ethnic identity in myanmar - reliefweb · 2019. 6. 5. · 1 re-examining ethnic identity in myanmar...

1

RE-EXAMININGETHNICIDENTITYINMYANMAR

BySarahLClarke

SengAungSeinMyintZabraYuSiwa

CoverPhoto:@SengAungSeinMyintGraphicDesign:KarlienTruyensPublicationDate31May2019

2

RE-EXAMININGETHNICIDENTITYINMYANMAR

By

SarahLClarkeSengAungSeinMyint

ZabraYuSiwa

3

TableofContents

INTRODUCTIONThe2014MyanmarPopulationandHousingCensus………………………………………………………………5ThisReport……………………………………..………………………………..…………………………………………………...7Acknowledgements…………………………………..………………………………..…………………………………..……10ListofAcronyms…………………………………..………………………………..………………………………………..…..10CHAPTER1HistoricalOverview…………………….………………………..………………………………..………………………….…12TheEraofHero-Kings:dominanthistoricalnarrativesandalternativeviews………………………..12BritishColonialRule………………………..………………………………..……………………………………….…………16

PoliticalAdministrationUnderColonialRuleEthnicClassificationUnderColonialRule

WorldWarIIandIndependence………………………..………………………………..…………………………….…18TheSecondWorldWarIndependence:thePanglongAgreementand1947Constitution

ParliamentaryDemocracyandMilitaryTakeoverof1962………………………..…………………………..21MilitaryRuleUnderNeWin:1962-1988………………………..………………………………..………………...23

TheConceptofTaingyinthaEffortstoMoveBeyondMilitaryRule:1988-2008………………………………………………………….…..26

CeasefiresandtheDraftingofaNewConstitutionCHAPTER2EthnicIdentityNarrativesandTheirInstitutionalisation………………………..……………………………..31NarrativesandAssumptionsSurroundingEthnicIdentity………………………..……………………………31

Theme1-ThereisaCorrelationBetweenPopulationSizeandEntitlementsTheme2-CommunitiesAreHomogenousandEthnicIdentityisFixedTheme3-CommunitiesShouldbeStationaryandTiedtoEthnicHomelandsTheme4-OutsidersPoseaThreat

The2008Constitution………………………..………………………………..………………………………………………38ViewsonEthnicitywithinthe2008ConstitutionDesignationofTerritorialUnitsArrangementsforPoliticalRepresentation

DilemmasSurroundingaCollectiveRightsApproachintheMyanmarContext…………………….42CHAPTER3EthnicIdentityDilemmasinMyanmar’sCurrentContextofTransition…………………………………44TheLeaduptoElectionsin2010andtheTheinSeinPresidency………………………..…………………44

TheNationwideCeasefireNewNationalLeadershipandNextStepsinthePeaceProcess………………………..…………………..47

FederalisminMyanmar:divergentapproachestocollectiverightsEthnicIdentityBeyondthePeaceProcess………………………..………………………………..…………………49

4

CASESTUDY………………………………………………………………………………..…………………………….…....51TheCaseofKachinIdentity………………………..………………………………..……………………………….…52TheCaseofArakaneseIdentity………………………..………………………………………………………………74TheCaseofKarenIdentity………………………..……………………………………………………………..………94CONCLUSIONBuildingUnitybyEmbracingDiversity………………………..………………………………..……….……….112ChallengingEthnicIdentityNarratives………………………..………………………………..…………….….114Trust-Building,PoliticalLegitimacyandOpeningsforAutonomyandSelf-Determination……………………………………………………………………………………………………...………..117RethinkingtheConceptofTaingyinthaandEngagingwithComplexity…………………………..118

Bibliography………………………..………………………………..…………………………………………………....…120

5

INTRODUCTIONSince its independence from Britain in 1948,the country of Burma, also known asMyanmar,hasexperienceddecadesofarmedconflict focused on issues related to ethnicidentity. Over generations, ethnic-basedconflicts have produced severe humanitarianand human rights consequences for many,including death and injury, displacement,genderbasedviolence,andalackofaccesstobasic services. A focus on ethniccategorisation and ethnic identity narrativeshasalsocontributedtosystemsandstructuresthat have institutionalised discriminationagainst some while allocating benefits andentitlementstoothers,producingalandscapeof deep fractures, inter-group competition,anddistrust.The purpose of this report is to re-examineethnicity from the perspective of diverseMyanmar stakeholders. Emerging from acloser examination of historical experiencesand grievances, this report seeks to uncoverthe ways that ethnic identity has been usedfor a variety of political purposes. Theobjective of this analysis is to bring complexroot causes of armed conflict inMyanmar tothe surface in order to better consider andidentify strategies that address long-standingtensions and violence. The report concludesby considering a range of recommendationsaimed at multiple Myanmar stakeholders,including leaders from a variety of ethniccommunities, theMyanmar government, andinternationalactors.Bywayof introduction,thisreportwill takeacloser look at the events and reactions thatarosearound the inclusionofethnicity in the2014 Myanmar Population and HousingCensus.Thisreportwillnotprovideadetailedexploration of the census. However, theexperienceofthe2014censusoffersausefuldeparture point, highlighting a number ofdeepcomplexitiessurroundingethnicidentityin Myanmar. Indeed, the following pages ofthis reportwill drawonanumberof sources

inordertodevelopadeeperunderstandingofwhy collection of ethnicity data in the 2014censusprovedsoproblematic.The 2014 Myanmar Population and HousingCensusIn2014,Myanmarundertookitsfirstnationalcensus in 30 years. Enumeration was carriedoutbetween30Marchand10April,ledbytheMinistryof ImmigrationandPopulation1withsupport from the United Nations. Theoverarchinggoalofthecensuswastoprovidedata needed for actors working at differentlevels to undertake development planning,policy formulation, and service delivery. Ittook place within a broader context oftransition that saw renewed efforts toimprove socio-economic wellbeing in acountry suffering from widespread poverty,invigoratepeacebuilding activities aftermanyyears of armed conflict, and support atransition to partial democracy after half acenturyofmilitaryrule.The census was approached as a technicalexercise that would shed light on essentialdemographic variables such as populationdensity, composition of the population intermsofageandsex,educationalattainment,labour force participation, access to housing,sanitation, and transportation, as well asinformation about fertility and mortality. Itwas a challenging undertaking in a countrythat includes populations living in remotecommunities, includingsomeareasunderthecontrolofarmedgroups.Accesstoeducationin Myanmar varies widely, and in manycommunities the national language,Myanmar,isnotafirstlanguage,orspokenatall. Additionally, communities to beenumerated were in a process of emergingfrom years of military rule. In this context,questions regarding basic socio-economicindicators provoked deep suspicion amongmany. 1TheMinistryofImmigrationandPopulationwouldbecometheMinistryofLabour,ImmigrationandPopulation(MOLIP)afterthe2015elections.

6

It was also an exercise that provokedwidespread confusion. Households werefamiliarwiththelongstandingpracticecarriedout by the Ministry’s Department ofImmigration (DoI) to collect householdregistration lists, and had difficultydistinguishing between that process and acensus.2 Furthermore, the census wasscheduled to take place approximately 18monthspriortothe2015elections,andsomeassumedthat thedatacollectionwasdirectlyrelatedtoelectionpreparations.However, some of the strongest reactions tothe2014censusemergedaroundcollectionofdataonreligionandethnicity.Theinclusionofquestions on religion and ethnicity sparkeddeepcontroversyandconcern,pointingtotheprofound sensitivities surrounding these twoaspects of identity in the Myanmar context.Collectionof religiousdatageneratedanxietythat census results might further damagealready tense intercommunal relations.Collection of ethnicity data provoked deepopposition frommany different communitiesdue to concerns about how ethnic groupswould be categorized and what politicaldeterminationswouldbemadeonthebasisofthedata.ManystakeholdersfromMyanmar’s

2HouseholdregistrationprovidesarecordofallindividualsresidingineachhouseholdinMyanmar.Confusionbetweenthetwoprocesseswasexacerbatedbythefactthatthesamenamewasusedtorefertoboth:degaungsayin,or“midnightcount”.CollectionofthehouseholdregistrationiscarriedoutbytheDepartmentofImmigration.Itiscompulsoryand,historically,thecollectionofethnicitydataaspartofthehouseholdregistrationprocesshasnotbeencarriedoutusingtheprincipleofself-idenfication(e.g.respondentsmaybeaskedtopresentdocumentationasproofoftheirethnicidentity).Bycontrast,thecensusexercisewascarriedoutundertheDepartmentofPopulation,and,exceptforthosewhoself-identifiedasRohingya,collectionofethnicityidentitydata(orlumyo)wasconductedundertheprincpleofself-identification.BoththeDepartmentofImmigrationandtheDepartmentofPopulationarewithintheMinistryofLabour,ImmigrationandPopulation.

non-Bamar3 communities were deeplyopposed to the government’s use of acontroversial list of 135 national races toclassifyethniccategories.Friction came to a head during theenumeration period when violent protestsbrokeout inRakhine State in reaction to theprospect that, under the principle of self-identification, respondentswould be allowedto self-identify as Rohingya. In an effort toavert further escalation of violence, thegovernment then announced thatrespondentswouldnotbeenumeratediftheyself-identified as Rohingya, leaving much ofthepopulationofnorthernRakhineoutofthecensus.Inaddition,somepartsofKachinStateandKayinStateremainedunenumeratedasitwas not possible for the government andsomelocalarmedactorstoagreeonaprocessfortheenumerationexercisetogoforwardincertain areas under the control of EthnicArmedOrganisations(EAOs).Notably,insomeother areas under armed group control theenumerationwent forward and collaborationin these areas between the government andtherelevantarmedgroupswassuccessful.While challenges related to unenumeratedareas were noted, a team of internationalobservers reported that the quality of theoverall enumeration was quite high.4Provisional results from the census wereavailable in August 2014, followed by arelease of the main results in May 2015.Beyond detailed results for each state andregion, a series of thematic reports were

3TheethnicityofthemajoritypopulationinMyanmarisoftenreferredtobytheAnglicisedname“Burman”.TheBritishcolonialadministrationalsousedtheterm“Burma”todescribetheterritorythatitcametocontroloverthecourseofthe19th-century.Outofrespectfortheprincipleofself-identification,thisreportwillrefertomajorityethnicgroupinMyanmarasBamar.Moreattentionwillbedevotedtoissuesaroundnaminginsubsequentpages.4SeeFindingsoftheCensusObservationMission:AnOverview.(2014).

7

producedthat lookedatkeyaspectsofsocio-economicdevelopmentingreaterdetail.5Data that required additional processing wasnot released as part of the May 2015 mainresults. This included data on occupation,industry, religion,andethnicity,all categoriesthat necessitated additional coding. In July2016, data on occupation, industry, andreligion were released, but data on ethnicitywas not released. Beyond additional coding,government officials explained the non-release of ethnicity data by highlighting itssensitivity and ongoing uncertainty aroundclassification.6 At the time of writing, theMyanmar governmenthadnot yet reachedadecision on releasing ethnicity data from the2014census.The Myanmar government’s Ministry ofLabour, Immigration and Population (MOLIP)and the United Nations Population Fund(UNFPA)havejointlypublishedawidearrayofmaterials describing all stages of the census.Inaddition tocensus reports, thesematerialsshare information on topics such as findingsby the Census Observation Mission, stepstaken to ensure accuracy, steps involved indata processing at the census office, post-enumerationactivities,andalistoffrequentlyaskedquestions.7Atthesametime,anumberof reports and articles have been publishedthat include detailed criticism of the 2014census.8 The main focus of criticism has

5Awidearrayofreportsandinfographicsderivedfromthecensusarepubliclyavailableatwww.dop.gov.mmandhttp://myanmar.unfpa.org/census.6SeeFreshdelaysforcensusdataoverstabilityfears,byPyaeThetPhyo,TheMyanmarTimes,24February2016,andCensus,ethnicitiesdiscussedatAmyothaHluttaw,TheGlobalNewLightofMyanmar,22February2018,andQuestionsandAnswersaboutMyanmar’sCensus.(2014),p.18.7ThesematerialsarepubliclyavailableinMyanmarandEnglishatwww.dop.gov.mmandhttp://myanmar.unfpa.org/census.8ForexampleseeEthnicitywithoutMeaning,DatawithoutContext.(2014),

centred on the effort to collect religious andethnicity data, as well as doubts about dataaccuracy.ThisReportIn response to the reactions and controversythatemergedaroundthe2014census,UNFPAconvened a small team of national andinternationalresearcherstolookmorecloselyat sensitivities related to data processing,analysis, release and dissemination of censusdata.Thisworktookplaceoverseveralyears.FromtheperiodofJuly2016toJune2018,theworkofthissmallteamfocusedexclusivelyonconcerns related to census ethnicity data.Consultations conducted by theUNFPA teamrevealed the deep rooted concerns,frustration, and grievances related to theeveryday experience of ethnic identity inMyanmar. It is these larger systemic issuesrelated to assumptions and narrativessurrounding ethnicity in Myanmar thatconstitutethemainfocusofthisreport.BeyondreflectionsemergingfromtheworkoftheUNFPAteam,thisreportdrawsonaseriesofinterviewsthatwereconductedduringlate2018.InterviewstookplaceinMaiJaYang(inKachin State and under the control of theKachin Independence Organisation),Mae Sot(abordertowninTakprovince,Thailand,andlocation for many NGO offices, and alsoadministrative offices for the Karen NationalUnion),andSittweinRakhineState.It is important to note the limitations of thisreport and the need for additional researchandanalysis.Forinstance,thefocushereisonthe issue of ethnic identity, with very littleexplorationofthewaysthatreligious identityis often intrinsically bound up in ethnicidentity.Thiswasafactthatwasoftennotedin community consultations as discussionsabout ethnic identity (lumyo) often triggered

CountingtheCosts:Myanmar’sProblematicCensus(2014),Ferguson,J.M.(2015),andCallahan,M.(2017).

8

conversations that focused on religiousidentity. Furthermore, many authors havenoted that, for instance, Buddhism plays acentral role in Bamar culture as reflected inthephrase“TobeBurmanistobeBuddhist.”9While the linkage between ethnicity andreligion was often a part of the team’sconversations, this report will make anartificial distinction by primarily consideringviews on ethnicity. The research team notesthatwithmoretimeandresourcesitwouldbehighlybeneficialtoexpandtheanalysisinthisreport to include perspectives on religiousidentity.Also, the research team would like toemphasize that this report is in no wayintended as a critique of the experience ofethnic identity inMyanmar, or any particularethnicgroup.Ethnicidentityrepresentsarichformof social capital. It canbeused tobuildties and cohesion within and betweencommunities, strengthening social networksand giving rise to rich traditions. Indeed,ethnic identity is an aspect of humanexperience that should be recognized andcelebrated. The concern that has motivatedthe production of this report is not theexperience of ethnic identity, but theinstanceswhenethnic identityhasbeenusedto justify the allocation of benefits andprivileges to some and the practice ofdiscriminationandexclusiontowardsothers.ReportOverviewThis report is not intended to provide an in-depth, authoritative overview of ethnicidentity in present-day Myanmar. Manyexcellent resources exist on these topics –severalofwhicharecited.Instead,itprovidesa snapshot of the main themes related toethnicity that arose over the course ofcommunity consultations and interviews. Thefocus of this analysis is to consider thewaysthat narratives and assumptions aroundethnic identity have been constructed overtime, and used as the basis to allocate 9Walton,M.J.(2013),p.7.

benefits to some and enforce discriminationagainst others. These themes are exploredthrough an examination of Myanmar’shistorical context. Thus,Chapter1providesabrief overview of Myanmar history from theprecolonialperiodupuntiltheadoptionofthe2008 Constitution, with a particular focus onpracticesaroundethniccategorisationandtheemergence of the concept of taingyintha, or“nationalraces.”Buildingonthishistoricalbackground,Chapter2 undertakes a closer examination of ethnicidentity narratives that were identifiedthrough consultations and interviews. Thechapter goes on to consider how theseassumptions regarding ethnic identity wereinstitutionalised in the 2008 Constitution.From this point, the report goes on toconsider ongoing dilemmas surroundingethnic identity in Myanmar’s currenttransition process with a particular focus onthe peace process, including the nationalpolitical dialogue process and contrastingviews of federalism, as well as the ongoingexperience of armed and intercommunalviolence.The second half of the report explores theseissues with reference to three case studies:onefocusedonKachinethnicidentity,oneonArakanese ethnic identity, and one on Karenethnic identity. The case studies provideadditional historical background aimed atgrounding the views raised by meetingparticipantsandcommunitystakeholders.Thecase study on Kachin identity focuses on thetensions between maintaining unity whileallowing for diversity in a context of chronicinsecurity. The Arakanese case studyexamines perspectives from within theArakanese community in order to betterunderstand the complex root causes thatcontributed to the 2017 crisis in RakhineState. Finally, the Karen case study considersopportunities and challenges associated withparticipation in the peace process and theimpact that the peace process has had onengagementaroundgroupdiversity.

9

It should be noted that case studies are notintended to portray a unified or consensusview emerging from any of the threecommunities that are explored. Indeed,interviews and consultations sought to drawout a diversity of perspectives from eachcommunity, and the research team fullyacknowledges that it is not possible (orhelpful) to convey perspectives of an ethniccommunityasbeingmonolithic.The concluding section summarises the keychallengesoutlinedinprecedingchaptersandcasestudies.Thissummaryprovidesthebasisfor consideration of priority areas for furtherengagementforactors insideandoutsidethecountry as they begin to build newapproachestoethnicidentityintheMyanmarcontext.NamesofPlacesandPeoplesNames of places and peoples are particularlycontroversial in Myanmar. Disagreementarises as a result of contested historicalnarrativesanddivergentpoliticalperspectivesthat names convey. The name controversythat is probably best known is thedisagreement around how to refer to thecountry itself – “Burma” or “Myanmar”?Another serious disagreement has emergedaroundwhetherornottorefertotheMuslimcommunitythathaslivedinnorthernRakhineStateas“Rohingya.”Thepurposeofthisreportisnottodeterminethe accuracy or legitimacy of particularnames. However, this study arises out of anexerciseofcarefullylisteningtodiversevoicesin order to better understand and share arangeofperspectivesandexperiences.Aspartof this process, it is important to accordrespecttodifferentgroupsandrefertothemby their chosen name. Likewise, it is animportantsignofrespecttorecogniseandusethe official place names designated bysovereignauthorities.

Therefore, this report will refer to groups ofpeople using the name that group favours inarticulating their identity.10 Leaders of non-Bamar ethnic groups have rejected thedesignationof“ethnicminorities”andinsteadprefer “ethnic nationalities”. Thisidentification has been chosen as it capturesthesenseofnon-Bamar groups forming theirownnationswithdistinctheritageandculturalidentity, and avoids any suggestion that theyconstituteinsignificant,marginalisedgroups.This same approach of naming groups andpeople according to the termsbywhich theyself-identify will be used for other specificcommunitiesfeaturedinthisreport:

• Members of the largest ethniccommunity living in Rakhine State:Arakanese

• Members of the country’s majorityethniccommunity:Bamar

• Members of the ethnic communityassociatedwithKayinState:Karen

• Members of the Muslim communitywho have lived in northern Rakhine:Rohingya

Thereportwillusethefollowingapproachforplace names, shifting names as appropriateaccording to the historical period underdiscussion:

Priorto1989: After1989:Burma MyanmarArakanStat RakhineStateIrrawaddyDivision/River

AyeyawadyRegion/River

KarenState KayinStateKarenniState KayahStatePeguDivision BagoRegionRangoonDivision YangonRegionTenasserimDivision TanintharyiRegionSalweenRiver ChindwinRiver

10Again,theresearchteamnotesthat,evenwithinagroupthatsharesthesameidentity,therecanbeadifferenceofviewsonhowthegroupreferstoitself.Thisreportusesthenamethatmostcommunitystakeholdersusedintheirownprocessofself-identification,notingthatthisdoesnotmeanthatallmembersofagroupself-identifyinthesameway.

10

AcknowledgementsThe research teamwould like to express ourgratitudetoallmeetingparticipantswhotookthetimetosharetheirperspectivesandviewsthroughconsultationsandinterviews.Insomecases, stakeholders travelled long distances,and all were generous in sharing their timeandinsights.The research team would also like to thankcolleaguesatUNFPAMyanmarwhowerekeypartners in thinking through and identifyingcertain themes captured in this report. Inparticular, our thanks go out to Paul LundSteinheuer, Khin Zar Naing, Phyu Sin NgweThaw,JanetJackson,andDanielMsonda.A number of individuals provided supportthrough feedback on the report includingDeborah Livingstone, Dr Mike Griffiths, andRoger Shotton. A special thank you goes toAshley South, Elizabeth Moorsmith, NimrodAndrew and Jason Tower for their detailedcommentsandinput.The research team is also grateful to the UKDepartment for International Development,and the staff of IPEwhomadeproductionofthisreportpossible.

ListofAcronymsAA ArakanArmyABSDF AllBurmaStudents’

DemocraticFrontAFPFL Anti-FascistPeople’s

FreedomLeagueANP ArakanNationalPartyALD ArakanLeaguefor

DemocracyALP ArakanLiberationPartyARSA ArakanRohingyaSalvation

ArmyBGF BorderGuardForceBIA BurmaIndependenceArmyBRI BeltandRoadInitiativeBSPP BurmeaSocialist

ProgrammePartyCDNH CenterforDiversityand

NationalHarmonyCMEC China-MyanmarEconomic

CorridorCNF ChinNationalFrontCPB CommunistPartyofBurmaCSC CitizenshipScrutinyCardDoI DepartmentofImmigrationDKBA DemocraticKarenBuddhist

ArmyEAOs EthnicArmed

OrganisationsFPNCC FederalPolitical

NegotiationandConsultativeCommittee

GAD GeneralAdministrationDepartment

IDPs InternallyDisplacedPersons

KBC KachinBaptistConventionKDA KachinDefenseArmyKIA KachinIndependenceArmyKIC KachinIndependence

CouncilKIO KachinIndependence

OrganizationKMT ChineseNationalist

KuomintangForcesKNA KarenNationalAssociation

11

KNLA KarenNationalLiberationArmy

KNU KarenNationalUnionKNU/KNLA-PCKNU/KNLAPeaceCouncilKPF KarenPeaceForceKSDP KachinStateDemocratic

PartyKSPP KachinStateProgressive

PartyKUPC KarenUnityandPeace

CommitteeLDU LahuDemocraticUnionMOLIP MinistryofLabour,

ImmigrationandPopulationMNDAA MyanmarNational

DemocraticAllianceArmyNCA NationwideCeasefire

AgreementNCCT NationwideCeasefire

CoordinationTeamNDAA NationalDemocratic

AllianceArmy,orMonglaArmy

NDA-K NewDemocraticArmy-Kachin

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

NLD NationalLeagueforDemocracy

NMSP NewMonStatePartyNRAM NationalRaceAffairs

MinisterNRPC NationalReconciliationand

PeaceCentreNUPA NationalUnitedPartyof

ArakanPNLO Pa’ONationalLiberation

OrganizationPNO Pa’ONationalOrganisationPPST PeaceProcessSteering

TeamRCSS/SSA RestorationCouncilofShan

State/ShanStateArmyRNDP RakhineNationalities

DevelopmentPartyRRF RebellionResistanceForceSAAs Self-AdministeredAreas

SEZ SpecialEconomicZoneSLORC StateLawandOrder

RestorationCouncilSNA Shan-niNationalitiesArmySNLD ShanNationalLeaguefor

DemocracySPDC StatePeaceand

DevelopmentCouncilSSA-N ShanStateArmy-NorthTNLA Ta’angNationalLiberation

ArmyUEC UnionElectionCommissionULA UnitedLeagueofArakanUNFPA UnitedNationsPopulation

FundUSD USDollarUSDP UnionSolidarityand

DevelopmentPartyUWSA UnitedWaStateArmy

12

CHAPTER1

HistoricalOverviewAsadeparturepointforexploringethnicityinMyanmar, this reportwilluseachronologicalhistorical approach to better understandsomeofthedevelopmentsthatcametoshapenarratives, views, attitudes, and assumptionsregarding ethnicity. This introductoryoverview is by no means an exhaustiveaccount of Myanmar history or culturalcontext. However, it will outline some keyaspectsrelatedtogeographyandhistorythatbear consideration when reflecting on howviews and narratives surrounding ethnicityhaveevolvedovertime.Any political or conflict analysis of Myanmarneeds to consider the geography that hasshaped the physical world in whichcommunities live, as well as the historicalevents that have underpinned therelationships between individuals andcommunities. Myanmar finds itself tuckedbetween two massive neighbours, with theIndian subcontinent to its west and Chinalooming to its north. Present-day MyanmaralsosharesalongborderwithThailand(totheeastandsoutheast),ashortborderwithLaos(alongtheeasternmostportionofShanState),and a relatively small border area withBangladesh (in northern Rakhine). Thousandsofmiles of coastline on its southwest borderhave provided ports for seafaringcommunities and formal and informalcommercial ventures that have thrived overcenturies. To the north, an archway of hillsandmountainsstretchestowardsthefoothillsof the Himalayas. From these highlands, twoparallel mountain ranges – the Pegu Yomasand the Arakan Yomas – extend into centralMyanmar towards the Ayeyawady Delta. Inthecradleofthesemountainsandhillsadry,hotplainsareaopenssouthwardsintoabroadlow-lyingdelta thatpoursout intotheBayofBengal. Lower-lying areas, particularly theAyeyawady delta, have been associated withwet rice agriculture since the nineteenth

century. Further north, Myanmar’smountainous areas have been home to amyriadofdifferentcommunities, traditionallyliving in small, isolatedmountain villagesandpracticingrotationalfarming.As in other parts of the world, accounts ofMyanmar’shistoryarefarfromneutral.Inthecase of Myanmar, it is essential to considerhow varied historical narratives have shapedpresent day perspectives surrounding ethnicidentity. An examination of events fromMyanmar’s pre-colonial past, and theinterplay between historical developmentsand the country’s physical geography,provides important insights intothecountry’scurrentcontext.The Era of Hero-Kings: dominant historicalnarrativesandalternativeviewsTextbooks in government schools reflect astandard historical narrative that recountscentral events in Myanmar’s past.11 Theaccount emphasises the key role of threegreathero-kings.Anawrahta,Bayinnaung,andAlaungphaya are depicted as the three kingsthat united the territory thatwould come tobe Burma and gave rise to Burmese cultureandcivilization.

11FormorediscussionseeSalem-Gervais,N.(2018).TeachingEthnicLanguages,CulturesandHistoriesinGovernmentSchoolstoday:GreatOpportunities,GiantPitfalls?(PartI).

14

King Anawrahta is said to have unifiedterritoryleadingtoanexpansivekingdomthatincludedmuchoftheterritoryofmodern-dayMyanmar and beyond. During the era ofAnawrahta and subsequent kings, BuddhismwasadoptedfromtheearlierMoncivilisationandestablishedasthedominantreligion,withthe capital Pagan (now Bagan) becoming acentre of Buddhist thought and the site ofsplendidpagodasandtemples.Following a period of decline, includinginvasion by Mongol forces, King Bayinnaungemergedasanewrulerduringthefourteenthcentury, establishing the Toungoo dynasty.BayinnaungledBurmese-speakingforcesfromToungootooverthrowtheMonkingdomthathad re-emerged at Pegu and extended hiskingdom to includealmost all ofmoderndayMyanmar, as well as reaching intoneighbouring kingdoms in what are todayLaos, Vietnam, and Thailand. He is oftendepicted as a strong soldier-king whoseleadership unified a territory that wasotherwisepronetofragmentation.By the sixteenth century, the kingdomestablished by Bayinnaung’s dynasty hadgreatly contracted and his descendants werefacing renewed threat from a revival of theMon kingdom to the south. A new leader,named Alaungpaya, emerged in theeighteenth century and led forces to retakeconsiderableterritory.Peguwastakenin1757and, famously, Alaungpaya led his troops totake the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya tenyears later, burning it to the ground.Alaungpaya’s rule established the Konbaungdynastythatwouldremain inpoweruntil theperiodofBritishcolonisation.Since Burma’s independence, this golden eraofBamarkingshasfrequentlybeeninvokedaspartofahistoricalnarrativethatcelebratesanexpansive view of Burmese territory, powerandculture.Itisastorythatemphasizesunity,celebrates a martial culture, and justifiesstrongandcentralizedpowerovera territoryinhabitedbydiversecommunities,someliving

in remote locations. As such, the hero-kingnarrative inMyanmar has been employed inaneffort tobuilda senseofnational identityor, in the words of Benedict Anderson, an“imaginedcommunity”generatingloyaltyandpatriotism.12Alternative views of Myanmar’s history andcritiquesofthisnation-buildingapproachhaveemerged from several vantage points. Onecritique points to the great diversity ofpeoples and cultures, all with their ownhistories and stories of heroes, thatoverlapped with periods of Burmese-dominated history and are treated only inpassing in the above narrative. The historicalfocus on Anawrahta, Bayinnaung, andAlaungpaya as glorious victors and thefounders of Burma leaves little room toconsider other significant non-Bamar politiesand historical heroes. One of the mostobviousexamplesisthatoftheMonkingdomsinlowerBurma,rivalstotheBamarkings.Situated around strategically important Pegu(locatedclosetotheSittaungRiverinpresent-dayBago),theMonkingdomenjoyeditsowngolden era and saw periods of greatprosperity. TheMon language spreadwidely,and Mon merchants traded with farawaymarkets across the Bay of Bengal. The Monkingdom was a centre of Buddhist thought,playing a key role in the fifteenth centuryTheravadaBuddhist revival inSoutheastAsia.TheworkofMonarchitectscanstillbeseeninparts of Thailand and Myanmar today,including at Bagan. All three of the Burmesehero-kings fought wars against Mon kings,with Alaungpaya’s capture of Pegu in 1757bringingafinalendtotheMonkingdom.The dominant Burmese historical narrativealso leaves littleroomforrecountingtheruleof theArakankingdomduring the fourteenthandfifteenthcenturiesinwhatisnowRakhineState.

12Anderson,B.R.(1983).

15

Orientingitselftowardstheseawiththeridgeof the Arakan Yomas at its back, the Arakankingdomwas ruled fromMrauk-U and, at itsheight, its borders extended along coastalBengaltothewest,towardsPegutotheeast.The Arakan people shared a commonlanguage with their Bamar neighbors andpracticed Buddhism. But the kingdom,situated on the Indian Ocean, was alsoremarkably international and cosmopolitan.Thekingdom includedaMuslimminorityandMrauk-U served as home to people fromArakan, Holland, Portugal, Bengal, Burma,Afghanistan, Persia and elsewhere.13 TheArakankingdomwasdefeatedunder theruleofAlaungpaya’sson,Bodawpaya.Another alternative view that contrasts withthe dominant Burmese historical narrativefocusesongeography. Itpointstothemyriadofdiversecommunities,especiallythoselivinginmore remote hill areas, and raises doubtsabouttheunitaryandabsolutenatureofrulebytheancientBurmesekings.James C. Scott has articulated this focus ongeography in his 2009 book The Art of NotBeing Governed. Scott asserts that ancientkingdoms, in what became modern-dayMyanmar(aswellasotherpartsofSoutheastAsia), were dependent on labour-intensivewet rice agriculture as a food supply. Theseagrarian states encountered a significantchallenge when their boundaries moved

13Myint-U,T.(2006)pp.72-74,andMyint-U,T.(2001)p.14.

beyond easy reach of rice production. Scotthas described highland areas (as well asswamps) as creating a “friction of terrain”where wet rice agriculture cannot easily bepracticed but also transportation networksprevent the grain frombeing used to sustainthe military forces necessary to maintainpolitical control. In Scott’s view, challengingterrain – whether it be the hills of the PeguYoma, swampy areas of the IrrawaddyDelta,thehillsofKarenState, the rugged terrainofShan State, or the remote mountains ofNagaland–offereda refuge from thecentralstate and its demand for labour, taxes, andgoods.Thisanalysisraisesquestionsabouttheextent to which periphery areas truly cameunder the control of a central state. It offersan alternative view that challenges thenarrative of the absolute power of Bamarkings.14Thecampaignsandsoldiersofthegreathero-kings may have traversed remote areas thattoday constitute the borderlands ofmodern-dayMyanmar, but this analysis suggests thatcontrolbythecentralstatesteadilydecreasedat greater distances and elevations from thestatecentre.Asaresult,communitiessuchasthe Shan enjoyed higher levels of autonomyunder the rule of a local prince or sabwa.However, the Shan princes also faced thechallenge of geography, and communities ofPalaung/Ta’ang, Pa’O, Lisu, Wa and otherscould easily exceed the reach of the localsawbwainevenmoreremotecommunities.15Beyond thedegreeof the truepolitical reachof the central state, theanalysisof Scottandothers raises questions about the degree towhichcommunities, living inwhatconstitutesmodern-day Myanmar, experienced ethnicityasafixedandascribedidentity.Inhisfamousethnography, Political Systems of HighlandBurma, Edmund Leach notes tremendousfluidity between communities in northernBurma.16VictorLiebermanalsohighlightsthat 14Scott(2009). 15Ibid.p.252.16Leach(1954).

16

during the pre-colonial era, among thoseliving in central Burma and the IrrawaddyDelta, ethnic identity would fluctuatebetween Bamar and Mon communitiesdepending on patron-client relationships andthe ascendency of different centres ofpower.17 Scott likewise highlights theporousnessofethnicidentityascommunities,especially those in mountainous areas, wereable to absorb those seeking refuge andfleeingthecontrolofthecentralstate.Given the apparent fluidity of ethnic identityprior to colonisation, it is essential to look atBurma’s colonial experience and Britishsystems of administrative control to furtherunderstand the emergence of a fixed andessentialisednotionofethnicidentity.BritishColonialRuleDuring thenineteenthcentury,Britain foughtthreewarsagainsttheBamarKonbaungkings(the descendants of King Alaungpaya). TheFirstAnglo-BurmeseWar(1824-26)resultedinthe British annexation of Arakan andTenasserim. The Second Anglo-Burmese War(1852) gave Britain control of Lower Burma.The Third Anglo-Burmese war culminated inthesurrenderofKingThibawin1885andsawthe establishment of British rule over allterritory previously controlled by theKonbaungdynasty.As Martin Smith highlights in his chapter“Ethnic Politics and Citizenship in History,”Myanmar military leaders have oftenharkenedbacktothedaysofthehero-kingsoftheeleventhtoeighteenthcenturiestocreateaunifyingnarrative.Butany considerationofcurrentnationalpoliticsinMyanmarneedstoalso carefully consider the profound impactand legacy of British colonialism.18 In hisarticle “The British ‘Pacification’ of Burma:Order Without Meaning,” Michael Aung-ThwinnotesthatBritishcolonialruleimposedarbitrary administrative systems and 17Lieberman,V.B.(1978).18SmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.31.

structuresthatsoughttocreatemeaningandorder as new colonial rulers confrontedcomplexity and resistance. He notes that theconsequences of this approach are still felttoday.19PoliticalAdministrationUnderColonialRuleFollowing the British annexation of Burma in1885, the administrative system of the newcolonial power sought to cope with the“friction of terrain” in a very explicit way. Aseparation was made between MinisterialBurma(alsoknownasBurmaProper),andtheFrontier Areas. In terms of geography,Ministerial Burma included the lowlands andvalleys, mostly occupying the central andsouthern areas of the country. By contrast,theFrontierAreasconsistedofthearchwayofhighland hills and mountains to the west,northandeast.The separation resulted in very differentadministrative systems and structures. Astrong centralized state was established inMinisterial Burma, where the power of localleaders was curtailed. By contrast, in theFrontierAreas local leadersand localpoliticalsystems(atleastasunderstoodbytheBritish)were left intact, under a system of indirectrulepracticedelsewhereintheBritishEmpire(e.g. incolonial India). Inexchangefor loyaltyand regular payment of taxes, leaders in theFrontier Areas enjoyed a high level ofautonomy.20This dual approach reflected Britain’s keyinterest in its newest colonial expansion: riceproduction for export. This necessitatedimposingstrictcontroloverthericeproducingareas of central Burma, while the highlands,being remote anddifficult to access, andnotyet a source of key export products,were ofless interest (although highland teak andother hardwoods were always valued). Thetwo-track system of administration not onlyhad an impact on howmaps and boundaries 19Aung-Thwin,M.(1985)p.247.20SmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.32.

17

were drawn up; it also meant that theexperience of state power and control wasvery different for communities living inMinisterial Burma than those living in theremote hills of the Frontier Areas. Theexperience of having different areas of thecountry under different forms ofadministrativecontrolwouldhaveaprofoundimpact on the country beyond the colonialperiodandintothepresentera.EthnicClassificationUnderColonialRuleBeyond the imposition of administrativesystems and structures, British colonialismalso introduced the concept of classifyingpeople according to ethnicity. Based onnineteenth century understandings ofEuropean history and society, ethnic,classificationbecameaguide tohelp colonialrulers understand and manoeuvre thecomplex diversity they encountered amongpopulations living within the boundaries oftheirnewcolonialterritory.One key concept related to ethniccategorisation in Myanmar came from theBritishcolonialadministratorandscholar, J.S.Furnivall. In his writings, Furnivall describedBurmaasa“pluralsociety,”inwhichdifferentethnic communities might engage with eachotherinthemarketplace,butnotcombine.InFurnivall’sview,groupsmightlivesidebyside,butwouldremainseparate.21Scholars have pointed out that in Furnivall’scharacterisation of Burma, and otherSoutheast Asian countries, the degree towhich groups remained separate wasexaggerated.Also, ithasbeennoted thathe,and others in the British administration,imposed systems of categorisation that hadlittle meaning to the groups under Britishrule.22 Indeed, authors such as Robert Taylorhave noted that the imposition of a setclassification system reflected Westernassumptions that the ascribed trait of 21Furnivall,J.S.(1939).22Lee,H.G.(2007).

ethnicity was a central element in identity,and necessarily produced antagonismbetween different groups.23 A variety ofhistorians and researchers have argued thatthisassumptionwasfalseandunhelpful,as itrepresentedadeparture frommore fluidanddynamic pre-colonial relationships. AshleySouth puts forward the perspective thatethnic identityexistedduringthepre-colonialera but that other elements – particularlywhere individuals and communities foundthemselves in terms of paying tribute to acentral authority–wereequally important informingindividualandgroupidentities.24Thus,oneofthedeepestremaininglegaciesofthe British colonial period in Burma was notsimply the imposition of a bureaucraticsystem that applied different administrativeapproachesindifferentgeographicareas.Thebureaucraticsystemwasaccompaniedby thedevelopment of an imposed categorisation,which had profound consequences for thefuture. It was assumed that these categoriesrepresented innate and fixed qualities thatassociated particular groups, or “races” (theterm commonly used by the British at thetime),withcertain territorialboundaries,andsupposedracialcharacteristics.25While reflecting on the practice ofcategorisationandethnicessentialisation(thepositing of fixed racial characteristics) underBritish colonial rule, it is important to alsoacknowledge that ethnic identity and thesense of communal belonging are authenticexperiences in any community. Thus, whilecategories imposed by the British may havebeenquitearbitrary, thisdoesnot imply thatthe experience of ethnic identity is notgenuine. Indeed, multiple generations havetaken on these categories and made themtheir own. As such, ethnic identity hasmuchtoofferintermsofrichculturaltraditionsandpractices.26

23Taylor,R.H.(1982).24South,A.(2008)p.4.25Ferguson,J.M.(2015)p.526South,A.(2008)p.4.

18

As suggested in the introduction, the mostproblematic aspect of ethnic identity is howimposed categories were used to treatdifferentgroupsdifferently,andthelong-termconsequences of this divisive approach. Forinstance, as was the practice in other Britishcolonies, the British administrationencouraged specific ethnic/racial groups toplay particular roles. As a result, groups suchas the Karen, the Kachin or the Chin, whichtheBritish identifiedas“martial races,”oftenperformedmilitary functions. Also, the Karenwere frequently selected to carry outadministrative functions, as were immigrantsfromBritishIndia.27Beyond giving preferential treatment tocertain national groups from within Burma,immigration from India was activelyencouraged.ThousandsofIndiantroopswererelocated to Burma to perform securityfunctions.Workers were imported and cameto settle in Burma’s main cities, and civilservants from Indiawere brought in to carryout senior civil servant positions. Seasonallabourersalsomoved fromBengal towork inriceproduction.TheywouldcometoestablishpermanenthomesinnorthernArakan.28As a result, the territory that was broughtunder colonial administrationwould come tobe what Will Kymlicka describes as both amultinational stateandapolyethnicstate.Asa multinational state, the boundaries ofcolonial Burma would include pre-existing,self-governing“nationalminorities”withtheirown language, culture, and territory orhomeland. However, Burma also emergedfrom colonialism with significant immigrantcommunities, forming what Kymlickadescribesasapolyethnicstate.29Thus, the colonial period would have asignificant impact on views and narrativessurroundingethnicidentityinBurma.Colonialrule formalized a practice of delineating and

27Taylor,R.H.(1982)p.14,andCallahan,M.P.(2003)p.35.28LeiderinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.195.29Kymlicka,W.(1995)pp.11-14.

applying different administrative approachestodifferentpartsof thecountry, throughthecreationofMinisterialBurmaandtheFrontierAreas.Whilethisadministrativeapproachwasoriginally established to extract the greatesteconomicsurpluspossiblefromthe lowlands,it was accompanied by the imposition of aclassification framework intended to helpcolonial rulers understand the complexity ofBurma. Complexity in the colonial state onlyincreased as communities that had occupiedterritory for centuries and those that hadcome to settle more recently were boundtogetherunderBritishrule.Asaresult,bythetimeBurmaapproachedtheend of the colonial period, “ethnicity hadbecome a defining category of politicalorientation.”30 Ethnic identity and ethno-nationalismprovidedatoolthatcouldbeusedto mobilize communities around efforts toshapethepost-independenceperiod.WorldWarIIandIndependenceA Burmese independence movement inoppositiontoBritishruleemergedpriortotheSecond World War. Bamar political leadersfrom Burma’s central lowlands led themovement and articulated their desire forindependence emerging out of grievancesproduced from the experience of strictcentralized rule in Ministerial Burma. Theysought to establish an independent nationwhere state authority would extend into theperiphery, abolishing the boundaries anddifferent levels of autonomy between thecentreandhighlandareasofthecountry.While seeking an end to colonial rule, manynationalist leaders also felt deep resentmenttowards non-Bamar groups that hadintegrated into the colonial structures. Forinstance,SouthrecountshowmembersoftheBamar population resented the Karen whomthey saw as being disproportionatelyrepresented in the colonial administration 30South,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.4(emphasisadded).

19

system. Karen forces had been used by theBritish against the Bamar as far back as theFirst and Second Anglo-Burman wars, whilelater Karen security forces were used tosuppress Bamar nationalist campaigns. Theresult was that many within the nationalistindependence movement saw the Karen ascollaboratorsandsupportersoftheBritish.31At the same time, communities in Burma’shighlands and border areas had notexperienced the restrictions of centralizedcolonial rule. Among elites from non-Bamarcommunities,manyhadexperiencedadegreeof patronage under British administration.They saw the nationalist independencemovementasapotentialthreattotheir long-established autonomy. Leaders from thesecommunities came to articulate their owninterest in independence, but their vision forthefuturedidnotnecessarilysharetheBamarnationalist desire for a strong unitary state.Instead, many saw independence aspotentially offering an opportunity to makegains for theirowncommunities,and,aswasthe case for independence leaders in centralBurma, leaders from ethnic nationalitycommunities came to see their own ethniccategoryasakeytomobilizeandadvocateforpolitical rights: “[C]olonial rule fostered theemergence of self-consciously distinct ethnicminority groups, who were encouraged toidentify themselves in opposition to theBurmesemajority.”32TheSecondWorldWarSuchwere thedynamicsemergingoutof the1930sattheonsetoftheSecondWorldWar.WithJapaneseexpansionintoSoutheastAsia,agroupofBamar independenceleaders,whocame tobeknownas the “ThirtyComrades,”left Burma and connected with Japaneseforces. Theywereprovidedwithpolitical andmilitary training, which prepared them toreenter Burma and seize control as Britishcolonial powers retreated to India. Following 31South(2008)p.12.32South(2008):p.12(emphasisadded).

