ethics and institutionalization in social science...

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21 NOV m

international social science Journal

Vol. X X I V , N o . 4, 1972

Published quarterly by Unesco

Peter Lengyel

Gunnar Boalt and Ulla Bergryd Terry N . Clark Mihailo Markovic Harold Orlans Paul Davidson Reynolds

Ethics and institutionalization

in social science

Introduction : ethics, institutionalization and policies 635 The decline and fall of the departmental empire 648 The stages of scientific institutionalization 658 Ethics of a critical social science 672 Academization in the polity 686 O n the protection of h u m a n subjects and social science 693

Wilfred Beckerman

Heinz Steinberg

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Editor: Peter Lengyel Assistant editor: Ali Kazancigil

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Printed by Imprimerie Chaix-Desfosses, Paris © Unesco 1972 Printed in France SHC.72/I.103/A

ethics and institutionalization in social science

Peter Lengyel Introduction: ethics, institutionalization and policies

It m a y at first sight seem surprising to couple problems of professional ethics with those of institutionalization, as proposed in the present issue of the Journal. O n closer examination, however, the approach appears to be a fruitful one, for it is too often assumed that ethical questions are somehow resolved along with institutionalization, and that therefore professional institutions reflect, indeed embody, a tested code and a more or less accepted set of performance norms. This is certainly far from being the case in the social sciences, where ethical problems have always been close to the surface and which have become institutionalized largely by the adoption of models derived from the natural sciences or from bureaucracies. The latest crisis of the social sciences has consequently thrown a number of long latent and unresolved issues into sharp relief: they crop us again and again in the literature, obviously troubling the consciousness of scholars and the m u c h wider community of those more or less closely concerned with the social science enterprise.

T o o m u c h should perhaps not be m a d e of the current crisis since, historically speaking, the social sciences have never yet found a particularly comfortable niche amongst the institutions within which they function, and the societies of which they are a part. Controversy, doubt, ideological and disciplinary fission are the very stuff of their evolution. Over the fairly brief period of their emergence they have constantly been at loggerheads about conditions governing autonomy, recognition and support. The precise front lines of battle, of course, shift. N o w they are situated at the borders between disciplines, n o w between an alliance of social scientists against traditional h u m a nists; at other times, and in different circumstances, the main issue m a y revolve around the general freedom of inquiry and criticism, with social scientists in the vanguard, or again in competition with natural sciences for a place in the sun and a slice of the budgetary cake. Perhaps it is as well that it has been so in the past, and promises to continue in like fashion, for nothing is more alarming to contemplate than a thoroughly comfortable, established, complacent social science growing fat on self-congratulation.

T w o major approaches to current discontents appear to have emerged. The first argues in terms of a policy towards the social sciences, that is to say, favourable terms for their functioning and welfare to be provided by the

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community at large, and more specifically, by governments. The assumptions behind this approach are that the social sciences have already adequately demonstrated their utility, actual or potential, and that their unfolding can hence but have widely beneficial effects. F r o m this, it is but a logical step to construct comparative tables contrasting the support extended to the natural sciences, both pure and applied, with the rather paltry treatment meted out to the social sciences, and arguing that the returns on the marginal unit invested in social science m a y well be as great as, if not considerably greater than, the return on a comparable investment in the natural sciences. A s further support for the case, it is c o m m o n to contrast the striking difference between the speed and efficiency with which technical and scientific frontiers are conquered with the m u c h less spectacular performance in the social domain where perplexities, if anything, are growing and solutions do not seem to be forthcoming.

The question of priorities then quite naturally follows. If w e can get to the m o o n , h o w c o m e w e cannot solve urban degeneration, underdevelopment, juvenile delinquency or industrial conflicts? The answer is said to lie in lack of research, shortage of trained manpower , inadequate respect for and use of the findings of social scholarship and similar failings while the solution is supposed to reside in an adequately generous treatment of the social sciences in all their legitimate needs and aspirations.

The other approach is internal to the social sciences. Seeing their fields riddled with ambiguities and cleft by disputes, m a n y social scientists concentrate upon an introspective critique in the hope that, if only some semblance of order and agreement could be established within the confraternity, and greater 'operational capacity' be achieved the rest would be comparatively easy sailing. The resulting debate often absorbs so m u c h of the available energy as to leave little for other purposes. Problems of ethics fall mainly into this second category, but provide a significant link with questions subsumed under the first type of approach. N o doubt, professional ethics are perennially relevant: in a changing world, they pose new challenges to doctors, judges, scientists or civil servants alike and they can never be finally resolved since they concern contingent judgement as exercised by fallible h u m a n beings. The discussion of ethics, moreover, has the advantage of illuminating both problems of institutionalization and those of the general status of a profession in society in an especially incisive manner. It originates from what is usually the most alert and sensitive group of practitioners, those already sufficiently established to care for the future of the trade but not as yet satiated by success nor satisfied with the prospects offered by the established avenues of professional advancement. Boalt and Bergryd, in their article below, document one aspect of this process in a highly personal manner, which adds a welcome subjective dimension to what is, after all, often a very subjectively perceived perplexity.

Ethics also c o m e to the fore w h e n innovations m a k e their impact. Thus, the Hippocratic oath has been put into question by the present ability to postpone clinical death long after all hopes for any meaningful recovery of a patient have had to be abandoned, while heart-lung or kidney machines raise

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the dilemma of w h o is to be selected to survive with the help of such expensive devices. In the social sciences, the very scale of the enterprise and volume of production over the past decades have raised—perhaps exaggerated—hopes of influence on policy and on public opinion. T h o u g h it is hard to assess the precise degree to which this has actually occurred, the impact has not been sufficiently spectacular to please m a n y of those w h o feel that social science has more to offer than it is being allowed to contribute, and that the point has been reached where one must go beyond description and analysis to application for the avowed purpose of social change.

O n e issue which has emerged from this situation revolves around the famous concept of value-freedom. A ritual assault on M a x Weber and those w h o worked in his tradition has become the set centre-piece for m u c h radical challenge, though it often addresses itself to aberrations of application rather than to the underlying idea itself. If value-freedom is interpreted to m e a n that practically any social phenomenon deserves as m u c h investigation and attention as another, or that the investigator should adopt a quasi-Olympian stance which s o m e h o w translates him into a sphere of unassailable neutrality and dispenses him from examining or making his assumptions explicit, then it indeed deserves to be attacked. But often, there is no more to it than the erection of straw m e n for the pleasure of knocking them d o w n which has little to d o with what M a x W e b e r had in mind, since he believed that the variety of ultimate commitments in fact governed the possible range of social sciences which could exist. If value-freedom is thrown out of the window, it has an inconvenient talent for coming back through the front door, since what is involved is the central problem of the observer's degree of complicity with, or reasoned detachment from, the social phenomenon under scrutiny and the subsequent interpretation of his data, which can never be wholly escaped.

In the contemporary context, attacks on value-freedom often bear not so m u c h on the principle itself as on the manner in which it has been appropriated and internalized mainly in academic circles: in other words, the challenge is directed at a form of institutionalization and its claims to neutrality or objectivity. Here is an important distinction for it illustrates the confusion which arises through the manifest imperfections in the socialization of social science. It is fatally easy to slip from a critique of institutionalization to a critique of basic scientific principles, forgetting that the latter are not the exclusive property of those w h o happen to be manipulating them in a certain framework or for certain ends. Differently interpreted and applied, from different institutional bases, the same scientific principles change character : one m a y therefore look forward to a spirited defence of value-freedom from the radical side in the not very distant future. This could well take the form, in part, of a struggle to defend the social sciences against popular encroachments, an argument adduced by Reynolds, in his article below, to support the case for a code of professional ethics. The backlash from that quarter could indeed be at least as dangerous—and a good deal more difficult to handle—than the hostility of authorities which might consider the social sciences as subversive, if not simply as redundant.

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Institutionalization and creativity

Cherns, in a recent book, observes that 'the organizational development of the social sciences has not only paralleled but also to some extent been modelled on, organizational forms devised for the natural sciences. . . . While it m a y be argued that organizational forms modelled on those devised for the natural sciences m a y be inappropriate to the social sciences, there seems no doubt that the adoption of such models has unquestionably influenced the w a y in which the social sciences have developed' [l].1 This thesis is largely confirmed by Clark in the article on stages of scientific institutionalization, below, and illustrates what Cherns calls 'the element of me-too-ism, even a certain bandw a g o n effect' [2].

For m a n y purposes, the natural-science model was clearly an appropriate one. Beset by problems of organization, financing, training and recognition as were the social science pioneers, moreover, it would have been too m u c h to ask that they develop entirely original professional structures as well. The universities offered the obvious h o m e , and the university chair or department the obvious initial base for independence. F r o m the viewpoint of strict intellectual creativity, Karl Deutsch et ah, in their (very controversial but for present purposes sufficiently indicative) analysis of sixty-two major advances in the social sciences since 1900 confirm that universities have indeed been their prime source, though of late an important role has equally been played by university and government interdisciplinary institutes and 'think-tanks'. But they also conclude that 'a very few capital cities or university centers accounted for the great majority of all contributions ; other cities and university centers of comparable size contributed little or nothing. W e surmise that contributions to social science m a y be extremely sensitive to external economies, such as the presence of local sub-cultures with other first-rate investigators and facilities in other fields, as well as to an intellectual climate specifically favorable to social science in the country and in the local community. . . . [This] growing importance of interdisciplinary work reinforces our finding of the great importance of locating social science work at major intellectual centers, in proximity to m a n y kinds of information and expertise from m a n y disciplines. Locating a highly specialised social science enterprise at a small town or college "far away from all distractions" seems, on the contrary, to be a very promising prescription for sterility' [3].

Trist, in an article in this Journal, emphasizes the dysfunctional persistence of academic individualism, the importance of team-work, joint responsibility, group creativeness and what he calls 'longitudinal capability' and speaks of 'reassociating the university with society' [4]. It would appear, therefore, that there is a measure of agreement concerning research capacity, or at least the prerequisites for original work: the future seems to lie with the big battalions, with very purposefully and rationally organized centres, preferably, if one is to believe Deutsch, not tucked away in bucolic isolation; a rational social

1. Figures within square brackets refer to notes at the end of the article.

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science policy would thus seem best advised further to underwrite the already strong if pay-off in the form of intellectual discovery is sought.

But what of the rest? The thousands of scattered universities, colleges, technical schools and other institutions which n o w offer teaching and research facilities in the social sciences are not simply going to close d o w n , if for no better reason than because they are very m u c h in demand by students w h o d o not by any means necessarily aspire towards intellectual leadership. Indeed, the social sciences have to some extent displaced the humanities as a general educational field: they are sought in part for what they can supply in the w a y of a broad approach to the understanding of processes which affect all alert and participating citizens in a modern or modernizing community. Despite not consistently brilliant employment outlets for this type of training, students continue to enrol and faculties to expand. There are interests here which must be catered for, whether or not they hold out bright hopes of measurable returns : perhaps they should even be treated as aspects of consumption, a new sort of service industry. If this is the case, one should carefully consider both whether further development along the model of the natural sciences (themselves perhaps about to change direction, which m a y give rise to an ironical me-too-ism twist on the part of the social sciences) or along lines suitable for the great creative centres is at all appropriate. It could well be that the most rewarding course for the minor university department or centre lies in experimentation and institutional diversification, that perhaps they could act in some respects as those laboratories of organizational and h u m a n potential, the very lack of which social scientists so often bemoan. They might act as schools of citizenship, of parenthood, of psychological or sexual adjustment, proving grounds for diverse ways of living and of learning or community service centres rather than as orthodox degree-granting and standard-setting institutions. O n e could also think more in terms of regular interchange between theory and practice with persons w h o , after an initial training period, go out to perform various tasks, return to their school, go out again and so on. This would have the advantage not only of 'reassociating the university with society', as Trist suggests, but of ensuring that the university does not lag behind or deform emergent social reality, by assimilating its uncertain trends chiefly in excessively structured, abstract form.

S o m e of these tasks are indeed already being performed in certain countries. Thus Bogdan Suchodolski, describing the situation in Poland, refers to the role of the social sciences in moulding social awareness 'to inform, persuade and educate people to see reality as it acutally is, to understand the principles underlying n e w institutions and to grasp the new ways in which political mechanisms function [5]. While admitting that social research in Poland has been 'apologetic' in that 'it takes for granted socialism as a form of social life intrinsically more valuable than the capitalist one' Suchodolski e m p h a sizes that 'at the same time it can be described as blame-seeking or critically oriented, because another underlying assumption is that socialism is evolving and thus subject to improvement in each m o m e n t of time, and in each of its institutional aspects' [6] (shades of value-freedom again!). H e goes on to quote

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examples of the directly useful application of social science in organizing group action. In m a n y Third World countries, where the social sciences will continue to be rather exotic and culturally difficult to assimilate, such tasks could be even more appropriate than they are in Poland, a European nation with a long, indigenous social science tradition of its o w n . If it has become fashionable to call for a specifically 'Asian', 'African' or 'Latin American' social science, and to deplore the client relationships which allegedly exist between the scholarly communities of these regions and the centres of creativity, one can be sceptical about the ability to force the pace. For a variety of perfectly good reasons, it m a y be several decades before coherent and significant intellectual differentiations in the basic conceptual apparatus emerge, and by then they m a y be less relevant than they appear today. O n the other hand, there is nothing impossible about adapting existing social science resources and dosing the mixture imaginatively in a manner best designed to suit current demands and opportunities. Quite conceivably, Keynesian economics, like Marxist sociology, do not have m u c h appeal in m a n y societies, but there are other ways of moulding social awareness and organizing group action. T o insist that the revolution must come from 'above', that it must be led by advanced theorizers and conceptualizers, is simply part of an elitist position. W h a t semi-trained, auxiliary medical personnel have done for public health in certain countries, similarly modestly qualified social science auxiliaries, working out of 'social dispensaries' rather than faculties and research institutes, might emulate. This, of course, implies a m u c h greater fusion between social science, social work and what could be conceived as a variety of existential practice than is at present admitted. A n example from the author's o w n experience m a y illustrate the point. Involved in the organization of an economics refresher course for middle-level teaching and research personnel from Asian countries, I was dismayed to find the consultants for the most part delivering themselves of lectures in sophisticated mathematical techniques which the great majority of the trainees were clearly unequipped to follow. Since these trainees were in turn teaching persons aspiring, perhaps, to become local branch bank managers or to occupy subordinate civil-service posts in the provinces this seemed hardly useful, but the consultants, fired by missionary zeal in the diffusion of intellectual fashion, could not be persuaded to desist from their chosen course. I believe the trainees took away little more from their exposure to the mysteries of econometrics than a sense of discomfiture or, at best, a participatory experience in a g a m e well played in remote locations. The feedback on teaching efficiency was probably negligible. W o u l d it, then, not have been more appropriate to discuss teaching methods and mat erials or other practical questions relating to the training of future branch bank managers or civil servants, rather than devoting time to what might possibly be appropriate to a graduate course for a select élite bound for national planning boards or similarly exalted assignments?

Institutions, as has often been shown, develop socialization patterns appropriate to their structures. Academies are academic, bureaucracies bureaucratic: those w h o have been socialized into these moulds live by and for them.

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O n e could therefore intelligently attack the problem of social science capacity in countries where it as yet barely exists, or is mal-structured, from the institutional rather than the strictly intellectual angle. Instead of seeking an 'African' social science, w h y not seek an African institution from which social science m a y emerge, whether or not such an institution is comparable to models in other parts of the world? Even in Deutsch's list of creative centres w e find, under the heading of 'type of support', the Fabian Society (the W e b b s , Shaw, Wells), the Politbureau (Lenin), an ashram (Gandhi), an invisible college (the Vienna circle) and the United Nations regional economic commissions (development theorists). Perhaps the major advances of the next half-century m a y come out of tribal councils, Buddhist monasteries, municipal authorities, audio-visual studios or the W o m e n ' s Liberation Movement .

