h a long, ir- regular corps f r o n t s . L f t o r the arm b a t t a l i o n s became a v a i l a b l e , obse rva t ior b a t t e r i a s were a t tached t o t h e corps nhich hed the most d i f - f i c u l t observat ion problems. This re l ieved the s i t u a t i o n to sorm ex- t e n t ; however, t h e r e were only two observat ion b a t t e r i e s a v a i l a b l e ir. each arqy and t h e r e were usua l ly three or mwe c o r p . 1*1B~19*2a-

8. Types of Employment.

a, L=ijm.& nf a Bearh. In t h e a s s a u l t on the Normandy Beach

A r t i l l e r y opposition t o t h e ad-

The 1 3 t h and 17th F i e l d L r t i l l e r y

the coas ta l defense guns and the a r t i l l e r y of t h e s t a t i c c o a s t a l defense divis ions were quickly overrun. vanae was l i g h t . u n t i l contact via5 m d e with the German d i v i s i o n s t h a t were sent t o conta in the beachhead. Observation Bat ta l ions a r r i v e d on Utah and Omha beechheads on 6 June 1944. The survey and meteorological s e c t i o n s were i m e d i a t a l y 8aployed i n providing survey and nateoroloLica1 d e t a f o r t h i cont ro l and cor- r s c t i d n 4f i n t e r d i c t i o n f i r e s . Sound and f l a s h rar,ging aec t ions were i n ac t ion O n 9 June 19114, bu t were of very littla value as i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies u n t i l contact with the German conta ic ing force was es tab l i shed , . l*

b. Support of %Beechhead. The German a r t i l l e r y r e a c t i o n t o the Normndy Beachhead vias v io len t . On t h e V Corps and X I X Corps f r o n t s there wa8 a period of s t a b i l i z e d warfare . Corps f r o n t s there was a p e r i o d of slor-, advence and t h e reduct ion of a f o r t r e s s . Under each of these condi t ions t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y cjbserva- t ion ba t ta l ions were succossful i n accot~pl i sh ing t h s i r missions. Gom- p l s tu and a c c w a t e survey cont ro l vias e s t a b l i s h e d throughout t h e area. Ideteorological inessabes were de l ivered on schedule. Sound r a n g i n g was ef fec t ive i n l o c a t i n g t h s Germn a r t i l l e r y and in ad jus t ing c o u n t e r - ba t te ry f i r e . F l a s h ranging 'i/as only moderately successful as an in- t e l l i g m c e agency. T e r r e s t r i a l observat ion was hampered by t h e Lack O f conmanding t e r r a i n , the n a t u r a l covm af forded the enemy, and poor a t m s p h e r i c condi t ions.

On the V I 1 Corps and VXIX

C . P i r s u i t . In t h e Eurogean Theater of Operations t h e Y i e l d a r t i l l e r y observation b a t t a l i o n s s e r e of l i t t l e valuz during t h e pur- s u i t of tho German a r w across France and l a t e r across Germany. Lt- t a c b n t of tho individual observation b a t t e r i e s t o the i n f a n t r y div- i s ions which they could be r e a a i l y deployad when contact r i t h the main enew

during t h e pursui t kspt t h a a well forlwmd i n p o s i t i o n s from

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force mas =de. the d iv is iona l a r t i l l c r y was t h s main source of value d u r i n g t h e s e periods. Meteorological s e c t i o n s functioned d u r i n g t h e p u r s u i t but the value of the d a t a was doubtful because of tho d i s t a n c e s b e t w e n tho meteorological s t a t i o n s and the gun pos i t ions .

gains i n the a t t a c k charac te r ized the opera t ions a g a i n s t t he SiagfrLod Line. survey cont ro l of t h e combat a r e a . Sound ranging o p e r a t e d e f f i c i a n t l y in l o c a t i n g the Germn a r t i l l e r y and i n a d j u s t i n 2 countcrba t tGrY f i r e . V i s i b i l i t y f o r f l a s h rat,ging m a poor because of ext€nSiVQ p d r i o s s Of heavy f o g , r a i n , and snov, throughout the perioZ and was p a r t i c u l a r l y va iuablc einccl o b s e r v r t i o n of fire ivas r e s t r i c t & by the poor v i s i b i l i t y .

The survey ass i s tanca t h a t they were able t o f u r n i s h

p19p20'

d . S t a b i l i z e d Warfare. S tab i l ized n z r f a r e nr.d l i m i t e d

The f i e l d artillery observntion b a t t a l i o n s f u r n i s h e d COmplota

The ze tcaro logicn i s e r v i c e func t iondd

e. Ret rea t . observation b a t t a l i o n s operating i n a r e t r e a t . poplitions .;Tell in r e a r of the f r o n t l i n e p o s i t i o n s had praviouzly been se lec ted and swvsyed. r e a r of a noturol b a r r i e r and the r a p d i t y of thi? G e m n ndvoncd caused i t t o be nbanconed before it vre.s occupied, t e r n a t a bese hrd b e m s e l e c t 4 i n r e a r of a riv2r b n r r i z r and funct ioned e f f i c i e n t l y i n a s s i s t i n g to h a l t the Garmn advance. i y 9t 210

There w r c only t r o exs.mples of f i a l d a r t i l i a r y In b o t h c a s s s a l t a r t i a t a

In on2 cas2 the e l t a r n o t o p o s i t i o n K:'Rs no t in

In t h e sdcond cazd t h e a l -

9. T a c t i c a l Control.

a . Centrnl ized Control, Tie most connnon type Of t a c t i c a l con- t r o l of the obsarvat ion b s t w r i a s was c e n t r a l c o n t r o l w i t h i n tha b a t - t a l i o n . This had d i s t i n c t advantages. Eniniy be. t tery and i n t a i l i g e ~ c o data for t h s mtire corps zone i.7eerc evaluated end p l o t t e d a t one haod- quarters . Bat tery c o m n d e r s i 7 3 r ~ not concerned w i t h e v o l u s t i c n an5 had greater freedom t o supervise t he i r n ide ly s e p a r a t e d i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Confirmation of l o c a t i o n s by photo i n t e l l i g e n c e , shelling r z p s r t s , and a i r OP's wes more accura te ';)hen tnndlod between the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observation b a t t a l i o n opera t ions section anc t h e corps n r t i l l e r y c o m t m b a t t e r y secsion than when t ransmi t te6 through o ther channels . I n goiieral cen t ra l izod cont ro l .:as relaxed t o allo;, sound a114 flash ranging o f f i c e r s t o c a l l fhz neGrept d i v i i i o n a l a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n d i - r e c t i n ordsr t o a t t a c k t a r g e t s of 02 o r t u i t y . Latsrzl l inoa n o r e l a i d f o r t h i s gurposs . 5 , l 7 * la* y91 2 0 *

