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Ethnic Parity andDemocratic Pluralism inDagestan: A ConsociationalApproachRobert Bruce Ware & Enver KisrievPublished online: 01 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: Robert Bruce Ware & Enver Kisriev (2001) Ethnic Parityand Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: A Consociational Approach, Europe-AsiaStudies, 53:1, 105-131, DOI: 10.1080/09668130124419

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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2001, 105–131

Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralismin Dagestan: a Consociational Approach

ROBERT BRUCE WARE & ENVER KISRIEV

WHAT FACTORS PERMIT SOME ETHNICALLY and religiously segmented societies to avoidlarge-scale violence while others sink into protracted con� ict? The collapse of theSoviet Union has given rise to a variety of plural societies, the principal commonfeature of which has been their rapid, and seemingly irrevocable, descent along atrajectory of ethnic con� ict, political separatism and socioeconomic disintegration.Nowhere has this collapse had more tragic consequences than the Caucasus where,with rare exceptions, all administrative units have approximated this trajectory tovarying degrees. This study focuses upon perhaps the most dramatic of thoseexceptions.

The absence of protracted ethnic con� ict in the Russian Republic of Dagestanstands in stark contrast to its neighbours in the region, and indeed to the RussianFederation considered as a whole. For whereas the latter has been mired in horri� cethnic con� ict just across Dagestan’s border, in Chechnya, Dagestan has largelyavoided such dif� culties.

This is especially remarkable in that, even by regional standards, Dagestan isdistinguished by its extremes of ethnic diversity and economic deprivation. Indeed,Dagestan has been depicted (falsely, we will argue) as a miniature Soviet Union onthe verge of disintegration. With more than 34 ethno-linguistic groups, Dagestan is byfar the most ethnically heterogeneous of Russia’s republics. Apart from Chechnya, itis also the poorest. Since these conditions have been compounded by the rigours ofsocial transition, by the collapse of a central authority that previously guaranteedorder and subsidised most of the Dagestani economy, by an in� ux of refugees fromthe three bordering republics that have been mired in violent ethnic strife, bypressures of Islamic fundamentalism, by a virtual blockade during the � rst Chechencon� ict, by relative isolation following that con� ict, and by two cross-borderinvasions from Chechnya that played upon Dagestan’s internal ethnic and religiouscleavages, there would seem to be few localities with a greater potential for ethniccivil war.

Surprisingly, Dagestan is among the few administrative units in the Caucasus tohave avoided this fate. To be sure, there have been, and will continue to be, cases ofserious con� ict in the republic. Dagestan, undeniably, is mired in crime; kidnappinghas been fashionable and, apart from Chechnya, no Russian region has a higherincidence of terrorist acts. But mechanisms existing within Dagestani society have sofar prevented these trends from escalating into protracted ethnic con� ict. Ethnic

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/01/010105-27 Ó 2001 University of Glasgow

DOI: 10.1080/0966813002001650 3

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ROBERT BRUCE WARE & ENVER KISRIEV106

relations in Dagestan are extraordinary not only for their rich diversity but also fortheir relative tranquility.

Moreover, the results of the 1999 invasions by Chechnya-based militants have beennearly as cathartic for Dagestan as they have been catastrophic for Chechnya. Whilethe war resulted in the devastation of Grozny it stimulated a dramatic improvementin relations between Moscow and Mahachkala, Dagestan’s capital, and has con-tributed to the stability of the republic as a whole. Federal � nancial support for therepublic has increased by 270% since 1999, and the invasions actually helpedDagestan to resolve a number of previously intransigent social and political problems(Kisriev & Ware, 2000).

These developments invite questions: why have Dagestan’s fortunes differed sodramatically from those of Chechnya, with which it has close ethnic, religious andhistorical connections? Why has Dagestan neither disintegrated among variousseparatist movements, like the Soviet Union, nor been engulfed by enduring ethniccon� ict, like Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria? Whataccounts for the relative stability of Dagestan’s political institutions and ethnicrelations in the midst of its social and economic decay?

Paradoxically, it appears to be Dagestani society’s intricate ethnic structure, thevery cause of some of its most pressing problems, that has inhibited con� ictingelements from taking radical steps. This has involved the development and preser-vation of a complicated and often precarious parity among the 30 plus ethnic groupsthat comprise the peoples of Dagestan.

We will suggest that Dagestan’s political stability is drawn initially from itstraditional social structure and sustained, since the rati� cation of its constitution in1994, by a political system that is compatible with consociational models. Indeed, wewill suggest that there may be certain similarities between the former and the latter.Yet while we suggest that Dagestan’s political stability owes much to its quasi-conso-ciational political system, we also � nd developments that offer to augment theories ofmodernisation and consociational democracy. While some of these are attributable toDagestan’s social traditions, others derive from its recent socioeconomic transform-ation. Hence this study might be regarded as suggesting a need for the broaderextension of consociational analyses to the problems of transitional societies.

We begin with a brief review of the relevant literature before focusing uponDagestan’s social traditions and political institutions in order to assess their compati-bility with consociational models. We conclude by considering ways in which theDagestani case diverges from some existing models.

What are the causes of ethnic con� ict and accommodation?

Whereas cultural pluralist theories have conceived of ethnic con� ict as a clash ofincompatible values (Furnivall, 1948; Smith, 1973, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1986, 1988,1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1992), modernisation and economic interest theories considercon� ict as the struggle for resources and opportunities that are valued in common(Allensworth, 1998; Barrera, 1969; Bates, 1974; Brass, 1976; Deutsch, 1956, 1969a,1969b; Melson & Wolpe, 1969; Pennar, 1971; Perdue, 1995; Pirages, 1972; Sigelman,1971). Where cultural pluralist theory stresses separation and isolation of the different

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 107

ethnic groups, modernisation and economic interest theories emphasise contact andcompetition. Where one speaks of divergence and disengagement, the other under-scores convergence and consensus.

This debate has been echoed in various consociational models of ethnic accommo-dation. Arend Lijphart (1977a) de� nes consociational democracy ‘in terms of both thesegmental cleavages typical of a plural society and the political cooperation of thesegmental elites’. He explains that in a consociational democracy ‘the centrifugaltendencies inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudesand behaviour of the leaders of the different segments of the population’, and heemphasises that pragmatic accommodation among elites is the principal featuredistinguishing the consociational model. In particular, Lijphart’s account has lentcurrency to concepts of a ‘grand coalition of the political leaders of all signi� cantsegments of the plural society’ and the ‘mutual veto’ or ‘concurrent majority’ rule,which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests.

Many consociational models (Esman, 1986, 1994; Horowitz, 1975, 1985, 1993;Kymlicka, 1995; Lijphart, 1977a; Nordlinger, 1972) have involved a macrostructuralemphasis on proportionality among ethnic groups and the expression of ethnicautonomy through federal arrangements. Yet while the view that territorial boundariesshould correspond with ethnic divisions has received considerable support (Duchacek,1977; Kymlicka, 1995; Lijphart, 1977a; Watts, 1992), some scholars (Esman, 1986,1994; Horowitz, 1975, 1985, 1993; Nordlinger, 1972) have been more cautious, anda few (Lipset, 1960, 1963; Ware, 1993, 1998b) have defended the Madisoniancontention that ethnic cleavages are bene� cially crosscut by territorial boundaries. Toone extent or another, all of these investigations have underscored the importance ofapproximate long-term parity, proportionality, reciprocity and autonomy in achievingaccommodation among ethnic groups. However, none of these studies has considereda case that compares with the ethnic heterogeneity of Dagestan.

Who are the Dagestanis?

Dagestan is by far the most ethnically and linguistically diverse republic in theRussian Federation. The Republic’s people are culturally, linguistically and territori-ally divided among more than 30 recognised ethnic groups, ranging in populationfrom 1000 to more than 500 000. Dagestan’s multi-national political system is notonly an ethnographic peculiarity, but a complicated framework which has evolvedover several centuries, and which has long supported the whole of the socio-politicalsystem. The stability of the society, bursting with all sorts of serious problems, isdependent upon a complex balance of power among ethnic elites, each with a powerbase in one of these groups. Most of these groups have their own language, living,for the most part, in newspapers, magazines, theatre and television programmes, aswell as village conversation.

Some of these belong to a single Dagestan branch of the Ibero-Caucasian lan-guages. These include Andis, Botliks, Karatints, Akhvakhs, Bagulals, Tindints,Chamalints, Godoberints, Tsezs or Didoyts, Khvarshints, Ghinukhts, Beshtints orKaputchins, Gunzibts and Archins. All of these groups identify themselves as Avars,which is consequently Dagestan’s largest ethnic group. Avars total 577 100 persons

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(all ethnic statistics are approximations, see Kisriev, 1999), or 28% of Dagestan’s2 137 600 people (July 1996).

The second largest group is the Dargins, including Kubachins and Kaitags, whocomprise 16% of the population, with 333 000 persons. Living near to the Dargins,in the central regions of the Dagestani highlands, are approximately 100 000 Laks,constituting 5% of the total.