Japanese forces, the independence leader,General Aung San, led the newly formedBurma Independence Army (BIA) across theborder of Siam and into Burma in December1941. The collapse of British rule in Burma,along with the invasion by Japanese forces,and theentranceof theBIA,was aperiodoftremendousupheavalandviolencethatwouldleaveitsmarkonthecountrywellbeyondthewaryears.Again,ethnic identity,resentment,and suspicionwould play a significant role intheexperienceofdifferentcommunities.IncontrasttotheBIA,somenon-Bamarethnicgroups maintained their allegiance to theBritishduringthewar,andKachin,Karen,andKarenni militias carried out daring raidsagainstJapaneseforces.Atthesametime,asBIA troops entered Burma, long-standingresentment towards ethnic nationalitycommunitiesfuelledterribleatrocitiesagainstnon-Bamar villages. Well-documentedmassacres took place in the IrrawaddyDelta,Tenasserim,andtheKarenhills.In1942, further to thewest,asBritish forcesretreatedtoIndia,butbeforeJapaneseforceshad established control, a series of eventsoccurredintheArakanregion, leavingadeepscaroncommunitiesthatremainstothisday.In contrast to the violence that took place inthesoutheast,eventsinArakanwerenotwelldocumented. As a result, the exactchronology, the number of deaths, thenumberofhomesdestroyed,theexactroleofBIA forces, and the level of overalldisplacement related to these events is notclear. However, it is clear that seriouscommunal violence – violence againstMuslims carried out by Arakan Buddhists inthe south, and violence against ArakanBuddhistscarriedoutbyMuslimsinthenorth– resulted in many deaths and a significantmovementofpeoplebetweenMaungdawandButhidaung in the north and districts furthersouth.Theresultchangedwherepeoplelivedand created divisions based on ethnicity that

20

hadnotpreviouslyexistedinthesamewayinArakan.33Under the Japanese, the BIA was allowed aleadership role in the wartime regime andthey proceeded to use the opportunity todevelop and implement their vision ofnationhood.Inanapproachreminiscentofthepractice of King Alaungphaya in the mid-eighteenth century, they promoted the ideaof a unitary Burmese state with a focus onloyaltytothecentre.Authorshavenotedthatthe experience of military and politicaltraining under Japanese forces had a deepimpact on future military leaders such asGeneralNeWin,creatingadeliberateBamar-centric political shaping of the army.34 As aresult of thewar experience,many from thenon-Bamar communities were left with deepconcern. The wartime administration haddemonstrated a high level of Bamarchauvinism, pursuing strategies such asoutlawing the teaching of languages otherthanBurmese.35As the end of the war drew near, GeneralAungSanandmembersoftheBIAtransferredtheirallegiancetotheAllied forces.TheAnti-FascistPeople’sFreedomLeague (AFPFL)wasfounded in March 1945 to resist Japaneseoccupation in cooperation with the BIA, andasJapaneseforceswithdrew,turned its focusto ending British colonialism. At this point,Bamar nationalists were eager to begin theprocess of leading a new unified country. Atthe same time, ethnic nationality groups sawindependence as an opportunity to solidifytheir claims to autonomy in exchange forloyalty to theBritish throughout thewartimeperiod. British authorities did not grantindependence to non-Bamar ethnic groupsdespite vague promises made during thewar.36 Rather than immediately grantingindependence to Aung San’s AFPFL, the

33LeiderinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.210.34Callahan,M.P.(2003)pp.48-55andSmith,M.(1991)p.92.35South(2008)p.23.36Ibid.p.22,p.24.

departing British regime required that Bamarnationalists undertake some level ofconsultationwithnon-BamargroupsfromtheFrontierAreas.Independence: the Panglong Agreement and1947ConstitutionThe mechanism used to resolve this hurdlecame in the form of a Conference of theNationalities that took place in Panglong inShanStateduringFebruary1947.Themeetingwas convened by leaders of the Shan andother non-Bamar groups, and attended byAung San. The conference produced thePanglongAgreementofFebruary11,1947, inwhich Chin, Kachin, and Shan leaders agreedto join the Union of Burma in exchange forguaranteesofautonomy.Ultimately,thestepsleading up to the conference and the finalagreementclearedthewayfor independenceandthedraftingofanewconstitution,writtenin 1947 and adopted in January 1948 whenindependence was granted from Britain.Despite the key role that the PanglongAgreement played in finalizing the movetowards independence, ethnic groupsassociatedwithMinisterialBurmasuchastheKaren, Mon, Arakanese, and other smallergroups were not represented at theconference and did not sign the PanglongAgreement.37The Panglong Agreement is often seen as asymbolic moment and a key element in theformation ofmodern Burma, butmany havenoted its limitations. To begin, the PanglongAgreement sought to establish a newunifiedstate in a situation where little unity existedandsignificantstakeholdershadbeenleftout.While thepriority forBurmese independenceleaderswastocreateanindependentpoliticalentitythatunitedbothMinisterialBurmaandthe Frontier Areas, the main focus of non-Bamar groupswas to gain independenceandto maintain autonomy and the right to self-determination. The Panglong Agreement

37SmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.33.

21

managed to bridge the gap between theseaspirationsthroughaclausethatstated,“Fullautonomy in internal administration for theFrontierAreasisacceptedinprinciple.”38Following thePanglongConference, the1947Constitution was adopted outlining variouscharacteristics of the new state. Taylorcaptures the challengesencounteredand thestrategies adopted at the time ofindependence,andnotesthatthisestablisheda pattern that would be repeated in thefuture:

ThedominantproblemofBurmesepoliticssinceindependencehasbeenthatofnationalunity.Becauseofthegreatethnic,linguistic,andculturalheterogeneityofthepopulation,nogovernmenthasbeenabletomeetallthedemandsplaceduponitbyvariousminorityandtribalgroupsforpoliticalautonomy,economicdevelopment,andculturalindependence.OneofthemajorwaysgoverningpartiesinBurmahaveattemptedtodealwiththenationalunityproblemhasbeenthroughconstitutionalprovisionsguaranteeingthepreservationofminorityculturesandadegreeofinstitutionalautonomyforregionallyconcentratedethnicgroups.39

Thus, in line with agreements reached atPanglong, the 1947 Constitution createddistinct states for Kachin, Karenni, and Shancommunities, as well as a Chin SpecialDivision.AKarenStatewascreatedfiveyearssubsequent to the adoption of theconstitution. The head of each of theseethnically-associated states served as aminister in the national cabinet. The newconstitution provided for the creation of abicameral legislature with a Chamber ofDeputies and a Chamber of Nationalities.

38ThefulltextofthePanglongAgreementcanbeaccessedthroughmultiplesourcesincludinghttps://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MM_470212_Panglong%20Agreement.pdf39Taylor,R.H.(1979)p.232.

Representation in the Chamber ofNationalitieswasallocatedaccording toa setnumber of seats associated with differentethnic groups. The result has been describedby Josef Silverstein as a “federal structure…morenominalthanreal.”40Another key aspect of the 1947 Constitutionwas that Shan State and Karenni State wereaccordedtherightofsecessionafteraperiodof ten years. By contrast, Kachin State wasgranted additional territory in exchange forgivinguptherightofsecession.41As Ferguson notes, the association betweenethnic identity andpolitical representation inthe 1947 Constitution further reinforced theidea that political representation should takeplace on the basis of ethnic identity.42Furthermore, Taylor outlines how politicalleadersassociatedwithBamarcommunitiesinthe new country’s lowlands, as well astraditional leaders from the borderlands,began to promote their communities andspeakof interests in termsofethnicdiversityand cultural protection, giving rise to thespreadofethnic-basedpoliticalpartiesduringtheparliamentaryperiod.43Parliamentary Democracy and MilitaryTakeoverof1962While seen as the father of Burma’sindependencemovement, andoften creditedwithaleadroleinbuildingtheunderstandingneeded for the signing of the PanglongAgreement, Aung San did not live to see thefruitsofhislabour.Hewasassassinated,alongwithfiveofhiscolleagues,duringJuly1947.UNu,afellownationalistandco-founderoftheAFPFL,wouldcometoplaytheroleofBurma’sfirst PrimeMinister as the country gained itsindependence from Britain in January 1948.However,nothavingbeenclosely involved inthe Panglong negotiations, U Nu and other

40Silverstein,J.(1977)p.59.41SmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.33.42Ferguson,J.M.(2015)p.10.43Taylor,R.H.(1982)p.15.

22

AFPFL colleagues showed little interest inunderstanding and responding to theaspirations and concerns of Burma’s ethnicnationalitycommunities.Even before formal independence, thecountry was facing serious instability frommultiplesources:Burmawasawashwitharmsdistributed over the course of the SecondWorldWar;atthecloseofthewar,aMuslimMujahid movement had already emerged innorthernArakanandwas advocating for thatregion of Burma to join neighbouring EastPakistan;during1947theCommunistPartyofBurma(CPB)would leavetheumbrellaof theAFPFL and form an underground insurgencymovement the following year; only one yearafter independence, in 1949, fighting woulderuptbetweengovernmentandKarenforces,led by the Karen National DefenceOrganisation(latersubsumedundertheKarenNational Union, KNU);44 and a wide array ofpocketarmieshademergedunderthecontrolof various political leaders. Beyond upheavaland instability associated with differentideologies, different ethnic identities, andcompeting leaders,Burmaalsoexperiencedahighleveloflawlessnessandcrime.By1957,itwas described as having the highest murderrate in theworld,with non-insurgent relateddeathshigherthanthoserelatedto insurgentfighting.45Thecountryalsoexperiencedsecuritythreatsemerging as the result of Cold Warcompetition:followingtheChineserevolutionof 1949, Chinese nationalist Kuomintang(KMT) forces retreated into Burma and, withthesupportoftheUS,establishedbases(andgreatly expanded opium production) in thecountry’s northeast. At the same time, Chinaand the Soviet Union lent support tocompetingfactionsoftheCPB.Meanwhile, the situation within theparliament and among political leaders 44TheformationoftheKNUisexploredinmoredetailaspartofthecasestudyonKarenidentity.45Smith,M.(1991)p.97.

displayed internal instability, tensions andfactionalism. Authors such as Steinberg notethatBurma’searlyexperiencewithdemocracyduring thisperioddidnotdevelopa traditionof compromise and accommodation oftenassociated with a parliamentary system.Instead, in a context where power wasperceived as being finite, competition wasintense.46Looking back, it is clear that Burma’sparliamentary period was one of chaos andinstability with conflicting forces emanatingfromnumeroussources.Externalandinternalpressures contributed to a perception,particularlywithin thearmed forces, that thecountry was under siege.47 The Tatmadawbriefly took power and formed a “militarycaretaker government” in 1958, only torestore it back in elections won by U Nu’sfactionin1960.At the same time, a range of mountinggrievances gave way to the emergence of anew armed group, the Kachin IndependenceOrganization (KIO),48 in 1961. Also, Shan andKarenni leaders pursued demands to see arestoration of greater autonomy, and theability to claim their right of succession asoriginallyoutlinedinthePanglongAgreement.However, when U Nu began discussionsregarding steps towards federalism with a“Federal Movement” led by Shan and otherethnic nationality leaders, General Ne Wintookpoweragaininadefinitivecoupin1962.Predicting even greater levels of chaos iffederalism was pursued, he began theTatmadaw’s half-century-long project ofcreating a strong, unified nation built onBamarcultureandidentity.49

46Steinberg,D.I.(2001)p.19andp.48.47Ibid.p.185.48TheformationoftheKIOisexploredinmoredetailaspartofthecasestudyonKachinidentity.49South2008:p.27.

23

MilitaryRuleUnderNeWin:1962-1988TheTatmadawjustifieditstakeoverin1962asa necessary measure to address instabilityemanating from civilian rule, particularly theperceptionthatamovetowardfederalism,asadvocatedbynon-Bamarrepresentatives,wasathreattostabilityandraisedthepotentialofnational disintegration. Indeed, the siegementality that originally prompted Ne Win’smilitary takeover would continue unabateduntilwellintothe1980s.TheTatmadawintroduceditsnotorious“FourCuts” counter-insurgency strategy during themid-1960s. This military tactic sought to cutEAOsoff fromsourcesofciviliansupportandresulted in the forcible relocation ofcommunities to areas under firm Tatmadawcontrol. The strategy pushed insurgents fromcentral Burma into the country’s peripheryand Burma’s mountainous borderlandsbecame home to many different armedgroups. During the 1960s and 1970s, ethnicnationality forces came to control andadminister territories that were colloquiallyknown as “liberated zones.” In these zones,some armed groups would develop thesystems needed to both tax and deliverservices, includingeducationandhealthcare.The largest armed groups came to developcivilian administrations that oversaw a rangeofcommunityneeds,includingintheareasofagriculture,managementofforestandminingresources, and justice.50 In the Thai andChinese border areas, armed groups such asthe KNU and the KIO established fairlysophisticated (if under-resourced) state-likestructures of considerable durability thatoften enjoyed significant legitimacy on thepart of conflict-affected nationalitycommunities.At the same time, central Burma undermilitaryruleshiftedtosingle-partyruleledbythe Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).Ne Win pursued a form of authoritarian

50Jolliffe,K.(2015)pp.15-17.

socialist economic development following his“Burmese Way to Socialism,” eliminatingforeign influence inside the country, whilegovernment functions were furthercentralised under the control of a militaryestablishment increasingly identifiedwith theBamarmajority.Beyond, political, economic, and securitymeasures, the years of authoritarian ruleunderNeWin sawanemphasisonunityandthe primacy of Burmese identity. The post-1962 regime unambiguously rejected theclaim to nationhood by non-Bamar groups.Anydiscourseregardingself-determinationorfederalismwasinterpretedasemanatingfromsecessionist aspirations, raising the potentialofnationaldisintegration.51The 1947 Constitution was suspended whenthe military took power in 1962, and it wasnotuntil1974thattheBSPPpublishedanewconstitution. This differed from the 1947version in several important ways. Thenumberofethnicstateswereexpandedfromfive to sevenwith the creation ofMon StateandArakanState,allocatingonestatetoeachofwhat themilitarydeemed tobe themajornon-Bamargroups;tobalancethenewethnicstates, seven divisions were created in areasthatwere associatedwith the predominantlyBamar population. The two-chamber systemof the 1947 Constitution was replaced by aunicameral system with a single People’sAssembly.Taylornotesthattheargumentforeliminating the Chamber ofNationalitieswasthatthePeople’sAssemblywouldlegislateforthebenefitofallcitizenswithouttheneedforspecial representation for particular ethnicgroups.52HeleneMariaKyedandMikaelGraversassertthat one consequence of military rulebetween1962-1988wasthepromotionoftheideaofastrong,unitarystateinwhichBamaridentitywasthefoundation.Whilediversityinthe formof eightmajor “national races”was 51Taylor,R.H.(1982)p.19.52Taylor,R.H.(1979)p.241.

24

acknowledged, Bamar identity was seen askeytoasenseofbelongingandothergroupswere encouraged to assimilate under thisnational identity.53Furthermore,thefocusoneight major nationality races tended toobscure and confuse the significant diversitythat exists within and between non-Bamarcommunities.54Discriminationagainstnon-Bamargroupswasjustified and reinforced through historicalnarratives that fostered distrust andanimosity. Steinberg outlines a list ofperceptions of ethnic nationality groups thatframed intercommunal relations. Thisincludedtheviewthatnon-Bamargroupsandforeigners took advantage of Britishcolonialism foreconomicgain; thebelief thattheBamarweretheonlyethnicgroupresidingentirely within the territorial boundaries ofthe country, and thus, the only groupwhoseallegiancewasentirelydevotedtoBurma;anda suspicion that non-Bamar groups, whosharedacommonheritagewithethnicgroupslivingoutsidethecountry,andmanyofwhomwere not Buddhist, would secede given theopportunity. These narratives unfolded in acontext of increased isolation andxenophobia, and contributed to a sense ofinsecurity within the military and the widerBamarcommunity,leadingtodistrusttowardscommunities living in the country’sborderlands.55Withinthiscontext,authoritiescontinuedthepractice of promoting Bamar culture througha process often referred to as“Burmanisation.” Gravers has described thisasapolitical regimeusingdifferentstrategiesto impose “one singular cultural essence.”56Gustaaf Houtman notes that this has beenachieved through emphasising shared “racialorigins, common culture and common

53KyedandGraversinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)pp.60-61.54South,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.8.55Steinberg,D.I.(2001)p.26,p.190.56GraversinTønnesson,S.,&Antlöv,H.(1996)p.240.

language.”57Finally,MatthewWaltonexplainsthat through the assimilation efforts ofBurmanisation,

Membersofnon-Burmanethnicgroupsareforced(eitherthroughdirectcoercionsorthroughincentives)toadoptvariousaspectsofBurmanculture,speedingtheirassimilationintheMyanmar“culturalnation,”whileatthesametimeriddingthemofthoseculturalelementsthataredeemeddangeroustonationalstabilityorcontrarytothespiritofnationalunity.58

Walton goes on to note that Burmanisationhas not usually been an explicit policy of thegovernment. Rather, “establishing Burmanculture as the norm of national identity” hastaken place through development efforts,educationpractices(particularlytheoutlawingof instruction inethnic languagesandBamar-focused historical narratives in textbooks),and, as illustrated above, narratives aroundloyalty.59At the same time, narratives also emergedwithin non-Bamar communities thatcontributed to polarisation, and a sense ofdistrustandresentmenttowardsthemajorityBamar community. These sentiments werereinforced through narratives thatemphasized pre-colonial and colonialexperiencesofautonomy,andjustifiedarmedinsurgency based on the right to self-determination.TheConceptofTaingyinthaWhile the dynamics of division and distrustwere certainly present prior to Ne Win’stakeover in 1962, they reached new heightsunder military rule. Moreover, ideassurrounding the categorization of people,originally introduced under the British, werefurther internalized and institutionalized. A

57Houtman,G.(1999)p.60.58Walton,M.J.(2013)p.11.59Ibidp.6.

25

focusontheconceptoftaingyinthaplayedanimportantroleinthesetrends.Nick Cheesman describes taingyintha as “anidea thatprovides thebasis for guidelinesbywhich certain facts are accepted and othersrejected in determining membership inMyanmar’spolitical community.”Whileoftentranslated as race, ethnicity or indigeneity,Cheesmanemphasizesthatthesignificanceofthe term goes further as it provides the“contrivance for political inclusion andexclusion, for political eligibility anddomination.”60A connection between citizenship andindigenous heritage had already emergedduring the post-independence period, but itwas during the Ne Win period that theconcept of what it meant to be taingyinthacameintoprominence,legitimizingclaimsthatthe country belonged to some but not toothers.61 Following Ne Win’s Union Dayspeech in 1964, in which he urged that“Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Chin, Burman, Shanandothertaingyintha inhabitingtheUnionofBurma need to be resolved to stick togetherfor life, throughweal andwoe,” the conceptoftaingyinthacametooccupyanewplaceofimportanceinthecountry’spoliticallife.62As Ferguson explains, to be consideredtaingyintha, a group had to have alreadyexisted within the territory that came to beidentifiedas theUnionofBurmaprior to thefirst Anglo-Burmese war (prior to 1824).During theyearsofmilitary rule, theconcepttaingyinthawould be further associatedwithcitizenshiprights.The 1974 Constitution captured Ne Win’semphasis on the role of the state in“promoting unity, mutual assistance, amityand mutual respect among taingyintha.”63

60Cheesman,N.(2017)pp.461-462.61South,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.6.62Cheesman,N.(2017)p.465.63SeeArticle21(a)ofTheConstitutionoftheUnionofBurma(1974)availalbleat

Following the adoption of the 1974Constitution, work began to draft a newcitizenship law. However, even before a newlaw was published, sensitivity surroundingillegalimmigration,accompaniedbythefocuson who belonged and who did not, wouldshape the 1978 Nagamin operation64 thataimed to verify immigration status of thoseliving on the northern Arakan border withBangladesh. The violence that accompaniedthe campaign led 250,000 refugees to fleeacrosstheborderintoBangladesh.Fouryearslater,the1982CitizenshipLawwaspassed, restricting full citizenship to groupsthat were taingyintha. Lesser categories ofcitizenship (associate citizenship ornaturalized citizenship) were developed forthose who did not meet the taingyintharequirement. Cheesman notes that thearticulation within the 1982 Citizenship Lawmeantthat“aperson’sstatusasamemberofa national race, or not, preceded and partlydeterminedtheirstatusasacitizen.”65This articulation of what it means to beindigenous firmly emanates fromwhatmanydescribeasanessentialistviewofethnicity,66which assumes that ethnic identity is a fixedcharacteristic, akin to DNA, assigned at birthby virtue of one’s ancestors. It also requiresthe establishment of fixed categories withclear boundaries so that social membershipcan be documented.67 Indeed, during themilitaryera,and inassociationwith the1982CitizenshipLaw,thegovernmentcametorelyonanofficiallistof“nationalraces”thatwentbeyond common reference to themaineightgroups,includingahierarchyofsubcategoriesforeachgroup.Wewillconsidertheemphasis

http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/1974Constitution.pdf64KnowninEnglishas“OperationDragonKing.”65Cheesman,N.(2017)p.472.66ForexampleseeAresurgentnationalismisshapingMyanmarpolitics,byThantMyint-U,inNikkeiAsianReview,19October2017.67Cheesman,N.(2017)p.469.

26

on categorisation in further detail as weexaminetheeventsof1988andbeyond.Efforts toMoveBeyondMilitary Rule: 1988 -2008During the 26-year period of military ruleunder Ne Win, from 1962-1988, Burmaexperienced significanteconomicdecline. Formost, the Burmese Road to Socialism turnedout to be a road to extreme poverty. By themid-1980s, civilian anger towards the BSPPhadreachednewheightsaseconomicreformsweremismanaged,andpeoples’savingswereeliminated through successivedemonetisations.Large demonstrations emerged during 1988with students playing a leadership role. Inresponse to the unrest General Ne Winresigned as BSPP Chairman in July 1988.However,callsfortheendofmilitaryruleanddemocratisation continued and a nationwidestrike was called for 8 August 1988.Demonstrationsweremetbymartial lawandviolentsuppression,withcasualtiesestimatedtobeinthethousands.Theuseofforcedidnotdeterpro-democracyprotests,withdemonstrationscontinuingintoSeptember. On 18 September 1988 GeneralSawMaung led a coup, suspending the 1974Constitution and replacing the BSPP with anewmilitaryregime:theStateLawandOrderRestoration Council (SLORC). The followingyear, the SLORC junta re-namedmanyplacesincluding the country – often replacingpreviously neutral or ethnic nationality placenames with those derived from the nationallanguage.BurmabecameMyanmar,BurmeselanguagebecameMyanmarlanguage.The SLORC promised to hold multipartyelectionsthattookplaceinMay1990.Despitea restrictive political environment, includinghouse arrest for opposition leaders, voterscast their support for parties that offeredchangeafteralmost30yearsofmilitary rule.TheNationalLeagueforDemocracy(NLD),ledby Aung San Suu Kyi, won 60 percent of the

voteswhileethnicnationalitypartiesalsodidwell with 35 percent of the votes. However,the country’s military rulers refused torelinquish power until a new constitutioncouldbedrawnupthatwouldensureastronggovernment.Violent suppression followingdemonstrationsalso led many young activists to flee urbancentres for Myanmar’s border areas. There,pro-democracy activists joined ethnic armedgroupssuchastheKNUorformednewarmedorganisations such as theAll Burma StudentsDemocraticFront(ABSDF).The emphasis on strong rule, unity, andsuspicionofoutsiders,thathadbeenathemeduring the Ne Win period, was apparent inpublic statements by the new SLORC regimeand was used to justify its ongoing role.GeneralSawMaungsaidinJune1990:

ThenationshouldbeoneinwhichonlyMyanmarsresideandwhichMyanmarsown.WewillhavetobevigilantagainstMyanmarNaing-Ngan[theUnionofMyanmar],thehomeofMyanmarnationals,beinginfluencedbyanyone.AnditisimportantthatMyanmarNaing-NgandoesnotbecomethehomeofmixedbloodsinfluencedbyalienculturesthoughitiscalledMyanmarNaing-Ngan.68

The military’s ongoing role was furtherjustified through repetitive reference to itsThreeNationalCauses:

• Thenon-disintegrationoftheUnion• The non-disintegration of national

[taingyintha]solidarity• The perpetuation of national

sovereigntyThe Three National Causes, which wererepeatedly emphasized in governmentcontrolled print media and broadcasts, helduptheideaofunitybetweenthetaingyintha,perpetuating the focus on “national races”that had been started under Ne Win. 68Steinberg,D.I.(2001)p.62.

27

However,theneweraofmilitaryrulealsosawthe emergence of an official list of 135nationalracesortaingyintha.Ferguson points out that the exact origins ofthis list remain obscure.69 Kyed and Graversidentifythefirstgovernmentreferencetotheofficial taingyintha list as emerging in the“Working People’s Daily” newspaper in1990.70Despitethefrequentreferencetotheconcept of taingyintha and the 135 list,Cheesman notes that definitions haveremained convoluted and inconsistent.71 Thesimultaneousassociationofentitlementswiththe taingyintha status and the inability todefine or provide an accepted categorisationof taingyintha groups will be explored infurtherdetailinthisreport.Ceasefires and the Drafting of a NewConstitutionGeneralSawMaungwas replacedbyGeneralThan Shwe, who inaugurated a NationalConventionprocesstocreatethenew,strongconstitutionrequiredforelectionsandpavingtheway towhat themilitary regime referredto as “disciplined democracy.”72 The draftingprocessoftheNationalConventionwouldrunfrom 1993 to 2007, with a suspensionbetween1996and2004.UnderGeneralThanShwe,SLORCwasrenamedastheStatePeaceandDevelopmentCouncil(SPDC).Following the student uprising in 1988, therewas intense focus from the internationalcommunity onwhatmany perceived to be asimple struggle between “the forces of good(western-style democracy and the freemarket) and the forces of evil (Third World- 69Ferguson,J.M.(2015)p.15.70KyedandGraversinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.63.71Cheesman,N.(2017)pp.468-470.72SeeforexampleMyanmarRoadmaptoDemocracy:TheWayForward,PresentedbyH-E.KhinMaungWin,DeputyMinisterforForeignAffairsoftheUnionofMyanmar,presentedatMyanmarInstituteofStrategicandInternationalStudies,SeminaronUnderstandingMyanmar,Yangon27-28January2004.

style everything else).”73 By contrast, far lessoutside attention was paid to armed conflictin Myanmar’s borderlands, which had beenongoing since independence. A series ofceasefires, negotiated between armed groupleadersandMilitaryIntelligencechiefGeneralKhin Nyunt, would produce a pause in thefighting. These began in 1989, when thecommunist-led insurgency that had beenfightingsinceindependencecollapsed.With the demise of the Cold War, China’ssupporttotheCPBhaddeclined,andin1989foot soldiers from a variety of ethnicnationalitygroupsmutiniedagainstthemostlyBamar leadership of the CPB. In thewake ofthis event, four new ethnic affiliated armedgroups emerged, the largest and most well-known being the United Wa State Army(UWSA).GeneralKhinNyuntmovedquicklytoengage these new groups and others inceasefiretalks.After decades of violence and displacement,many ethnic nationality forces and civilianswere tired of conflict and there was a hopethatceasefireswouldbringanopportunityforbadly-needed development assistance. Therewas also an aspiration on the part of somenon-Bamar ethnic leaders to transform theirarmedgroups intopoliticalparties that couldpursue change and advocate for theircommunitiesatafuturetimewhenthecountyhad transformed to the democratic systempromisedbythemilitaryjunta.74Ceasefirenegotiationsstartedwithafocusonformer CPB militias. As a result, 1989 sawceasefire agreements reached between thegovernment and the UWSA; the MyanmarNationalDemocracyAllianceArmy(MNDAA,aKokang group formerly from the CPB); theShan State Army (SSA); and a group thatwould come to be known as the NationalDemocraticAllianceArmy (NDAA),orMonglaArmy. During the early 1990s, furtheragreements were formed with the Pa’O 73Aung-Thwin,M.(2001)p.494.74South,A.(2008)p.119.

28

NationalOrganisation (PNO) andother EAOs.The only written ceasefire between thegovernmentandanarmedgroupwasagreedwith the KIO in 1994. The following year, aceasefireagreementwasagreedbetweenthegovernment and the New Mon State Party(NMSP), followed by an agreement with theMongTaiArmy,ledbynotoriousdrugwarlordKhunSa,in1996.75GeneralKhinNyunt’sceasefiresallowedrebelforces to retain their troops, arms, andcontinued control over territory. Agreementsdid not include any form of politicalsettlement,buttherewasanexpectationthatpolitical dialogue would take place at somepointinthefuture.76Even prior to the disintegration of the CPB,Burmahadbeenhometomanysmall,armeds. This was true from the time ofindependencewhendifferentpoliticalleadersmade use of pocket armies to pursue theirown political agendas. As illustrated in thefollowing case studies, it has also beencommon for breakaway groups to split fromethnic armed organisations formingindependent armed units, which have oftenbeen quickly co-opted or coerced intoceasefires by the Tatmadaw. Following theceasefires of the late 1980s and early 1990s,the country’s military leaders activelyencouraged the formation of splinter groups,creating a proliferation of “People’s Militias”orpyithusit.77 Theseunitswouldbeprovidedwith economic incentives (often includingparticipation in the drug trade) in exchangefor ongoing allegiance and supportingTatmadawoperationsasneeded.As a result, when the National Conventionreconvened in 2004, Myanmar’s borderlandswere home to a complex array of armedactors. At the convention, a number ofceasefire groups, led by the KIO and the

75SmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)pp41-42,andSouth,A.(2008)pp.121-122.76WoodsinSadan,M.(2016)p.129.77Ibid.

NMSP,advocatedfortheinclusionofpoliticalprinciples thathadbeenat theheartof theirarmed struggle. Proposals were put forwardformeasuresthatwouldprovidehigherlevelsof autonomy at the level of ethnic states.Ultimately, the SPDC was unwilling to reviseprinciples thathadbeenoutlinedat the startof the National Convention process in 1992and these advocacy attempts wereunsuccessful.78At the same time, the SPDC worked closelywith a number of smaller ceasefire groups,both applying pressure and offeringconcessions. Reflecting on the NationalConventionprocess,Southwrites:

AnumberofceasefiregroupssupportedthegovernancestructuresemergingintheNationalConvention,eitherbecausetheyhadnochoice,becausetheyconsideredacquiescencepoliticallyexpedient,orbecausetheyperceivedadvantagesindoingsofortheircommunities(and/ortheirleaders’vestedinterests).79

The National Convention process drew to aclose in July 2007. Soon afterwards, massdemonstrations broke out in response to adrastic increase in fuel prices.Withmonks inthe forefront, frustration over poverty andliving conditions led thousands into thestreets producing the largest protests sincethose seen in 1988. These demonstrations,which came to be known as the “SaffronRevolution,” were again met with a violentcrackdown.AsMyanmarapproachedtheendoftheSPDCera, it found itself again rocked by popularunrestmetbyviolentrepressioninthecentreofthecountry.Intheborderlands,acessationofhostilitieswasinplacebetweenthemilitaryandmanyEAOs,butnostepshadbeentakento facilitate meaningful political dialoguebetween armed groups and the central 78Taylor(2009)pp.505-506.79South(2008)p.172.

29

government. Also, the National Conventionhad come to a close with ethnic nationalityactors having been denied meaningfulparticipation. Smith notes that “the nationallandscape could be described as one ofceasefireswithoutpeace.”80In May 2008, the Constitution was adoptedthrough a highly contested nationalreferendum. Opposition to the Constitutionwas strong, given the lack of inclusion in thedrafting process and provisions thatentrenched the military’s role in nationalpolitics. The referendum became furthershrouded in controversy, as it took place inthe days following Cyclone Nargis, describedas theworst natural disaster in the country’shistory with fatalities estimated at over130,000.Despitethetragedy,thereferendumwent ahead. Official results showed a highlevelofvoterturnoutandwidespreadsupportfor the Constitution, a result that provokedscepticismamongmany.Before undertaking a closer examination ofthe 2008 Constitution and the peace processthat subsequently emerged, we will use thenext section to reflect more closely on theassumptions and narratives surroundingethnic identity that have emerged out ofMyanmar’shistoricalexperience. 80SmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.42.

31

CHAPTER2

EthnicIdentityNarrativesandTheirInstitutionalisation

The first chapter of this report provided abriefoverviewofMyanmar’spastupuntiltheadoptionofthe2008Constitution.Thebulkofthis analysis has been drawn from existingacademic study, highlighting the scholarshipof some of the key authors on Myanmar’shistoryandpolitics.Thefollowingchapterwillbuildonthiscontextand introduceanumberof important narratives regarding ethnicidentity that emerged over the course ofconsultation meetings and interviews during2016-2018. We will explore each of thesethemes and go on to consider theways thatthe perceptions captured in these narrativesarereflectedinthe2008Constitution.NarrativesandAssumptionsSurroundingEthnicIdentityThefollowingoverviewisneithermeantasanexhaustiveexplorationofviewsandattitudestowards ethnic identity, nor is it meant tosuggest that individuals or ethnic nationalitycommunities share uniform views. Rather, itsummarises the most common narrativesencounteredoverthecourseoffieldvisits.Assuch, the following section provides anopportunity to look in greater detail at thepresumed correlation between populationsize and entitlements; the narrativesurroundingthehomogeneityofcommunitiesandthefixednatureofidentity;thebeliefthatcommunitiesshouldbestationaryandtiedtoethnic homelands; and the perceived threatposed by outsiders. While these themes arelistedanddescribedseparately,itisimportanttonotethateacharelinkedandreinforceoneanother.Before looking at these narratives in greaterdetail,itisimportanttoalsoacknowledgethatexperiences of ethnic identity in Myanmarhaveemerged frommultiple sources.Groupssuch as the Arakan, Bamar,Mon and others,pointtolong-establishedpre-colonialhistories

that have shaped narratives and have beendeveloped and refined over centuries andthrough the British colonial period. At thesame time, through the colonial period andindependence, ethno-nationalist currentswithin Bamar and non-Bamar communitiesemergedandwerewovenintotheexperienceof military rule and ethnic armed struggle.Within this process, the articulation of theconceptofnationalraces,ortaingyintha,andthe practice of categorisation, have had aprofoundimpact.AshighlightedintheIntroductionandChapter1, it is also important to reaffirm ethnicidentity as an authentic experience and asource of rich traditions that provides socialties and benefits to group members. Again,the following section, like other sections ofthis report, is not intended as a criticism ofethnic identity. Rather, the intention of theresearchteamistoreflectonanumberofkeythemes surrounding ethnic identity inMyanmar,andtoconsiderhowthesethemeshave facilitated the use of ethnic identity inthe allocation of entitlements to some whileexcludingandjustifyingdiscriminationagainstothers.Theme1-ThereisaCorrelationBetweenPopulationSizeandEntitlementsOne common narrative in Myanmar focuseson the assumed correlation betweenpopulationsizeandentitlements.Thisreflectsa widely held belief that allocation of rights,protections, and benefits (as well asdiscrimination) should be determined by thesize of one community vis-a-vis the size ofanothercommunity.While this assumed connection may appearstraightforward, it is worth examining moreclosely. Indeed, the association betweenpopulation size and entitlements revealsinsights intoasourceofpolitical legitimacyinMyanmar. It also provides a deeperunderstanding of why the focus oncategorisationandmeasurementcontinuesto

32

be so strong. Finally, the primacy of thisnarrative points to the power of the scarcitymindset and zero-sum-game in theMyanmarcontext.

At its heart, the association betweenpopulationsizeandbenefitsrelatestothefactthatpopulationsize isseenasoneofthekeycomponents needed for any ethnic group toestablish political legitimacy in theMyanmarcontext. This reality was highlighted in aninterview with a ethnic nationality leaderactively engaged in the peace process whooutlinedthethreekeyingredientsforpoliticallegitimacyemergingfromagroup’shistory,itscontroloverterritory,anditspopulationsize:

WhenwethinkaboutwhatgroupsareabletomakealegitimateclaimtopowerinMyanmar,wethinkaboutcertaincriteria.Agrouphastobeabletoarticulateitshistory.Ithastobeassociatedwithphysicalterritory,andthedegreethatagroupisabletocontrolterritoryisimportantinMyanmar(thisiswhytherearesomanyarmedgroupsandmilitiasandwhycontrolovernaturalresourcesissoimportant!).Finally,thesizeofagroup’spopulationiskey--ifagroupisabletoassertthattheyhavealargepopulation,theyenjoyahigherlevelofpoliticallegitimacyandthatcanbeusedforleverage.81

81Fieldnotes,Yangon(May2018).

Theassumedconnectionbetweenpopulationsize and political legitimacy provides insightsinto the preoccupation surroundingcategorisation and measurement of ethnicgroups in Myanmar. Indeed, a closer lookreveals that categorisation andmeasurementaremorethanjustahangoverfromtheBritishcolonialperiod.Theability todefineagroup,clearly determine who are group membersand who are not, and then establish anaccepted narrative surrounding the group’ssize, are essential aspects in asserting alegitimateclaimtobenefitsandentitlements.Thus,while the government’s Department ofImmigration (DoI)maintains figuresonethnicpopulation size, EAOs and some religiousorganisations also maintain populationrecords. These alternative sources of dataconsistently contradict official figures,invariably depicting ethnic nationalitypopulations asbeing larger than indicatedbyDoIrecords.82Furthermore, there is a tendency to try anddefineethniccategoriesasbroadlyaspossibleinanefforttoprojectthelargestpossiblesize.Mandy Sadan provides an example regardingthe Kachin group. She notes that China’sCultural Revolution led to increasedimmigration into Kachin State. This, in turn,prompted ethno-nationalist elites toovercome sometimes fragile politicalallegiances inorder to incorporatea rangeofdifferent communities into the broad Kachin

82Notethatitisnottheintentionheretosuggestwhichofthetwosetsofdataismoreaccurate.Thereisarangeofexplanationsthatcouldaccountforgovernmentfiguresunder-representingthepopulationsizeofethnicnationalitycommunities.Thereisalsoarangeofexplanationsthatcouldaccountforrecordsbeingmaintainedbyethnicnationalitycommunitiesover-representingthepopulationsizeoftheircommunities.Thepurposeofthisreportisnottodeterminehowthemostaccuratepopulationsizeshouldbedetermined.Buttheargumentspresentedhereintendtorefutethenotionthatitispossibletoaccuratelymeasureethnicpopulationsize,becauseofthefluidnatureofethnicidentity.

33

group.Inthisway,Lisupeople,whohadbeencategorisedasadistinctgroupinChina,wereincorporated into the Kachin group inMyanmar(anexperiencethatwillbeexploredfurtherwithintheKachincasestudy).83

Indeed,authorssuchasFergusonhavenotedthat in a context ethno-nationalism, there isan inevitable pressure for smallminorities tosurrender theirunique identitiesandbecomepartofthelargergroup.84However,thetrendto define groups as expansively as possiblealso comes with an inherent risk that sub-groups may seek to differentiate themselvesfrom the large group. In consultationmeetings, this tension was clearly illustratedthrough repeated comments by meetingparticipants who insisted that members ofsmaller groups were, in fact, asserting falseidentitiesthatthreatenedtodividethe largergroup. At the same time, members of sub-groups often privately shared theirresentment regarding pressure to abandontheirdistinctidentitiesandassimilateintothelargergroup.85

83Sadan,M.(2013)p.340.84Ferguson,J.M.(2015)p.19.85ThiswasarecurrentthemethatcameupduringmeetingsinmultiplesettingsincludingLashio(November2016),Myitkyina(May2017),DaweiandHkamti(October2017),andHpa’anandKalay(May2018).

Thiscomplexdynamicbetweentheperceivedneed for groups to be as large as possible inorder to establish political legitimacy andmaximiseaccesstoentitlements,thepressureto maintain group unity, and the inevitableresentment that emerges in the face ofassimilationeffortsisonethatwewillexplorein greater detail through subsequent casestudies.Finally, the focus on the assumed correlationbetween population size and entitlementshighlights the common perception that, inMyanmar, allocation of entitlements takesplace in a context of scarcity inwhich a gainby one group necessitates a loss by another.In the context of this zero-sum game, theability to legitimatelyclaimbenefitsbasedonthe size of one’s group is of utmostimportance.Group identity,andtheabilityofanethnicgrouptoprojectthelargestpossiblesize,becomeshighlypoliticised.Incommunityconsultations,meetingparticipantsrepeatedlyemphasized the importance of “correctly”identifying one’s ethnic identity andhighlighted the negative consequences of“false reporting” that would intentionally orunintentionally skew population figures. Thepotential inaccuracy of ethnic populationfigureswasofutmost concernas itwas seenas inevitably producing a situation in whichsomewouldunfairly gainwhile otherswouldlose, preciselybecauseentitlements are seenasbasedongroupsize.Interestingly, while the focus on group sizeand entitlements tended to dominateconversations, there was also the occasionalinstance when individuals questioned theunderlyingassumptionthataccesstobenefitsandprivilegesshouldbedeterminedbygroupsize. One representative who identified asH’mong poignantly challenged the dominantnarrative:

Whataboutifyouarepartofaverysmallethniccommunity?IamH’mongandweliveinveryisolated,smallcommunities.Becausewearesmallandwehaveno

AlistingofethnicpopulationsizeattheKachinCulturalMuseuminMyitkyina.Photocredit:KhinZarNaing

34

armedgroup,itisverydifficultforustogainaccesstobasicrightslikehealthcareoreducation.Shouldwenotbeentitledtothesamerightsjustbecausethereareveryfewofus?Dowehavetoabandonourhistoryandourtraditionsjusttoreceiveservices?Atthemoment,provisionofsocialoreconomicdevelopmentassistanceisdependentonhavingalargegroupand/orhavinganarmedgroupthatcanthreatentouseforce.Butwhyshouldthatbethewayithappens?Smallisalsobeautiful.86

Theme2-CommunitiesAreHomogenousandEthnicIdentityisFixedWhile the preceding section highlights theassumed correlation between group size andentitlements, a further and related narrativefocuses on the idea that communities arehomogeneous and ethnic identity is fixed.Indeed, as is true elsewhere, communities inMyanmararewidelyseenasbeingmadeupofpeople who share a common ethnic identitythat is fixed and is passed down from onegeneration to the next. This is based on anessentialised understanding of ethnicity thatassumes individuals, families, andcommunitiesshareasingle,exclusive identitythat remains constant over time.87 Indeed,while modern anthropological studies seeethnicity as a social construct, ethnicity inMyanmar is frequentlydescribedasbeing“inone’s blood.”88 In interviews with ethnicnationalitycommunitymembersfromaroundthe country, it was frequently explained thatethnic identity was, at least in theory,determined by the identity of one’s father,and many noted the importance of childrenadoptingtheirfather’sethnicity.89

86Fieldnotes,Lashio(November2016).87South,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)pp8-9.88Fieldnotes,Yangon(November2016).89Interestingly,theKarencommunitywasanexception:manyofthoseinterviewedinthatcommunityrejectedtheideathatethnicidentityshouldalwaysbedeterminedbytheidentityofone’sfather.