b. Field f r t i l l e q Group Control. In thoss c n s e ~ nhhero the comunicnt ions p o b l e m OI? exten6ed corps f r o n t s m d c c e n t r a l i z e d con- t r o l impract ical , e i t h e r one 3r both of t h e o b s a r v a t i o n b e t t a z i e s ';:era at tached t o f i e l d a r t i L l e r y groups. 'Jsually c o u n t w b n t t h r y intul- l izoncc psrsomel and f i e l d a r t i l l e r y obscrvet ion b a t t o i i o n s t a f f nnd $urvGy persome1 were a t tached t o t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y g roup a t thi: SEWE time t o provide o. countcrbat tery in te l l igenca and surv3y i n f o r m t i o n centcr . The exact composition of t h e a t tached secC,ions vas n o t s tandard izod ond var iad in each s i t u a t i o n . Complete records mero m i n t a i n a d a t the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y group, and the advanta6es oi" c e n t r z l i a e d c o n t r o l were exploi ted t o tha ex ten t permit ted by tila c o m u n i c a t i o n s n u t . The g r e a t e s t disadvantage of t h i s m t h o d o f , c o n t r o l wag t h a t r c p i d cross chckin , of sound ranging l o c a t i o n s with t h e c o r p s a r t i l l e r y phota in- te l l igence sec t ion Tias not ali inys p o s s i b l e , 20*

c. C e c m t r a l i z e d ,r Divis iona l Cont ro l . This m t h o d of con- t r o l WOS employad t o ~ C C D the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y obsarvation batCJr io3 vie11 foraard t u r i c g a r a p i d a?vanc6. It operased s m o t h l y in t h e early s tages of deploymnt. Honevor, excapt i n those ceads i n .;JhJhich i t :?as augmented by a counterba t te ry nection and a f i e l d artillery observat ion b a t t a l i o n l i a i s o n s o c t i o n , the d iv is ion a r t i l l e r y d i d n o t he.ve t h e per-

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sonnel o r f a c i l i t i e s f o r keeping t h e records and cross-checking with other i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies . 18119920.

d. Divisional Detachmnts . An improvised d i v i s i o n a l sound and f l a s h r a i g i n g detachment was used dur ing the t r a i n i n g per iod t o demonstrate t h e nethod of l o c a t i n g and a d j u s t i n g o r t i l l e r y f i r e on e n e w a r t i l l e r y involved i n a delaying a c t i o n . This de tnchmnt mns not s a l f - s u s t a i n i n g Eind w8s inccpable of extonded c.ation. The d i v i - sioiiol sound and f l n s h ranging de tcchmnt ns u t i l i z e d during t h e - trr.inin6: per iod vas not used i n t h e Europe::n Thontsr of Operations. A solf-sustr:iiling wit, thouzh not r.lvrcys a complete b c t t a r y , mas in- vcr inbly scrt on any mission. 18,19,20.

10. Combed Fai lures . Thc f a i l u r e s of individucl s i z t i o n s of the f i e l d c r t i l l e r y observat ion b a t t a l i o n s i n combat i n t h e Europenn Thie.ter t h o t c r o a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t r c i n i n g def i c i m c i e s are discussed w d e r the ind iv idunl subject headings.

a. Sound Bases. A l m o s t a l l of the f i s l d c r t i l l e r y observc- t i o n b a t t a l i o n s t h c t snr: ex tens ive a c t i o n i n the Europem Theater in- s t a l l a d sound ranging bcsss n h i c h d id n o t ob tc in locct ions. This -:ma cqionsive i n r7irc 2nd e f f o r t . Experionce i n coinbct t a l g h t t h e bat- t c l i o n commndars t o m.ka slo:-;cr nnd more cccurcte es t imates of t h e Cormn o r t i l l m y c a p c b i l i t i e s . l v 1 9 e

,be guElreya. , , su r~?y c o n t r o l far the c r t i l l e r y was, hand1.edL i n a s u p a i o r mi:ner. Homvsr , t h e r c WQLS i s o l n t e d oxmplas of f i e l d nr - t i l l o r y obsorvc t ion b c t t z l i o n s f:.iling t o rake t h e b e s t use of t h e ex- i s t i n g t r igonometr ic dnto ni;d r u m i n g unchecked surveys f o r too g r o a t a distance. 1920.

e , Relations.- w. T ~ P va&e of . the Llhsion.5 ac- compliohoh by t h e f i d d a r t i l l e ry-obs3rvr . t i o n b a t t a l i o n s in combct vas c o t understood by nlnny n r t i l l e r y u n i t s mid s t c f f s . A t r u e npprecio- t i o n of t h o vnluo of somd ranging looc t iona , 2s cn exnmplu, m s nocesrwy. A r t i l l e r y s t c f f s which m c a p t e d the locc t ions without ref- orwicu t o tho accurccy c.-sigr.cd by t h e obscrvntion b,-,tt?.lion and f i r e d counterba t te ry were f r o q u a t l y a s s t i n g m u d t i o n . 011 the o t h e r ex- tram mre t h e s t a f f s which acs ted o p p r t u x i t i e s by f n i l i c g t o arpre- c i a t e tho methcds of dscrensil;g the e r rors nnd obtnining e f f a c t i v e co:ii;tmhr?ttory f i r e . sound ranging f i l m could bo road m d p l o t t e d i n thrce minutes a h i l e complox f i l m t h a t showd the t r c c e s of nirlny guns c,nC s h e l l s Could i 'rcquently not be untnngled t o l o c e t s a p n r t i c u l m gun in less t h a n tm hours. mny i n d i v i d m l o f f i c e r s f a i l e d t o r e n l i z e t h a t a locf l t iol i two hours l e t o WRS still vs lucbla i n t e l l i & m c e . 8,9,18-

i a o t h s r excmple arose from tho f a c t t h a t a s imple

SECTIOtJ 9

SOUND W G D G

11. Sound Ranginq Locations, tormining how m;iy Gerwn b c t t e r i a s T i e r C a c t u a l l y 10CC.tQd by sound rai?ging. f d r c n t aloaning i n vcr ious units. i n E nveraged 750 locnt ions p m b a t t a l i o n per m n t h on the c x t i v s f r o n t s . k large p s r c a ~ t c g e 3f thes; were racognized nnd r e p o r t e d as sc l f ->ropel led guns whoso locc,tions were t r a n s i e n t . From E s tudy of t he c o n f i r m t i o n s of sound ranging p l o t s by photo h t e i l i g e n c e , a i r O h , f l n s h rniiging, s h e l l i n g r e p o r t s , and pr isoner of pim r o p o r t s , it V i O U l d appear tL?t sound ranging n c t m l l y locRtod t h e m j o r i t y of t h e Germn bnt tory p o s i t i o n s and t h a t t h e actuc.1 accurnc ias of tho l o c a t i o n s nerw

Thoro i s no occurote method for de-

The tern1 "sound rc,nging loca t ion" \;ms used with e n t i r e l y d i f - Under s t a t i c condi t ions sound rang-

mas minted ch the apparent SOUTCI: of t h e sound t o obtain the estiimteu a z i m t h . 2 Q

C * BRloYmrlt of bases. Because of the wide corps f r o i t s t h e observat ion ba t ta l ions hnd to e~ploy rdre then one baso wr br . t te ry f o r l a r g e portionS,.'Of the tino. X t l u n t h e bat tsry ' t h e r ; o s t . c m n i n s t a l l a t i o n was thc t of two bnsds crosssd ct aFproximtely 30 degrecs ~

operatad on " x t e ."d recording s e t s but ushg only one record ing and p l o t t i n g crew. A variat ion of t h i s wcs the use o f crossed fou r &and f i v e nicrophone baszs employing a c a m n microph0r.c ond one recording set* Hinged bases q p l y i n g both the nbove pr inciplos nerv c l s o cormon. N o r a l l y - , three outposts were ez.ployed in the o p r c t i o n or' t h e cbovc 'bba598. Bat ta l ions orgr.nized under the lcrger T/O 6 - 7 3 , 1 A p r i l 1942, opere.ted two independent bases per h t t c r y f o r periods CIS g r m t cs oce m n t h . f e c t i v d l y by employing a detochi2ent mde up f r o 3 the ba t tn l ioo cs a whole. t m t i c n l s i t u e t i o n was s table . 1vf8119.