The example of communication

The current state of communications in the social sciences is an excellent index to their ambiguities and a measure of their conservatism and rigidities. It is, of course, in m a n y ways uncomfortable that the content and language of the social sciences are, in themselves, frequently insufficiently esoteric to give specialists a sort of natural monopoly over them. The public does not contest the manner in which physicists or construction engineers choose to discourse since it is readily admitted that what these specialists have to say to each other, and the way in which they say it, is their business and cannot in any case be understood by laymen. But society is everybody's affair, so that it is natural if the lay public wants not only to eavesdrop on social scientists but also demands to k n o w in what way and to what extent they possess k n o w ledge which should be widely disseminated, and h o w such knowledge m a y differ from that conveyed by journalists, commentators on the media, politicians or other 'experts'.

For m a n y a long century, social scientists were indeed perfectly happy to use the philosophical-literary m o d e of written expression which they shared with other learned m e n and directed at that small group of peers and educated laymen which m a d e up the accessible élite up to about sixty years ago. F r o m Aristotle through the mediaeval schoolmen, Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, A d a m Smith, the Utilitarians and d o w n to M a r x , Lenin, Schumpeter and Durkheim there is no clear line of demarcation to be drawn between the expository styles of social scientists and those of other thinkers, nor was there good cause for m u c h differentiation to develop. In the past few decades, however, the scientific and philosophical-literary modes of communication have considerably diverged from each other, the social sciences finding themselves somewhat uncomfortably caught in the middle. A 'good'—that is to say, classically literate and polished—mode of expression has become highly suspect amongst broad circles of social scientists : those w h o still adopt it lay themselves open to charges of being demagogues, popularizers or, quite simply, of allowing base commercial considerations

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to outweigh scientific ones. T h e others have opted for what Orlans, below, qualifies as 'circumlocutious expression—methodical, depersonalized, generalized, humourless pedantic', often deliberately hermetic, peppered with questionably useful neologisms and ridden with a mathematical apparatus that frequently does no more than elaborate upon quite simple points. The plea that this m o d e is a result of an effort at greater scientific rigour and conceptual as well as terminological precision is certainly partly acceptable, but its function as an element of professional mystique and as a protective device should also be acknowledged. It marks off social science from other forms of social c o m ment. At any event, the style of expression and m o d e of communication typical of m u c h social science today is another example of their rather uncritical adoption of models derived from the natural sciences and can hardly be said to constitute either an ideal or to cover the full range of what it would seem desirable to convey, in different ways, to different groups for different purposes [7].

Brittain, quoting Line, enumerates thirteen ways in which the social sciences differ from the natural sciences : '(1) The subject matter of the social sciences is less stable than that of the sciences; (2) there are m a n y types of approach, and it is not unusual (as it is in science) for a researcher to question the whole validity of a given approach; (3) methodological disputes are m u c h c o m m o n e r in the social sciences; (4) each discipline in the social sciences is m u c h less clearly defined than in the sciences; (5) the scatter of potentially relevant information is m u c h greater in the social sciences than in most sciences ; (6) the relevance of information is harder to assess in the social sciences; (7) the solid factual content is probably quantitatively less than in the sciences and almost certainly less vitally important; (8) concepts and ideas are more important in the social sciences; (9) the unstable subject content and the strong conceptual element in the social sciences tend to m a k e identification of information requirements difficult; (10) the nature of discovery in the social sciences is a different phenomenon from discovery in the sciences; (11) duplication of research can be almost impossible in the social sciences; (12) scientific information is superseded by subsequent discoveries and general laws but there is n o agreement that this takes place in social science; (13) the pattern of research m a y be quite different in the social sciences' [8].

This list, which is probably not exhaustive, strongly suggests that c o m m u nication in the social sciences should be characterized by great flexibility and diversification and allows m u c h r o o m for imaginative innovation, including adaptation to specific cultural settings. Yet the trend appears to be just the other way, towards standardization and formality. A n issue of this Journal^ has been devoted to an examination of the social science press in eight key countries and internationally. T h e broad picture which emerges therefrom, and which has been confirmed by trends observed by the author since, can be summarized as follows: the typical vehicle of periodical communication remains the academic, disciplinary journal with a small circulation of between

1. Vol. XIX, N o . 2, 1967.

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1,000 and 5,000 copies. T h o u g h in some cases the publication of such journals implies heroic efforts, they are, for the most part, by-products of the academic and research establishments of which they are, if not actual house-organs, what might be called the publicity arm. Despite rapid growth in the total number of such journals, and some diversification in terms of subject-matter (including interdisciplinary fields, emergent areas of study, and subspecializa-tions) no systematic impetus is apparent to widen accessibility of material, either in terms of the languages in which journals are published nor in terms of their appeal to different audiences. A few experiments in mediation, that is to say, in bridging the gap between producers and actual or potential users of social science information or debate, have indeed proved gratifyingly successful, especially in the United States and the United K i n g d o m , and there has also been a show of interest in covering the social sciences by general magazines, the daily and the weekly press, but the scale and impact of these efforts have still been m u c h smaller and weaker than those of corresponding initiatives in the natural sciences. O n e can, of course, argue that precisely because social scientists face competition from m a n y quarters a political scientist, for example, must seek to discourse in different terms to a different audience than does a syndicated political columnist or an official spokesman. But the opposite is also true. If social scientists withdraw into their o w n closed circles, if they hide behind esotericism and technicalities, then they fail to avail themselves of the opportunity to inform and influence the community in terms which they feel to be appropriate and leave such matters primarily in the hands of profane, often poorly qualified and less than scrupulous publicists, by no means above savaging the social science enterprise, which they m a y partly misunderstand and partly decry even though they are not at all shy of plundering its findings or terms of reference, w h e n it suits their purposes.

S o m e of the contradictions induced by this situation are crippling. Boltan-ski and Maldidier have documented the effect of scientific careerism and peer-group pressures on popularization, which is to say, essentially on any efforts to communicate with those outside the professional circle, even presumably colleagues in related fields unable to assess w o r k according to highly specialized criteria [9]. The impression conveyed is that of a relentlessly structured process which, while it m a y have its roots in the exchange of gifts of information in return for recognition, as put forward by Hagstrom [10], is reaching a degree of deformation at which it no longer serves to reinforce a commitment to values. Especially in the social sciences, one m a y say that the form and effort to communicate should form an integral part of the basic endeavour and that there is m u c h less r o o m for complacency about the way in which findings are reported, and their diffusion (if necessary in several different versions), than there is in the natural sciences.

Garvey et al. in their comparative study of communication behaviour of social and physical scientists show that the process can hardly be said to function efficiently, even in its o w n terms [11]. Despite the more topical nature of their subject-matter, social scientists w o r k longer at their material, suffer greater delays in its publication and have their articles more frequently rejected

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by journals, thus increasing communication lag, than do physical scientists. Further, it appears that social scientists have more trouble in transferring information from the informal to the formal domain than do their colleagues in the physical sciences. Yet one might suppose that, precisely in the social sciences, there should be a premium on rapidity and also mechanisms for the informal, interim circulation of data, perhaps in semi-finished or tentative form, since the reality dealt with is subject to constant and sometimes radical change. It is one way in which the modern social scientist could usefully distinguish himself from the historian, and avert the charge that his material is chronically post facto.

If social scientists have been so remiss in the highly traditional m e d i u m of written material, it is hardly surprising to find them less active still in other media. W h a t immediately springs to mind in this context are, of course, films, television and recordings but it is also worth remarking that social scientists have not been prompt to adopt modern audio-visual techniques in their teaching. Though they adore 'models' they do not often construct them in three-dimensional and dynamic form to illustrate, for instance, the interdependence of economic flows or elements of systems analysis, often easier to grasp if a little ingenuity is expended on an apparatus which can be activated by a simple mechanical device (such as a p u m p pulsing coloured water through tubes and tanks) than if they are simply drawn on paper or blackboard. This might even— the notion is not so fanciful—induce toy manufacturers to offer social science material on a market already favourably conditioned by the popularity of science sets and thus introduce young minds to certain basic notions in forms a little less crude and aggressive than party games like 'Monopoly' .

A final point links u p problems of communications with those of institutionalization and creativity already discussed. The structure of communications is obviously closely related to the institutional matrix and the prevailing professional patterns: it is both conditioned by them and a reflection thereof. But it is also an element which lends itself rather well to independent variation, particularly if it is esteemed as an activity in its o w n right. A s matters stand, the teacher, the researcher, the administrator and the communicator are often one and the same person, which has severe disadvantages. If science writing has become a recognized specialization, social science writing is still in its infancy (as is social science fiction !), though it m a y probably be expected to develop spontaneously, or with a little help (such has already been provided by certain foundations and schools of journalism, particularly in North A m e rica and Western Europe). In other parts of the world, however, the form and content of social science communication, itself a cultural product of the context in which it first arose and continues to flourish, needs careful assessment. Arguably, the scientific component of social science is as universal as that of the natural sciences and knows no frontiers, but its organizational and communication components are more culture-bound. T o test this hypothesis, it seems worth attempting to 'translate' social science messages in terms specially adapted to different cultures, languages and groups not simply by finding terminological equivalents or drawing up glossaries so as to export

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a standard product smoothly but, on the contrary, by reshaping that product to change its appeal to, and impact on, specific audiences. A lot of challenging work remains to be done in such directions. It deserves specific support and recognition.

Implications for policies

Let us return to the problems of policy touched upon earlier. Current discussions on this question appear to suffer from monolithism and considerable insensitivity to all the nuances of the situation. S o m e varieties of social science, especially those connected with monitoring, can obviously flourish under orthodox sponsership; for these, the traditional and derivative models, with some adjustments in detail, are probably appropriate and sufficient. O n e thinks of the m a n y ancilliary services which governments themselves require, from censuses to surveys, from statistical material to cost-benefit analysis and so on. M u c h of this kind of social science has the advantage of being highly technical and part of the accepted machinery for any kind of modern régime. Those w h o supply it, therefore, need not fear that their work m a y decisively be affected by the winds of political change for, as Orlans puts it below, 'the language and procedures of the social sciences in their behavioural and quantitative modes and the bureaucracy in its more tedious and lowly forms are strikingly similar'. O n e can go further: certain varieties of social science are natural allies of the forces of stability and the machinery of control typically favoured by m a n y régimes. For these varieties, there is no contradiction between professional aspirations and needs and a policy towards social science designed primarily in terms of user expectations and of preconceived ideas about desired results. Even the dangers of servility are minimized if these activities are regarded as auxiliary inputs theoretically at the service of anybody w h o cares to use them; the major ethical requirement is that honest data be m a d e publicly available.

A second variety of social science is best accommodated within the traditional academic structure, changing and adapting slowly along with the higher educational systems as a whole. This variety encompasses the bulk of recognized effort at present. Though it m a y be criticized for its inadequacies, there will always be an important place for it, nor should it be asked to perform functions which, by definition and organizational sponsorship, it simply cannot undertake. A s Clark shows below, such varieties of social science have broadly followed a five-step evolutionary process from the solitary scientist through amateur science, emerging academic science and established science to 'big science': in a few countries the process has been completed, others m a y be expected to follow suit. The advantages of 'big science' are sufficiently persuasive for policy towards academic varieties of social science to be largely based upon them, though one should seek to strike a balance between the glamorous and the h u m d r u m , the spectacular and the modest roles and functions of social scientists.

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For both the first and second varieties of social science, further, policies need to take into account a hierarchy of needs and potentials. In some instances, a strictly local (municipal, county, federal state, ethnic or economic group) approach is most appropriate, in others the nation as a whole m a y be the appropriate unit of operation. S o m e enterprises can show returns to scale, by linkage across borders, through consortium or other collaborative arrangements if necessary, others are best kept small and isolated, c o m m o n services (such as access to computers, documentation and statistical facilities, etc.) are essential for academic-type social science of certain kinds, less important for others: the geographical location of institutions and personnel can be adjusted accordingly. Whatever is done, however, academy-based social science posits a set of policies which are flexible and mediated through academic bodies themselves, even if the bulk of financial support comes from government sources. Direct transmission is risky for it tends eventually to convert academic-type social science into the first variety of official, bureaucratized social science ; the two must be kept clearly distinct. Both Markovic and Reynolds, in their articles below, show this clearly. Whether the individual social scientist opts for the abstemious dedication recommended by Markovic as part of the ethics of a critical science, or pursues his tasks in the observance of the professional ethic outlined by Reynolds, both he and his enterprise need a measure of protection and independence. The academies are the only institutions which can reliably provide these and which in other respects, too, are equipped to deal with the changing needs of a changing set of disciplines in a changing environment.

There is a last variety of social science struggling to emerge which needs no policy at all; indeed it needs to be left alone, to grow, to survive, to die and to be reborn according to a strictly internal and spontaneous dynamic. This variety, earlier described as a closer fusion between social science, social work and existential practice, would have no necessary pretensions towards 'utility', at least as this m a y be understood by mundane or career criteria nor towards the production of finished products for exhibition, whether in the form of scientific material or other demonstrable achievements. It would be experimental and tentative, crop up here and there, perhaps short on endurance but full of energy while it lasted, perhaps cranky and unrealistic but generous and nonconformist, probably amateurish and marginal, but seminal and participatory, an experience more than a structured undertaking, romantic and intuitive rather than value-free and affectively neutral. The organizational patterns appropriate for this variety of social science, or their absence, would emerge directly from its conduct and would most closely reflect the chosen ethical commitment. In cultures and areas where the social sciences can be regarded as exotic, this last variety could be the kernel round which a locally appropriate direction and institutionalization agglutinates, thus offering an alternative to imported patterns, established or imposed because nothing else exists. In other contexts, this variety would serve to leaven the lump of established social science and to provide a haven for those w h o feel they must try another way while remaining in important respects loyal to professional values or commitments, and applying their training.

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It therefore appears appropriate to speak in terms of policies rather than of a policy and to recognize areas where any kind of systematic directive is inappropriate or even destructive. If one m a y have reservations about the last variety of social science sketched out above, it should be recalled that our times are particularly barren of social imagination. If the rich Utopianism of past centuries n o w strikes us as often naive, mechanistic and static, the tradition stands in need of renovation. Perhaps a new kind of commitment towards systems in part evolved by themselves can be expected from social scientists operating at the margins of those enormously complex communities which prove so frequently impervious to their best efforts.

NOTES

1. C H E R N S , A . B . ; S I N C L A I R , R . ; J E N K I N S , W . I. (eds.). Social science and government, p. xxiii. London, Tavistock Publications, 1972.

2. ibid., p. xxii. 3. D E U T S C H , Karl W . ; P L A T T , John; S E N G H A A S , Dieter. Conditions favoring

major advances in social science. Science, vol. 171, no. 3970, 3 July 1971, p. 458. 4. T R I S T , Eric. Social research institutions: types, structures, scale. International

social science journal, vol. X X I I , no. 2, 1970, p. 318-23. 5. Cherns, ed., op. cit., p. 201. 6. ibid., p. 202. 7. cf. A N D R E S K I , Stanislav. Social sciences as sorcery. London, Deutsch, 1972. 8. B R I T T A I N , J. M . Information and its users, p. 50. Bath, Bath University Press,

1970. 9. B O L T A N S K I , Luc; M A L D I D I E R , Pascale. Carrière scientifique, morale scientifique

et vulgarisation. Information sur les sciences sociales, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 99-118. 10. cf. H A G S T R O M , Warren O . The scientific community, p. 20-21. N e w York and

London, Basic Books, 1965. 11. G A R V E Y , W . D . ; L I N , N a n ; N E L S O N , Carnot E . A comparison of scientific

communication behaviour of social and physical scientists. International social science journal, vol. XXIII, no. 2, 1971, p. 256-72.

