DEPARMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

2004 ELECTION PROJECT: THEMATIC STUDIES

ETHNICITY, DEMOCRACY AND GHANA’S ELECTION 2004

Alexander K. D. Frempong

kaadupong2002@yahoo.co.uk

[This article, a sequel to my “Ghana’s Election 2000: The Ethnic Undercurrents” (Frempong 2001: 141-59), has been published as: “Ethnicity, Democracy and Ghana’s Election 2004” in Kwame Boafo-Arthur, ed. (2006) Voting for Democracy in Ghana: The 2004 Elections in Perspective, Vol.1, Accra: Freedom Publications, pp. 157-186]

INTRODUCTION

Ghana’s current experiment at constitutional rule has taken significant strides forward.

From a flawed and very shaky start, the Fourth Republic, for the first time in the

country’s history, has witnessed four general elections in a roll. The first two elections

returned the former military ruler-turned-president, Jerry Rawlings, into power. In

another first, political power alternated in 2000 from the then ruling National

Democratic Congress (NDC) to the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by John

Kufuor, who was re-elected president in 2004. The success of four successive elections

has made Ghana the paragon of good governance and peaceful coexistence in a region

which over the last decade and a half has been better known for a spiral of violent

conflict.

Ethnicity however remains a major and increasing problem in Ghana. As the country

continues to consolidate its democracy, there is a growing concern that democracy is

unleashing ethnic rivalries that threaten the very gains it has conferred on the country.

Perhaps, the clearest manifestation of this dangerous trend was the post-Election 2004

bashing of the people of the Central Region. That region’s only ‘crime’ ironically, had

been the rejection of the canker-worm of ethnicity. The region, dominated by ethnic

Fantis, had voted massively for Kufuor, an ethnic Ashanti against Mills who hails from

that region and had campaigned there on the ‘virtues’ of voting for a ‘son of the soil’.

Though this may appear contrary to the conventional wisdom that the level of ethnicity

decreases with improvement in democratic governance, it also demonstrates the

complex, indeed the Janus-faced, relationship between ethnicity and democracy. The

right linkage between ethnicity and democracy is one on which opinions remain divided.

Some analysts are of the view that the multiparty system reinforces ethnicity and

impacts negatively on democracy. But others think that ethnicity has a positive link with

multiparty democracy and that democracy offers an auspicious context for the

management of ethnicity; in other words, ethnic competition is not incompatible with

democratic governance if it finds expression as group interest among other interests.

Similarly, whereas successful democratization means the establishment of regimes in

which ethnic and other interests are accommodated by peaceful means; the very

process of transition creates threatening uncertainties for some groups and opens up a

range of transitory political opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs (Gurr 2001: 176).

Does the process of establishing more participatory and responsive political systems

necessarily have problematic consequences for ethnic mobilization and conflict?

This seemingly paradoxical situation is not restricted to Ghana. Most African

governments have had to confront the difficult task of maintaining national unity with

multiethnic, socio-culturally diverse citizenries and under circumstances in which loyalty

to one’s ethnic group takes precedence over loyalty to the nation as a whole. Indeed,

one of the major tasks for Africa’s democratization process is how to ensure that ethnic

socio-economic antagonisms are not converted into collective political action with the

potential for violence (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 94-95). The attitude of African leaders

towards ethnicity has often not been helpful. While they reject the legitimacy of ethnic

identities they at the same time rely on ethnicity to bolster their own power (Ottaway

1996: 120-121). Often, incumbent power elites try to deny that any problem related to

ethnic inequalities or antagonisms exists. The reality however is that they actually

promote the interests of their own groups while advocating impartiality (Conteh-

Morgan 1997: 108).

This chapter examines some of the essential questions about ethnicity in Ghana: What

have been the main trends in, and character of, ethnic relations in Ghana? How can we

explain the apparent intensification of inter-ethnic antagonisms in Ghana while the

democratic experiment progresses? To what extent is it a legacy bequeathed from the

almost two-decade rule of ex-President Rawlings? What has it got to do with the Akan

perception of the ruling NPP or the ethnic background of incumbent President Kufuor?

How did all this impact on Election 2004? And what is the way forward? These issues are

examined in the context of the discourse on the relation between ethnicity, democracy

and the African state.

ISSUES OF ETHNICITY, DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE

Ethnicity

There are essentially two schools of thought on the meaning and nature of ethnicity.

The first school, the primordialists, holds that members of the same ethnic group have a

common bond that determines their personal identity and “turns the group into a

natural community of a type that is older than the modern (state)” (Van de Goor

1994:18; cited in Ake 2003: 93). This group stresses the idea of ethnic identification as a

result of inherent long-standing and usually unchanging sets of alliances which often

defy rational explanation (Smith 2000: 36). One is bound to one’s kinsmen by virtue of

some unaccountable way that is related to the very tie itself (Geertz 1963:109-110). The

instrumentalists, on the other hand, see ethnicity essentially as a means for people,

especially leaders, to pursue their own purpose such as ‘forming, mobilizing and

manipulating groups of people for political ends’ (Van de Goor 1994:18, cited in Ake

2003:-94). They explain ethnicity in terms of a variety of political, economic and

institutional structures which mobilize, alter and even create an ethnic identity in the

service of political goals (Smith 2000: 36).

The reality is that ethnicity exhibits both characteristics at the same time. Although

ethnicity may appear instrumental, it is structurally primordial, possessing an intrinsic

absolute value, involving and demanding a level of loyalty which transcends that given

to any other social group (Amoo 1997: 16). While aspects of ethnic identities are open

for change, the relevance of ethnic identities as such tends to persist over time (Buzzi

2000:4). Mare (1993:2) likens an ethnic identity to a story, a way of dealing with the

present through a sense of identity that is rooted in the past. Indeed, ethnicity has

been politicized because it can combine both instrumental and affective dimensions.

(Conteh-Morgan 1997: 99).

Ethnicity, it must be emphasized, thrives on half truths and perceptions as much as on

historical facts and is sustained by stereotypes and prejudices which help to explain why

ethnicity remains a crucial weapon for political mobilization (Frempong 2004).

Furthermore, ethnicity may exhibit a number of paradoxes: One, while ethnicity rests on

culturally specified practice and given sets of beliefs, in reality an entirely ‘pure’ group is

extremely rare. Two, ethnic groups can generate forces of moderation, constitute a

form of social capital and advance the private fortunes of their members; but they may

also occasionally engage in acts of violence, destroying wealth and discouraging the

formation of capital (Rothberg 2000; Ayoob 2001).Three, contrary to the conventional

wisdom that it is the political elite that manipulate ethnicity for their own purposes,

sometimes the elite act under pressure from the masses. How do all these complexities

tie in with democracy?

The Ethnicity-Democracy Interface

The thrust of the ethnicity-democracy debate is whether democracy alleviates or

increases ethnic conflict. Those who think the establishment of democracy ought to lead

to less conflict between ethnic groups argue that democracy is an instrument for

peaceful resolution of conflicts without having to resort to violence. In a democracy, it is

further argued, conflicts between ethnic groups can be put on the negotiating table and

solved through dialogue. If a compromise is not found through negotiations, consensus

over voting as the proper procedure to reach decisions will ensure that a solution is

found to the satisfaction of all parties concerned (Buzzi 2002: 1). For the exponents of

this position, ethnicity acts as a pole around which group members can mobilize and

compete effectively for state controlled power, economic resources, positions, contracts

awards and constitutional protection (just like any other interest group) (Rothchild

1997: 4)

Others think democracy leads to more ethnic conflict. In their view, as more people

participate in the political process and differences between ethnic groups are articulated

openly, political leaders in multiethnic societies may be tempted to use ethnicity as a

means to obtain electoral support (Buzzi 2002: 1). In a climate of uncertainty, a policy of

uniting an ethnic group against real or imagined political threat or of whipping up ethnic

animosity against another ethnic group becomes expedient. Under the circumstances,

past legacies of ethnic conflict are rehashed and intensified (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 101

&102). Whether used defensively to thwart the ambitions of others or offensively to

achieve their own end, ethnicity is primarily a label or set of symbolic ties that is used

for political advantage (Psalidas-Perlmutter 2000: 238), and is therefore, inherently

conflictual

Perhaps the truth about the ethnicity-democracy interface lies in-between these

opposing views. Sometimes the reciprocal impact of democracy and ethnicity is

complementary and at other times opposing.