Twee independent bnses per bat ta l ion xere o p r c t e d cf-

Theso specie1 types of de loyiiect were only possible where the

d. Counterbctters Technique. The confidence t h c t t h e corps n r t i l l o r y counterbattery sect ion plcc,;d i n sow-d r tngiag inf1uenc.d t h e r.ethod of a t tack ing sound ranging locat ions. Yhile the d e p e e t o vhich onch corps enployed ench cathod v<aried, t h e mthods themelves vere qui te standard.

b P Dsta Corrected. In those c?.ses .(;here n sound ranging location w s comidered os accurc te ar i7here it ' ~ 8 confirma by a photo in td l l igcoce l o c c t i o n , couiterbzttery W E S f i r e d oc ccrracted i x p d - t c , vei l lance by sound ranging of the e f f e c t of t h e firs W s fraquently obtoincd,

- Sound RrmRing Rcais t ra t ion. In those CCSBS ahere sound ranging looctions ;7ers not suff i c i c n t l y ac- o u r a t e f o r the f i r i n g of %-,p dcte cor rec ted , e sound ranging r e g i s t r r t i o n was usw.lly conducted a t SOB distence f r c n the locat ion. The souhd ranging arrors of location of thG r e g i s t r c t i o n end thr: t n r g e t Bere considered to bc the sene and c d i r e c t s!i if t w.1 :;-.de between the t i 7 0 locations. This mthod p e r x i t t z d t h e mssing of a r t i l l e r y f i r e on the t a r g e t a i t h o u t .:ern-

Sur-

ing . --- Sound on Sound Adjustrant. tnrgots was the xost ccclu'nte but lncks t h e e l e - a n t of surpr ise . n t ~l t i m 0 s necr the tagst cs the dzta p e r n i t t c d . The p o s i t i o n of ccch set 3f b u r s t s wns plo t ted by sound ranging and the def lzct ion and r-ng- cor rec ted before the next f i r i n g . This rjns c m t i n u s d u n t i l the p t t e r n of i n i t i z l b r a k s of thc shells End t h e target "ere idcnticP.1. lacked t h e ~ L e o s n t of s m p i s e but 1r.d the sdvantage of grea te r occurncy,

Coordination v i t h Air OPS-. a r t i l l c r y c i r OPs f i r i n g whenever v i s i b i l i t y perni t tea . If they iden- t i f i e d the ta rge t thcy frequently t J o k Over t h e nis- s i o n on orders of the corps Rrtillery ccur t s rb .? t t s ry of f icer . 1 1 4 t.5 17 118,20,22*

This re thod of a t t a c k i n g

h i ' t i l i e r y shol l s iiere f i r e d one o r two

This nLtb3d ' X I S S l O - 2nd

In rll the nbove ~1sth3ds executed surveillr.Ilce s f t h e

e . Posi t igns of Szund RanPinq Boses. 'Where c m d i t i m s were

- 6 -

fs,vorable, t he observstion b c t t a l i s n cmrmnders kept t h j i r bases moll forncrd. S x n d oUtp@sts f requent ly l i vcd with the forward alew3nts 3f t h e in fnn t ry nnd d id nJ t wpear t3 ba less e f f i c i e n t beccuse of t he si,nll ?rm f i re . Several bnses vere put in and owretad where ind iv i - dual nicrt-~pliones wore between the f r iendly f r a n t l i n e and the e n e m

.. .

17. EsuiD.Mnt Eofioiencies. I d observation b c t t a l i x i cm- r m d u r s woru extrmldy pleased E t tho mnner i n which the sound rmg- hi: e q u i p e n t f w c t i m e d i n c0nbnt i n the Europocn Thectcr. Bccause

- 7 -

of the spec ia l ized n3tu-e of t h e equipmht -11 h-.d d i f f i c u l t y i n &- tin& eorz expendable Supplies and ninor rsplacerxnt p-r ts , but t h i s c m d i t i o n improved 0s c3nbr.t proeressed, They expressdd t h e o p i n i m thc t c l i g h t e r , &;ht channel, dry r o c x d e r and c l i c h t e r p lo t t jng bJax?d, bemd cm the PeSant sound Ranging Plotting Bomd, ML, could cnd should be developed. I r dcf in i ta need existod f3r a l k h t durcble p l o t t i n g sur face l o r use with irregul;?r bases. 14,18,19,20,21.

18. F l n s h Ranainq Locntions. Flcah ranging m s only ab?ut w e tenth as successfu l as sound ranging i n l o c a t b e Geran artillery, Throughout t h e CC.i,pai;;nS i n tho Eurcpeon Thecter f l - s h rnnging observers sporntLd c d e r e h a r s e t e r rc in and neather c x d i t i 2 E s . Of an average 3f 70 c r t i l l z r y locat ions pcr b n t t n l i m par m n t h ?f s t c t i c conbat e,ln;st a l l wore believed t o b~ self-pmpelled cum. Operctini ngcinst r x k e t s of the nebelvrerfer type, flr.sh r:.nrlnc wcs axt rsne ly scccossfu l , nnd f a i r resu l t s -$ere o b t c i n s t ::.?.inst t c r s a t s ?f op- portuni ty . The value of the vas t ?.munt sf intel l igcnce dctc , includ; i n c ind iv idua l sin@ f lcsh r n y s nnd nezative irfork-.tion, ccnnA be estii:r.ted. Rezis t rc t ion of c . r t i l l c r y was 3f Croat vclue t , u t c x l d have h e n p e r f x n e d by tha f i r i n c bnttzliocs. 15,7118,19,20*

19 . R e r i s t r a t i ; n @ Cslibrcti:n, Rec is t ro t i sn and c l l i b r c t i m of a r t i l l e r y vas a aecmdcry rdssion of the f i e l d r r t i l l m y o b s e r v c t i m ba t ta l ions . Early in c:xib,bot i n the E u r o p e n Thentor it wns bund t h a t the f l a s h rPaIGlnG sections were devotin- t o 3 larGe a p o r t i m tin.? t o reGis t rc t ion and t h a t the Genernl intel l iaence n iss ion wzs being s l i s h t e d . The p n e r c l policy was estnblished ih:.t a r t i l l e r y Zroups nust p l a n and stai'f the i r imn l c t e r a l OH: for rag is t ro t ions but that they could still c c l l on the observation ba t ta l ions i n nn ewerzency. In order t o assist the a r t i l l e r y p x p s jo in t oocupt ion of observn- t i o n b n t t a l i m OB ' end r e s t r i c t e d use 3f the n i r e net wcs nuthmized. Even with these r e s t r i c t i s n s t h e nmbr of spec ia l raqumts for re- p s t r c t i o n s of divisia, corps end arw artillery m s enormus. 1 ~ 1 4

their

92.0.