The Lezgins occupy the southernmost tip of Dagestan, traditionally inhabiting anarea that extends from the Caucasian highlands to the shores of the Caspian Sea andinto neighbouring Azerbaijan. Unlike the Avars, members of this group are registeredof� cially as separate nationalities. These are proper Lezgins, with 250 000 people or12.5%; Tabasarans, with 95 000 or 4.5% of the population; Rutuls comprising 17 000or 0.8%; 16 000 Aguls with 0.75%; and 6500 Tsakhurs, 0.3% of the total.

On the Caspian lowland to the north of Derbent, back to the foothills and north onthe Tersko-Sulack plain live an Altaic people known as the Kumyks, whose languagebelongs to the Turkic branch. Kumyks number 268 000 people, or 12.5%. In the sameregion, and predominantly in the Khasavyurt district, live Chechen-Akkins, or AukovChechens, a Veinakh people; 95 000 Dagestanis, or 4.5%, are of Chechen ethnicity.

North of these groups, along the Terek River, in the Kizlyar and Trumovskydistricts, and including the town of Kizlyar are concentrated 150 000 Russiannationals comprising 7% of Dagestan’s population. In the semi-arid region further tothe north live 35 000 members of another Turkic group. These Nogais make up only1.6% of Dagestan’s population, but there are another 37 000 Nogais nearby inChechnya and the Stavropol region of Russia.

Though Sunni Muslims predominate, Dagestan also contains 90 000 Shiite Azeris1

constituting 4.2% of the population, and signi� cant populations of Christians andJews. In the southern part of the Caspian lowland, in the town of Derbent and in thenearby foothills, live 12 000 mountain Jews, known as Tats, whose language belongsto the Iranian group. Together with another 6000 Jews residing in Dagestan theycomprise 0.8% of the population.

While Dagestan’s cities have long been multiethnic, the countryside traditionallyhas been a mosaic of ethnic territories. Recently, economic and political pressures,most notably from refugees, have increased ethnic heterogeneity in rural areas. Therethe scarcity of land and the paucity of economic development have yet to deter theexpansive birth rate. The population has doubled in the past 30 years, and theRepublic regularly appears at or near the bottom of the list of Russian republics fora wide range of socioeconomic indicators.

Why has Dagestan diverged from Chechnya?

Sometimes Dagestan appears at the bottom of such lists alongside Chechnya. Yet acasual glance at the indicators may be deceptive, for developments in Dagestan andChechnya are following remarkably divergent paths (Ware & Kisriev, 2000a; Kisriev& Ware, 1999, 2000). In August 1999 the extent of this divergence came equally asa surprise to Chechen militants, such as Shamil Bassaev, and to Kremlin leaders, suchas Vladimir Putin. Muscovites tend to assume that all of the dark-complexionedpeoples of the Caucasus are united in their hostility to Russian rule. Hence both

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 109

Muscovites and militants were thrown off guard in August 1999 when Dagestanisoverwhelming af� rmed their solidarity with Russia and resisted a series of invasionsby guerillas based in neighbouring Chechnya and bent on the establishment of aradical Islamic state. Given the close geographical, historical, ethnic and religious tiesbetween Dagestan and Chechnya, how can their divergence be explained?

The explanation for these events begins with the development of Dagestanipolitical relations during the recent social transformation. The collapse of theauthoritarian state structure led to the re-emergence of traditional values, institutionsand social organisations. Prior to both Tsarist and Soviet regimes, Dagestani life wasdominated by a system of djamaats. A djamaat is a community organised politicallyand de� ned along territorial and historical lines. Typically, it is a village or a groupof villages with an historical connection. Each djamaat consists of a few, andsometimes as many as 10, different tribal or ancestral structures, known as tuhums.Each tuhum is a broadly extended and closely connected family. Governments of thedjamaats traditionally consisted of councils of elders drawn from each of theconstituent tuhums. This is to say that a traditional djamaat might be considered asa proto-consociational society insofar as it is a plural association consisting ofsegmented kinship structures, and governed cooperatively by elites drawn from eachof these segments. The independent djamaats were governed by adat, customary andsometimes written law, which structured a complex of economic, political andsocio-cultural norms that collectively distinguished Dagestan as a coherent culturalentity.

For more than 500 years Dagestan has been a separate country, set apart fromShiites in the South, Christians in the West and Chechens to the North. From the endof the 15th century Dagestani life was de� ned not by tribal relations but by the civiland political structures of the djamaats, which operated in a manner analogous to theancient poleis. From this period onward the civil and judicial structures of thedjamaat successfully transcended ethno-tribal connections, which thereafter graduallydiminished in their signi� cance. The adat restricted the intra-tribal solidarity amongmembers of the djamaat and demanded the subordination of kinship concerns to thepolitical integrity of the community.

Despite the independence and sovereignty of the djamaats, a uni� ed Dagestanemerged through common faith in Islam and an integrated intelligentsia consisting ofeducated alimi (Dagestanis typically do not use ulama). Hence Dagestan’s ethno-linguistic diversity did not play a decisive role in its early political development.Citizens of most djamaats spoke the same language, but this was not the reason fortheir connection. On occasion, indeed, ethnic homogeneity of some djamaats tendedto provoke resort to arti� cial extra-ethnic distinctions. In short, ethnic identi� cationwas not a factor in the socio-political discourse of traditional Dagestan. Rather it hasbeen traced to Soviet ethnic policies (Ware, 1998) and to the national movements thatsprang up in the late 1980s and early 1990s as loci of grassroots agitation and elitelegitimation (Ware & Kisriev, 1999; Kisriev & Ware, 2000).

Though the national movements remain a factor, their signi� cance has faded as thesocial transformation has progressed, and especially as Dagestan’s 1994 constitutionprovided new sources for authority. Gradually, the national movements have givenway to traditional structures of social solidarity, which are now consolidating as an

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informal foundation of the formal political system. Thus the djamaats have begun tore-emerge through the course of the transformation and the consequent struggle forcontrol of the economic and political legacies of socialism. Despite the super� cialappearance of national movements and Western-style political parties, Dagestanipolitical life has settled increasingly into its traditional patterns.

The resulting political organisations may be described as ‘ethnoparties’ since theydisplay many attributes of Western-style political parties. However, ethnoparties arepeculiar in that their entire membership and base of support consist of a singledjamaat. An ethnoparty may include some activists from another ethnic group, but allkey positions of leadership and support are � lled by djamaat members. Every ethnicgroup receives representation through its ethnoparties, yet because ethnopartiestypically are concerned primarily with local interests they do not represent an entireethnic group. The leaders of ethnoparties may unite with leaders of the same ethnicity,but they may also form alliances against other leaders of their ethnic group by unitingwith other ethnic groups. As a result, Dagestan has seen the emergence of djamaat-based elites. The elites devote all of their efforts to maintaining and strengtheningtheir control over their supporters by proportionate measures of pressure and con-cession.

The traditions of the Dagestani djamaat, transcending both kinship and ethnicstructures, provide a basis for the stabilisation of a political system which, howeverfragile, has nevertheless endured in the face of extraordinary crises, and whichincreasingly provides for peaceful integration into Russia’s federal system. Small-scale political organisation was ideally suited to Dagestan’s rugged terrain, wheregroups cluster in alpine valleys, and the people on the other side of the mountainspeak a different language. But after the revolution, when the Soviet authoritiescombined its diverse ethno-linguistic groups to form the Republic of Dagestan, thetraditions of the djamaat became the basis for a political organisation that transcendedkinship barriers. Dagestanis developed a trans-ethnic national identity and settledfairly comfortably within the Soviet federal system, which was, for them, in somerespects, the djammat writ large. Today most Dagestanis are nostalgic for that system,which brought them pavement, plumbing, electricity, education, sexual equality andsecurity.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Dagestanis re� exively remained withinthe Russian Federation, adopted a new constitution in 1994, and set about thedevelopment of a unique political system, as described in the following sections.While Dagestan lacks neither factionalism nor self-seeking, it nevertheless has beenable to channel these forces into a uni� ed Dagestani identity and an authoritativepolitical system. The traditions of the djamaat as the informal foundation ofDagestan’s political system have much to do with this fragile success, but so does thequasi-consociational expression that those traditions have received in Dagestan’sconstitution.

The constitutional djamaat

The 1994 constitution echoes traditions of the djamaat insofar as it provides acodi� ed framework for transcending kinship structures through the cooperative

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 111

interactions of elites. Dagestan’s ethnic diversity is the de� ning feature of its politicalsystem, which conforms with consociational models at a number of different points.Article 88 of the constitution requires that ‘there cannot be more than one represen-tative of each of fourteen major ethnic groups’ on the Republic’s chief executivebody, the Gos Sovet (State Council, or SC); and a representative of the same ethnicgroup cannot ‘be elected chairman of the State Council for two consecutive terms’(Art. 93). Indeed, the collegial nature of this executive has a consociational basis.Dagestanis have thrice rejected referenda (most recently on 7 March 1999) that wouldhave created an individual presidency for fear that it would give too much power toa single ethnic group. The chairman of the SC is elected by its members for a � xedterm, a restriction intended to provide for the rotation of the chair among the council’smembers. This system of rotation was devised as a compromise among ethnic eliteswho feared, � rstly, a violent and precipitous ethnic struggle for this powerful position,and secondly, the loss of ethnic balance through the in� uence of an individualexecutive. The chairman of the SC appoints two vice-chairmen.