Peter Lengyel, editor of this Journal since 1964, recently spent a period of leave investigating problems of institutionalization and science policy chiefly in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. He edited Approaches to the Science of Socio-economic Development (1971) and has published a number of articles on various themes, including problems of communication in social science.

647

GunnarBoait T h e decline and fall of and Ulla Bergryd

the departmental empire

Writing out of Swedish experience w e believe that the ethical problems of university professors in the social sciences have changed radically in recent years, in keeping with the conditions surrounding their professional performance. T w o n e w factors have influenced social scientists: student unrest and the n e w government regulations for handling academic affairs at the departmental level. Student action began in autumn 1967; hence the spring term of 1967 marked the end of the old system.

It is difficult to obtain a chair in Swedish universities; hence there were and still are few full professors. In 1967, for example, most departments had only one chair. W h e n a new chair is created or an established one falls vacant the most qualified scientists in the field apply for the position. They submit their scientific production for evaluation by three experts appointed by the faculty. If these three experts pronounce themselves unanimously in a candidate's favour, the faculty usually endorses their selection, as do the higher authorities, up to and including the government. But the experts, as well as faculty and higher authorities, are somewhat unpredictable. Every candidate for a chair lives in a state of fear alternating with hope, trying to influence the faculty and the authorities but unable to produce scientific work during the crisis. Once an appointment has been made , however, the new professor should soon be able to return to research, as he is expected to do. But very often he is unable to meet this expectation, for he is generally made chairman of his department and becomes caught up in administrative work. Though he has opportunities for research, he spends most of his time working for his department—trying to get more resources for it and helping his students along with their research, writing textbooks, etc. Thus, his prior research served as a means to secure a chair, memberships in committees and councils, but not as a goal in itself. The department, his personal empire and the department's expansion take priority over further research. Thus, chairholders should theoretically be anxious to maintain their positions, despite constant grumbling about the administrative burden, committees, etc. Let us analyse what happened to those chairholders w h o were in position at the beginning of 1962 and h o w m a n y of them were still holding the same jobs by the end of 1966. There were eight social science departments at the University of Stock-

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holm in 1962. O n e chairholder had been appointed as ambassador in 1965 but seven chairholders still remained heads of their departments. Hence, there was a strong tendency to keep the chair and give less weight to research.

Then the students began their drive against the academic Establishment by questioning the value and the purpose of teaching, textbooks and academic training, all of which had previously been taken for granted; this was no longer to be the situation. Chairholders suddenly had to defend and rationalize their decisions and their goals, which few of them were able to do. In addition, new regulations took most of the power of decision in important questions out of chairholders' hands and placed it either higher up or lower d o w n in the academic hierarchy. A n example would be a committee m a d e up of all the commissioned members1 in a department. Under the new regulations chairholders can no longer allocate departmental resources according to their o w n views: their academic empires suddenly became republics with little power vested in their o w n positions. This new situation did not suit the chairholders. By the beginning of 1967 there were ten social science departments at the University of Stockholm but four years later only one of them still had the same chairholder. O f the nine departing chairholders, one was m a d e president of a new university, two were retired without attempting to get one or two years more as professors, one become ill and was later pensioned off and five returned to research.

This is interesting because these chairholders had once given up research in order to build up their departmental empires. W h e n these crumbled and fell, the chairholders had either to withdraw or to build up some other kind of empire. Five of them decided to return to research. Thus, researchers appointed to chairs gave a higher value to position and academical empires than to research, but when departments got too hot to handle and the chair-holder's power was reduced, the majority of professors returned to research.

A professor is by definition able to call anything he does 'research'. D o these former chairholders w h o escaped back to research really produce scientific work? In 1970 the social science faculty of Stockholm published a book about its departments, listing staff, publications and research projects. This book2

constitutes a convenient source to evaluate the activities of researchers. O n e department does not give publication data, the other nine do. Where articles in journals and books as well as stencilled reports are listed the stencilled publications have here been omitted, and in this way there is a total of 241 publications between 1967 and 1970 for the nine departments. The four researchers (data not being available for the fifth) contributed, respectively, six out of eighteen, three out of twenty, thirteen out of sixty-nine and four out of twelve items, totalling 26 out of 119 publications, which represents an average of 22 per cent of all the publications produced by their departments. The five professors w h o did not escape into research published, respectively,

1. Only full professors and a few highly qualified assistant professors hold royal commissions at Swedish universities.

2. Samhällsforskning vid Stockholms Universltet, Stockholm, 1970.

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Gunnar Boalt and Ulla Bergryd

none out of three, two out of thirty, none out of three, two out of fifty-four and two out of thirty-two, totalling 6 out of 122, which is an average of 5 per cent of publications produced by their departments. Thus, researchers do publish more.

For scientific projects handled similar data can be derived. The five researchers handled, respectively, four out of ten, one out of twenty-eight, nine out of sixty-two, five out of fifty-three and six out of thirty-two, totalling 25 out of 185 projects, an average of 14 per cent of the listed projects. The five professors choosing other ways to escape their dilemma as chair-holders were handling, respectively, one out of seven, one out of fourteen, none out of eighteen, three out of twenty-two and one out of thirty-eight projects, a total of 6 out of 99 projects, which represents an average of 6 per cent of the projects considered to be under way. Thus, the researchers, a m o n g the professors, had a greater share of the scientific projects.

The chairholders w h o either remain such or retire from their chairs with a pension evidently are little inclined to take up research again. W h a t , then, do they retire to? Their family? If so, their families should be more gratifying and more stable than are the families of the researchers. Children hardly m a k e the modern marriage less difficult though they certainly create contacts. H o w do w e measure family stability without asking questions? O n e possibility is to observe the number of divorces, marriages and children. The five researchers together had, as of 1970, five divorces, nine marriages and eighteen children; the five non-researchers had one divorce, five marriages, and eight children. The latter appear to have a more stable family pattern, but not as m a n y children. W e suggest that there is a tendency, a m o n g the researchers, to seek out n e w experience in the emotional field, by going in for more children and wives. Researchers sometimes use their research commitments as a means for making emotional contacts with their female co-workers. Hence, research achievements can be exchanged for administrative or political empires, emotional contacts and security; furthermore they can be used to obtain grants, to start new research, to gain further scientific status, etc. Research is consequently an excellent way to escape from crumbling and collapsing personal empires without losing status. But the conditions leading to the decline and fall of the department chairman need not deter n e w professors from building their personal departmental empires on the ruins of the old ones. Since 1968 eight full professors have been appointed to the social science faculty of Stockholm. W h a t has happened to them? Seven are still chairmen of their departments in 1971. Perhaps they accepted their posts not knowing and never finding out h o w little of the former chairholder's power is left to them so they do not feel their ambitions curbed. In addition, perhaps conditions for building departmental empires have improved again. At any rate, a new generation of chairholders has taken over, probably better equipped for present conditions but still eager to exchange research for a departmental empire. Doing research is a highly skilled occupation, greatly esteemed in Western society. It is not surprising, therefore, that the researcher can exchange his scientific status for other types of status, though it is difficult to describe

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this very complicated game in detail since every first-rate researcher is able to m a k e his o w n rules of play. O n e of us, Boalt, has for a long time played the academic game, and w e will use his impressions as a basis for a set of hypotheses to be tested with available hard data.

Boalt was awarded his P h . D . in 1947. Before then, he attempted to m a k e himself available and useful to his full professor—assuming and accepting the role of apparently favourite pupil. In 1948 he was promoted to assistant professor in social philosophy but in reality was teaching sociology, which did not yet exist as a discipline at the University of Stockholm. However, it became one the next year (1949) at Stockholm, after it had been introduced at Uppsala University (1947) when Torgny Segerstedt, formerly full professor in social philosophy, was m a d e a full professor in sociology. In addition at Lund University, Bertil Pfannenstill was m a d e assistant professor of sociology in 1948.

Segerstedt, at Uppsala, enjoyed security and status as full professor, Pfannenstill probably felt rather secure at Lund, but Boalt had a strong feeling that he himself was regarded as an outsider in the Faculty of Arts. Boalt believed that most of the professors wanted a sociology devoted to historical studies or studies of primitive societies and not his kind of sociology, which relied upon statistics and data drawn from modern society. H e was anxious therefore to ally himself with members of the other social science departments, already established at the university, to demonstrate his respect and loyalty.

For the new subject of sociology he had to prepare a list of textbooks in 1949, which gave him the chance he needed. It was, after all, a great compliment to any Swedish social scientist to have one of his books appear on the list for the new subject, and was equally important to flatter the chairholders of the social science departments at Stockholm. The textbook list got rather long this way, which did not matter if the student was allowed to choose, for instance, one textbook out of several in statistics. A s an example, for a minor in sociology students were required to read one classic work, but could choose between eight titles : Boas, Sumner, T h o m a s and Znaniecki, Weber , Lazarsfeld-Jahoda, Thrasher, Zorbaugh or the Lynds.

Certain trends emerge if w e compare the textbook lists for Uppsala, 1948; Lund, 1948; and Stockholm, 1949. The data are reported in Table 1.

T A B L E 1. The lists in sociology at different universities, number of books, books by Swedish authors and books by professors in the local social science departments

University

Uppsala, 1948 Lund, 1948 Stockholm, 1949

Number of books

23 25 57

Books by Swedish authors

4 3

21

Books by local professors

1 0

11

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A s the figures indicate, Boalt paid far more attention to Swedish authors, especially members of his o w n faculty, than the other chairholders. By doing this he hoped to obtain support from Swedish authors and particularly local professors for his department and for himself. Their support would be exceedingly important to him if a new chair was to be created in sociology, which appeared beyond reach in 1949. Slowly, the government showed more interest for new chairs in sociology, which should have made Boalt's position stronger, though he was keenly aware of the risks. A new chair could be created, but his colleagues could give it to somebody else. Then he would be dismissed. Consequently he had to go on collecting merit and keep trying to use revised literature lists to his advantage, which were published by his department in 1951, 1953 and 1954. They show what we would suspect (see Table 2).

Boalt thus slowly increased the number of books, especially by Swedish authors and Stockholm professors, until he was made a full professor in 1954. With his position secured, he no longer had to add new books by colleagues to his list.

The new chair gave him security but very few resources. H e needed a staff, but to get it he needed students. T o attract students then became the next step. Before he had secured his chair he had been careful not to attract too many students from other departments. N o w he was freer to manipulate the number of students. One opportunity was to play on the students' aversion for books written in foreign languages, an important consideration for the first term of studies, less important for the second term and dangerous for the third. However, in 1949 there existed hardly any books at all in Swedish covering the central parts of the subject. Thus, Boalt started writing sociological textbooks in Swedish and slowly covered the field. Table 3 shows the number of Swedish textbooks used the first and second terms, the number of students w h o passed examinations after their first term and the size of staff as it appeared in university handbooks. (The numbers for staff are often too low, since some teachers were hired too late to appear in the handbooks). Data correspond to the publication dates of new lists.

The percentage of textbooks in Swedish for the first term slowly rose to 100 per cent, but in 1968 student action reduced it to 53 per cent and cut the number of Boalt's books in use to one. The trend for the second term is similar. The number of students steadily increased until 1971. A s a result,

T A B L E 2. Literature lists in sociology at the University of Stockholm

Number of Books by Swedish Books by Stockholm books authors professors

1949 57 21 11 1951 59 21 14 1953 61 23 16 1954 57 23 16

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T A B L E 3. N u m b e r of Swedish textbooks for first and second term, books by Boalt, number of marks given for the first term and size of staff according to catalogues

Swedish textbooks for first term Swedish textbooks second term Students Fuit passing pro-

By Boalt Totally Percentage By Boalt Totally Percentage examination fessors

1949 1951 1953 1954 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1971

0 1 2 3 4 10 13 9 7 1 1

17/42 17/31 21/34 23/35 21/26 25/28 35/39 26/26 26/26 10/19 13/24

40 55 61 64 81 89 90 100 100 53 54

1 1 1 0 0 2 2 5 4 0 0

7/15 7/23 7/24 3/22 3/8 8/11 12/16 19/26 16/25 6/20

34/61

47 31 29 14 38 73 75 73 64 30 56

24 48 42 86

205 289 409 477 676

1,082 About 800

0 0 0

2 3 3

2 3 5 7 16 18 17 18 19 33 56

it was possible to get several n e w chairs. The size of the staff also increased, although in later years this partly resulted from dividing positions into half-time jobs. This is a good example of departmental elephantiasis. T o secure chairs and positions for qualified researchers, m a n y students had to be brought in which resulted in an almost complete breakdown of the relationship between students and teachers.

A chairholder building a departmental empire of this size—at one time numbering nearly 3,000 students—cannot afford to be a nice or generous person. Though he m a y perceive himself that way, his staff will not share his view, for it has only too often had to cope with the chairholder's harsh demands and firm refusals. It fails to appreciate the necessity for his quick and rather arbitrary decisions. Boalt, acutely aware of this situation, decided to leave his chair in 1966, which he could afford to do since, in the previous year, he had been elected dean of the social science faculty. A s such he could still retain control of the department while avoiding direct contacts with discontented staff members . But the successor he wanted left for the United States; hence Boalt had to remain formally in the chair until his successor returned, and the student revolt directly hit him instead of his successor. Remaining in the chair until 1968, Boalt had to weather the storm, and do so alone. H e could not expect his staff's confidence in a serious crisis. But he handed over to his successor those of his committees or council memberships which could be transferred. H e slowly gave u p writing textbooks nobody needed and reacted like most social science department chairholders, as illustrated in the tables, that is, he tried to return to the research he had given up when he was appointed to his chair. N o w he was faced with the need to secure grants and start writing scientific works again which, moreover, had to be in foreign languages since the Swedish market was n o w closed to him. Unable to tolerate

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the traditional contact-seeking at academic conferences and congresses, he sometimes spent a quarter at an American university, kind enough to appoint him as adjunct professor.

There are thus two turning-points in Boalt's career: his appointment as full professor and chairman in 1954 and his decision to relinquish the chair in 1966 (although he did not leave until in 1968). Let us examine the hard data on his performance (Table 4).

Table 4 demonstrates Boalt's slow acquisition of membership in important councils and committees. The process accelerated when he was m a d e full professor, but decreased in 1966 when he retired from some posts. His age will probably soon exclude him from most of his remaining posts. The number of textbooks written reached a peak in 1960, then dropped to zero, where it will probably remain. Research grants were important to Boalt beforel954, because they gave him resources and marked achievements for his promotion to full professorship; then he gave up research until he decided to leave his overgrown departmental empire. After 1966, he again started planning research, applying for grants and hiring competent assistants; his findings have been published as books in English or G e r m a n .

The two turning-points show up clearly in Table 4, although their effect on textbook writing was delayed. A s long as Boalt was able to get his books printed, he continued writing, but publishers slowly discovered that there was no longer a market for his work and they ceased to accept it, which explains the delayed turning-point concerning textbooks.

T A B L E 4. Boalt's memberships in councils, etc., textbook production, research grants and scientific books in foreign languages

Year

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953

1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961

Membership

in councils,

etc.

0 1 1 2 2

3 2 5 5 5 5 6 6

Textbooks written during

the year

0 2 1 0 1

1 0 1 1 2 2 3 2

Research grants

for the year

1 .—. — 1

-— — — —

—

Scientific books in foreign

language

— — — -

— — — — —

z —

Year

1962 1963 1964 1965

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

Membership

in councils,

etc.