The State and Ethnicity

It is essential in any analysis of ethnicity to consider the crucial role of the state: First,

the state is the turf on which ethnic politics is played. It is the arena for interaction,

encounter, cooperation, conflict and struggle over the exercise of power and

distribution of societal resources (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 104; Udogu 2001: 3- 4).

Second, the state’s political institutions and capabilities structure ethnopolitical groups’

choices about policies to be pursued and the means to do so; whether to participate,

protest or rebel. Often the state shapes and directs the scope, intensity and even

duration of ethnopolitical conflicts (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 106; Gurr 2001: 174). Third,

when the state is viewed as a prize in the hands of a particular ethnic group, it creates

distrust and insecurity and makes it difficult for the state to be perceived as an impartial

arbiter by the other ethnic groups.

THE ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF GHANA

It is estimated that there are about ninety individual ethnic groups, but these are often

reduced to a few large groups, namely, Akan, Mole Dagbani, Ewe, Ga-Adangbe Guan,

Gurma, etc. For instance, the Akans form more than a dozen and half smaller groups

including (Ashanti, Fanti, Akim, Kwahu, Akwapim, Nzema, etc) . The Mole-Dagbanis

include (Dagbombas, Gonjas, Mamprusis, Nanumbas, etc) and the Ga-Adangbes include

(Gas, Krobos, Adas, Shais etc). Often within each broad groups there had been some

historical rivalries as well. The 2000 Population and Housing Census, identified 8 such

major ethnic groups based on language, four of which accounted for nearly 80%: Akan-

49.1%; Mole Dagbani-16.5%, Ewe-12.7%, Ga-Adangbe-8%, Guan-4.4%, Gurma-3.9%,

Grusi-2.8% and Man Busanga-1.1% (Ghana Statistical Service 2002; Nukunya 2003: 214)

The geographical spread of the ethnic groups has some interesting features that

impinge on electoral politics. On the one hand, each of these broad groups has its

traditional home-region(s): The Akans spread across five regions - Western, Central,

Eastern, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo; the Mole-Dagbanis cut across the Northern, Upper

East and Upper West regions; the Ewes are in southern Volta Region; the Ga-Adangbes

are in the Greater Accra and Eastern regions, and the Guan-speaking groups are

scattered in Northern, Central, Eastern and Volta regions. On the other hand, owing to

migration and other factors, several proportions of the various ethnic groups currently

live outside their traditional home-regions and are becoming increasingly vocal in

electoral terms. A few examples may suffice here:1

Ewes formed significant proportions of the populations of most of the five Akan

regions – 15.9% in Eastern, 5.9% in Western, 4.7% in Central and 3.1% in

Ashanti.

Three out of every twenty (15.7%) of the population in Brong Ahafo, 7.7% in

Ashanti and 4.7% in Western are of Mole-Dagbani descent.

There are more Akans (39.7%) in the Greater Accra Region than the indigenous

Ga-Adangbes (29.6%).

This leaves none of the regions ethnically homogenous; yet in the Volta and Central

regions where Ewes and Fantis are the respective dominant groups, the impression is

often created as if there are no other ethnic groups in those regions.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF ETHNICITY

Ghana’s 1969 and 1979 Constitutions, contained provisions aimed at curbing ethnicity in

electoral politics. Leadership and membership of political parties are not to be restricted

to any particular ethnic group or region. Names, symbols, colour or motto should not

have exclusive or particular sectional significance or connotation. Nor should parties be

formed for the sole purpose of seeking the welfare, advancement or interests of

members of any particular group.2 The 1992 Constitution went further in the manner it

sought to deal with the issue of ethnicity and/or regionalism in a democratic state. For

instance, each political party is to have a national character, and membership is not to

be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions; the members of the

national executive committee of a political party must be chosen from all regions of

1 The percentages used in these examples extracted from Ghana’s 2000 Population and Housing Census. See also The Daily Dispatch, (Accra) 13 & 14 September 2005 2 See Articles 35(1), 42(5), of the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions respectively

Ghana.3 But these elaborate provisions have hardly succeeded in curbing the ethnic

hype that has preceded every election in the Fourth Republic.

HISTORY OF ETHNICITY AND ELECTORAL POLITICS

Ethnicity has remained an important ingredient in the recipe of Ghana’s electoral

politics, but it has waxed and waned during different periods of the country’s history.

Ethnic tensions were high in the 1950s in the run-up to independence when ethnic- and

regional-based parties emerged to contest Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s

Party (CPP) (Frempong 2001: 145). The CPP soon after independence passed the

Avoidance of Discrimination Act to prohibit the formation of political parties on ethnic,

regional or religious lines. This forced the sectarian groups to merge into the United

Party (UP). By the time of its overthrow in February 1966 the CPP had succeeded in

reducing ethnic politics to the barest minimum. However a series of events over the

three years of the military ruling council, the National Liberation Council (NLC) reversed

the situation.

By the time of the 1969 Election, ethnicity had again become a major issue. The

unfortunate legacy of that election was that the ruling NLC itself was split along the

Akan-Ewe divide in its support for the two leading parties the Progress Party (PP) and

National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) whose respective leaders, K. A. Busia and K. A.

Gbedemah came from those two ethnic groups. The election results apparently

confirmed that divide.4 The politics of the Busia era deepened the Akan-Ewe rivalry

further and Victor Owusu’s ‘inward-looking’ diatribe has remained the political burden

that presidential candidates of the Danquah-Busia tradition continue to bear.

3 Articles 55(4) and 55 (9) of the 1992 Constitution. Other related articles are 17(2), 35(1), 35(5), 35(6), 35(9), 41, and 55(7).4 In the five Akan-speaking regions of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern and Western, the PP won 78 out of the 85 seats. In those five regions, NAL won only 4 in the non-Akan speaking Krobo areas. On the other hand NAL won 14 out of the 16 seats in the Volta region and the PP-2.

Over the decade of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) rule (1982-1992),

there were serious allegations of Ewe domination of the government and all its agencies

and ethnic and regional discontent ran high though muted owing to the culture of

silence imposed by that regime (Bening 1999: 342; Lent & Nugent 2000: 22). Not

surprisingly, under Rawlings some Ashantis contemplated Ashanti secession or at least

the revival of the federal dream of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) days

(Bening 1999: 363).

The Ashanti-Ewe rivalry has prevailed in the Fourth Republic largely because the leading

political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party

(NPP) have been associated with the two ethnic groups.5 The emergence of Vice

President Mills, a Fanti from the Central Region, as the NDC flag-bearer in 2000

introduced a new twist to the ethnic dynamics of the electoral politics of that year. It

turned out to be a contest among the three largest groups- Ashantis, Ewes and Fantis.6

The results of the first round of the 2000 presidential elections proved a clear

identification of the two dominant parties with the Akan/Non-Akan divide. The NPP in

addition to winning Ashanti (74.8%), for the first time in the Fourth Republic also won

the four other Akan regions of Eastern (55.0%), Brong Ahafo (50.6%), Western (50.5%),

and Central (49.7%). The NDC retained its hold of four Non-Akan regions of Volta

(86.2%), Upper West (62.3%), Upper East (52.1%) and Northern (50.7%) (Extracted from

Ephson 2003: 152). The only exception to this rule was Greater Accra which is

traditionally Non-Akan but also the most cosmopolitan region. The NPP won that region

by 52.5%.

The presidential run-off between Kufuor and Mills led to increased ethnic undertones.

The NDC after tasting defeat in the first round went all out to play the ethnic card

5 For details of how this rivalry played out in the 1992 and 1996 elections see Frempong 2001: 146-148)6 See Frempong 2001: 148-155 for the ethnic undercurrents of the Election 2000

(Frempong 2001: 156). But the broad picture, ethnically speaking, did not change in the

run-off. The NPP retained the five Akan regions and Greater Accra and lost the other

four Non-Akan regions. But the most intriguing aspect of the presidential run-off

apparently escaped several observers, given the furore that surrounded the Central

Region vote in 2004. NDC presidential candidate Mills was defeated by NPP’s Kufuor in

sixteen out of the then seventeen constituencies in his home region. The only one he

won in the run-off was the Mfantseman East constituency.