While institutionally distinct from the SC, the Cabinet of Ministers (Sovet Min-istrov) is subordinate to the executive power of the former. The ministers areresponsible to the chairman of the SC and not to that body as a whole. Hence, thechairman is the most powerful position in the land. The Head of the Cabinet, or PrimeMinister (at present a Kumyk named Hizri Shiksaidov), is at the same time one of thetwo deputy chairmen of the SC. By convention the highest of� cials in each branchof government are selected from different ethnic groups.

Under the new constitution, representatives to the new People’s Assembly (Narod-noe Sobranie) were � rst elected in March 1995, and again in March 1999. While the� rst election was highly contentious, involving violent incidents and several fatalities,the second election proceeded more smoothly. The assembly consists of 121 mem-bers, of whom the chairman, two deputy chairmen, the heads of � ve standingcommittees and two or three members of each committee (about 25 people) serve ona continuous basis. Some members are popularly elected and others are appointed bythe raiony (districts). The function of the assembly is largely restricted to legislationand budgetary allocations.

However, the People’s Assembly also comprises one half of the ConstitutionalAssembly. The latter is formed from the entire People’s Assembly plus an equalnumber of delegates (i.e. 121 1 121 5 242) elected from the municipalities andraiony particularly for the occasion of any given convention of the ConstitutionalAssembly in the same ethnic proportions (see below) as the delegates to the People’sAssembly. The Constitutional Assembly considers Constitutional Amendments andelects members of the SC.

Each member of the Constitutional Assembly can nominate one candidate for theSC, and the three individuals from each ethnic group with the greatest number ofnominations are then placed on a ballot for the SC. Any member of the ConstitutionalAssembly may vote for any SC candidates regardless of nationality. This system ofselection promotes political integration and stability insofar as it favours individualswith cross-national support. Owing to the extent of Dagestan’s ethnic diversity,candidates with support from several nationalities are likely to receive more nomina-tions than those whose support is concentrated within a single group. Single group

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candidates are even less likely to triumph in the � nal vote. It is signi� cant that noleader of a national (mono-ethnic) movement has been elected to the SC. Those whoare elected are regarded as the most in� uential members of their ethnic groups, butthey do not attain that position through ethnic chauvinism. This process is intendedto ensure that the government is made up of individuals and interests that favourstability and seek moderate and conciliatory solutions to con� icts occurring betweensegments of the population.

Yet the power of the People’s Assembly has been increasingly overshadowed bythe growing executive power of the SC. In particular, the chairman of the assemblyhas come to be signi� cantly less powerful than the chairman of the SC, and the powerof the latter is growing. This imbalance has a destabilising potential, for Dagestan isedging toward a de facto presidential-style system, which it has thrice rejected.Moreover, the � rst (and only) chairman of the SC, a Dargin named Magomedali M.Magomedov, declined to yield his position at the end of his two-year term, precipitat-ing a constitutional crisis.

The constitution stipulates that the SC should be elected at four-year intervals, butthe � rst SC (according to the transitional chapters of the constitution) was electedonly for two years. By February 1996 it became clear that Magomedov would notsurrender power in June at the end of this two-year term, but intended to continue fora further two years. The assembly, led by an Avar named Mukhu Aliev, initiallyresisted this move. However, all non-Avar representatives were quickly offeredincentives by the executive branch. By March Avar representatives found themselvesinsuf� ciently numerous to prevent the assembly from extending Magomedov’s termof of� ce for two years on the grounds of ‘exceptional circumstances’. The Avarsappealed to the Constitutional Court, which upheld the extension on 19 March.Nevertheless, on 21 March the assembly voted to convene the Constitutional As-sembly. The vote of this convention on 22 March � nally extended the term of the SCby two years, until the summer of 1998. In the spring of 1998 Magomedovmanoeuvred to obtain the support of two-thirds of the People’s Assembly for aconstitutional amendment permitting the chairman of the SC to seek a second term.

On 25 June 1998 the Constitutional Assembly met to select from among twocandidates for chairman of the SC: Magomedali Magomedov and SharaputdinMusaev. The latter is, like Magomedov, a Dargin, who served as chairman of theRepublic’s Pension Foundation prior to his removal in 1999 on charges of corruption.Musaev and other of� cers of the Foundation made their fortunes by regularly delayingpension payments and using the money to make millions of dollars for themselves.In a secret ballot Musaev received 78 votes to Magomedov’s 162. The assembly alsoapproved Magomedov’s nomination of Shikhsaidov as Prime Minister.

These events were followed by the nomination and election of the remaining 12members of the State Council. Only three seats were unopposed: in contests for seatsallotted respectively to Aguls, Russians and Tats one of two candidates withdrew infavour of the other. In the cases of the Aguls and Tats the remaining candidate wasa woman. Candidates for the nine remaining seats won by slim majorities. Nearly50% of the SC are new members from the following nationalities: Avar, Lezgin, Lak,Rutul, Tabasaran and Tsakhur. Representatives were re-elected from the followinggroups: Agul, Azeri, Chechen, Dargin, Kumyk, Russian and Tat.

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Does Dagestan’s electoral system display consociational features?

Dagestan’s electoral system is designed to avoid the marginalisation of any group andto ensure the representation of all nationalities in proportion to their numbers. Theseobjectives could not be ensured unless the authorities had complete control of thenomination process. Though the Communist Party previously exercised such control,this is no longer feasible. During recent elections the government consequently hasdepended upon informal agreements among ethnic groups. Where this is insuf� cientthe Electoral Commission has the authority to allocate seats to members of a givenethnic group.

Article 72 of the Dagestani Constitution establishes that in the People’s Assembly‘representation of all the peoples of Dagestan shall be guaranteed’. A law on electionsto the People’s Assembly of Dagestan lays down a procedure guaranteeing therepresentation of all the constituent nationalities in proportion to their share of theRepublic’s population. Of the 121 single-mandate electoral districts for elections tothe assembly, 66 districts with multinational populations are designated by theElectoral Commission as ‘national electoral districts’ (e.g. an Avar district, a Lezgindistrict, etc.). Within these districts only candidates of a single pre-determinednationality can run for election, though voters of all national groups may select fromamong these candidates. This is done to avoid inter-ethnic confrontations duringelections and to achieve the necessary proportions of ethnic representation. Of the 66nationally de� ned electoral districts, 12 are Avar districts, 12 Kumyk, 10 Russian,seven Dargin, � ve Tabasaran, � ve Azeri, four Lezgin, four Chechen, three Lak, twoTat, one Nogai and one Tsakhur.

Most of the remaining 55 electoral districts are in mountainous regions, whosepopulations are largely mono-ethnic. The exception was the Rutul region, where twoelectoral districts were established: one for the Rutuls and one for the Tsakhurs, theleast numerous of the Republic’s peoples. Table 1 shows that, as a result of thesecareful arrangements, each of Dagestan’s 14 principal ethnic groups achieved, in 1995as well as in 1999, a representation in the assembly that was almost preciselyproportionate to its representation in the total population. However, the proportion ofChechen representatives was somewhat lower, and that of Dargin representatives wasslightly higher, than their respective population proportions. Notably, for an Islamicsociety, the Tats, or Mountain Jews, have bene� ted, in both assemblies, from slightover-representation.

Some ethnic groups (such as Kumyks, Azeris, Russians, Chechens and Tats) liveentirely in multi-ethnic rural regions or in Dagestan’s multi-ethnic cities. Other ethnicgroups (including Avars, Laks and Lezgins) inhabit primarily mono-ethnic territories.Thus, for example, the 21 Avar representatives who are not from designated Avardistricts are from districts in which the population is overwhelmingly Avar.

