1

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2014-2015

PART II PAPER 03: ETHICS

COURSE OUTLINE

This paper covers a wide range of topics in moral philosophy, ranging from the most abstract and theoretical questions about the nature of morality on the one hand, to the most concrete and applied questions of individual and collective morality on the other. At the abstract and theoretical end are metaethical questions about the nature and foundations of ethical thought, including the topics of moral realism, irrealism, expressivism and quasi-realism. At the concrete and applied end are questions about disability, overseas aid, implicit bias and the nature of trust. In between, are questions about the ends of action, including the relationship between preference and value, and the nature of personal well-being and happiness.

This paper also offers the opportunity of undertaking an in-depth study of a core text in the history of moral philosophy, namely Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.

Prerequisites There are no formal prerequisites, but those who have not taken the Ethics paper in Part IA or IB should consult the reading list for those papers, in particular ‘The Nature and Status of Ethical Claims’ in Part IA and ‘Reasons for Action’ and ‘Life and Death Issues’ in Part IB. Course Objectives Students taking this paper will be expected to: 1) Acquire a detailed knowledge of central arguments in the texts studied. 2) Acquire an understanding of how different topics of the syllabus fit together.

SYLLABUS

� Theories of the Good : intrinsic versus extrinsic goodness, fitting attitudes. � Incommensurability . � Well-Being : needs and capacities, preferences, happiness,

disability,developmental aid. � Metaethics : realism; expressivism and quasi-realism; irrealism. � Kant's ethics and Kantian ethics : the categorical imperative, duty and motive,

morality and freedom, autonomy. � Ethics of Knowing : trust, implicit bias, epistemic injustice.

2

3) Engage in close criticism of with arguments studied. 4) Develop their powers of philosophical analysis and argument, through study of the

readings set for the topics chosen. 5) Develop their ability to think independently about philosophical problems and

arguments studied. Preliminary Reading KANT, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. O'NEILL, Onora, A Question of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). PARFIT, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Part 2;

Appendix F, G and I. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001

SHAFER-LANDAU, Russ, and Terrence CUNEO, eds., Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).

SIDGWICK, Henry, The Methods of Ethics. 7th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981).

READING LIST *Material marked with an asterisk* is important THEORIES OF THE GOOD General *SIDGWICK, Henry, The Methods of Ethics. 5th ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981). DARWALL, Stephen, 'Sidgwick, Concern, and the Good', Utilitas, 12 (2000): 291-306. IRWIN, Terence, The Development of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),

chs. 81-83. SCHNEEWIND, J.B., Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1977). Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198249314.001.0001.

SCHULTZ, Bart, ed., Essays on Henry Sidgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Goodness *KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Two Distinctions in Goodness', Philosophical Review, 92

(1983): 169-95. *MOORE, G.E., Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912), ch. 7. LANGTON, Rae, 'Objective and Unconditioned Value', Philosophical Review, 116 (2007):

157-85. Fitting Attitudes *D’ARMS, Justin, and Daniel JACOBSON, 'Sensibility Theory and Projectivism', in D.

Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University

3

Press, 2007). Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195325911.003.0008.

*SCANLON, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 2.

BYKVIST, Krister, 'No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails', Mind, 118, no. 469 (2009).

INCOMMENSURABILITY *CHANG, Ruth, Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). [Especially chs. 1, 4, 6 & 7] BROOME, John, 'Incommensurable Values', in R. Crisp and B. Hooker, eds., Well-Being

and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 21-38. Also available on Camtools.

HARE, Caspar, 'Take the Sugar', Analysis, 70, no. 2 (2010): 237-47.

WELL-BEING General *GRIFFIN, James, Well-Being: Its Meaning Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1986), chs. 1-4. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.

*PARFIT, Derek, 'What Makes Someone's Life Go Best', in his Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 493-502, Appendix I. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.

ARISTOTLE. "Nicomachean Ethics." ARNESON, Richard, 'Desire Formation and Human Good', in S. Olsaretti, ed.,

Preferences and Well-Being (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 9-32. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511599743.

FELDMAN, Fred, Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 38-78; 108-123. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.

HURKA, Thomas, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com. [Especially chs. 1-4]

RAILTON, Peter, 'Facts and Values', Philosophical Topics, 14, no. 2 (1993): 5-31. SEN, Amartya, 'Capability and Well-Being', in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., The

Quality of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.

SOBEL, David, 'Full Information Accounts of Well-Being', Ethics, 104, no. 4 (1993): 784-810.

4

Needs and Capacities *FRANKFURT, Harry, 'Necessity and Desire', in G. Brock, ed., Necessary Goods: Our

Responsibility to Meet Others' Needs (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 19-37.

*WIGGINS, David, 'Claims of Need', in Needs, Values, Truth. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 1-58.

NUSSBAUM, Martha, and Amartya SEN, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), Part I. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.