ETHNIC POLITICS AND KUFUOR’S FIRST TERM

The first term of the NPP government provided a useful background for analyzing the

ethnic dynamics of Ghana’s Election 2004. For several reasons, the ascendancy of

Kufuor, an Ashanti, to the presidency and his Akan-associated NPP to power in 2001 was

going to impact seriously on the ethnic politics of the country. First, more than even in

1969, the NPP victory was dependent on the Akan support. Second, Ashanti is not only a

group with a historical legacy of dominance but also remains the single dominant ethnic

group, numerically speaking, not only within the Akan group but nationwide with14.8%

of the national population (2000 Population and Housing Census: 5). Third, the myth

that an Ashanti would never be elected president was broken and those who subscribed

to mythology were anticipating its implications (Frempong 2001). Fourth, an Ashanti

president assumed power after an era in which Ashantis were perceived to have been

targeted for destruction by the previous regime. The Ewes, as one would expect, were

apprehensive of their fate when for the first time in twenty years their son will not be in

the Castle, neither his ‘anointed’ successor. For the Gas who have been ‘coached’ to be

suspicious of Ashantis and their hegemonic instincts, they were waiting to see what was

in store for them just like the Northerners who had once more given massive support to

the NDC. Even among the Akans, the other subgroups were not too sure how they

would fare under an Ashanti President. Against this background therefore an initial task

that faced the Kufour administration was how to allay those fears.

On the other hand, the NPP victory was celebrated across the country as liberation from

the authoritarianism and culture of silence of the PNDC era which were always lurking

under the NDC with Rawlings still in power. But a sense of liberation often comes with

its excess baggage; a dilemma aptly captured by Conteh-Morgan:

The tight control over the political sector by an authoritarian power elite discourages open expression of ethno-politics. On the other hand, a reduction in repression or authoritarianism can instigate ethnic political competition or instigate ethnic political movements that tend to undermine democratization

efforts (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 102).

Thus, whereas over the nearly-two-decade Rawlings era, there were pained silence and

angry grumblings about what was perceived as a deliberate policy to promote Ewes, in

the more liberalized atmosphere of the Kufuor era, people (including those formerly in

government) were going to be more open and vocal about perceived or real attempts to

favour Ashantis in particular and Akans in general. How well or badly was the Kufuor

government going to strike the delicate balance on such a slippery turf of ethnicized

politics?

Ministerial and Other Government Appointments

The first major task the Kufuor presidency faced was related to ministerial

appointments. Given the pattern of voting, the Non-Akans were going to be very

sensitive to these appointments.

The first set of sector ministers (19 cabinet and 7 non-cabinet) produced 18 Akans (a

third of which were Ashantis), and 8 Non-Akans ( 3 Mole Dagbanis, 2 Ewes and 3 Gas). In

regional terms, all, except the Upper West Region, were represented. The 30 deputy

ministers were shared equally between Akans and Non-Akans. Two of the cabinet

ministers were close relations of the President- his younger brother, Kwame Addo-

Kufuor and his brother-in-law, J. H. Mensah, who would have made the cabinet in their

own right under any NPP president. The reality, The Dispatch (19 March 2004, p.8)

revealed, did not show a steep imbalance in favour of Ashantis or even Akans in general

when compared with the 2000 population census, but in matters of ethnicity,

perceptions are often more dangerous than the facts. It is therefore not surprising that

the perception out there has been that more top positions are held not only by ethnic

Ashantis but by the president’s close relations. The cliché making rounds was that

‘Nyebro’ of the Rawlings’ era has been replaced by ‘Me Nua Osanteni’- my ‘Ewe brother’

for my ‘Ashanti brother’.

The initial exclusion of the Upper West from the cabinet provided unnecessary

ammunition for cultural entrepreneurs. It brought back bad memories of the exclusion

of Ewes from the Busia government.7 The President’s initial handling of the matter was

the first demonstration of how nervous the NPP government was going to be towards

accusations of ethnic favouritism. Kufuor had explained at the first ‘People’s Assembly’

that he could not find somebody suitable at that point in time from the Upper West.

This muddied the waters further and hardly removed the perception of disrespect when

Prof. Kasim Kassanga, a deputy minister, was later promoted to the cabinet.8

The Volta Region

The Kufuor Administration throughout its first term sought to allay the fears of the

Voltarians who had given him the least vote in 2000. His government completed the

Keta Sea Defence project and gave the region its fair share of development projects; but

suspicion of the NPP government in the region lingered. Constant reference had been

made to the fact that there are too few Voltarians in the Kufuor government.9 The

7 It was also somewhat ironic for an area that had had historical association with the Danquah-Busia/United Party (UP) tradition. S. D. Dombo , for example was the deputy leader of the UP and a minister together with Jato Kaleo and B. K. Adama in the Busia government. There is no doubt however that in the Fourth Republic the NDC had asserted its dominance in the region,8 There have also been allegations of instances where people have lost their jobs, or asked to proceed on leave based on where they came from; issues allegedly more related with ethnicity than inefficiency (The Chronicle, 20 October 2004: 6), and the added perception that most of their replacements have been Ashantis or Akans. In a similar vein, the predominance of Ewes as heads of the security agencies changed to people with Akan or Guan sounding names on top (Ghanaweb/The Chronicle , 31 January 2005).9 The then Food and Agriculture Minister, Courage Quashigah, at an award ceremony by a media house for his outstanding performance as a minister, admitted the dilemma of an Ewe minister in an NPP government. He revealed that while his Ewe kinsmen saw him as a sell-out, he had never been fully accepted by his Akan party colleagues. This dilemma became manifest in April 2004, when Quarshigah, was reported to have expressed regret about the attitude of some Ewe communities which for political reasons refused to use amenities provided by the government and also turned their backs on initiatives intended to improve their economic status.(The Evening News, 19 April 2004, p. 1).

perceived bad blood between Rawlings and Kufuor seemed to have worsened matters.

How were these going to impact on Election 2004?

Claims of Ashanti Superiority and Anti-Ashanti Sentiments

It is significant that at his first meeting with the Asantehene at the Manhyia Palace in

2001, President Kufuor had counseled Ashantis to avoid any conduct that would create

the perception as if he was president only for Ashantis or that his was an Ashanti

government (Ghana Palaver, 10-12 August 2004: 1& 8). It was from this perspective that

a series of press conferences and paid adverts extolling Asante superiority did not help

the cause of the President in allaying the fears of other ethnic groups. A group calling

itself, the Asante United Front (AUF) had warned against ‘attacks on Asante customary

law and usage and the discussion of the Golden Stool and its occupant, the Asantehene,

in public’ and had intimated that it was ‘mobilizing Asante Force to counter any such

attacks on Asante’ (The Chronicle, 16 July 2003, pp.4-5).

In another development, a press conference by one Kwame Arhin extolling Asante

history led to a series of paid advertisements and articles in which the Ashantis, Akyems

and Gas tried to undo each other in terms of the greatness and superiority of their

respective ethnic groups (The Chronicle, 9 September 2003; Daily Graphic, 16 October

2003, pp 12 7 21; The Chronicle, 26 November 2003, pp1 & 8). The fact is that the

publications and their rebuttals and rejoinders were full of half-, if not, un-truths. They

had twisted historical records to suit their biased and self-serving agenda.

This growing perception of Ashanti ethnic hegemony in the country led to increased

anti-Ashanti sentiments particularly among the Gas:

References have been made to the many official visitors to the country who paid

courtesy calls on the Asantehene in Kumasi at the expense of the Ga Mantse, the

traditional custodian of the capital city.

When in 2002, the Director–General of Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC)

was removed by the National Media Commission for unexplained reasons Ga

opinion leaders protested that he had been sacked by the government because

he was a Ga and had established Obonu FM, a Ga local radio station. This was

irrespective of the fact that his successor, Eva Lokko was also a Ga.

In May 2002, the Asantehene had to postpone indefinitely and at the last

minute, the official launch in Accra, of a well advertised Otumfuo Education Fund

‘due to unforeseen circumstances.’ This turned out to be a tactical retreat to

forestall inter-ethnic violence that was looming between Gas and Asantes.10 In

2003, similar clouds surrounded the invitation of the Asantehene as a Special

Guest of Honour to the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Mensah-

Sarbah Hall of the University of Ghana over the issue of ‘entry visa’.