This system of designated ethnic electoral districts has been widely criticised byDagestan’s democratic intelligensia, who regard it as a violation of civic equality andthe individual’s right to stand for election in a district of choice. Prior to the election,in February 1999 (Ware & Kisriev, 2000c), this system was scrutinised, at theinsistence of certain democratic organisations, by the Constitutional Court of theRepublic of Dagestan. The court concluded that designated electoral districts did not

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ROBERT BRUCE WARE & ENVER KISRIEV114

TABLE 1DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND ETHNIC REPRESENTATION IN DAGESTAN’S FIRST AND

SECOND ASSEMBLIES COMPARED WITH REPRESENTATION IN POPULATION

Number of ethnic Number of assembly Percentage of ethnic Percentage ofelectoral diststricts representatives group in assembly ethnic group

(%) in populationEthnicgroup 1995 1999 1995 1999 1995 1999 1995–99a(%)

Avars 12 12 33 33 27.3 27.3 27.9Dargins 5 7 21 21 17.3 17.3 16.0Kumyks 12 12 16 15 13.2 12.4 12.5Lezgins 4 4 14 14 11.6 11.6 12.5Russians 10 10 10 10 8.6 8.6 7.0b

Laks 3 3 6 6 5.0 5.0 5.0Tabasarans 5 5 5 6 4.1 4.9 4.5Azeris 5 5 5 5 4.1 4.1 4.2Chechens 4 4 4 4 3.3 3.3 4.5c

Nogais 0 1 2 2 1.6 1.6 1.6Tats (and other Jews) 2 2 2 2 1.6 1.6 0.8Rutuls 0 0 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8Aguls 0 0 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.75Tsakhurs 1 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.3

Notes:a Approximate.b Whereas explosive birth rates in Dagestan, and anti-Caucasian sentiments elsewhere in the Federation,have contributed to increases in other ethnic populations since 1996, Russians are migrating out ofDagestan.c While this number excludes refugees, Chechen immigration in to Dagestan has been high as aconsequence of instability in Chechnya; and while Dagestani law prevents the sale of flats to Chechens,some Chechens disguise their ethnic identity through falsi� ed documents . Many others reside in Dagestanillegally. Hence this � gure is problematic.

violate Dagestan’s constitution, and that they were consistent with guarantees madeto minorities by Articles 1, 2, 4, 5 and 72 (Dagestanskaya Pravda, 2 February 1999).

In addition to designated ethnic districts, Dagestani electoral laws also provided forseven women’s districts and several ‘professional’ (or ‘full-time’) districts. Whereas96 representatives serve on a part-time basis, while retaining their principal means ofemployment, the remaining 25 representatives serve full-time as administrativeof� cers of the assembly or members of standing committees. Only individuals whoare able to leave their jobs for full-time parliamentary positions are permitted to runfrom districts that are designated for full-time representatives. In a few cases a singleelectoral district was designated simultaneously as an ‘ethnic’, ‘women’s’ and‘professional’ district, so that the only candidates permitted to stand were women ofa certain ethnic group who were able to leave their jobs.

Following formal protests, the constitutional court abolished ‘women’s’ districts onthe grounds that they violated the constitution, Articles 19, 21 (Parts 1 and 2) and 32(Parts 1 and 2). The court decided that such districts undermined individual equalityand discriminated against men (Dagestanskaya Pravda, 4 February, 1999). However,when several men immediately declared their candidacy in these districts publicopinion was aroused against them. Perhaps in part for this reason, women hold sixseats in the Second Assembly whereas they held only three in its predecessor.

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 115

Electoral districts are also de� ned nationally for regional and town assemblies soas to ensure ethnically proportional representation in local government. For example,in the Khasavyurt raion the administration determined the ethnic allocation of the 39seats in the local soviet: Avars (14), Kumyks (13), Chechens (nine), Dargins (two)and Lezgins (one). Since most of the villages in the raion are monoethnic, their seatswere assigned to their respective nationalities. Where villages were mixed, the seatwas assigned to the largest nationality. In urban areas electoral districts were reservedfor speci� c nationalities when their members constituted the bulk of the inhabitants.Leaders of different nationalities were able to arrive at an agreement concerning theallocation of more ambiguous districts. The Electoral Commission refused to recog-nise the validity of candidates from groups other than that to which a district had beenassigned. Neither Kumyks nor Chechens in Khasavyurt have been entirely satis� edwith their allotments.

In some cases the approach is clearly unsuccessful. Consider, for example,Makhachkala’s June 1994 elections in which Avars, who constitute 20% of thepopulation, took 50% of the seats; Dargins, with 10% of the population, won 30% ofthe seats; Kumyks and Lezgins each won two seats despite the fact that theyrespectively constitute 14% and 10% of the city’s inhabitants. With 10% of thepopulation Laks held only a single seat, and though 20% of the city is Russian theyheld no seats at all. Kaspiisk elected no Lezgin, Russian or Kumyk representativesthough Kumyks account for 10% of the municipal population, Russians for 22% andLezgins are the largest national group. Though Kizilyurt is 15% Kumyk none of themwas elected. While accepting that individuals should be elected on their merits, andwhile encouraging cross-national voting, the government is nonetheless concernedthat such results may leave some groups feeling marginalised. In Makhachkala tennew seats were created, and a new election was held in which Dargins and Avarswere barred from candidacy.

The government has been considering other electoral strategies for theachievement of balanced results. Interestingly, it has rejected the proposalof a two-chamber Dagestani Assembly with a lower house representing eachnationality in proportion to its size and an upper house providing equalrepresentation for every ethnic group. In a sense, however, this system is alreadyin place, since the SC provides a single seat for each ethnic group regardless of itssize.

Alternatively, a system of proportional representation would have advantagesinsofar as it offered enough seats in each constituency to ensure that alllocal nationalities had a reasonable chance of representation. Yet even an effectiveproportional system would be challenged by the ethnic heterogeneity ofDagestan’s larger towns. And insofar as Dagestan’s pre-eminent political goal isstability, a proportional system might also have disadvantages. As existing singlemember constituencies generally favour political centrism, Dagestani candidates aremore likely to succeed when they organise across ethnic lines and avoid ethnicextremes. This has tended to marginalise the popular leadership of national move-ments and to favour established elites, local celebrities and others with a broadfollowing.

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What are the consociational features of Dagestan’s political system?

No analysis of Dagestan’s political stability would be complete without considerationof its patently consociational features, for these have had much to do with Dagestan’sability to avoid, and perhaps ultimately transcend, entrenched ethnic cleavages. Yetclearly there was no intent to base the Dagestani political system upon consociationalmodels. Consociational features of Dagestani politics may be attributed to the generaldemands of any highly segmented society, as � ltered through ancient social traditionswhich were themselves in� uenced by such demands. Hence a consociational analysiswill suit some features of Dagestan’s political system better than others, and we willsuggest that whereas the formal structure of Dagestani politics displays a number ofconsociational aspects, its informal political practices involve elements that are novelin consociational literature.

It is signi� cant that Dagestan’s traditional political system is also based uponpolitical structures that speci� cally transcend the bonds of kinship through govern-ments based upon written law and the consensual administration of elites. This was,in fact, the function of the traditional Dagestani djamaats, based upon the applicationof adat by councils of elders drawn from the constituent tuhums. In other words, thedjamaats historically have displayed proto-consociational features that have served toin� uence the political culture within which Dagestan’s constitution was framed.

There is little dif� culty in identifying consociational elements of contemporaryDagestani politics. For example, it is dif� cult to imagine a better illustration ofLijphart’s grand coalition than Dagestan’s State Council, with its 14 representativesof Dagestan’s principal ethnic groups. The original constitutional mandate for therotation of the chair of the SC after four-year terms was a particularly interestingarrangement from a consociational standpoint since it seemed to guarantee that noelite from any single group could retain power for long enough to establish an ethnicdynasty in the various branches of power. However, constitutional amendments to thisinstitution have edged Dagestan toward a de facto presidential system, and haverisked dangerously disproportionate power in a single segment of the population. Thisis all the more signi� cant in light of the 15 February 1998 election of Said Amirovto the highly in� uential position of Mayor of Mahachkala. Like the chairman of theState Council, Amirov is a powerful Dargin, who, in fact, was previously appointedby Magomedov to the post of vice-prime minister. Nevertheless, � erce rivalriesamong Dargin elites thus far have prevented consolidation of ethnic power, even atthe cost of numerous acts of violence among principal players.

Yet while these events bring Dagestan closer to a de facto presidential system, andwhile they have not occurred without political cost and democratic peril, the structureof the SC fundamentally remains both consensual and consociational. It should alsobe emphasised that the successful elections of SC and assembly members, though notwithout violent disturbances, were evidence of the success of this coalition inrepresenting the components of Dagestani society.

However, it is also necessary to consider rather undemocratic instances of electoralfraud, which are connected to Magomedov’s ascendancy and Dargin power. Evi-dently Magomedov was instrumental in delivering the Republic to El’tsin’s forcesduring the second round of the 1996 Russian presidential election. Whereas Dagestan

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 117

voted 29.2% for El’tsin in the � rst round of the election, he received 51.7% in thesecond round amid widespread whispering, and notable anecdotal evidence, of fraud.

Extra-democratic arrangements were even more transparent in the Duma election of1999, which contributed to the rivalry between Magomedov and Amirov. While theState Council was supporting the Unity party, Amirov agitated for the Fatherland-AllRussia (FAR) party of Luzhkov and Primakov.

An independent public opinion survey conducted by Kisriev just before the electionshowed that 47% of the Dagestani electorate favoured the Communists, 21%supported Unity and 20% would vote for FAR. However, the Dagestani governmentwould not permit the result of this survey to be published in Dagestan.