O'NEILL, Onora, 'Rights, Obligations and Needs', in G. Brock, ed., Necessary Goods: Our Responsibility to Meet Others' Needs (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 95-112.

WIGGINS, David, 'What Is the Force of the Claim That One Needs Something?' in G. Brock, ed., Necessary Goods: Our Responsibility to Meet Others' Needs (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 33-55.

Preferences *SCANLON, T.M., 'Value, Desire and the Quality of Life', in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen,

eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 185-200. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com.

*SEN, Amartya, 'Behaviour and the Concept of Preference', Economica, 40, no. 159 (1973): 241-59. Reprinted in J. Elster, ed., Rational Choice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 60-81.

QUINN, Warren, 'Rationality and the Human Good', Social Philosophy and Policy, 9 (1992): 81-95. Reprinted in his Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 210-27.

ROSATI, Connie, 'Preference Formation and Personal Good', in S. Olsaretti, ed., Preferences and Well-Being (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 33-64. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511599743.

SAGOFF, Mark, 'Values and Preferences', in his The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 99-123. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817472.

SCANLON, T.M, 'Preference and Urgency', Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975): 655-69. Happiness *CRISP, Roger, 'Hedonism Reconsidered', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,

73, no. 3 (2006): 619-45. *HAYBRON, Daniel M., 'Happiness and Pleasure', Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research, 62, no. 3 (2001): 501-28. HAYBRON, Daniel M., The Pursuit of Unhappiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2008). LAYARD, Richard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (London: Allen Lane, 2005). NETTLE, Daniel, Happiness: The Science Behind Your Smile (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2005).

5

Disability * KITTAY, Eva, 'At the Margins of Moral Personhood', Ethics, 116, no. 1 (2005): 100-31. *MCMAHAN, Jeff, 'Causing Disabled People to Exist and Causing People to Be

Disabled', Ethics, 116, no. 1 (2005): 77-99. AMUNDSON, Ron, 'Quality of Life, Disability, and Hedonic Psychology', Journal of the

Theory of Social Behavior, 40 (2010): 374-92. SILVERS, Anita, 'On the Possibility and Desirability of Constructing a Neutral Conception

of Disability', Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics, 24, no. 6 (2003): 471-87. WENDELL, Susan, The Rejected Body (London: Routledge, 1996). Development Aid *POGGE, Thomas, ed., Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). JAGGAR, Alison, ed., Thomas Pogge and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). MURPHY, Liam, 'The Demands of Beneficence', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 22, no. 4

(1993): 267-92. NAGEL, Thomas, 'The Problem of Global Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33, no. 2

(2005): 113-47.

METAETHICS Realism *CUNEO, Terence, ed., Moral Realism. Edited by C. Miller. The Continuum Companion to

Ethics (London: Continuum, 2011). Also available on Camtools. *SHAFER-LANDAU, Russ, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003),

chs. 1-3. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199259755.001.0001. ENOCH, David, Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Also

available online at: www.dawsonera.com. [Especially chs. 2-4] JACKSON, Frank, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),

chs. 5 & 6. Also available online at: www.oxfordscholarship.com. PARFIT, Derek, On What Matters. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs.

24-32. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=316017. RAILTON, Peter, Facts, Values, and Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2003), chs. 1 & 2. [Ch. 1 is reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 186-203]

SCANLON, T.M., Being Realistic about Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chs. 1 & 2.

STURGEON, Nicholas, 'Moral Explanations Defended', in J. Dreier, ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 241-62. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.

6

Expressivism and Quasi-Realism *BLACKBURN, Simon, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chs. 1-4

& 9. *GIBBARD, Allan, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

2003), chs. 3 & 4. *SCHROEDER, Mark, Noncognitivism in Ethics (London: Routledge, 2010). BLACKBURN, Simon, Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),

chs. 9-11. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=52667. BLACKBURN, Simon, 'Evaluations, Projections and Quasi-Realism', in his Spreading the

Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). Reprinted in M. Smith, ed., Meta-ethics (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 3-38.

CHRISMAN, Matthew, ed., Ethical Expressivism. Edited by C. Miller. The Continuum Companion to Ethics (London: Continuum, 2011), pp. 29-54.

GIBBARD, Allan, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), especially chs. 1-7. Also reprinted as a short excerpt as 'Wise Choices, Apt Feelings', in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 179-198.

PRICE, Huw, Naturalism without Mirrors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs. 1-5 & 11.

RIDGE, Michael, 'Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege', Ethics, 116 (2006): 302-36.

Irrealism *JOYCE, Richard, The Myth of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),

chs. 1-3 & 8. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487101. An abridged version is reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp.23-34.

*OLSON, Jonas, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), chs. 2, 5, 6 & 9.

*WILLIAMS, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), ch. 8. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=62206.

BLACKBURN, Simon, Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 8. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=52667.