This insistent on the royal protocol of ‘entry permit’ in the case of the Asantehene

raised a number of questions: Why had the Ga traditional authorities not been so

insistent in the many instances where other chiefs had trooped to Accra to hold

consultation with the government or to announce funerals? Why was it that past and

even the present Asantehene did not face such resistance under the Rawlings regime? Is

it not because of the fact that an Ashanti is now president?

Another dimension of the anti-Ashanti sentiments related to the fifth anniversary of

Otumfuo Osei Tutu II. On 9 May 2004, the Asantehene rounded off the commemoration

of the fifth anniversary of his ascendancy to the Golden Stool with the Addaekese

festival which attracted both national and international attention. But this was

rubbished by some non-Ashanti social commentators who wondered what was special

about a fifth anniversary when other chiefs who had spent more than three decades on

their stools were not celebrating? Others wondered why the Asantehene timed his

10 Ga traditional authorities had vehemently protested against the visit on grounds that it was a violation of the protocols governing royal visits. Hardliners were ready to disrupt the launch because in their view the Asantehene had not sought the prior consent of the Ga Mantse –an expression of disdain for the Gas and symbol of subjugation of sorts. (Democracy Watch Vol. 1 No. 3 August 2000 pp. 3-4). Though the organizers claimed the necessary consultations had been made, they took the line of least resistance when the opposition would not abate.

ceremony to coincide with the third anniversary of the 9 May 2001 Accra Stadium

Disaster (The Chronicle , 12 May 2004, p. 2).11

A further case in point was the confusion which surrounded the acquisition of the World

Bank loan/grant under the Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities Project

PPTAP). An article in the Ghana Palaver had in the middle of 2003 revealed, with an

obvious partisan and ethnic slant, that the NPP government had contracted a five

million-dollar loan from the World Bank exclusively for Asanteman and Akim Abuakwa

Traditional Councils. The paper had run a banner headline on Monday, 30 June 2003:

“Hurray All Hail the Era of Ashanti Initiatives…NPP’s $5million Ethnic Agenda Loan.” The

uproar that followed the publication should be expected since indigenes from the two

traditional areas dominated the Kufuor cabinet.12

Ethnic Slant to Actions of State Institutions

Even more dangerous for the fledging democracy had been the increasing attempts to

hype the actions of the police and the courts in ethno-partisan terms. Two examples will

suffice:

IGP and Ga Chiefs: On 7 April 2004, the Inspector General of Police Nana Owusu-

Nsiah began what was scheduled to become a nationwide tour of meeting

traditional rulers. At the first meeting with chiefs in the Greater Accra Region,

IGP Nana Owusu-Nsiah, himself a chief, advised them not to meddle in partisan

politics but to uphold their unique position in society (The Chronicle, 7 April

2004, pp.4-5). This seemingly innocuous advice soon attracted a Daily Graphic

11 It was also not for nothing that an independent newspaper had side by side, on its front page, the day after the Addaekese two articles, the one about the grand durbar which the president attended and the other, a festival by the chiefs and people of Nchumuru in the Volta Region which no government official attended even though they reportedly gave the president three months notice (The Chronicle, 10 May 2004, p. 1).12 The fact of the matter was that after the Asantehene had interacted with World Bank officials in 1999, the initial $5million loan was signed on behalf of the NDC government by NDC Finance Minister Kwame Peprah under the World Bank’s Country Assistance Programme for 2000-2003.The facility was to cater for education, health, heritage preservation and capacity-building. The Kufuor government only worked for it to be converted into a grant. But the NPP government did not make this public until Palaver, either with limited facts or for mischief, revealed it in a more damaging manner. Thus such a development-oriented facility was allowed to be tainted by the soiled hands of ethnic politics.

feature article entitled ‘Tribal Politics Should Be Avoided’, from a well known

senior citizen with half-Ga origins, K. B.Asante, which ironically tended to inflame

tribal passions (Daily Graphic, 19 April 2004, p. 7). The writer had likened the

encounter between the IGP and the Ga chiefs to one between a headmaster and

his students and had wondered if the IGP could assemble chiefs in Ashanti and

give them such a lecture? The particular reference to Ashanti chiefs in this

context was worrying as it was a confirmation of the phenomenon of

“Asantephobia” (or is it Asantemania?) that seemed to be engulfing the whole

country. Indeed another writer, an Ashanti, I.K. Gyasi, had questioned the

motive behind the reference to Ashanti chiefs and had argued that the earlier

writer had either assumed that the IGP, a Brong, was an Ashanti or it was a

deliberate ploy to cause mischief. (The Chronicle, 27 April 2004, p. 2)

Assault on Brong Chiefs: The NDC-friendly Ghana Palaver in a back page article

entitled “‘Assault’ on Brong Ahafo Chiefs Continues” sought to give a politico-

ethnic twist to a series of chiefs from the Brong Ahafo Region who over the

period of the Kufuor Administration had had a blush with the judicial courts. That

article had ended with the question which was increasingly becoming an anti-

Asante slogan: ‘Can anybody imagine such systematic and systemic politico-

judicial ‘assault on Ashanti region chiefs under President J. A. Kufuor?’ (Ghana

Palaver, 27 April 2004, p. 8)13

Were the law enforcement agencies to allow the chiefs to go Scot free over matters

some of which bordered on criminality? Did the author imply that it was the

government which ordered the Courts to try these chiefs? Clearly, the motive of that

article was to incite Brong animosity against an Ashanti President, against the

background of the traditional rivalry between the two ethnic groups which the NDC had

exploited to its advantage in previous elections.

13 The article cited six cases which included Agyewodin Adu Gyamfi Ampem, Paramount Chief of Achirensua, appointed Chairman of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology Council app by the NDC government and Nana Kwadwo Nyarko III, Paramount Chief of Prang and a member of the Council of State in the NDC era.

ETHNICITY AND ELECTION 2004

Ethno-Electoral Issues

Early in 2004, tell-tale signs emerged about how intensive and ‘bloodily’ the ethnic card

was going to be played in that year’s election. The following were some of the signs:

“Gas in NPP are Fools” Diatribe

The perception of the NPP government being one of close relations of the president

assumed wider ramifications during the election year.14 The clearest manifestation of

this was E.T Mensah’s ‘Gas in NPP are Fools’ diatribe. The NDC MP for Ningo-Prampram,

at a meeting with party faithful at Teshie in Accra, reportedly chastised native Gas who

supported the NPP. This was allegedly because Gas had been marginalized in the Kufuor

administration. He reportedly asked his Teshie audience how many Gas were in the NPP

government and emphasized that when it came to appointments, eight out of every ten

were filled with personalities from the current president’s hometown and specifically his

family men (The Daily Dispatch, 5 April 2004, p.8).

Psalidas-Perlmutter (2000: 238) has emphasized that ethnic activists and political

entrepreneurs often operate by reinforcing group fears of physical insecurity and

cultural domination and as political memories, myths and emotions magnify these fears,

they can produce a toxic brew of distrust and suspicion (Conteh-Morgan 1997: 99). The

diatribe attributed to the MP for Ningo/Prampram and the resultant furore had most of

these ingredients of cultural entrepreneurship. First, the MP vehemently denied the

report until a tape recording of the event was played. Second, the statement was spiced

with half-truths.15 Third, in an effort to repair the damage caused by Mensah’s diatribe

14 For instance, in the Effutu Constituency in the Central Region, there was confusion following the NPP parliamentary primary, largely because the winner, bore the President’s surname and was believed to be his relation.. Things went so bad that the prospective candidate had to withdraw for a fresh primary to be conducted. Kofi Wayo, a defected 2000 NPP parliamentary candidate for Ayawaso East, described the Kufuor administration as a family government and accused the president of being only interested in giving jobs to his family members who are no better than other Ghanaians.( The Chronicle 20 April 2004: 7)15 He indicated that it was former president Rawlings who created both the Greater Accra and Upper West Regions (The Daily Dispatch, 5 April 2004, pp1&8). The truth of the matter however is that while the Upper West region was created under the PNDC, the Greater Accra Region came into existence more than a decade before Rawlings first assumed the reins of power in 1979.

and perhaps to balance the politicized-ethnic equation, it soon appeared in an NDC-

friendly newspaper that the NPP MP for Nsuta Kwamang, Osei-Prempeh, had in a radio

programme some months earlier alluded to the fact that the people in Kumasi

(Ashantis) were more enlightened than those in Accra (Gas) (Crusading Guide 8-14 April

2004, pp. 1 & 3).