No doubt this was, in part, because the Republic’s government took an active rolein attempting to in� uence the voters toward the achievement of maximum representa-tion for the republic in the Duma, and toward the achievement of ethnic balanceamong the representatives. In addition to the Republic’s two single mandate districts,the government judged that it had a good chance to win seats for more Dagestanisthrough the party lists. Toward this end, leaders did their best to ensure that as manyDagestanis as possible appeared near the top of party lists. They appealed forpreference for Dagestani candidates on many grounds: the Dagestani victory in therecent war, the fact that Dagestan is the largest republic in the North Caucasus, andtheir ‘special relationship with Putin’, who once proclaimed that he ‘loved’ the peopleof Dagestan. They reckoned that if the Communists, Unity and FAR each received noless than 25% of the Dagestani vote then Dagestan would have three additionalrepresentatives in the Duma.

The following Dagestani candidates were well-placed on the party lists: for Unitythere was Gadjimed Safaraliev (Lezgin, physicist, Rector of Dagestan State Univer-sity); for FAR Magomed-Kadi Gasanov (Dargin, director of an enterprise calledAdam-International, supporter of Amirov); for the Communists Hapisat Gamzatova(female Avar) and an ethnic Russian, Sergei Reshulsky. Since Communists usuallyattract substantial support in Dagestan, the government found it ‘necessary’ to‘readdress’ their ‘excessive’ ballots to Unity and FAR. Dagestani of� cials argued thatsimilar techniques had been employed in other North Caucasian republics where thegovernment was less pluralistic and the electorate more pliable than in Dagestan.Increasingly, Dagestan, and perhaps other North Caucasian republics, are prepared topresent themselves monolithically in their dealings with the federal centre. When itcomes to federal politics, ethnic, ideological and political differences are increasinglysubordinated.

When the election took place on 19 December there was a 74% turn-out. In theBuinaksky single mandate district, number 10 (including the southern half ofDagestan, below the 43rd parallel), the victor was Gadjimurad Omarov, a wealthybusinessman who has lived for the last four years in Moscow. He won 27.6% of thevote, upsetting two well-known political � gures. They were a Kumyk surgeon namedAskerkhanov, who served in the Duma in 1995, and Magomed Tolboev, formersecretary of the Security Council of Dagestan, and representative in the � rst Duma in1993.

Tolboev had been expected to win, but the government had pinned its hopes uponAskerkhanov because he is Kumyk and they had no other Kumyks to promote.

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ROBERT BRUCE WARE & ENVER KISRIEV118

Omarov was accused of vote buying and there were published discussions of hiscontroversial practices, which also included the performance of services on behalf ofvoters.

The single mandate Mahachkalinsky district, number 11 (essentially north of the43rd parallel), went overwhelmingly for Gadji Mahachev, leader of the Avar nationalmovement, vice-prime minister of Dagestan, representative in the Dagestani People’sAssembly and head of the Dagneft oil company. There was little surprise inMahachev’s 62.4% victory.

With regard to the party lists, the government managed to exceed even its ownexpectations, securing six Duma representatives from the republic. This success islikely to encourage further reassignment of votes in the future. Of� cially, theCommunists received 37.1% of the vote, Unity 29% and FAR 28.6%. Amirovallowed himself to be persuaded that FAR should receive slightly less than Unity. TheCommunists are protesting that their votes were ‘readdressed’ to Unity and FAR, butMagomedov has responded that the vote was fair.

Here we should note that much of the Communists’ strength is in the Lezgin southof the Republic. Lezgin Communists chronically accuse Mahachkala of electoralfraud, probably with some reason. The results of this election are unlikely to improveLezgin alienation.

Dagestan’s six representatives to the Duma are Gadjimurad Omarov (Avar, SMD),Gadji Mahachev (Avar, SMD), Sergei Reshulsky (Russian, KPRF), Hapisat Gama-tova (Avar, KPRF), Gadjimed Safaraliev (Lezgin, Unity) and Magomed-KadiGasanov (Dargin, FAR). In addition, a Dagestani Lak, residing in Moscow, waselected to the Duma from Zhirinovsky’s list. The government regrets that the list doesnot contain a Kumyk and will surely remedy the situation through the promotion ofa Kumyk to a high of� ce in the near future.

The chairman of the Election Committee, named Shapiev, announced that thecommittee had received numerous complaints concerning voters who were bribed,and that these had been forwarded to the of� ce of the public prosecutor.

While these events raise concerns about the development of democratic culture, theliterature has noted that the consensualist and elitist features of consociational systemssometimes fall short of democratic standards arising from adversarial systems such asthose of Britain and the United States. These features are vividly illustrated by thecooperation among Dagestani political elites to maximise the Republic’s representa-tion in the Duma in a manner consistent with the proportionate representation of therepublic’s ethnic groups.

What of autonomy and proportionality?

A second important feature of consociational models is the mutual veto, which, onceagain, appears prominently in Dagestan’s political system. Any of the 121 represen-tatives to the People’s Assembly can block the passage of any legislation thatsigni� cantly affects the member’s ethnic group, particularly if the legislation involvesethnic boundaries or territories. As prescribed by Article 81 of the constitution, anoverride requires a two-thirds majority: ‘During the review of questions concerningchanges to the current administrative-territorial arrangements, and likewise to the

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 119

demographic, linguistic, socio-economic and cultural environment of the peoplesof Dagestan, in the case of disagreement with the projected draft law of a deputyor group of deputies from the said territory, a decision is reached by a vote in whichnot less than two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the People’s Assemblyagree’.

Dagestan’s political system has numerous arrangements to provide for proportion-ality, the third feature of the consociational model. Representatives to the assemblyare elected from districts that are identi� ed with particular ethnic groups in order toguarantee remarkably precise proportionality. Elections to local government bodiesoften involve similar arrangements, and proportionality is an objective that guidesgovernment appointments at all levels.

Further illustration of proportionality in Dagestani politics is provided by aremarkably consociational innovation that we call ‘packet replacement’. In view ofDagestan’s complex ethnic balance, personnel replacements are a dif� cult issue at anylevel of government, and this is especially the case in the higher echelons. Thereplacement of any high-ranking of� cial results in a dramatic swing of the ethno-pol-itical pendulum. Suppose, for instance, that the Ministry of Health is headed by anAvar minister who is approaching retirement. If another Avar is appointed in hisplace, then the Avars would achieve dynastic control of health services, which wouldalarm other groups insofar as it might result in sustained Avar patronage throughoutthe lower echelons of health care. On the other hand, if a member of any othernationality is appointed then Avar representation will be reduced and members of thatgroup will be consequently disturbed. Of course, an Avar could be appointed toanother position, but in the past this has led to a dangerous game of administrativemusical chairs. If a Dargin replaces the Avar in the Health Ministry, then anotherAvar must receive a compensatory post. If this results in the displacement of aKumyk, then the latter must be given another position even if it displaces a Lezginor a Lak, and so on. Once the process of replacement begins, it becomes very dif� cultto stop. Consequently, the replacement of high-level of� cials has been relativelyinfrequent.

However, the government has devised a procedure that might be described as‘packet replacement’. This involves the simultaneous replacement of several ministerstogether with high-level staff members. Selections are made by considering the sizeand signi� cance of potential resistance to any candidate. Insofar as this process hasa propensity to snowball, even highly placed of� cials are unable to control it, andthere is no recourse save consensual pragmatism and mutual accommodation. In 1996the government managed to replace six ministers by this method. The shift requiredthe abolition of one post and the establishment of another highly authoritativeposition, and efforts were made to appoint compliant, instead of charismatic, individ-uals. Opponents of the adjustment were neutralised by the sheer mass of interestedparticipants and observers. The details of the procedure provide a number of helpfulillustrations.

In April 1996 the appointment of a Dargin named Gamid Gamidov as Minister ofFinance substantially disrupted the existing ethnic balance. Efforts to restore acondition of parity were undertaken by the SC, and by the chairman, Magomedov, inparticular. These efforts were successful because of their introduction of an extensive

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ROBERT BRUCE WARE & ENVER KISRIEV120

TABLE 2PACKET REPLACEMENT

Before After

1. None Avar2. Dargin Dargin3. Dargin Avar4. Avar Lezgin5. Avar Avar6. Lezgin Russian7. Avar None

packet replacement programme which resulted in changes to nearly a third of thecabinet ministers and their staffs.