Thisviewofcommunitiesashomogenous,andthe notion of ethnic identity being fixed, isfurther reinforced by the categorization ofethnicityandtheprominenceofthe135listofofficialracesortaingyintha.Thefocusonfixedcategorisation has been furtherinstitutionalised in the use of CitizenshipScrutinyCards(CSCs)that,upuntilnow,haverecorded ethnic identity. While there hasbeen talk about changing CSCs, thesedocumentsarecurrentlythekeyrequirementto access services and, depending on theethnic identity recorded on the card, permitmembers of some groups to participate inselection of ethnic-focused representation inparliament,somethingthatwewillexplore ingreaterdetailbelow.

Theendresultisanidealisedviewofethnicityas a fixed and exclusive trait that manyassumeisdeterminedbytheidentityofone’sfather. Thus, it is not uncommon to hearpeople speak of their own, or other,communities in very homogenous terms: “inTedim,everyoneisZomi”,90or,“whereIcomefrom,outsideofBhamo,weareallShan-ni.”91

This assumption is widely held despitepeople’s everyday experience of living withcomplex heterogeneity. Indeed, theexperience of heterogeneity is acknowledgedby many and shared quite readily. Theexistence of mixed marriages that produce“mixed-race” children is quite common andopenly discussed. For instance, “My father isKachin, but I was raised by my maternalgrandmother and she was Shan. So I alwaysfeel more Shan than Kachin, even though I

90Fieldnotes,Kalay(May2018).91Fieldnotes,Myitkyina(May2017).

35

knowthatI’msupposedtoidentifyasKachin,likemyfather.”92Thejuxtapositionofethnicityconceivedasanascribed attribute that is fixed and static,versustheconceptualizationofethnicitybeingsociallyconstructedandfluid,wasreflectedinthe writings of Edmund Leach in his 1954classic study Political Systems of HighlandBurma:

UnlikemostethnographersandsocialanthropologistsIassumethatthesystemofvariationaswenowobserveithasnostabilitythroughtime.Whatcanbeobservednowisjustamomentaryconfigurationofatotalityinastateofflux.93

While Leach challenged the notion of fixedethnic identity over sixty years ago, the viewof ethnicity as an unchanging and innatecharacteristic is nonetheless still firmly heldtoday.Theme3-CommunitiesShouldbeStationaryandTiedtoEthnicHomelandsMany in Myanmar articulate an assumedassociation between territory and ethnicidentity, despite the reality that ethnicdiversity and in- and out-migration arecommonaspectsofeverydaylife.

Laur Kiik describes this association betweenterritoryandethnicidentitywithreferencetothe Kachin community. He notes that Kachinnationalists see the existenceof Kachin State

92Fieldnotes,Lashio(November2016).93Leach,E.R.(1954)p.63.

as a significant source of legitimacy. He goeson to highlight the illusion this assumptionembodies for Kachin and other ethniccommunitiesinMyanmar:

YetthewayKachinnationalistsperceivetheirnationas‘owning’thisterritory,justlikeMyanmar’sotherso-called‘nationalraces’aresaidto‘own’theirrespectiveStates,contradictswith[sic]theon-the-groundrealityofadeeplymulti-ethnicdemographic.94

Ethnic leaders illustrated the narrativesurrounding the importance of ethnichomelands through comments as theydiscussed their ethno-nationalist aspirationsfor their group. For example, the Chair of aLiteratureandCultureAssociationsharedthishopeforthefuture:

Ourgroupisworkingtoimprovelivingstandardsinourtraditionalareassothatmembersofourcommunitywillgohomeandnothavetolivein[Myanmar’scapitalcity]Yangon.Ourdreamistoestablishanethnichomelandwherepeoplecanliveinareaswheretheirancestorslivedandtheywon’thavetoleave.Theywillbeabletofarmaswedidinthepastandtheywillspeakourlanguage.95

At the same time, populationmovement is areality of modern-day Myanmar. Data fromthe 2014 census reveals that, at the time ofenumeration,almost9.4million(outofatotalpopulation of 51.5 million) people hadmigratedfromapriorresidence.Thegreatestreason given for this movement had to dowithemploymentopportunities.96

94KiikinSadan,M.(2016)p.210-211.95Fieldnotes,Yangon(November2016).96FormoredetailsseeThe2014MyanmarPopulationandHousingCensus,TheUnionReport,CensusReportVolume2,2015,publishedbytheMOLIP’sDepartmentofPopulation.

36

Thoseinterviewedwereoftenalarmedbytheconsequences of both out-migration and in-migration. This was illustrated throughinterviews with members from the Mon,Shan,NagaandKachincommunities.Interviews withmembers from theMon andShan communities illustrate commonconcerns regarding out-migration. InMawlamyine, Mon community membersexplained thatmanyMonpeople now live inotherpartsofMyanmarduetoinsufficientjobopportunities in Mon State. Likewise,membersfromtheShancommunityexplainedthat many Shan people had migrated toThailand in search of employment. In bothinstances, those interviewed expressed deepconcern that out-migration was producing asituation where community members wereleaving their ethnic homeland and becomingdisconnectedfromtheirheritage.97By contrast, interviews with communitymembers from the Kachin and Nagacommunities raised concerns regarding in-migration related to the presence of labour-intensive industries such as jade and goldmining. An example from the Nagacommunity illustrates a narrative that washeardrepeatedly:

Therearemanynaturalresourcesfoundinourareaandthisprovidesagoodsourceofemployment.Bigcompaniescomeinbecausethisisaplaceforgoldminingandthentheyneedpeopletowork.PeoplecomefromotherpartsofSagaing,theycomefromMagway,andfromMandalaytodogoldmining.ItmeansthattherearemanypeoplelivingintheNagahomelandthatarenotNaga.Thenthegovernment[theDepartmentofImmigration]countsthemasbeingpeoplefromthisareaandtheysaythatNagapeoplearenolongerthemajority.Butthisisstillouthomeland.Wehavelivedintheseforestsforeverandthese

97Fieldnotes,Taunggyi(November2016),andMawlamyine(May2018).

otherpeoplehaveonlycomehereforwork.98

A similar narrative was shared in interviewswithmembers of the Kachin community andwill be explored in greater detail in the casestudyonKachinidentity.Anxietysurroundingmigration,particularlyin-migration from other parts of Myanmar intoareas viewed as ethnic homelands, connectswith the long-standing concern surroundingBurmanisation. Beyond the imposition of acommon Bamar culture, as described inChapter 1, many have come to seeBurmanisation as also involving the actualphysical occupation of territory. It isanticipated that the movement of people,often assumed to be Bamar, or associatedwith the military, will bring demographicchange that threatens the associationbetween ethnic communities and areas thathavebeenseenastraditionalhomelands.Theme4-OutsidersPoseaThreatEveninaverycursoryoverviewofMyanmar’smodernhistory,thedeeplevelofanxietyandsuspicion regarding groups perceived to beoutsiders is apparent. Indeed, Ne Win’sBurmeseWaytoSocialismusheredindecadesofmilitaryrulewhilealsoundertakingaseriesofmeasuresaimedatbarricadingthecountryoff from foreign influences. Steinbergillustrates the xenophobia typical ofsuccessive military regimes in the followingquote taken from the Foreign BroadcastInformationServiceinAugust1991:

Itisofgreatimportanceforweakmultiracialcountrieslikeours,thataresituatedbetweenthesuperpowers,todefendthemselvesfromanyforeigninterferenceandinfluence.Thereforesafeguardsmustbetakentoexcludepeoplewhomighthaveforeigninfluence,havelesspatrioticspirit,andlackanyidea

98Fieldnotes,Hkamti(October2017).

37

ofpreservingnationaldignity,fromanyinfluentialpositionsthatcandeterminethedestinyofthecountry.99

In our own brief historical overviewwe haveseenhowthisxenophobicoutlookhasguidedcertainmilitaryoperationsandshapedofficialpolicies in Myanmar’s “polyethnic andmultiethnic” context. Indeed, Myanmar’s1982 Citizenship Law clearly distinguishesbetween insiders and outsiders, excludingthose who are not taingyintha from fullcitizenship.

Atthesametime,theidentificationofinsidersandoutsidersoftengoesbeyondthequestionof whether or not a group is taingyintha. Assome scholars have noted, the fact that onlythe Bamar have historically resided entirelywithin the territorial boundaries ofMyanmarhas contributed to a perception that “whileother groups might be indigenous, only theBurmansareexclusivelyindigenous.”100Indeed, as Chapter 1 mentioned, Steinbergnotesacommonlyheldviewthatemphasisesthe leadership role of the Bamar in the anti-colonial struggle, as well as the perceptionthat non-Bamar communities extend acrossthe territorial boundaries of Myanmar,connecting to communities outside thecountry and raising doubts aboutwhether ornottheycanbetrusted.101While this is identified by Steinberg as aperspective held by members of the Bamar

99Steinberg,D.I.(2001)p.63.100Ferguson,J.M.(2015)p.10.101Steinberg,D.I.(2001)p.190.

community towardsnon-Bamarcommunities,there are additional levels of complexitysurroundingthispatternofthinkingthatbearcloser examination as similar sentiments arealso reflected within ethnic nationalitycommunities.Duringconsultationmeetings,itwas not uncommon for members of oneethnic nationality group to questionwhetheranother group was genuinely taingyintha,suggesting that they might, in fact, beoutsidersseekinganillegalroutetocitizenshipby claiming taingyintha status.102Furthermore, it was not uncommon formembers of smaller ethnic communities toexpress deep anxiety over the prospect thattheir groupmightbeeliminated from the listofofficialraces(ifitwascurrentlyonthelist),ornotbeaddedtothelistofofficialraces(ifitwas not currently listed). In either case,omissionfromthelistinstilledadeepsenseofinsecurityat theprospect that theywouldbelabelled“outsiders.”Theyassumedthe resultwould be that they would either have toabandon their identity (and adopt anacceptable identity) or lose their rights ascitizens.Thus,narrativesaroundinsidersandoutsidersnotonlyfocusonthepolyethnicnatureofthestate,andgroups thatareperceivedtocomefrom outside the country’s nationalboundaries. Insider and outsider narrativesalso focus on the multiethnic nature of thestate, and the perception that actors frominside the country share linkages andconnections with outsiders, and this poses apotential threat.This focusproducesmultiplelayersofanxietywithonesetoffearsfocusedonpotential invasionorpenetrationfromtheoutside,andasecondsetoffearsfocusedon 102WhilethemostfamiliarexampleofthisconcernisundoubtedlytheperceptionsexpressedbymanyinMyanmartowardstheRohingya,itshouldbenotedthatthisresearchprojectdidnotlookattheissueofRohingyaidentityorperceptionstowardsRohingyaidentity.However,theresearchteamencounterednumerousinstanceswhenthissameconcern(”suchandsuchagroupisnotreallythaingyintha”)wasexpressedwithregardtoawiderangeofethnicgroups.

38

the threat of disintegration emanating frominternaldivisions.The preceding section outlines a set ofassumptions surrounding ethnic identity inMyanmarthathasevolvedovertime.Shapedby historical events and, at times, reinforcedthrough legal frameworks, narratives haveemerged around the correlation betweenpopulation size and entitlements, thehomogeneityofcommunitiesandfixednatureof ethnic identity, the idea that communitiesshould be stationary and tied to ethnichomelands, and the threat posed byoutsiders.Theseviewsandattitudesplayedanimportant role shaping developments andinstitutions as the country moved into thetwenty-first century. In the next section, wewill considerhow thesenarrativeshavebeenintegratedintoMyanmar’scurrentcontext.Toillustrate, we will undertake a closerconsiderationofthe2008Constitution.The2008ConstitutionFrom the start, the 2008 Constitution of theRepublic of the Union of Myanmar was aflashpointforcontroversy.WhiletheNationalConvention process included a variety ofethnicarmedgroups,proposalsfromsomeforafederalsystemofunionandhigherlevelsofautonomy for ethnic states were notadopted.103Oncedraftingwascomplete,AungSan Suu Kyi’s NLD urged its supporters toboycott the referendum. The KIO alsoindicated they would boycott, although theychanged their stance just days prior to theevent following what has been described asSPDCpressure.104The referendum itself took place on 10May2008,justdaysafterCycloneNargis.Laterthatsame month, it was announced that thereferendum had seen a voter turnout of 98

103South,A.(2018).ProtectingciviliansintheKachinborderlands,Myanmar,Keythreatsandlocalresponses,p.135.104DuwaMahkawKhunSainSadan,M.(2016)p.344.

percent and that 92 percent had voted infavour of adopting the new constitution.105Within Myanmar, many doubt the officialoutcome of the referendum, raising issuesaround public perceptions regarding thelegitimacyoftheconstitution.Someofthegreatestcontroversysurroundingthe2008Constitutioncentreson themannerinwhichitestablishesanongoingroleforthemilitary in national politics. This was donethroughanumberofprovisions including thereservation of 25 percent of seats inparliament for themilitary, representingadefactovetooverproposedamendmentstotheConstitution(amendmentstotheConstitutionrequire a majority of over 75 percent ofvotes).TheroleoftheTatmadawwasfurthercemented as key government ministries,including the Ministry of National Defence,theMinistryofHomeAffairs (whichoverseesthepolice)106aswellastheMinistryofBorderAffairs,wereidentifiedasremainingunderthecontrol of the military. Furthermore, thedefence services were guaranteed autonomyin determining military matters as theConstitution identified the role ofCommander-in-Chief to be filled by a high-ranking member of the military, not by acivilianheadofstate.Another source of controversy has beenarticle 59(f), which prevents anyone with aforeign spouse or children from assumingexecutiveoffice.Thisprovisioncame into thespotlight as it prevented Aung San Suu KyifrombecomingPresidentfollowingherparty’selectionvictory in2015. Indeed,unsuccessful

105SeeMyanmarformallyannouncesratificationofnewconstitutiondraft,30May2018,People’sDailyOnline106Atthetimethe2008Constitutionwasadopted,theMinistryofHomeAffairsalsooversawthepowerfulGeneralAdministrationDepartment(GAD).Thischangedattheendof2018astheNLD-ledgovernmentannouncedtheGADwouldbemovedoutfromundertheMinistryofHomeAffairs.Atthetimeofwriting,itisunclearhowquicklythischangewillhappenortheultimateimpactontheoperationsoftheGAD.

39

attempts to amend article 59(f) became amain focus of attention prior to the firstmeeting of the new parliament in February2016.The 2008 Constitution created state/regionalgovernments that each have legislativeassemblies. However, decision-makingresponsibilities allocated to state/regionallegislatures are limited, and fall far short ofaspirations articulated by ethnic nationalityrepresentatives during the NationalConvention. Key functions and decision-makingremaincentrallycontrolled.Aswewillsee in the case study on Arakanese identity,tensionsbetweenstate/regionalgovernmentsand the Union government in Nay Pyi Tawpoint to a further source of controversysurroundingthe2008Constitution.Views on Ethnicity within the 2008ConstitutionThese very public controversies haveovershadowed the ways that the 2008Constitution has been shaped by, and hasinstitutionalised, the above narrativesregarding ethnic identity. Themes regardingthe correlation between population size andentitlements, the homogeneity ofcommunities and fixed nature of ethnicidentity,theideathatcommunitiesshouldbestationary and tied to ethnic homelands, andthethreatposedbyoutsiders,areallreflectedindifferentaspectsofthe2008Constitution.In the followingsection,wewill takeacloserlook at how the above themes wereincorporated into the Constitution byexaminingconstitutionalprovisionsrelatedtothe designation of territorial units, andarrangementsforpoliticalrepresentation.Wewillthengoontoconsiderhowmeasuresthatcan be seen as aiming to uphold collectiverightsbecomeproblematicgiventheinherentinaccuracies surrounding the aboveassumptions and that the Constitutionallocates entitlements based on the sameassumptions.

Observers have noted that the 2008Constitution offers increased representationfor ethnic nationality groups. Smith haspointed out that constitutional provisionsmeanthat“theethnic landscapehasbecomeat itsmostdiverse innational representationsince independence in 1948.”107 He outlinessome examples of this increasedrepresentation including the retention ofethnic states from the1974Constitution, thecreationofsixSelf-AdministeredAreas(SAAs),and the establishment of reserved seats inparliamentforethnicgroupsthatmeetcertainpopulationcriteria.Indeed, interviews with members of ethnicnationality communities revealed an oftenintense attachment to provisions that areperceived as providing an opportunity forincreased levels of representation andautonomy. One representative of an ethnicpoliticalpartyreflectedthisincomments:

We’vebeencollectinginformationfrommembersofourethnicgrouplivingin[ourstate].Wearecertainthatthereareatleasttwotownshipswhereour[ethnic]groupmakesupthemajorityofthepopulation.ThismeansthatweareentitledtoaSpecialAutonomousZone[Self-AdministeredArea]andwewanttoseethischangemadeintheConstitution.108

Whileprovisions inthe2008Constitutioncanbe seen as offering a path to increasedautonomy and political representation forethnicnationality communities, they canalsobe seen as fuelling inter-group competition.Graversnoted thisprospectwhendraftingofthe 2008 Constitution was still in its earlystages:

ThenewConstitutionbeingpreparedbySLORCintendstogivelocalautonomytothesmallerethnicgroupslivinginareasdominatedbythelargergroups.Thus,to

107SmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.47.108Fieldnotes,Mandalay(May2018).

40

dividebyanewethnicclassificationandtorulebyretainingstatecorporatismseemstobethestrategyofSLORC.109

ThepotentialdeepeningofcompetitionandfaultlineswasfurtherillustratedincommentsbyacommunityleaderinMyitkyinawhoreflectedonconstitutionalprovisionsfortheallocationofNationalRaceAffairsMinisters(NRAMs):

IwishtheyhadneverincludedArticle161(c)110intheConstitution.Itwasputthereasatrapthathasbeensetfor[non-Bamar]ethnicpeopletomakeusfightwitheachotheranddistractusfromfocusingonrealissues.111

To better understand the tension betweenthese different perspectives, we will take acloser look at the provisions in the 2008Constitution related to the designation ofterritorialunits,andarrangementsforpoliticalrepresentation.DesignationofTerritorialUnitsThe 2008 Constitution outlines a variety ofpolitical units in Myanmar. The largest oftheseareregionsandethnicstates.AnumberofSelf-AdministeredAreasarealsoidentified.Ethnic States – The 2008 Constitutionretained the designation of seven ethnicstates that were outlined in the 1974Constitution promulgated under Ne Win.Ethnic states were identified based onassertions about where the highestconcentrations of themain sevennon-Bamarethnic nationality communities reside. At thesame time, the seven divisions, seen aspredominantly – though by no meansexclusively – Bamar areaswere also retained

109GraversinTønnesson,S.,&Antlöv,H.(1996)p.241.110ThearticlethatprovidesfortheappointmentofNationalRaceAffairsMinisters,tobeexploredinmoredetailbelow.111Fieldnotes,Myitkyina(May2017).

from the 1974 Constitution and renamed“regions.”Statesandregionsarerepresentedbystateorregional assemblies that resemble legislativebodies created under the 1947 Constitution.Areas of public policy that are under thecontrol of state and regional legislatures areoutlined in Schedule Two of the 2008Constitution. These are restricted to sectorssuchas financeandplanning;agricultureandlivestockbreeding;energy,electricity,mining,and forestry; and transport, communicationand construction.112 Notably, control overpolicy related to education and security areabsent from sectors outlined in ScheduleTwo.113A ChiefMinister for each state and region isappointed by the Union level government.Tensions around appointment of ChiefMinisters and jurisdiction over policy issueswith implications at state/regional levelsillustrate the ongoing sensitivities aroundaspirations for autonomy and the perceivedneed to maintain centralised control. Thissource of friction between Union level andstate/regional level governments will beexplored in greater detail through casestudies.Self-Administered Areas –While the creationof ethnic states with their own legislativepowers, even if curtailed by variousrestrictions, can be seen as a form ofincreased ethnic representation, it did notaddress longstanding concerns articulated bysomesmallerethnicnationalitygroups.Thesegroupsnotedthatbynamingethnicstatesforthe largest non-Bamar communities,representation was not being granted tosmallergroupsthatalsoconstituteamajorityin certain areaswithin largerethnic states.114

112SeeNixon,H.,Joelene,C.,Lynn,T.,ChitSaw,K.,&Arnold,M.(2013).StateandRegionGovernmentsinMyanmar,p.3.113Jolliffe,K.(2015).EthnicArmedConflictandTerritorialAdministrationinMyanmar.Yangon,p.vi.114Taylor,R.H.(2009)p.505.

41

The solution was to create six semi-autonomous areas carved out of the existingstates and regions. Thus, the 2008Constitution designated Self-AdministeredAreas (SAAs) for the Danu, Kokang, Pa’O,Ta’angandWainShanState,andfortheNagainSagaingRegion.115SAAsarebasedontheidentificationofethnicnationalitygroupsthatconstituteamajorityintwoormoreadjacenttownships,buthavenotbeen allocated an ethnic state.116 A “LeadingBody” made up largely of locally electedofficials governs these areas. Likestate/regional assemblies and the upper andlower houses of parliament in Nay Pyi Taw,theTatmadawappoints25percentofofficialstotheseLeadingBodies.Whileautonomousinname, the experience and autonomyof eachareavariesagreatdeal.OutofthecurrentsixSAAs,theWaSelf-AdministeredDivisionistheterritorial unit with the highest level ofautonomy.ArrangementsforPoliticalRepresentationEchoing theChamberofNationalitiescreatedunder the 1947 Constitution, the 2008Constitution provides for the allocation ofNational Race Affairs Ministers, also widelyreferredtoasethnicaffairsministers.NationalRaceAffairsMinisters–Article161(c)of the 2008 Constitution created a newsystem under which ethnic groups – Bamarand non-Bamar – that meet a designatedpopulation threshold in a state/region aregrantedrepresentationthroughtheallocationof a state/regional NRAMs. Under thisprovision,ethnicgroupslivingoutsideoftheirrespective ethnic state or region, with apopulation in a given state/region, whichconstitutes at least 0.1 percent of thecountry’stotalpopulation,wouldbegiventhe

115South,A.(2008)p.136,andSmithinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.48.116ThawnmungandYadanainSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)4p.118.

chance to elect their own representative atthelevelofstateorregionallegislatures.Upon first read, theprovisionencompassesalevel of confounding complexity that can bedifficulttograspandisbestexplainedthroughillustration. For example, Ayeyawady Regionhas an NRAM appointed to represent theKaren community living in Ayeyawady, andanother NRAM appointed to represent theRakhine community living in Ayeyawady. Theopportunity for members of the Karen andRakhine communities toeachelect anNRAMis based on the assessment that thepopulationoftheirrespectivecommunities inAyeyawadyRegionmeets the threshold of atleast51,500(0.1percentofthecountry’stotalpopulation)ormore.AsAyeyawadyRegion isnotalreadyassociatedwitheithergroup,andneither group has been allocated a Self-AdministeredAreawithinAyeyawadyRegion,eachgroupisentitledtoanNRAM.Ardeth Maung Thawnmung and Yadanaoutline that, following the 2015 elections,there were 29 NRAMs representing thefollowing groups at the state/regional level:Bamar (5), Kayin (5), Chin (3), Shan (3),Rakhine (2), Lisu (2), Pa’O (2), Kachin (1),Rawang, (1), Lahu (1), Kayan (1), Mon (1),Inthar(1),Akha(1).117Interviews during 2016- 2018 revealed thatthe current mandate and responsibilities ofNRAMsarequitelimited.AnumberofcurrentorformerNRAMsinterviewednotedthattheyhad few resources at their disposal and thattheir role was more one of raising concernsand advocating on behalf of theirconstituencies. At the same time, thepotential influenceofNRAMsloomedlargeinthe minds of ethnic nationality communitymembers.Many of those interviewed sharedtheir concerns regarding the populationfigures that determine the potential for theircommunity to receive an NRAM in givenstates and regions, doubting the accuracy of 117ThawnhmungandYadanainSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.131.

42

data maintained by the DoI. Also,identification on one’s CSC was a majorconcern for many, as this designationdetermined (amongother things) theirabilitytovoteforanNRAMintheirstateorregion.118Thus, the provisions in the 2008 Constitutionthat designate territorial units and providesome with enhanced political representationdenote an effort to outline group-specificrights in the Myanmar Constitution. At thesametime,theapproachassumesthatgroupscan be clearly categorised (determining whoare insiders and who are outsiders),measured, and will remain stationary. Inpeople’s everyday lived experience this is farfromthetruth,withtheimplicationbeingthatallocations produced by constitutionalprovisionsremainhighlycontested.DilemmasSurroundingaCollectiveRightsApproachintheMyanmarContextMyanmar provides an example where thetension between individual rights andcollective rights, one of the great debates ofmodernpoliticaltheory, isaddressedthroughthe 2008 Constitution. As Will Kymlickaexplains, a liberal focus on individual humanrights asserts that no special protections areneededifindividualrightsareequallyapplied.By contrast, a focus on collective rightsacknowledges that under certaincircumstances, group-specific rights areneeded to “accommodate enduring culturaldifferences” and to give “permanent politicalidentity or constitutional status” to ethnic ornational groups.119 When examined throughthis rights-based framework, it is clear thatthe 2008 Constitution seeks to go beyondindividual rights to create provisions forcollective rights through the designation ofethnic states, theestablishmentof SAAs, andthe appointment of NRAMs. Each of thesemeasures canbe seenas emergingoutof an

118Fieldnotes,Hpa’an,Kalay,Loikaw,Mawlamyine,Yangon(May2018).119Kymlicka,W.(1995)p.4.

effort to uphold and protect collective rightsbyenumeratinggroup-specificentitlements.The inclusion of these provisions can beunderstoodasanefforttoovercomeconcernsregardingnationalunitybyaimingtoproduceastrongertietothepoliticalentitythatoffersthe prospect of achieving these rights. AsThawnhmung and Yadana explain, “theprovision of minority rights is the key toassuaging distrust of a dominant group byminority communities and strengthening thelatter’sidentificationwiththenation-state.”120However, ThawnhmungandYadana goon topointoutthattheallocationofrightsbasedonethnic identity in the Myanmar context isproblematic.Challengesemergedirectly frominaccuracies embedded in the narrativesoutlinedabove. Indeed, theConstitutionmayincludeprovisions thatbenefit certaingroupsbasedon assumptions regarding the size andgeographical concentration of communities.However, the realities surrounding ethnicidentity make such an approach highlycontroversial.Firstly, a problem emerges around thechallenge of measuring the size of an ethnicgroup. Indeed, measuring an ethnic group’spopulation assumes that groups arehomogenous and their identity can bedescribed through fixed categories. But eversince the colonial authorities first tried toclassify and measure ethnic identity, theseefforts have been repeatedly stymied due tothe reality that identity is anattribute that isnotstaticbutshiftsandchangesovertime.Aswe have seen, numerous scholars onMyanmarhavenotedtheinstabilityofidentityas illustrated in the following quote from anappendixtothe1931census:

Someoftheracesor“tribes”inBurmachangetheirlanguagealmostasoftenastheychangetheirclothes.Languagesarechangedbyconquest,byabsorption,byisolation,andbythegeneraltendencyto

120ThawnhmungandYadanainSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.115.

43

adoptthelanguageofaneighborwhoisconsideredtobelongtoamorepowerful,morenumerous,ormoreadvancedtribeorrace….Racesarebecomingmoreandmoremixed,andthethreadsaremoreandmoredifficulttountangle.121

Furthermore, the establishment of territorialboundaries based on ethnic identity assumesa level of stasis that is not borne out inpeople’s lived experience. Indeed, censusfigures reveal that in-migration and out-migration is a reality of everyday life inMyanmar.Provisionsinthe2008Constitutionalsoreflectand reinforce the assumption that there is acorrelation between population size andentitlements. The result has been aninstitutionalisation of competition betweengroups as each tries to project the necessarypopulationnumberstosecureorexpandtheirterritorial boundaries or enhance politicalrepresentation. This was reflected overmultiple visits to Shan Statewheremembersof one groupexpressed a concern that othergroups sought to inflate their population sizein order to maximise claim to benefits andentitlements:

CertaingroupshaveanunfairconnectiontotheDepartmentofImmigrationandtheyusethisunfairadvantagetoincreasethenumberoftheirgroup.122Theyreportfalsenumbersandthisendsupbeingreflectedonpeoples’CSCs.Ultimatelytheiraimistoestablishtheirownethnicstate.DoIknowsthisandtheyarehappytogoalongbecausetheyknowitcreatestensionbetweenethnicminorities.123

121Scott,J.C.(2009)quotingGreenp.239.122AsmentionedintheIntroduction,theDepartmentofImmigrationoverseesthecollectionofhouseholdregistrationdatawhich,atthetimeofwriting,constitutedthemainsourceofethnicitydatainMyanmar.123Fieldnotes,Taunggyi(May2018).

Finally,thefocusonallocationofentitlementsbasedongroupcategoriesandgroupsize,inacontext of intense competition, furtherinstitutionalises narratives surrounding thethreatposedbyoutsiders.Outsidersbringthepotential of demographic change, anddemographic change represents a potentialthreattothecurrentdesignationofterritorialunits and arrangements around politicalrepresentation.Onthesurface,thecollectiverightsapproachpursuedthroughthe2008Constitutioncanbeseen as a move towards meeting theaspirations of diverseMyanmar communitiesto attain higher levels of self-determination.The Constitution offers the promise ofcommunity-specific benefits potentiallyaccruingtogroupsthatareabletoasserttheyhave met population size criteria in givengeographic areas. However, this sets up acompetition between groups, and theparameters of this competition are based onassumptions regarding ethnic identity that,though widely held, often do not reflectpeople’sreal-lifeexperiences.Inthefollowingpageswewillfurtherexaminewhether the provision of collective rights inthe 2008 Constitution truly offers anopportunity to achieve increasedrepresentation and autonomy, or whether itinfactproducesthetrapreferredtoabovebythe community leader from Myitkyina thatlocksethnicnationalitycommunitiesinacycleof endless competition.124 This question willbeexploredingreaterdetailthroughthecasestudiesincludedinthisreport.However, before examining case studies, thisreportwillreturntoitshistoricaloverviewandconsider the events that followed theadoptionofthe2008Constitution.Indeed,thetransition that was launched by the 2008Constitution has had significant implicationsfor communities throughout Myanmar, andforengagementaroundethnicidentity. 124SeequoteabovefrominterviewinMyitkyinaregardingArticle161(c)ofthe2008Constitution.

44

CHAPTER3

EthnicIdentityDilemmasinMyanmar’sCurrentContextofTransition

Having undertaken a close examination ofethnic identity narratives and theirinstitutionalisation in the 2008 Constitution,the report will next focus on events thatfollowed the Constitution’s adoption. Sincethen,Myanmarhasundergonearapidprocessof change and transition and the followingchapterwill lookat somekeyaspectsof thattransition as they relate to ethnic identity inMyanmar.Thiswill includeanexaminationofthe lead up to the 2010 elections and theThein Sein presidency; the signing of theNationwide Ceasefire Agreement; theelectoralvictoryoftheNLDandlaunchofthenational political dialogue process; divergentthinking around models of federalism; andsignificant events related to ethnic identitythathaveunfoldedoutsidethecontextofthepeaceprocess.TheLeaduptoElectionsin2010andtheTheinSeinPresidencyIn April 2009, following the adoption of the2008 Constitution, the SPDC announced thatall ceasefire groups and militias wouldtransform into Border Guard Forces (BGFs)underpartialcontrolof theTatmadaw.Whilethe announcement was in accordance withsection 338 of the new Constitution thatrequired that “all the armed forces in theUnion shall be under the command of theDefence Services,” the order was seen asdeeply provocative. As we will explore ingreater detail in our case study on Kachinidentity, the BGF announcement and theunsuccessful attempt of Kachin politicalparties to register in advance of the 2010elections meant that tensions between theTatmadaw and the KIO were high as thecountrywentthroughmultipartyelections.Elections were held in November 2010. TheNLD did not participate in the elections and

the military-backed Union Solidarity andDevelopmentParty (USDP)wonamajorityofvotes with a former general, Thein Sein,becoming president in early 2011. Deepscepticism accompanied the 2010 electionsandtheTheinSeinpresidency.Thepredictionsof pessimists seemed to be confirmed whentheceasefirebetweentheTatmadawandtheKIO broke down in June 2011. Again, thecircumstancessurroundingthecollapseoftheceasefirewill be explored in greater detail inthesubsequentcasestudyonKachinidentity.However,thenewpresidentwentontosignala notable change in Myanmar politics whenhe undertook several significant steps duringthe firstmonths of his presidency. In August2011, President Thein Sein bothmet directlywithNLDleaderAungSanSuuKyiandinitiated a new peace process. In a publicstatement, the new president invited ethnicarmed groups to join peace talks aimed atputting “an end to armed insurrection tomake internal peace in order to build apeaceful,developednation.”125By initiatinganew peace process, President Thein Seinkickedoffanintenseseriesofpeacetalksthatwould eventually produce a NationwideCeasefire Agreement (NCA). Furthermore, inSeptember 2011, the president announcedthatworkonamassivehydroelectricproject-the Myitsone dam, which had been agreedprior to the 2010 elections by the SPDC andthe Chinese government – would besuspended in response to public pressure.WorkhadalreadystartedtobuildthedaminKachinState,provokingconcernsaboutlackofcommunity consultation, environmentaldamage, displacement, destruction of Kachin(and Bamar) cultural heritage, and anger atwhat some perceived as Chinesecolonialism.126Thesuspensionwasseenasan

125UnionGovernmentoffersolivebranchtonationalracegroups,NewLightofMyanmar,19August2011.126InanarticleintheIrrawaddynewspaper,dissidentAungDinsaidthatChinahad“colonizedBurmawithoutshootingagunandhassuckedthelifeofthepeopleofBurmawiththehelpoftheBurmeseregimeanditscronies.Now,theyarekillingthe

45

historicfirstintermsofgovernmentresponsetopublicprotests.Unfortunately, theTheinSeinpresidencyalsosawnewwavesofarmedconflictandviolenceeruptindifferentpartsofthecountry.BeyondthecollapseoftheTatmadaw-KIOceasefireinJune 2011, the situation in the northeastfurther deteriorated in 2014. Fightingbetween the Tatmadaw and the KIOescalated, and there was a new outbreak ofviolence between the Tatmadaw and armedgroups in northern Shan State, including theMyanmar National Democratic Alliance Army(MNDAA), the Ta’ang National LiberationArmy (TNLA), and the newly formed ArakanArmy(AA).Elsewhere in the country, waves ofintercommunal violence erupted. In 2012, astate of emergency was declared in RakhineState following violence between RakhineBuddhists and Rohingya Muslims. Riotsresulted in deaths and thousands of homeswere destroyed on both sides. The followingyear, in central Myanmar, anti-Muslimviolence broke out in Meikhtila, MandalayRegion. Furtherviolencewas seen inRakhineState during 2014 when a Rohingya villagewasattacked.The Thein Sein presidency also saw theemergenceofMaBaTha,ortheCommitteeforthe Protection of Race and Religion. Thisnationalist organisation, led by Buddhistclergy and laypeople, became linked with asurge in anti-Muslim hate speech andviolence. In Myanmar’s rapidly changingenvironment, the combination ofMaBaTha’sleadership and the new availability of socialmedia provided powerful tools for the rapidspread of Buddhist extremism and angertowardsthoseperceivedtobeoutsiders.127

IrrawaddyRiveraswell.”SeeKillingtheIrrawaddy,byAungDin,4August2011.127BuddhismandStatePowerinMyanmar(Vol.290,AsiaReport).(2017).

But as well as the experience of renewedarmed clashes and intercommunal violence,the Thein Sein presidency also saw changesthat were welcomed and celebrated: areasthathadbeenatwar fordecadessawpeace,particularly in the country’s southeast; manyexiles who had lived outside the country foryearswereformallyinvitedbackhome;mediarestrictionsandrulessurrounding freedomofassemblywererelaxed;andnewemploymentopportunities became available with theopeningoftheeconomy.Atthesametime,asthe economy opened, offering newopportunities for foreign direct investment,issues around land ownership, labourstandards, and corruptionmade headlines intheincreasinglyopenmedia.ItwasinthiscontextofchangeandtransitionthattheTheinSeingovernmentundertookthe2014 Myanmar Population and HousingCensus.AshighlightedintheIntroduction,theprevious census had takenplace in 1983 anddemographicdatarelatedtoarangeofsocio-economic indicators was badly out of date.The country was embarking on a challengingperiod of reform and transition in whichgovernment ministries, international donors,and private sector actors welcomed theopportunity to receive updated data thatwould inform development and investmentendeavours. Thus, the collaborative effortbetween the Myanmar government and theUN was initiated in order to meet theseneeds.At the same time, in the context ofheightened ethnic and religious tensions, theinclusionofquestionsrelatedtoethnicityandreligion triggered deep sensitivities. Theanalysis undertaken in Chapter 2 providesinsightsintosensitivitiessurroundingethnicitydata, highlighting the provisions within the2008Constitution that relate to ethnic grouppopulation size and concentration. The factthat the Constitution assumes that it ispossible to categorise and measure ethnicpopulationgroupsprovidesinsightsintosomeof the underlying motivations for including

46

ethnic identity as part of the censusenumeration. However, the ultimate use ofthat data to make highly politicaldeterminations, in which some wouldpotentially benefit while others would loseout,made the collection an undertaking thatwouldinevitablyprovokeintenseemotion.Asnoted in the Introduction, anger towards thecensus, particularly the concept of self-identification, resulted in the non-enumeration of Muslim communities innorthernRakhine.TheNationwideCeasefireWithin the context of change, volatility,intercommunaltensions,and(insomeplaces)anintensificationofarmedconflict,theTheinSeingovernmentalsocontinuedtopursuethepeace process initiated in 2011. The ongoingprocessmovedbeyondbilateral ceasefires toanapproach that– for the first time–wouldspanagreementbetweenthegovernmentandmultiple ethnic groups. Negotiations wereseenasanopportunitytonotsimplyachieveacessationofhostilities thatwouldputanendto active fighting, but as leading to aframework for political dialogue that wouldenable genuine resolution of long-standingconflicts. The aim was to go beyond aceasefire and establish a path to a politicalsettlement that would reach agreement on“fundamental issues such as power- andrevenue-sharing; reform of the securitysector,thejudiciaryandland;andcommunity,ethnicandminorityrights.”128On the EAO side, a Nationwide CeasefireCoordinationTeam(NCCT)lednegotiations.UAungMin played the role of lead negotiatorfor the government. Meetings unfolded at agruelling pace, and were continuouslychallenged by issues surrounding inclusionand ongoing fighting. Finally, a text wasagreed and, on 15 October 2015, PresidentThein Sein, EAOs, and the Tatmadaw 128Burma-nationaldialogue:armedgroups,contestedlegitimacyandpoliticaltransition,byHarnYawnghwe,Accordissue25,2014,p.49.

Commander-in-Chief, signed theNCA.On theside of the EAOs, eight ethnic armed groups,including twoof the largest forces, theKarenNational Union (KNU) and the RestorationCouncil of Shan State (RCSS) signed onto theagreement.129 The Agreement was reachedwith less than amonth remainingbefore thenextnationalelectionandwiththeTatmadawinsisting that the MNDAA, TNLA, and AAwouldnotbe includedintheagreementuntiltheysurrendered.Also,majorgroups like theKIOandtheUWSAdidnotsign.Although itwasnotall-inclusive, theNCAdidbringaformalcessationofhostilitiesbetweenthe Tatmadaw and certain ethnic armedgroups.Moreimportantly,theNCAcontainedlanguage that many saw as potentiallysignallingaturningpointinrelationsbetweenthe Tatmadaw and all EAOs. This includedacceptancebytheTatmadawofareferencetofederalism, and acceptance by EAOs of theTatmadaw’s Three National Causes. Thus,includedintheNCA’sBasicPrincipleswastheaim to “[e]stablish a union based on theprinciples of democracy and federalism inaccordance with the outcomes of politicaldialogueandthespiritofPanglong”aswellasreferenceto“upholdingtheprinciplesofnon-disintegrationoftheunion,non-disintegrationof national solidarity and perpetuation ofnational sovereignty.”130 For each group,these inclusions represented keyachievements.

129In2015,theeightgroupstosigntheNCAincludedtheKNU,theDemocraticKarenBuddhist(orBenevolent)Army(DKBA),KNU-KNLAPeaceCouncil(KNU-KNLAPC),RestorationCouncilofShanState(RCSS),ChinNationalFront(CNF),Pa’ONationalLiberationOrganization(PNLO),ArakanLiberationParty(ALP),andtheAllBurmaStudents’DemocraticFront(ABSDF).In2018theNewMonStateParty(NMSP)andtheLahuDemocraticUnion(LDU)alsojoinedtheNCA.130ThefulltextoftheNationwideCeasefireAgreementisavailalbleathttps://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MM_151510_NCAAgreement.pdf

47

NewNationalLeadershipandNextStepsinthePeaceProcessFollowing the signing of the NCA in October2015, national elections were held inNovember 2015. The NLD had notparticipated in 2010 elections but werepreparedtocontestin2015.Theresultwasalandslide victory. In the Amyotha Hluttaw(UpperHouseofParliament),theNLDsawitsseatsjumpfrom4to135.131Atthesametime,seatsheldby theUSDPdeclined from124 to12. Likewise,NLDseats in thePyithuHluttaw(LowerHouseofParliament)wentfrom37to255,andUSDPseatswentfrom218to30.132As was mentioned in Chapter 2, despite thesignificantelectoralvictory,AungSanSuuKyifound herself barred from assuming the roleof president due to restrictions in theConstitution. This challenge was finallyovercomewhenherpartycreatedtheroleofState Counsellor for her, allowing her tobecomethedefactoheadofstateand“abovethe President.”133 The NLD’s new leadershiprolemeant itwouldassumeresponsibility forthe reform process started under the TheinSeingovernment,includingthepeaceprocess.ThesigningoftheNCAtriggeredthelaunchofa national political dialogue process in early2016.ThisbeganwithaUnion-levelgatheringreferred to as the twenty-first CenturyPanglong Peace Conference. Further politicaldialogue sessions were also slated to takeplace at the state and regional levels.Originally envisioned as a path that wouldallow parties to finally tackle the persistenttension in Myanmar politics between unityand ethnic diversity, the process quicklybecame weighed down with challenges

131WhiletheNLDdidnotparticipatein2010elections,theydidparticipatein2012by-electionswhichprovidedthemwithanentryintoparliament.132Foranoverviewofelectionresults,seeThefightingpeacockspreadsitstail:Finalresultsgraphics,TheIrrawaddy,24November2015.133SeeAungSanSuuKyiMovesClosertoLeadingMyanmar,byWaiMoeandRichardC.Paddock,TheNewYorkTimes,5April2016.

relatedtoinclusion,participation,andagendasetting.While a detailed examination of the peaceprocess and the national dialogue processexceeds the scope of this report, it is fair tosay that the process has fallen short ofexpectations.At leastseven importantarmedgroupshavenotsigned,leavingwelloverhalfofthetotalnumberofethnicarmedtroopsinMyanmar outside the NCA.134 Likewise, intermsofprovidingamechanismfordiscussionof substantive issues, the national politicaldialogueprocess hasmade little progress. Asthis report will explore further through casestudies, key sub-national political dialogueshave been blocked frommoving forward. Atthe same time, Union-level meetings havebeen unable to move beyond basicdefinitional issues,andhavefailedtoaddressmatters of key concern to ethnic nationalitystakeholders.As a result, many of those interviewed whohavebeendirectly involvedintheprocess,aswellasobservers,heldarelativelypessimisticviewof the ability of thedialogueprocess toaddress underlying tensions and buildconsensus around a vision for the future.Many felt that under the NLD-ledadministration, progress achieved under theTheinSeinpresidencyhas, infact,stalledandeveneroded.Thiswasreflectedin2018bytheKNU’s move to suspend participation in thepeaceprocess,135andinpublicremarksbythecommanderoftheRCSS.136

134NotethattheKIO’sarmy,theKachinIndependenceArmy(KIA),andtheUWSAareseenasthelargestethnicarmedgroupsinMyanmar,estimatedtohave10-12,000troopsandover30,000troopsrespectively.TheMyanmarPeaceMonitorprovidesahelpfuloverviewonstakeholdersintheMyanmarpeaceprocessandisavailableathttp://mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/stakeholders-overview135SeeKarenNationalUnionsuspendsparticipationinpeacetalks,byYeMon,FrontierMyanmar,29October2018.136SeeRCSSGeneralYawdSerkworriesofmoreconflictifpeacetalksfail,MyanmarTimes,23October2018.