GARNER, Richard T., 'On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1990): 137-46.

JOYCE, Richard, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), chs. 5 & 6.

KALDERON, Mark, Moral Fictionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 3. LILLEHAMMER, Hallvard, 'Constructivism and the Error Theory', in C. Miller, ed., The

Continuum Companion to Ethics (London: Continuum, 2011), pp. 55-76. STREET, Sharon, 'A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value', Philosophical

Studies, 127 (2006): 109-66.

7

KANT'S ETHICS AND KANTANIAN ETHICS: GROUNDWORK OF T HE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS General and Background a) Kant's Ethics *SULLIVAN, Roger J., An Introduction to Kant's Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1994), chs. 2-6 & 10. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606151.012 [Introductory]

*TIMMERMANN, Jens, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=91712.

GUYER, Paul, 'The Strategy of Kant's Groundwork', in his Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 201-31.

SCHNEEWIND, J.B., 'Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy', in P. Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 309-41. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521365872.

b) Contemporary Kantian Constructivism KORSGAARD, Christine, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1996). Also available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511554476. [Especially chs. 3 & 4]

LANGTON, Rae, 'Objective and Unconditioned Value', Philosophical Review, 116 (2007): 157-85.

MILO, Ronald, 'Contractarian Constructivism', Journal of Philosophy, 92 (1996): 181-204. Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell 2007), pp. 120-31.

O'NEILL, Onora, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), ch. 11. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173773.

RAWLS, John, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory', Journal of Philosophy, 77 (1980): 515-72.

SCANLON, T.M, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 103-29. Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau, ed., Ethical Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 644-60.

Duty and Motive *HERMAN, Barbara, 'On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty Alone', Philosophical

Review, 90 (1981): 359-82. Also in her The Practice of Moral Judgements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 1-22.

*KANT, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), sect. 1.

8

BARON, Marcia, 'Kant on Acting from Duty', in his Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 146-87.

KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I', in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 43-76.

LANGTON, Rae, 'Duty and Desolation', Philosophy, 67 (1992): 481-505. MARKOVITS, Julia, 'Acting on the Right Reason', The Philosophical Review, 119 (2010):

201-42. STRATTON-LAKE, Philip, Kant, Duty and Moral Worth (London: Routledge & Kegan

Paul, 2002), chs. 1-4. The Categorical Imperative *KANT, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1997), sects. 1 & 2. *O'NEILL, Onora, 'Consistency in Action', in her Constructions of Reason (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 81-103. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173773.

*O'NEILL, Onora, 'Universal Laws and Ends in Themselves', in her Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 126-44. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173773.

HERMAN, Barbara, 'Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties', in her The Practice of Moral Judgement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 132-58.

KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Kant's Formula of Humanity', in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 106-32.

KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Kant's Formula of Universal Law', in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 77-105.

SULLIVAN, Roger J., Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chs. 11-15.

WOOD, Allen W., Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chs. 3-5. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173254.002.

Morality and Freedom *KANT, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1997), sect. 3. *O'NEILL, Onora, 'Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III', in her Constructions of

Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 51-65. Also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173773.

ALLISON, Henry, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 12.

HILL, Thomas E., 'The Kantian Conception of Autonomy', in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 76-96.

KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Morality as Freedom', in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 159-87.

9

ETHICS OF KNOWING Trust *HARDIN, Russell, 'Conceptions and Explanations of Trust', in K. Cook, ed., Trust in

Society (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), pp. 3-39. Also available on Camtools.

*O'NEILL, Onora, A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

HARDIN, Russell, 'Do We Want Trust in Government?' in M.E. Warren, ed., Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 22-41.

HOLTON, Richard, 'Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1994): 63-76.

JONES, Karen, 'Trust as an Affective Attitude', Ethics, 107 (1996): 4-25., 'Trust as an Affective Attitude', Ethics, 107 (1996): 4-25.

O'NEILL, Onora, Justice,Trust and Accountability. Transcript of lecture, dated 18 March 2005. Available on Camtools and in the Faculty Library offprint collection.

Implicit Bias and Epistemic Injustice * FRICKER, Miranda Epistemic Injustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Also

available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001. EGAN, Andy, 'Comments on Gendler's, “the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias"',

Philosophical Studies, 156, no. 1 (2011): 65-79. GENDLER, Tamar Szabó, 'On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias', Philosophical

Studies, 156, no. 1 (2011): 33-63. HAWLEY, Katherine, 'Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting', Synthese, 9 (2012): 1-17. KELLY, Daniel, and Erica ROEDDER, 'Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias',

Philosophy Compass, 3, no. 3 (2008): 522-40. Available online only at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00138.x.

LESLIE, Sarah-Jane, 'The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and Generalization', Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming). Available online only at: https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/TheOriginalSinOfCognition.pdf.

SCHWITZGEBEL, Eric, 'Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or the Gulf between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91 (2010): 531-53.