Apart from the tensed atmosphere that such accusations and counter-accusations

generated, they tended to divert attention from the major social, economic and political

issues on which the elections were supposed to be fought.

Sympathizing With or Exploiting the Dead King?

Another politico-ethnic issue which was always going to have its repercussions on

Election 2004 was the Dagbon crisis. Ever since the untimely death on the Ya Na, Yakubu

Andani II, in March 2002, the Dagbon crisis, the largely intra-family (Andani-Abudu) feud

with a long history of partisan political undertones, had remained a festering wound.

The Andanis have traditionally supported CPP and in the Fourth Republic, NDC; while

their half-brothers, the Abudus have been associated with the UP tradition whose

offshoot is the ruling NPP. Worse still, at the time of the crisis there was a long chain of

Abudus in the top hierarchy of the security apparatus, and indeed, the interior ministry

of the NPP government. The Interior Minister at the time, Malik Alhassan Yakubu, was

also the MP for Yendi. Under the circumstances, whatever the NPP government did16

could not shake off the perception that either by omission or commission it facilitated

the gruesome murder.

The opposition NDC served early notice of fishing in the muddy ethnic waters of Dagbon

in the election year. In January 2004, T-shirts bearing NDC symbols and the portrait of

the late Ya Na, were on sale in Dagbon. In a radio discussion, an NDC MP, Twumasi

16 The actions of the NPP government included a long-running state of emergency, a commission of enquiry, a committee of eminent chiefs and a monthly budget of 6 billion cedis (Accra Daily Mail, 30January 2004: 1-3)

Appiah, indicated that it should be taken to mean the NDC’s way of sympathizing with

the dead king. NDC flagbearer Mills promised, on assumption of office, to set up a new

and truly non-partisan, professionally competent and independent Presidential

Commission to re-open investigations claiming that it was unacceptable for an act of

daylight murder to be classified as war (Ghana Palaver, 19-22 March 2004: 2).

Dagbon also had its ripples within the ruling NPP. A section in the party had argued that,

as an Abudu, Vice President Aliu Mahama would be a liability to the NPP ticket if he was

retained as running mate by President Kufuor in Election 2004. NPP’s opponents had a

field day reading several meanings into the matter. Ghana Palaver (23-26 July 2004: 8)

reported that a strong anti-Aliu Mahama lobby had developed in the NPP dedicated to

ensuring that the Vice President was dropped as a running mate to President Kufuor;

that the real agenda of the group, made up mostly of Ashantis, was to make sure that

Aliu would not be around as Vice President in 2008 should President Kufuor win in order

to make a bid for the presidency.17 The twist in the tale however was that the same

article raised a series of issues virtually incriminating the Vice President in the murder of

the Ya Na and ended up raising the Andani-Abudu rivalry to the highest pitch.

Otumfuo’s Dynamism, Kufuor’s Headache

It is a real irony of fate that the dynamism and foresight of the Asantehene would

remain a major source of controversy for the first Ashanti president of the Republic. In

the election year of 2004, Otumfuo and his initiatives became big electoral issues,

perhaps no less controversial than the Dagbon crisis. In July 2004, the Asantehene, in

furtherance of the Promoting Partnership with Traditional Authorities Project (PPTAP),

earlier referred to, was granted $30million by the World Bank to undertake water and

other sanitation projects in Central, Volta, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions (Daily Guide,

27 July 2004: 1 & 12). Instead of commending this rare initiative, the extension of the

17 The paper cleverly claimed further Aliu’s presence would disturb a carefully worked out scenario designed to consolidate the Ashanti dominance of the NPP by putting up Trade Minister Alan Kyeremateng as NPP presidential candidate in 2008. (Ghana Palaver, 23-26 July 2004: 8)

project to other regions was given ethnic-tainted interpretations (The Chronicle, 14

August 2004: 2; Daily Guide, 27 July 2004: 1 &12). It was alleged, among other things,

that the Asantehene had not consulted the chiefs in the areas concerned or the National

House of Chiefs. Also, the effort was perceived as a political ploy to win votes in those

regions that were unlikely to vote for the NPP in 2004. Otumfuo’s public responses to

the above and other misconceptions about the project, and his caution that

ethnocentricism tended to frustrate those who were genuinely interested in the

country’s development, could do little to erase those misperceptions (The Ghanaian

Times, 27 July 2004: 1 & 3).

Sometimes the opposition-friendly media stretched the accusation of ethnocentricism

too far. But by persisting in such slanted reportage, it became difficult for the NPP

government to deny semblance of favouritism and the perception lingered on.18 The

biggest orchestration of all was the Ghana Palaver’s 5 November 2004 publication of an

alleged discovery of plans by the Kufuor administration on its re-election to make the

Asantehene King of Ghana and make Kufuor Prime Minister. Funny as this might seem

on reflection, the paper cleverly, if not maliciously, outlined a purported stage-by-stage

plan to achieve this on Ghana’s 45th Republican anniversary on 1 July 2005.19

An earlier incident that had also turned the scales of ethnocentricism against the NPP

was Agyare Koi-Larbi’s open letter to the president in July 2004. The NPP MP for

Akropong had drawn attention to what he perceived to be a threat to the cohesion of

the country by the government’s selective projection of chiefs; the Asantehene and

18 For instance, the Ghana Palaver (10-12 August 2004: 1 & 8) alluded to the fact that on their visits to the Castle, the seat of government, the Otumfuo and his retinue were received in the air-conditioned presidential lounge, while the new Nayir, Naa Boahugu Abudula of Mamprusi was received in the open air garden. Secondly, citing a Daily Graphic report of 24 July 2004, the Palaver further drew attention to the fact that Ashanti Region was the first to benefit 10 billion cedis from the Youth Fund disbursed as loans to skilled youth. 19 The alleged plan included the suspension of the current constitution and the crafting of a new one by the NPP using its 2/3-majority in parliament. And to give credence to the story, references were made to Asantehene’s role in the two Ghana Expo fairs in Britain and US, and a purported instruction from the President to all Ghanaian companies to make regular and handsome cash donations to the Manhyia Place before they are considered for contracts.

Okyehene were cited (Statesman, 28 July 2004: 3). Koi-Larbi became an instant ‘darling

boy’ of the opposition.20

NPP Government’s Response

The Kufuor government appeared persistently overwhelmed by the accusations of

ethnocentrism and so its response has generally been piecemeal, incoherent and

counter-productive:

In November 2003, Information Minister Nana Akomea in the process of

condemning cultural entrepreneurs following the ethnic press war earlier

referred to, had introduced inaccuracies/biases of his own (The Statesman, 18

November 2003).

In the heat of the election campaign, Vice President Mahama was compelled to

break his silence on the Dagbon crisis, because according to him, some

detractors were determined to use the unfortunate incident to score cheap

political points (Daily Graphic 10 August 2004: 5). But the Vice President did so,

after more than two years, at a meeting with the Zongo community in Takoradi

in the Western Region, as it were, far away from the ‘crime scene.’ Even then,

he argued rather mildly that it did not make sense to him that a government

which wants peace and progress would engage in or condone an action that

undermines the very conditions it is working for.

In a similar vein, the President had not visited Yendi since the Ya Na had died and

as the electoral campaign got underway, ‘To Visit, or Not To Visit Yendi’, became

a major electoral issue. As a face-saving device, the President declared he would

visit Yendi but would not campaign there while the dead king remained

unburied. Such a lame response again brought up the question of what the

20 Capitalizing on the political windfall, the opposition cleverly emphasized that the outgoing MP was only drawing attention to the ‘reality’ of the enhanced profile of the Asantehene over and above other chiefs in the country. Koi-Larbi was hailed as a thorough-bred Danquah-Busiaist whose father was one of the martyrs of that political tradition and praised for his bravery in raising the issue of ethnocentrism in his own party. The opposition then called on the NPP to see Koi-Larbi’s letter as a timely caution to avoid feeding into the perception of Ashanti dominance (Ghana Palaver, 10-12 August 2004: 1& 8). Ironically, when the same MP during Rawlings’ second term raised issues about ethnicity within the security agencies on the floor of Parliament, he was chastised by the then ruling NDC.

government’s reaction would have been had the murder occurred in Ashanti.

That in turn, attracted the retort that such a dastardly act would not happen in

Manhyia Palace (Daily Guide, 12 July 2004: 14).