48

In light of the focus of this report on ethnicidentity, the following section will examinetheaspirationssurroundingfederalismsharedby those interviewed. As noted above, thereference to federalismbeing included in theNCAwasseenasatremendousachievement,as previous attempts including during theNationalConvention,hadbeenrejectedoutofhand. For all its shortcomings, inclusion oflanguagerelatedtofederalismintheNCAhasmovedtheaimofethnicnationalitygroupstoachieve federalismonto the public agenda inMyanmar. However, what has also becomeclear is that the term “federalism” meansdifferent things to different people. In thefollowing section we will consider how theethnic identity narratives outlined in Chapter2 have shaped outlooks regarding possiblefuturefederalmodels.FederalisminMyanmar:divergentapproachestocollectiverightsMany questions surround the concept offederalism in Myanmar. While the term isfrequently used, often in association withreference to autonomy, decentralisation,democracy, and self-determination,stakeholders in Myanmar often have verydifferent ideas aboutwhat federalismmeansor, indeed, how a federal systemmight lookdifferent than Myanmar’s current unitarysystem. For the purposes of this report, wewill draw on the definition of federalismoutlined by South (which, in turn, is takenfromA.Smith):

‘Federalism’refers(AlanSmith2007)tomixed-sovereigntygovernancesystemscharacterisedbypower-sharingbetweenacentral(federal)government,andconstituent(state)governments;related(butdistinct)conceptsinclude‘decentralisation’and‘regionalautonomy’.137

137South,A.(2008)p.xix.

A variety of Myanmar actors have put forthproposals and visions for Myanmar’s futureunder federalism, but proposals are far fromrepresentingaconsensusview.Whilesharinga common focus on the importance ofautonomyandself-determination,avarietyofaspirations and expectations have emergedregarding possible models to be adopted inthefuture.Aswehavenotedabove,astrongpreferenceexists for collective rights, oriented aroundethnic identity. In fact, debate in Myanmardoes not centre on whether or not specialrights and recognition should be granted todifferent cultural groups. Rather, theassumption is that special rights andrecognitionwillbegrantedtodifferentethnicgroups, and the debate instead centres onhow to define those groups andwhich rightsshouldbegranted.For example, it is widely accepted thatterritorialunitswithinthecountryare,shouldbe, and, under any future federalarrangement,willbedeterminedaccordingtoethnic population size or concentration ofdifferentethnicgroups. Inconversationswithmeeting participants, it was widely acceptedthat the country would be organised aroundthese lines. When questions arose theyfocused on whether current boundariesshouldbe redrawn,andwhat leveland typesof power should be accorded to territorialunitsassociatedwithdifferentgroups.The assumption that future territorial unitsshould be determined by ethnic populationsize was illustrated through proposals thatemerged at a meeting of EAOs and ethnicpoliticalpartiesthattookplaceinMaiJaYang,KachinState,inJuly2016,priortothesecondTwenty-first Century Panglong PeaceConference. At this gathering, which wasdescribed by one observer as “the mostcomprehensive conference to determine acommon position among nationality forcesand political parties since independence in

49

1948,”138 meeting participants affirmed thatstates should be demarcated according towhere ethnic nationality communities form amajority. One proposal at the meeting wentfurther to suggest that the country’s sevenregions should also be transformed, possiblywith the creation of one Bamar state, andpossibly with the creation of a “nationalitiesstate” (recognizing that in some currentregions in the countryno single ethnic groupconstitutesamajority).139Thus,asKyedandGraversexplain,avarietyofviews exist. On the one hand, it would bepossible to continue along the lines ofMyanmar’s current model but with theaugmentation of genuine access to rights forall and authentic decentralisation. A moreextreme view might move towards areconsideration of boundaries and a movetowards higher levels of autonomy, including“ethnic political and juridical institutions.”Given the ethnically mixed character ofMyanmar communities, the latter approachwould likely raise questions around politicalrepresentation as well as the conundrum of“geographic delineations of ethnicidentity.”140The logic of pursuing either approach isshaped by longstanding ethnic identitynarratives in Myanmar including thepresumed correlation between populationsize and entitlements; the narrativesurroundingthehomogeneityofcommunitiesandthefixednatureofidentity;thebeliefthatcommunitiesshouldbestationaryandtiedtoethnic homelands; and the perceived threatposedbyoutsiders. Interestingly, inmeetingsand interviews, the research team seldom 138SaiWansai,Constitution-MakingandPeaceProcessStagnationinMyanmar:Willaconditionalclausehelprestoreconfidenceinthe21stCenturyPanglongConference?TransnationalInstitute,TheNetherlands,3September2018.139SeeStructureoffederalUniondebatedonseconddayofMaiJaYangsummit,MyanmarTimes,28July2016.140KyedandGraversinSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.80.

heard voices that questionedwhether or notethnicity should be used as a centralorganizing principle. This is despite the factthat,asdemonstratedinthepreviouschapter,the use of ethnic identity as a principle forallocating collective rights is inherentlyproblematicintheMyanmarcontext.EthnicIdentityBeyondthePeaceProcessWhile the peace process and resultingnational political dialogue evolved under theThein Sein presidency and first years of theNLD-led government, significant events inMyanmar have dominated media headlinesand global concern, often reducingpeacebuildingeffortstoafaintshadowinthebackground.Thesehaveincludedasignificantcrisis in northern Rakhine State followingclearanceoperationscarriedoutbyTatmadawforces against Rohingya communities. Theseactions, widely condemned by theinternationalcommunity,tookplacefollowingattacks against security forces by the ArakanRohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August2017, and produced over 700,000 refugeesfleeingtoneighbouringBangladesh.141Recentyearshavealsoseen intensification inmilitary operations carried out by theTatmadaw against EAOs in the country’snortheast. These accelerated, with theTatmadaw often making use of heavyweaponry, after a military alliance betweenbrigadesof theKIA, theAA, theMNDAA,andtheTNLAemergedduringNovember2016.Finally, doubts and concerns around thefuture of the peace process have intensified.These have been highlighted by theemergenceoftheFederalPoliticalNegotiationand Consultative Committee (FPNCC), led bythe UWSA, that has proposed an alternativepath to peace outside the parameters of thecurrent peace process. Also, as mentioned

141FormoredetailsseeReportoftheIndependentInternationalFact-FindingMissiononMyanmar,presentedtotheUNHumanRightsCouncilon24August2018.

50

above, the KNU and RCSS announced thesuspension of their participation in the NCApeace process in October 2018, raisingquestions about the futureefforts to achieveapoliticalsettlement.Furthermore,whiletheTatmadawannouncedaunilateralceasefireinDecember 2018, fighting between theTatmadawandtheAAbeganamajorupswinginthefinalmonthsof2018,into2019.Attheirheart,alloftheseconflictsareframedaroundissuesrelatedtoethnicidentity.Theseinclude conflicts emerging from the tensionbetween diversity and unity, as well as deepinsecurities regarding the threat posed byoutsiders. In the following section we willcontinue to explore these issues in moredetailbylookingatthreecasestudies:Kachinidentity,Arakanidentity,andKarenidentity.

51

CASESTUDIES-IntroductionThefollowingsectionwilltakeacloserlookatissuessurroundingethnicidentityinMyanmarthrough the lensof threecase studies.Thesecasestudiesprovideanopportunitytolookinmore depth at Kachin identity, Arakaneseidentity, and Karen identity. The case studiesdraw on existing research to complementinterviews and consultations carried out bytheresearchteam,resultinginthreeseparatestories. Each begins with a brief summary ofthe rich histories and complex experiencesthat have shaped current perspectives onethnic identity in the Kachin, Arakanese, andKaren communities, before exploring theresearchteam’sfindingsindetail.It should be noted that issues related toethnic identity raise sensitivities and somelevel of controversy in all three groups. Theanalysisoutlinedinthefollowingcasestudiesmakes no attempt to classify groups orcritiquehowgroupsengagearoundtheirownidentity. Rather, the case studies reflect anarray of views voiced by members of eachcommunity.Theseviewsandperspectivesareusedtoillustratethecomplexitiessurroundingethnicidentityindifferentsettings.Finally, it isalso important toemphasize thatthe case studies do not claim to convey anexhaustive exploration of perspectiveswithineachcommunity,nordoestheresearchteamclaimthatanyoftheviewsoutlinedrepresentaunifiedoutlook. Indeed, thecontributionofthecasestudies isnot inprovidingconsensusperspectives.Instead,thecasestudiesprovidean opportunity to consider a range of viewsthat are held by community members whohavereflectedcloselyonhowissuesrelatedtoethnicidentityhaveanimpactonthelivesandexperiences of their communities. Theintention of the case studies is to provide aspace to share voices that are often notwidely heard, and to consider the insightsthey provide in terms of understandingunderlying challenges and alternativeapproaches.

Principle location for casestudy interviews: Myitkyna,Mai JaYang, Sittwe,Yangon,Hpa-an, and Mae Sot.Preceding Chapters alsoinclude quotes frominterviews in Hkamti andLashio.

52

CASESTUDYTheCaseofKachinIdentity

In the arch formed byMyanmar’s highlands,Kachin State makes up the keystone at thearch’s summit. It shoulders the weight of along international border with China, and ashorter internationalborderwith India.To itssouth, Kachin State borders Shan State, andSagaingRegiontoitssouthwest.Thestate’snameandethnicassociationreferto a complex set of ethnic identities thatbegan to emerge in the late nineteenthcentury.Theterm“Kachin”wasformalisedbyBritish colonialists as they came into contactwith the variety of communities living in theborderlands of Burma, China, and India. Assuch, “Kachin” was used as a catch-alldesignation that referred to the largerJingphaw group and its smaller clans, aswellas other groups. Community leaders alsofoundthetermuseful inbuildingunityacrossadiverserangeofcommunities.142

142Sadan,M.(2013)pp.14-20,244.

The following case study provides anopportunitytoreflectmorecloselyonaspectsof Kachin identity and history, as well asKachin experiences with armed struggle, theceasefire period of 1994-2011, and morerecent resumption of armed conflict. In thecurrent context, many Kachin communitieslive in areas that are under centralgovernment control, KIO control, or mixedauthority. There has also been a sustainedfocus on the part of some Kachin leaders toengageinelectoralpolitics.Theseexperienceshave shaped outlooks within the Kachincommunity regarding the prospects for localgovernance and aspirations for the future. Inconsidering a vision of governance for thefuture,manyofthoseinterviewedfocusedonissuesrelatedtoterritorialboundariesandthedesire to achieve autonomy and self-determination.

53

Concerns and aspirations articulated bymembers of the Kachin community arenotable in the way that they illustrate theethnic identity narratives outlined in Chapter2. In particular, perspectives on Kachinidentity illustrate narratives surrounding theassumedcorrelationbetweenpopulation sizeand entitlements, the idea that communitiesarehomogeneousandethnicidentityisfixed,the notion that communities should bestationaryandtiedtohistorichomelands,andthatoutsidersposeathreat.Thiscasestudywillconcludebytakingacloserlook at aspects of Kachin identity in thecurrent situation of insecurity and armedconflictinwhichacomplexinterplaybetweenpushandpull factorsmaylead,paradoxically,to both stronger group unity and deepergroupdivisions.KachinIdentityTheexactcategorisationoftheKachingroupisamatterof sometimesheateddebate.Whilethiscasestudyinnowayseekstoimposeanyform of categorisation on a community thatenjoys rich diversity, the tensions andcontroversies surrounding efforts to classifyandbuildunitywithintheKachingroupareaprincipalfocusofthiscasestudy.Prior to the arrival of the British, BurmesekingdomsextendedfromthecentrallowlandsandclaimeddominionovertheShanhillsandthe Kachin highlands. However, numerousauthorshavenotedthatthepoliticalauthorityof monarchs sitting in Toungoo, Ava, orMandalay over the remote hills of thismountainousperipherywasnominal.143IntheareaknowntodayasKachinState, traditional

143Smith,M.(1991)p.39.

leaders, referred to as duwas, from theJingphawcommunity,andsawbwas,fromtheShan community, connected with differentclans and retained independent control.AuthorssuchasSouthnotethatthetraditionof local autonomywas strong and continuedwell into the colonial period. Indeed, it wasnot until the 1930s that aspects of Britishcolonial administration extended their reachintothenorthernhighlands.144While the state – both the central Burmesekingdoms of the lowlands, as well as theBritishcolonialstate–waslimitedinitsabilityto penetrate and control these areas,Christian missionaries and other outsiderscametoknowthecommunitieslivinginthesenorthern highlands and referred to them asKachin. However, for the communitiesdesignatedasKachinthetermwasnotwidelyused or loved, and the Jingphaw termWunpawng was gradually adopted as anequivalentterm.AsSadanrecounts:

ThetermWunpawngastheequivalentofKachindownplayedexplicitreferencetothedominanceoftheJinghpawlineages.Yet,asuseofthetermWunpawngandotherreferentswithintheumbrellacategoryindicate,itwasnonethelessaJingphawmodelofsocialrelationsthatbecameauthoritative…145

Authors such as Sadan and South haveidentified the Jingphaw as the dominantgroup within the broader Kachin/Wunpawnggroup. This is reinforced by the fact that theJingphaw language is used as a commonlanguage within much of the Kachincommunity, and leadershipwithin theKachin

144South,A.(2008)p.18.145Sadan,M.(2013)p.341.

54

Baptist Church (KBC) and the KachinnationalistmovementhastendedtobedrawnfromtheJingphawcommunity.146Atdifferenttimes,thetermJingphawhasalsoservedasastand-inforthetermKachin,butSadannotesthat

[E]mphasisonthetermJingphawastheprimaryequivalentofKachincouldbeinterpretedwithtoonarrowanethnographicrange,undulyemphasisingtheJingphawdominancewithinthecollectiveanddestablisingthesometimesfragilepoliticalallegiancesthatKachinethno-nationalisteliteshopedtomaintain[.]147

While classification of Kachin/Wunpawnggroups remains highly contested, it is oftendescribed as including a range of about sixgroups. Laur Kiik outlines these as beingJingphaw, Lhaovo (or Lawngwaw), Zaiwa,Lachid (or Lachik), Rawang, and Lisu.148 Ininterviews and consultations, meetingparticipantsgenerallyagreedwiththesix-partclassification for the Kachin group, adding arange of additional perspectives. Someexpressed the view that the term Maru isoftenassociatedwiththeLhaovogroup,whileothers were of the opinion that the termZaiwa is interchangeable with Atsi.Furthermore, the research team met with 146ItshouldbenotedthattheCatholicChurchandotherevangelicalcongregationsalsoenjoyawidefollowingwithintheKachincommunity.ThesedenominationsdrawmembersfromavarietyofKachinsubgroups,aswellasnon-Kachinpeople. 147Sadan,M.(2013)p.340.148KiikinSadan,M.(2016)p.213.NotethatavarietyofspellingsexistforgroupswithinthelargerKachin/Wunpawnggroup.Forthepurposesofthisreport,wehaveadoptedthespellingsoutlinedbyKiik.However,itiscommonforsourcestousespellingsthatdifferfromthoseoutlinedabove.

individualswhoself-identifiedasNung-LungmiandNgawChan, andwho asserted that theirgroups were also distinct members of thebroaderWunpawnggroup.Asagroupthatwaspresentintheterritoryofpresent-dayMyanmarat the timeof the firstAnglo-Burman war in 1824, theKachin/Wunpawng group is consideredtaingyintha, and therefore entitled tocitizenshipandassociatedrights.Atthesametime,Kachingroups liveoutsideofMyanmar,andtheJingphawofMyanmararealsoknownas Jingpho in China and Singpho in India.Furthermore, within Myanmar, Kachincommunities are by no means confined toKachin State, with significant Kachinpopulations living inotherpartsofMyanmar.In fact, the Kachin population in Shan Statemeets the threshold for appointment of aKachin NRAM, or ethnic affairs minister, inShanState.Likewise, many non-Kachin communities arepresent in Kachin State. Indeed, Shan andBamarcommunitieslivinginKachinStatehavebeen determined to reach the 0.1 percentthreshold needed to receive appointment ofNRAMsintheKachinStateparliament.149Datafromthe2014censusrevealshighlevelsof migration into Kachin from other parts ofthe country. The highest in-migration wasrecorded as coming from Sagaing Region,MandalayRegion,andShanState,butKachinState was also the principal destination formigration from Rakhine State and Yangon

149NotethatNRAMshavealsobeenappointedinKachinStatefortheLisuandRawangcommunities,ahighlycontentiousdevelopmenttreatedinmoredetailbelow.

55

Region.150Manyofthoseinterviewedpointedout that migration into Kachin State fromother parts of the country is a commonphenomenon as the state’s extractiveindustries provide a draw for those seekingemployment.151Infact,aswewillseethroughthis case study, migration and perceivedchangesindemographicswereissuesofgreatsensitivity and concern for many meetingparticipants.HistoricalBackgroundUnderBritishcolonialadministration,muchofwhat constitutes Kachin State today wasdesignatedasthe“KachinHills”andgovernedindirectly as part of the Frontier Areas. Theturbulence of the Second World Warextended its reach into the Kachin Hills andmany Kachin fought on the British side,againsttheBIA,Chinese,andJapanesetroops.Sadanpointsoutthatitwouldbeamistaketoassume this reflectedadeep senseof loyaltyto the colonial power. Instead, she assertsthat siding with the British emerged from adesiretoprotecthomesandvillagesfromtheconflagration of violence that consumednorthern Burma. Like Karen communities,members of the Kachin community werevictims of atrocities committed by the BIA.The experience of the war years producedanti-Bamar sentiment within the Kachincommunity and shaped the development ofmodern,nationalistKachinpolitics.152With the end of the war, and with Burmannationalists seeking independence fromBritain, Kachin leaders took part in the 1947 150SeeThematicReportonMigrationandUrbanization(Vol.4-D,CensusReport).(2016).151Fieldnotes,Yangon(November2016),Myitkyina(May2017andJune2018). 152Sadan,M.(2013):pp.257-8.

Panglong Conference. Over the course ofnegotiations, a vision for the creation ofKachin State was articulated, including thelowlandareasofMyitkyinaandBhamo.Sadannotes that defining Kachin State as includingthese lowland areas was significant as “itinvolved breaking down the ecologicalessentialism of Frontier Areas Administrationthat consigned Kachin communities to onlyone lived environment [the highlands].”153Smith points out that Myitkyina and Bhamowere ceded to Kachin State in exchange forKachinrepresentativesabandoningtheabilityto invoke the right of secession, claimed bythe Karenni and Shan representatives atPanglong.154KachinArmedStruggleIn the immediatewakeof independence, thecommander of the First Kachin Rifles, NawSeng, led his troops into rebellion as part ofthe Karen uprising in 1949.155 Naw Seng’sleadershipofthisKachinmovementwasbrief,before he crossed the border into China,returning later in the 1960s to play aleadership role in the Communist Party ofBurma(CPB).BeyondthemutinyoftheFirstKachinRifles,afragile post-independence peace held inKachin State. However, many in the Kachincommunity, like members of other ethnicnationality communities, found themselvesdisappointedand frustrated that thepromiseof federalism, which had led groups to signthe Panglong Agreement,was never fulfilled.Instead, they saw a steady erosion of

153Ibid.p.277.154Smith,M.(1991)p.79.155TheseeventswillbediscussedingreaterdetailwithinthecasestudyonKarenidentity.

56

autonomy and moves towards greatercentralisation.Sadan notes that “[t]hroughout the 1950s,therefore, there was a build-up of socialhostilities and resentments andan increasingsense of unfairness at the outcomes ofindependence.”156Shegoesontoexplainthatgrowing frustration and a sense ofvulnerability was provoked by a combinationofactionstakenbythecentralgovernmentinRangoon. These included the decision toadjust the boundary line between KachinState and China, handing over three Kachinvillages to China’s control; the prospect ofroad construction and displacement; and agrowingsensethatKachinpoliticianswerenotable to influence developments in their ownstateorcontrolthestatebudget.157As a result, in October of 1960, a group ofKachinstudentsatRangoonUniversityformedthe Kachin Independence Army (KIA). SmithdescribestheoutlookofearlyKIAleadersthatgave rise to the new militant undergroundmovement:

Theywereamixedgroupofyoungpeople,allofwhomhadbecomeprogressivelydisillusionedwiththeideathattherewasanyprospectofpoliticalprogresswithinthefailingstatestructures,orthatthepoliticalsystemwasinterestedinthespecificneedsandinterestsoftheKachinpeoplesandtheplacestheyinhabited.158

The outbreak of the Kachin armed strugglecame in early 1961, ushering in an extended

156Sadan,M.(2013)p.317.157Ibid.p.319.158SmithinSadan,M.(2016)p.52.

period of conflict from 1961 to 1994. TheKachin uprising would come to be part ofwhatSouthandothershavedescribedas the“second wave” of ethnic insurgencies thatemergedduring theNeWineraand involvedmanyofthegroupsthathadtakenpartinthePanglongConference.159AswasmentionedinChapter1,thisfirstlongperiod of armed conflict between theTatmadaw and the KIO/KIA lasted until the1990s. During this period, the KIO saw anumberofdifficult splits anddefections. Thisincluded the departure of one unit in 1968that joined theCPB.Thegroupwasmadeupof mostly non-Jingphaw Kachin and, at thetimeoftheCPB’sdisintegrationandunderthelead of commander Ting Ying, became theNewDemocraticArmy-Kachin(NDA-K).Underthe terms of the 1989 ceasefire agreement,theNDA-KwasgrantedcontrolofterritoryontheborderwithChina,officiallydesignatedasKachinStateSpecialRegion1.160In 1991, Tatmadaw pressure resulted in thedefection of a large part of the KIA’s FourthBrigade in northern Shan State. This groupwent on to form the Kachin Defense Army(KDA),whichalsoagreeda ceasefire in1991,andwas granted control of an area north ofLashio, Shan State, thatwasdesignated ShanStateSpecialRegion5.161CeasefireFollowing the upheaval surrounding thestudent-led demonstrations in 1988 and theNLD’s electoral win in 1990, KIO ChairmanBrang Seng, called on authorities to hold a

159South,A.(2008)p.35.160Ibid.p.153. 161Ibid.p.153.

57

National Convention to draft a newConstitution. He also outlined his vision forthe future of the KIO. Smith notes that, inlookingtowardsthefuture,BrangSengurgedthat “the most important thing is that webecome a legal party during this period ofconstitutionalchange.”162ThroughmediationeffortsundertakenbyRev.Saboi Jum of the KBC in 1993 and 1994,dialogue was successful in establishing aceasefirebetweentheKIOandtheTatmadaw.Notably, this was the only written ceasefiredocumentagreedduring the ceasefireperiodof the late 1980s and early 1990s. Theagreement came after more than threedecades of fighting and was greeted withoptimism and welcomed as a chance forpeaceand reform.BrangSengwouldnot liveto provide leadership through the period oftransition, as he died in 1995, the year afterthesigningoftheceasefire.TheKachinceasefireperiod, from1994-2011,saw a number of significant developments –some positive and some negative. The newceasefire environment was notable for theemergenceofcivilsocietyactors.KachinStatesawtheestablishmentofMyanmar’sfirsttwoofficial non-governmental organisations(NGOs), with the creation of the MettaDevelopment Foundation in 1998 and theShalom (Nyein) Foundation in 2000. Thesetwoorganisationsledneweffortstomeettheneeds of local communities and to engagelocal communities around key issues ofconcern. In a context where Myanmar wasotherwise isolated from outside aid andinternational actors, the role of these localorganisationswassignificant.163

162SmithinSadan,M.(2016)p.66.163Ibid.p.76.

Atthesametime,theKachinceasefireperiodis also rememberedbymanywith a senseofregret due to a perception that KIO leadersandothersusedtheperiodasanopportunityfor personal enrichment rather than pushingbeyond the ceasefire to a politicalsettlement.164 In termsof leadership, theKIOwas plagued by power struggles followingBrangSeng’sdeath,withrivalriesunderminingitsdirection.InFebruary2001,acoupwasledagainst Brang Seng’s successor, Zau Mai.Three years later, the KIO saw a subsequentunsuccessful coup attempt in January 2004,followedamonthlaterbytheassassinationofaKIOleader.165InternalstruggleswithintheKIOwereseenbymany to emerge not just from generationaldisagreementsabouthowbesttoengagewiththe Tatmadaw, but from competition overbusinessopportunities.166Authorshavenotedthat theKachinceasefireallowedavarietyofelites the opportunity to accumulate vastsums of wealth derived from a range ofcommercial interests. Kevin Woods hasdescribed the ceasefire years as a period of“ceasefire development” that allowed “theallocation of private, large-scale resourceconcessions, and the related right (or not) totax associated resource flows and trade,”tying Kachin areas more closely to “theBurmesemilitary-state.”167Researchers have noted how the politicaleconomy dynamics surrounding this processof enrichment and central state expansion

164Ibid.p.81. 165Ibid.p.82.166SeeBusinessInterestsmaybeBehindKIAassassination,byNawSeng,TheIrrawaddy,5March2004.167WoodsinSadan,M.(2016)p.117.

58

unfolded in Kachin State during the ceasefireyears. However, this pattern of developmenthasalsobeenseeninmanyotherpartsofthecountry. Indeed, the extension of the centralstate, through the allocation of concessionsfor the right to carry out mining, logging,large-scale agricultural projects, plus thebuildingofhydroelectricdams, roads,oil andgas pipelines, as well as the construction ofspecial economic zones, all accompanied byincreased militarisation, are themes thatemerge in all three of the case studiesexaminedinthisreport.Beyond the acceleration of resourceextraction,theKachinceasefireyearsarealsorememberedfortheKIO’sactiveparticipationintheNationalConventionprocess.FollowingBrang Seng’s articulation of a future for theKIO as a participant within a democraticsystem, the KIO undertook sustainedengagement in the process to draft the newConstitution. While the process would startand stop, the KIO continued to take partdespite repeated frustrations anddisappointments.ThegreatestfrustrationwasundoubtedlytheexperienceoftheKIOputtingforwardanineteen-pointproposalfocusedonincreased provisions for autonomy in ethnicnationalityareas.Inthewakeoftheproposal,the KIO cameunder increased pressure fromthe Tatmadaw, with demands to relinquishkey bases along the China border, while notreceiving any response to the points putforward.168Thus,the2008Constitutionwasadoptedafterfourteen years of ceasefire between the KIOandtheTatmadaw.Theperiodhadseeninitialoptimism and the emergence of new socialforces through the advent of civil society

168South,A.(2008)p.135.

organisations. The period also produced adeep sense of frustration and resentment.While it was hoped that the ceasefire wouldopenthedoor topoliticaldialogue leadingtoachangeinpoliticalrelationswiththecentralstateandsustainedpeace,engagementintheNational Convention process produced noresults. This was compounded by thewidespread perception that Kachin leadershad focused their energies on personalenrichment through collaboration with themilitarystatearoundresourceextraction.ThisexperienceleftmanyintheKachincommunitywith a deep sense of dissatisfactionwith the1994ceasefire–asentimentthatwouldonlydeepenintheleaduptothe2010elections.ANewCycleofConflict169As mentioned in Chapter 3, the SPDC’sannouncementinApril2009thatallceasefiregroupsandmilitiaswouldbetransformedintoBorderGuard Forces (BGFs) came as a shocktomany.TheInternationalCrisisGroupnotesthat the KIO’s leaders had been assured thatdiscussion regarding disarmament wouldhappen only under the new governmentfollowingelections in2010,anditwasonthebasis of these assurances that the KIO had

169InhischapteronEthnicPoliticsandCitizenshipinHistory,inSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)MartinSmithnotesthatMyanmarhasseenmultipleerasofgovernment,eachstartingwithaperiodofoptimismaroundtheprospectsforpeace.Ineachinstance,thatoptimismhasbeenfollowedbyarenewedcycleofconflict.HenotesthatMyanmar’stransitionunderthe2008Constitutionmarksafourtheraofgovernmentand,asinpreviouseras,theperiodbeganwithoptimismandhighexpectationssurroundingsignificantreforms.However,thetransitionperiodalsousheredinanewcycleofconflict.ThiswasespeciallytrueinKachinandotherpartsofMyanmar’snortheast.

59

participated in the 2008 referendum on theConstitution.170AsSmithnotes,theKIOhadbeenunsuccessfulin repairing the fractures between itself andsmaller Kachin militias during the ceasefireperiod. As a result, the NDA-K and the KDA,alongwithanumberofsmallermilitias,cameunder the partial control of the TatmadawfollowingtheBGForder.171However, the largest ceasefire groups,including theUnitedWa StateArmy (UWSA),theKIO,andtheShanStateArmy-North(SSA-N), refused the disarm. While the SPDCeventually relaxed its orders for groups suchas the UWSA and the SSA-N, the order wasdramaticallyimposedbymilitaryforceagainstthe Myanmar National Democratic AllianceArmy (MNDAA) in the Kokang region. For itspart, the KIO continued to refuse the orderbutfounditselfundercontinualpressureasitmovedtowardsthe2010elections.In the run up to the elections, a number ofKachin parties set out to register with theUnionElectionCommission(UEC),astepthatwould have furthered Brang Seng’s vision ofKIO reform. Three Kachin-based parties,including the Kachin State Progressive Party(KSPP) led by Dr Lamang Tu Ja, who hadpreviouslyservedasVice-ChairmanoftheKIO,attempted to register but their registrationwas rejected by the UEC. The 2010 electionstook place with the USDP and Tatmadaw-appointed representatives together holding aclearmajorityintheKachinStateparliament.

170SeeATentativePeaceinMyanmar’sKachinConflict(Vol.140,AsiaBriefing,Issuebrief).(2013)p.6.171SmithinSadan,M.(2016)pp.81,85.

Thus,whileMyanmartransitionedtowardsitsfirst semi-civilian government, a process thatwas watched with great interest by thoseinside and outside the country, the outlookwithintheKachincommunitywaspessimistic.Community support for the 1994 ceasefirehad eroded and Smith notes that the KIO’s“credential as the defender of the Kachincause” had emerged deeply tarnished fromthe ceasefire period.172 KIO participation inthe National Convention and attempts fromthe Kachin community to participate in the2010 elections had been blocked. WoodsnotesthatmanywithintheKachincommunityfelt “politically disempowered and hopelessabouttheprospectsofabetterfuture.”173Thus, as the country undertook nationalelections in 2010, the stage was set forresumptionofactivefightingbetweentheKIOand theTatmadaw. Indeed,by late2010, thegovernment had declared the 1994 ceasefire“null and void” and began using the term“insurgents” when referring to the KIO.174Ultimately, it was a small armed clashbetween Tatmadaw and KIA forces near ahydroelectricpowerproject that ledtoa full-scaleresumptionoffightinginJuneof2011.Since 2011, fighting between the Tatmadawand theKIAhas lurchedon, at timespausingandattimesgoingthroughperiodsofseriousescalation. Multiple rounds of peace talkshavetakenplace,includingeffortstogainKIOsupport for the NCA. The armed conflict hasbeen of particular concern to neighbouringChina, which has named several Special

172SmithinSadan,M.(2016)p.82.173WoodsinSadan,M.(2016)p.143.174SeeATentativePeaceinMyanmar’sKachinConflict(Vol.140,AsiaBriefing,Issuebrief).(2013)p.7.

60

Envoys toplayasupportingrole in thepeaceprocess.175Despite these efforts, dynamics have furtherdeteriorated with significant acts ofaggression on both sides. As pressure fromthe Tatmadaw increased, the KIA looked forways to bolster its position. It did so bysupporting the formation of two new ethnicarmedgroups:theArakanArmy(AA),andtheTa’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).Furthermore, KIO brigades in northern ShanStatejoinedtheTNLA,theAA,andtheKokangMyanmar National Democratic Alliance Army(MNDAA) to form a loose military alliancecalled the Northern Alliance. The NorthernAlliance announced their presence through aseries of coordinated attacks that took placeinnorthernShanStateinNovember2016.MembersoftheNorthernAlliancewentontojoin a like-minded grouping of armed groupsled by the UWSA, along with the NationalDemocratic Alliance Army (NDAA, or MonglaArmy),andtheSSA-N.Thegroupwasformedunder the name Federal Political Negotiationand Consultative Committee (FPNCC), withthe aim of forging an alternative nationwideceasefire.176The KIO/KIA’s role in the Northern Alliance,along with its membership in the FPNCC,places it in firm opposition to the Tatmadawand the NLD-led government. Through theNorthern Alliance, the KIA is connected to

175Formorebackground,seeChinaDoesNotHaveSpecialInterestsinSupportingMyanmar’sPeaceProcess:Official,TheIrrawaddy,13July2018. 176ForamoredetailedanalysisoftheNorthernAllianceandtheFPNCC,seeBynum,E.(2018).AnalysisoftheFPNCC/NorthernAllianceandMyanmarConflictDynamics,andYun,L.(2017).BuildingPeaceinMyanmar:BirthoftheFPNCC.

groupssuchastheAAandtheMNDAAagainstwhich the Tatmadaw has been bitterlyopposed. Likewise, KIO participation in theFPNCC, and the FPNCC’s proposal for analternativepathtoachievingpeaceoutsideofthe Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement andrelated political dialogue, undermines theNLD-ledpeaceprocess.177Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw has drawn sharpcriticismforitsheavy-handedresponsetothesecurity situation in northeastern Shan StateandKachinState,particularly itsuseofheavyweaponry and airstrikes, often targetedagainst civilian populations. Since thebreakdownof thebilateral ceasefirewith theKIO,itisestimatedthatover100,000civilianshave been displaced, and this new cycle ofconflict has caused a deep rupture in trustbetween civilian communities, the centralgovernment,andtheTatmadaw.178Experiences of Local Governance and VisionsfortheFutureConversations with members of the Kachincommunity in Myitkyina, Mai Ja Yang, andYangon provided opportunities to hear arange of perspectives regarding both currentexperiencesofgovernanceandaspirationsforfuture governance arrangements. Interviewsoffered varied insights from communitieslivingbothwithinKIO-administeredareasandgovernment-controlledareas.

177However,atthetimeofwriting,itwasuncleartheextenttowhichtheKIOwasfullycommittedtocontinuingtopursueanalternativetogroupsjoiningtheNCAandthegovernment-ledpeaceprocess.178SeeSouth,A.(2018).ProtectingciviliansintheKachinborderlands,Myanmar,Keythreatsandlocalresponses.

61

When considering Kachin perspectivesregarding governance, it is important torecognise that great variations exist in termsof peoples’ daily experiences. Some areas ofKachin State and northern Shan State areunder the controlof the central government,with the backing of the Tatmadaw. Otherareas are under the control of non-stateactorssuchastheKIO,orsmallerlocalmilitias(militias thatmay be alignedwith the KIO orother armed groups, or the Tatmadaw). TheresulthasbeendescribedbyWoodsasa

complexsetofpowerrelationsinwhichnationalmilitaryandstateofficialsholdpowerinarrangementsthatsometimesoverlaporconflictwiththoseofnon-stateauthorities....theresultisamulti-layeredmosaicofpoliticalgeography,ratherthanneatlyseparableterritorialentitiesthatmaybecategorizedas'government'or'rebel.’179

This report will seek to distinguish betweenareasunder thecontrolof theKIOand thoseunder control of the central government.However, it is important to note that thedistinction is often not clear and, particularlysince the 1994 ceasefire, areas of mixedcontrolarecommon.ThisistrueformembersoftheKachincommunitylivinginKachinStateandnorthernShanState,butitisalsotrueformanyothercommunitiesinMyanmarandwillalsobeexploredwithintheKarencasestudy.GovernanceinKIO-ControlledAreasSincethebreakdownoftheceasefirein2011,successivewavesof fightinghavetakenplacebetween the Tatmadaw and the KIA. As aresult, territoryunderKIOcontrolhas shifted

179WoodsinSadan,M.(2016)p.116.

atdifferenttimes,ashavethenumberofKIAbrigadesandlocationofbrigades.180However,at the time of writing, the KIO controlledterritory in central and eastern Kachin State,including areas bordering on China. The KIOalso has troops in the far north of KachinState,closetotheIndianborder,andcontrolsterritoryinnorthernShanState.Observers have noted that the KIO is one ofthe most “state-like” of Myanmar’s EAOs.181AreascontrolledbytheKIOhavedevelopedasophisticatedadministrative systemprovidingimportant social services to localcommunities. Administration takes placeundertheKachinIndependenceCouncil(KIC),an administrative structure that is separatefrom the KIO, though largely staffed by KIOofficials. Administrative operations areconductedoutofLaiza,locatedontheKachinborderwithChina.TheKICcarriesoutmanyoftheadministrativefunctions of a parallel government,maintaining departments of health,education, foreign relations, commerce,taxation,andconstructionofinfrastructure.182Sincerenewedfightingin2011,administrationunder the KIC has also sought to meet theneeds of an influx of internally displacedpersons (IDPs). This has included providinghealthservicesandadministeringeducationalservices for over 22,000 students.183 Funding 180Forexample,seeKIAForms2NewBrigades,byNanLwinHninPwint,TheIrrawaddy,14February2018.181SeeSouth,A.(2018).ProtectingciviliansintheKachinborderlands,Myanmar,Keythreatsandlocalresponsesp.21.182SeeJolliffe,K.(2015).EthnicArmedConflictandTerritorialAdministrationinMyanmarp.74.183SeeSouth,A.(2018).ProtectingciviliansintheKachinborderlands,Myanmar,Keythreatsandlocalresponsesp.21.

62

to support the operation of public servicesandprojectshasreliedonKIOinvolvementinnatural resource extraction, cross-bordertrade,anddonationsandsupportfromKachinorChinesestakeholders.184In interviews with those living in areascontrolled by the KIO, many expressedappreciation for the ability to access servicesin their own language. They noted that KIC-administered public services had a betterability to connect with the needs ofcommunities, though theyexpressedadesireto have services be available in rural areasoutsideofMaiJaYangorLaiza.185Interestingly, this perspective is reflected inthefindingsoftheDurablePeaceProgrammeConsortium that surveyed conflict-affectedcommunities in Kachin State. According tosurvey results, more of those living in KIO-controlled areas disagreed than agreed withthe statement that their community’s needswere not being understood by authorities.Likewise, out of those living in government-controlledareas,moreagreedthandisagreedwiththesamestatement.186Ontheotherhand,someofthoseinterviewedshared their mixed feelings aboutadministration under the KIO. In terms oflanguage, those interviewed who did notidentify as Jingphaw noted that, just as theMyanmar central government only providesservices in Burmese, the KIC only providesservices in Jingphaw. For these individuals,livingundertheKIOdidnotfacilitateaccesstoservices, as theywere still expected to speak

184Ibid.p.21.185Fieldnotes,MaiJaYang(November2018).186SeeDurablePeaceProgramme,EndlineReport,Kachin,Myanmar.(2018)p.40.

in a language other than their mothertongue.187Some individuals also noted that, while theKIO enjoys a wide level of support andlegitimacywithin the Kachin community, it isseenashighlyauthoritarian.Theyexpressedadesire to see the KIO undertake reforms sothat it would be less authoritarian andaccountable to communities under itscontrol.188Finally,while the Tatmadawwaswidely seenas illegitimate as it had taken control ofterritory in Kachin State by force, some ofthose interviewed nonetheless shared theperception that services available ingovernment-controlled areas were betterfunded than those under KIO control. As aresult, some of those interviewed articulateda desire for a future where governance andadministration, including service delivery,wouldbeprovided throughanadministrativebody that enjoyed a high level of locallegitimacy (as the KIO does), but that is lessauthoritarian. They hoped that achievingpeace would mean they could enjoydemocratic governance and that serviceswould have funding necessary to genuinelymeettheneedsofcommunities.189KachinStateGovernanceandtheExperienceofElectoralPoliticsWhile governance in KIO-controlled areas ofKachin State takes place under the authorityof the KIO (or under mixed authority of theKIO and the central government), much ofKachin State falls under the authority of thecentral government. As a result, and even in 187Fieldnotes,MaiJaYang(November2018).188Fieldnotes,MaiJaYang(November2018).189Fieldnotes,MaiJaYang(November2018).

63

areas under KIO control, many of thoseinterviewed expressed strong feelings aboutthe role of Kachin ethnic political parties atthe state and Union levels. Echoing theaspirationsarticulatedbylateChairmanBrangSeng,meetingparticipantsexpressedadesireto see electoral politics as an avenue forpursuingKachininterestsandconcerns.Giventhisaspiration,therefusaloftheUECtoallowthe KSPP to register in advance of the 2010elections, followed by the resumption offighting in 2011, remained a source of bitterangerandfrustration.Despite this focusonelectoralpolitics,ethnicKachin political parties that have successfullyregisteredandtakenpartinnationalandlocalelections have, thus far, only been able toclaim small victories at the polls. In 2015, DrLamangTu Jaagain ledaKachin-basedparty,this time renamed the Kachin StateDemocratic Party (KSDP), to compete in theelections. The party was registered, but wonjustoneseat.190In a by-election that tookplace inNovember2018, a fierce contest unfolded betweenparties vying for control ofMyitkyina’sNo. 2constituency. The military-backed USDP,whichhadputforwardalocalcandidate,wontheelectionandcameinaheadoftheKachinDemocraticParty.TheNLDfinishedtheraceinthirdplace.191WhileKachinpartieshave,sofar,beenlimitedin their success, working through electoralpolitics remains a priority for many. Lookingtowardsthe2020elections,agroupofethnic 190SeeState/RegionalHluttawResults:Graphics,TheIrrawaddy,17November2015.191SeeMyanmarBy-ElectionVotersVoiceDisappointmentinRulingPartyofAungSanSuuKyi,TheIrrawaddy,5November2018.

Kachin parties has announced their intentiontomergeintooneunitedKachinparty.192Thisreflects a move more broadly amongMyanmar ethnic political parties tomerge inadvanceofnationalelectionsin2020.VisionsfortheFuture-territorialboundariesandaspirationsforautonomyandself-determinationInterviews in Myitkyina, Mai Ja Yang, andYangon provided an opportunity to hear arange of different visions and aspirations forthe future from members of the Kachincommunity. These perspectives were oftenshaped by current experiences aroundgovernance andadministration, aswell as anemphasis on electoral politics. In theseconversations, two major areas of focusemerged as meeting participants lookedtowardsthefuture:onecentredonterritorialboundaries; the other centred on aspirationsfor autonomy and self-determination.Interestingly,commentsandperspectivesalsoreflected the ethnic identity narrativesoutlinedinChapter2.In thinkingabout the future,membersof theKachin community often raised the issue ofterritorial boundaries. Views were striking inthat they tended to capture one of twocontrastingperspectives.First, a large number of those interviewedexpressed deep anxiety and concern relatedtotheissueofin-andout-migrationinKachinState.Thiswasbasedonaperceptionthatthedemographic makeup of Kachin state waschanging in ways that were not welcome.

192SeeFourKachinpoliticalpartiesmergedas‘KachinStateParty’,byNawBettyHan,TheMyanmarTimes,14August2018.