20. Methods and Techniaue.

8 , Qpe Flash RanRinR Bases Encloyed, The 1 m g f l m b ranging base usinG four 3r f i v e observation posts separated by at least 2000 y a r d s was the s t n n d a r d t y p of deplayzsnt, This type base wes highly favored because :f the bst tor angles of in te rsec t ion abtnined when p lo t t ine , t h e f leshes froc; G3-n a r t i l l e r y 01' B high b u r s t re- . i s t m t i o n . Shere te r re in c s r r i d o r s l h d t o d t h e obsarvction xf a p r v . &.Qdaf area t 2 two observatisn posts , short base f l a s h ran ing p l o t - t ing nothods were useL i n r e l a t i o n tc these twa posts. 7,l8,19,20*

b. Orientctizn. Survey cmtr-1 rrns nlways cnrr ied t o t h e ob- ServRtion posts. Of 93s i t ion it FIRS necjssary f o r t h e f l a s h ranzinz sbservntion peer- ssimel t 3 mp spat t h e i r p3s i t i sn end es tcb l i sh t h e i r 3wn azimuth. Tha a b i l i t y tc. abservi: :a~ cjnpute E sun neir;.uth W:IS of p e n t volue in obtcining or iontct ion, 7,18120.

Hawever, i n 3rder t 2 2btnin rcp id i ty i n occupc.+ion

c, Odjustnent of Fire, The f l a s h rcncin; obserpaf im p x t s were f requent ly cc l le t on t s adjust S i re on tnrcets of opp;rtunity. Where mrc than one observation pJs t csuld observe the ta rge t , bi- l a t a r a l a d j u s t m n t wcs favcred. tho cas;s where the ta rgs t was vis ib le ts only one o b s e r v a r , 7 ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ @ *

Fsmnrd observer neth2ds mer$ used i n

- 8 -

(1 ) Binooular vision.

(2)

( 3 ; (4) hbisturs proof.

6) (6) Horizontrl ard va r t i co l so-16s thct a r e ensy to rznd.

( 7 )

(8) Stablo tr ipod. 14,18,19p20f22'

so lec t ivc , e ight or twenty ,wcr Ions.

Light proof scale 2nd reticle i l l m n a t i o n .

Lightar neight ar.d a m l l i T bulk.

Posit ive hor izof i tc l cnd vor t ico l ralonsc mobonism.

- 9 -

b* Flash Sv4tchboerd. The Flnsh Fhnging S;iitchboarCl BD 70 vas u n s a t i s f c c t o r y ' i n combat in the ~m~~~ Thcatur of Operntions bcccusc i t 17as not moisture proof. 14,18,19,20,

SECTION 5 SURVEY -

24- Sw'Je!! Mission and Accom~lishents . Tho lnission of t h e f i e l d o r t i l l a r y ObsorvctiOh be t ta l ion swvey . i n the Ewopcan Theeter of Operations m.s t o provide IMP data and 6WVCy control to div is ion , COQS a d Z ~ W m t i l l e r y cnd t o survty t h e n sound end flash rnr,ghg h?tc 'dl i l t ioLs. The IIEps tb.t were provided by t h a corps of &gu-3ers "?e p o b n b l y t h e b a s t that niiy army i n the h is tory of i7orfcre hes hnd 2.t its disposal . Trigonometric stations were abundant cnd o c c m t c , Observation b a t t d i o n s the t fought throughout the cnnpc.imS nvereged 1200 lnilcs of eccurc te , connecting, trnviirse surveys. survey p r t i e s es tab l i shed l0cr.l C o n t r o l s tn t ions throughout the a r t i i l e r y m e a nnd f c m z r d nlinost t o t h e f ront l i n s s thus lucking tho task of the regular a r t i l l e r y survey parties rl iwst ile&ligihlL3. Azimuth checks by shots ncro used cxtensivcly. Very l i t t l a night surv<y was nttonptcd btcause of the roactior? of OUT troops t o the use of l i g h - t s . Very lit- tlc: t r icngulc t ion 8ns r.ttzinptud sirm t h c terrrs.in v' s Iil3ro adaptable t o t r c v m s e -.nd a n ' e x c d l c n t bzsic control elre?.dy exis ted. A l l observa t ion b a t t c l i o n s ogcreted survey sect ions unusr the d i rao t super- vis ion of the survay i n f o r m t i o n cer,tzr. T h i s centar wcs one of t h e most velunble innovotions of t h i s war. It t;m charged with obtaining tho t r igonometr ic dnte. from the engineers cnd disser inc t ing t h i s w i t h i t s omn survey cont ro l t g tk,o artillery survcy of f icers . W r s m n e l nore alnnys evnilable c t t h i s center rrko aere qunl i f icd t o givo advice on surv-y, essist i n tho repair of oquipmnt, or inaugurate new SUT- ve$s t o Root ciiacging re&ircnients, s s rva t ion bntml ion s vey . r t i e s cnd informttion centers :Tcre 3f t h e highost s txndnrds . l,K13 9LE19,20 Iz2

The acconplishmcnts of the ob-

25. Co:.st nnd Geodetic Survay Officers. Officers of the United S t a t a s Coost cr,d Geodetic survuy were c,ttached t o mst of the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observation bc t tc l ians . vnlunbla servica ir. s u p r v i s i i i g survey icstructior. end improving sup- voy tachnique. superviszd tha surv;y inf3rnEtian center rind, under the b c t t a l i o n con- rlmdor, plcnned i.nd sugerviscd t h o survay cantrol of each comb-t men.

During t rnining they rendered in-

L? c0;ubo.t in tha Europeal-- Ther.ter of O p r c t i o n s they

1 , l L .

26, Trnining. Survey t rc in ing i n the f i e l d n r t i l l e r y observGtion b a t t a l i o n s was of tha h ishes t s tendad.

27. EQui)xrJalt Deficiencies.

Zransits, The 20 second Gurley Transif was m s a t i s f a c t o V - It fell far b4lOvi t h e s t rndards of cvan the c h e a p s t c o m m c i a l . t ran-

tho a r t i l l c r y i s necesscryr K9f1411a*20* sits . The dove1opfiznt and OCUI'CWiIt df tV79 E t d f l d t ransi ts for

(1) orla socand theodAi te f s r av t ronodc observztion and t r iangulnt ion. Ono per observrtion bnt to l ion S-eY grty and For d i v i s i m artillery.