6 7 8 8

5 6 6 6 6 5

TOTAL

Textbooks written during

the year

1 1 2 2

1 2 2 1 1 0

29

Research grants

for the year

— — —

1 1 1 1 2 2

10

Scientific books in foreign

language

— — —

—

5

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W e have not yet dealt with Boalt's emotional life and its relationship to the turning-points in his career. This is a delicate matter, although w e believ that considerable changes took place. The turning-point in 1954 meant that Boalt gave u p scientific work, but gained more power and no longer had to watch his step so carefully: either he could afford emotional risks or he needed them. Whichever was the case, emotional contacts presented themselves and in 1956 he left his wife and five children, remarried the next year and started building a new family empire.

His decision to leave the chair in 1966 was to some extent motivated by the wishes of his family, which wanted to see more of him and regretted that he did not retire immediately. Besides, he was already 56 years old, and, while preparations for new research did not upset him, student troubles in 1967 and 1968 did. H e developed a number of stress symptoms and was seldom able to relax with his family, wanting far m o r e sympathy and support than a normal family could provide. A s a result, his second family empire was badly shaken, though there was no open schism or divorce.

T h e two turning-points thus affected Boalt in m u c h the same w a y as the tables on chairholders suggest. The research empire, the departmental empire and the family empire interact. W h e n the researcher decides to build a departmental empire he not only has to give u p his research but also sometimes his family. Then, when he relinquishes his department he tries to go back to research and badly needs emotional support. This transition m a y disrupt his marriage. There are of course cases where a researcher starts by giving u p his family empire and then has to use a departmental empire or his research to compensate for his loss. W e believe generally these three areas of behaviour interact so closely that it is difficult or impossible to isolate the 'causes' of change, unless one blames external factors like student unrest, etc.

W e wish to m a k e one more point clear: social scientists have at least one advantage over other kinds of scientists, since they can use their personal difficulties to help in their research or their research to help in their personal difficulties. W e realize that this article was written partly because Boalt needed to air his feelings of guilt, by trying to present his personal case in a better light by relating it to that of other people w h o seem to react in the same way . Social scientists thus sometimes disguise their ethical problems as scientific ones, and if this represents no advantage to science, it m a y be hoped that it is of some help to scientists.

W e have used our data to illuminate ethical problems and conditions of professional performance for social scientists, for w e suspect that they are bound up with academic and research careers because social scientists must present their findings in appropriate forms and use them to compete with equally ambitious colleagues.1

T h e scientific career is almost always the first one open to the social scientist, although it is only one variant of the general career pattern. Once the social scientist has written a brilliant thesis or been promoted to a full

1. See, for instance, Boalt and Lantz, Universities and Research, N e w York, 1970.

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professorship his success can provide opportunities for an administrative or political career, or for a fine family. Nothing succeeds like success. Social scientists naturally prefer the administrative career and eagerly try to exchange their small research empire for a departmental one, so long as they consider conditions favourable. If they sense that conditions are deteriorating, the department builders try to switch back to research or, if that proves too difficult, retire to family life and the enjoyment of well-earned leisure. Professional ethics would have it that research is the scientist's top value, but in fact it is not, being merely an exchangeable part of the delightful career pattern.

There are, of course, exceptions to this pattern: scientists completely caught up in their research and utterly opposed to the idea of giving it up for any kind of promotion. O n e sees them sometimes, for instance, in the limelight of the Nobel prize ceremony, blinking like dug-up moles, trying to tolerate the fuss and impatiently waiting for a chance to return to their o w n nice, silent little niche. However, there are not too m a n y of these types a m o n g us.

W e have tried to present a picture of the departmental chairholder, as he behaved on the Swedish scene. It is our picture but it need not necessarily be the correct one: we are well aware of the fact that our interpretations are open to challenge. Does he really give up research because he wants power and status as chairholder? H e might consider it his duty to protect his staff and promote their research instead of his o w n . Or does the disillusioned chairholder give up his position and return to research because he can thus retain more status? Perhaps he does not care m u c h about his status but is concerned with his intellectual interests? W e believe that chairholders w h o leave and take up research again have more children and more divorces because they seek emotional contacts to alleviate the stress of research activity at high levels of aspiration, but are they perhaps merely younger and more active? There is probably some truth in explanations like these. So w h y stick to the status factor and empire-building in some direction? W h y neglect those other factors which are perhaps just as important? W h y present so gloomy a portrait of the chairholder, of the interaction between his research, administration, family and of emotional life? Because the status aspect appears in most cases to be a factor c o m m o n to them all. It is difficult to read too m u c h about scientists' research behaviour, their intellectual independence, their devotion to science and humanity, and similar matters without being overcome by suspicions: perhaps the present authors also are demonstrating devotion to their o w n status and career. B y posing our hypothesis on this arguable point w e have no doubt exaggerated it.

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R E F E R E N C E S

B O A L T , Gunnar. The sociology of research. Carbondale, 111., Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

Samhällsforskning vid Stockholms Universitet [Social research at the University of Stockholm). Stockholm, Gumelius, 1970.

Gunnar Boalt was professor of sociology, chairman of the department and dean of the social science faculty of Stockholm University before being appointed as adjunct professor at Southern Illinois University. His publications include: The Sociology of Research (1969), Universities and Research (1970) and Allocation of Resources a m o n g University Departments: Sweden and U S A (1971).

Ulla Bergryd is assistant in the sociology department of Stockholm University. She has translated C. Wright Mills' The Sociological Imagination into Swedish.

657

Terry N . Clark T h e stages of scientific institutionalization

This article outlines three basic elements crucial for the development of a new field—a paradigm, talent and institutionalization—and considers the basic stages through which the social sciences have passed in association with different institutional structures. The empirical examples are few and brief, drawn especially from a recent study focusing on France (Clark, in press), but the framework could easily be extended to other countries and fields. W e conclude with some brief remarks concerning science policy.

A paradigm, talent and institutionalization

The basic elements for the development of a new field are (a) a set of coherent ideas, some sort of paradigm, (b) talented individuals to extend these ideas, and (c) institutionalization of the basic structures for preservation and extension of ideas in the area. The three elements might be viewed as functional imperatives or at least as ideal preconditions for the emergence of a new field. The ' n e w field' considered here in most detail is sociology, but the elements seem of similar importance for other academic fields and, to a lesser degree, all cumulative intellectual activities including, for example, sculpture, film-making, public health, or 'research and development'. Let us consider briefly each of the three elements.

A set of ideas coherent enough to serve as a paradigm provides a foundation on which m u c h else can be built. The specific characteristics of a paradigm have been defined only vaguely by philosophers of science to date (see K u h n , 1970), but w e m a y consider as basic components (a) specific concepts, (b) propositional statements relating these concepts to each other, (c) models defining the types of variables and relations that deserve study, and (d) statements of the conditions under which the paradigm applies.1

At the early stages of a n e w field the paradigm is inevitably tentative and incomplete, m a n y gaps remain and inconsistencies must be ironed out. Nevertheless, a broad sketch of the field, definitions of its limits and major subsec-

1. W e thus exclude as too general Kuhn's (1970, p. 181 ff.) 'values'.

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T h e stages of scientific institutionalization

tions, a core set of interrelated hypotheses, and perhaps a methodology for empirical research, if presented logically and consistently, can provide a very valuable guide. It can offer intellectual guidance by specifying the general structure of the field and outlining problem areas where extension is most in order. B y offering such intellectual guidance, it can also enhance the social integration of persons working in the field. M a n y paradigms of this sort have been developed in the social sciences, and for sociology in particular, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. S o m e were most ambitious in staking out the entire field of sociology and its subfields; others, especially more recently, have been m o r e limited. If disagreement about general issues has continued over m a n y decades, in the same years coherent and cumulative results have emerged in m a n y subfields (Boudon, 1971, p. 9-40). The interpénétration of the social sciences is such that it m a y be vain to hope that the m a n y subfields within sociology, political science and anthropology should be logically articulated with more general theories specific to each of these three disciplines. The more successful general theories in the last few decades—e.g. structural functionalism, exchange theory, the new political economy—have tended to be shared by at least these fields, with some overlap into economics, geography, and psychology. Simultaneously, within the arbitrary boundaries of each discipline a number of fields have developed, not tightly linked with each other, but which exhibit m a n y of the properties of paradigms, or sub-paradigms—voting behaviour, comparative organization studies, political party structure, urban spatial location, community power, kinship structure and so forth. Despite the widespread use of disciplinary labels, the social and natural sciences m a y often be as well or more adequately analysed in terms of these narrowly defined paradigms.1 Still, these narrow paradigms and invisible colleges could not achieve their present status without considerable institutional development.

O u r second element is talent. In good part, but not entirely the product of idiosyncratic circumstance, talent tends to emerge more frequently (a) from national societies and subsectors of these societies that emphasize cultural and intellectual achievement ; (b) a m o n g individuals trained in demanding primary and secondary schools and colleges—institutions that provide a solid general training; and (c) for talent in a single area, a m o n g those w h o experience advanced training in that general area.

Past societies have thrown up few talented persons of financial independence, so that retention of talented persons in an area, and integration of their efforts toward some cumulative result, generally depends on our third element, institutionalization. Fields accommodated in institutions of higher status,

1. Consider too this description of their discipline by certain physicists: 'a fluid subject, with shifting boundaries, and eruption and subsidence of topics within these boundaries', reported by Anthony et al., 1969, cited in Crane (1972, p. 13), and the discussions by Price (e.g. 1965), Crane and others of invisible colleges. K u h n ' s sociologistic definition (1970, p . 176) that a 'paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share', and his discussion of defining scientific communities using such tools as those of Crane, Price and others, moves in this same direction. So does his focus on the importance of 'exemplars', which generally are substantively limited achievements.

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ceteris paribus, will attract and retain more talented individuals. But h o w can the relative success of different fields accommodated in the same institutions be explained? Recruitment depends in part on the prestige awarded by society to a particular field. Broad patterns of occupational prestige change slowly. But more temporary, fluctuating concerns also channel talent in different directions. This is especially true for career decisions reached by students in so tempestous and intense a milieu as the Parisian Latin Quarter (Clark and Clark, 1969). The immediate concerns—literary, aesthetic, cultural, and political—which informed the debates of Latin Quarter figures at any given m o m e n t have been of considerable import in shifting talented young people into or away from different fields, especially social scientific fields. N o doubt such temporary shifts of opinion have operated in every country, but leading universities in the United Kingdom, Ge rmany and the United States have not been concentrated in the financial, political and cultural capital to the same degree. The prestige of the literary-oriented, generalizing intellectual has apparently been higher in France, and the Latin Quarter, than in other countries. A s literary figures are more subject to shifts in outlook than, for example, the businessman, civil servant or professional person w h o often served as the model for students in other countries, in France such temporary fluctuations seem to have been correspondingly more important.

The third element, institutionalization, m a y be considered in terms of five basic elements which seem to have developed historically so as to form a modi fied Guttman scale (see Table 1). M a n y fields have passed through stages which roughly build on each of the last.

Before turning to these stages, it seems useful to consider the process of moving from one stage to the next. W h a t are the dynamic elements which help propel a field through successive stages of institutionalization? O n e of the most fundamental is the development of its paradigm. Paradigms clearly differ in their precision, consistency, comprehensiveness, quantification of basic concepts and empirical support for their propositions, these being the criteria which have been broadly accepted as standards for evaluation of scientific activities over the past several hundred years. N e w fields, such as specific social sciences, also tended to be evaluated, by creators and critics alike, by applying these basic criteria. With such criteria institutionalized rather firmly, they m a y be applied to different fields, research groupings, and individuals. Original research advances m a y then be judged by these criteria as inputs to the professional community, in response to which professional rewards are allocated. A balanced exchange between research achievements and professional rewards can thus be established. The amount and type of reward appropriate for any given research contribution clearly depends on the 'payoff coefficients' current in any given institution (Clark, forthcoming). Comparisons across fields are obviously essential, especially for new fields, to gauge the degree of recognition appropriate within established institutions—in terms of university chairs, specialized degrees, research grants and similar rewards. In brief, then, w e hypothesize that a given field will advance to a n e w plateau in terms of institutional rewards w h e n it, and its individual represen-

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tatives, develop a paradigm and original research contributions roughly comparable to those rewarded in analogous manner in adjoining fields. Given the importance of vested interests or related factors tending toward conservatism (such as centralization of the university in France), rewards m a y not be allocated to achievements exactly following our market analogy. Conversely, h o w ever, in certain new or would-be innovative institutions (e.g. certain American land-grant institutions in their early years), the payoff coefficients m a y be adjusted so that rewards are disproportionately allocated to very n e w fields.

If the three elements—a paradigm, talent and institutionalization— appear reasonably straightforward, w e should recall that m a n y analyses of the growth of science tend to focus on only one (e.g. K u h n , 1970). In subsequent sections, w e sketch briefly some of the interrelations a m o n g these three sets of variables in terms of five stages of scientific growth. Alternatively, m a n y remarks in terms of discrete stages could be recast as general propositions relating analytical variables. W e also consider briefly certain effects of broader socio-economic and political factors, but these are introduced mainly as ecological or environmental factors. Doubtless the considerable ideological implications of m u c h of social science were such that institutional protection from ideological pressures were more important than for the natural sciences. But w e will not dwell on ideology. O u r more detailed focus on specific institutional arrangements is intended to correct what w e view as an exaggerated concern for macro-social variables in traditional work o n the sociology of knowledge. O n e basic consequence of institutionalization as considered here is to curtail the effects of these extra-professional factors.

Five stages in institutionalization

1. THE SOLITARY SCIENTIST

Early efforts in the development of social science were launched by individuals with absolutely minimal institutional support. Saint-Simon and Comte in France, and Spencer and J. S. Mill in the United K i n g d o m , to cite just a few outstanding cases, supported themselves by activities bearing scarcely any relationship to social science. Previous efforts by other solitary scientists were available in the loose sense that books and articles had been published bearing on social issues. But as there were no clear definitions of fields within social science, or supporting institutions, cumulative development was difficult to maintain or even define. Overlapping efforts could easily go unrecognized. Communication patterns a m o n g solitary scientists concerned with analogous problems might be developed informally, but these tended toward the local and immediate. With intense personality involvement in research frequent at this early stage, petty jealousies and intrigues arose easily; with scarcely a shared set of values or institutional norms regulating these activities, other values and norms tended to dominate interpersonal relationships. Moreover

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T A B L E 1. Five stages of institutionalization

Individual Small University Graduate Large Stages researcher professional chairs for training professional

organizations individuals programme community

1. T h e solitary scientist

2 . A m a t e u r science 3. Emerging acade

mic science 4. Established science 5. Big science

+ +

0 0 0

0 +

+ + 0

0 0

+ + +

0 0

0 + +

0 0

0 0 +

in general there seem to have been relatively few social relationships a m o n g individual researchers, compared to subsequent stages.

Considerable professional anomie encouraged efforts by early solitary scientists toward frameworks broad enough to define their field and subfields ; at least a first approximation of a paradigm was needed. C o m t e 's Cours de Philosophie Positive and Spencer's Principles of Sociology were prime examples. Typologizing, specifying disciplinary limits and subfields and labelling general categories of phenomena were the basic concerns of these paradigmatic efforts. Mounting such a broad attack, they understandably included prophetic overtones and seldom progressed to coherent sets of propositions.

Intellectual and substantive concerns of our solitary scientists were also informed significantly by the society around them. The social role of the social scientist was hardly defined or institutionalized; there were minimal constraints or support from professional reference groups; professional standards jr norms were hardly present. Lacking a professional reference group, they adopted substitute roles from available alternatives: philosophers, general intellectuals, political ideologues, gentleman scholars.