64

These perceived trends were often summedupbytheterm“Burmanisation,”whichmanysaw as being supported by the centralgovernment. They explained the trend asfollows:

PoorpeoplefromotherpartsofthecountryoftencometoKachinStateforworkbecauseKachinStatehasmanynaturalresourcesandtherearemanyjobsassociatedwiththeseindustries.Whentheycometheybringtheirwholefamilieswiththem.Becausetheyarepoor,theydon’thavehouseholddocumentsorCSCs.ButthegovernmenttellsthemthatthisisokayandtellsthemthatiftheymoveandgoworkinKachinState,theywillreceiveidentificationcards.OncetheyareinKachinState,theyreceivethedocumentstheyneed.ThecardssaythattheyliveinKachinStateandrecordtheirethnicityasBamar.

Atthesametime,weareKachinandmanyinour communities don’t have registrationdocuments either. But sometimes people inour communities don’t speak Myanmar, andthe Department of Immigration won’t givethemthedocuments.

Itmeansthatnowtheremaybemorepeopleliving in Kachin State with householddocuments that say they are Bamar thanpeoplewithdocuments that say theyKachin.ThisisanexampleofBurmanisationandawaythat the government plays a direct role tomakeithappen.193Anxieties around in-migration and thepossibledemographic impactpromptedsomemembersoftheKachincommunitytoexpress

193Fieldnotes,Myitkyina(May2018).

a desire for the imposition of migrationrestrictions. For instance, several communityleadersadvocatedfortheissuingofpermitstoensure that migrants who were not Kachinwould only be allowed towork and reside inKachinStateforalimitedperiodbeforegoingbacktotheirpreviousplacesofresidency.194Others voiced a second and more confidentperspective. These individuals were lesspreoccupiedwith thepotential decline in therelativesizeoftheKachinpopulationresidinginKachinState.Instead,theyassertedthattheboundaries of Kachin State should beexpanded,astheyspeculatedthattheborderestablished at independence did notaccurately reflect where Kachin and Shancommunitieslive.Inparticular,manyfeltthata portion of northern Shan State should beincludedinanenlargedKachinState.Whether expressing anxiety about theprospects of a reduced Kachin State, orconfidencearoundtheprospectforexpandingKachin State, both perspectives reflected anassumption that territorial boundaries wouldbe determined by ethnic population size andwhereethnicpopulationslive.While concerns and aspirations coming frommembers of the Kachin community oftenreflected a preoccupation with thedesignation of territorial boundaries, it isimportant to note that this theme was notunique to the Kachin community. Concernsand aspirations around identification ofpoliticalunits isatopicthatemergesinmanydifferentpartsofthecountry.Arecentmediaarticle highlighted the complexities that arisefrom the association between territorial

194Fieldnotes,Yangon(May2017)andMaiJaYang(November2018).

65

boundaries and the location of ethniccommunities, given Myanmar’s multi-ethnicmakeup. Quotingmembers from the Shan-niNationalities Army (SNA), the article outlinedhow some members of the Shan-nicommunityaspiretoestablishaShan-niStatethatwould include parts of Kachin State andSagaing Region.195 Obviously, such anendeavour would undoubtedly be highlycontested by Kachin and other ethniccommunities that feel a strong claim to thesameareas.Similaraspirations,raisingsimilarchallenges,wereheardby the research teamin many different consultation meetingsaroundthecountry.Beyond a focus on territorial boundaries,many of those interviewed also highlightedthe importance of a future in which Kachincommunities enjoy greater autonomy andself-determination. Many noted that theirdesire for high levels of autonomy emergedfromtheirdeepsenseofmistrusttowardsthecentral government. In KIO-controlled areas,meetingparticipantsnotedthattheyareableto access social services in a local language,and that even if the services are not as wellfunded, the ability to speak their ownlanguage had given them an added sense oftrust. Based on this experience, theyadvocated for the creation of governancestructures thatwouldmaximise autonomy atthelocallevel.196Interestingly, the focus on autonomy was sostrong that some even advocated that afuture Myanmar should move away fromsubnationalunitsbasedonstatesandregionsand towards an increased number of Self- 195SeeWithoutTerritory,theShanniArmy’sDifficultPathtoRecognition,byChitMinTun,TheIrrawaddy,8April2019.196Fieldnotes,MaiJaYang(November2018).

Administered Areas (SAAs) based on ethnicpopulations that meet a given thresholdrequirement. The individualswho voiced thisperspective saw it as a strategy to allowmaximum autonomy for communities andareas where ethnic identity was highlyconcentrated. When pressed on what anarrangement like this might look like onerespondentexplained:

Yes,KachinStatehasalotofethnicdiversity.SoyouwouldhaveoneareathatisRawang-dominant,youwouldhavesomeSAAsthatareZaiwa-dominant,youwouldhaveoneareathatisShan-ni,andyouwouldhaveareasthatareJingphaw.Eachareawouldhaveahighlevelofautonomyandcouldpursuewhatwasbestforthemajorityethnicgroupinthatarea.Thiswouldbedoneinmanydifferentareasaroundthecountry.197

Whether conversations focused on territorialboundaries or the need for greater localautonomy, meeting participants oftenemphasised the importance of establishing afederal system. While more detailed aspectsof federalism, such as the question of howpower-sharing arrangements might delimitUnion-level and local-level authority, wereconspicuously absent from discussions, therewas a common belief that federalism wouldlikely bring a change in territorial boundariesbased on the size of ethnic populations.Furthermore,itwasassumedthatsubnationalunitswouldenjoyhigher levelsof autonomy.Finally, meeting participants often explainedthat high levels of autonomywould result ingovernanceandadministrationstructuresthatbettermeettheneedsoflocalcommunities.

197Fieldnotes,MaiJaYang(November2018).

66

AninterviewwithaKachincommunity leaderprovided further insight into a potentialfederal model that assumed allocation ofentitlementsbasedonethnicpopulationsize,while at the same time providing rights andprotections for a variety of smaller minoritygroups:

Inthefuture,itwillbeimportanttoknowourethnicgroups,includingthesizeofeachgroup,becausetherewillbealevelofdecentralisationbetweengovernanceattheUnionlevel,andgovernanceatthelevelofstatesandregions.Weenvisionsomerightsthatwillbereferredtoas“citizenshiprights”thatwillcoverallcitizensofMyanmar.Atthesametimetherewillbe“ethnicgrouprights”thatwillarticulatethespecialrightsofeachofMyanmar’smajorethnicgroups.These“ethnicgrouprights”willfocusonthepromotionofarts,literature,andculture,butalsoquestionsrelatedtoautonomy--whatissueswillbedeterminedatthestateandregionallevelandwhatethnicgroupsmeetthecriteriatoenjoyahigherlevelofautonomy.Itwillalsobeimportanttoensurewehavestrong“ethnicminorityrights”becausetherewillalwaysbeverysmallgroupsinMyanmarthatseethemselvesasdistinctfromMyanmar’smajorethnicgroups.Sowewillneedlawsthatensurethesecurity,livelihoods,andbasicneedsoftheseverysmallgroups.198

The above overview highlights the mainthemes that meeting participants sharedwhile reflectingon aspirations for the future.Conversations were notable in the way thatthey illustrated the ethnic identity narrativesoutlinedinChapter2.


The focus on territorial boundaries and theassumption that groups with the largestpopulation size have a legitimate claim toreceiving the benefit of a dedicatedsubnational unit reflects the assumedcorrelation between population size andentitlements.Theemphasisonpopulationsizealsoreflectsabeliefthatgroupscanbeclearlycategorised and measured, a challenge thatwe will explore in greater detail in the nextsectionofthiscasestudy.Enthusiasmaroundtheprospectofincreasingthe number of SAAs for groups that meet athreshold requirement not only reflects thefocus on allocating entitlements based onpopulationsize,butalsothewidely-heldbeliefthat, at the local level, communities arehomogeneousandethnicidentityisfixed.Closely related to the narrative around theethnic homogeneity of communities is therecurring concern about in- and out-migration. Indeed, support for migrationcontrols reflects adherence to the narrativethat communities should be stationary andthat there isaneedtoputmeasures inplaceto maintain the ethnic makeup of areasidentifiedasethnichomelands.Finally, conversations about migration –particularly concerns about in-migration –illustrate the common perception thatoutsiders pose a threat. Many of thoseinterviewed expressed a view that outsiderswerewillingpawnsbeingbrought intoKachinState as part of a deliberate plan by thecentral government to change the state’sethnicmakeup–aconcernthatbringsus fullcircle, back to the assumption that theallocation of benefits and entitlementsdependonagroup’ssize.

67

ItshouldbenotedthattheseassumptionsarenotuniquetotheKachincommunity. Indeed,readers who are familiar with other ethnicnationality communities will undoubtedlyrecognise the ways that these narratives arereflected in the experience of non-Kachincommunities, including in the experience ofBamarcommunities.Kachin Identity in a Situation of ChronicInsecuritySince the renewal of conflict between theTatmadaw and the KIO in 2011, Kachinidentity, and issues around diversity withintheKachingroup,havebeen sensitive topics.In a context of increased military pressure,questions around how the Kachin group isdefined and its population size have becomecloselylinkedtoideasaboutentitlementsandpolitical legitimacy. Indeed, the highlysensitive topic of Kachin categorisation andpopulation size flared around the 2014 theMyanmarPopulationandHousingCensusthatmade reference to eleven Kachin subgroups.Manyperceived this tobeanattemptby thecentralgovernmenttoproliferatethenumberof subgroups, in order to promote new faultlines within the group and weaken groupunity.As noted in Chapter 2, the assumed linkagebetweenpopulationsizeandthelegitimacyofa group’s claim to entitlements produces atendency to define the group as broadly aspossible.Inacontextwherethegroupcomesunder significant pressure from outsidesources, the impulse to solidify andstrengthen the unity of the broad groupbecomes a defensive instinct. This strategycanbequitesuccessfulinproducingasenseofshared identity. Indeed, a numberof authorshave noted that the collapse of the Kachin

ceasefire in 2011produced a surge in KachinnationalismandsupportfortheKIO,followingthe disillusionment of the ceasefire period.Woodsreflectsonthisdevelopment:Many Kachin people have felt in the recentfightingthattheKIO,throughtheKIA,isfinally'standing up' to the military-government, aninstitution blamed for entrenched inequalityand structural violence against ethnic peopleinBurmaasawhole.199

Likewise,SouthhasnotedthattheresumptionofactivefightingbetweentheTatmadawandtheKIOhasproduced“a surge in support forKachinnationalism.”200At the same time, the imposition of groupunity risks creating resentment that,ultimately,canleadtogreaterfragmentation.Aswewillexplore,acomplex interplayeasilyforms between the experience of insecurityandpressureemanatingfromoutsidesources,the push towards group unity, the pull thatthen arises as the result of resentment inresponse to assimilation efforts, and theensuingemergenceorreassertionofdivisionsthat only deepen the initial experience ofinsecurity.A number of stories follow, shared over thecourse of consultations with diversestakeholders in Myitkyina, Mai Ja Yang, andYangon, which illustrate these push-pullfactorsmoreclosely.NCA Anniversary Speech by the Commander-in-Chief

199WoodsinSadan,M.(2016)p.144.200SeeSouth,A.(2018).ProtectingciviliansintheKachinborderlands,Myanmar,Keythreatsandlocalresponsesp.5.

68

In conversations with Kachin communitymembers around issues related to Kachinidentity,a speechbyTatmadawCommander-in-ChiefMinAungHlaingon15October2016,theone-yearanniversaryofthesigningoftheNCA,was frequentlymentioned.Membersofthe Kachin community noted one paragraphof the speech in which the Commander-in-Chief outlined the population size of ethniccommunitiesresiding indifferentpartsofthecountry,startingwithKachinState:For example, more than 1.6 million ofpopulationarelivinginKachinStatewith29.2percentofBamar,23.6percentofShan,18.97percent of Jaingphaw, 7 percent of Lisu, 5.5percent of Rawam, 3.33 percent of Lawwaw,2.89 percent of Lacheik, 1.57 percent ofZaikwa, and 8 percent of other ethnics inpopulation ratios in line with the censusenumeratedin2014.201The reference to the size of different ethniccommunitiesinKachinStatewasperceivedbymany tobehighlyprovocative. Inaddition tothe lack of clarity around the origin of thepopulation data,202 the statement drewcriticismfor listing theBamaras the firstandlargestethnicgroupinKachinState,aswellasthe presentation of Kachin figures bysubgroup, rather than as a whole Kachingroup.

201SeeGreetingsofCommander-in-ChiefofDefenceServicesSeniorGeneralMinAungHlaingatthefirstanniversaryoftheNCA,GlobalNewLightofMyanmar,15October,2016(spellingsofgroupnamesasintheoriginal).202Thespeechmadereferencetothe2014census,butcensusethnicitydatahadnotbeenreleasedatthetimethespeechwasmadeanditisnotclearwhetherthecensuswasinfactthesource.

The speech was widely interpreted as anattempt by the Commander-in-Chief tochallengetheassociationbetweenMyanmar’snorthernmoststateandKachinethnicidentitybyasserting that themajority living inKachinStateisactuallyBamar.Inacontextwheretheallocationof rights,protections,andbenefits,including the identification of ethnic states,aredeterminedbythepopulationsizeofonegroup relative to others, this statement wasseen as potentially challenging the veryexistenceofKachinState.Furthermore, many within the Kachincommunity found the listing of populationfigures by Kachin subgroups (Jingphaw, Lisu,Rawang, Lhaovo, Lachid, and Zaiwa), ratherthan for the Kachin group as a whole, to behighly confrontational. They noted that thepopulation of the Bamar and Shancommunitieshadeachbeengivenasawhole,and many interpreted the listing populationfigures for the separate Kachin groups as anattempt to foster division. The assumptionwas that emphasising subgroups threatenedgroupunitybyleavingambiguitiesaroundthequestionofwhoisandisnotKachin.It is important to note that the speech wasmadeonthefirstanniversaryoftheNCA,inacontext that had also seen an escalation ofarmed conflict, including the use of heavyweaponry. As such, the speech by theCommander-in-Chief was perceived as adifferenttypeofTatmadawattackthataimedto erode the legitimacy of the state’s Kachinidentityandfostergroupfragmentation.Appointment of National Race AffairsMinistersinKachinState

69

Asnoted in Chapter 2, the 2008ConstitutionprovidesfortheappointmentofNationalRaceAffairs Ministers (NRAMs), also known asethnic affairsministers, in state and regionalparliaments. Article 161 of the Constitutionoutlines that each national race with apopulation that meets a threshold of 0.1percentofthecountry’stotalpopulationlivingoutside their respective state or region isentitledtorepresentationthroughelectionofanNRAM.The appointment of NRAMs in Kachin Statehas been an issue of deep controversy. Fourethnic ministers have been allocated forKachin State: one each for the Bamar, Shan,Lisu, and Rawang communities respectively.Deep disagreement has arisen from theappointment of Lisu and Rawang ministers.The controversy emerges from ambiguitiesaround the question of who is and is notKachin.While widely regarded as subgroups withinthe larger pan-Kachin group, many Lisu andRawang have asserted their identity outsidetheWungpawn/Kachingroup.203Thisrejectionof Kachin identity has emerged out of long-heldgrievancesaroundwhatsomedescribeas“Jingphaw domination” and pressure toassimilate into the larger group.204 In thiscontext, the appointment of the two ethnicaffairsministers is seen as implying that Lisuand Rawang communities are entitled to anadditional form of representation becausetheyconstitutegroupsseparatefromthepan-Kachin group, and because they each meetthe threshold requirement in terms ofpopulation size. This appointment has drawn 203KiikinSadan,M.(2016)p.213.204SeeSouth,A.(2018).ProtectingciviliansintheKachinborderlands,Myanmar,Keythreatsandlocalresponsesp.17.

irefrommembersofthebroadKachingroup,as it is seen as a move by the centralgovernment to affirm Lisu and RawangidentityasdistinctfromKachinidentity.

Formany,thisdevelopmentisseenasaclearexample of the central government offeringaninducementtosubgroupsinanattempttodeepen fractures within the larger group.Interestingly,despitetheassumptionthattheappointment of Lisu and Rawang ministerswouldresultintheadvancementofthesetwocommunities in a way that would not beavailable to others, very few of thoseinterviewedwere able to describe the actualresponsibilities associated with the position,or articulate how the positionwould provideadvantages to the Lisu and Rawangcommunities.ThePresenceofEthnicMilitiasinKachinState

Experienceofinsecurityandpressurefromoutsidesources (Tatmadaw) produces a push towardsgroup unity (exerted by pan Kachin group oversmaller sub-groups);pull thenarisesas the resultof resentment in response toassimilationefforts,exacerbated by inducements from outsidesources,leadingtogreaterfragmentation.

70

During several interviews in Myitkyina,individuals raised concerns about ethnicmilitias being used in military operationsagainst KIA forces. Those interviewed notedthat various Kachin subgroups had comeunder pressure, or received inducements tocreate their own militia groups, and thesemilitiaswerethenusedtofighttheKIA:

TheTatmadawgoestothesesmallgroupsandtellsthemthattheywillprovidethemwithuniforms,training,andtheabilitytocontroltheirownterritoryifthegroupsbecomeamilitiaunderTatmadawcontrol.ThegroupsagreeandthentheyareunderthecontroloftheTatmadaw.Then,theTatmadawwillsendthemilitiastofighttheKIA.ItmeansthatthereareRawang,Lisu,Lachid,evenmilitiasthatidentifyasKachin,fightingagainsttheKIA.Whenthishappens,thedivisionsonlygrowdeeper.ItmeansthatKachinpeoplearefightingwitheachotherandtheTatmadawcanjuststandbackandwatch.Thesituationisverysad.205

Media reports from July 2015 reporting onTatmadaw airstrikes against KIA positions innorthern Kachin State provide an illustrationthat backs up this narrative. Tatmadawoperations in Putao against the KIA werereportedly supported by the RebellionResistanceForce(RRF)describedas“amostlyethnic Rawang militia based in Putao.”206 Atthesametime,mediareportsinAprilandMayof 2017, regarding alleged killing of Lisucommunity members by the KIA, provideinsights into some additional underlying 205Fieldnotes,Myitkyina(May2017).206SeeAirstrikes&ClashesinKachinState'sPutaoDistrictDisplaceCivilians,KachinNewGroup,20July2015.

drivers that could lead communities such astheRawangandLisu toestablishmilitiasasadefence strategy against perceived KIAaggression.207TheAssertionoftheNung-LumnniIdentityThe anxiety related to potential groupdivisionscanbeseenatmultiplelevels.Whileindividualswho identifiedaspartof thepan-Kachin/Wunpawng group lamented thedivisions that led subgroups such as theRawang to articulate a distinct identity,members of the Rawang group expressedexasperation regarding the same dynamicwithin the Rawang group. This frustrationaroseinconnectiontomembersoftheNung-Lungmi group that have sought todifferentiate themselves from the Rawang.This tension was illustrated in separatemeetings withmembers of the Nung-LungmigroupandtheRawanggroup.In meetings with members of Nung-Lungmigroup,communityleaderscarefullyrecountedtheir group’s history and asserted theiridentity as separate from the Rawang group,while at the same time articulating that theysaw themselves as very much part of thelargerKachin/Wunpawnggroup.According tomembers of the Nung-Lungmi community,theyhadalwaysbeenadistinctKachingroup,buttheirdistinctidentityhadbeenlostduring

207SeeLisupeopleprotestKIAviolence,byNyeinNyein,TheIrrawaddy,22May2017,andEthnicpartyaccusesKIAofkillingLisupeoplebyKhinOoTha,TheIrrawaddy,28April2017.

71

themilitaryera,whentheyhadbeenincludedas part of theRawang group. They explainedthat, more recently, members of their grouphad begun to reclaim their separate Nung-Lungmi identity throughactivities topreserveand develop their culture, despite pressurefromtheRawanggrouptoidentifyasRawang.They pointed to the appointment of theRawangNRAMasamotivating factor for thistop-down pressure and speculated that iftheircommunitywasnolongerclassifiedasapart of the Rawang group, the thresholdrequirement for appointment of a RawangNRAMmightnotbemet.

At the same time, members of the Rawanggroupexpresseddeepanger towards theKIOfor its recognition of the Nung-Lungmi.Indeed,inthesamewaythatmembersofthepan-Kachin group perceived the centralgovernment as legitimizing the Lisu and

Rawang identities as separate from Kachinidentity, members of the Rawang groupexpressed deep hostility towards the KIO forits recognition of the Nung-Lungmi asseparatefromtheRawang.NarrativesSurroundingLisuIdentityA slightly different dynamic emerges whenlooking at perspectives from inside andoutsidetheLisugroup.While somemembers of the Lisu communityassertedthattheirgroupidentitywasdistinctfrom that of the broad Kachin/Wunpawnggroup, there were also members of the Lisugroup who self-identified as Kachin. At thesame time, some members from the pan-KachingroupsuggestedthatperhapstheLisuwerenot”realKachin,”aconclusionbasedontheassertionthatLisudidnotsharethesamecultural heritage as other members of theKachin/Wunpawng group. Some evenquestioned the historical roots of the Lisugroup inMyanmar. They suggested that Lisucommunities had not been present at thetime of the first Anglo-Burman war in 1824,andthuswerenottaingyintha.Theassociatedimplication was that if a group is nottaingyintha then they are not entitled to thebenefitsassociatedwithfullcitizenship.Sadan notes that an increased number ofmigrants came into Kachin State from Chinafollowing the Cultural Revolution and thatmany of these were Lisu. She notes that inChina, Lisu and Jingpo communities are seenas distinct groups.208 Likewise, arepresentative from a Lisu civil societyorganisation in Myitkyina noted manydynamics exist that might lead people who

208Sadan,M.(2013)p.340.

In context of intra-group competition (betweenbroadKachingroupandRawang)there isapushtowards group unity (exerted by Rawang oversmaller Nung-Lungmi group); pull then arises asthe result of resentment in response toassimilationefforts,exacerbatedby inducementsfrom outside sources, leading to greaterfragmentation.

72

self-identify as Lisu to see themselves aseither part of, or separate from, theKachin/Wunpawnggroup:

TherearemanydifferencesinhowothersseetheLisucommunity,andhowmembersoftheLisucommunityseethemselves.Sometimesthisdependsonwherepeoplelive.Forinstance,LisuwholiveinKachinStateusuallyidentifyasLisu-Kachin--theyseethemselvesasLisu,buttheyalsoseeLisuasbeingpartofthelargerKachingroup.Atthesametime,youwillfindthattherearemanyLisulivingaroundMandalay,andsomepeoplesaythatthoseLisuareactuallyChinese.ThereisaperceptionthattheyarerecentillegalChineseimmigrantswhohavecometoMyanmar.Tomakethingsgosmoothly,andinordertogetaCSC,theysaythattheyareLisu.Idon’tknowifthat’strueornot,butthat’swhatsomepeoplesay.Also,theLisuinMandalaytendtoidentifyasjustLisu[notasLisu-Kachin].So,thisiswhysomepeopleintheKachingroupsaythattheLisuarenotreallypartoftheKachin.Theythinktheyareactuallyillegalimmigrants.209

This last narrative is one that the researchteamheard in reference to the Lisu, but it issignificantasthesamenarrativecanbeheardoutside the Kachin context with regard togroups that are viewed as outsiders. In theMyanmar context, ethnic identity, and theissueofwhetheran identity isdeemed tobetaingyintha or not, is key. Also, somecategoriesofethnicityenjoyamoreclear-cutclaimtobeingtaingyinthathanothers.


The above stories illustrate some of thecomplex push-pull factors that can shapeethnic identity. In some instances, situationsofinsecurityandoutsidepressureleadgroupsto define themselves in ways that maximisetheir population size as a strategy to bolstertheir political legitimacy and their claims toentitlements. However, this strategy requiresalevelofgroupunityandassimilationthatcanlead to resentment. In this context, acombinationof pressures and incentivesmayleadactorstoassertdistinctidentities.At the same time, narratives around who ispartof thegroupandwho isnot canalsobeused to exclude some on the basis that theyare outsiders and not entitled to the samebenefits.The FocusOnGroupUnity - the Kachin CaseandBeyondThe Kachin case provides an opportunity toexplore and unpack a number of complexideassurroundingethnicidentityinMyanmar.Interviews revealed that group size hasbecome highly politicised, as it is seen asdetermining political legitimacy and theallocationofentitlements suchas creationofethnic states, designation of SAAs, andappointmentofNRAMs.Furthermore, the assumption that benefitsand privileges should be allocated accordingto group size requires that groups can beclearly defined, categorised, and measured.However, theexaminationof theKachincaserevealsthat,inreality,manypush-pullfactorsmean that fixed categories remain illusory.Resentment provoked by imposedassimilation may push groups to assert theirown distinct identity. At the same time,inducements such as the prospect of

73

increased representation throughappointment of NRAMs, or increasedautonomy in exchange for forming a militiaunder Tatmadaw control, may make theassertion of a distinct identity even moreattractive.While this case study has focused on theexperienceofethnicidentitywithintheKachincommunity,itshouldbenotedthattheKachincaseoffers insights into a dynamic that playsoutatmultiplelevelsinMyanmar.Indeed,theperception that diversity represents apotential threat to group unity has governedrelations between ethnic Bamar actors andethnicnationalityactorssinceindependence.Thus, while many perceive the PanglongAgreementashavingaffirmedthenotionthata diverse group of ethnic communities couldcome togetherwhilemaintainingahigh levelofautonomyandself-determination,thepost-independence situation of insecurity andinstabilitymeantanygenuinecommitmenttothis conceptwasquickly leftbehind.Ahighlycentralised and increasingly authoritarianapproachwasjustifiedbytheperceptionthatdiversityposedathreat–anassessmentthatbecame entrenched during the period ofmilitaryrulethroughanarrativethatdepictedthecountryasbeingundersiege.The pressure to assimilate into the majorityBamar culture, or Burmanisation, manifeststhrough a range of different strategies.However, efforts toenforce conformityhave,actually propelled ethnic nationalitycommunities to protect and assert theiridentitiesasdistinct fromtheBamarmajorityvia a variety of responses, including armedstruggle.

Ultimately,beyondtheanalysisofthesepush-pull factors, it is importanttonotethatthesedynamics have produced decades of terriblesuffering for both ethnic nationality andBamarcommunities.Theconflictbetweenthecentral government and Kachin non-stateactors remains but one out of numerousarmedconflictsthathasresultedinthousandsof deaths, and widespread injury,displacement,andhumanrightsviolations.

74

CASESTUDYTheCaseofArakaneseIdentity

RakhineStateislocatedinwesternMyanmar,ontheIndianOcean.ImagesofRakhineoftendepictbeautifulbeaches,oraviewofmorningmist rising over the historic temples of theancientcapital,Mrauk-U.Thesestandinstarkcontrast to more recent media images ofRakhine that depict burned villages andmilitarycheckpoints.

This case study will take a closer look atperspectivesfromtheArakanesecommunity–theethnicgrouplongassociatedwiththelandwest of the Arakan/Rakhine mountains.Reflecting on the perspectives shared bymeeting participants, desk research, andongoing, grounded analysis, the case studywillconsiderArakaneseidentity,includingtherange of grievances that have fuelled a longexperienceofarmedstruggle,andaspirationstoachieveautonomy,self-determination,andpoliticallegitimacy.

Additionally, this case studywill examine theroleofforeigndirectinvestmentinlarge-scaledevelopmentprojects takingplace inRakhineState.Followingaconsiderationoftheincomegeneration opportunities associated withthese projects and the need to maintainstability and security through increasedmilitarisation,wewill take a new look at theroot causes of conflict in Rakhine State,particularlyeventsthatunfoldedduring2017.In keepingwith the naming practice outlinedin the Introduction, this case studywill referto“RakhineState,”inobservanceofthenamechange instituted by the Myanmargovernment in1989.Atthesametime,thoseinterviewed expressed a desire for the term“Arakanese” to be used when talking aboutthe ethnic group that is associated with thedescendantsof theArakankingdom,and thiswill be the term that is used to discuss theviews and perspectives from the Arakanesecommunity.ArakaneseIdentityIn earlier chapters, and through ourexaminationofKachinidentity,thisreporthasalready noted the fluid and inherentlyunstablenatureofethnicclassification.Inthesamewaythatthisreportdidnotimposeanyset classification when examining identitywithintheKachingroup, itwillnotassertanydefinitive categorisation among groups fromRakhine State. However, it is widelyacknowledged that Rakhine ethnic groupsincludetheArakanese(alsoassumedtobethelargestgroup),aswellastheMro,theKhami,the Kaman, the Dainet, the Maramagyi, andtheThet.210

210TheclassificationofgroupswithinthelargerRakhinegroupandspellingofnamesisderivedboth

75

Ininterviews,onemeetingparticipantofferedhis perspective on classification within theRakhinegroup:Really,whenweusetheterm“Arakanese”weonlymeantheArakanesegroup.Weallknowthat thereareanumberofothergroups thathavealsobeenpresentinthesameterritoryastheArakaneseforalongtime,sotheyarealsoseenasbeingRakhineandtheyareconsideredtaingyintha. But they are not Arakanese. TheArakanese are Buddhists, they identify ashaving a connection to the rich historicalcivilizationthatwasoncefoundintheterritorythat is now Rakhine State, many will speakArakanese, and know the literature of theancientkingdom.Theothersmallergroupsaredifferent.Theycomefromthesamearea,butdo not share the same heritage. One group[theKaman]isMuslim,andtherearesomeintheothergroupsthatpracticeanimism.211HistoricalBackgroundAsnotedinChapter1,theregionknowntodayas Rakhine State once formed the centre ofthe expansive and prosperous Arakankingdom. The kingdom was protected by abarrier of hills andmountains that allowed itto develop with an orientation towards theIndian Ocean. Arakan enjoyed strong navalcapabilities,allowingittoplayadominantroleintradeacrosstheBayofBengal.Toward the end of the 18th-century, KingBodawpaya launched a campaign against the

frompublishedsources,suchasMyanmar:ThePoliticsofRakhineState(Vol.261,AsiaReport).(2014),andinterviewswithmembersoftheArakanesecommunityinYangonandSittwe(November2016andDecember2018).211Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).

Arakan kingdom, with the Arakan capitalbeing occupied in 1784. Burmese occupationgenerateddeepresentmentonthepartoftheArakanese, and grievances that date back tothe 18th-century are still felt today. Tens ofthousandsofpeoplewereforciblytakenfromArakan to labour in other parts of theBurmese kingdom, and the revered MahaMuni Buddha image was confiscated andmoved to theBurmesecapital.By theendofthe 18th-century, refugees had fled ArakanintoBritish-heldBengalandbegantoformanArakaneseinsurgencymovement.212Burmese occupation of Arakanwas relativelyshort-lived, as Arakan was ceded to Britainalongwith Tenasserimat the endof the firstAnglo-Burman war. Following the secondAnglo-Burman war in 1853, as the Britishpushed their control of Burma further north,ArakanandTenasserimwouldbe joinedwiththe Irrawaddy Delta, including Rangoon, andPegu, aswell asMon, to form Lower Burma.Thus, Arakan came under British rule muchearlier than the Kachin Hills and, after thethirdAnglo-Burmanwar,wasgovernedaspartof Ministerial Burma, not as part of theFrontierAreas.A Muslim population was already present inArakanpriortothearrivaloftheBritish.213Atthesame time,Arakanwas incorporated intoBritish India following the first Anglo-Burmanwar,andbordersbetweenArakanandBengalremained porous. Migration from BritishIndia, particularly by Muslims from Bengal,increased under colonial rule, as labour wasneeded for economic development.214 As inother parts of Burma, this influx producedresentment among local populations. Burma 212Myint-U,T.(2001)p.18.213Ibid.p.14.214SeeRakhineStateNeedsAssessment.(2015)p.2.

76

hadalreadyseenanti-Indianriotsin1930and1938, and, as was recounted in Chapter 1,violence between Buddhists and Muslimsliving in Arakan would erupt in the north ofthestateduringtheSecondWorldWar.Duringthewar, therewasArakanesesupportforboththe JapaneseandtheBIAduringtheSecondWorldWar,andfortheindependencemovement being led by Bamar nationalists.Indeed, some Arakanese leaders joinedBurmese political parties working towardsindependence.215 This included U Aung ZanWai, a prominent member of the AFPFL andadvisor toAungSan.At thesametime,otherArakanese leaders began to organise anationalist Arakanese movement. In 1938,ArakanesemembersofparliamentformedtheArakan National Congress. Soon afterwards,the renowned monk U Seinda establishedwhatwouldcome tobeanarmednationalistorganisation known as the Arakan LiberationParty(ALP).Following the violent war years, Rakhinefound itself home to competing communistfactions, as well as both Arakanese andMuslim separatist movements. Despite theupheaval facingBurma’swesternmostregion,Arakan was not included in the Panglongconferenceof1947as it, likeKarenandMonareas, had been administered underMinisterial Burma, and the meetings inPanglong focused on building unity withregions that had been administered asFrontierAreas.216Infact,itwouldnotbeuntilthe promulgation of the 1974 Constitution,

215Smith,M.(1991)p.53.216WhileArakan,likeotherpartsofMinisterialBurma,wasnotincludedindiscussionsatPanglong,UAungZanWaiwasoneoftheleadnegotiatorsfortheAFPFLatPanglong.

underGeneralNeWin,thattheethnicstateofArakanwascreated.ArakaneseArmedStruggleArakanese community leaders interviewedduring 2017 and 2018 took pains toemphasise the fact that the Arakanesestruggleforautonomyandself-determinationpredates thecreationofUSeinda’sALP,and,in fact, dates back to before Britishcolonisation. As mentioned above, thisnarrativeissubstantiatedbyhistorianssuchasThantMyint-Uwho trace theearliestdaysofan Arakanese insurgency back to the periodfollowing 1795, when refugees fled from therepression of Burmese rule.217 Thoseinterviewed emphasised that not only hasarmed struggle been a consistent theme inArakanese history since the end of the 18th-century, but the aim of achieving Arakaneseautonomy has been a longstandingobjective.218The situation in Arakan following the SecondWorld War provides an illustration of thelargerpost-warchaos thatgripped thewholecountry, with different factions of theCommunist Party, nationalist Arakaneseforces, and a Muslim Mujahid Party allemerging onto the scene. Over the comingdecades, the CPB would continue its fight inArakan, with more than 1,000 active troops.Eventually, the CPB leadership in Arakansurrenderedaspartofawideramnestyduringthe1980s.Atthesametime,theALP, lackingthe ability to hold local territory militarily,would move to bases with the KNU in thecountry’seast.219

217Myint-U,T.(2006)p.18.218Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).219Smith,M.(1991)pp.239-40.

77

While based with the KNU in easternMyanmar,theALPfurtherdevelopeditsfocuson achieving autonomy and self-determination. Like other EAOs, it began toassociate the struggle for self-determinationand theestablishmentof federalismwith thefightfordemocracy.OneformerALPmemberexplained that the combined focus onfederalismanddemocracycametobeseenasastrategyforoverthrowingmilitaryrule.220Atthe same time, the ALP was never able toestablish control over physical territory or tobephysicallypresenttofightinRakhineState.Assuch, itremainedanarmedgroupwithoutterritory.In addition to the on-going struggle of theALP, other political movements and armedgroups worked to carry out an insurgency inRakhine State. During the 1990s, the mostprominentof thesewere theNationalUnitedParty of Arakan (NUPA) and its armed wing,the Arakan Army (AA). NUPA-AA is believedto have established its general headquartersinParva,Mizoram,inNortheastIndia.LiketheALP, the NUPA and AA maintained closeconnectionswiththeKNU.However,thisfirstiteration of the AA collapsed when Indianforces killed its leadership in a militaryoperationduring1998.221CeasefireAndANewCycleofConflictIn 2012, the ALP joined a number of otherEAOs,includingtheKNU,insigningabilateralceasefireagreementwith theTatmadaw.TheALP would go on to become one of the

220Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).221Formoredetails,seethewebsiteoftheAllArakanStudents&YouthsCongress,availableathttps://www.aasyc.info/history-geography/#.XHAtAJNKhQZ

original eight armed groups that signed theNCAin2015.BecominganNCAsignatoryprovidedtheALPwith a new source of legitimacy and anopportunity to participate directly in thepeace process. However, participation withinthe peace process did not come withoutchallenges. Following the first session of the21st Century Panglong Peace Conference inearly2016,theALPbeganworkingtoconveneRakhine State-level community consultations,as foreseen in the framework for post-NCAdialogue process.222 The central governmentand Tatmadaw provoked deep frustrationamongstakeholdersfromRakhineStatewhenthey denied permission to proceed, citingsecurity concerns—although several otherNCAsignatorieshadbeenallowedtoproceedwith theirowncommunityconsultations.Theinability to move forward on the initiativeeventually led the leadership of the ALP toabandon their attempts to convene thesessionin2018,withasenseoffrustration.223WhiletheALPmadethetransitionfrombeingan insurgent group to being a participant inthe peace process, a new Arakanese armedgroup emerged onto the Myanmar stage.FollowingCycloneNargis,Arakanesestudentsfounded the second iteration of the AA in2009.224AsmentionedwithintheKachincasestudy, the KIA provided training for the newgroup, and the AA first fought alongside theKIA and other members of the Northern 222SeeMyanmar’sstalledpeaceprocess,byAshleySouth,AsiaDialogue,3April2019.223SeeRakhineStatemovesaheadwithpreparationsfornationaldialogue,byNarinjara,MyanmarPeaceMonitor,15February2017,andRakhineLeadersAbolishPoliticalDialoguePanel,CitingGovtInterference,byLawiWeng,TheIrrawaddy,21March2018.224Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).

78

Alliance in Kachin State and northern ShanState.Reports indicatethattheAAbegantheprocessofestablishingbasesinsouthernChinState during 2014, sparking frequent clasheswiththeMyanmarmilitary.225InDecember2018,theTatmadawannounceda unilateral ceasefire, excluding the area ofthe country under its Western Command inRakhineState,allowingoperationsagainsttheAAtocontinue.InearlyJanuary2019,theAAcarried out attacks against police outposts innorthern Rakhine, prompting a significantupsurgeinhostilities.Thefightingpromptedanew wave of casualties and displacement inKyauktaw,Minbya,Mrauk-U,Ponnagyun,andRathedaung townships in Rakhine State, aswellassouthernChinState.GrievancesthatFuelRenewedArmedStruggleIn interviews, many meeting participantsemphasised a range of different grievancesexperienced by the Arakanese community.They often summed these grievances up asbeing manifestations of “Bamar oppression,”and attributed the renewal of Arakanesearmed struggle to a range of differentinjustices experienced over generations.226Whenreflectingonthisexperience,anumberof common themes emerged includingnarratives surrounding long-held historicalgrievances, economic exclusion,discrimination, and current tensionsbetweentheRakhine Stateparliament and the centralgovernment.In terms of historical grievances, Arakanesemeeting participants frequently grounded 225SeeANewDimensionofViolenceinMyanmar’sRakhineState(Vol.154,AsiaBriefing,Issuebrief).(2019)p.5.226Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).

comments andanalysis in a reflectionon theculturalachievementsandreachoftheArakankingdom, followed by deep resentmentregarding the conquest under KingBodawpaya. As one meeting participantnoted,

Wehadaveryancientkingdomandarichculture.ButwealsohavealonghistoryandexperienceoffightingthatstartedwiththeinvasionoftheBamar.Wehavebeenfightingeversincethen--firsttheBamar,thentheBritish,andnowagaintheBamaraswefighttheTatmadaw.227

Beyond historical grievances, many meetingparticipants focused on the reality that,measured by any number of differentindicators, Rakhine State is one of the mostimpoverished areas of the country. A 2015needs assessment carried out by the Centerfor Diversity and National Harmony haspointed out that the widespread experienceof poverty has producing a “deep rootedfeeling of economic exclusion” among manyfromRakhineState.228Indeed, while much of northern Rakhineremained unenumerated during the 2014census,229 figures for the rest of the statereveal that living conditions in Rakhine Statelagsubstantiallybehindconditions in therestof thecountry.For instance, inRakhineStateonly 12.8 percent of enumerated householdsuseelectricity as theirmain sourceof energyfor lighting; by contrast, the figure at theUnion level is 32.4 percent. Likewise, 88.9

227Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).228SeeRakhineStateNeedsAssessment.(2015)pp5-6.229SeeIntroductionandChapter3ofthisreportforamorein-depthdiscussionofthe2014censusandnon-enumerationinRakhineState.

79

percentofenumeratedhouseholdsinRakhineState use firewood as their main source ofenergy for cooking, versus 69.2percentof atthe Union level. In terms of drinking water,only 37.8 percent of enumerated householdsin Rakhine State use an improved watersource as themain source of drinkingwater,whereas the Union level average is 69.5percent. Finally, only 31.8 percent ofenumerated households have toilets that areclassified as improved sanitation facilities,compared to theUnion-level average of 74.3percent.230During consultations held in Sittwe, meetingparticipants noted that the lack ofemployment opportunities in Rakhine Statehas ledmanyfromtheArakanesecommunityto migrate to other parts of the country. Inone interview, a member of the Arakanesecommunity reflected on the intensediscrimination faced by Arakanese migrantsand noted that experience has motivatedsometotakepartinarmedstruggle:

InYangon,discriminationtowardsArakaneseworkersexists.ArakaneseareperceivedastroublemakersandtherearemanycaseswhereemploymentisdeniedsimplybecauseofbeinganArakanese.ThisisoneofthereasonswhywehearmanyyoungpeoplearewillingtoreturntoRakhineStateandfightwiththeAA.231

In addition to the experience of economicexclusion,meetingparticipantsexpressed theviewthatthecentralgovernmenthasfailedto

230SeeThe2014MyanmarPopulationandHousingCensus,FiguresataGlance,DepartmentofPopulation,MinistryofLabour,ImmigrationandPopulation,withtechnicalassistancefromUNFPA,May2015.231Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).

consult or include Arakanese communities ineconomicplanning.Theyattribute this to thefact that Bamar civil servants (often formermilitary officers) dominate the government’sGeneral Administration Department (GAD),andthatstate-levelcabinetministersarealsoBamar.Theynotedthatitisthesegovernmentofficialsthataretaskedwithimposingpoliciesgenerated in Nay Pyi Taw, using a top-downapproach that does not allow for communityinput.Also, just as was observed in Kachin State,many meeting participants noted that thecentralgovernmenthasbeenactivelygrantingconcessionsfor investorstocarryoutarangeof different development projects in RakhineState. Theywere quick to point out that thishas taken place without communityconsultation,andthatitisanticipatedthattaxrevenues and profits from developmentprojects will benefit elites elsewhere in thecountry.Onemeetingparticipantsummedupthesituationsuccinctly:

Decadesofinfluence,controlandmanipulationbytheBurmesegovernmenthavecreatedinstabilityandunrestinRakhine.Wehaverichnaturalresources,localagriculturalandfisheryproducts,beachesfortourism,theancientcapitalMrauk-U,andthegasreserveinKyaukPhyu.HoweveronlytheelitescomingfromcentralMyanmarbenefitfromthese.Rakhineisverypoorandnotabletodevelopbecauseoftoomuchcentralisation.232

Finally,thoseinterviewednotedthattensionsbetween the Rakhine State parliament andthe central government have intensified

232Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).