(2) Twenty second trensit, f o r traverse. CUB PT obsarva- t i o n b a t t a l i 0 9 survey pRrtY two p r n r t i l l c r y battalion.

per division mew#

b. Chrononeter. A good chrsnomter, t o vrhich the v a t c h e s used

- 11 -

sect ion. *0,22*

0. Flot t inF; and AssanblinK Messoge: The observotiDn bat- t a l i o n m t e o r c l o g i c n l section p l J t t e d E.nd coI;lputed the fin,-l bal l is t ic vinds f a r thb ncsWZe tlnd essembled these with the bc. l l is t ic densi- t i e s i n t h o f i n a l mssngc. A mcsscge was norr,.lly computed every two 11surs. 2 0 2 2 .

d. TrnnSLIi?>sion. It hed o r i e i n r . l l y bsen plarlned f a r the obscrvnt i ,m b a t t s l i o n a t s tronsciit thi! x t e g r o l o g i c c l mssn~z corps c s t i l l a r y SCR-284 mdi3 n e t . T:rec!k, t rcnsmiss ion over tho SCE-193 net YES authsrized. 193 did n o t hcvQ the p w e r t.: qivc pxi i t ive t r r ? n s x i s s i ~ n , the XR-399 n t c j rps artillery VI: s used. sec t ion was respons ib le for de l ivor ing t,hs m t e o r ~ l ~ g i c c l ,mssnge t; the rad io set which 17r.s t? w.ko t h e b r x d c n s t and t o the hct t r . l i?n rxssago contor xhhcre n f i l e c>pJr v r . s ~ . i n t a i n e d . 2ot22.

the 3hn.n t h i s r c d i s net I;r:ved t,,>

$:hi-n t b s SCR-

The obscrvct ior bct tul isn Eetecrological

e. Divis im h t i l l e r y Mdt:taorological section. The d iv is ion a r t i l l e r y I2eteorological sect ion made p i l o t balloon determinations of ths winds and psschrouetor m a s u r o m n t s of density. When atnospheric condi t ions permitted observation, d iv is ion a r t i l l e r y used i t5 i 0 C d

data f o r l ow ar.glc f i r i n g . 21-

f Ranging Msteorological Messam. This mssage was computed by e i t h e r t h e observntion ba t ta l ion or divis ion a r t i l l e r y xe tcoro logico l oect ions. Eecawe of t h e wide f r o n t s involved t h a d iv i - s ion s t a t i o n s were f requent ly a b l e t o g ive b Q t t & r data on the l o n e r atmosphor,:, k smll mteoro lo ic:l sect ion VICS def in i te ly nueded n i t h each sound ranging platoon. 1 # $ 0 *

8. Deficiencies of Mothods. The w t h o d s used in observing and coinputiiig t h e ixeteorologienl datc, were unscltisfcctory ir. s e v z r o l rQSpQCtS. The r c d n r ana rediosondo data w r e tckan 2.t too g r a s t a dis tanco f r o n t h o corps a r t i l l e r y m o a , o'seurve, conputc, end dulivur the dct;,., plus the six hour del ivery achsdule, m d e t h e maascgc e ight hours o ld ,;ihen t h e nrtillory f in i shad criploying i t . This "E d c f i n i t e l y too out 3f datv t o be trusbvorthy.

Tha tir& l o g of t!?o hours t o

20.

31. Use of MetooroloRicc.1 w. The f i e l d , -s t i l lery 'wcs tkrou&hly indoctrir.ctsd with the va lw of r.utcorologic?.l d a t o , r m l i z i n g tho t i r n u c l j n e n t s involvod in the mdssc&cs, cpplied the= too bl indly. iiy,Es. Rogis t rnt ior is should bd f i r e d bofore the rib?ss:.ge to be appl ied is rocoivad cnd p:uferc.bly during thu observing period. 18-

30% u n i t s , not

Uni t s should bo i n f o r m d of t h e ob.sorving snd COmPUting

32. Meteoro lqqiad SGt, SCR-658. This e q u i p a t nhs not raceived i n thd Ewopuan Thec.ter . m t i l : ? f te r tho alose of t h e col;;br,t period. Its d i r e c t i o n c l r a d i o nnd radiosonde e l c w n t s place in the ebservntion b a t t o l i o n mc;teorologiccl sect ions t h e eci\aipmnt necessnrgr f o r t t e de- t e r E ~ n n t i o n of h c . l l i s t i c winds, d e n s i t i e s , cnd temperetqas i n Over- c a s t weather. l o c a l datr. on c, four how schedule . will b6 about 75 i ; b u t e s for a corps c r t i l l e r y messnge. 21.

This oquipmnt should pern l t the n r t i l l e r y t o have good The ohserving and CoElPuthg per iod

'33, Wire Probler;. in Combat. All observntisn bat tc l ions reported tha t they l o i d and r i i r . t - ined t a i o e tho authorized ellowanc2 of Wire.

- 12 "

There were s u f f i c i c n t wire crevrs ir, t h e observation b a t t e r i e s but hoedquarters b e t t e r i e e noa te9 one more t ruck m a cruFi. A11 nirc- crews mxc s l i c i t l y s rml l . Lieht t r e n s p o r t c t i c n v:,s b o r r o w d froin o t h e r s e c t i o n s cnd ~ n s ossatitir.1 for xaintennnce of lriro. T h i s m y par- t i c u l a r l y t rue on rarrom ro3ds a t ni::ht. by higher hccdquarters hL%dorcd mintenance and recovery. Cnbl ing of v r i r c B C S extensively grcctined i n t h e European Theoter t o hhgrove np- pe?.rnnc;, Tho followinE wires , used i n cor.ibnt, ward c o m c t e d upon:

The p r a c t i c e of cabl ing wire

6,10,20.

C . ’N-11OB. Insu la t ion of t h i s wi re no3 u n s c t i s f n c t o r y in n o t :;oather,

b. ’Fr-lqc. S a t i s f a c t o r y when use6 on s h o r t l i n e 8 Such 0 s co::mad rest i n s t s l l c t i o n s . 20.

C. u. Excallent e l e c t r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s bu t p o r t c n s i l o s t runkth and fGbric cover t o r e off when rulroving i f from ice. 20.

d. Sp i ro l Four. (Cable Assoriibl8ge ~ 6 3 5 8 ) . T h i s wire vias too b u l k y t o USL- i n i n i t i r l inatnl l ,? . t ions, It tias irwclucbl* , however, t o i q r o v o thc bnso durinc S ~ O I , i c e or hocvy r a i n s . T o s t s by t h e 6 t h F i e l d i s t i l l c r y Observation ERtto.lion shoacd t h a t i n wet weothdr t:lo microphones functioncd,r, great d m l b e t t a using t h i s a i r e t h n n they d id usin& l,i!-llOB, 20.