Table 2 shows the ethnic distribution of seven cabinet posts before and after theintroduction of packet replacement. Line 1 refers to the Secretary of the SecurityCouncil, a post that did not exist prior to the shift. An in� uential Avar cosmonaut,military of� cer and politician named Magomed Tolboev, who formerly representedDagestan in the Duma and who competed with Magomedov for the chair of the SCin 1994, was appointed to the post. The second line describes the retirement of theDargin Minister of Conservation and Natural Resources, and his replacement by ayoung and talented Dargin representative to the assembly. The latter vacated his postin the assembly, which was � lled by another Dargin. Line three shows the retirementof the Dargin Minister of Social Security and his replacement by an Avar ofimpeccable reputation. The fourth line refers to the dif� cult and controversialretirement of the Avar Education Minister and his replacement by an authoritative andwidely respected Lezgin. The retirement of the Avar Minister of Health, indicated byline � ve, led to the appointment of a distinguished member of the same ethnic group.The sixth line follows the replacement of the somewhat under-quali� ed LezginMinister of Zoning and Land Use by his hardworking Russian deputy. Line sevenrefers to the abolition of the Ministry of Information and the consequent eliminationof an Avar Minister whose adamant Communist approach had earned her a reputationfor obstinacy. The Ministry of Information was replaced by the State Committee forInformation and the Press, which was headed by the Lak deputy of the formerInformation Minister.

The new appointments were carefully selected for their contribution to competentadministration and ethnic parity. The success of packet replacement in this instanceis due in part to the large number of people who carefully followed the process, whohad interests in its outcome, and who were able to overcome others who opposedthese changes. Additionally, the retiring ministers avoided stigma and disgracethrough their very numbers. This exchange took place on 2 August 1996.

A further consociational feature of Dagestan’s political system is the high degreeof autonomy that is permitted to each segment with regard to its internal affairs. Mostof Dagestan’s 39 raiony are mono-ethnic, and exercise complete control over theirinternal cultural and agricultural affairs. Both during and after the Soviet period theDagestani government has supported ethnic groups and protected national cultures.

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 121

Indicative of this concern is the establishment of a Ministry of Nationalities withresponsibility for external relations in keeping with the external rami� cations ofDagestan’s ethnic issues. It funds six national theatres (sharing three buildings) aswell as locally administered, mixed cultural centres in Makhachkala and in variousraiony. It supports radio broadcasts in 11 languages and television broadcasts in nine.It � nances 11 newspapers in the major indigenous languages and multiple languageeditions of a women’s magazine. Though these newspapers claim independence theyare generally supportive of the government. In addition, there are numerous unsub-sidised ethnic publications.

Many of the national movements (especially the Kumyk Berlik and the LezginSadval) have agitated for a confederated political system incorporating ethnic regionswith a greater degree of autonomy. Given the partition of the Lezgins by the borderwith Azerbaijan, Sadval’s advocacy of a new ‘Lezgistan’ is particularly poignant, anda Lezgin autonomy within Azerbaijan reportedly has attracted some sympathy fromAzerbaijan’s President Aliev. In Dagestan, however, the national movements havebeen of declining signi� cance since their perestroika high point, as their leaders eitherrise to institutional positions or descend into criminality. A few groups have alsoexperimented with ethnic assemblies, but these have been without political power.

While Dagestan’s approach to ethnic autonomy thus falls short of the full-blownfederalism that Lijphart invokes (1977a, pp. 41–44), it is consistent with Nordlinger’sconcern that segmental autonomy encourages secession: ‘The combination of territo-rially distinctive segments and federalism’s grant of partial autonomy sometimesprovides additional impetus to demands for greater autonomy … secession and civilwar may follow’ (1972, p. 32). In Dagestan these darker possibilities are ever-presentconcerns, which serve not only as a restriction on structural arrangements but also asa force for the moderation and speedy resolution of con� icts.

The consociational literature sometimes suggests that societies with relatively fewsegments, perhaps three or four, provide more fertile ground for consociationaldemocracy than do those with a large multiplicity of segments (Lijphart, 1977a, p.56). At � rst glance, Dagestan’s 30-plus ethnic groups would appear to place it in thelatter category. However, Dagestan has only four powerful segments. The Avars andDargins are strongest. Their strength derives not only from the fact that they are mostnumerous, but also from the traditional Avar concern with power and honour andfrom the Dargin cultural emphasis upon wealth. Respectively following in numbersand power are the Kumyks and Lezgins. However, Lezgin culture, which prizeseducation, and which is the most cosmopolitan of the Dagestani ethnic cultures as aconsequence of its contact with an earlier cosmopolitanism in Baku, often producesspecialists, professionals and educators precluded from genuine political power bytheir modest salaries and scholarly proclivities.

Elites from Dagestan’s other 30 ethnic groups may be compared to wanderingelectrons which ceaselessly transfer themselves from one of these ethnic nuclei toanother in order to sustain a constantly shifting balance of political forces. Thisfeature becomes all the more important insofar as the larger groups are effectivelycomplex combinations of ethnoparties, which may detach themselves from their ownethnic group and unite with others. This feature appears to be unprecedented in theconsociational literature, and when taken together with the approximate parity of the

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four main groups (which these features also help to sustain) is one of the great secretsof Dagestan’s political stability. From a theoretical standpoint it is of primesigni� cance that these uniquely transient groups of elites actually strengthen thepolitical system insofar as they facilitate a highly � exible political structure that mayshift to respond to the latest crisis or to correct the overall balance against theascendance of any particular group. Yet while Dagestan’s political system respondsquickly to characteristically local crises, it is often prevented by this same politicalfragmentation from responding effectively or with anything approaching long-termstrategy. And it is deeply vulnerable to pressures being plentifully applied by allexternal powers.

With just over two million inhabitants Dagestan is a small political system. Lijphartargues that ‘when a country is very small, its reservoir of political talent will also besmall. Because consociational democracy requires an exceptionally able and prudentleadership, smallness is a favourable factor only to a certain extent’ (1977a, p. 66).On the one hand, this appears to be the case in Dagestan, where a lack of charismaticleadership has contributed to social strife, political fragmentation, short-term evasionsof long-term problems and susceptibility to external pressures.

Yet it can be argued that the continual series of confrontations and crises, whichare evaded (if not always resolved) by elaborate political compromises and contor-tions, are indicative of plentiful political talent. There are ready explanations for thistalent: � rst, Dagestani political culture has always prized political experience andhonoured the opinions of its elders. Second, ‘Maslat’, meaning ‘reconciliation’, is thekey word in Dagestani politics. Third, Dagestan has a long history of independenceand self-rule through which political talent has been cultivated. By tradition inDagestani villages, each man is independent and his power depends only upon hisskill. Dagestanis say: ‘A holy place cannot be empty’; hence any political void willbe � lled. Fourth, Dagestani culture is highly competitive, as re� ected, for example, intheir love of sport. The intricate manoeuvring of Dagestan’s political arena exercisesa natural attraction for the most adroit members of the population and providesopportunity at all levels for the cultivation of their skill.

Yet this is not necessarily to suggest that the consociational features of theDagestani system will be suf� cient to ensure political stability in the face of theRepublic’s enduring social and economic problems. Elsewhere, indeed, some conso-ciational governments have proved to be brittle and transitory. And insofar asDagestan’s political system does, in fact, conform with consociational models thereare also factors that render it unique in consociational literature: (1) It has developedduring the collapse of a communist regime. (2) It is forming within a larger state thatis simultaneously striving to develop an adversarial (non-consociational) democracy,a state that will never accept a consociational system for itself, but that nonethelessplays a role in the segmental balancing of Dagestan’s political system. While there isminimal separatist sentiment in Dagestan, it remains conceivable that the divergingdemocratic forms that distinguish Dagestan’s political system from that of the RussianFederation could ultimately contribute to Dagestan’s independence. (3) Dagestan’spolitical system involves institutional innovations and social idiosyncrasies thatdistinguish it from other cases considered in the literature on theories of modernis-ation and consociational democracy. These include: (a) the increasing salience of

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ETHNIC PARITY IN DAGESTAN 123

ethnic and religious identity as a consequence of modernisation and democratisation;(b) the recruitment of elites; (c) the development of a multiplicity of informalorganisations that we describe as ‘ethnoparties’; and (d) the rapid growth of a volatileIslamic Wahabite fundamentalist movement, at least partially in response to thepressures of modernisation and democratisation (Ware & Kisriev, 2000b; Kisriev &Ware, 2000). We will consider these distinguishing features in sequence.

What is the effect of modernisation on ethnic identity in Dagestan?

The Dagestani case differs from many of those in consociational literature in termsof its response to modernisation. The primary thesis of modernisation theories is thatassimilation and integration are promoted by the social mobilisation that comes withmodernisation. Modernisation introduces universal interests and homogenisingin� uences that may serve to transcend long-standing social divisions, while at thesame time stimulating new cleavages, including class and inter-generational divisions,that cut across the traditional segmentation of a plural society. Improvements, forexample, in agricultural and industrial technology, transport and mass communicationhave profoundly affected traditional patterns of social interaction.

In Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands this process has involved the weakeningof vertical cleavages between ethnic and religious segments of these societies,accompanied by the emergence of new horizontal strati� cations along economic,educational and generational lines, for example. Yet this is possible precisely becausethe consociational system has already furnished the foundation for the resolution ofreligious and ethnic con� icts (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990; Lijphart, 1977a). Thusmodernisation and consociational democracy have often been viewed as makingmutually reinforcing contributions to the development of plural societies (Dogan &Pelassy, 1990). Within this development, consociational democracy appears as an‘historical phase’, the very success of which ‘permits its replacement rapidly orslowly by a more competitive (democratic) model’ (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990; vanMierlo, 1986).

However, modernisation theories also concede that integration and assimilationmay be impeded when modernising forces increase contacts between members ofdifferent groups more rapidly than these can be accommodated by integrativeinstitutions. The slow process of assimilation can be reversed in modernising societieswhen the increasing pace of transactions between members of different groupsrenders their differences more conspicuous (Deutsch, 1956; Lijphart, 1977b). In suchcases ethnic identity and ethnic con� ict may be increased by modernisation.

At the same time, ethnic identity may be increased by democratisation, whichencourages the establishment of ethnic organisations, the formulation of ethnicagendas and the expression of ethnic demands. In much of the consociationalliterature ethnic pluralism is taken as an independent variable and democracy istreated as the dependent variable, such that the question is whether an ethnicallysegmented society can sustain a democratic regime. Yet this causal relationshipinvolves an inherent reciprocity. Thus democracy also appears as the independentvariable and ethnic pluralism becomes the dependent variable, such that democratisa-tion is linked to ethnic con� ict. In the past decade Dagestan has been jolted by

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high-speed processes of modernisation and democratisation. Both of these haveserved to strengthen ethnic identi� cation and the ethnic organisation of the society.

Moreover, while this vertical segmentation has intensi� ed, important cross-cuttingcleavages have diminished. An overarching ideological motivation has disappeared,though the Communist Party remains a signi� cant force in Dagestan. Furthermore, aseries of surveys we have conducted in the past two years indicate that, despite adramatic resurgence in the number of mosques and other religious institutions, adeclining number of Dagestanis are committed to Islam. Prior to the con� ict of 1999there was a small but rapidly growing minority that turned to Wahabite Islamicfundamentalism, partly in reaction against the Westernising forces of modernisation(Ware & Kisriev, 2000a,b).

Thus whereas much of the consociational literature views modernisation anddemocracy as cooperating to reduce ethnic and religious differences and promoteassimilation, the opposite is the case in Dagestan.

How are elites recruited in Dagestan?

Evidently Karl Jaspers was wrong in his insistence that authoritarian regimes cannotbe eliminated from within (1991, p. 218). He may have been correct in his assertionthat a totalitarian system cannot be changed from below, but he overlooked thepossibility that the regime, and indeed the entire political system, could be changedfrom above when elites transform the system in order to achieve their privateobjectives. The demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of Russia’s current politicalsystem could be described as revolution from above.

Party and government elites, along with factory managers and other industrialleaders, who were closest to the distribution of � nancial and material resources priorto perestroika, were best positioned to exploit social and political changes for theirown advantage. Many of these people were able to amass huge resources during thesocial transformation. At the same time a new and generally younger elite emergedinformally from among those with the energy and daring to pro� t from socialupheaval. Preoccupied by their competition with one another, the older elite failed toprevent the rise of these new bosses in no small part because the former required thesupport of the latter.

The transformation of the Russian elite has been reproduced in Dagestan withpeculiarities resulting from its social structure and cultural diversity. First, theabolition of the old hierarchy has resulted in markedly less reticent, more assertiveelite behaviour. The destruction of this reticence resulted from, and has led to, theintroduction of new principles for the selection of elites. These have resulted in anexpansion of elite ranks, and in the increasing complexity of interactions among them,thereby diminishing the in� uence exerted by any particular group of elites.

Generally, these changes resulted not so much from the replacement of oldapparatchiki with new leaders as from the political rise of an entrepreneurial and� nancial elite unknown in the Soviet Union. Whereas it might have been supposedthat the collapse of the cumbersome Soviet regime would result in the simpli� cationand rationalisation of government institutions, the opposite has occurred. Since 1991the number of state of� cials has increased by 50% in the Russian Federation, and by

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100% in Dagestan. This swelling of state agencies, together with relations betweenold and new elites, largely determine the character of ongoing political processes.

Shortly after the collapse of the communist regime there were few changes in thehighest echelon of power. However, tendencies are rapidly developing that havesigni� cantly changed the character of political power and are now changing thepersonnel. There are now two principal types of in� uence in Dagestan, correspondingwith a Weberian distinction between authority and power: (1) formal-legal authorityprimarily exercised by the highest of� cials of all three branches of government; and(2) informal, extra-legal power that depends upon (a) � nancial capacity, (b) charis-matic appeal and (c) force, including violent acts and threats thereof from well-armedethnic and religious organisations. Elites who enjoy a combination of formal andinformal in� uence have seen their in� uence expand most dramatically. This intersec-tion can be approached either by formal or informal routes: (1) High of� cials mayenrich themselves, attracting acolytes and establishing extra-institutional supportnetworks. (2) Popular leaders of ethnic organisations or other mass movements andwealthy individuals may acquire of� cial positions through appointment or popularelection. Meanwhile, those elites whose power remains primarily formal or primarilyinformal tend to become marginalised, and in many cases radicalised.

Old and new elites may be distinguished by the political tactics they employ. Theold regime relied upon extra-economic levers of in� uence, including moral andideological inducements as well as formal-legal mechanisms of control and politicalrepression. By contrast, the new elite is largely indifferent to ideological consider-ations. Power is measured by the material bene� ts it bestows and is supplemented byextral-legal suppression and threats thereof.

Increasingly, Dagestan has seen the emergence of a new class of political bosses,the primary motivation of whom is the corporate interest of a tightly connected groupof people. While the term ‘boss’ evokes connotations of corruption and evencriminality that are often appropriate in this context, it is also intended to connote aninformal, highly personal and sometimes charismatic capacity for the acquisition,amalgamation and retention of power. Under present circumstances it is often the casethat informal operations lead to an increase in material prosperity, followed by the‘bosses’ entrance into formal power structures. Elections in 1997, 1998 and 1999 haveprovided newer elites with legitimacy and have sometimes contributed to theirreconciliation with their elder peers.

Nevertheless this transition has not been smooth. In 1996–97 there were 32reported cases of criminal pressure on state of� cials. Fourteen of� cials were assassi-nated, including seven members of the assembly. The fact that not one of theseassassinations was solved does not mean that the murders went unpunished. Accord-ing to the spokesperson of the former Minister of Internal Affairs, M. Abdurazakov,suspects in assassinations were often found murdered themselves. For example,suspected assassins of Representative M. Sulaimanov and former Trade Minister B.Hadjiev were murdered, as was the suspect in the beating of S. Reshulsky. Sincemany of these attacks involve explosions in public places, it may be observed thatDagestan’s elite is responsible for a signi� cant portion of its terrorist activity, a factas ominous as it is remarkable.

If these circumstances have led to increasing insecurity among Dagestan’s politico-

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economic elites, they have also contributed to increasing tensions between these elitesand the general population. In Dagestan, where the richest 10% are 13 times wealthierthan the poorest 10%, there may be greater discrepancies of wealth than anywhereelse in Russia. Average income in Dagestan is a third of the average for Russia as awhole. This places Dagestan’s average salary below the living wage in the rest of theFederation and eight times lower than the average in Russia’s wealthier regions.Moscow’s average income, for example, is � ve times higher than Russia’s livingwage. Moreover, arrears in salaries owed to Dagestan’s two million people (a � gurethat includes under-age, retired and other non-workers) are in excess of 131 billionrubles. Dagestan is also among the six Russian regions with the highest arrears in thepayment of child allowance.

Dagestan’s wealthy elite forms an increasingly tight circle. At present there areabout 200 clans in Dagestan that have managed to acquire huge resources and thatconsequently de� ne the system of political relations. Money that Moscow providesfor the Republic is siphoned off by these individuals, who openly � out the law andlead lavish and ostentatious lifestyles in mansions and palatial, often forti� ed,compounds. This nucleus consists of approximately 1000 families with 6500 members(or 0.3% of the population). This highest elite is supported by another 5% to 7% ofthe population who have signi� cantly improved their � nancial situation. Another 20%to 25% have managed, often by means of extraordinary effort, to raise their incometwo to � ve times above the living wage. Approximately 70% of the population livesin deep, and deepening, poverty. Apart from electri� cation, rural life is oftencharacterised by 19th century living conditions. Even in the capital the overwhelmingmajority live in crumbling blocks where electricity and running water are at bestunreliable, and where water, when it runs, must always be treated before it can beconsumed.

The increasing tensions among Dagestani elites, and between these elites and theirsupporters, are both unusual and unhealthy for a consociational system, whichultimately must depend upon traditions of cooperation among elites no less than uponconditions of trust between elites and their supporters.

How is Dagestan’s traditional social structure re� ected in its political system?

