etienne vincent neil carson norad operational research team april 2012 a decision timeline approach...

Etienne VincentNeil CarsonNORAD Operational Research Team

April 2012

A Decision Timeline Approach to Assessing Air and Maritime Vulnerabilities

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Outline

• Context

• The Decision Timeline Approach to Modeling

• Examples of Applications

• Conclusion

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DRDC Centre for Operational Research and Analysis

• A Centre of DRDC – the Science and Technology Agency of the Department of National Defence

• Teams of Defence Scientists providing decision support and physically co-located with a wide spectrum of Department and Canadian Forces partners

• Our team is at NORAD Headquarters, operating as advisors to the NORAD Deputy Commander (senior Canadian), conducting analyses in support of decision making throughout the Command

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NORAD

• North American Aerospace Defence Command

• Bi-national Canada-United States

• Headquartered at Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs

• Mission:

– Aerospace Warning

• Detection, validation and warning of attack by aircraft, missile, or space vehicles

– Aerospace Control

• Ensuring air sovereignty and defence

– Maritime Warning (since 2006)

• Shared understanding of activities conducted in maritime approaches, maritime areas and internal waterways

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CAVEAT

• So as not to reveal NORAD true analytical processes or vulnerabilities:

– All the examples that follow are notional

– They do not employ parameters representative of those used in actual NORAD or DRDC CORA studies

– Nor are they directly illustrative of the analyses currently informing NORAD plans or operations

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Example of a Surveillance Study

• Assumptions:

– considered threat approaching coast at X knots

– security force response requires up to Y hours along coast

• This implies a requirement for surveillance extending XY nautical miles offshore to cue responders

Island to be Defended

Surveillance Requirement

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• Current sensor coverage is overlaid on the requirement

• There are surveillance gaps

Sensor Coverage

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• Three additional sensors are required to fill the gap


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• But the requirement for surveillance extending XY miles offshore was really a worst case requirement for points where response takes longest

• The true surveillance requirement varies along the coast, and is widest at that point furthest from the responding force’s alert site

responder

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• When considering response and surveillance concurrently, it is found that a single additional sensor suffices

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Necessity to Assess Mission Requirements

Assessment of Current Capability

(e.g. current sensor coverage)

Assessment of Mission Requirements

(e.g. coverage required given response posture)

Gap Analysis

Close the Gap

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• If constraints prevent fulfillment of the surveillance requirement with existing means, study conclusions will focus on the deployment of new technologies

zone that cannot accommodate a

sensor

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Existing Capabilities before New





Gap Analysis

Close Gap with Existing Capabilities

(Redeployment, Revised Processes, etc.)

Close Gap with New Capabilities

(Acquisition, Research)

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Example of a Basing Study

• Assumptions:– response initiated within X hours, responder speed of Y knots– response requirement to each site of Z hours

• This implies a requirement for basing within (Z – X)×Y nautical miles of the sites to be defended

Basing Requirements

Site to be Defended

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• The responding force’s current alert site only meets the response requirement to one of the sites to be defended

• There is a response gap. Meeting the requirement requires either moving the site or additional sites

responder

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• But the requirement for response within Z hours was arbitrary

• If response is triggered by the sensors, the extent of sensor coverage drives response requirements

worst-case warning

worst-case warning

worst-case warning

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• When considering response and surveillance concurrently, the existing base suffices

Basing Requirements for Sensor-triggered Response

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Necessity to Assess Mission Requirements


(e.g. current response time)


(e.g. response requirement given sensor triggers)

Gap Analysis



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• If constraints prevent fulfillment of the response requirement using existing infrastructure, the study advocates new infrastructure or faster response platforms

Potential Bases

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Existing Capabilities before New





Gap Analysis



Close Gap with New Capabilities

(Acquisition, Research)

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Example of a Study of Defences

• A study considering enhancements to surveillance and response concurrently

• Assess vulnerability through the modeling of defences against selected threats

Threat axes

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• The threat is detected at point A, and seeks to reach point B before the responding force.