Presidential Spokesman Kwabena Agyapong had reportedly, described Koi-Larbi

as ‘a person with bitterness in him perhaps because he was not given any

ministerial appointment… and that if he had performed well he would have gone

for re-election’ (Ghana Palaver, 10-12 August 2004: 1& 8). Clearly, the

accusation of the MP’s failure to develop his area was misplaced, since under the

1992 Constitution, the focus of local development was the District Assembly and

not the MP. The attack also depicted the NPP government as intolerant of

internal criticism. Not surprisingly, the opposition projected Koi-Larbi as a true

democrat who was being persecuted for speaking his mind. However, given the

impending elections, a memorandum to the president and party hierarchy

instead of an open letter could have served the party better.

President Kufuor chose to comment on accusations of ethnocentricism leveled

against the government during a courtesy call on him by the Asantehene and

perhaps inadvertently ended up reinforcing the views of the cynics. The

President had made reference to the Asantehene’s advocacy role in Ghana’s

effort to reach the completion point of the HIPC Initiative. That was capitalized

on by the cynics as a manifestation of his alleged ‘King of Ghana’ status. To them,

the Asantehene was usurping the powers of the President and Finance Minister.

Thus, his endeavours to salvage Ghanaians from their predicaments were

cleverly twisted and turned into a vicious charge of ethnocentricism, nepotism

and hegemonic intentions (Daily Graphic 27 July 2004 : 1 & 3; Daily Guide, 27

July 2004: 1 &12).

It must be emphasized that the impact of the media in this regard was great, especially

where FM stations have proliferated, featuring newspaper review programmes, phone-

ins and other programmes on the elections.

Pre-Election Ethnic Dynamics in the Regions

In the months leading to the elections there were intriguing regional developments

with ethnic undertones which either threatened or favoured the NPP’s re-election

bid:

In the Ashanti Region, the NPP slogan was ‘Operation 39’, meaning, it was going

to win all the seats in the party’s stronghold at both the presidential and

parliamentary polls.21 The assumption, in ethnic terms was that with an Ashanti

as an incumbent president, it was inconceivable that a constituency in the

Ashanti Region would vote against the NPP. The NDC while accepting its

underdog status in the region claimed that it would cause an upset by winning at

least ten parliamentary seats and 40% of the presidential vote. The situation in

the two constituencies the NPP lost in 2000- New Edubiase and Ejura

Sekyedumase- remained ethnically interesting. In New Edubiase in 2000, the NPP

had chosen an Ewe, Francis Dorpenyoh, in the hope of attracting the large Ewe

settler vote (Frempong 2001: 155). When he failed against NDC’s Theresa Baffoe,

he was appointed the DCE for the area in preparation for the 2004 contest. The

NDC in 2004 countered Dorpenyoh’s incumbency advantage as a DCE with an

Ewe candidate, Ernest Kofi Yakah, to set the stage for a ‘battle of Ewes in

Ashanti.’ In the other NDC ‘safe seat’ of Ejura-Sekyedumase, the NDC had

replaced its Ashanti incumbent, Sampson Atakora, with a northerner, Alhaji Issifu

Pangabu Mohammed, in its bit to retain the northern settler support. In the

Kumasi metropolis itself, the re-demarcation of constituencies had created in the

Asawase Constituency, a strong northern settler presence which posed a serious

threat to the NPP. Was the NDC candidate, Gibril Mohammed, going to cause an

upset against the well-resourced Akan NPP candidate, Patricia Appiagyei, in this

battle in which all the four other candidates were of northern descent?

In the Volta Region, the NPP had proclaimed turning the NDC’s electoral ‘World

Bank’ into a ‘rural bank’ and predicted 40% of the regional vote for the

21 The implication here was that the NPP was going to retain its thirty one seats and win the six newly created constituencies in addition to the two it lost to the NDC in 2000

incumbent president and at least seven parliamentary seats. A number of factors

might have accounted for this overconfidence on the part of the NPP. In 2000,

the NDC had maintained its hold on the Volta Region in part because it had

hyped the rumour that if the NPP came to power Voltarians would be driven

away to Togo and would need visas to enter Ghana. After four years in power,

the NPP had brought considerable developments to the region and there was no

sign of the purported expulsion order. In fact, the NPP parliamentary candidate

for South Dayi, E. K. Mallet, had argued that it would be unethical for the people

of Volta Region to refuse to vote for President Kufuor because in spite of the

region’s abysmal electoral support for the NPP government, it had been

magnanimous (Daily Guide, 11 November 2004: 7). In addition, the NPP had

among its parliamentary candidates well known politicians, at least four

ministers; while several of the NDC third term MPs had either stood aside or had

been defeated in the primaries and replaced by lesser known candidates. But the

dilemma which confronted the NPP in the Volta Region was aptly captured by

Kufuor’s passionate appeal in Ho to Voltarians to trust the NPP soon after he had

reportedly been hooted at as his entourage passed through Akatsi by people

allegedly dressed in NDC colours (Daily Graphic, 1 October 2004: 13). Had the

four years of NPP rule sufficiently allayed the Ewe suspicion of an Ashanti

President? Had the people in the region been convinced adequately enough that

the NDC was not going to recapture power in 2004?

In 2000, the Brong Ahafo had produced one of the most surprising results in

both the parliamentary and presidential polls. From 61.7% presidential vote and

17 out of 21 seats for the NDC in 1996, the region in 2000 gave the NPP 50.6%

and 14 seats. How was this ‘electoral chameleon’ of a region with traditional

discontent for Ashanti hegemony going to vote after four years of an Ashanti in

the Presidency?

Like Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra had made an electoral u-turn in 2000, replacing

its 1996 sixty-four percent presidential vote and 13 seats out of 22 for the NDC

with 52.5% and 16 seats for the NPP. The NPP had won surprise victories in

several of the traditional NDC strongholds in the region.22 But with the increased

anti-Ashanti sentiments among the indigenous Gas, could the NPP retain those

seats and make further in-roads in 2004?

In the Eastern Region, the NPP appeared to have no problem retaining its seats

in the predominantly Akan constituencies. It therefore concentrated its efforts in

winning for the first time the non-Akan speaking Krobo areas and the settler

dominated Afram Plains, Fanteakwa and Upper West Akim.

The Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions all appeared solidly for the

NDC as the NPP struggled to retain the few seats from previous elections with

the albatross of the Dagbon crisis hanging around its neck.

The Central Region presented the most intriguing scenario of all. It had refused

in 2000 to allow itself to be turned into the second electoral World Bank, for the

NDC in spite of Mills’ “son of the soil status”. With Mills still in the saddle for the

NDC, it seemed the region was not going to reject its own for a second time. At

the same time the NPP had for strategic reasons taken the region as one bye-

election constituency and given it a special attention in terms of development.

For the Western Region, it has traditionally voted like the Central Region, except

for the CPP’s dominance in first president Nkrumah’s Nzema district.

The Electoral Verdict

Election 2004 confirmed the dominance of the NPP and the NDC. The two parties won

between them more than 97% of the presidential vote with the remainder going to the

Grand Coalition and the CPP. In the case of the parliamentary seats the two major

parties won a total of 222 parliamentary seats leaving eight for the PNC-(4), CPP-(3) and

one independent. Four other parties contested but won no seats.23

22 Those constituencies included Ashaiman, Dade Kotopon, Klottey-Korle, Krowor, Odododiodoo, Ledzokuku23 These were Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE), National Reform Party (NRP), Great Consolidated People’s Party (GCPP) and Democratic People’s Party (DPP)

Table 9.1: Regional Breakdown of Election 2004 Results for NPP and NDC

Presidential Presidential Parliament Parliament

NPP (%) NDC (%) NPP (Seats) NDC (Seats)

Western 56.64 40.89 12 8

Central 58.57 46.37 16 2

Eastern 60.27 38.38 22 6

Ashanti 74.61 24.06 36 3

Brong Ahafo 51.96 46.05 14 10

Greater Accra 51.9 46.3 16 11

Subtotal 58.99 40.3 116 40

Volta 14.6 83.83 1 21

Northern 36.2 56.94 8 17

Upper East 31.66 53.9 2 9

Upper West 36.23 56.67 1 7

Subtotal 28.59 62.84 12 54

TOTAL 52.45 44.64 128 94

Source: IEA Governance Newsletter, January 2005 and Electoral Commission, 2004

Parliamentary and Presidential Results, December 2004

A careful analysis of the results of Election 2004 (Table 9.1 above) clearly indicates that

in broad terms they were not different from Election 2000. The results confirmed the

Akan/Non-Akan pattern of the previous contest. In the presidential poll, the NPP won

the same six regions it had won in 2000 – Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Central, Eastern,

Western and Greater Accra. The situation was similar at the parliamentary level except

that in 2000, the NDC had narrowly won majority of seats in Central and Western. With

the exception of Greater Accra, the other five regions have between 52% and 82% of the

population being Akan (See Table 9.2 below). Interestingly, Greater Accra with about

40% Akans has more Akans than the Eastern Region and about the same number as

Brong Ahafo Region (Table 9.2). Indeed, there are more Akans (39.7%) in Greater Accra

than Ga-Adangbes- the indigenous inhabitants of the region- who constitute 29.6% of

the population(Jonah 2005: 3; 2000 Population and Housing Census: 22). The NPP’s

share of the presidential vote in the six regions ranged between 51% and 75%. In the 5

Akan regions, the NPP garnered 100 of its 128 total parliamentary seats.