34. Radio N u t s . Very l i t t l e use WT.S ;redd during cornbnt i n tha Eurag3i.n Theater of the observat ion b n t t c l i o n SCFi-608 n e t from kottcl ior , t o b a t t e r i c s wore f requent ly so Groat thcit t h i 3 set vror.lb not fur:ction. m& n specin1 nu: betnocn scund o u t y o s t s and c e n t r z l s q d o y i n i ; t h o ~ ~ ~ - 6 1 0 ocre uocd extensively. The b n t t a l i c n SCR-284 n e t w s usocl by 5 3 m b c t t a l i o n s tlint did not oxchilr,,Je th*si. rodios f o r SCBJ4193. l a t t e r :7as c m r e satisfactory r n d i o f o r bo t tn l ion cormunicnt ions. 78

Dis tnncos

’5ithin thu b a t t c r i a s t h - flcsh rmging SCR-610

Tho

1 e , i q I 2 o .

35. ~ p o c i - 1 ~ ~ t o o r c l c ~ i c i l E. 1, spacic.1 iwteoroloGicnl n o t vms c;.gloyod by ths R i r carps wuntlier d e t n o h m u t s duriw coliibnt i n the Eu- ropcon Thoutor of Operetions. oxchnn;,c of r i o t e x ~ l o ~ i c a l da ta betwccn r.d jccent corps rind bet!iom curps a i d R T i . y w i l l ba neccsscry. no t c a s t be pr3vldLid t o tha observnTion bnt fa l ion -nd t q n super- visory or c>ilrdine.titq: ..roLc; a t arrg l e v e l . k or im t., avoid du- p l i c a t i m of brmdcas ts t h c frequailcy of t h i s n e t should be in a bond :,hcrc: oll nr:iller.y c m l i s t e n i n and rdccive their l : l C t Q 3 r * r s l O ~ ; i C a l

Provisicns f a r c. simildrrrnet f o r t h e

Thr: e q u i p ” a i d gorsvnnal f o r t h i n

Llz;;so,e. 2C.

R1.Di.R _I

36. Rcd;.r ObscrvGtim J-r T e r r e s t r i a l Tnrzets. The c m c e p t i m af tho use of radqr i n H t o r r a s t r i d r212 t a repluca or sul>l:lirraent v i sunl m t h o d s of observation vas i n i t s infancy during t h o c:.nbc.t p u r l ,d i n t l k Ewopee,n ‘Thecter. 1,:t bz-n devolapod and hhti i n v e s t i p s t i xis IThich m r a aonducted s h n ~ l d bc) cmuidured lnrg- ly as p i n t i i i & tho wny tonnrcl f u t u r e d e v e l Q p m n t .

mopor equir.ner-t f m t h i s vork I ind

n. Fif teent i : TJ. S. r”sl;iy Rndnr Schml. The F i f t e a n t h U. S. :cry ovtoblishad two countar nmtcr rcclor soh3318 during Iularch and A p r i l 1945. f a r t h s SCR-304 i n n co,l?tej: rmr tor rsle and t o acquain t obszrvnt ion

Tha f i r s t 3f those schcols i!cs as tnbl i shed t o t r a i n crav1s

b a t t a l i o n representa t ives with the p o s s i b i l i t i c s of t h i s equipmnt , ; /e l l - t ra ined Crews usin& r!mnuc.l -p la t t ing were ?.ble t o locate :Tagrtr.ss

and p l c t t i n g t im VKLS t : m e minutjs. n t tncnixnts , the rc.dnr crew obtzined an occurccy 3f 50 ycrds in DE- ccd onc-half minutes. The f r o n t thc t one s e t wa3 c . b l j t 2 c m e r uf fcc t ive ly W C , ~ 2,500 yards. 584 cnd tho f a c t t h a t comb-t i n t h e Europecn Theater ended 3zitl;in c foa days a f t e r the counter a r t c r crens reported t o t h e i r observztian b a t t a l i o n ass ignrents , t h i s nethod of locot+g m r t a r s BC~S not ef- f e c t i v c l y used i n CJr;$at. Battfllions reportt id locat ions by r r d a r but tRc s i tun t i sn 1p.s to3 f l u i d fo r i t s p r c c t i c a l use. The secand school was desicnad -.s a tsst r J f tho l.N/APS -3 rador s e t . This =as n smll Navy s e t neighing arpsx- i m t e l y 250 pounds. It was c f l p b l e of beicg munted i n tno qucrtor ton t r n i l c r s and could bo put i n actiori fr-n i t s t r a v e l i c r p s i t i o n i n f i v e minutes. This s e t wns not s e t i s f n c t o r y f o r counter x..rtcr Icon- t ions without exteiisive inodif i c a t i m s I but d id demnstrc,te t h a t ?.

l i ,?ht weight psr table rfldcs s e t f x szrv ice in thu i f i fxi t ry e r e m is possible from a ti;chniccl point of view; 15 1201::2*

t o n range of 71000 ycrds with cn accurccy of 100 ynrds . Observing Eqloyiqr; o u t o m t i c plottin:

Because sf the s i z e cnd lcck of mbbility Jf the SCR-

The 8 t h cnd 1 6 t h y ie ld L r t i l l e r y Observ-ti-1:

h. R- 0bservc.tion sf T e r r e s t r i a l Tornets and Re,~istr:.i. ii - t ions . 584 radar set i n n t e r r e s t r i a l rAe.

The n n t i a i r c r e f t o r t i l l o r y m d e extensive t e s t s of t h e SCR- This s e t vms n?t des i nad Z?r

t h i s purpose c.nk -K.S unsuitable f r m the p>int nf viein =f r d b i l i t y cnd size . MoverAmnts of individuals and GrDups of m n x r o plot ted cnd t h e oporotors were ab13 tr, rzkc qui te accureta e c t i m t e s zf the nunber gf i . m in any g2oUp. es+ir.nted acC~u?ccy of ten ynrds vzs 1?2ssible. nc.s r:mo sat isfackory than i rqac t bursts . r a d e r can b3 dovaloped as n l i n e of s igh t observing i n s t r m n t , t h e use of which is n o t l i n i t e d by dr rkness Jr p)or v i s i b i l i t y , 11,20,21*

It Bas successful in locot in2 vehiculcr t r a f f i c at 28,500 yerds.