With minimal financial support for professional activities, the only talent which could turn this w a y had to support itself from other sources. Comte's sorrowful solicitations to the Tsar of Russia, the Egyptian Viceroy, and the French Minister of Education were representative of, if m o r e ambitious than, m a n y others. Cumulative intellectual development and attraction of younger talented persons were thus most difficult at this stage.

2. A M A T E U R SCIENCE

Almost as soon as an ambitious individual entered a n e w field he would tend to seek intellectual stimulation and criticism from peers, or extension and diffusion of his ideas by disciples, or both. The two were closely intertwined and in either case implied professional social contacts. A first stage could be rather informal. For example, Saint-Simon entertained Polytechnique professors at elegant dinners while learning their recent thoughts. Frédéric Le Play

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cultivated a circle of younger acquaintances w h o m he also entertained at his h o m e .

The next obvious step was creating a scientific society or professional organization that could convene regularly, permit presentation and discussion of papers, and often publish these and related materials. Le Play thus established the Société d'Études Sociales and the journal La Réforme Sociale. Comte also cultivated a following of official positivists. Limited instruction was often provided in the new field in conjunction with other professional activities. Courses on positivist philosophy were offered by Auguste Comte and then after his death by various disciples in Comte 's residence in the Rue Monsieur-le-Prince, Paris. The Le Playists provided similar instruction. However, as such courses did not lead to a recognized degree or regular career, few students were attracted for more than part-time diversion. Henri de Tourville helped underwrite expenses of certain Le Playists in the 1880s and 1890s, and the scholarships he gave to students provided support for some suggestive field-work. A few years later the Musée Sociale supported analogous field research, which led André Siegfried, for example, to prepare monographs on Canada and N e w Zealand. In both cases, however, funds from the original benefactors were depleted after a few years.

It is more than individual accident that the groups around Comte and Le Play became intolerant sects as their prophetic founders aged. Then soon after each prophet's death, the precariousness of the structures became clear in the followers' disputes. Nascent professional activities of the sort they maintained could encourage communication and feedback among colleagues, w h o could constitute a distinct reference group. Through such interaction professional roles and identities could emerge, intellectual boundaries be sharpened and subfields become more defined. But when such activities are heavily dependent on one individual and enjoy no linkages to more established professional or scholarly bodies, they are short-lived. Amateur science, as w e have characterized it, is a step beyond solitary efforts, but in general, until full-time careers become available, most research remains sporadic and fragmentary.

3. EMERGING ACADEMIC SCIENCE

Although certain academies in France and Italy supported full-time work in natural science, full-time positions in social science first became available in the universities. A single political-economy chair was held by Jean-Baptiste Say at the Collège de France after 1830, and in the 1880s some faculty of law chairs were given an emphasis on economies ; Durkheim taught la science sociale in Bordeaux after 1887, and he came to Paris in 1902. In 1898, however, there were still only four social science chairs in all of France; by 1928 there were twenty.1 In France the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were thus

1. This includes positions at the faculties of Letters, the École Normale Supérieure and the Collège de France, but excludes certain positions with an emphasis on political economy in the law faculties as they were frequently occupied by non-economists.

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periods when a very few outstanding persons held university chairs in social science, although they were surrounded by amateurs participating in profession activities. The situation was broadly similar in several other European countries at the time. A n uneasy relationship often existed between the few occupants of university chairs and the m a n y amateurs with careers elsewhere. In the 1890s René W o r m s created the Institut International de Sociologie and Société de Sociologie de Paris, which provided a setting where a few distinguished scholars (Gabriel Tarde, F . Toennies, Karl Menger, L . T . Hobhouse, E . A . Ross) rubbed shoulders with pacificists, labour organizers, feminists, publicists and ideologues of every sort. Somewhat similar situations were found in the Sociological Society in England and in the G e r m a n Sociological Society. While meetings and publications cf these societies m a y have diffused a general interest in social science, the content was so chaotic and the quality so uneven as to shock even sympathetic observers. Durkheim refused to participate in the W o r m s organizations; Weber's coolness toward amateur sociology is well k n o w n . The expansion of membership in these societies beyond a close-knit group of disciples led to the loss of any paradigmatic orientation, conflicting role definitions and reference groups, and minimal cumulation. Talent naturally m o v e d elsewhere.

Most university professors in the social sciences remained fairly solitary scientists, although with the significant difference from those in our first stage in that they could pursue research nearly full-time. Weber, Hobhouse and to a lesser degree others thus produced considerable achievements, though from an institutional standpoint they remained definitely isolated. The great exception, outside the United States, was of course Emile Durkheim. H e moved the institutionalization of sociology in France toward established science. H e created a coherent and highly talented following which elaborated his ideas for several decades. W h a t was the secret of his success? Part of it was related to Durkheim's unquestionable intellectual and political skills, but a good deal also followed from the structure of the French university.

Briefly, the centralization and hierarchical organization of the national educational system in France was such that considerable informal power tended to concentrate in the hands of leading Sorbonne professors, les patrons (Clark and Clark, 1971). The relative diversification and decentralization of the American or G e r m a n systems were such that, although students might be recommended for a first job by their university professor, they soon became reasonably autonomous. In France, however, even if a m a n rose to a chair in a provincial university or to a position in a Parisian research or teaching institution of moderate status, he still frequently depended on an informal network that passed through a Sorbonne patron. For career promotions, examination changes, certain publication and research activities, and related matters, the central patrons were key actors for the entire national system.

Sociology spread through the French system in good part because Durkheim became a leading patron. H e attracted young philosophers to work with him initially because he was an exceptional mind, and at the turn of the century a distinguished Latin Quarter intellectual. A s the École Normale

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Supérieure and the Sorbonne were near the peak of the intellectual prestige hierarchy, he enlisted some of the most talented minds in France. But he retained the loyalties of his followers longer than L e Play, Comte , W e b e r or Hobhouse because he was a patron universitaire. O u r three factors of a paradigm, institutionalization and talent, in the case of the Durkheimians, combined with particular felicity.

In the Année Sociologique and associated publications, Durkheim and his collaborators achieved results of a comprehensiveness, consistency, precision and empirical support that differed dramatically from all previous efforts in France. They moulded a paradigm that set the directions for work in m u c h of sociology in the United Kingdom, the United States and France for half a century, and had an important impact on work in anthropology, and parts of history, philosophy, law and education.

Still, although the Durkheimians took significant steps toward creating an established science, they m a d e almost no impact on examinations or degrees. A student interested in pursuing social science thus still had to complete the licence-agrégation examination sequence in a traditional subject (mainly philosophy or history). The examination sequences remained traditional because of their enforced linkage to the lycée curriculum; the same was true of career possibilities, which were reasonable for subjects in the lycées, but this excluded the social sciences. University positions in social science were created only very gradually during the inter-war years. Most Durkheimians did not hold university chairs in social science per se, but in social philosophy, history, law and area studies. Their intellectual continuation depended correspondingly on a specific tradition which was never institutionalized in the official structures. Dependent on outside support (from the Latin Quarter climate and ministerial favours), which ended in the inter-war years, the demise of the Durkheimians soon followed. They might have continued more successfully if they could have created a genuine graduate curriculum.

4. ESTABLISHED SCIENCE

With only an isolated chair in a new field, even university students entering the field have difficulty obtaining adequate training. Most often, the research of the individual professor is emphasized in his lectures and seminars, and although he m a y seek to cover the entire field, he inevitably cannot bring an equally critical awareness to all its parts. Though the outstanding student can sometimes put together a coherent background by working with available faculty and reading alone, adequate research training for the average student only follows the creation of a regular training programme A n d it is in the use of average minds that stages of science seriously differ. Specific courses in sub-areas of the field, examinations covering these areas, specialized seminars where original research is undertaken in several overlapping areas and support of a diversified faculty to provide these offerings and direct theses in conjunction with their o w n research—these are the basic elements of an advanced research training programme, the core of what we have called established science.

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Such programmes were institutionalized earliest in the United States, for most social sciences towards the end of the nineteenth century (Ben-David, 1971, 1972). Elements of such programmes were added piecemeal in different European universities, especially in the 1950s and 1960s with the considerable growth of faculty appointments.

Training programmes helped establish definite professional roles for their graduates, define not only the general limits and subsections of a subject, but train students in the specifics of the field and correspondingly sharpen the details of paradigms. Paradigms, after all, must be broadly shared before they can serve as a foundation for informed criticism and cumulative advance within a scientific community. With the growth in social science research and teaching positions in France in the 1950s and 1960s, and without the development of regular advanced training programmes, the result was the creation of large numbers of autodidacts. Each might be proficient in a given area, but lacking shared training at an advanced level; m a n y inevitably retained large gaps in their knowledge. The absence of a shared training experience also helped perpetuate a professional anomie. Advanced training was frequently not institutionalized in other European countries either, but as the number of social scientists expanded especially rapidly in Paris, the climate there sometimes seemed particularly Hobbesian.

For the faculty, an advanced training programme seems to depersonalize the subject matter, to help m o v e toward a collégial definition of the professional role, and to lead individuals to accept more graciously the limits of their o w n contributions. Serving jointly on examination and thesis committees led faculty members to constrain one another and thus m a k e clear to each other and to students that no single individual was inevitably correct ; with differences of opinion frankly expressed, the sect-like tendencies of less institutionalized groupings were correspondingly inhibited. Problems of ageing were also curtailed as the presence of an older figure could still add maturity and insight from long experience, while the active presence of younger m e n could remind all that times were changing rapidly. Students, and faculty, could clearly benefit from contact with a diversified set of colleagues.

5. BIG SCIENCE

Several elements of the last and especially the present section are hard to disentangle in their causal priority especially as the major examples come from only the United States and quite recent dimensions of certain European systems. W e have attempted to abstract from the specifics of these developments and to retain the most crucial elements for a viable and creative scientific community. The distinctive aspects of big science, for example, seem to derive less from large laboratories, research budgets or complicated machinery than from the scale and related characteristics of the national, and sometimes international, professional community. B y big science w e refer to those operating characteristics influencing the w a y in which scientists do their work which most differs from operating characteristics at earlier stages.

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Consider advanced training programmes. F e w persons will undertake an intensive and lengthy training programme unless openings exist for careers after its completion. Such openings have long been available in the American colleges, which provided an extensive market for the products of graduate training programmes initiated in the late nineteenth century. Even if few graduates of these programmes would ever contribute significant research, their presence was still important. They provided a substantial pool from which to select incumbents of leading chairs. A s selection of qualified persons is inevitably imperfect, if more individuals remain potential candidates at each stage, more choice for the system remains. Equally, a person unsure of his abilities has the large college system as a cushion to fall back on. With more positions available, more potential talent can be drawn into social science initially and, over time, promoted to leading positions.

These possibilities have been far more restricted outside the United States, especially in the French system. W e mentioned that the French university included some twenty chairs in social science in 1928; in 1967 about 200 persons held positions as university teachers or C N R S researchers in sociology; some 320 psychologists and 300 philosophers held analogous positions (Bour-dieu et al., 1971). In the United States, however, just two years later there were about 12,000 members of the American Sociological Association. Without raising questions of quality or comparability of status, it remains clear that the American professional communities are m u c h larger than those in France. M a n y other aspects of big science are related to effects of scale.

Considerable internal differentiation tends to follow increased size. As analysts of differentiation since A d a m Smith have observed, greater division of labour permits increased specialization, which tends to generate more intense and successful completion of individual tasks. If individuals m a y be narrowed in the process the outputs of the total system are still generally improved.

At the same time, with increased scale more individuals work on similar or closely related tasks, and help provide critical reference groups for each other. Co-operation and mutual support can take place at special conferences and within section meetings of larger congresses. Preprints can be circulated, and useful references, recent findings and n e w interpretations shared through personal contact. Such invisible colleges increasingly accommodate the basic life of m u c h of the natural and social sciences (Crane, 1972).

Open competition can also ensue, but it is a competition regulated by the observation and at least modest involvement of m a n y individuals. If only a few persons are doing significant work in an area, the reading, discussion and criticism of this work by a large number of others keeps the more creative élite aware that any decline in quality will not go unnoticed. High levels of personal antagonism can develop a m o n g competing individuals, but the continual presence of a substantial critical mass of observers helps insure against deviations from established standards. M a n y of these processes are highly subjective and operate on the basis of anticipated reactions, internalized norms and informal interaction. But this critical mass can also provide formal social controls by serving in a variety of decentralized regulatory institutions.

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Indeed, size normally contributes toward decentralization of the power and prestige located in the various academic, publishing and fund-granting institutions which structure teaching and research. Decentralization need not follow automatically from increases in size, but studies of government agencies (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971) and communities (Clark, 1971) have consistently indicated an association between the two variables. The association seems related in part simply to the number of persons w h o must be 'supervised' in some manner. Even a would-be academic despot cannot oversee 500 people as he can five. The general collégial norms of science resist the development of elaborate hierarchical structures, and as most academics resent the time involved in administration, the normal tendency is to expand the élite. M o r e individuals are thus drawn into decision-making institutions which overlap less in membership as the scale of the system grows. The larger the system, ceteris paribus, the more decentralized its decision-making structure. Other things in this instance most significantly relate to the structure of the national system of universities and administrative agencies. The traditional French university, in accordance with the rest of French national administration, resists innovation and decentralization more than the G e r m a n system, for example, which was more decentralized even when roughly the same size. But within these given systems, increases in scale still generally seem to enhance decentralization.

Perhaps the most fundamental contribution of increasing scale—linked with the numbers of actors, differentiation, and decentralization—is the more complete achievement of the general value of universalism in working norms. With a small number of actors involved in large numbers of decisions affecting each other's lives, it is extremely difficult to prevent previous contacts and continuing associations, positive or negative, from affecting any single decision. These m a y include the decision to pass a candidate on an examination, award him honours for a thesis, recommend him for a faculty position and subsequent promotions, allocate fellowships and research funds, accept or reject manuscripts for journals and books and generally evaluate his research and seek to extend it or to work instead in other areas. W h e n few actors are continually involved in such evaluations, universalistic standards are far more difficult to maintain than if a large pool exists from which over time different combinations of decision-makers can be drawn.

The corollary on a social psychological level of the institutionalization of universalistic standards is a general feeling that good work will be rewarded, at least in the m e d i u m term. Even if a dozen members of an American university department achieve the intense intellectual disagreement and personal antagonism which has at times characterized subfields in France and smaller national systems, mobility to other institutions of roughly comparable quality is usually possible. The mere awareness of potential mobility serves as an important escape valve. But equally or more important is a sense that the functioning of the national system, over a few years at any rate, will reward creativity and that good ideas will disseminate roughly in relation to their intellectual merits. Such a feeling helps those w h o m a y be at odds with their immediate

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environment to ignore m a n y annoyances. If it is felt that good ideas will be rewarded and diffuse of their o w n accord, less effort toward creation of disciples is also necessary, although such efforts m a y speed the process. Less competition for disciples in turn decreases the zero-sum character of departmental social relations.

The inherent vagueness of this concept—we might call it subjective uni-versalism—and the difficulties in specifying its presence or absence, especially across national borders and for past historical periods, seems to have led to its being ignored. W e suggest that it should be considered a basic component of big science, however, and correspondingly given serious attention in future theoretical and empirical w o r k on scientific communities. In at least most of those societies where free intellectual inquiry is valued, maintenance of a differential between the degree of achievement of this value in certain institutions (perhaps universities or research institutes) compared to other parts of the society will attract talent toward the m o r e open institutions. They in turn m o v e toward n e w levels of achievement in paradigm construction. The process moves ahead, reinforcing itself once again. But the process is not automatic, especially if controls are imposed on the traditional openness of scientific activity. If institutional freedoms are preserved for scientific purposes, and self-imposed restraints prevent these freedoms from being turned to ideological ends, political repression is less likely. W h e n ideology and repression enter, subjective universalism departs.