80

resentmentwithintheArakanesecommunity,bolstering support for renewed Arakanesearmed struggle. These tensions will beexplored in greater detail as we examineArakanese perspectives on local governanceandvisionsforthefuture.TheExperienceofRohingyainRakhineStateThe preceding pages have provided a briefoverview of key historical experiencesidentified byArakanesemeeting participants,including narratives surrounding the manygrievancesthatledarmedstruggleinthepastand in the present-day. While these eventshave shaped narrativeswithin the Arakanesecommunity,itisimportanttonotethatalargeMuslim community has also lived in RakhineState. Segments of that community haveengaged in a long-standing struggle to gainrecognition for their own right to self-determination and citizenship. They havefaced discrimination, repeated waves ofviolence,anddisplacement.Indeed, although theKamanMuslimgroup isconsidered part of the broad Rakhine ethnicgroup,withrootsandhistoriesthatdatebackto the Arakan kingdom, sensitivities arisesurrounding theMuslim community that hasbeen present in northern Rakhine State andthat self-identifies as Rohingya. Note that, ingeneral, most meeting participants from theArakanese community (as well as meetingparticipants from other communities inMyanmar)donotusethetermRohingya.Thisarises from a concern that using the nameRohingya strengthens the group’s claim tocitizenship rights. Furthermore, Rohingya isnota term that isofficially recognisedby thegovernment of Myanmar. However, inkeepingwiththisreport’scommitmenttotheprinciples of self-determination and self-

identification, we will refer to non-KamanMuslimsfromRakhineStateasRohingya.TheRohingyaareoftenassociatedwithwavesof immigration that took place under theBritishaswell asmore recent immigration. Itis precisely the question of when and howmembersof theRohingyacommunityarrivedin Myanmar that has proven deeplycontroversial. There is deep disagreementabout whether or not this ethnic categoryshould be considered taingyintha, and, inturn,whetherornottheRohingyaareentitledtocitizenship,andtherights,protections,andprivilegesassociatedwithcitizenship.Again, the principle focus of this case studycomes from the perspectives of stakeholdersfrom the Arakanese community.233 However,inconsideringeventsthathavetakenplaceinRakhine State and their impactonArakanesecommunities, it is essential to note therepeatedwavesofpersecutionand insecuritythat Rohingya communities have had tonavigate. These have included the Nagaminoperation mentioned in Chapter 1, as wellmultiple instancesof intercommunal violenceoutlined in Chapter 3. Outbreaks of violencehave resulted in deaths, gender-basedviolence, and significant destruction anddisplacement.In2016,Myanmarsawtheemergenceof theArakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).234 Ayear later, in August 2017, ARSA attacks onpolice security posts provoked a heavy-

233Foramorein-depthanalysisofperspectivesfromtheRohingyacommunity,readersshouldconsult.TheRohingyas,byAzeemIbrahimandTheRohingyas:AShortAccountoftheirHistoryandCulture,byDr.AbdulKarim.234SeeMyanmar:ANewMuslimInsurgencyinRakhineState(Vol.283,AsiaReport).(2016).

81

handedresponsefromthemilitaryandpolice.Security forces carried out clearanceoperations reminiscent of the “four cuts”strategy imposed against ethnic nationalitycommunities in other parts of Myanmar,burning villages, destroying crops, andcarrying out widespread human rightsviolations.235As the result of Tatmadaw clearanceoperations, it is estimated that over720,000236 Rohingya refugees crossed theborder into Bangladesh. This report will notundertakean in-depthexaminationof eventsrelated to clearance operations that tookplace in northern Rakhine during 2017.237However, the final section of this case studywill take a closer look at the complexenvironment inwhich thoseeventsunfolded,and it is important to acknowledge theincidents aswe consider thebroader contextthat has shaped the lives of those from theArakanesecommunity.Experiences of Local Governance and VisionsfortheFutureWhen considering the experience of localgovernance, the Arakanese case offers anopportunitytoexplore issuesthatdiffer fromthose presented in the Kachin and Karen

235ForexampleseeBurma:MethodicalMassacreatRohingyaVillage,HundredsKilled,RapedinTulaToli,HumanRightsWatch,19December2017. 236TheUNRefugeeAgency(UNHCR)estimatesthatbyAugust2018over723,000RohingyarefugeeshadfledtoBangladesh.237ForamoredetailedlookatallegedhumanrightsviolationscommittedbythemilitaryandsecurityforcesinRakhineandotherpartsofMyanmar,readersshouldconsultTheUNIndependentInternationalFact-FindingMissiononMyanmar,27August2018.

cases. Neither of the two main Arakanesearmed groups – the ALP or the AA – controlterritoryorrunpublicadministrationsystems.Thiscontrastswiththeexperienceofthemainarmed group associated with the Kachincommunity (the KIO), and the main armedgroup associated with the Karen community(the KNU), and means there is no currentexperienceofgovernanceunderanArakaneseethnicarmedgroup.However,theArakanNationalParty(ANP)hasseenahighlevelofelectoralsuccess,withthemajority of seats in the Rakhine Stateparliament since 2015. As a result, theArakanese case provides an opportunity toexplore the opportunities and challengessurrounding the experience of local stategovernance in a context where an ethnicpolitical party is in the majority in the stateparliament.RakhineStateGovernanceandtheExperienceofElectoralPoliticsTheANPwasformedinMarch2014throughamerger between the Arakan League forDemocracy (ALD) and the RakhineNationalities Development Party (RNDP). Thenew party enjoyed a high level of support,producing the election victory in November2015.Infact,theANPwasthemostsuccessfulethnicpoliticalparty inMyanmar,winning62percent of the electable seats in theRakhineState parliament, the highest percentage ofanyethnicpoliticalparty runningat thestateor regional level.At theUnion level, theANPwon only two seats fewer than the military-backedUSDP in theAmyothaHluttaw (upperhouse of parliament), and the same numberof seats as the Shan Nationalities League forDemocracy (SNLD) in the Pyithu Hluttaw

82

(lower house of parliament).238 However, theANPfoundthattheirstrongelectoralshowingdidnotautomaticallytranslateintotheabilityto determine key developments in RakhineState.RelationsbetweentheNLD-ledgovernmentinNayPyiTawandtheANP-ledstatelegislaturegot off to a rocky start when the centralgovernment rejected the ANP’s proposal toselect theChiefMinister forRakhineState.239The choice by the Union government was inline with provisions in the 2008 Constitutionthat leave the appointment of state andregional state ministers up to the President.However, following elections in 2010, theThein Sein administration demonstrated adegree of sensitivity on this issue, consultingtheRakhineStatelegislature(thenheadedbyoneoftheANP’spredecessors, theRNDP)ontheappointment.240Asa result, therewasanexpectationthatsomeopeningwouldexistforthe ANP to influence the Chief Ministerdecisionfollowingthe2015election.The rejection of the ANP’s request andunilateralappointmentof theNLD’sUNyiPuas ChiefMinister provoked deep resentmentwithin the ANP and the broader Arakanesecommunity.Despite the fact thatUNyi Pu isethnic Rakhine, his non-affiliation with theANP was seen as a demonstration ofdisrespect by the NLD towards the winningparty. This only intensified when, despiteholding the majority in parliament, no ANP

238SeeState/RegionalHluttawResults:GraphicsinTheIrrawaddy,17November2015.239NotethatasimilarexperienceunfoldedinShanState,wheretheSNLDwonmoreseatsthantheNLDinthestatelegislature.240ANewDimensionofViolenceinMyanmar’sRakhineState(Vol.154,AsiaBriefing,Issuebrief).(2019)p.6.

representatives were included in the ChiefMinister’s cabinet. In an interview, a civilsociety representative with long experienceworking in Rakhine noted that this decisionreflected a surprising level of rigidity on thepart of the NLD as they assumed their newleadershiprole.241One meeting participant shared hisperspective on the situation in the stateparliament:

Self-determinationdoesnotmeansecession,itmeansbeingabletodothingslikenameyourownChiefMinister--thatisgenuinedemocracy,itisnotsecession,andthat’swhattheArakanesepeoplehavealwayswanted.242

BeyondthesetensionsinthestateparliamentbetweentheANPandtheNLD,eventsinearly2018 provoked deep anger in the Arakanesecommunity towards the central government.First, Dr Aye Maung, a popular politicalleader, was arrested on charges of unlawfulassociation and high treason after havingmadeaspeechthatencouragedArakanesetopursue greater sovereignty through armedstruggle.243 The speech was made as part ofeventscommemoratingthefalloftheArakankingdom, andwas followed by an event thathad been planned to take place inMrauk-U.Authorities from the General AdministrationDepartment rescinded the permit for theevent in Mrauk-U, and nine people died in

241Fieldnotes,Yangon(December2018).242Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).243NotethatinMarch2019,DrAyeMaungandauthorWaiHinAungweresentencedtotwentyyearsinprisonforhightreason.SeeAyeMaung,WaiHinAunghanded20-yearsentencesforhightreason,byYeMon,FrontierMyanmar,19March2019.

83

resulting clashes between protestors andpolice.244The arrest of Dr AyeMaung and subsequentdeadly clash reinforced grievanceswithin theArakanese community regarding the lack ofaccountability for local governmentadministration and the police. Thoseinterviewedsharedtheviewthatthiswastheproduct of Myanmar’s highly centralisedsystem, in which the GAD and police haveboth been under the control of themilitary-run Department of Home Affairs in Nay PyiTaw.245Onemeetingparticipantdescribedtheeventsthisway:

Everythingthathappenedrepresentsanabuseofpowerbythecentralauthorities--theUniongovernment,thepolice,theGAD--againstaminorityethnicgroup.246

Whileanumberofflashpointsoftensionhaveerupted between the Union-level NLD-ledgovernment and the state-level ANP-ledparliament, there have been some notableinstances in which the ANP has beensuccessfulinusingitspositioninparliamenttopushforsmallvictories. Inonecase, theANPtooka leadershiprole inthe impeachmentofan NLD-appointed member of the RakhineState cabinet who was forced to resign. TheresignationoftheNLD-appointedMinisterforPlanningandFinance,UMinAung,cameafter

244SeeRakhinepoliticalleaderDrAyeMaungarrestedinSittweafterMrauk-Uviolence,byNyanHlaingLynn,Frontier,18January2018.245Notethatattheendof2018theNLD-ledgovernmentinitiatedaprocesstomovetheGADfrombeingunderthecontroloftheDepartmentofHomeAffairs.Atthetimeofwritingthischangeisstillinprocessanditisunclearwhatimpactthechangewillhave.246Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2019).

he submitted a draft budget for the 2018-19fiscal year without consulting state-levelparliamentarians. Following complaints bynearlytwo-thirdsofstate legislators,theANPSpeakerofParliament setupa committee toinvestigate, resulting in the dismissal of theminister.247 One of the members of theinvestigationpanelwasquotedassaying:

They[thecentralgovernment]shouldnotethattheycannotdowhatevertheywantwithoutdiscussingwiththe[state]parliament.Welawmakersneedtoknowaboutthedevelopmentprojectstobemoreeffective,asweknowmoreabouttheneedsofpeoplewearerepresentingandwearedealingwithpeopleontheground…Rakhineisdifferentfromotherstates.Inotherstates,therulinggovernmentcandoastheywishbecauseparliamentisdominatedbytheNLD….248

Laterin2018,theANPuseditsplatformatthethird session of the 21st Century PanglongPeace Conference to criticise elements ofgovernmentpolicytowardsRakhineState.TheVice-Chair of the ANP did not mince words,highlighting the experience of unevendevelopment and what she described as“heavy-handed control and pooradministration,”beforegoingontoemphasisethepovertyandarmedconflictbeingfacedbymany states and regions.249 The statementgenerated a strong reaction from those whofeltthatthecriticismhadgonetoofar.Atthe

247SeeABitterBudgetBattleinRakhineStateDragsOn,byMoeMyint,TheIrrawaddy,21March2018.248SeeRakhineministersackedfornotperformingduties,byEiEiToeLwin,MyanmarTimes,3January2018.249SeeANPViceChairdeliversaddressat21stCenturyPanglong3rdSession,TheGlobalNewLightofMyanmar,12July2018.

84

same time, it was successful in drawingattention to the perspectives that manyArakanese hold regarding governance by thecentralgovernment.Visions for the Future - self-determination,autonomy,andpoliticallegitimacyTheprecedingpageshaveoutlinedarangeofgrievancesandfrustrationsraisedbymeetingparticipants from the Arakanese community.Thesehaveincludedthehistoricalsubjugationof the Arakan kingdomduring the era of theKonbaung dynasty; the experience ofeconomic exclusion; the blocking of ALPeffortstoconveneaRakhinepoliticaldialoguebythecentralgovernmentandtheTatmadaw;the limitations placed on the ANP despite itsmajority inthestateparliament;andongoingrestrictionsandperceivedinjusticeasaresultof centralised and militarised control ofinstitutionssuchastheGADandthepolice.Together,theseexperienceshavecontributedto a strong sense among many within theArakanese community that they lack theability to control and determine importantaspectsof theirown lives. Indiscussions, thisnarrative is often articulated in highlyethnicised terms, as injustices are frequentlydescribed as being carried out by the Bamarmajority’s use of different tools of statecontrol.Given this context, it is not surprising that,when sharing their visions for the future,meeting participants from the Arakanesecommunity focused on the importance ofautonomy and self-determination.Furthermore, those interviewed frequentlyemphasised that the best path to achievingautonomy and self-determination would betheadoptionoffederalism.

When reflecting further on what a futureunder a federal system would look like,stakeholders from the Arakanese communityemphasised the need for public policy to bedeveloped at the state level and saw this asthe best avenue to genuinely address thesocioeconomic hardships experienced inRakhine State. Also, those interviewedadvocated resource sharing and local controlof income from economic developmentprojects as strategies that could liftcommunities inRakhineStateoutofpoverty.Reflecting on the future, one meetingparticipantexplained:

Inthefuture,weexpectmorepowersharing.Thecentralgovernmentwouldretainpowerondeference,military,andforeignpolicy,buttherestwouldbedeferredtothestatelevelsothatit[eachstate]willbeabletomanageitsownresourcesandboostitslegislativecapacity.Thereshouldbemoredevolutionofpowers,lesscentralisation.Currentpower-sharingarrangementsintheConstitutionareverylimiting.250

Finally, meeting participants frequentlyemphasised the importance of the groupsrepresenting theArakanesecommunitybeingtreated with respect by the centralgovernment. Indeed, the focus on autonomyandself-determinationwasoftenportrayedasbeing an issue of respect, and it was oftenconcluded that constraints facing the ALP inthe peace process, or the ANP in the stateparliament, were a manifestation ofdisrespect.Furthermore, the need for respectwas oftendescribed interchangeably with the

250Fieldnotes,Sittwe(November2018).

85

importance of political legitimacy, andconversations aboutpolitical legitimacyoftenledmeetingparticipantstonotetheperceivedconnection between political legitimacy andterritory. One community leader pointed outthatbeingabletoreturntoRakhineStateandcontrol territory has been a long-heldobjective of multiple Arakanese armedgroups, but thatnoneupuntil this pointhadbeen successful. He went on to explain thatcurrenteffortsbytheAAtogaincontroloverterritory in Rakhine State251 are seen as anessential prerequisite to gaining recognitionandpoliticallegitimacy–notintheeyesoftheArakanese community (recent media articleshave asserted that support for theAAwithinthe Arakanese community is alreadystrong),252 but from the wider Myanmarcommunity:

IftheAAisabletocontrolterritory,theTatmadaw,NLD,andotheractorsassociatedwiththecentralgovernmentandthemajorityBamarcommunitywillhavetorecognisethattheAAisalegitimateactorfightingonthebehalfoftheArakanesepeople.Onceyoucontrolterritory,youcannotbeignored.TheTatmadawwillhavetoallowtheAAintothepeaceprocessandlistentothevoicesoftheArakanesecommunity.253

251Notethatatpeacetalksbetweenthegovernment’sNationalReconciliationandPeaceCentre(NRPC)andtheAAinMarch2019,arepresentativeofthepoliticalwingoftheAA,theUnitedLeagueofArakan(ULA),statedthattheestablishmentofabaseinRakhineStatewasagoaloftheAA.FormoredetailsseeGovt,eightarmedgroupsatloggerheadsoverAAbase,byHtooThant,MyanmarTimes,22March2019.252Forexample,seeAnalysis:ArakanArmy-APowerfulNewThreattotheTatmadaw,TheIrrawaddy,8January2019.253Fieldnotes,Sittwe(August2018).

This association between territory andpolitical legitimacy echoes the criteria forpolitical legitimacy outlined in Chapter 2 –beyond a group’s population size, the otherkey elements associated with politicallegitimacy were the ability of a group toarticulate a historical narrative (also animportant focuswithintheArakanesegroup),and its association with physical territory.When thinking about the future, many ofthose interviewedasserted that theabilityoftheAA(oranyotherArakanesearmedgroup)tocontrolterritorywasanecessaryingredientto produce the legitimacy needed to join awidernationalconversation.254

Finally,anumberofcommunityleadersnotedthat the achievement of autonomy and self-determination,aswellasrespectandpoliticallegitimacy, are goals that are being pursuedsimultaneously throughthreedifferentpaths:electoral politics, participation in the peaceprocess, and armed struggle. However, theyalso noted that efforts to work through thepeace process and electoral politics have runintoroadblocks,makingthestrategyofarmedstruggleallthemorecompelling.255

254Fieldnotes,Sittwe(August2018).255Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).

86

Expanding the Narrative Surrounding theCrisisinRakhineTheprecedingsectionsofthiscasestudyhaveoutlinedkeyaspectsofthecurrentArakaneseexperienceas sharedbymeetingparticipantsthrough consultations and interviews during2017 and 2018. Beyond these reflections,meetingparticipantsalsosharedviewsontheeventsof2017thatproducedamassoutflowofrefugeestoBangladesh.Thelastsectionofthis case studywill take a new look at thoseevents, with views and analysis shared bymembersoftheArakanesecommunityasourdeparturepoint.Thisre-examinationofthosetragic events offers the opportunity tobroadenthenarrativefromasingularfocusonthe serious human rights violations andatrocitiescommittedagainsttheRohingya, toone that includes underlying economic,political,andsecurityconcernsthathavebeenoften omitted as the result of a simplifiednarrative focused on ethnic and religiousconflict.In expanding theboundaries surrounding thedominantaccountofevents in2017, it isnotthe intention of the research team tominimise the gravity of violations committedby security forces against Rohingyacommunities. Observers such as Selth havepointedoutthatactionscarriedoutfollowingthe ARSA attacks emerged out of deep-heldand widespread animosity towards theRohingya community. He points out that theTatmadaw’sseniorleadershiphaslongseenaneed to address the presence of inhabitantswho they view as “not native”, and thatassuming the role as “the defenders of thecountry’smajorityBuddhistculture”provideda helpful justification for clearance

operations.256 However, Arakanese meetingparticipants emphasised that additionalfactors, beyond pervasive anti-Rohingyasentiment, served to intensify the 2017clearanceoperations.To broaden our field of view, this reportwillfocus on two related factors that wererepeatedlyhighlightedthroughinterviewsandconsultations. First, we will consider recentdevelopments around large-scale economicdevelopment projects in Rakhine State.Second, we will look at increasedmilitarisationininthestate.Large-scaleEconomicDevelopmentinRakhineStateA closer look at Rakhine State reveals acomplex backdrop of economic interests andgeopolitics. Despite the fact that Rakhine isone of the poorest and least developedregions in Myanmar, it is a major focus ofinvestment from a variety of foreign actors.Stakeholders from the Arakanese communityand observers have noted that in order totrulyunderstandthecomplexitiessurroundingthe events of 2017 and the current securitysituation in Rakhine state, it is necessary toexamine large-scale economic developmentactivitiesinthestate.In terms of foreign direct investment, bothChina and India have recently launchedsignificant large-scale development initiativesin Rakhine State. Through its Belt and RoadInitiative (BRI), China aims to vastly increasethe infrastructure and networks supportingtrade flows between China, Europe, Africa,and other parts of Asia. Within this plan,Rakhine State represents an important 256SeeSelth,A.(2018).Myanmar’sArmedForcesandtheRohingyaCrisis.p.16.

87

strategic node. Likewise, India’s Kaladan-Multi-Modal Transport Project focuses onpromoting transportation across the Bay ofBengaltoIndia’snortheast.Within China’s BRI,Myanmar holds a uniqueposition,asitfindsitselfattheintersectionofinitiatives linking the Middle East, Europe,Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia withChina’s landlocked southwest border ofYunnan. With a long stretch of coastline,Rakhine State is seen as having particulargeostrategic importance within BRI plans.Several large-scale infrastructure projects arelocated, or originate, in Rakhine State andrepresent key aspects of the initiative. Theseincluded the China-Myanmar Oil and GasPipeline, the Kyauk Phyu Special EconomicZone, and the Chinese-Myanmar EconomicCorridor.The China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelineserves as a conduit for both gas reservesfound off the coast of Rakhine and crude oilfrom the Middle East to reach Yunnan insouthwestChina.InYunnan,therawmaterialsprovided via the pipeline play a vital role insupplying a newly constructed petrochemicalfacility located outside the Yunnan capital ofKunming. One observer noted that thepetrochemical plant, in operation since April2017, represents the largest single economicproject in Yunnan and the facility’s successdepends on a steady supply of energyresources, particularly crude oil, via thepipelinefromRakhine.257This transportation corridor is also ofgeopolitical significance, as it facilitates theability of China to access vital energy

257SeeOncecontroversialoilrefinerytoopeninYunnanthismonth,byPatrickScally,GoKunming,5June2017.

resources without having to rely on shippingthrough the Strait of Malacca. Without theoverland pipeline via Rakhine, the Strait ofMalacca is the shortest route for shipping toChina from Africa and the Middle East.However, observers have pointed out thatChinawouldliketoavoidhavingtorelysolelyon transportation via the chokepoint of theStrait.Geostrategic considerationshave likelyled China to seek out the alternative route;analystsnote that theStrait couldpotentiallybeobstructedbyanavalblockade,andpiracyisalsoanissue.258For Myanmar, revenue associated with thepipelineislinkedwiththequantityofoiltobetransported plus an annual fee of USD13.81million. Given the pipeline’s capacity(estimated tobeable to transport justunder0.5 percent of global oil demand), potentialannualincometotheMyanmargovernmentissubstantial.259In addition to Rakhine State serving as thegatewayfortransportationofnaturalgasandcrude oil to China’s southwest, China andMyanmarhavealsoagreedonconstructionofa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) including anindustrial park and deep-sea port in KyaukPhyu,Rakhine State. Following an agreementreached in November 2018, phased work onthedeep-seaportwassettobegin.Thedeep-seaportwill formpartofChina’s access to a

258SeeTheGeopoliticsofRakhine,byAnnabellHeugas,Mizzima,6November2017,andSecuringtheEnergySupply:China’s“MalaccaDilemma”,byMatthewCaesar-Gordon,E-InternationalRelations,26February2016.259SeeThisChina-Myanmaroilpipelinewillchangetheglobaloilmarket,byDaveForest,BusinessInsider,5February2015,andShwegasfieldandpipeline,Myanmar,EnvironmentalJusticeAtlas,availableathttps://ejatlas.org/conflict/shwe-gas-field-and-pipeline

88

strategicportnetworkknownasthe“StringofPearls.”AlongsidetheChina-MyanmarOilandGas pipeline, it is predicted that the KyaukPhyu project will generate further billions inannual GDP growth for Myanmar andsignificant tax revenue for the Myanmargovernment.260In November 2017, as part of China’s widerBRI, ChinaandMyanmarannouncedplans toestablish the Chinese-Myanmar EconomicCorridor (CMEC). Thecorridor laysoutaplanfor construction of roads and a high-speedrailway to connect Kunming with Mandalay,Yangon, and Kyauk Phyu. It also anticipatesgreater connectivity through economicintegration.Amemorandumofunderstandingpaving theway for CMEC-associated projectsto move forward was signed in September2018. It is estimated that the initiatives willresult in tens of billions of dollars worth ofChineseinvestmentinMyanmar.261Not to be left behind, India has also securedthe right to undertake amajor infrastructureproject through construction of the KaladanMultimodal Transportation project. Theproject involves building a network ofwaterway and highway linkages that willconnectshippingtransportationfromKolkata,India, across the Bay of Bengal, through

260SeeMyanmarnegotiatingwithChineseconsortiumondeep-seaportprojectinwesternstate,Xinhua,8July2018,MyanmaragreessmallerdealforChina-backedportafter'debt-trap'concern,byThuThuAung,SimonLewis,Reuters,8November2018,andStringofPearls–TheworldisworriedaboutChina’smilitaryambitions,Belt&RoadNews,21January2019.261SeeThegrandplanfortheChina-MyanmarEconomicCorridor,byClareHammond,FrontierMyanmar,26September2018,andGov’tSignsMoUwithBeijingtoBuildChina-MyanmarEconomicCorridor,byNanLwin,inTheIrrawaddy,13September,2018.

Rakhine and Chin States, and into southernMizoram State in India’s northeast. Theproject is part of India’s “Act East Policy”which,inanefforttobalanceChina’sgrowingrole, seeks to build close ties between Indiaand other countries in Southeast Asia.Furthermore, India has also matched China’sinvestmentintheKyaukpyuSEZbybackinganadditional SEZ in Sittwe, just north of KyaukPyu, and connected to the KaladanMultimodalproject.262Inadditiontohigh-profilemegaprojectsbeingcarried out jointly between the centralgovernment and neighbouring countries, thecentralgovernmenthas launchedavarietyofsmaller initiatives aimed at boostinginvestment from outside sources. InNovember 2017, the NLD-appointed RakhineState Minister for Planning and Finance, UKyaw Aye Thein (successor to impeachedminister U Min Aung), invited investors to abriefing on investment opportunities inRakhine State, including the Kanyin Chaungeconomic zone being developed inMaungdaw, close to the Myanmar borderwithBangladesh.263Similarly,StateCounsellorDawAungSanSuuKyispokewithinvestorsatthe Rakhine State Investment Fair held inFebruary 2019. The event served to highlightprojects in Sittwe and Mrauk-U in northern

262SeeMizoram-MyanmarKaladanroad,byPratimRanjanBose,TheHinduBusinessLine,17April2018,WhyIndiaIsn’tReally‘ActingEast’inMyanmar,byJonathanTai,TheDiplomat,15July2017,Myanmar,IndiaAppointOperatorforSittwePortProject,byNanLwin,TheIrrawaddy,26October2018,andIndiaplanningtosetupSEZinMyanmar'sSittwe,byDipanjanRoyChaudhury,TheEconomicTimes,2August2016.263SeeInvestmentopportunitiesemergeinKanyinChaungeconomiczone,byChanMyaHtwe,MyanmarTimes,3November2017,andMaungdawKanyinchaungeconomiczonetoreceiveupgrade:RakhineChief,ElevenMyanmar,15February2019.

89

Rakhine, as well as Ngapali and Man AungIsland further south.264 Both events wereframed as opportunities to bring economicgrowthtoRakhine.However,oneRakhineobservernotedthat:

Withoutreformsonresourcesharing,thegreatestbenefitsfromeconomicdevelopmentandinvestmentswillgotobenefitNayPyiTaw.Also,therewillbesignificantimplicationsbecauseinthe

264SeeDawAungSanSuuKyiPitchesInvestorsonRakhineState,byNanLwin,TheIrrawaddy,22February2019.

currentcontext,highlevelsofmilitarisationwillbeneededtoprovidesecurityrequiredtokeepinvestmentssafe.265

Thisbriefoverviewoutlinesonly someof thebiggest projects and investment initiativesunderway. Some of these projects are basedentirely in Rakhine State. Others only runpartiallythroughthestate,butdependontheaccess that Rakhine provides to the IndianOceanandtherestoftheworld.

265Fieldnotes,Sittwe(December2018).

90

The projects represent a tremendousinvestmentonthepartofforeigncommercialinterests, and a significant source of currentand future revenue for Myanmar businessinterests and the Myanmar government. Assuch, Rakhine State has come to occupy aplace of strategic importance for actors bothoutside and inside Myanmar. In thisenvironment, thesafetyof these investmentsand anticipated revenue depends on securityandstabilityinRakhineState,aswellasotherpartsofMyanmarIncreasedMilitarisationinRakhineStateIn light of concerns regarding security, anumber of those interviewed noted thatRakhine State has seen a significant increasein deployment of Tatmadaw troops.Meetingparticipants frequently shared observationsaboutthe increasednumberofmilitarybasesand patrols in their own communities,particularlyinnorthernRakhine.266A study by Security Force Monitor trackeddeployment of Tatmadaw units to RakhineState during the period of 2015-2018. Theirfindings confirm observations by meetingparticipants. Using open source data, thereport documents a substantial increase inTatamadaw battalions and command centresin the townships of northern Rakhine.Accordingtothereport,duringthethree-yearperiod, Sittwe and Kyaukphyu each sawincreaseddeploymentoftwoTatmadawunits;Mrauk-U and Minbya, which had notpreviouslyhostedunits,eachsawanincreaseof five units; Kyauktaw, which had notpreviously hosted units, saw an increase ofseven units; Maungdaw and Buthidaung,which had previously hosted 22 units and 19

266Fieldnotes,Sittwe(August2018).

units respectively, each saw an increase ofsevenunits.267WhiletheTatmadawoftenportraysincreasedmilitarisation in northern Rakhine State asmotivatedbyconcernaboutthethreatposedby ARSA and Muslim extremism, thoseinterviewedwerescepticalofthisexplanation.Instead, they pointed to AA aspirations toestablish bases and territorial control inRakhine State as prompting the increasedTatmadaw deployment. They noted that,geographically,northernRakhineisastrategicentry points for the AA. Those interviewedwereoftheviewthatitis,infact,theAAthatis perceived as the primary security threat,particularly in light of large-scale investmentanddevelopmentprojectsthatareplannedorunderwayinRakhine.TheynotedthattheAAis well equipped with arms supplied from avariety of sources, and that AA recruitmenthas been highly successful, observations thathave been supported through mediacoverage.268 Given these factors, meetingparticipants concluded that the centralgovernment and the Tatmadaw see the AA,and its aspiration to control territory, as thegreatestsecurityriskinnorthernRakhine.OneArakanesecommunityleadernoted:

InstabilitycouldhappenacrossRakhineState,butneverinareaswherelarge-scaleinvestmentsare.Thegovernmentwillmakesuretheseareasareprotected.Buttodosomeansbeingabletokeepthe

267SeeThestructureandoperationsoftheMyanmarArmyinRakhineState:Areviewofopensourceevidence.(2018). 268SeeAnalysis:ArakanArmy-APowerfulNewThreattotheTatmadaw,TheIrrawaddy,9January2019.

91

AAfromgainingground.Thisrequiresabigmilitarypresence.269

TakingaNewLookattheEventsof2017Over the course of informal conversations, anumberofmeetingparticipantsexpressedtheviewthattheeventsof2017–whichfocusedattention inside and outside the country onthe perceived threat of violent Islamicextremism taking root in Myanmar, and thedisproportional response of the Tatmadawthat followed ARSA attacks – were in fact adiversion that directed scrutiny away fromotherdynamicstakingplaceinRakhineState.According to the analysis of thoseinterviewed, this diversion functioned bycreating a sense of heightened fear andanxiety among those living in Rakhine Stateand inMyanmarmorebroadly. This fear andanxietycentredonthepotentialthreatposedby outsiders – the outsiders being bothmembers of the Rohingya community (whoare widely perceived as being illegalimmigrants from Bangladesh), and radicalIslamic forces from outside the region whoweresaidtobesupportingARSA.Meetingparticipantspointedout that, in thiscontext of heightened insecurity, increaseddeploymentofTatmadawforceswas justifiedbyclaimsthatitwasaprotectivemeasure.Asaresult,theTatmadawsubstantiallyincreasedits presence in an area of the countrywheresignificant economic development projectswere either planned or taking place, andwhere renewed armed struggle with the AAhad emerged as a major threat to thoseprojects.

269FieldNotes,Sittwe(December2018).

Furthermore, those interviewed were of theopinion that the ARSA attacks provided anopportunity for authorities to use perceivedthreatsfromoutsidetotrytoforgeunityandfuel a sense of patriotism towards theUnionofMyanmar.ThiswasakeyprioritywithintheTatmadaw as support within the ArakanesecommunityforarmedstruggleandtheAAwason the rise. Interviewees felt that theTatmadawhadhoped the crisiswould createan upsurge of loyalty within the Arakanesecommunity and slow the AA’s rate ofrecruitment. One meeting participantsummarisedthesituation:

RememberthatthemilitaryclearanceinnorthernRakhineagainstARSAhappenedwhentheAAwasalsofightingtheTatmadawattheborderofnorthernRakhine.TheTatmadawwaslosingthebattleagainsttheAAandneededfurtherdeploymentofsoldiers.TheclearanceoperationswereinfactastrategytopreventAAfrominfiltratingRakhinestate.ARSAandtheRohingyawereaconvenientexcusetobuildupTatmadawforcesandpreventreinforcementstotheAAinsideRakhine.270

Accordingtosomemeetingparticipants,then,therehadbeenadeliberatestrategytofosteranxiety within the Arakanese communityabout the threat posed by the Rohingyacommunity and ARSA. They noted that thiswas a strategy that has been employedfrequently during Myanmar’s history,highlighting instances when General Ne Winused the same approach as he undertookmilitary operations against ethnic nationalityforces. Indeed, the events of 2017 provide avivid illustration of how a focus on ethnic

270FieldNotes,Sittwe(December2018).

92

categories and the narrative that outsidersposeathreatcanbemanipulatedforpoliticalpurposes.Thus,somemeetingparticipantsbelievedthattheeventsof2017playedtotheTatmadaw’saimsofrevivingthesiegementality,divertingcommunity support for theAA, and directingattentionofdomesticstakeholdersawayfromother developments in Rakhine State.Participants further noted that the approachof the international community to frame theevents of 2017 in terms of a human rightscrisis had vastly oversimplified complexities.They lamented that international actors hadadopted this overly simplistic perspectivewhile failing to incorporate an understandingof broader dynamics. As a result, mostinternational media coverage andengagement by international actors saw theevents of 2017 as a unidimensional storyabout mass atrocity crimes, humanitariancrisis, and the need for accountability.Analysis from the international level includedlittle mention of the aspirations within theArakanese community for increasedautonomy, self-determination, and politicallegitimacy, the large-scale economicdevelopmentprojectsplannedorunderwayinnorthern Rakhine, or the fact that increasedmilitarisation has served a dual purpose ofboth carrying out anti-Rohingya clearanceoperations andopposingAAefforts to gain afootholdinRakhineState.Also, some meeting participants regrettedthat the overly simplified view of eventsproduced a polarised environment that leftlittle space for actors within Rakhine toacknowledge or share stories about positivelinkagesandrelationshipsbetweenArakaneseandRohingyacommunities.Theypointedoutthat,likeanyothercommunity,theArakanese

community is not monolithic and greatvariation exists in terms of attitudes andrelationshipswithRohingyaneighbours.Sadly,thisdiversityof viewshasbeen lost inmediareports that painted all Arakanese asharbouring deep hatred towards theirRohingyaneighbours.EngagingComplexRootCausesIn the wake of the deadly clearanceoperations in 2017, many observers haveemphasisedtheneedtomovebeyondafocuson symptoms toadeeperunderstandingandresponse to root causes.271 Likewise, somemeeting participants from the Arakanesecommunity emphasised the importance ofdeveloping an analysis that goes beyondunderstanding the situationofRakhine todaysolelyasahumanrightscrisis.Theyurgedthatactors from inside and outside the countryfind ways to expand the narrative toencompassadditionalaspectsofcomplexity.Those interviewed highlighted the need forperspectives of the Arakanese community,including long-held grievances towards thecentral state, and aspirations for autonomy,self-determination, andpolitical legitimacy tobecarefullyconsidered.Furthermore, they emphasised that anyanalysisshouldexaminethewaysthatcentralgovernmentandTatmadawprioritiesstandinopposition to the aspirations of many withintheArakanesecommunity.Onthesideofthecentral governmentand theTatmadaw,mainprioritieswereseenasmaximisingincome(aswell as rents) associated with large-scale

271Forexample,seeBreakingthedeadlockinRakhine,byMyoSannAung,FrontierMyanmar,11February2019.

93

economic development projects, providingrevenueneededtomeetavarietyofcentrally-determined priorities. The Arakanesecommunity identified different priorities: theneed to improve living standards, theimportance of shifting towards governancestructures that are responsive andaccountable to local communities, and theneed for state leaders to control the statebudget. They noted that these opposingaspirations have pitted the centralgovernment and the Tatmadaw, with theirfocusonmaintainingthestabilityandsecuritynecessary to attract foreign investment,against Arakanese actors that are pursuingappropriate local development, autonomy,self-determination,andpoliticallegitimacy.In this complex context,meeting participantsstressed that the Rakhine State narrativeneeds to move beyond an overly simplisticfocus on ethnic and religious identity (andwhat itmeans tobe taingyintha). Instead, itneeds to be broadened to include significantdynamics related to large-scale economicdevelopment,andmilitarisationinthefaceofsecurity threats. They acknowledged thatwhile ultranationalist sentiment againstMuslim communities in Rakhine (and otherparts of the country) has deepened sinceintercommunal riots that took place inRakhine during 2012, a diversity ofperspectives still exists within the Arakanesecommunity.Meetingparticipantsemphasisedthat positive relationship between theArakanese and Rohingya do continue, andtheserelationshipsneedtobeincorporatedaspart of the more nuanced narrative onRakhineState.Those interviewed explained that only bygreatly expanding the narrative surroundingevents in Rakhine State,would it be possible

to genuinely understand the clearanceoperations that took place in 2017 and tobegin to address their complex root causes.They noted that without a thoroughexamination that engages those root causes,achieving a long-term resolution wouldremainelusive.

94

CASESTUDYTheCaseofKarenIdentity

The Karen community is associated with avariety of locations and topographies insoutheast Myanmar. These include thedenselyforestedandremotehillsthatextendalong the border between Myanmar andThailand, all the way to the lowlands of theAyeyawady Delta. Karen communities areassociated with present day Kayin State, butare also associated with Mon State andAyeyawady, eastern Bago, Tanintharyi, andYangon Regions. There are also many Karenliving in Shan State, and in northwestThailand.

Karen, like the term Kachin, is an exonymapplied to a number of related groups. In1989, the military government changed theofficialnameoftheethnicgroupandthestatefromKarento“Kayin”–atermthatisrejectedby many within the community. In keepingwith the practice used thus far, and out ofrespectfortheprinciplesofself-identificationandself-determinationthisreportwillusetheterm “Karen” in reference to the people.

Whenconsideringeventsthattookplacepriorto 1989, this reportwill refer to Karen State,andtoKayinStatewhenmakingreferencetothegeographicalunitsince1989.The following case study provides anopportunity to consider perspectives frommembers of the Karen community living inHpa’an, Mae Sot, and Yangon. Following abrief overview of Karen identity, this casestudywill take a closer look at key historicalexperiences from the Karen communityincluding the many years of armed struggleledby theKNU, theemergenceof theDKBA,and the more recent experience ofparticipating in the Myanmar peace processand becoming an NCA signatory. Resting onthe foundation of this historical background,the case study will look more closely atgovernance experiences in Myanmar’ssoutheast and consider how these haveinformed aspirations for the future, includinga desire to achieve equality, protection,autonomyand self-determination. Finally,wewill concludebyconsideringanumberofkeyopportunitiesandchallengesthathavearisenasaresultofKarenparticipationinthepeaceprocess, particularly as they relate to Karenethnicidentity.KarenIdentityIn the context of this report, Karen ethnicidentityisofparticularinterestasitchallengesone of the themes outlined in Chapter 2. Anexamination of perspectives from the Karencommunity reveals that the assumption thatcommunitiesarehomogeneousandidentityisfixed is a deeply flawed supposition. Instead,the Karen case demonstrates that Myanmarcommunities are often remarkablyheterogeneous and that ethnic identityremainshighlyfluid.It istruethatsomeKarencommunitiesliveinsmall,fairlyhomogeneousvillagesinthehills.Some live in remote, forested andmountainous areas – which are often highlyconflict-affected–andtendtopractice forms

95

of subsistence livelihoods. However, manyKaren are scattered and mixed withcommunitiesofotheridentitiesandlocatedina wide range of different geographicalsettings. Thus, Karen communities in theAyeyawady Delta and other lowland areashave long been integrated into the broaderMyanmar society. Furthermore, while KayinStateisassociatedwiththeKarencommunity,it is estimated that only a relatively smallpercentage of the Karen community liveswithin Kayin State.272 Thus, the situation ofKaren communities varies widely and manyhave the experience of living inheterogeneous settings. Many meetingparticipants noted this reality as theyreflectedontheirownlifeexperiences:

Yes,IcomefromToungooinBagoRegion.ThisisreallytheheartoftheKarenpeople,butKarenpeopleliveeverywhere.SomeKarenliveupinthemountains,othersliveintheDeltaandareneighbourswithBamarpeople.Maybe[some]Karenpeopledon’tevenspeakKaren–theyspeakBamar,justliketheirneighbours.ButtheyarestillKaren.273

The Karen case also illustrates the way thatethnic identity remains fluid and can changeover time depending on social, political, oreconomic circumstances. This wasdemonstrated most clearly when meetingparticipants reflected on the emergence ofKarenni and Pa’O identities. In the Karennicase,meeting participants explained that theKayah, Kayan, Kayaw, Kawyaw, Geba, Paku,and Yintale groups (mostly located to thenorth, in Kayah State) used to bepart of thewider Karen family but they acknowledgedthat this identity has now shifted. This isreflected in writing on the Karenni group,whichnotesthatovertimethesegroupstookon aspects of the Shan Sawbwa politicalsystem, making them distinct from otherKarengroupstothesouth.Theresultwasthe 272SeeSouth,A.(2011).Burma’sLongestWar,AnatomyoftheKarenConflictp.10.273Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

emergence of the Karenni political identity,whichwasrecognisedbytheBritishduringthecolonialperiod,andreceiveddesignationasadistinctstateunderthe1947Constitution(thename was then changed to Kayah State in1951,amovethat,tothisday,provokesdeepresentment among many from the Karennicommunity).274TheevolutionofadistinctKarenniidentity,aswell as Pa’O identity, was widelyacknowledged in conversations withmeetingparticipantsinHpa’an,MaeSot,andYangon:

Ohyes,wesharemanythingswiththeKarenniandthePa’O-actually,weallcomefromthesamegroup.ButnowthegroupsinKarenniState,andthePa’OinShanState,theyhavetheirownidentitybecausethereareimportantwaysthattheyaredifferent.Thisisnotaproblemandiswidelyaccepted.275

In terms of language, there are a number ofrelatedKareniclanguagesanddialects.Amongperhaps a dozen Karen dialects, the mostcommonareSgawandPwo.Sgawisgenerallyassociated with Christian communities andupland animists. Pwo tends to be associatedwith lowland Buddhist communities.However, there are many exceptions to thisgeneralisation.Furthermore, while it is often assumed thatmost Karen are Christian, this is amisconception. Authors such as South havepointed out that Sgaw-Christian identity hasplayed a central role in the Karen nationalistmovement,andKareneliteshavemostlybeenSgawChristians,whohistoricallyhaveenjoyedbetter access to education and other 274SeeKramer,T.,Russell,O.,&Smith,M.(2018).FromWartoPeaceinKayah(Karenni)State,ALandattheCrossroadsinMyanmarpp.12-16. 275Fieldnotes,Hpa’an(May2018)andYangon(December2018).NotethattheviewsaboutthedistinctionbetweenKaren,Karenni,andPa’Oidentitieswerewidelyshared,however,disagreementexistedaboutexactgroupclassification.