Plot t ing of f r iendly a r t i l l u r y s h c l l burs t s t3 c.n Observetion o f r?Fr burs t s

Tha t a s t s dei.-rznstrc.tad tliet

37., D i v i s i m nnd C3rl:s X u s m n s i b i l i t ~ , Explw-t-ry w r k in Rortcu: dc,tocti.m by sound rnnzinz Cemonstrnted thr.t, t o be e f f z c t i v e , countor f i r 0 3 h:d t o be quickly deliverec;. Corps a r t i l l e r y c m l d not obtaiii tho necossnry clearances i n tiix t o o c c o q l i s h the r,issim. Locations of m r t a r s cad nsbelverfers nere therefore r e p w t o c d i r e c t t o d i v i a i j n a r t i l l w r y . The dcvolognmt of radar sh;uld therefgr;: bo along t w 3 l i n e s ; and a s l i g h t l y larger s e t for the o b s c v c t i o n bct t d i o n s t5 accoi.iplish lone: r n n j e sbsorvat ion nnd r a c i s t r a t i o n . 18120921.

shmrt ranee, xxbilc wt f;r t h j division c r t i l l c r y

SECTION 2

SUD@ILlTY OF ORGAYIZIBION

38. Obacrvction Bat ta l ions i n Coribct i n EUT~TXXLI Thectcr. There wre observat ion t a t t a l i o n s orgnriized under Tcbls of Or{rcnizati>n 6-75 , 1 iApril 1942, and Table of Orp.nizr.ti:>n c.nd Equi]~i.;ent 1944, i n tho Eur-jpeon Theater of Opsmtions. U n i t s 3f the f i r s t t y p mere C b l u t : ~ deDloy tas inclopndant sound bcsss p a r bc.ttery fgr s h x t periods. It WUS r o t c leer ly donanstrcted t h a t u n i t s of the second t Y l B c s u l d not have n c c j q l i s h o d t h i s s incs it 6zs never atte;r.pted in c3Litx.t. liot f e a s i b l e with tho rjduced nunber of en cnd vehicles. t ion b a t t a l i o n s were reorganized undor Tnblcs of &t;r.nizati3n end Equipxent i n c m b a t .

6-751 9 ?k.?rCh

The uni t comnnders, howaver, wre sn t i s f iud t!mt it 'x.s. NO observc-

6-75, 1 l?eb 1943, i n tirx t o say thc t it had been tes tod This t a b l e i s e s s e n t i a l l y the sane c s that of 9 Mmch l9h4.

1,m.

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39. The lnw Observetion Bat tn l ion . In addi t ion t o the orgnddo corps observct isn bot ta l ions thore w113 one assicnud t o ecch a m y . Bat ta l ions assigned t o arnies were seld.ln eciployed OB uni t s , t h e t w 2 observat ion b a t t e r i e s being divided c.nd nttachad t o tho t w j corps sf th6 arw which hP.d the p e n s t e s t obsorvati3n problem. The head- q m r t e r s 3f these arrw observst ion b a t t n l i m s were sc ldoo xiployat, w i t h thc ir b o t t o r i e s , ,i8 I l 9 0

40. Corps Fronts en? Observation Bat ta l ion Capabi l i t ies . The ex- cessive width of the corps f r a t s i n th l j Euzopan Thenter of Opern- t ions was discussed in paragraph 7. The obscrvotion b a t t e r i e s were organized f o r operation on a 10,000 ymd f ront . To covcr tho corps f r o n t s that exis ted in the European Theater a minimum 0:” thre , obswva- t i o n b a t t e r i e s p r observation b a t t a l i o n v r m nacessary. 1a* rg~20*

41. Chongos &I Ormnizc t ion . 1, confaronce of the observn- t i o n b a t t a l i o n commdors whose u n i t s h:cl operotsd i n thc European Theater ims held at =is, France , from 18 J u l y 1945 t o 24 J u l y 19s. Basod on t h e i r combat experience, they rccormnded the following mjor changes in organizetion of t h e observc t ion b n t t d i o n s :

a. Bet tol ion Organization. The observation bnt tnl ion should Lc corFEJoscd of P. hoedqunrtors nnd headqucrtcrs bc t te ry cnd t h r e e observat ion bc t tor ies . t h n t they desirud on zddi t iona l b n t t a r y f o r t e r r e s t r i a l rzdrr o b s ~ r v a - t i o n i f it prove6 impract iccl t o oporata radar e i t h o r from t h e f l a s h platoon o r ns c. sepnrote plntoon i n the present obse rvn t ion b a t t e r y .

This racotrmndation nr.s qunl i f iod t o tho ex ten t

b. Headquarters B a t t e r y [email protected]. The overr.11 O r g m l -

znt ion of the observation ba t tn l io i i kaad<mrters c!nd hendquorters bnt- t e r y should remain unchangud. Two oddi t ionnl v i m trucks ond c r w s and adjustment of . t h ~ s e r v i c e platoon t o corresl-oad t o the incroosed s ize o f the ba t ta l ion w i l l be neaessclry if an nddi t ionol observation bat tory is added t o the b a t t a l i o n .

0. Obsarvhtion Bat te ry Orwmizntion. The o w r n l l o rgcnim- t i o n of the obsorvc.tion b a t t m i e s should r e h n unchcngsd until rndLar equipment i o developed for observxt ion of t a r r e s t r i a l t a rxe ta . Tor- r e s t r i a l radar obvorvntion s h o u l d opcrnto c s p c r t of the flcell ranging platoon o r as fl scpernte platoon i n the observc.tion bntterg., ditiona; )Tire and m i n t m a n e e personncl m d equipment :rill bo necessnry at t h a t time.

dd-

CW.” 2

CONSLUSIONS I&-D WGOIfiJENDi:?? IOMS

SECTIO)! 1

C ONCLUS I O W

42 EmPlOyEmt,

A. Thut .eixploymnt of t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observation bnt- te.lion under cent ra l ized c o n t r o l es EL corps n r t i l l e m i n t e l l i g e n c e agmcy wns mre effectiv.: than erJploymnt undor ducunt rd iacd c o n t r o l with the f i o l d a r t i l l e r y group or divis ion a r t i l l e r y .

b. That t h e enploymnt of t h o f i e l d a r t i l l e r y obsorvc.tion b a t t a l i o n had its g r e a t e s t value undod Ytabi l izzd conditions of WcrfarE aiid t h a t the value doorcased a6 the r a p i d i t y of mvamznt increcscd.

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43. Sound .Ransina.,

e . Thet so‘&. rcnging C E S c f f a c t i v e in locating the &ror.n e r t i l l a r y end t h z t the s t c ” d mthods or’ sound ranging described i n F ia ld k h i l U C l 6-120, h b Y 1945, nerc mcd z i t h the Po l lwing cxcsptions:

(1) NO Curvcd bases rm-2 employed,

( 2 1 No b a l l i s t i c p lo t t i ng nas employed.

(3 ) Microphones were inser ted betaeen the reeuls r microphones of the base t o g ive mre points on the curve of i n i t i a l breaks.

‘

b. Thnt sound ranging locc t ions aere n o t suf f ic ien t ly accuratG t o porr.it the indiscriminate employntnt of m p dzta correct- & methods of counterbattery f i r e .

0 . That \?ken sound renging locations’ vere compred a i t h photo in t e rp re t a t ion , oxcellent r s s u l t s mre obtained.

d. Th?,t the fvllowing sound renging equipmnt should be improved:

(1) Sourrd Hongiag Recording Set, GR3-C.

( 2 ) Sound Ranging P lo t t i ng Bee-rd, M1.

(3) Modulator Lsscmbly LN/GF&-l-( ), Radio Link.

4&.. F a Rangin&.

a. Thnt f l a s h rsnging was hot e f f ec t ive i n lccnting the Gcrr1n.n a r t i l l e r y but was able t o accomplish i t s missions of r eg i s t r a - t i on and general in te l l igence .

b. That t he stctndcrd rflsthods of f l a s h ranging described i n F i e l d Manual 6-120, May l9G, were employed.