• If the responding forces can reach point B before the threat, the island is defended from that threat approach

A B

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• Applying the assessment to each modeled threat approach reveals current vulnerabilities

• The island is 5/9 = 56% defended?

vulnerable

defended

defended

vulnerable

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• 5/9 is only the proportion of investigated approaches that are defended; the other 4 are always vulnerable

• The choice of approach is in the threat’s hands

vulnerable

Threat’s perspective

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• Potential changes to the force posture (bases and sensors), or to operational procedures can now be assessed against the modeled threats

• The best option is picked as that resulting in the highest proportion of coastline defended

Potential Base

Potential Sensor Site

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• Study limitations– may miss a potential threat– may miss a potential solution (e.g. reducing C2 delays)– understanding defensive failures requires further investigation– results are a collection of anecdotes

?

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Decision Timeline Approach

• The problem is approached in reverse order

• Step 1: For a point to be defended, calculate necessary response time

response time

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• Step 2: Along all potential threat axes of approach, project back the threat locations at the latest time when the response must be initiated

• These points define a decision line around the points to be defended

threat location at latest response initiation

threat axis

decision line

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• Step 3: Surveillance and command and control delays can be added to the response time to result in the line at which the initial detection must occur to guarantee timely response

decision line

surveillance line

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• When this is repeated for all points to be defended, and the individual decision/surveillance lines are merged, decision/surveillance lines for the entire area to be defended result

decision line

surveillance line

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• Surveillance coverage can now be overlaid on the decision timeline to visually identify defensive gaps and potential solutions

gap

gap

gap

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Decision Timelines Application Examples

• Border Security / Airborne Illicit Trade

• Maritime Threats

• Northern Sovereignty Operations

• Airborne Terrorism (Operation Noble Eagle)

• Cruise Missiles

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Airborne Illicit Trade

• Trafficking takes place using light or ultralight aircraft over U.S. southern borders

• Modeling of interdiction is a straightforward application of the decision timeline approach

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Airborne Illicit Trade

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Maritime Threats

• Trafficking, terrorism, other illicit activity, state actors

• Longer timelines than for air threats

• Many potential sources of warning; information sharing is a key aspect

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Maritime Threats

NortheastAsia route

SoutheastAsia route

Warning

Notice to Sail

Underway

Intercept

Buffer Zone

Protecting Portland, OR

Response Forcefrom San Diego

I&W region for Asian great circle

routes

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Maritime Threats

Warning

Notice to Sail

Underway

Intercept

Buffer Zone

Protecting Portland, OR

Response Forcefrom Victoria, BC

Southeast Asia route

I&W region moves closer

to Portland andreduces area

NortheastAsia route

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Maritime Threats

detection, tracking, analysis planning, coordination intercept, neutralizetransitconferencing buffer

Land avoidance using Floyd-Warshall Algorithm

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Maritime Threats

deployed responder

detection, tracking, analysis planning, coordination intercept, neutralizetransitconferencing buffer

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Northern Sovereignty Operations

• Continued Russian bomber penetrations of the Canadian/U.S. Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZ)

• National Policies require monitoring of this activity, including intercepts, toward enforcement of sovereignty claims

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Northern Sovereignty OperationsB

ear-

H

ADIZ

CA

DIZ

Dat

e L

ine

Desired Intercept Point

Decision Point, Inuvik ResponderDecision Point, Cold Lake Responder

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Modeling Air-refueled Response

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Modeling Air-refueled Response

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Operation Noble Eagle

• Airborne terrorism

• Recent examples (9/11, Tampa 2002, Austin 2010)

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more than 60 min

Resp

onse

Tim

e

45-60 min30-45min

20-30 minless than 20min

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more than 60 min

Resp

onse

Tim

e

45-60 min30-45min

20-30 minless than 20min

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Cruise Missiles

• NORAD was established in 1958 to counter threat from long-range nuclear-armed Soviet strategic bombers

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Cruise Missile Vulnerability Assessment

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Cruise Missile Surveillance Requirement

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Cruise Missile Response Requirement

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Conclusions

• Capability assessments benefit from detailed analysis of mission requirements

• Employment of current capabilities should be considered before introducing new capabilities

• Percentage of assets defended is not a probability of success

• The decision timeline approach:

– provides immediate visual understanding of certain vulnerabilities

– is less likely to miss vulnerabilities than direct models

– is less anecdotal than direct models

– can allow fast identification of solutions by reducing the size of the potential solution space

etienne vincent neil carson norad operational research team april 2012 a decision timeline approach...

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