96

resources through close relationships withChristian missionaries. However, the footsoldiers within the Karen National LiberationArmy (KNLA) have tended to be Buddhist-Pwo.276 Indeed, Buddhists, as well as asignificantnumberofanimists,arethoughttoconstitute a majority of the Karencommunity.277This brief overview highlights some keyaspects of Karen identity including the waythat the Karen experience challenges theassumption that communities arehomogeneous and ethnic identity is fixed. Italso reveals sources of diversity within theKaren community emanating from languageandreligiousaffiliation.HistoricalBackgroundAccording to South, a self-conscious Karennational identity began to emerge in thenineteenth century among Christian eliteswith close connections to Christianmissionaries. This was supported throughpublication of the Karen-language MorningStarnewspaperin1842and,fortyyearslater,the formation of the Karen NationalAssociation(KNA).278Historians note that, from the perspective ofthe Bamar majority, Karen elites weredisproportionately privileged under colonialrule. They were favoured for a range ofadministrative positions in the colonialbureaucracy including within the army, thepolice,andinthefieldofeducation.279Bythe1920s-30s, a growing sense of resentmenttowards the Karen had emerged within theBamarnationalistmovement.280 276SeeSouth,A.(2011).Burma’sLongestWar,AnatomyoftheKarenConflictp.10.277SeeJolliffe,K.(2016).Ceasefires,GovernanceandDevelopment;TheKarenNationalUnioninTimesofChange(Vol.16,PolicyDialogueBriefSeries)p.2.278South,A.(2007)p.58. 279GraversinTønnesson,S.,&Antlöv,H.(1996)p.243.280South,A.(2008)p.12.

Efforts to strengthen a pan-Karen identityintensified prior to the Second World War,with the KNA successfully advocating forKarenrepresentationaspartofreformstotheparliament for Ministerial Burma. Also, in1928,aprominentKaren,DrSanC.Po,madea proposal for creation of an autonomousKaren area. However, as noted in Chapter 1,theSecondWorldWarsawBamarresentmenttowards the Karen play out with tragicconsequenceswhenthenewlyformedBIAre-entered Burma committing mass atrocitycrimes against Karen communities in thesoutheast.Graversnotesthat:

ChristianandAnimistSgawaswellasPwoKarenswerekilled,andthisethnicviolencebecamedeeplyingrainedinthehistoricmemoriesoffutureKarengenerations.TothemajorityoftheKarentheatrocitiesconfirmedthereasoningbehindKarenautonomyasanationasopposedtotheBurmannation.281

At the close of the war, vague assurancesfrom the British that autonomy for groupssuch as the Karen and the Kachin would beprotected fell by the wayside. In the case ofthe Karen,Gravers points out that they “hadremained loyal to the British during theJapanese occupation. In all, the Karen hadreason to believe that they qualified for aparticular attention from their retiringmasters.”282 However, these plans wereabandoned as Aung San and his nationalistcolleagues pushed for a fastermove towardsindependence. This was cause for deepconcern among Karen leaders, who travelledto London in 1946 to argue their case, butwith no effect. Thus, Burma moved towardsindependence under predominantly Bamarleadership, with the Karen and other ethnicnationality communities often feelingalienated from the emerging post-colonialstate. 281GraversinTønnesson,S.,&Antlöv,H.(1996)p.247.282Ibid.p.243.

97

The KarenNational Union (KNU)was formedinFebruary1947,bringingtogetherarangeofdifferent Karen social, political, and religiousgroups, including both Baptist and Buddhistwings of the KNA, and youth groups. JoliffenotesthattheKNUfollowedtheKNAingivingvoice to thedesire for an independentKarenstatewithinalargerfederation.Thisobjectivewaspursuedinthepost-warperiodas“Karenleaders had become increasingly concernedthattheywouldbesubsumedunderaBamar-dominated independentBurmaandwouldbeoppressed.”283The founding of the KNU coincided with themeetings between Aung San and ethnicnationality groups at Panglong. While Karenrepresentatives were invited to attendPanglong as observers, the final agreementdidnotcovertheKaren.Followingthesigningof the Panglong Agreement, the KNUboycotted the Constituent Assembly taskedwith drawing up the new Constitution. As aresult,anewindependentBurmawasbornin1948without a Karen State. Itwould requireanother four years until the boundaries of anew Karen State were established, and thefinal result was much smaller than that oforiginal Karen aspirations, which would haveincluded parts of present-day Bago,Ayeyawady, and Tanintharyi regions.284However,bythetimeKarenStatewascreatedin 1952, the KNU had already launched arebellion that would extend through theremainderofthe20th-centuryandbeyond.KarenArmedStruggleThrough the late months of 1948 tensionsdeepened between the KNU and the newlyindependent government led by PrimeMinister UNu. The year endedwith a brutalattackbyagovernmentmilitiaagainstagroup

283SeeJolliffe,K.(2016).Ceasefires,GovernanceandDevelopment;TheKarenNationalUnioninTimesofChange(Vol.16,PolicyDialogueBriefSeries)p.4. 284Smith,M.(1991):pp.82-86,andSouth,A.(2008)p.26.

of Karen worshipers on Christmas Eve inMergui district, Tenasserim Division. It wasreported that 80 congregants were killedduring the church attack and another 200killedinotherlocalvillages.InJanuary1949,asubsequentattackonKarencivilianskilled150in Taikkyi Township, north of Rangoon. Theprospect of outright armed conflict seemedimminent.In January 1949, the forced resignation ofGeneralSmithDun,aKaren,fromthepositionas Chief-of-Staff of the new Burma army,signalled the final rupture. Smith Dun’soustingbroughtwithitthedefectionofKarenarmy and police units, aswell asNaw Seng’sFirst Kachin Rifles. It alsomarked the rise ofGeneral Ne Win (a Bamar and one of thelegendary Thirty Comrades who had workedalongsideGeneralAungSanwiththeJapaneseduring the Second World War). General NeWinwaspromotedtothepositionofChief-of-StaffintheplaceofGeneralSmithDun.On31January 1949, the KNU’s armed wing, theKaren National Defence Organisation (KNDO,latertobecometheKarenNationalLiberationArmy,orKNLA),wentunderground,beginninga three-month siege of a suburb north ofRangoon called Insein. This marked thebeginningoftheKareninsurgency.285TheoutbreakoftheKarenrebellioncoincidedwith an expanded insurgency led by variousfactions of the Communist Party of Burma(CPB), fighting by Muslim insurgents innorthern Arakan, and the incursion ofKuomintang (KMT) forces from China intoShanState.Itwasatimeoftremendouschaosand instability. The KNU would come toquicklyandbrieflyholdInsein,onlyninemilesnorth of Rangoon, as well as Mandalay andToungoo.InApril1949,Toungoowasdeclaredthe capital of an independent Karen State,knownasKawthoolei.FollowingtheoutbreakoftheKarenrebellion,the KNU suffered a number of setbacks.One 285AmongKNU-supportingcommunities,31Januaryiscelebratedas“KarenRevolutionDay.”

98

was theassassinationof thecharismaticKNUChairman, Saw Ba U Gyi, on 12 August1950.286 Over the coming decade, theTatmadaw would recapture territorypreviously claimed by insurgent groups. FortheKNLAthismeantbeingpushedoutof theIrrawaddyDelta and the Pegu Yoma towardsthe Thai-Burma border. The Tatmadaw wenton to implement the brutal – and quiteeffective – “Four Cuts” counter-insurgentstrategy,asitsoughttoeliminateallformsofciviliansupporttoEAOs.Startinginthe1970s,hundredsofthousandsofpeoplewereforcedto flee over the next three decades, withprofoundlynegativehumanitarian impactsonKarenciviliancommunities.287FNDuring the 1960s and the 1970s, General BoMyaemergedastheleaderoftheKNU.Southdescribes Bo Mya as an ardent anti-communistChristianwho,withother leaders,workedto

promoteasimplifiedpan-Karenidentity(intermsofdress,dialectandcustom),derivedprimarilyfromthepracticesofthedominantSgawsub-group,andoftenattheexpenseofculturalandlinguisticdiversity.288

Southnotesthatthisdevelopmentmostlikelyarose due to a lack of strategic foresightrather than a deliberate plan, but the resultproducedresentmentwithintherankandfileoftheKNLA,whotendedtobeBuddhist-Pwo.The perception of elite KNU leaders makinghuge profits off of cross-border trade withThailand was also a source of bitternessamongsoldiersonthefrontlineswhodidnotenjoythesamebenefits.289TheEmergenceoftheDKBAIn1994, theKNUexperienceda serious crisiswith thedefectionofBuddhistKaren soldiers

286Observedas“Martyrs’Day”inKNUareas.287South,A.(2008)pp.77-113.288Ibid.p.38.289Ibid.pp.38-40.

fromtheKNLAto formtheDemocraticKarenBuddhist290Army(DKBA).Thesplitcameafterlong frustration among predominantly Pwosoldiers under the predominantly eliteChristian Sgaw leadership of the KNU.291 Thedepth of the division was felt the followingyear when DKBA forces and the Tatmadawoverran the KNU’s headquarters atManerplaw,aswellasotherKNUbasesalongtheThai-Myanmarborder.The fall of the KNU’s Manerplawheadquarters, and the experience of KarenfightingKaren,highlightedtherealityofdeepdivisions within the Karen community. TheKNU found its authority greatly diminishedandanumberofsplintergroupsformedoverthe next fifteen years including the KarenPeaceForce(KPF),theP’dohAungSanGroup,the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, and varioussmall militias.292 Instability among Karenarmed groupswas exacerbated following the2009 order by the Tatmadaw for EAOs totransformintoBGFs.SomearmedgroupsthathadestablishedceasefireagreementswiththeTatmadaw made the transition. One splintergroup within the DKBA refused to make thetransitionandrealignedwiththeKNU.293CeasefireandJoiningtheNCAFinally,afteroversixtyyearsofarmedconflict,the KNU entered into peace talks with theTatmadaw following outreach andengagement initiated by the Thein Seingovernment. The result produced apreliminary bilateral ceasefire agreement inJanuary 2012. In October 2015, the KNUwould become a signatory to the NCAbetween the government and eight EAOs.Beyond the KNU, other Karen armed groups

290NotethattheDemocraticKarenBuddhistArmywouldlaterbecometheDemocraticKarenBenevolentArmy.291South,A.(2008)p.57. 292SeeKarenUnityBuildingInitiatives-TowardsSustainablePeaceinMyanmar.(2016)p.10.293Ibid.p.11.

99

to sign the NCA in 2015 included the DKBAandtheKNU-KNLAPeaceCouncil.294TheNCAestablishedacessationofhostilities.However, it also included provisions thatrecognised the unique role that manyMyanmar EAOs play in terms of localgovernance and delivery of services. Whileefforts to reach a comprehensive politicalsettlement continue, interim arrangementswereoutlinedacknowledgingthatmanyEAOsin Myanmar enjoy a high level of politicallegitimacy, exert authority, and deliverservices in areas that remain outside thereachofthecentralgovernment.Atthesametime,aswastrueduringtheKachinceasefire,complexities have arisen as the authority ofthe KNU often overlaps with that of thecentral government and the Tatmadaw inareas of mixed administration.295 Thesecomplexities will be explored further in thefollowingsection.Experiences of Local Governance and VisionsfortheFutureKaren communities have long experienced asituationinwhichtownsandroadsinlowlandareas have been under the control of thecentral government and the Tatmadaw, butthe reach of these actors has not extendedintomore remotecommunities.296 Instead, inthe highlands and borderlands, the KNU (likethe KIO) has taken on a quasi-state role,exerting governance functions and deliveringawiderangeofservices.Since the signing of bilateral ceasefires, andthen the NCA, the central government hasexpanded state authority into more remoteareas. Despite this expansion, the KNU has 294NotethatthiscasestudywillfocusontheexperienceoftheKNUinthepeaceprocessasitwasnotpossibletoundertakeconsultationsinareascontrolledbytheDKBAorotherKarenarmedgroups.295SeeSouth,A.,Schroeder,T.,Jolliffe,K.,ChanNon,M.,Shine,S.,Kempel,S.,Schroeder,A.,SheeMu,N.(2018).BetweenCeasefiresandFederalism:ExploringInterimArrangementsintheMyanmarPeaceProcessp.6.296Ibid.p.6.

continued to play a leading role in serviceprovision and governance. Particularly incommunities that were previously victims ofthe Tatmadaw’s brutal Four Cuts campaign,the KNU remains the primary governanceactor.297 Furthermore, while the KNU todayretains exclusive control over relatively smallareasofterritory,therearemanyareaswherethe authority of the Tatmadaw and the KNUoverlap.298KNUGovernanceLike the KIO, the KNU provides independentadministrationandgovernance,anddeliversarange of services for conflict-affectedcommunities living in southeast Myanmar.KNU-held territory ismuch reduced from thelargeswathesofterritoryor“liberatedzones”which existed following the outbreak of theKarenrebellionin1949.However, itcurrentlycovers parts of Kayin and Mon States, andparts of eastern Bago and TanintharyiRegions.299 KNU administration is organisedaroundsevendistrictsthateachcorrespondtotheKNLAbrigadeactiveinthatarea.Within these seven districts (the boundariesof which have changed over time and havenever been officially demarcated) there areareas controlled exclusively by the KNU(previously referred to by the Tatmadaw as“black areas”). Other areas (previouslyreferred to by the Tatmadaw as “brownareas”)havelongbeenundermixedKNUandTatmadaw control. In these mixedadministration areas, villagers pay tax to andreceive some services from bothgovernment/Tatmadaw and the KNU/KNLA,and sometimes other armed groups such astheDKBA.300

297Ibid.p.40.298SeeJolliffe,K.(2015).EthnicArmedConflictandTerritorialAdministrationinMyanmarp.ix.299Ibid.p.viii.300SeeJolliffe,K.(2016).Ceasefires,GovernanceandDevelopment;TheKarenNationalUnioninTimesofChange(Vol.16,PolicyDialogueBriefSeries)p.10.

100

Inanextensivestudyofgovernancedynamicsunder the KNU, Jolliffe outlines the range oftasks performed through KNU administrativestructures:

Amongotherfunctions,theKNUgovernancesystemcollectsformallyregisteredtaxes;providesabasicjusticesystemwithapoliceforce;registers,regulates,andprovidesownershiptitlesforagriculturalland;regulatesandmanagesforestsandotherformsofland;andprovidesbasicsocialservicesincludingeducationandprimaryhealthcare.301

Asoutlinedabove,theNCAacknowledgestherole that some of the largest signatory EAOsplayintheseareas.Asaresult,theroleoftheKNU in providing governance and localadministration has been preserved whileparties work towards a long-term politicalsettlement.Beforegoingontoconsideraspirationsforthefuture emerging from Karen experiences ofgovernance under the KNU, centralgovernment, and mixed administration, theexistence of a number of Karen politicalparties should be noted. During 2010elections, Karen parties only won a smallnumber of seats, and this number declinedfurther following elections in 2015. Lookingtowards the 2020 elections, a number ofKaren political parties havemerged with theaspiration to capture a higher number ofvotes. However, for both the Kachin and theKaren communities, and in contrast to theArakanesecommunity,ethnicpoliticalpartieshave not yet achieved the electoral successneededtoexerciseagovernancerole.Visions for the Future - Aspirations forEquality, Protection, Autonomy and Self-Determination

301Ibid.p.3.

Interviews in Hpa’an, Mae Sot, and Yangonprovided an opportunity formembers of theresearch team to meet with a variety ofstakeholders from within the Karencommunity, and to invite views andperspectives on current experiences ofgovernance and aspirations for the future.IndividualswithcloseconnectionstotheKNU,as well as journalists and those engaged inhumanitarian assistance, shared a range ofperspectivesregardingtheirownvisionforthefuture and aspirations fromwithin the Karencommunity.Overthecourseoftheinterviews,themes emerged that reflected similaritieswith those shared by stakeholders from theKachin and Arakanese communities. Otherthemesreflectedimportantdifferences.AswasreflectedinconversationswithKachinand Arakanese meeting participants, whenconsidering the future, meeting participantsfromtheKarencommunityoftenemphasisedtheirdesiretoseeequalityandprotectionforall, as well as autonomy and accountability.These elements were often highlighted ascrucial ingredients in the pursuit of self-determination, an aspiration that was voicedwith particular force in connection todeterminationof landuse. Finally, federalismwas often described as the mechanism thatwouldbestpromotethisvisionofthefuture.Intermsofequalityandprotection,anumberofmeetingparticipantsnoted theexperienceof living in heterogeneous communities, andemphasised that their vision of the futureextendedbeyondprotecting the rightsof theKaren community. Indeed, one seniormember of the KNU Central ExecutiveCommittee highlighted the importance ofprotectingtherightsofallcommunities:

Wehavefoughtformany,manyyearstoestablishagenuinedemocraticfederalunion.OuraspirationisnotjusttoachievefederalismfortheprotectionoftherightsofKarenpeople--wewantbenefitsforallpeopleinMyanmar.MaybethiscomesoutofthefactthattheKarencommunityis

101

spreadeverywhere.ThereareKarencommunitieslivingintheDelta,andtheyareKareneveniftheydon’tspeaktheKarenlanguage.TherearealsomanydifferencesbetweendifferentpartsoftheKarencommunityandweneedtoworktoprotectallofthem.ButwealsowantothergroupsinBurmatolivewithoutdiscrimination.Soforus,whenwesaywewanttoestablishfederalism,itisn’tjustbecausewethinkfederalismwillbegoodfortheKaren–federalismwillprovideapathwherewecanmakesurethateveryoneistreatedequally.302

Anothercommunity leader furtherdevelopedthis theme of equality and protection for all.He noted that having equal rights andprotection was something that Karen peopleshould enjoy no matter where they live inMyanmar, just as the KNU has theresponsibilitytoprotectandworkonbehalfofall communities livingunderKNUgovernancestructures,eveniftheyarenotKaren.

Rightnow,theKNUadministersareasthatareverymixed–inareascontrolledbyourKNUbrigadesthereareKarenpeoplebuttherearealsoBamarpeople,Pa’Opeople,Monpeople,Daweipeople(yes,DaweiareatypeofBamarbuttheyaredifferentfromBamarpeople,theyhavetheirowndistinctidentityandspeaktheirownlanguage).ItistheresponsibilityoftheKNUtoprotectallofthem,notjustKarenpeople–wearenotaskingforrightsjustforKarenpeople,becauseweliveinmixedcommunities.303

Beyond equality and protections for all,meeting participants often highlighted theimportance of achieving autonomy. Theynoted that autonomy was not the same asdecentralisation,becausedecentralisationstillimplies a hierarchy in which the mostimportant powers reside at the centre. Anumberofindividualsbelievedthatthekeyto 302Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).303Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

strengthening and protecting genuine localautonomy was to ensure that all states andregions in Myanmar have their ownconstitutions. They explained that thiswouldprovide a mechanism to ensure thatsubstantial powers and authority would beheldatamorelocallevel.As part of establishing a future that includesstateand regional constitutions, anumberofthose interviewedhighlightedthe importanceofmaintainingandbuildingonthegovernanceand administration systems alreadyestablishedunderEAOs.Notonlywere theseseenasvaluableintermsofefficacyofservicedelivery, but they also emphasised the valueof these systems in terms of theiraccountability to local communities. Notingthe importance of interim arrangements inthe current context, onemeeting participantunderlined the KNU’s current key role in theareasofgovernanceandadministration:

Weneedtolookatexistingarmedgroupadministrativestructures--theyprovideimportantservices,forinstancemothertongueeducationisverystrong.RightnowinKNU-controlledareas,theKNUprovideseducation,healthservices,andthejusticesystem,[and]theyensurethatcustomarylandpracticesarefollowed.Theyaretrustedbythecommunityandtheyareseenasaccountable.Thisisvaluableandshouldnotbethrownaway.304

Reflecting the focus on equality, protection,autonomy, and accountability, all meetingparticipants emphasised the importance ofachieving self-determination. This broadconcept was often raised in relation to theneed for communities to be directly involvedindecisionmakingrelatedto landuse.AsoneKaren community leader explained, “Beingable to control your land according to yourown farming practices is a form of self-determination”.305 304Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).305Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

102

Finally,manymeetingparticipantsfocusedonthe adoption of federalism as a key tool forachieving future goals. When pressed for amoredetailedviewonwhyestablishmentofafuture federal system was so important,several Karen community leaders noted that,unlikeconversationsaroundfederalismwithinthe Kachin community, Karen aspirationsplaced less emphasis on the boundaries ofpoliticalunits.Theyconcededthatinthepastthere might have been a focus aroundestablishing the boundaries of an expandedKaren homeland or state (Kawthoolei).However, they explained that, given the factthatKarenpeopleliveinsuchdiverseareasofthe country, this aspiration was no longerviewedasrealistic.Instead, they felt that what was reallyimportantwas toestablisha suitable formofgovernance that ensured equality andprotectionforall:

Whenwethinkaboutdemocraticfederalism,ourfocusisonequalityandmakingsurethateveryoneistreatedequallyandprotectedequally.WedonotfocusasmuchontheterritoriesoftheKarenstatebecauseKarenpeopleliveeverywhereandtheyliveverymuchintegratedwithothercommunities.Wecan’tclaimtoextendKarenstateintotheDelta,eventhoughmanyKarenpeoplelivethere--thatwouldn’tberealistic.ButwedowanttomakesurethatKarenpeoplelivingintheDeltaareprotectedandtreatedequally,justlikeaBamarpersonlivinginKarenStateneedstobeprotectedandtreatedequally.306

Thus, conversations with members of theKaren community regarding currentexperiences of local governance under theNCAprovidedanentrypointforreflectingonan array of aspirations for the future. Theseincluded guarantees of equality and

306Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

protection for all, the importance ofautonomy, and accountability, particularly inrelation to natural resources and land. Self-determination was repeatedly emphasisedanddemocratic federalismseenasaroutetoachievingthesegoals.Interestingly, a number of meetingparticipants emphasised that a future federalsystem should ensure the right to self-determination forallcommunities, regardlessof ethnic identity. This was articulated as afuture aspiration that was seen as being asimportant for Bamar communities as it wasforKarencommunities.Finally, reflections on the current experienceoflocalgovernanceandadministrationwithinthe Karen community highlight an additionalcomponent to the concept of legitimacyoutlined in Chapter 2 of this report.Participants noted that the legitimateauthority of an armed group was notnecessarily assessed in terms of its ability tocontrol or expand territory, but through itsability to deliver services to localcommunities. One aspect of service deliverythat was of particular importance was theability to access services in one’s mothertongue.This,alongwithmeetingtheneedsofcommunities, was seen as an essentialrequirement needed to build trust andestablishaccountability.Opportunities and Challenges Emerging fromParticipationinthePeaceProcessSincethe2012ceasefireandthesigningoftheNCA, conflict-affected communities living inareasofKNUcontrolormixedauthorityhavebenefited from greater security, increasedfreedomofmovement,andimproveddeliveryofservices.307Moreworkisneededtoachievea political settlement, and many of those

307SeeSouth,A.,Schroeder,T.,Jolliffe,K.,ChanNon,M.,Shine,S.,Kempel,S.,Schroeder,A.,SheeMu,N.(2018).BetweenCeasefiresandFederalism:ExploringInterimArrangementsintheMyanmarPeaceProcessp.37.

103

interviewed noted that the ceasefire has notputastoptoperiodicskirmishesbetweentheTatmadawandKarenarmedgroups.However,the cessationof activehostilitieshas allowedenough stability for some communities toreturnhomeandbeginnewlives.Thesedevelopmentshavebroughtwiththemnewopportunities.IncreasedspacenowexistsformembersoftheKarencommunitytoengagearoundissuesofgroupdiversityandinclusion.Furthermore,neweffortstobuildincreasedcohesionacrossethnicandreligiousdifferenceshavebeencomplementedbynewwaysofthinkingaboutethnicidentityandself-determination.Participation in the peace process has alsobrought increased interactions with thecentral government. This increasedengagement has opened the door to newpeacebuilding and development activities forsome communities. It has also seen anincrease in penetration by government andcorporate interests eager to accesscommunities and territory that, until recentyears, were inaccessible. For somestakeholders within the Karen community,newengagementwiththecentralgovernmenthas come tobe seenasa threat to the long-held priorities underpinning the Karenstruggle, particularly as relates to autonomyandcontroloverlanduse.The following section will consider theseopportunities and challenges in more depth.We will explore the opportunities related tonew engagement around group diversity andexpanded views on self-determination. Wewillalsoconsiderthetensionsandchallengesthat Karen actors have had to navigate as aresult of that participation in the peaceprocess.Opportunities:TheSpacetoEmbraceDiversityandGenuineInclusionManyof those interviewednoted that ethnicand religious diversity is a reality within theKaren community, as it is within other

Myanmarethniccommunities.Theyobservedthatinthepast,inacontextofarmedconflictandinsecurity,outsidersexploiteddiversitytoproduce painful divisions. However, they feltthe distressing experience of the 1990s –particularly, the split between the KNU andtheDKBA–forcedKarenleaderstoreconsiderapproachestoKarenunitybuilding.Anumberofmeetingparticipantspointedout that, inasituation of greater security and stabilityfollowing the 2012 ceasefire and the NCA, ithasbeenpossibletoadoptnewapproachestobuild cohesion within the Karen community.These initiatives have sought to go beyondassimilation,insteadembracinganacceptanceof diversity and undertaking efforts to buildgenuineinclusion.Reflecting on the past, meeting participantsnoted that decades of armed strugglemeantthatmanypaidaheavyprice in termsof lossof life, injury, displacement, and trauma,includingpainfuldivisions.Communityleadersfromavarietyofbackgroundsspokeatlengthabout the experience of division and theemergence of factions and splinter groupswithin the Karen armed struggle. As oneleaderfromtheKNUshared:

Duringthehistoryofourarmedstruggle,we[theKarencommunity]havehadtheexperienceoffacingbigdivisions,particularlywhentheDKBAemerged.Thiswasverydifficultandpainful.IthappenedbecausetheTatmadawwasabletocomeinandtellsomeKarenthattheyshouldmaketheirownarmedgroupbecausetheywereBuddhist.ItalsohappenedbecausetheKNUleadershipmademanymistakes.Wehadalottolearnfromthatexperienceandnowwearebetteratincludingeveryoneregardlessofdifferences.Whenproblemsstarttoarisebecauseofdifferences--differentpoliticalviews,differentreligiousbackgrounds,differentexperiences--wealwaysremindourselvesthatnobodywantstogoback

104

tothewayitwaswhenDKBAwasfightingagainsttheKNLA.308

Buildingonreflectionsregardingpastdivisionsbetween Christian-Sgaw elites and Buddhist-Pworankandfile,manyofthose interviewedalso emphasised the present-day reality ofdiversitywithin theKaren community, notingthat Karen people live in very differentgeographical locations,theypracticedifferentreligions,andtheyexpresstheirKarenidentityin different ways. Indeed, one communityleadersharedinsightsfromherowneffortstoraise awareness about diversity within theKaren community by using Pwo Karenlanguageinpublicforums:

Yes,foralongtimepeopleintheKNUonlyspokeSgawandIwasexpectedtospeakSgawtoo.AtonepointIstartedspeakingPwosothatotherPwointhegroupcouldunderstand.Atfirst,Iwastoldnottodoit,butIsaid,“No,mylanguageisimportanttoo.”ThentheyrelaxedandrealisedtherewasnoproblemwithusingbothSgawandPwolanguageinourmeetings.NowpeopleaskmetowriteinPwosothatPwopeoplecanbeincluded--weallagreethat’sabetterwaytodoit.

At the same time, a number of Karencommunity leaders observed that the morerecentperiodofrelativesecurityhasprovidedspace for KNU and Karen civil societyorganisations to openly engage communitymembersonthetopicsofdiversityandunity.Unity-building initiatives predate the 2012ceasefireas initial stepsweretaken followingthe KNU-DKBA split. The KNU held its firstKarenNationalUnitySeminar in1999.Duringthe subsequent fifteen years multiple unitybuildingseminarswereheld,“creatingaspacefor individuals from diverse background tocometogether,celebratetheirethnicidentityanddiscussthefuture.”309 308Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).309SeeKarenUnityBuildingInitiatives-TowardsSustainablePeaceinMyanmar.(2016)p.13.

Restingonthefoundation laidbytheoriginalunity-building seminars, a series of KarenAffairs Seminars were convened as the KNUand other EAOs began dialogue with thegovernment following the 2010 elections.These meetings also sought to bring a widevariety of Karen organisations and peopletogether to share perspectives on commonconcerns. Meeting records note that theseminars sought to bring a diverse group ofKarentogethertoembracetheirdiversitiesasstrength rather than weaknesses for thejourney towards sustainable peace anddevelopment.310Thisunity-buildinginitiativewentontoevolveintotheestablishmentoftheKarenUnityandPeace Committee (KUPC). The KUPC wasdevelopedin2013,followingthe2012signingof the ceasefire between the centralgovernment and the KNU. In terms ofparticipation,theKUPChasbeendescribedasincluding all the Karen political parties, themajor Karen armed groups, civil societalgroups, and bodies representing Karen fromacrossdifferentareas.311One of the founding members of the KUPCexplainedthattheKUPCwascreatedoutofadesire to ensure that all members of theKaren community would have a goodunderstandingof theemergingceasefire.Sheexplained that Karen leaders recognised thatthis task would require building connectionsacross the wide diversity within the Karencommunity.312 An official from the KNU alsohighlighted that the KUPC, and conferencesconvened by the KUPC, play a role insupportingmembersoftheKarencommunitytocome together tobuilda sharedvision forthefuture.313

310Ibid.p.14. 311ThawnhmungandYadanainSouth,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018)p.122.312Fieldnotes,Yangon(December2018).313Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

105

These unity-building initiatives, emerging outof the experience of increased securityfollowingthe2012ceasefireandparticipationin the NCA, stand in contrast to experiencesoutlinedintheKachincasestudy.Bycontrast,Kachincommunitieshaveseenadeteriorationofsecurityastheresultofactivefightingsince2011, including use of heavy weaponry. Onthe one hand, as noted in the Kachin casestudy, resumed fighting between theTatmadawandtheKIOhasbeendescribedasproducing increased unity in the face of aperceived external threat. At the same time,members of the Kachin community alsoacknowledgedthat,inasituationofsustainedinsecurity, Kachin communities findthemselves facing divisions. This reality thatwas captured in the comments by one civilsocietyleaderinMyitkyina:

Inacontextofarmedconflict,internaldivisionsemerge--therearerivalries,competition,andtherearedifferentleaders.Thecombinationofallthispressuremeansthatdivisionsemergeeasily.314

Inasubsequentconversation,anelderwithinthe Kachin community shared her views onwhyitissodifficulttoembracediversityinthecurrent situation of armed conflict facingKachincommunities:

Withoutpeace,wecannotembraceourdiversitybecausethewaypeopleidentifyhasimplications.Welivewithconflict,insecurityandpoverty.Inthiscontextgroupswillalwayslookforwhateveropportunitytheycangrabinordertobreakawayandimprovetheirlives.Soitmeansthatdiversitybecomesathreatandapotentialsourceofweakness.315

This comparison between the Karen andKachincommunities reveals that,whilebynomeansaguaranteedpanacea,reducedarmedconflict and participation in a ceasefire has 314Fieldnotes,Myitkyina(May2018). 315Fieldnotes,Myitkyina(May2018).

provided Karen communities with space toexplorediversityand inclusionwithaviewtobuilding unity and cohesion acrossdifferences.Opportunities: New Ways of Thinking AboutEthnicityandSelf-DeterminationBeyond new ways of engaging arounddiversityandthe importanceofensuringthatefforts to achieve unity and inclusion avoidtheimpositionofassimilation,interviewswithKarencommunity leaders revealedviewsandaspirations regarding future politicalarrangements that stood in contrast toperspectives shared by members of otherethnicgroups.Aswas illustrated inprecedingsections, a number of meeting participantsemphasised that principles such as equality,protection for all, autonomy, andaccountability were outcomes that theysought for everyone living in Myanmar, notjustformembersoftheKarencommunity.Furthermore,whileKachinstakeholdersoftenfocusedontheissueofaffirmingorexpandingthe boundaries of territory associated withtheKachincommunity(anaspirationthatwasassumedtobetiedtopopulationsize),Karenstakeholders tended to place greateremphasis on the principle of self-determination forall.When itcameto issuessuch as land-grabbing, stakeholders from theKarencommunitywentso faras tonote thatBamar communities often came under thesamethreatsasKarencommunities.Aspartofa focus on equality and protection for all, anumber of Karen community leaders arguedthatfundamentalrightsshouldbeguaranteedtoBamarcommunities justas theyshouldbeguaranteedtoKarencommunities.Another interesting contrast emerged whentalkingwithmembersoftheKarencommunityabout their perceptions regarding theappointment of ethnic affairs ministers, ornational races affairs ministers (NRAMs).While the appointment of NRAMs provokeddeep concern and controversy in the Kachin

106

community (emerging from the perceptionthat some communities were receiving ahigher level of representation than others),the view was quite different amongcommunity leaders in the Karen community.Several Karen community leaders expressedmarked indifference regarding theappointmentofNRAMs,owingtothefactthatthe added level of representationwas not ofgreat importance to them. One KNU leadernoted:

Votingforanethnicaffairsministerisonlyimportantifyouthinkthattheycandosomethingforyouandyouneedextraprotection.IamKaren,butIhaveahighlevelofeducation,Ihavespenttimeoutsidethecountry,Idon’tneedtheextraprotection.SowhetherornotIhaveanethnicaffairsministertorepresentmeisnotveryimportant.IamKaren,butIdon’tneedtousemyKarenidentitytotryandgetextraprotectionbecauseIalreadyfeelsecure.SotherealquestionisnotwhetherKarenpeoplearerepresentedbyanethnicaffairsminister;it’showdowemakeeveryonefeelssecureandsafe?316

This was further reinforced in a subsequentconversation:

ForothergroupsinBurmaitmaybeimportanttoknowtheirpopulationsizebecausetheywanttousetheprovisionsinthe2008Constitution–maybetheywanttotryandgetanspecialadministrativezone,ortheywantanethnicaffairsminister.Buttheytrytogetthesethingsbecausetheyfeeloppressedinsomeway.Ifwemovetowardsasituationwheregroupsallfeelsecureandprotected,thentheywon’tneedtotryandgetthesethings.317

These perspectives were markedly differentfrom those expressed among Kachin

316Fieldnotes,MaeSot(November2018).317Fieldnotes,MaeSot(November2018).

communitymemberswheretheprimaryfocuswasontheneedtomaximiseentitlements inthecontextofacompetitive,zero-sumgame.By contrast, comments from Karenstakeholdersreflectedarejectionofthezero-sum game and desire to expand rights,benefits,andentitlementsforall.At their heart, comments from many withintheKarencommunity reflectedadismissalofthe provisions in the 2008 Constitution.Rather than seeing provisions forestablishment of SAAs or appointment ofNRAMsaskeybenefitsworthpursuing,someKaren community leaders regarded theseprovisions as providing nominal benefits thatserved as diversions in contexts wherestakeholders, faced with insecurity, weresearchingforasourceofaddedprotection.Of course, to suggest that the above viewsrepresent a consensus within the Karencommunities would be a grossoversimplification.Therewerecertainlyvoiceswithin the Karen community that advocatedfor the expansion of the Karen Stateboundaries. Likewise, there were Karenstakeholders who shared their experience ofcoming from remote areas in the hillswherecommunities shared a distinct Karen identityand interaction with non-Karen communitiesorindividualswererare.Fortheseindividuals,aspirations for the futurewere focusedmoreon thewellbeingofwhat they sawas largelyhomogeneous Karen communities. Finally, inreflecting on provisions within the 2008Constitution, one Karen community leadernoted that creation of NRAM positions was“better than nothing” and should bepreserved.318Likewise, members of the Kachin communityexpressedawide rangeofviews.Therewerethose who felt deep resentment towardsprovisions in the 2008 Constitution that theyargued were dangerously divisive. Thisperspective was reflected in the remarks by

318Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

107

one Kachin community member outlined inChapter 2, who described provisions forallocation of NRAMs as being a “trap” thatensuredethnicnationalitycommunitieswouldfighteachotherandbedistracted fromwhathedescribedas“realissues.”319Overall, however, interviews with Karenstakeholders revealed a vision for the futurethatwasnotable in termsof its commitmentto work towards self-determination for all,regardless of ethnic identity. Furthermore, anumber of Karen leaders openly rejected thepursuit of special rights and entitlementsunder the 2008 Constitution, seeing them asdistractions that divert attention away fromthe fundamental need of achieving equality,protection, and autonomy for all. Whetherintentional or not, the rejection ofentitlements provided under the 2008Constitution amounts to a rejection of thezero-sum game framework of Myanmarpoliticsinwhichethnicidentityisusedtospurcompetitionbetweendifferentgroups.Challenges: Reconciling Different Views onEngagementinthePeaceProcessThe Karen experience offers insights onpossible new and different approaches toengagementaroundethnic identity,diversity,and self-determination. At the same time,members of the Karen community alsopointed out that participation in the peaceprocess as currently constituted has broughtsignificant challenges. In interviews, someKaren stakeholders questioned whether it isactually possible to participate in the peaceprocess while continuing to work towardsgenuine autonomy and self-determination.320In order to explore these questions in moredetail,thiscasestudywillconcludebylookingmore closelyatdivergentperspectiveswithintheKNUand theKaren community regardingparticipationinthepeaceprocess,particularlyastheserelatetoquestionsaroundlanduse. 319SeeChapter2ofthisreport.320Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

Over recent years, leadership in theKNUhashad to balance multiple priorities includingtheneedtomaintainpolitical legitimacywithlocal communities, its ability to deliverservices, and achieving recognition from thecentral government and members of theinternational community.321 The result hasbeen that someKNU leadershave advocatedthat peacebuilding and development,requiring cooperation with the centralgovernment, are priorities for Karencommunities. Other KNU leaders havechallenged this perspective, viewingcooperation with deep scepticism andemphasising that a substantive politicalsettlement leading to establishment of afederal system needs to come first.322 Thisunderlying tension persisted through thesigningoftheNCAin2015,whichsomesawastakingplacewithoutproperconsultation.For areas under mixed KNU-Tatmadawadministration, the signing of the NCAbrought rapid changes. In these areas, thecentral government quickly expanded its rolein communities through service delivery anddevelopment projects. At the same time, theceasefire has allowed the KNU to engagemore openly with civilians, and new,cooperative relationships between the KNUandotherKarenarmedgroupshaveemerged.Indeed, it was this new space for civilianactivities that allowed initiatives such as theKUPC to emerge. However, in more remoteareas of northeast Kayin State, leaders indistricts under full KNU authority (areas thathaveneverbeenundercontrolof thecentralgovernment) have rejected overtures fromthecentralgovernmenttocollaborate.323TheresulthasbeenastrainbetweendifferentperspectiveswithintheKNU.WhilesomeKNUleaders have advocated continuing with the

321South,A.(2017).“HybridGovernance”andthePoliticsofLegitimacyintheMyanmarPeaceProcess. 322SeeJolliffe,K.(2016).Ceasefires,GovernanceandDevelopment;TheKarenNationalUnioninTimesofChange(Vol.16,PolicyDialogueBriefSeries)p.12.323Ibid.p.13-17.

108

combined approach of cooperation,development,andpeacebuilding,othershaveexpressed doubts and have prioritisedguarding authority over land, resources, aswellasprotectingwhattheyseeastraditionalKaren lifestyle and heritage.324 TensionsbetweentheseperspectivescametoaheadinOctober2018,whentheKNUannouncedthattheywould suspend participation in theNCAprocess inordertocouldreachahigher levelofinternalconsensus.325Beyond highlighting the tension betweenthese two different approaches, thoseinterviewed noted that there have beenperiodicoutbreaksofarmedconflictbetweentheKNLAandtheTatmadawsincethesigningof the NCA. They attributed theseconfrontations to the fact thatauthorityoverterritoryremainscontested.An official from the KNU reflected on thecomplexityof thesituationfortheKNUasanNCA signatory. He noted that in the currentcontext, the KNU finds itself facing internalstrainswhile also having to navigate externalambiguities around territorial control. Heconcluded that the result produces layers ofuncertainty about how land canbe used andwhereauthorityfordecisionmakinglies:

Wehavealotofchallengesaroundlandissuesrightnow.ThereareareasthatarecontrolledbytheKNU,butbecausethereisnowaceasefireagreementthegovernmentthinksitnowhastherighttosellland-usecertificatesintheseareas.Theywanttosellthecertificatesbecausethiswillgeneratealotofincomefromforeigncompanieswhowanttomineorbuildroadsintheseareas.Theseareareasthathaveneverbeenexploitedbefore--placeswherethemineralsarestillintheground,andtransportationhasneverbeenpossible.Sothelandisvery

324Ibid.p.19.325SeeAnalysis:WhyDidtheKNUTemporarilyLeavePeaceTalks?byNyeinNyein,TheIrrawaddy,29October2018.

valuableandthismeansanewopportunityforNayPyiTawtomakemoney.Soland-usecertificatesarebeingsoldwithoutconsultingwiththeKNUandwithoutanyconsultationwiththelocalcommunities.InNayPyiTawtheysay,“wehaveaceasefiresonowthisareacanbedeveloped,”andtheysellthecertificate.ThenaforeigncompanyshowsuptostartdiggingandtheKNUknowsnothingaboutit.TheKNUstopstheconstructionfromgoingforwardandthentheTatmadawisbroughtin.Thatmeansforsuretherewillbefighting.Sothesethingsarehappeningrightnowandinthemeantimethepeaceprocessisnotmakinganyprogress.WeagreedtosigntheNCAandparticipateinthepeaceprocesssothatwecouldengageinapoliticaldialogueprocessandmovetowardsfederalismandautonomy.Underfederalism,thesethingswouldn’thappenbecauselocalcommunitieswouldhaveasayinhowtheirlandisusedandwhobenefits.Butthepeaceprocessisstuckandnotmovingforward.Sodoesthatmeanthatwegiveupeverythingwhilewewaitforthepeaceprocesstostartagain?Ifso,whydidwefightforsomanyyears?326

Indeed, the narrative surrounding conflictover land use came up repeatedly ininterviews with members of the Karencommunity, particularly regarding theimplementation of the “Vacant Fallow andVirginLandsManagementLaw”.327OneKarencommunity leader explained that Karenagricultural practices make use of shiftingcultivation that allows land to lie fallow for a

326Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).327Formorebackgroundinformationonconflictsemergingaroundimplementationofthe2012Vacant,FallowandVirginLandsManagementLaw,see:https://www.tni.org/en/article/a-declaration-of-war-on-us

109

periodofyears.Theynotedthatapplicationofthe law would mean that observing thistraditional practice would leave Karencommunities open to losing control of theirland:

Rightnow,weareexperiencingalotofissuesrelatedtoownershipanduseofland.Wehavecustomarylandpracticesthatallowfarmlandtoliefallowforaperiodoftimeandwe’vealwayshadasystemwhereacommunity,undertheleadershipofachieforaheadman,decidestogetherwhatplotswillbefarmedandwhatlandwillbeallowedtoliefallow.Nowthecentralgovernmentistellingcommunitiesthattheydon’tactuallyownthelandbecausethey’renotusingit.Theyareusingit,they’rejustusingitresponsibly,whichmeansallowingperiodswhenit’snotcultivated.Thelocalcommunitiesunderstandthis.Theyaretheoneswhoshouldmakedecisionsabouthowthelandisused,notthegovernmentinNayPyiTaw.328

Furthermore,theynotedthatthehighlevelofdisplacement for communities in Myanmar’ssoutheast meant that it was not uncommonfor internally displaced persons (IDPs) toreturn home and find their land alreadyclaimedandoccupiedforcommercialuse.329This common experience has recently beenhighlighted in the media. Numerous storieshave outlined how, as part of Myanmar’scurrent transition process, demand for landhas substantially increased. Foreign investorshave sought land for a range of commercialactivities including rubber and palm oilplantations, road construction, and mining.The current central government system ofland administration is not coordinated withthe peace process. The government has thusclaimed the exclusive right to grant land-usecertificates,generatinganimportantsourceofincome to the central government. This has 328Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).329Fieldnotes,MaeSot(December2018).

proven particularly problematic in instanceswhere ethnic community farmers, practicingcustomary land use, have found their claimover agricultural lands ignoredby the centralgovernment. It has also been an issue ofextremeconcernforIDPsforcedtoleavetheirhomesforaperiodofmonthsoryears.330ArecentarticlebytheTransnational Instituteillustrates the challenge facing the KNU intermsofitsparticipationinthepeaceprocessand its support for stronger protectionsaroundlandrights:

EffortsbytheKNUtoincludetheseprinciples[ethniccustomaryandcommunalrighttoland,aswellastherighttolandforIDPsandrefugees]inthecountry’sfalteringpeaceprocesshavenotbeensuccessful,asthesewereopposedbyrepresentativesfromtheMyanmararmedforces(Tatmadaw)andnotvocallysupportedbyrepresentativesoftheNLD.TheKNUhasrecentlywithdrawnfromallformalmeetingsinthepeaceprocessduetothelackofprogressinthetalks.331

The thorny issues of how land use isdetermined,howcommunitiesareengagedindecisionmaking, and how these decisionsrelate to the peace process and efforts toachieveself-determinationarecommontoallthree case studies examined in this report.Given the fundamental importance of landtenuretoagriculturalpracticesandlivelihoodsforMyanmarcommunities,it isreasonabletoexpect that these issueswill remaina centralfocus both inside and outside the context ofthepeaceprocess.Furthermore, in instances when ethnicnationality actors engage the central

330ForexampleseeAfterDecadesofConflict,LandDeadlineLoomsforMyanmarVillagers,VOA,26February2019.331See“ADeclarationofWaronUs”:The2018VFVLawAmendmentanditsImpactonEthnicNationalities,ACommentarybyTNI,TransnationalInstitute,13December2019.