C. T t a t poor v i s i b i l i t y i n t a r f e r e d with visuel mthods of obsarvntion E.nd tha t a more pos i t ive method of gaining iatel- ligonce was u s d e d ,

a. That the following f l a s h ranging squipmnt should be ir:iproved:

(I) Azimuth Instrument, Ml, and/or Br i t i sh Spotting Instrumant , E.

(2 ) Flash Ranging Switchboard, BD7O.

45. Survey. *

a. That t i e survey sections of t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observa- t ion ba t t a l io r , , employing the mth3ds describe6 i n F i o l d Ma.rual 6-120, lk*Y -945, successful ly established survey oont ro l throughout the a r t i l - lery a rea ,

b. That the 20 second Gwlcy t r a n s i t vms not sa t i s fac tory i n combat.

c , Thot survey sec t ions needed l i gh t ing devices Outside the v i sua l spectrum f o r night surveys.

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46. Meteorological Serv ice ,

a. That tho f i e l d a r t i l l a r y observution bat ta l ions did not h v e tho proper meteorological e q u i p n t during csmbat i n the European Theater of Operations t o furn ish a s a t i s f a c t o r y mtcorologicai message,

b. That tho observat ion ba t t a l ion , the a i r corps mbile wea;her detachnients aid the a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y cooprated t o furnish a meteorological message t h a t was s a t i s f a c t o r y rrith the exceptior. of its freg'ioncy.

c , That Meteorological S e t , SCR-658, arrive6 a f t e r the end of combat i n thG European T h e a t e r of Operations and is sat isfactory except i n tlic time rcguired for 'observ ing .

47. Cc"nica.;ions. That A spec ia l meteorologicnl rad io n e t yIas necessary i n combat i n the European Theater of 0pt.rations.

48. w. That i t was successfu l ly demonstrated t t a t radar could be usad t o obta in in tc l l igsnco , l o c a t e mortar pro jec t i les , and observe fo r ru , . is t ra t ions.

49. S u i t a b i l i t y f Orffnnizntion.

a . That th ree observat ion b a t t e r i e s per f i e l d a r t i l l e r y ob serva t ion b a t t a l i o n vero naadsd during combat i n the European Theater of Operations.

. , h. That radar methods of obsarving a re needec in t h e field

a r t i l l e r y obsorvntion b a t t a l i o n t o supplemant visual neth0d.S.

SECTION 2

REC OhD5ENDLTIONS

50. Mission. That the missions ,nssignod to the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observat ion b a t t a l i o n s in F i e l d R 5 " l 6-120, May 1945, should not be niodif iod.

51. Enlploymont. That t h e pr inc ip les of t a c t i c a l employmnt 3f the f i d d a r t i l l e r y observat ion b a t t a l i o n dascr ibad in Field Manual 6-120, l e y 1945, should not bo modif id.

52. Organization.

a, That the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observat ion bastal ions should ba i'oorganizid v i t h three observat ion b a t t e r i e s per bat tol ion.

b. That one f i e l d a r t i l l e r y obzeryat ion bat ta l ion s h o u 3 be reorganized on an exporimntol basis i'l.tth a radar platoon i n each obsorvatioii b a t t e r y ,

c That addi t ibna l c o w " i c a t i o n s , rmintennnce and service PorGonnol End equipment should bo ai.dod t o compensate f o r the in- cmasos rucoinnendad i n paragraphs 52n and 5 2 b .

rad io n e t betmaen adjacent corps and betvieen corps and a r w should be added t o the heaciquartors b a t t e r y of the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y obscrration ba",aiion. suwl-vis ing t h i s ne t ba a t a r m level .

d. That personnel and equipnmnt t o es tab l i sh a mteorOlo$i~*l

That o. weather o f f i c e r with personnel and WuiT:~nt for

53 . Traininq. That the regular course of instruct ion a t ths Field

Lrtillery School, Fo r t sill, O%lahoma, should stress the a n a l y s i s of in te l l igence data in a counterbattery intellisence course f o r all f i e l d artillery o f f i c e r s ,

5 4 , Equiprnent -

a. That developmdnt of the equipment descr ibed in Inclosures 10D, LS, 7T, and 1 9 t o t h e r epor t of tho I z q y Ground Forces Equipment Review Board, 20 June 194.5, and concurred in by t h e Theater Commander European Theater of Operations, w i l l meet t h e requirements of tho f i e l d art illcry observat ion battalions.

b, That tha development of meteorological equipment should be continued with a view t o decreasin” the time c o n s w d i n observa- t i o n , computation and dzlivcry of the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b c l l l i s t i c message to the using units.

7ibliography

I 1. LCter l c t i o n R e p o r t s , 3 d , 7 t h , Bth, I g t h , 16 th , 17 th l and 285th

F i e l d I . r t i l l e r y Observation Bat ta l ions .

\far Ikpartment Observers Report , Nmber 80.

'Jar B p r t i x e n t Observers Repor t , Nuniber 1 9 2 .

War Department Obszrvcrs Report , Nlunber 349,

liar Departmdnt Observers Report , Mwrber 3-57.

' r h Department Observers Report , Number 448. War Department Observers Report , Nurflbar 521.

:far Eqpartment Observers Report , Number 605'.

far Dipartinent Observers Repor t , NLmber 701.

10, 'lar i k p a r t m n t Observers Report , iiumber 719.

11. War Department Observers Repor t , Xunber 737.

12. ,far Department Observers Beyor t , Number 779.

13. Jar Departmnt Observers Ro'po~k, Nunber 935.

14. War Deprtment Observers Report , CJumbQr 978.

13.0 :ia? Department Obbervers Report , Number 1038.

16. ;tar Dupmtment Observers Report , Nunber 1053.

17. \far D e p r t E e n t Observers Repol't, Number 1077;

18. 'Jar Departmeht Observers Report , Number 1106.

2.

3.

4.

3 , 6.

7.

6 .

9.

19 . llor Department Observers & p o r t , Mumber 1111

20. Repcr t s on F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Observation Bat ta l ion O p e r n t i o n s and Equipaent - f i l e 320.2/43 , L r t i l l e r y Soct ion , Thea ter Goneral Board.

21. F i r s t Utlited S t a t e s i rnw l z t i l l e r y 1nfor .mt ion Servioe, I$@? 1945, f i l e 370.2, L r t i l l e r y S e c t i o n , Thaater Garma1 Board.

22. F i r s t Unitad S t a t e s lmny i a - t i l l e r y I n f o r m t i o n S e r v i c e , July 1-944, f i l e 370.2, L r t i l l e r y Section, Theater G,encral Board,

23. F i r s t United S t a t e s fsw i c t i l l e r j I n f o r m t i o n S,:rVioe, Saptambar 1944, f i l e 370.2, A r t i l l e r y Section , Theater Genaral Board,

V o l u i I, 12th l i m y GI:OU~ Troop L i s t , f i l e 320.2. 24;

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eto, the field artillery observation battalionreakt . on . study . of . the bdld . lrtlllery...

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