These tensions reverberate along the traditional divisions of Dagestani elites intoethnic groups and clans. These divisions have their own recent history. Whereas thecommunist regime initially declared proletarian internationalism, it later underwent apolitical erosion, � rst affecting its creative elite and then its political and scienti� celites. The last two decades of the USSR were remarkable for the increasing attentiondevoted to ethnic factors. Whether in Moscow or the republics, declining con� dencein established social structure led to an ascendance of personal loyalties, whichdeveloped naturally along ethnic lines. Latent nationalism put down deep roots in thedecaying Soviet society.

Communist cosmopolitanism had never been more than a thin veneer on Dages-tan’s historically multi-national social structure, and it was initially among Dagestan’selites that this structure began to regain political signi� cance. By the time ofperestroika, ethnic political structures were completely re-established. With the

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collapse of the communist regime, Dagestan’s governing elite lost the support ofpreviously existing political structures but recovered support through informal net-works of friends, relatives and community members of common ethnic heritage. Yetwhen grass-roots ethnic organisations began to arise they were often resistant toconsolidation by governing elites who now sought to strengthen their vertical,intra-ethnic connections. The ensuing political process focused on competition be-tween formal elites who sought to acquire in� uence over newly emergent nationalmovements and informal leaders of national movements who sought institutionalauthority.

Throughout the past decade this transformation of Dagestan’s multi-ethnic politicalbalance has become the prevailing political factor. Those ethnic communities whichwere previously without political power, and which acquired political signi� canceonly insofar as they were objects of ethnic policies determined by a distant,authoritarian regime, suddenly attained political prominence. Political mobilisation inthe Republic was based neither upon ideological nor upon partisan divisions, but uponethnic consolidation.

Each of Dagestan’s ethnic segments tries to spread its in� uence not only in politicsbut also in economic and � nancial concerns, education, the media, healthcare, publicworks and even cemetery administration. Yet while these segments of the societycompete for horizontal in� uence the vertical connections within each segment aresubject to proliferation and reinforcement as they are cultivated by those ethnic elitesthat depend upon them for support. The combination of this horizontal and verticalexpansion is a circle of friends and relatives that heads the political, economic, social,cultural, religious and healthcare organisations in each community, further entrench-ing the elitist elements of Dagestani democracy.

Dagestan’s genuine political organisation is expressed in informal social structuresbuilt on an ethnic basis, which we call ethnoparties. Ethnoparties tend to beclan-based and local, each occurring within a djamaat. They possess all of theattributes of political parties: aspirations toward the expansion of their power bypolitical means; ideological like-mindedness; organisation; authoritative leadershipand a broad circle of activists; � nancial support and support of the masses. They differfrom traditional parties primarily in that leaders and supporters are all members of asingle ethnic group. Larger ethnic groups such as Avars, Dargins, Kumyks andLezgins have several such ethnoparties, the leaders of which may oppose one anotherand unite, if necessary, with leaders of different ethnic groups.

These ethnoparties are to be distinguished from the national movements thatemerged during perestroika to advocate the interests of the principal ethnic groups.In fact, the ethnoparties are related to the national movements in a number of differentways. For example, the Lak national movement, Kazi-Kumuch, became the nucleusof an ethnoparty, and its leader, Magomed Khachilaev, became the genuine politicalleader of the Laks, prior to his arrest in 1999. On the other hand, the Dargin nationalmovement, Zadesh, has little to do with the Dargin ethnoparties. Generally, nationalmovements are subordinate to ethnoparties or serve as fronts for the latter.

Continual manoeuvring among these ethnoparties is a major source of politicalinstability in Dagestan; yet paradoxically it also does much to sustain the fragilebalance among Dagestan’s ethnic groups. Ethnoparties tend to diminish the

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signi� cance of Dagestan’s other political, economic and ideological polarities. At thesame time they form a system of counterbalances that maintain an intricate equilib-rium of ethnic power through a multiplicity of limited and countervailing oppositions.This dynamic balance, which follows from the extremity of Dagestan’s ethnicheterogeneity, is responsible for the unique character of Dagestani politics. ThoughDagestan’s numerous local con� icts sometimes become acute, they are limited by thedjamaat structure of Dagestani politics; thus far, their failure to grow into any morethan local crises lends support to this analysis.

At the same time, the existence of ethnoparties tends to fragment the political eliteand thereby inhibits the articulation and realisation of common social objectives. Thisappears in contrast to neighbouring Russian republics with titular nationalities.Perhaps for the same reason, Dagestan’s recent history has not produced thecharismatic leadership that has � ourished in other regions of the Caucasus. Moreover,because Dagestani politics is based upon the perpetual struggle of ethnic elites, it hasbeen nearly impossible for the government to focus on external issues affecting theRepublic as a whole. Regardless of their importance, external issues are at best asecondary concern, and all the more so when a tough solution is required. For a unitedpolitical elite it is relatively easy and often advantageous to focus on external threatsand problems. In Dagestan an effort to resolve such dif� culties could only weaken thedomestic position of any elites who attempted it. Any decisive solution will result ina new cleavage around which the population will polarise, dividing supporters andenlivening new opponents. Similar considerations often inhibit decisive resolution ofdomestic problems. Thus the incessant efforts of elites to counterbalance one another,and the efforts of the government to maintain stability, tend to inhibit the decisiveresolution of fundamental problems. As a consequence, Dagestan’s external relationsare chronically problematic.

For example, the internationalised border between Dagestan and Azerbaijan is apolitical malignancy that promises greater problems. Border controls that are at oncetough, restrictive and arbitrary are causing serious problems for the Lezgin people,one of the Caucasus’ larger ethnic groups. Traditionally living along the Samur River,the Lezgins were divided when the Samur became part of the border between Russiaand Azerbaijan, thereby separating families and friends, buyers and sellers. Whereasthe Lezgins historically have occupied a central position in the Caucasus, straddlingthe main range and the East Caspian trade route, they now occupy remote andforsaken provincial backwaters on both sides of the border. The only Lezgins whohave pro� ted from the situation are those who have formed well-armed bands ofsmugglers.

Moscow has created a � ve kilometre border zone on the southern edge of Dagestan.This means that the fertile Lezgin land along the Samur river valley has been placedunder the control of the Russian army. Naturally, the local population is stronglyopposed to the creation of this military zone. Lezgin unrest may be of geopoliticalsigni� cance insofar as it registers in Baku or reverberates along the pipeline thattransports petroleum across the Samur and through Dagestan on its way to the West.Yet the weak and divided Dagestani elite has sought more to placate Moscow thanto protect its own people.

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Do consociational studies apply to third-wave plural societies?

It is possible to regard the consociational analysis of democratic systems as occurringin two waves. The � rst wave of consociational studies focused attention on consen-sual democratic procedures occurring in segmented societies found in the Nether-lands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and Canada (Barry, 1975a; 1975b; Daalder,1974; Dahl, 1966; Lembruch, 1967; Lijphart, 1977a; McRae, 1974; Nordlinger, 1972;Powell, 1970; Steiner, Jurg, 1967, 1974; Steiner, Kurt, 1972). Shortly thereafter asecond wave of analyses examined consociational frameworks in Lebanon, Malaysia,Cyprus, Colombia, Uruguay and Nigeria (Apter, 1971; Hudson, 1969; Lewis, 1965;McRae, 1974; Nagata, 1975; Suleiman, 1967). More recently, Lijphart (1996) hasconsidered India as a consociational system. In varying degrees, the latter studiesconsidered the emergence of democratic systems that followed from the relaxation ofcolonial orders that had imposed uni� cation upon historically segmented societies.

In a preliminary fashion, the present case study suggests that there may be anemergent third wave of plural societies which (1) also follow from the relaxation ofpolitical orders that had imposed uni� cation upon historically segmented societies; (2)have been largely unattended by consociational literature; (3) present novel politicalpractices that raise new challenges for consociational models; and (4) suggest thatdemocratisation and modernisation may play a more complex role in plural societiesthan has been previously appreciated. During the period when these segmentedsocieties fell under the sway of authoritarian political systems, traditional patterns ofinter-segmental accommodation were allowed to atrophy, while vertical cleavagessometimes were exacerbated by policies imposed from the top (Ware, 1998). Hencethere are similarities between this and the second, post-colonial, wave of consocia-tional societies which emerged after World War II. Yet there are also importantdifferences, which follow not only from divergent administrative and ideologicalfactors but from features including industrial development, education and expecta-tions of third-wave plural societies. And however great the theoretical challengesraised by third-wave plural societies, they are accompanied by policy challenges thatare immediate and undeniable. These challenges are addressed, in part, throughinsights introduced by recent literature on regime transition (Cohen, 1992; Derlien,1993; Easton, 1995; Rozman, 1992) and new institutionalism (Alvarez, 1995; Brinton,1998; Grofman, 1989; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Rutherford, 1994). Some of thismaterial might be usefully expanded and incorporated through the extension ofconsociational analyses to third wave plural societies.

Southern Illinois University, EdwardsvilleDagestan Scienti� c Centre

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