The reverse was the case in those regions that the NPP lost. Volta, Northern, Upper East

and Upper West, on the average gave less than 30% of their presidential votes to the

incumbent president; and in those four regions the NPP could garner only 12

parliamentary seats, less than 10% of its size in parliament. It must be emphasized that

in none of the four regions do Akans form more than 11% of the regional population.

Table 9.2: Percentage of AKANS in the Ten Regions of Ghana

Region Total Population Akan Population % Akan

Western 1,774,037 1,388,738 78.28

Central 1,474,584 1,208,608 81.96

Greater Accra 2,679,991 1,065,509 39.7

Eastern 1,980,719 1,031,498 52.08

Ashanti 3,154,862 2,458,088 77.91

Brong Ahafo 1,705,612 1,069,744 62.71

Volta 1,525,744 129,384 8.48

Northern 1,740,700 174,469 10.02

Upper East 851,537 19,186 2.25

Upper West 548,807 17,524 3.19

Source: 2000 Population and Housing Census, pp.22-23; cited in Jonah 2005:3

On its part, the NDC won no Akan region but had between 56% and 84% of the regional

presidential votes in the four Non-Akan regions that it won. More than 60% of NDC

parliamentary seats (54 out of 94) also came from the four Non-Akan regions. At the

presidential level, the best NDC performance in the Akan regions was 46.37% in the

Central Region, the home of its presidential candidate.

The analysis of the Akan/Non-Akan divide could be stretched further in terms of the

settler factor. In Ashanti Region, the only three seats the NPP lost to the NDC at both

parliamentary and presidential levels were Asawase, New Edubiase, and Ejura

Sekyedumase, well known for their significant Non-Akan settler communities. Indeed for

the latter two the NDC had dominated throughout the four elections since 1992. It is

also note worthy that in Ashanti, the 24% presidential vote for the NDC reflects closely

23% Non-Akan regional population (Table 9.2). The Eastern Region provides another

test case in this respect. Three of the six constituencies that the NDC won at both levels

were non-Akan- Yilo, Upper Manya and Lower Manya- Krobo. The other three, Upper

West Akim, Afram Plains South and Afram Plains North are Non-Akan settler-dominated.

And in Brong Ahafo, NDC took three of the four constituencies that share borders with

the Northern Region- Kintampo North, Pru and Sene. The only exception was Tain

(formerly Wenchi West) which the NPP captured for the first time in 2004.

The respective traditional dominance of the NPP and NDC in the Ashanti and the Volta

regions remained virtually intact. In Ashanti, the NPP won 36 out of 39 seats in both

polls. In the Volta Region, the NDC won 21 out of 22. The NPP only managed to win its

first seat in the Fourth Republic. Significantly, the Nkwanta North constituency is the

farthest from the Ewe-dominated south and, ironically, its parliamentary candidate one

of the least resourced. All the four high profile and better resourced minister-cum-

parliamentary candidates in Akan, Ketu North, Biakoye and Ho West, lost miserably in

spite of all the pre-election hype; perhaps a confirmation of the notion that in the Volta

Region, membership of NPP is seen as a sell-out. All that incumbent President Kufour

could get for his special efforts to court the region was 3.1% increase in the votes from

11.5% in the 2000 run-off to 14.6% in 2004. He had lost in all the 22 constituencies to

Mills and scored less than 10% in 12 constituencies.

The three northern regions retained their support for the NDC which won 33 of the

possible 49 seats and between 53% and 57% of the presidential vote. In Tamale South,

the prominent NPP candidate, Mustapha Idris, lost heavily to young Iddrisu Haruna but

this apparent ‘Dagbon fallout’ was balanced by Malik Yakubu’s surprise retention of the

Yendi seat.

It was also ethnically significant that the CPP and the PNC won two seats each in the

respective home districts of their founders/godfathers ex-presidents Kwame Nkrumah

and Hilla Limann – Ellembelle and Evalue Gwira (Western Region) in the case of the

former and for the latter, Sisalla East and West (Upper West Region)

Central Region: Heroes or Villians?

What appeared to be the surprise package in Election 2004 was the Central Region vote.

The NDC flag-bearer Mills trailed the incumbent president 46.37% to 58.57%, a

significant 12.2% in the former’s home region. Indeed, Mills lost in all the 19

constituencies except two - his home constituency, Mfatseman East and newly created

Twifo-Atti Morkwaa Constituency. At the parliamentary level, the NDC lost 8 seats,24

and found its previous regional parliamentary majority reduced to only two seats. Other

aspects of this electoral ‘Tsunami’ made the matter more intriguing. The NDC flagbearer

had improved his 2000 performance from 20.1% to 24.1% in the ‘lion’s den’ of Ashanti

Region where the incumbent President had his 2000 run-off vote of 79.9% reduced to

74.6%. Mills also performed better in the five other regions that the NPP won than he

did in the 2000 run-off except the Central Region (Electoral Commission, 2000 & 2004).

The reactions to the Central Region vote were charged with emotions and in the process

threw up several issues related to the Ethnicity-Democracy interface. Instead of

24 NDC lost seven seats to NPP (Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese, Agona East, Awutu-Senya, Effutu, Gomoa West, Hemang Lower Denkyira and Mfantseman West) and one, Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirem (KEEA), to the CPP.

applauding the non-ethnic performance of the Central Region and the moderating

influence it had on the ethnic divide there were anti-Fanti bashing. Ironically, Ashantis

and Ewes who voted largely on primordial lines were spared the scorn.

Sections of the Fante community in Kumasi reportedly witnessed widespread

incidents of taunting in the settler dominated suburbs of Oforikrom, Anloga and

Aboabo. According to The Chronicle, NDC supporters –mainly Ewes and

Northerners - were insistent that ‘Fantes are concert people and foolish for not

voting for their own.’ And that they should go and perform at the National

Theatre that the NDC built for them (Ghanaweb/ The Chronicle, 10 December

2004).25

In Accra NDC women activists felt the party needed to ‘storm the Central Region

and shake the place in a way for Fantis to see their mistake’. Others even

suggested, perhaps comically, that Mills renounced his Fanti ancestry and

naturalize as an Ewe (Ghanaweb/ GNA 10 December 2004).

Other commentaries, sometimes from well educated people, described the vote

in very unsavoury terms such as ‘a collective and vicious Fanti betrayal’, ‘a

political dagger’, a ‘thrust in the heart of their own’ (Ghanaweb 16 December

2004).

The emotions aside, a major factor that accounted for the rejection of Mills in the

Central Region was the Rawlings ‘baggage’. Doubts about Mills’ ability to shake off

Rawlings and be his own man that caused his defeat in the region in 2000 remained

(Frempong 2001: 158). This perception manifested in several ways:

Mills did himself a great disservice by adopting ‘Sankofa’ as his initial campaign

slogan. It was difficult explaining that it did not mean a return to atrocities of the

Rawlings era. ‘For A Better Ghana’- the party’s election manifesto arrived rather

too late.

25 This alleged taunt was particularly interesting given the political capital that the NDC made in 2000 of Kufour’s reported ‘Fantes are Jokers’ statement. Was it an admission of the truth or a sign of frustration?