Conclusions and policy implications

In the last decade students and others radically discontented with the society around them (in most European countries and the United States) have been attracted to universities and research institutes, in part because of the feeling that these are more 'open' institutions than others in the same society. Student disorders have perhaps been encouraged by increases in the size of student bodies. But if student disorders m a y be one short-run effect of scientific growth, the scientific communities of most European countries still seem in a position to benefit from additional growth along the lines w e have presented. The costs are not low. But one w a y to save on costs as well as to achieve certain effects of big science more rapidly is to increase international collaboration. Doubtless the usual linguistic and cultural differences can pose barriers, but international involvement need not be followed uniformly across fields. If national institutions simply build in possibilities for their members to become involved in international collaborative activities, individuals and teams of researchers m a y be led to such collaboration where it can be of use to them. M a n y degrees of involvement, formal and informal, individual and institutional, are clearly possible. O n e can participate in international colloquia, invite foreign visitors to laboratory and teaching positions, publish abroad occasionally and solicit publications from foreigners, include foreigners on various advisory committees for personnel appointments, fund granting, publication matters, etc. A number

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of international organizations exist through which it is possible to operate, some of which m a y provide funds to encourage such activities. But as the types of individuals and institutions w h o can most benefit from or could most contribute to, such collaborative efforts clearly vary considerably across countries and scientific specialties, a flexible strategy is no doubt the most effective to m o v e toward the desirable qualities of big science. For international organizations, broad incentives and loosely defined programmes—for conferences, fellowships, collaborative research, etc.—are more likely to be more effective than narrow or mission-oriented projects.

If w e are correct in asserting that m a n y of the problems plaguing social science in Europe in the 1960s derived from the difficulties of moving beyond what w e have termed amateur science, then a good part of the solution to these problems would seem to reside in moving more completely toward the model of big science as w e have characterized it here. In so far as our formulations are correct, they m a y offer some guides for science policy; as a model for predicting one course of future developments, they at least go beyond mere projection. But w e do not wish to claim too m u c h ; if our framework helps achieve a more adequate interpretation of past and contemporary activities, it will have served its purpose.

REFERENCES

B E N - D A V I D , Joseph. 1971. The scientist's role in society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J . , Prentice Hall.

. 1972. American higher education. N e w York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill. B L A U , Peter M . ; S C H O E N H E R R , Richard A . 1971. The structure of organizations.

N e w York, N . Y . , Basic Books. B O U D O N , Raymond. 1971. La crise de la sociologie. Geneva, Droz. BouRDiEU, Pierre; B O L T A N S K I , Luc; M A L D I D I E R , Pascale. 1971. La défense du corps.

Social science information, 10, p. 45-86. C L A R K , Terry N . 1971. Community structure, decision-making, budget expenditures,

and urban renewal in 51 American communities. In: Charles M . Bonjean, Terry N . Clark, and Robert L . Lineberry (eds.), Community politics, p. 293-313. N e w York, N . Y . , Free Press.

. Prophets and patrons: the French university and the emergence of the social sciences. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. (In press.)

. Structural functionalism, exchange theory, and the new political economy: institutionalization as a theoretical linkage. Sociological inquiry. (Forthcoming.)

C L A R K , Terry N . ; C L A R K , Priscilla P. 1969. Writers, literature, and student movements in France. Sociology of education, 42, p. 293-314.

. 1971. Le patron et son cercle: clef de l'université française. Revue française de sociologie, 12, p. 19-39.

C R A N E , Diana. 1972. Invisible colleges. Chicago, 111., University of Chicago Press. K U H N , Thomas. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago, 111.,

University of Chicago Press. P R I C E , Derek. 1965. Networks of scientific papers. Science, 149, p. 510-15.

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Terry N. Clark is associate professor of sociology at the University of Chicago. He has published a number of articles on community structure, power and other subjects, is co-author and editor o / C o m m u n i t y Structure and Decisionmaking: a Comparative Analysis (1968), Community Politics: a Behavioral Approach (1971) and of Comparative Community Politics (forthcoming) and author of Prophets and Patrons : the French University and the Emergence of the Social Sciences (forthcoming).

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Mihailo Markovic Ethics of a critical social science

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T h e problem of the social responsibility of scientists and technologists has become one of the crucial issues of modern culture at the beginning of the last third of the twentieth century. This stems from the fact that science and technology themselves have become problematic. A century ago even the most radical intellectuals, while contesting all existing institutions, were reluctant to challenge science. T h e Russian nihilists, like Pisarev and his followers, for example, attacked all traditional values—from idealistic philosophy, Christian religion and morality to the State and family. They were certain that tyranny and ignorance were the source of all evils, that the former must be swept away by revolution and the latter be overcome through science. The heroes of Turgenev's Fathers and Sons believed that in a future society, science would solve all problems and cure all ills. That optimism is n o w gone. Certain young people of today, w h o need not be even mildly rebellious, let alone nihilistic, are inclined to think that, after all, it is science itself which is a problem and an ill to be cured. O f course, the spirit of Enlightenment is still very m u c h alive and one of the strongest social currents in all societies is ideologically based on faith in science and its end—products : power over nature, material wealth, efficient organization of social life. O n the other hand, there are growing doubts about an increasing number of implications of scientific development, such as the unexpected deterioration of personal relations in scientifically and technologically advanced societies, research for the purpose of destruction, which m a y ultimately lead to collective suicide of mankind, increasing opportunities to control and manipulate individuals, the massive use of scientists and of their methods and equipments for repressive purposes, and a pathological obsession with consumption which m a y lead both to waste of most necessary resources and to an irreversible pollution of the natural environment.

This is a n e w situation and one that demands prompt reaction on the part of scientists. If something of universal, planetary importance happens which can be traced back to their o w n production in alienated form then they must surely find a w a y to come to grips with the problem. They can either accept the alienation as a natural state of affairs and continue to draw a sharp demar-

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Ethics of a critical social science

cation line between responsibilities for the creation and for the use of k n o w ledge, or they can rebel against alienation, against the status of producers of information w h o neither care about the basic goals of inquiry and about the broader context of knowledge within which their intellectual products acquire final meaning, nor are allowed to participate in the decision-making process about the use of these same products.

If they accept the latter option, then scientists must change their fundamental assumptions about the nature of their task, must replace previously dominant ideas of positive science with the conception of a critical science and its methodology ; their traditional detachment and aloofness must give w a y to a very serious concern about all misuses of scientific findings for n o n - h u m a n e purposes.

If they accept the first option, however, scientists can continue to insist o n a narrow professional division of w o r k and to escape their responsibilities by pretending that scientific objectivity has nothing to do with commitment . They can attempt to take up a defensive stance based o n the position that either research must be value-free and ethically neutral, or findings will lack objectivity and have a predominantly ideological character.

This position does not have a long history. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the critical evaluation of reality was considered a legitimate function of scientific inquiry. T w o philosophical ideas constituted the ultimate criterion of evaluation. O n e was the idea of natural order and natural rights of m e n . It originated in ancient Stoic philosophy and was developed especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (by Bodin, Althusius, Grotius, Hobbes , Leibniz, Kant and others). T h e other was the m o r e recent idea of progress which emerged with the Enlightenment and dominated the nineteenth century. It m a d e it possible to take a critical attitude toward any actual state of the economy, of politics and of law from the point of view of natural order and progress. Certainly, these ideas were vague and underpinned by naïve, onesided or unverifiable assumptions. They were used not only for critical but also for apologetic purposes: for example, the capitalist e c o n o m y was construed as the economic order which best corresponds to h u m a n nature and allows optimally rapid progress. Hence strong resistance to these ideas and a resolute d e m a n d to eliminate from science all value-judgements and to reduce social inquiry to the description and explication of factual situations w a s partly the result of increasing methodological rigour. Partly it was also the expression of a conservative tendency to eradicate all scientific basis of social criticism and to relegate evaluation, projections and basic decision-making to the realm of politics. Nevertheless the problematic concepts of natural order and progress have not been replaced by any other normative categories. The d o m i nant philosophical trend in the 1930s and 1940s logical positivism—construed all value statements as mere expressions of emotion without any cognitive meaning. A s a result, philosophy became completely divorced from living social issues, lost its anticipatory, critical and guiding role and was reduced to the study of the logical structure of language. Science by contrast was interpreted as the study of given, empirically observable phenomena , which at best can establish certain regularities and extrapolate from them certain possible

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phenomena. All evaluation in terms of needs, feelings or moral standards was considered basically irrational and fit only to be discarded.

There are historical periods and conditions under which such emphasis on the ethical neutrality of science has a progressive character. M a x W e b e r was right in insisting that, in the conditions of restricted freedom of scientific research and teaching, the principle of ethical neutrality m a y save the honour and dignity of a scholar by allowing him to disengage himself from the immoral goals of the ruling circles. In such situations, and in that sense, value-free science m a y play a progressive, demystifying role.

It would seem, however, that at present the main social danger does not c o m e so m u c h from tyrannical, authoritarian régimes but from a spiritual vacuum that is being filled by a faith in power and success, by an ideology of consumption, by an almost pathological obsession with the efficiency of means coupled with a fatal lack of interest in the problem or rationality and the humanity of goals. In such an historical situation, and in such a spiritual climate, the principle of the ethical neutrality plays a rather mystifying, system-supportive role. By its indifference toward any long-range projections, by its profound scepticism with regard to any visions of radical social change, value-free science only leads to the growth and strengthening of alienated power, to ever more efficient control over natural and historical processes within the framework of the existing historical structure. 'Pure', positive, piecemeal knowledge can always be accepted, interpreted and used in a w a y most convenient to the ruling élite. A society in which this kind of science is favoured remains devoid of its potential critical self-consciousness.

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In fact, the very concept of value-free scientific inquiry is misleading. Certain values and norms are always present in any social research; the question is only: to which kind do they belong. Certain cognitive values are basic elements of the scientific method: clarity, precision, flexibility, the fertility and explanatory power of the conceptual apparatus, accuracy of inference, the verifiability and applicability of theories, etc. S o m e of these complement each other and do not necessarily go together with others. Priority patterns differ from one methodological orientation to another. T o choose a m o n g analytical method, phenomenology and dialectic, to adopt empiricism, rationalism or intuition, to prefer method of explanation or method of understanding—does not only m e a n the adoption of a certain type of language, a w a y of thinking and a set of descriptive, epistemological and ontological postulates, but also to give priority to certain cognitive values over others.

In addition to cognitive values, non-cognitive ones are also invariably implicit in the theoretical and methodological presuppositions of social scientists, no matter h o w neutral they pretend to be. For example sociological functionalists assume that society is a stable system, the parts of which are well integrated, each one having a definite function and contributing to the conser-

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vation of the system. Proper functioning of the system is contingent on agreement about its basic values. Social order is the fundamental condition for the successful functioning of the system. Finally, any deviation from this order is dysfunctional, deviant, pathological. B y contrast, a Marxist sociologist assumes that w e all live in an epoch of transition from reified to free h u m a n activity, from a class-bound to a classless society, hence all social systems are more or less unstable, with clear disintegrative tendencies, with m a n y obviously dysfunctional institutions, torn by disagreement and class struggle. Far from being pathological, deviation and dissent from a sick society m a y be revolutionary, and an indication of sanity. Here w e obviously have a clash of attitudes toward the whole system of values built into existing society. B y insisting on stability, harmony and order, functionalism tries to defend it. B y assuming the inevitability of a structural, revolutionary social change, by favouring a critical, rebellious position, Marxism seeks to destroy the claims to legitimacy of that value system, and to show that at least some of its basic assumptions do not have a universally h u m a n character but express the needs and interests of particular ruling groups. Thus, for example, private property, economic competition, labour as such (regardless of whether it is alienated or not), order, civil obedience, national unity, freedom to express views without freedom to participate in decision-making, etc., are really values only for certain people at a certain time and under certain specific conditions. T o advocate them (explicitly or implicitly) without any qualification, would be incompatible with scientific objectivity and universality. True, individual scientists belong to a particular nation and social group; they have been educated within a particular tradition and social climate. The most difficult and responsible task of those w h o train young scientists is therefore to help them overcome this narrowly critical spiritual horizon and to realize that science is a universal h u m a n product.

In fact, certain universal ethical values are implicit in the very concepts of objectivity and rationality which constitute the very foundation of scientific method. (Geiger was very right when he insisted that there is a close link between scholarly skills (Fachkönnen) and scholarly conscience (Fachgewissen)). Objectivity presupposes a basic honesty in the application of the professional norms of research; merciless elimination of any kind of personal vested interest; a co-operative spirit in the whole process of symbolic activity (without which communication would be impossible) ; readiness to give priority to truth over group loyalty; freedom from rationalistic, social, religious and ideological intolerance. The objectivity of scientific research is contingent upon certain social conditions and these, inturn, depend on the implementation of a whole series of other values, such as the openness of a society toward the rest of the world, a general atmosphere of political and cultural tolerance (which does not exclude struggle against superstitions and prejudice), the freeflow of information (which includes the freedom of self-expression, of discussion, of travel, of studying any scientifically interesting problem), the autonomy of science from other social spheres especially from politics, a social climate that favours anti-authoritarian attitudes, which implies that the only authority in science is one based on knowledge, and ability, and the only élite in society would be the

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élite of spirit and taste. O n the contrary, any barriers to communication, any ideological hostility toward rival philosophical approaches and methodological orientations, any monopoly of power that imposes control and censorship over scientific research and publication and tends to promote loyal supporters into scientific authorities greatly reduce objectivity and lead to a general deterioration of scientific work.

There is another social condition of objectivity that best shows its connexion with humanism. While scientific work is the privilege of a small minority and in general remains a strictly isolated field in the professional division of labour, 'objective' often means what the professional experts have agreed on. However, in proportion to which an increasing number of people obtain the necessary education in their free time and develop an active interest in science, the group of trained observers, theory-builders and critics, especially in the social sciences, is substantially expanded and social judgements concerning the objective validity of data and theories become more critical and accurate.

A similar analysis is possible for the concept of scientific rationality. All rational behaviour is value-laden: it consists in selecting the most probable alternative for reaching a certain goal. The goals in most cases are unexamined, tacitly assumed, put between brackets, which creates the illusion that instrumental, technological rationality is value-free and ethically neutral. O f course, it is not. M a n y n e w products emerging from highly rationalized productive processes are merely more profitable for the producer, not superior in the satisfaction of human needs. A n examination of the values concealed within the very concept of rationality uncovers the problem of the ultimate goals of all scientific inquiry. By n o w it has certainly become clear that some of the enorm o u s scientific efforts in this century have to some extent been misdirected, that m a n y essential h u m a n needs have been neglected, that incredible amounts of material, knowledge and the best h u m a n energy have been wasted to satisfy incidental and artifically induced needs, and that science in general requires an articulated, critical self-consciousness and a n e w humanist orientation.

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Theoretically, the key problem in building up such a n e w orientation is the justification of the claim that its basic ethical norms have a universal character.

There are three orders of reason that can be put forward to legitimate this claim.

First, the history of philosophy and of culture shows a very high degree of consensus a m o n g recognized great thinkers concerning certain fundamental values, such as freedom, equality, peace, social justice, truth, beauty, etc. This consensus does not itself prove anything but indicates the universal character of certain norms of h u m a n life.