110

government and the Tatmadaw across thenegotiating table rather than on thebattlefield, there will be a need to carefullynavigate tensions between what have so farbeen cast as competing priorities: a focus onpeacebuilding that brings an end to armedconflictbutentailsincreasedcooperationwiththe central government, or the achievementofapolitical settlement thatmeets long-heldaspirations for self-determination andautonomy. While this case study hasexaminedtheseissuesaschallengesfacingtheKNU and the Karen community, thedichotomy between collaborating with thecentral government or holding firm on firstachieving a political settlement need not beseen as irreconcilable. As one Karen leadernoted, there is a need to move away fromseeingtheseperspectivesasbeingnecessarilyin opposition to each other and insteadexploreapproachesthatcouldpursueaspectsofbothprioritiessimultaneously.332BeyondEthnicityThis brief examination of views andperspectives from the Karen communityprovides insights into a range of aspirationsand experiences. Since 1949, much of theKaren community has experienced anextended period of insecurity and militarypressure, culminating in the painfulexperience of divisions between differentsegments of the community. Yet greaterstability and security over recent years haveprovided an opportunity to engage aroundaspects of group diversity and to undertakeinitiatives aimed at building linkages acrossdifferentsegmentsoftheKarencommunity.This case study also provides an opportunityto consider voices within the Karencommunitythathavearticulatednewwaysofthinking about connection between ethnicidentity and self-determination. Many ofthose interviewed expressed the desire toworktowardsafuturefederalframeworkthat

332Fieldnotes,Yangon(2018).

would ensure equality, protection, autonomyand accountability for all, regardless of theirethnic identity. Indeed, the comments ofKaren leaders reflect not only a criticism ofhow the 2008 Constitution creates divisionsand instils competition between differentethnic nationality communities, but also arejection of the zero-sum approach toMyanmar politics that has hitherto requiredgroups to assert their group size to gainspecialrightsandentitlements.At the same time, participation in the peaceprocess has required that the KNU wrestlewithcomplex issuessurroundingengagementwiththecentralgovernment.Ithasalsogivenrise to tension between divergent viewsregardingpeacebuilding,cooperationwiththecentral government, and prioritisation of apoliticalsettlement.WhilesomeKarenleadershave prioritised the need for peacebuildingand engagement in a context where theyperceive an urgent need for communities toaccess development support, other Karenleadershaveprioritisedtheneedtoarriveatapoliticalsettlementandpreservecontroloverland and traditional practices, includingtraditionalapproachestolandtenure.333Observers have expressed concern regardingtensions that have dogged the KNU arisingfrom these seemingly opposed views aroundprioritiesandapproaches.Atthesametime,itis important to note that these tensionsexemplifyexactlythetypesofpullsandstrainthat are evident in any modern politicalprocess.Inthecontextofthisresearchproject,whatissignificantabout thesedivergentviews isnotso much what they are about, as what theyarenotabout:debateswithintheKNUdonotcentreonthe issueofethnic identity,what itmeanstobeKaren,oraspirationstomaximiseentitlements for the Karen community.Instead, debates focus on fundamental 333SeeJolliffe,K.(2016).Ceasefires,GovernanceandDevelopment;TheKarenNationalUnioninTimesofChange(Vol.16,PolicyDialogueBriefSeries)p.19.

111

questions regarding the best approach forbringing long-term, sustainable peace anddevelopment to conflict affectedcommunities. The debate centres onquestionsofpoliticalstrategyandhowbesttoachieve a set of ends. Furthermore, someKarenleadershavearticulatedthattheseendsare not only being pursued on the behalf ofmembers of the Karen community, but onbehalf of all communities in Myanmar. Assuch, current tensions within the KNU arenotableastheyexemplifyatypeofMyanmarpoliticsthathasmovedbeyondethnicity.

112

CONCLUSIONThe preceding chapters and case studiesprovide an opportunity to re-examine theexperience of ethnic identity in Myanmar.Initial chapters review key aspects ofMyanmar history with a focus ondevelopments and events that have, overtime, shaped the current relationship of thecentralgovernment, including theTatmadaw,with ethnic nationality communities, and therelationship between Myanmar ethniccommunities.Thisincludeskeyeventssuchascolonialismandstructural changesassociatedwith colonial administration, the bitterexperiencesoftheSecondWorldWar,effortsto forge unity across diversity, the siegementality of the Cold War years, the mixedexperiences associated with ceasefires, andmore recent experiences associatedwith thepeaceprocessandelectoralpolitics.The brief review of historical developmentsoutlined in this report also provides anopportunitytoconsidertheemergenceofkeyconceptssuchaswhoisandisnottaingyinthaand, as such, who is or is not entitled tocitizenship,anddoesordoesnotbelong.Ourbrief reflection on Myanmar history alsoprovides the opportunity to understand theexperience of Burmanisation and howpressures towards assimilation more broadlyhavecomeintoconflictwiththelongstandingdesire of many different communities toachieveself-determination.Chapter 2 reflects more closely on ethnicidentity narratives, examining the underlyingassumptions on which they are based. Thisanalysis challenges the underlyingassumptions and notes the ways that ethnicidentity narratives often differ from people’severyday lived experience. Furthermore,Chapter 2 explores the way that ethnicidentitynarrativeshavebeeninstitutionalisedinthe2008Constitution.Themesandconceptsthatwerehighlightedinthe initial chapters are further explored

through case studies associated with Kachin,Arakanese, and Karen identity. These casestudiesprovideanopportunitytodelvemoredeeply into thehistoricalexperiencesofeachcommunitywhilealsoconsideringhowethnicidentity shapes present-day realities for eachof the three communities. Case studies alsooffer insights into differences in theapplicationofethnicidentitynarratives,andaview of efforts by some to challenge andmovebeyondethnicidentitynarratives.Toconcludethereport,wewillreflectbackonkey themes inorder tohighlightanumberofareas for further work and engagement.Indeed, this re-examinationof ethnic identityin the Myanmar context provides animportantopportunitytoconsidernotjustthemany challenges that communities face, butalso possible strategies and approachesavailable to engage the challenges. Theultimateaimmustbeatransformationoftheexperience of ethnicity from being a tool forcategorisation and discrimination, to insteadbeing an experience of daily life thatcontributes to a rich and vibrant Myanmarsociety.Withthisaim inmind, theconcludingsectionof this reportwill focusonthe importanceofseeking out and supporting initiatives aimedat building unity by embracing diversity; re-examining and challenging existing ethnicidentity narratives, including theirinstitutionalisation in the 2008 Constitution;actively working to build trust throughmeasures that recognise political legitimacyand support efforts by local communities toexercise autonomy and self-determination;and leading efforts to rethink the concept oftaingyintha while supporting a variety ofactorstoengagewithcomplexity.BuildingUnitybyEmbracingDiversityLookingbackatthechallengesoutlinedinthisreport,theimportanceofdevelopingnewanddifferent ways of engaging around unity anddiversity in theMyanmar context stands out.

113

As many scholars have noted, Myanmar haswrestled with national unity, and resultingdistrust and conflict, since independence.334Ultimately, in order to build a cohesive,tolerant society and a truly lasting peace, anew approach to unity that truly embracesMyanmar’sdistinctdiversityisnecessary.Thisreporthighlightsthatethnicdiversityhasconsistentlybeenportrayedasrepresentingathreat to unity. In fact, military actors inMyanmar have long invoked the spectre ofnational disintegration as a result ofsecessionist aspirations from ethnicnationality communities as justification forauthoritarian rule. In response to thisperceived threat, central authorities haveused a range of measures to impose unitythrough assimilation. Ethnic nationalitycommunities have long pointed to theexperience of Burmanisation and the manypressuresthathavebeenappliedtosuppressdiversity in favour of one unified Bamaridentity. A deeper look reveals that thepracticeofassimilationhasalsobeenimposedwithin ethnic nationality communities asethnic nationality leaders have sought tosuppresstheirowngroupdiversityinfavourofstronggroupunity.Regardless of the context in whichassimilation strategies have been applied,many of those interviewed repeatedly notedthat using assimilation as a strategy to buildunity has not just failed, but actuallybackfired—as it inevitably provokes deepresentment that further fuels the desire toassert a distinct identity. This was true indiscussionswithethnicnationalitycommunityleaders as they reflected on their ownexperienceofBurmanisation. Itwasalso trueforstakeholdersfromsmallercommunitiesasthey reflected on sources of pressure to giveuptheirdistinct identityandassimilate intoalargernon-Bamargroup.

334Taylor,R.H.(1979).

The Karen case study provides insights intothe importance of going beyond imposedassimilation to adopt a unity-buildingapproach that embraces diversity andinclusion. Theworkof theKarenUnityPeaceCommittee demonstrates that, particularly ina situation of greater security and stability,communities have an opportunity to buildgreater cohesion. While acknowledging thatthe central government, Tatmadaw, andKaren actors still have a long path ahead toarriveatapoliticalsettlementandsustainablepeace,Karenleadersnotedthatthesigningofthe bilateral ceasefire in 2012, followed bysigning of the NCA in 2015, provided avaluableopening tostrengthenunity-buildingefforts while engaging around diversity.Following painful experiences of division inthepast,thisopportunityofferedthespacetogobeyondassimilation,explorediversity,andbuildgenuineinclusion.By contrast, the Kachin case study reveals averydifferentsituation.Inacontextofchronicinsecurity there has been a push towardsstronggroupunity.Withpressureandmilitaryoffensives by the Tatmadaw ongoing, manywithin the Kachin group have embraced thisarticulationofstronggroupunity.Atthesametime,resentmenttowardsassimilationeffortshas led some groups to articulate distinctidentities.This analysis points to an important peacedividend available to ethnic nationalitycommunities, even ina situationwheredeepdissatisfaction exists around the peaceprocess. Ethnic nationality actors need topersist in their efforts to arrive at andmaintain a cessation of hostilities, as theassociatedbenefitsprovideavaluable spacein which to build group unity. Furthermore,MyanmaractorsfromBamarandnon-Bamarcommunities and those who support themmust seek out opportunities to explore andembrace diversity as a central approach tobuildingunityatdifferentlevels.

114

The Karen case study also reveals thatengagementarounddiversityneedstoinformvisions of autonomy and self-determinationforthefuture.Whileinterviewswithmembersfrom ethnic nationality communitiesfrequentlyhighlightthedesireforheightenedautonomy based on the assumption thatcommunitiesarehomogeneousandethnicallyconcentrated, discussions with members ofthe Karen community challenged thisassumption. At the same time, a number ofleaders from Karen and Kachin communitiesoffered outlooks on autonomy and self-determination that were not tied to ethnicidentity.Indeed,anyprocessthatmovesawayfrom assimilation and embraces diversitywillinevitably challenge assumptions regardingthehomogeneousnatureof communities.Aspart of challenging the assumption thatcommunities are homogeneous and ethnicidentityisfixed,Myanmarstakeholdersmustconsidermodelsof increasedautonomyandself-determination that are built around thelived experience of diversity within localcommunities.Developingnewapproachestounity-building,and an articulation of a future vision ofautonomyandself-determination thatacceptthe heterogeneity of local communities, alsohas implications for Myanmar electoralpolitics.Ethnicpoliticalpartieshavelongbeenseenasanalternativetoarmedstruggleandameans to represent and advocate for ethnicnationalityconcerns.However,ethnicpoliticalpartiesthatcastthemselvesasarticulatingtheviews and desires of their targeted ethnicnationality community are rooted inassumptions regarding the homogeneousnature of ethnic nationality communities.While offering an important alternative toarmed conflict, ethnic political parties mustconsider the degree to which their politicalplatforms are tied solely to the needs of asingle ethnic nationality community, andwhether they have the ability to representand speak on behalf of local communitiesthat include a diversity of identities, needs,andperspectives.

ChallengingEthnicIdentityNarrativesPreceding pages of this report illustrate theneedforMyanmarcommunitiestore-engagearound ethnic identity narratives. Thenarratives identified in Chapter 2 include theassumedcorrelationbetweenpopulation sizeand entitlements, the belief that identity isfixedandcommunitiesarehomogeneous,thedesire for communities to remain stationaryand tied to ethnic homelands, and theconcern that outsiders pose a threat. Thesenarratives, as well as the inaccurateassumptionsuponwhich theyarebased,andthe challenges they pose are reflectedthrough different aspects of the three casestudies. Indeed, a key to building unity byembracingdiversity–whileavoidingtrapslikeessentialising groups and group size – is tochallengeanddeconstruct theethnic identitynarratives that are widely accepted by somany.Theassumedcorrelationbetweenpopulationsize and entitlements emerges as a recurringthemewithin theKachincasestudy.Manyofthose interviewed within the Kachincommunityandelsewherearticulatedabeliefthataccesstoprivilegesandbenefits–suchasthe designation of territorial boundaries –would be determined by the size of one’sgroup. This was reflected in both anxietyregarding the future viability of Kachin state,and, for some, aspirations to expand theboundaries of Kachin State. Interviews withKachinstakeholdersalsorevealedtheclosely-related belief that allocation of entitlementstakesplaceinthecontextofazero-sumgamein which a gain for one group necessarilymeans a loss for another group. Finally, therole that group size is assumed to play indetermining access to benefits providesinsights into the focus within the Kachingroup, and elsewhere, surroundingcategorisationandmeasurement.However, interviews with Kachin communityleaders also revealed divergent views. Theresearchteamheardfromstakeholderswithin

115

the Kachin community who were eager tochallenge the assumed connection betweengroup population size and entitlements. Thiswas illustratedduringameeting inMyitkyinawith a leader from a local literature andculture association, who questioned thefundamental assumption that group sizeshoulddetermineaccesstoentitlements:

Iknowthatourgroupisnotverybig,butthatdoesnotmeanthatwedeservelessthananybodyelse.WehavefoughtforethnicnationalitypeopletobeequaltotheBamarforsolong,buteveninourowncommunitywedon’taskwhyonegroupgetsmore,justbecausetheyarelargeinsize.Ifwhatwewantisequality,thenwhyaren’twealltreatedequally,regardlessofhowmanyareinourgroup?Theideathatsomeofusgetmorebecausetherearemoreofusmeanswespendallourtimeworryingaboutnumbers,butifweareallequalthenthatwouldn’tmatter.335

Thus,whiletheassumedconnectionbetweengrouppopulationsizeandentitlementswasarecurring theme in the Kachin case study,interviews with members from the Kachincommunity also demonstrate that thenarrativeisnotuniversallyaccepted.Avarietyof views exist and there are actors who areeager to re-examine and challenge commonassumptions. Actors who are supportingcommunity peacebuilding efforts need toseek out and collaborate with communityleaderswhoareactivelyupholdingtherightsof minorities, giving voice to alternativeperspectives, and challenging the assumedcorrelation between population size andentitlements.The assumption that identity is fixed andcommunities are homogeneous wasrepeatedly challenged during conversationswithindividualsfromtheKarencommunity.Inthese interviews, stakeholders were quick to


point out that many Karen communities arenot homogeneous, asmembers of the Karencommunityoftenliveinhighlyintegratedandmixed communitieswithneighbourswho areBamar or from other ethnic nationalitygroups. In fact, the experience of mixedhouseholdswheretheethnicidentityoffamilymembers differs was commonly reported inconsultation meetings throughout thecountry. Furthermore, the Karen case, andmore recent distinctions around Karenni andPa’O identity, illustrates the fluid nature ofethnicidentityandthepotentialforsignificantchangestooccur,even inthespaceofonlyafew decades. Ethnic nationality actors,whether they be civil society organisations,political parties, or EAOs, need to engage inreflection on the reality of diversity withintheir own group and the ways that ethnicidentityremainsfluidovertime.While the desire to establish and maintainethnichomelandareas isoftenarticulatedbyethnicnationalitycommunities,particularlyinresponsetohighlevelsofcentralgovernmentcontrol and authority, the Kachin case studyhighlightsthewaythatthedynamicnatureofcommunitiesrepresentsaninherentchallengeto this aspiration. This is true for individualswhoself-identifyasKachinandmigrateoutofKachinState,aswellasnon-Kachinindividualswho migrate into Kachin State. Observationsand anecdotes shared through consultationmeetings regarding migration are confirmedby an examination of migration data, whichidentifiesmigration as a common experienceinmanydifferentareasofMyanmar.The fact that in- and out-migration producesdeep anxiety points to the need to engagemorecloselyaroundtheunderlyingsourcesofconcern. This is especially true as newopportunities and pressures that lead tomigration are only likely to accelerate as aresult of Myanmar’s current transitionprocess.Atitsheart,concernsassociatedwithmigration relate to the assumed connectionbetweengrouppopulationsizeandallocationof entitlements and benefits. As long as

116

groups perceive a need to demonstrate thatthey meet a population threshold inconcentrated areas, demographic changeassociatedwithmigrationwillremainahighlysensitive issue in theMyanmar context. Thissensitivity only reinforces the need, outlinedabove, for a greater focus on support tocommunity leaderswhoare actively engagedin efforts to challenge the assumption thatentitlementsshouldbeallocatedonthebasisofgrouppopulationsize.Furthermore,actorsworking at the community level, whetherthey be connected with government,Myanmarcivilsociety,EAOs,orinternationalagencies, need to undertake awareness-raising efforts to develop a deeperunderstanding of the drivers that leadindividuals to migrate, as well as theimportanceofensuringprotectionandrightsformigrant communities, regardlessof theirethnicidentity.Finally,concernsaroundmigrationarecloselyrelated to the widely-shared narrative thatoutsiders pose a threat. Whether looking atthe case of Kachin identity or of Arakaneseidentity, it is evident that this commonperception is connected and reinforced byother ethnic identity narratives, particularlythebelief that there isacorrelationbetweena group’s population size and allocation ofentitlements.AcloserlookateventsinRakhineduring2017reveals that in circumstances wherecommunitiesalready strugglewitha senseofexclusionand insecurity, fearandanxietycanbeusedtoreinforcetheperceptionthatthoseconsidered outsiders constitute a threat. Insuchasituation,fearandanxietycanbeeasilytransformed intoanimosity towards thosedonot conform to acceptable ethnic andreligious categories. This is of courseheightened if, as in the Rakhine case, groupslike the Rohingya are categorised underexisting legal frameworks as outsiders. Suchsocial and/or legal manipulation can serve avariety of purposes – some related toeconomic development priorities, some

related to military and security concerns. Astep back from the Arakanese case revealsthat, since independence, the fear ofoutsidershasbeenevokedrepeatedlybyboththe central government and ethniccommunities and applied towards othergroupsthathavenotmetthecriteriaforbeingtaingyintha.Challenging the narrative around theperceivedthreatposedbyoutsidersrequiresthat those engaged in communitydevelopment efforts, whether operatingunder the auspices of the centralgovernment, Myanmar civil society, orinternational agencies, address theexperiences of insecurity and exclusion.Addressing the anxieties facing communities,particularly in a situation of transition, andbuilding a deeper sense of inclusion willminimise the utility of this ethnic identitynarrative as a strategy to manipulate anddirectpublicdiscourse.Ultimately, there isaneed to re-examine the2008 Constitution and consider how it hasinstitutionalised and reinforced unhelpfulethnic identity narratives. Some of theprovisions in the2008Constitution, includingthe designation of Self-Administered Zonesand the allocation of National Race AffairsMinisters, are widely seen as efforts toincreaseautonomyandethnicrepresentation.However,theanalysisinthisreporthighlightsthat, at their heart, these constitutionalprovisions are based on unhelpful ethnicidentity narratives that emerge frominaccurate assumptions regarding theeveryday experience of ethnic identity inMyanmar.While some ethnic nationality leaders haveadvocated for these provisions, interviewsdemonstrate that actors hold a diversity ofviews. Some community leaders feel themeasures are “better than nothing.” Othersarequick tonote theproblematicconnectionbetween constitutional provisions, contestedethnic categories, and group size. In

117

discussionswithmembersfromtheKarenandKachin community, someopenly rejected thepursuitofspecialentitlementsunderthe2008Constitution, which they saw as distractingattention away from the more fundamentalneedtoachieveequality,protection,andself-determinationforall.As part of re-engaging ethnic identitynarratives, ethnic nationality communitiesand those who support them will need torevisit and challenge these aspects of the2008Constitution.Indeed,anumberofethnicnationality leaders noted that letting go ofconstitutional provisions that currently fueltremendous competition and tension wouldoffer the opportunity to focus on achievinghigherlevelsofsecurityandprotectionforall.Trust-Building, Political Legitimacy andOpenings for Autonomy and Self-DeterminationTheneedtoundertaketrust-buildingemergesrepeatedlyintheprecedingchaptersandcasestudies. This report’s emphasis on historicalcontext highlights the many ways that trustbetween ethnic nationality communities andBamar political leaders has been repeatedlybroken, producing grievances on all sides.Ultimately, a commitment to long-termreconciliation efforts will be needed to buildmutual understanding and to provide a pathtorepairdeepfractures.In considering different approaches tobuildingtrust,theprecedinganalysissuggeststhat a closer examination of politicallegitimacy is a priority. Case studies highlightthat political legitimacy comes frommultiplesources and there is a need to challenge theassumption that political legitimacy isconferredsolelyon thebasisofgroupsizeorthe ability to control territory. Indeed, thepreceding analysis has noted that politicallegitimacybasedongroupsizeortheabilitytocontrol territory only serves to deepen inter-groupcompetitionandarmedconflict.

Instead, there is a need to broaden ideasaround political legitimacy to includeconsiderations such as the ability of localactors – whether under the authority of thecentral government or not – to carry outservice delivery andmeet the needs of localcommunitieswithasignificantlevelofmutualtrustand respect.As illustrated in theKachinand Karen case studies, the role that EAOshave come to play has conferred them withheightened political legitimacy within theirrespective communities. The role of thesetrusted actors, and the level of politicallegitimacythatarisesoutofthisrole,needstobe recognised. As Myanmar continues on apath towards long-term transition andreform, the central government andTatmadawmust be prepared to collaboratewith EAOs to develop interim arrangementsthat acknowledge the role of EAOs in theareas of local administration and servicedelivery, and the associated legitimacy andrespecttheycommand.Furthermore, the need to develop a sharedunderstanding of the role that many EAOsplay in the area of local administration andservice delivery highlights the connectionsbetween political legitimacy, trust-building,andtheexperienceofgenuinelocalautonomyand self-determination. Indeed, the case ofArakanese identity illustrates that whenobstacles block ethnic nationalitycommunities as they pursue autonomy andself-determinationthroughthepeaceprocessorelectoralpolitics, theseobstaclescanpushethnic nationality actors towards the moreextremeoptionofarmedstruggle.Evenunderthe limitations of the current 2008Constitution, it is imperative that theMyanmar central government seeks outavenuesthatallowcommunitiestoengageinthe genuine exercise of local autonomy andself-determination.

118

Rethinking the Concept of Taingyintha andEngagingwithComplexityThe analysis and perspectives raised throughtheprecedingchaptersandcasestudiespointtotheneedforMyanmaractorstore-examineassumptions about who does and does notbelong, in order to build a peaceful andcohesive society that is able tobuildingunityby embracing diversity. At its heart, this willrequireanewlookatthetaingyinthaconceptthat came to prominence during theNeWinera.Ultimately, a deeper consideration of ethnicidentity narratives offers one possible entrypoint to undertake such a re-examination, asthecurrentarticulationofwhatitmeanstobetaingyintha is intrinsically connected to allfourof theethnic identitynarrativesoutlinedin this report. A process that engages andchallenges ideas around group size andentitlements, the notion that ethniccommunities are homogenous and identity isfixed, the desire to see stationary ethniccommunities tied to homelands, and thebelief that outsiders pose a threat, wouldoffer the opportunity to also challenge thepractice of determining who does and doesnotbelongonthebasisofarbitrarycategoriestied to one moment in Myanmar’s historicalpast.Thefocusontheconceptofwhoisandisnottaingyintha emerged from the period ofmilitaryruleandwasusedasastrategytotrytobuildunityinthefaceofdiversity,andinacontextwhereoutside forceswereperceivedas posing serious security threats. AsMyanmar undergoes its current process oftransition and assumes a new role on theglobal stage, there is an urgent need forMyanmaractorstoreconsiderdefinitionsandperceptions around “insiders” and“outsiders.”Furthermore, inthisnewera it isessentialforMyanmaractorstochallengeandreject instances when ethnicity is used as atooltoachievepoliticalends.

To work towards these goals, and as notedabove, a variety of actors including theMyanmar government, donors, Myanmarcivilsociety,andinternationalagenciesneedto work collaboratively with localcommunities to ensure that everydayexperiences of insecurity and exclusion areaddressed and transformed. Furthermore,support is needed to create opportunitiesand spaces where Myanmar communitiescan engage across differences and celebratediversity. Ultimately, this work must beundertaken to inoculate communities fromforces thatwill inevitably seek tomanipulatedifferencesforpoliticalpurposes.Finally, the project of moving beyond NeWin‘s concept of taingyintha also highlightsthe need for actors both inside and outsidethe country to seek out and engage withcomplexity. There is an urgent need to gobeyond a superficial understanding of thepresent moment, and to explore the manyways that present-day conflicts are rooted inthecomplexitiesofthepast.Donor funding is needed to support a rangeofMyanmar initiatives that engage a broadrange of community leaders to reflect uponand engage on the many complexitiessurroundingethnicidentity.Safespacesneedto be provided for these complex andsensitive issues to be explored jointly by awidevarietyofMyanmarstakeholders.Likewise, international actors –whether theybe attached to international media outlets,international governmental or non-governmental organisations, or corporateinterests – must develop a deeperunderstandingofthecomplexenvironmentinwhich they are operating. Engagement byoutside actors must be informed by carefulexploration of complex local dynamics, andmust thoughtfully strive to avoid reinforcingexclusionarynarratives.The purpose of this report has been to re-examine theexperienceofethnicity fromthe

119

perspectiveofdiverseMyanmarstakeholders.Theurgencyunderlyingthisprojectliesinthefact that Myanmar has experienced decadesof armed conflict oriented around ethnicidentity. The recent clearance operationagainst the Rohingyas is only one extremechapter in a much longer tragic history ofexclusion,violenceanddiscrimination,as thisreport has endeavoured to show. Overgenerations, a multitude of ethnic-basedconflicts in Myanmar have produced tragicconsequences in terms of death,displacement, sexual violence, andunnecessary exposure to disease forcommunitiesonallsides.Beyondthesebrutalconsequences, ethnic identity narratives, andbeliefsaboutwhodoesanddoesnotbelong,have created systems and structures thatinstitutionalise the allocation of benefits andprivileges to some, while others facediscrimination and limited opportunities,entrenching inter-communal competition andresentment.

Only by delving into the experiences andperspectives of diverse communities is itpossibletoidentifythemanyforcesthathaveshaped the central role of ethnic identity inMyanmar. This report highlights the need tosupport initiatives that build unity andembrace diversity, to re-examine andchallenge existing ethnic identity narratives,tobuildtrustthroughmeasuresthatrecognisepolitical legitimacy, autonomy and self-determination, and to rethink the concept of

taingyintha while engaging with complexity.These strategies and approaches offer theopportunity to challenge and deconstructcurrent assumptions and concepts associatedwith ethnic identity. As such, these effortsrepresent only the first steps on a long, butnecessary, road to forge new outlooks andsentiments regarding Myanmar’s richdiversity. Indeed, the route to sustainablepeace inMyanmar depends on being able tochallenge and discard perspectives that seediversity as a threat and ethnic identity as atool mobilising inter-group competition overwhatareperceivedtobescarceresourcesinazero-sumgame.Instead,thereisaneedtore-engagewithethnicidentityasanaspectoflifethatcontributestoarichandvibrantmodernMyanmarsociety.While the pages of this report have focusedon the challenges and opportunities facingMyanmar, it should be acknowledged thatthereisaneedforsimilarengagementtotakeplace in many settings around the world.During the first decades of the twenty-firstcentury,countless instanceshaveemerged inwhich narratives surrounding the perceivedthreat of diversity have produced fault linesbetween communities and nation states.Ultimately, there is a need for stakeholdersglobally to mobilise and challenge instanceswhen differences are manipulated for social,political, or economic ends. As Myanmargrapples with the needs and prospectsemerging from its own transition process, itwill have valuable lessons to offer the widerglobalcommunity.

120

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ScholarlyBooksandJournalsAnderson,B.R.(1983).Imagined

communities:Reflectionsontheoriginandspreadofnationalism.Brooklyn:Verso.

Aung-Thwin,M.(1985).TheBritish

“Pacification”ofBurma:OrderWithoutMeaning.JournalofSoutheastAsianStudies,16(2),245-261.doi:10.1017/s0022463400008432

Aung-Thwin,M.(2001).Parochial

Universalism,DemocracyJihadandtheOrientalistImageofBurma:TheNewEvangelism.PacificAffairs,74(4),483-505.doi:10.2307/3557803

Callahan,M.(2017).Distorted,Dangerous

Data?Lumyointhe2014MyanmarPopulationandHousingCensus.JournalofSocialIssuesinSoutheastAsia,32(2),452-478.doi:10.1355/sj32-2q

Callahan,M.P.(2003).Makingenemies:

WarandstatebuildinginBurma.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.

Cheesman,N.(2017).HowinMyanmar

“NationalRaces”CametoSurpassCitizenshipandExcludeRohingya.JournalofContemporaryAsia,47(3),461-483.doi:10.4324/9781315146263-7

Ferguson,J.M.(2015).Who’sCounting?

BijdragenTotDeTaal-,Land-EnVolkenkunde/JournaloftheHumanitiesandSocialSciencesofSoutheastAsia,171(1),1-28.doi:10.1163/22134379-17101022

Furnivall,J.S.(1939).TheFashioningofLeviathan:TheBeginningsofBritishRuleinBurma.JournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSocietyofGreatBritain&Ireland,74(02),150-151.doi:10.1017/s0035869x00094302

Galtung,J.(1969).Violence,Peace,and

PeaceResearch.JournalofPeaceResearch,6(3),167-191.doi:10.1177/002234336900600301

Houtman,G.(1999).Mentalculturein

Burmesecrisispolitics:AungSanSuuKyiandtheNationalLeagueforDemocracy.Tokyo:InstitutefortheStudyofLanguagesandCulturesofAsiaandAfrica(ILCAA),TokyoUniversityofForeignStudies.

Kymlicka,W.(1995).Multicultural

Citizenship.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Leach,E.R.(1954).PoliticalSystemsof

HighlandBurma.Boston:BeaconPress.

Lee,H.G.(2007).Furnivall'sPluralSociety

andLeach'sPoliticalSystemsofHighlandBurma.JournalofSocialIssuesinSoutheastAsia,24(1),32-46.doi:10.1355/sj24-1c

Lieberman,V.B.(1978).EthnicPoliticsin

Eighteenth-CenturyBurma.ModernAsianStudies,12(03),455.doi:10.1017/s0026749x00006235

Myint-U,T.(2001).TheMakingofModern

Burma.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Myint-U,T.(2006).TheRiverofLost

Footsteps:HistoriesofBurma.London:FaberandFaber.

121

Sadan,M.(2013).BeingandBecomingKachin:HistoriesBeyondtheStateintheBorderworldsofBurma.Oxford:PublishedfortheBritishAcademybyOxfordUniversityPress.

Sadan,M.(2016).WarandPeaceinthe

BorderlandsofMyanmar:TheKachinCeasefire,1994-2011.Copenhagen:NiasPress.

Scott,J.C.(2009).TheArtofNotBeing

Governed:AnAnarchistHistoryofUplandSoutheastAsia.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Silverstein,J.(1977).Burma:MilitaryRuleandthe

PoliticsofStagnation.Ithaca:CornellUniv.Press.

Smith,M.(1991).BurmaInsurgencyandthe

PoliticsofEthnicity.London:Zed.South,A.(2007).KarenNationalist

Communities:The“Problem”ofDiversity.ContemporarySoutheastAsia,29(1),55-76.doi:10.1355/cs29-1c

South,A.(2008).EthnicPoliticsinBurma:

StatesofConflict.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.

South,A.(2017).“HybridGovernance”and

thePoliticsofLegitimacyintheMyanmarPeaceProcess.JournalofContemporaryAsia,48(1),50-66.doi:10.1080/00472336.2017.1387280

South,A.,&Lall,M.C.(2018).Citizenshipin

Myanmar:WaysofBeinginandfromBurma.ChiangMai,Thailand:ChiangMaiUniversityPress.

Steinberg,D.I.(2001).Burma:TheStateof

Myanmar.Washington,D.C:GeorgetownUniversityPress.

Taylor,R.H.(1979).Burma´sNationalUnityProblemandthe1974Constitution.ContemporarySoutheastAsia,1(3),232-248.doi:10.1355/cs1-3c

Taylor,R.H.(1982).PerceptionsofEthnicity

inthePoliticsofBurma.SoutheastAsianJournalofSocialScience,10(1),7-22.doi:10.1163/156853182x00029

Taylor,R.H.(2009).TheStateinMyanmar.

Honolulu:UniversityofHawaiiPress.Tønnesson,S.,&Antlöv,H.(1996).Asian

formsofthenation.London:RoutledgeCurzon.

Walton,M.J.(2013).The“Wagesof

Burman-ness:”EthnicityandBurmanPrivilegeinContemporaryMyanmar.JournalofContemporaryAsia,43(1),1-27.doi:10.1080/00472336.2012.730892

OnlineReportsandResourcesAGenderAnalysisoftheRighttoNationalityin

Myanmar.(2018).TheNorwegianRefugeeCouncilinMyanmar,UNHCRMyanmarandUNWomenMyanmar.doi:https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/myanmar/cedaw-report-web-7-march-2018.pdf

ANewDimensionofViolenceinMyanmar’s

RakhineState(Vol.154,AsiaBriefing,Issuebrief).(2019).Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b154-new-dimension-violence-myanmars-rakhine-state

ATentativePeaceinMyanmar’sKachin

Conflict(Vol.140,AsiaBriefing,Issuebrief).(2013).Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/

122

south-east-asia/myanmar/tentative-peace-myanmar-s-kachin-conflict

Buchanan,J.(2016).MilitiasinMyanmar.

Yangon:TheAsiaFoundation.doi:https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Militias-in-Myanmar.pdf

BuddhismandStatePowerinMyanmar(Vol.290,AsiaReport).(2017)Brussels:

InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/290-buddhism-and-state-power-myanmar

Burma:MethodicalMassacreatRohingya

Village,HundredsKilled,RapedinTulaToli.(2017).Rangoon:HumanRightsWatch.doi:https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/19/burma-methodical-massacre-rohingya-village#

Bynum,E.(2018).Analysisofthe

FPNCC/NorthernAllianceandMyanmarConflictDynamics.ACLED.doi:https://www.acleddata.com/2018/07/21/analysis-of-the-fpncc-northern-alliance-and-myanmar-conflict-dynamics/

CountingtheCosts:Myanmar’sProblematic

Census(Vol.144,AsiaBriefing,Issuebrief).(2014).Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/counting-costs-myanmar-s-problematic-census

DurablePeaceProgramme,EndlineReport,

Kachin,Myanmar.(2018).Yangon:Oxfam.doi:https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report_Durable_Peace_Programme_Endline_Report_in_Kachin_May2018.pdf

EthnicitywithoutMeaning,DatawithoutContext.(2014).Amsterdam:TransnationalInstitute.doi:https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/ethnicity-without-meaning-data-without-context

FindingsoftheCensusObservationMission:

AnOverview.(2014).NayPyiTaw:DepartmentofPopulation,MinistryofImmigrationandPopulationandUNFPA.doi:https://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/FindingsoftheCensusObservation_ENG.pdf

FireandIce(Vol.299,AsiaReport).(2019).

Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/299-fire-and-ice-conflict-and-drugs-myanmars-shan-state

Jacquet,C.(2015).TheKachinConflict,

TestingtheLimitsofthePoliticalTransitioninMyanmar.Bangkok:ResearchInstituteonContemporarySoutheastAsia.doi:http://www.irasec.com/ouvrage121

Jolliffe,K.(2015).EthnicArmedConflictand

TerritorialAdministrationinMyanmar.Yangon:TheAsiaFoundation.doi:https://asiafoundation.org/publication/ethnic-armed-conflict-and-territorial-administration-in-myanmar-full-report/

Jolliffe,K.(2016).Ceasefires,Governance

andDevelopment;TheKarenNationalUnioninTimesofChange(Vol.16,PolicyDialogueBriefSeries).Yangon:TheAsiaFoundation.doi:https://asiafoundation.org/publication/policy-dialogue-brief-series-no-

123

16-ceasefires-governance-development/

KarenUnityBuildingInitiatives-Towards

SustainablePeaceinMyanmar.(2016).SiemReap:CentreforPeaceandConflictStudies.doi:http://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/publications/karen-unity-building-initiatives-towards-sustainable-peace-in-myanmar/

Kramer,T.,Russell,O.,&Smith,M.(2018).

FromWartoPeaceinKayah(Karenni)State,ALandattheCrossroadsinMyanmar.Amsterdam:TransnationalInstitute.doi:https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/tni-2018_karenni_eng_web_def.pdf

Myanmar:ANewMuslimInsurgencyin

RakhineState(Vol.283,AsiaReport).(2016).Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/283-myanmar-new-muslim-insurgency-rakhine-state

Myanmar:ThePoliticsofRakhineState(Vol.

261,AsiaReport).(2014).Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-politics-rakhine-state

Myanmar’sElectoralLandscape(Vol.266,

AsiaReport).(2015).Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.doi:https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-s-electoral-landscape

Nixon,H.,Joelene,C.,Lynn,T.,ChitSaw,K.,

&Arnold,M.(2013).StateandRegionGovernmentsinMyanmar.Yangon:

TheAsiaFoundationandMyanmarDevelopmentResearchInstitute.doi:https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/StateandRegionGovernmentsinMyanmarCESDTAF.PDF

QuestionsandAnswersaboutMyanmar’sCensus.

(2014).NayPyiTaw:DepartmentofPopulation,MinistryofLabour,ImmigrationandPopulation,withtechnicalassistancefromUNFPA.doi:https://myanmar.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Census_Q%26A_ENG_0.pdf

RakhineStateNeedsAssessment.(2015).

Yangon:CentreforDiversityandNationalHarmony,Myanmar:CDNH.doi:https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bwd1WXitJ5PHeXBGVmx0bjZSUlk/view

Salem-Gervais,N.(2018).TeachingEthnic

Languages,CulturesandHistoriesinGovernmentSchoolstoday:GreatOpportunities,GiantPitfalls?(PartI).TeaCircles,AnOxfordForumforNewPerspectivesonBurma.doi:https://teacircleoxford.com/2018/10/01/teaching-ethnic-languages-cultures-and-histories-in-government-schools-today-great-opportunities-giant-pitfalls-part-i/

Selth,A.(2018).Myanmar’sArmedForces

andtheRohingyaCrisis.Washington,DC:UnitedStatesInstituteforPeace.doi:https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/08/myanmars-armed-forces-and-rohingya-crisis

South,A.(2011).Burma’sLongestWar,

AnatomyoftheKarenConflict.Amsterdam:TransnationalInstitute.doi:https://www.tni.org/files/download/Burma%27s%20Longest%20War.pdf

South,A.(2018).Protectingciviliansinthe

Kachinborderlands,Myanmar,Keythreatsandlocalresponses.London:

124

OverseasDevelopmentInstitute,HumanitarianPolicyGroup.doi:https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12566.pdf

South,A.,Schroeder,T.,Jolliffe,K.,Chan

Non,M.,Shine,S.,Kempel,S.,Schroeder,A.,SheeMu,N.(2018).BetweenCeasefiresandFederalism:ExploringInterimArrangementsintheMyanmarPeaceProcess.Yangon:CovenantConsultancyCo.doi:https://covenant-consult.com/2018/11/between-ceasefires-and-federalism-exploring-interim-arrangements-in-the-myanmar-peace-process/

The2014MyanmarPopulationandHousing

Census,FiguresataGlance.(2016).NayPyiTaw:DepartmentofPopulation,MinistryofLabour,ImmigrationandPopulation,withtechnicalassistancefromUNFPA.doi:https://myanmar.unfpa.org/en/node/15104

TheIndependentInternationalFact-Finding

MissiononMyanmar.(2018).Geneva:UnitedNationsOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights.doi:https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarffm/pages/index.aspx

Thestructureandoperationsofthe

MyanmarArmyinRakhineState:Areviewofopensourceevidence.(2018).NewYork:SecurityForceMonitor.doi:https://securityforcemonitor.org/2018/11/20/myanmar-army-in-rakhine-state-structure-and-operations/

ThematicReportonMigrationand

Urbanization(Vol.4-D,CensusReport).(2016).NayPyiTaw:

DepartmentofPopulation,MinistryofLabour,ImmigrationandPopulation,withtechnicalassistancefromUNFPA.doi:https://myanmar.unfpa.org/en/publications/thematic-report-migration-and-urbanization

ThisisNotWhoWeAre,Listeningto

CommunitiesAffectedbyCommunalViolenceinMyanmar.(2015).SiemReap:CentreforPeaceandConflictStudies.doi:http://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/This-is-Not-Who-We-Are-8.9.15.pdf

Wansai,S.(2018).Constitution-Makingand

PeaceProcessStagnationinMyanmar:Willaconditionalclausehelprestoreconfidenceinthe21stCenturyPanglongConference?.Amsterdam:TransnationalInstitute.doi:https://www.tni.org/en/article/constitution-making-and-peace-process-stagnation-in-myanmar-will-a-conditional-clause-help

Yawnghwe,H.(2014).Burma-national

dialogue:Armedgroups,contestedlegitimacyandpoliticaltransition(Vol.25,Accord).London:ConciliationResources.doi:https://www.c-r.org/accord/legitimacy-and-peace-processes/burma-national-dialogue-armed-groups-contested-legitimacy-and

Yun,L.(2017).BuildingPeaceinMyanmar:

BirthoftheFPNCC.Nottingham:AsiaDialogue.doi:http://theasiadialogue.com/2017/10/06/building-peace-in-myanmar-birth-of-the-fpncc/

125

The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies is home to a range ofinterconnected programmes that promote the advancement ofpeaceprocesses,researchandlearning.Itcreatesopportunitiesforpractitioners, students, academics and analysts to accessinformationandresourcesthatarecontextuallygrounded.www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org

ethnic identity in myanmar - reliefweb · 2019. 6. 5. · 1 re-examining ethnic identity in myanmar...

Documents