The people of the region saw how Rawlings wanted to push his will on Kufuor

and wondered what he would do if Mills, who had promised to consult him 24

hours a day, were elected. The slogan ‘Vote for Mills and You Get Rawlings Free’

resonated well in Central Region.

At several stops during his campaign in the Central Region, Mills talked tough

and the more he did so the more he became cast in the mould of his mentor and

the more he confirmed the view that he was paving the way for his former boss.

In addition, Mills stance as a Fanti Warrior in the region did not fit into the image

of ‘the prince of peace’ (Asomdwiehene) he was projecting nationally (Daily

Graphic, 17 December 2004 p.14).

Some of the utterances of Rawlings were not only scaring but also insulting. His ‘I

will be Back’ speech at the launch of the NDC campaign in Cape Coast confirmed

their lingering fears. And his rumblings about the quality of drinking water in

Dunkwa brought back sad memories of his previous call on the people of Cape

Coast to learn the hygienic consciousness of the cat (Ghanaweb/The Chronicle 15

December 2004).

In a sarcastic sense, the people of Central Region felt by voting against Mills they were

releasing him from the political ramshackle of Rawlings

Central Region proved by its vote that its loyalties are not tied to primordial relations,

but to exigencies of the time and for strategic calculations. A careful analysis of the

voting pattern in the region since the Second Republic clearly confirms this view.26

The picture is even more interesting particularly at the presidential level in the Fourth

Republic. In 1992, Rawlings got 66.5%, though a number of the presidential candidates

were from the Central Region. In 1996 when none of the presidential candidates was

26 In 1969, the region gave all its 15 seats to Busia’s Progress Party (PP) (Boahen 1975: 235, 238; Badu & Larvie 1996:6). In 1979, neither the Popular Front Party (PFP) nor the United National Convention (UNC) that belonged to the Danquah-Busia tradition could win a single seat. Rather the seats were shared almost equally between the Nkrumahist People’s National Party (PNP) and the Action Congress Party (ACP), the party of home boy, Frank Bernasko (Badu & Larvie 1996:9).

from the region, Rawlings’ vote reduced by 10.8% to 55.7%. The 43.7% that Mills got in

the first round in 2000 represented another 12% reduction on the NDC’s 1996 vote. On

the other hand, the NPP’s 26% in 1992 climbed up by 16.9% to 42.9% in 1996. In the

first round in 2000, with three other sons of the region in the race, the ‘stranger’ Kufuor

bagged 49.7%. In the run-off, the region did its ethnic worst by again giving Kufuor

60.3% and Mills 39.7% and damned the consequences.

It should be clear therefore that the 58.8% of the vote that the Central Region gave

Kufuor was consistent with its voting tradition. Simply put, the hope that the NDC

banked on the region was, to all intents and purposes, a false one. And I have no doubt

that the Central Region will vote at the next election the way it will, depending on how

things go over the next four years. In my opinion, none was as objective as the Central

Region vote. It portrayed a high level of maturity and civility, a better appreciation of

democracy and independent-mindedness that must be applauded rather than

condemned. The voters in Central region were democratic heroes rather than the ethnic

villains that they were made to appear.

LESSONS

Several lessons can be distilled from this study; some of them positive others negative:

Election 2004, in spite of the apparent Akan/Non-Akan divide, confirmed that

legislative and presidential victories often require appeals across ethnic groups

to gain a minimum wining coalition. Clearly, Kufuor’s re-election would have

been in jeopardy without the support, however little, of the Non-Akan regions,

and so would have been the NPP parliamentary majority without the twenty

eight seats won from those five Non-Akan regions.

The Central Region vote showed the beauty of a free exercise of universal adult

suffrage, that Ghanaians must not vote for candidates merely because they

come from their home-village, town, district or region. It is therefore a blight on

democracy when people are ridiculed publicly for exercising their right in a

particular way, more so when as in the case of the Central Region, they were

doing the proper thing-rejecting ethnicity in favour of what they felt was in their

best socioeconomic interest.

It has also been confirmed by this study that ethnicity remains at the root of the

electoral process in Ghana, particularly as a tool of mobilizing grassroots

support. At the same time, pushing the ethnic card is one of the easiest ways to

inflame passions and arouse emotional responses. Analysing issues with tainted

ethnic goggles does not give room for objectivity; rather it beclouds people’s

sense of judgment and poisons the political atmosphere. Are we not heading for

a situation in which any critic of the Kufuor administration is automatically

branded an Ewe and NDC and any supporter an Ashanti and NPP?. But is the NPP

equal to Ashanti and the NDC synonymous with Ewe in a country whose

Constitution demands in Article 55 (4) that “Every political party shall have a

national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious,

regional and other sectional divisions”?

Election 2004 confirmed further that not even ethnicity, or any other factor

alone, can determine the outcome of elections. Other factors like region, level of

literacy and rural-urban ratio, poverty, unemployment, and government

performance (governance deficit or dividend) all work together to determine the

final outcome of the vote.

Unless democratic regimes can build a sense of overriding societal interests as a

whole, they are not likely to provide an effective bulwark against parochial

interests over the long term. A consensus vision of democracy, incorporating

various power sharing arrangements may be necessary to reassure weaker

parties about their security and the protection of their interests. Political actors,

therefore, should be prepared to live by and uphold democratic rules on

participation, transparency accountability and respect for diversity.

The emerging situation where even matters of national interests such as national

reconciliation, national health insurance, education, funding development

projects, tend to take ethnic and/or partisan interpretation does not augur well

for democracy. Such ethnic politics takes place at the expense of national ideals

and interests and spawns hatred, witch hunting, lack of inter-ethnic trust, ethnic

clashes, etc, which in turn, not only threaten to split the nation but also

endanger the security of individuals and their property

Freedom of expression can either make or mar democratic consolidation. The

media in particular could be an effective tool of civic education and the

management of peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence; if misused, the media could

inflame ethnic passions. Several examples of slanted reporting cited in this study

demonstrate the dangers that irresponsible journalism pose especially during

elections.

Overall, election processes in Ghana, despite their emphasis on individual choice and

the possibility of cross party voting, remain vulnerable to elite manipulation along

ethnic lines especially where elites play upon latent fears that members hold about

their group’s security and economic well being.

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the Ghanaian situation that democracy does not automatically and

necessarily lead to fewer ethnic conflicts; and that, ethnicity is a reality that can be

mobilized for electoral purposes. Therefore:

There is the need for sensitivity towards the interests and demands of various

ethnic groups as well as coherence and consistency in the manner in which

ethnic demands are addressed. Indeed, the success of the democratic

experiment in defusing ethnic tensions will depend on the speed with which

ethnic issues are recognized and attended to. It is important to enhance the

equitable distribution of national resources and transparent approach to the

recruitment into the civil and all other public services.

It must be emphasized that successful democratization requires continuous

interaction among interest groups over time. As elites reciprocate and political

exchanges occur, trust can develop among the various parties. But where some

elements of the political elite ignore the norm of moderation and engage in

efforts to outbid each other, the effect is increased ethnic tensions, particularly

as elections approach and the stakes in politics rise.

Leaders should as well encourage parties based on policies that transcend ethnic

conglomeration and ensure that they become instruments of public education

and not weapons of ethnic politics.

Democracy calls for civic education programmes in and out of school on

fundamental issues which affect the essence of interdependence and peaceful

co-existence between the ethnic groups. Civic education should develop,

conscientize and empower Ghanaians to appreciate and cope with social and

cultural diversities, without conflict. It should therefore be the duty of every

citizen to put up a national frontage and minimize the negative consequences of

ethnicity.

There is a further need for a shared history of cooperation through

intermarriages and common infrastructures which bring mutual dependence.

This will lead to the development of mutual sensitivity and the desire towards a

common peaceful future. A lot too can be achieved in ethnic relations through

policies that seek to deconstruct myths, stereotypes and prejudices through the

creative use of public discourse and humour.

Cultural diversity should not be seen as barrier to national unity and peaceful co-

existence. We are born of different ethnic groups we cannot change; but I

refuse to believe that because our ethnic groups have different backgrounds,

culture and customs, we cannot build a Ghanaian nation.

All said and done, since we cannot wish away the fact that Ghana is a nation of many

peoples and traditions, the country can only operate at its harmonious best when the

various cultures, traditions, languages and histories of all those peoples are reflected in

the project of nation-building.

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