Second, critical philosophical anthropology offers a theory of m a n , of his essential capacities and genuine needs, from which all value considerations,

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including the problem of a hierarchy of values, m a y be derived. This theory obviously contains not only an indicative but also a normative component. The former is implicit, for example, in the theoretical justification of the view that there are universally latent dispositions (such as: capacities to use symbols and communicate, to solve n e w problems, to develop a self-consciousness, etc.), that these are realized at a certain stage of growth under favourable social conditions and that they m a y be wasted and extinguished if appropriate conditions are lacking. The normative component is implicit in the very selection of essential h u m a n capacities and in the distinction between true and false needs. The universality of this normative component would be validated if it could be shown that, ceteris paribus, all normally developed h u m a n individuals really have structurally similar affective needs and preferences in certain crucial existential situations of deprivation and suffering, group activity, sexual attraction, etc.

Third, contemporary, humanist psychology derives universal h u m a n values from the study of psychologically healthy, self-actualized persons. The essential methodological point here is that health m a y be defined operationally and not with the help of higher-level abstract concepts. A b r a h a m Mas low defines the concept of a healthy, self-actualizing h u m a n being by the following empirically describable characteristics: clearer perception of reality, more openness to experience, increased integration of the person, increased spontaneity, a firm identity, increased objectivity, recovery of creativeness, ability to fuse concreteness, and abstractness, democratic character structure, ability to love, etc.1 O n the other hand, what is characteristic for all pathological mental states is the disintegration of the person, and the homeostasis of organism as a whole. This approach allows humanist psychologists to replace the question ' W h a t should h u m a n values be?' with the factual question: ' W h a t are the values of healthy h u m a n beings?'

These three approaches, historical, philosophical and psychological, taken together, allow us to speak in a meaningful w a y about a universal humanist foundation for a critical social science.

F r o m these general considerations it follows that at least the following three alternative positions are open to a social scientist : (a) to act as an apologist for the official ideology in a given society, (b) to try to pursue research guided solely by cognitive norms and to relegate any ethical principles, or economic, political and cultural aspirations, to the background; (c) to engage in a critical study from a universal humanist point of view.

It is not difficult to explain w h y m a n y social scholars assume the role of apologists. At best, they m a y identify with the official ideology, with the aspirations and goals of the ruling élite. At worst, they m a y conform because they recognize the price of acceptance or refusal to play that role : high social status in one case, rejection in the other. Whatever their motives, those scholars w h o decide to subordinate their work to ideological demands cannot but violate

1. Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 157, N e w York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1968.

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standards of the scientific method, which relate to truth and therefore have universally objective validity. All ideologies, on the other hand, are false rationalizations; being the expressions of limited, particular interests, they nolens volens construe social relations in a mystifying way, only pretending that they produce scientific truths.

This worst kind of abuse m a y be avoided by scholars w h o commit themselves to ethical and ideological neutrality. There are several variants of this type of approach. Obviously considerable differences exist between: a scholar w h o escapes into the security of pure science while silently rejecting the official system of values in a repressive society; a frustrated and sceptical former rebel for w h o m any commitment has become senseless ; the owner of a special kind of commodity, knowledge and intellectual skill, at the disposal of anybody ready to pay his price ; the servant of the government or the corporation w h o takes a certain pride in his social function but w h o , in contrast to the ideological doctrinaire, tries to produce really 'positive' knowledge in the tasks assigned to him by the establishment; and last like Bertold Brecht's 'Der D e n kende', the carrier of knowledge, w h o , like Brecht's figure, Herr Kenner, should not fight, nor tell the truth, nor serve anybody; he has 'only one of the virtues: he carries knowledge'. A c o m m o n feature of all these different attitudes is escape from responsibility for the use of knowledge.

Yet no scholar can any longer ignore this responsibility. The greatest abuse of scientific endeavour in history, the development of the nuclear b o m b , immediately resulted in a series of reactions by leading contemporary scientists : Einstein's and Szilard's letters, the Franck report, the petition to the President of the United States of America of 17 July 1945, later the Pugwash movement and increasing participation of scientists in the peace and environmental movements and in various cultural activities of the United Nations and Unesco. A new international solidarity of intellectuals has begun to emerge in recent decades. A critical consciousness is developing which tends to transcend the limitations of nation, race, class or religion and assume a humanist position. O n e of the most widely diffused expressions of this new and spontaneous intellectual universalism is to be found in the First Pugwash Statement signed by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein: ' W e are speaking not as members of this or that nation, continent or creed, but as h u m a n beings, members of the species of m a n , whose continued existence is in doubt.

'Most of us are neutral in feeling, but as h u m a n beings w e have to remember that if the issues between the East and West are to be decided in any manner that gives any possible satisfaction to anybody, whether communist or anti-communist, whether Asian or European or American, whether white or black, that these issues must not be decided by war.

'. . . W e appeal as h u m a n beings to h u m a n beings—remember your h u m a nity and forget the rest.'1

1. Russell, Einstein, 'Appeal for the Abolition of War, Sept. 1955', in Grodsius and Rabi-nowitch (eds.), The Atomic Age, p. 535-41, N e w York and London, 1963.

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4

M a n y scholars feel uneasy when they are confronted with such a universal humanist appeal, and there are good reasons to be on guard. First, a universal point of view m a y be so abstract that it does not do justice to any particular standpoint or claim. It is intellectually and morally very comfortable, and to that extent also irresponsible, to gloss over all issues and assume the appearance of a 'neutral' universal judge w h o damns all sides from the vantage point of 'Mankind ' . Surely some particular standpoints m a y be more compatible with universal interests and needs of h u m a n development, of self-realization, than are others. Furthermore, it is not even possible in practice to promote these universal interests without taking a particular stand in each particular situation. In some conditions that m a y imply the condemnation of all sides, in others it might be endorsement of and active support for the side which, while struggling for its o w n ends, also struggles for humanity as a whole. W h a t is needed is a concrete historical, not an abstract, transcendental universalism.

Second, humanism has so often, in history as in dictionaries, been associated with philanthropy, tolerance, charity, soft-heartedness and do-goodism that m a n y social reformers and revolutionaries m a y be reluctant to appropriate this label, even when , objectively or subjectively, they have a universal standpoint. The preaching abstract universalim and humanistic tolerance could be the ideology of the dominant power, which might thus try to neutralize radical criticism of existing social relations and deflect militant activism towards harmlessly benign or welfare efforts. A concrete universal humanist point of view has indeed nothing to do with such a superficial, watered-down concept.

F r o m the beginnings of ancient Greek culture the universal, the humane and the critical go together in one form or another. According to Heraclitus, for example, m a n lives in the prison of his individual world so long as he relies only on his personal experiences and aspirations. Thinking allows him to grasp logos, the universal structure of all being, and thus to enter a world c o m m o n to all those w h o think. In this way m e n overcome their previous state and develop into awakened beings. In Plato, the Stoic philosophers and many other classical thinkers one finds a similar fusion of three great ideas : (a) that the universal structure of being, exists; (b) that this universality is not strictly outside m a n but can be discovered and appropriated by m a n ; and (c) that the transition from an existing, individual state to a potentially universal state possesses a critical character : m a n lives in a dream, in a cave, in a prison before his critical thought (where reason and emotion fuse)1 allows him to awake, to set himself free, to be really h u m a n . The main point on which modern h u m a nism has decidedly gone beyond the ancient version is in its historical character, and consequently in a stronger emphasis on the practical dimension of m a n . The universal m a n as an active individual develops over time, the split

1. Greek thought has strong intellectual touch but it is far from the cold, calculated rationality of present-day science. For Plato true philosophical emotion is the root of all philosophy.

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between the actual and the potential h u m a n being takes different forms in each historical epoch and the purpose of criticism is not only to awaken m a n but practically to overcome any social situation on which he remains unfulfilled and degraded.

Finally, a third reason for the rejective attitude of some contemporary scholars towards humanism even when it emplies criticism, or precisely for that reason, is the fact that certain humanists fail to satisfy methodological scientific standards or even assume a markedly anti-scientific stance. Here one should distinguish between two kinds of humanist attack on positive science, their motives and arguments being quite different. O n e originates from the traditional humanities which have always expressed indifference towards the practical application of knowledge and efficiency as a value. This has its roots in the ancient Greeks' relation to work and in their conviction that theoria is significant primarily as a w a y of attaining full humanity, not as a means to implement certain practical goals. The term humanitas in Cicero designates a set of genuinely h u m a n properties which can be developed in each individual through the proper education. That is w h y in mediaeval universities, during the Renaissance, and later, the purpose of humanistic studies was always: to cultivate spiritual abilities and to develop the necessary cultural basis for a given society. Humanities created the intellectual élites for European societies over m a n y centuries, but they lost their dominant role as a field of study from the beginning of the industrial revolution and the increasingly rapid development of technologically oriented science. Yet the rivalry never vanished. Humanists m a k e a sharp distinction between nomothetical and ideographic sciences, assert that with respect to h u m a n society the search for scientific laws does not m a k e sense, that the method of covering law explanation must be replaced by the method of understanding, that formal and quan-titive methods are fruitless and misleading, etc. 'Positivists' reply that all genuine scientific inquiry must follow clearly formulated methodological rules, to rely on conscientious w o r k and to offer intersubjectively testable results. Humanists, on the contrary, tend to be arbitrary, to rely on unverifiable mental faculties (intuition, imagination, understanding, etc.) and to offer problematic and subjective results.

Defenders of positive science are surely the prisoners of a very one-sided and simplified paradigm of science which, in addition to its naivety with respect to values, suffers from its incapacity to account for the heuristic and creative aspects of scientific inquiry. But they have a point when they criticize attempts to introduce a cleavage between the sciences and the humanities. The difference between natural and social sciences is only one of degree. A n y notions concerning the optimal potential of a social situation (which is the crucial point of a critical social theory) require the most scrupulous investigation of the actual situation, its general trends and most probable future outcomes. Without such a concrete study, a generally critical humanist approach remains dangerously vague and indeterminate. Lack of knowledge of facts and of the laws of a given social situation imply ignorance of the limits within which the goals of possible social action have opportunities of success.

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The critique of positive science originating from some leftist circles has different motives but often suffers from the same dychotomous approach to the relation between humanism and science. The members of the Frankfurt School, and especially M a x Horkheimer, have rejected any positive theory-building in the n a m e of 'negative dialectic'. The argument is that all positive theories have a system-supporting function. Therefore, the business of a dialectical social theory can only be criticism of given a social reality and all proposed scientific theories. A similar argument, put forward by existentialist authors, holds that to establish scientific laws of a society amounts to determining the conditions of its normal functioning and perpetuation; thus science has an implicitly conservative function.

The strength of this argument lies in the fact that it refers to something that in most cases really happens, though it happens only because most scholars indeed accept system-supporting roles. Scientific methodology as such does not prevent a scholar from establishing a law which describes a destructive tendency in the system. Marx's law of the fall of the average profit-rate is a classic example. In effect, the very requirement of scientific objectivity would seem to m a k e it incumbent on a social scholar to establish both the conditions of survival and normal functioning of a system and the conditions for its qualitative change and emergence of a n e w system. W h i c h only means, first, that scientific theory building need not play an apologetic role, and, second, that a dialectician is not condemned to negative criticism only. Indeed, the very term 'negative dialectic' seems to be misleading. The negativity of a dialecti-cally critical thought consists in the discovery of an essential limitation to a given system and of the ways to overcome this limitation. This double negation (Aufliebung) leads to a new system and there is nothing in the dialectic process which might prevent us from describing this new system (for Hegel this was the stage of synthesis). The process of critical thought does not, of course, stop with the n e w system. A series of successive steps, projected in the manner indicated by critical theory, mediates between the actual situation at present, and the vision of an optimal historical opportunity over the whole given epoch. Without this mediation, a humanist vision of an optimal future remains only a matter of faith or hope. H u m a n i s m needs science in order to transcend its Utopian and arbitrary character, i.e. to translate its theoretical aspirations into a practice.

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Once scholars assume their responsibility and accept a humanist-ethical point of view they commit themselves not only to showing the way to social practice but also to taking a direct part in that practice. The character of their commitment is obviously contingent upon the very nature of the problems created by modern scientific development.

The most urgent task is to struggle by all means for the suppression and elimination of existing, inhumane technology. This means in the first place a struggle for disarmament, for a new anti-pollution technology.

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A much broader task is active commitment against the abuse of existing knowledge, for those w h o create knowledge have not only every right but also a duty to be concerned about its practical applications.

A s we are already familiar with some of the worst forms of the abuse of knowledge it sometimes becomes possible to identify the pathological character of research at an early stage. 'Pathological' here means research for inhuman purposes, such as the destruction of h u m a n lives, the poisoning of our natural surroundings, or domination over h u m a n minds. Taking part in such a research with full awareness of its purpose is obviously immoral. It is true that the practical purpose of certain research need not be k n o w n or can be irrelevant to the subsequent use of its results, but there are other cases when it is, or could be, known . It is the moral obligation of a scholar in such cases to refuse to serve. H e can preserve his moral integrity and avoid intellectual prostitution only if he refuses to be an accomplice in the scientific preparation of crimes against humanity, in the violation of h u m a n rights, or in the methodical psychological destruction of h u m a n aspirations towards freedom and development. Refusal to use one's knowledge and skills for such objectives can take different forms, from the openly rebellious one following Goethe's advice, 'Defy power, don't ever b o w , show yourself strong', to the more passively resistant one that follows Brecht's Herr Kenner: 'Don ' t serve powers that be but don't say a loud no. I have no backbone to be broken, I must outlive the powers that be. '

It is high time for scientists to work out various strategies of professional disobedience and resistance to abuse, which also requires a change in the character of their organizations. U p to n o w they have organized themselves primarily either into learned societies in order to promote knowledge, or into associations comparable to trade unions in order to protect their professional interests. Nowadays it is the order of the day to organize for the long coming struggle against the abuse (and waste) of scientific knowledge, and because that abuse is of international scale, it can be relatively effectively counteracted only by a world organization of scholars.

Such an organization would undoubtedly be needed also for another purpose: to protect scholars w h o are persecuted for their ethical attitudes, especially for such crimes as the critical analysis of systems, challenging official ideology, démystification of institutions and charismatic leaders or revealing in public facts, which people have the right to k n o w about alienated political, economic and military forces which mould their lives.

Surely the moral strength of an individual cannot be contingent on the existence and efficiency of any organization. Organizations can help to mobilize public opinion and to express collective solidarity. It is good to k n o w that one is not alone. But moral decisions have to be taken even if one is alone. Ethical norms are thoroughly social but the decisions to act in accordance with them and to take all the risks which such action involves aie individual and purely autonomous. There are certain conditions which reduce the vulnerability and increase the necessary autonomy of a person. They all have to do with such changes in individual consciousness and life style as result

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in a greater sense of self-identity and self-determination. The following seem to be of basic importance : 1. Critical re-examination of values and life-roles which have been imposed

on us during the process of education, with the ultimate aim of building up a new, coherent, fundamental life-orientation. Without such a critical and self-integrative effort a scholar m a y lack strength of moral conviction. H e will, like any individual, find in his consciousness various norms that direct his behaviour, but being a scholar, he will, unlike other individuals, often realize that these norms lack both unity and rational foundations, that they stem from different sources and constitute alien, unreliable forces of his conscious life. Such an erosion of original moral consciousness leads to pragmatic or escapist behaviour. Without a new and freely accepted Weltanschauung, which furnishes ground for a firm sense of direction, an autonomous moral commitment with all its attendant risks is hardly possible.

2. Emancipation from false, artificial needs such as those for power, wealth and unnecessary consumer goods, insignificant titles and honours, or fictitious friendships. It is characteristic of all such needs that they not only waste time and generate constant anxieties but also that they m a k e a person dependent and vulnerable. The freedom involved in a moral act implies a readiness to accept blows from the power against which the moral act has been directed. A s the satisfaction of most artificial needs depends on the existing powers, retaliation becomes easy, the price to be paid for freedom looks high and the reluctance to pay that price amounts to renunciation of freedom. Spinoza was one of the freest m e n of his time because, a m o n g other things, he m a d e his living by brushing optical glasses. Scholars w h o crave promotion, rank and opportunities for political influence, w h o are too eager to live in great comfort, to travel at official expense and to preserve by all means all their illusory friendships cannot afford to be free for moral commitments.

3. Raising professional, scientific activity to the level of praxis. Artificial needs are surrogates for genuine ones, they are necessary to furnish a spiritually empty life. T o the extent to which a scholar experiences his research as an end in itself, that allows him to fulfil his best creative aspirations and potential capacities, he becomes able to organize his life in a simple, healthy way which provides the m a x i m u m of necessary independence and moral autonomy.

There are also other conditions worth mentioning such as broad scientific and cultural interests openness to change, awareness of new social needs, professional excellence. They are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions: the freedom involved in a moral act cannot be determined by them. But they create a personal situation in which obstacles to self-determination are considerably reduced.

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6 In addition to their responsibilities as producers of knowledge and techniques scientists have a special responsibility as the educators of those w h o will train coming generations.

Teachers w h o are only able to convey information and pass on routine skills m a y become redundant in the not too distant future : they can be collectively replaced by teaching machines. O n the other hand, students will always need living contact with a teacher w h o can do certain things that no machine will ever be able to do because they are not a matter of routine and cannot be programmed. Amongst these are: 1. Putting pieces of information into broader contexts, showing the con

nexions, mediations, place in history, social and psychological conditions under which knowledge originated, the scientific method by which it was created, implications for future research and social practice. This broader context provided by the teacher is not prefabricated, it can be built up in various directions, it emerges from a dialogue between the two sides in the teaching process, and it depends not only on the breadth of k n o w ledge and culture of the professor but also on the specific interests of the students.

2. The creative interpretation of knowledge. Mere conveying knowledge, even when reproduced in all its complexity, should be replaced by an attempt to endow the symbolic forms in which knowledge is expressed with a new meaning, in the light of a specific, personal philosophical outlook.

3. Awakening the intellectual curiousity of students, broadening their spiritual horizon, developing their capacities for critical thinking. In order to educate an open-minded and creative type of young intellectual w h o will have a sense of history, a good professor must teach them to approach reality not only with the question ' h o w ? ' and 'what are the optimal means to keep things going?' but also with the questions ' w h y ? ' , 'to what purpose?', 'what are the essential limitations and h o w to supersede them?'.

In order to be a successful educator, a scholar must possess personality, being not only a m a n of knowledge and culture but also a m a n of integrity and character, w h o is actively committed to the realization of his beliefs. Students forgive if the beliefs are somewhat Utopian or too realistic. W h a t they cannot forgive, and rightly so, is the discrepancy between thought, word and deed.

It follows, then, that a professor w h o wants to live up to the ideal implicit in his calling will extend his activities beyond the limits of the relatively narrow academic circle and become an active figure in the global community. This need not necessarily imply political commitment in the strict sense of the word, for it can consist of any practical initiative that leads to an intellectual and moral reform of society and contributes to the creation of a new culture, more adequate to the needs of the time.

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This public activity is an important link in the process of mediation between theoretical mind and concrete praxis of a society. A n immense collective effort of the best minds of a nation is needed in order to convert the given social reality to the level of its optimal historical potential. Without such an effort, or in the case of the irresponsible escapism or conformism of its leading scholars, a nation or class is likely to miss its optimal level and end u p in a state of stagnation and decline.

A scholar-teacher has the opportunity to influence the course of the most important social processes in a double sense: on the one hand by his direct action, on the other hand, indirectly, by educating those w h o will change the world. That involves simultaneously changing external conditions and changing of self.

This kind of activity is a break in the chain of blind historical determinism and fully deserves to be qualified as the 'making of history' or briefly as 'praxis'.

Mihailo Markovic is director of the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade, a member of the board of the International Humanist and Ethical Union and an adviser to the International Peace Academy. He is also a member of the editorial boards of several periodicals, including Filosofija (Belgrade), The Philosophical Forum (Boston) and Neues F o r u m ( Vienna). Amongst his main publications (in Serbo-Croat) are: Logic (1954), Dialectical Theory of Meaning (1961) and Re-examinations (1972), and (in German) Dialectic der Praxis (1968) and (in English and Japanese) Dialectic and H u m a n i s m (1968).

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The shortest word in m y title, in, is critical to its meaning, for I do not claim that there has been an academization of the polity. That would pass belief in any nation of blood, fat, bone, gristle and full intestine, none of which seems quite a suitable rock upon which to found Plato's, Marx 's or Marcuse's disembodied utopias. The utopias of m a n y philosophers, scientists, saints and students have that disembodied character in which affliction, anguish and, of course, death—the mortal realities w e m a y dismiss in our classes but not our lives—are transcended in thought if not fact.

Fortunately and unfortunately, no historical government, certainly not that of the United States, has been Utopian. If it is the business of the academy to be academic (and w e all k n o w h o w remiss m a n y professors have been at that, in recent years), it is the business of the government to govern (provided the population is governable). T o govern is not only to rule by instruments of power but also to serve various constituencies.

The academy is one such constituency, and to ensure the continuance of the government's services to it in the United States its representatives exercise considerable influence (as staff, advisers and private citizens) on the affairs of agencies like the Office of Education, the Public Health Service, and the National Science Foundation, and the congressional committees to which they report. O f course, academic m e n are as concerned about the nation's interests as about their o w n , and they have pursued both concerns at high levels of all branches and levels of government, though the pursuit has been welcomed most, or resisted least, by the federal executive apparatus. Contrariwise, academic education and research has been fostered and occasionally utilized by the government, and academic approaches—or methods, ideas and language originating in the academy—have made perceptible inroads in the government bureaucracy.

T o note just a few, and to confine ourselves solely to the social sciences : In recent years, some 8,000 persons designated as 'social scientists' have been employed by United States federal agencies and the government has

1. This is a revised version of a paper given at a panel discussion on The Academy and The Polity at the 31 August 1970 meeting of the American Sociological Association in Washington, D . C .

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been spending roughly $300 million a year on social science research, about $120 million of which is conducted by universities. During the last decade, the volume and influence of academic research has been especially marked in economic and defence affairs and in the areas of mental health, education, poverty and welfare; more recently, crime, violence and social protest have received attention; few social areas have been completely untouched by government-financed research. N o n e of this alone nor all of it together adds up to a domination of government by the academic-intellectual complex, but the academic note is distinctive and worth critical attention.

Once, an agency head might have employed a lawyer, an historian or simply an experienced administrator to analyse an operating or policy problem and set forth alternative solutions; today, such m e n are still employed, but some of the grist in their mill is apt to come from the social sciences and an economist, political scientist or operations researcher m a y be assigned the task.

The social science style of thinking and circumlocutory expression— methodical, depersonalized, generalized, humourless, pedantic—is admirably suited to that of the bureaucracy. Indeed, the language and procedures of the social sciences in their behavioural and quantitative modes and of the bureaucracy in its more tedious and lowly forms are strikingly similar. Both elaborate the obvious in painful detail; both attempt to render persons and events rational by allocating them to categories which can then be processed systematically by clerks and computers; each attempts to ignore, suppress, or supplant emotion and individuality, one for the sake of a sterile truth (which, being sterile, remains s o m e h o w unreal and unconvincing) and the other for the sake of efficient and equitable operations (which m a y , however, become foolishly inefficient and inequitable).

M o r e : it often seems that, in their search for reliable, reproducible truths, social scientists adopt the same methods as bureaucrats, imposing a degree of orderliness—of predictable, reproducible conduct—upon the fractious, irreverent citizenry. A s the government's maintenance of public order rests upon obedience to authority and the voluntary acceptance, or forceful imposition, of restraints upon conduct, so m u c h social scientific knowledge rests upon subjects' obedient, putatively honest responses and voluntary acceptance of, or forceful classification into, categories imposed by the analyst. The intellectual 'discipline' or 'control' inherent in the search for 'laws' of conduct, most explicit in experimental procedures, harbours an element of obedience or force, for subjects must be constrained to act within the experimenter's conditions. Thus, the words in quotation marks simultaneously retain their popular as well as their professional meaning.

A n adequate historical explanation of the growth and utilization of the social sciences in the United States and other countries has yet to be given. N o doubt, numerous explanations are necessary because these disciplines serve numerous purposes, supplying both genuine knowledge and genuine ideology, the demand for which varies with the degree of a nation's literacy, industrialization, and traditionalism. The a-historical social sciences have

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risen as respect for the past has fallen, as society has become more secularized and higher education more widespread. Their development—their content, size, and influence—has also been affected by each nation's political, social and cultural organization and traditions. Their relatively greater growth in the United States than in Europe and their greater acceptance by the United States Government is due in part to the greater openness and adaptability of the American civil service and, in part, to the greater optimism and faddishness of Americans, their tendency to mistake change for progress and their excessive faith in science, rationalism, pragmatism and liberalism, i.e. in the possibility of increasing h u m a n happiness by political and social reform.

C a n the myths and truths of sociology and economics sustain a modern society when those of the Church and classical disciplines no longer can? Perhaps—and perhaps not, for there are conservative as well as radical, aristocratic as well as democratic, tough- as well as tender—minded factions, myth-spinners and myth-killers in these fields. The trouble is that nobody can say precisely which set of myths and truths will ultimately help to preserve or destroy society.

Numerically, the dominant political outlook of American social scientists is liberal Democratic, with important conservative and radical minorities; but that affords no accurate measure of the outlook of those social scientists actually employed by the government, engaged in government-financed research or influential in government affairs. Presumably the radical contingent is generally underrepresented (least so, in sponsored 'basic research') whereas liberal and conservative forces are drawn upon more heavily by liberal and conservative administrations, respectively (or, to be more precise, administrators, since every administration spans a political spectrum). However, whatever the political colour of a particular administration, the apoliticism of the civil service, matching the apoliticism which reigned in the academy until the later 1960s and remains characteristic of contract research organizations, gives a colourless cast to m u c h government-sponsored research. That m a y testify to the technical element in this research, to the equating of 'apolitical' with 'centrist' or 'legitimate' politics, or to the extraordinary power of obfuscation which provides bureaucrats and social scientists with a kind of protective political colouration, or, rather colourlessness.

If there ever was a case of one patient being diagnosed by too m a n y doctors, it is our society. G o d m a y have foresaken it, but not social scientists. They swarm like Lilliputians all over the recumbent Gulliver, ogling, poking and testing every organ, sick or well, yet failing to fathom the giant as a whole. In so far as they have developed moderately reliable methods of observation and understanding, an order of knowledge meriting the designation 'scientific', theirs is a science of parts, not wholes; of generalities, not specifics; of order, not change; repetition, not novelty: of yesterday, not today. They cannot cope adequately with accident and error, with spontaneous acts and idiosyncratic events, with originality, subtlety and guile, with the entire realm of individuality and history. A n d so, except for economics, the social sciences have been more successful in the lowlier, routinized bureaucracy than in the

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higher reaches of government, where success is more dependent upon the fast and artful play of shifting forces.

The good sociological citizen must perform normally, like a good (i.e. old-fashioned) student, according to sociological rules. It is easy to devise such rules—every text contains hundreds—which are plausible explanations of h o w and w h y a society functions. But the plausible should not be confused with the real, the generalized explanation with the specific and the knowable with the unknowable. H o w peculiar it is that the future is so unknowable and the past so explicable! After-the-fact explanation should be as suspect as prophecy ; it is too facile to infer that what happened had to happen and for reasons better k n o w n to the scholar than the actor. T o o m a n y intellectuals aim to determine the meaning of events even if they have to put it in themselves: indeed there is a special pride in doing so, because simply to accept the explanation of a man's action that he himself offers turns the intellectual into an amanuensis. G o o d history should harbour as m u c h uncertainty as life and a good social scientist should be modest, because he has a lot to be modest about.

It is precisely the immodest intellectual, confident of his answer even when it changes daily, w h o is most useful to government and most congenial to government leaders. Regardless of the state of their bowels, the nation's leaders must appear confident and knowledgeable in public. H o w often dare senators and cabinet secretaries tell the press—how often does a professor tell his class?—what every honest m a n tells himself constantly: 'I don't k n o w ' ?

The statistician provides the data without which the computers, the planners, the economists, budgeteers, generals and cabinet secretaries could not function. The government could not run and policy could not be m a d e without him, but he is too modest to m a k e policy. His mind is immobilized by too scrupulous regard for too m a n y facts, whereas policy is m a d e by assigning a few factors more weight than they deserve. A n d is not giving a few factors more weight than they deserve the essential nature of social science and of historical explanation in general, particularly that of the great system builders w h o have had the largest influence?

I do not want to exaggerate the similarities between great and ordinary intellectuals or between intellectuals and academics. There are important differences in the quality, range and persuasiveness of first- and second-rate minds. M a n y writers have distinguished true 'intellectuals' (like themselves) from mere 'academic', intellectuals being 'thinkers' w h o spew forth ideas as fast as they deposit words on paper,1 whereas academics are m e n of more limited imagination w h o earn their living retailing other persons' ideas in small quantities and dull facts in large quantities to students of equally limited

1. Asked to define an intellectual, Bertrand Russell once replied: 'I have never called myself an intellectual, and nobody has ever dared to call m e one in m y presence'.

'I think an intellectual m a y be defined as a person w h o pretends to have more intellect than he has, and I hope that this definition does not fit m e ' (quoted by Russell Kirk in T h e American Intellectual: A Conservative View', in George B . de Huszar (ed.), The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait, p. 309, Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1960.

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imagination. H o w would empirical social scientists be classified? A few, perhaps, as intellectuals (e.g., Marx , Spencer, Boas, Myrdal) but far more as academics or technicians. In a more flattering classification, they might discharge the function of experimentalists, leaving theorizing to the intellectuals. In m y o w n view, there are as m a n y kinds of empirical social scientists as of m e n . S o m e are clerks and others thinkers; some have m a n y and some, fewer ideas; but if they are honest empiricists and not ideologues or professorial bureaucrats with a vested interest in their o w n doctrine, they should make a scrupulous effort to distinguish what is true from what they believe; they should always be prepared to admit that they are wrong; and they should k n o w what realistically obtainable evidence would demonstrate that.

However one m a y serve up the stew of ideas and beliefs and facts, all varieties of professional men—genuine and spurious intellectuals, scholars, academics and social scientists—have plainly earned a place in modern government or under contract to it. Let m e say briefly what I think that place is. Again, I confine myself to intellectuals whose subject is m a n and society, excluding scientists and engineers whose subject is nature and technology.

F r o m the days of the scribes and elders, intellectuals have played a part in government. I do not think their part more important today than at periods in the past (though the degree of their specialization and the language of their discourse m a y have changed) or their understanding of society any keener, more timely or more useful than that of their predecessors. The new role some have seen for intellectuals in contemporary society mistakes the volume of their work for the degree of their insight, the occasional success and utility of some intellectuals and fields for the progressive success and utility of all and their rising number and affluence and intermittent influence for a rising level of comprehension.

Certainly, the volume of published and unpublished writing and data has vastly increased—both the volume of trash and of serious scholarship, of useful and useless knowledge, accurate and inaccurate data. Forests have been cleared to record them, libraries and garbage d u m p s bulge with their contents, the task of sifting the mouldering mass is beyond the capacity of any m a n and for want of the right datum at the right time m a n y a social battle has been lost. M a n y data, right and wrong, are repeated incessantly, clogging the mills of understanding. Others are so topical and transitory that they rarely recur twice and, no matter h o w m a n y are collected and classified, legions more remain to plague us like jungle insects. In principle, social data are infinite, because more are, and still more can readily be, manufactured than can ever be absorbed : to order them all is as futile as to dry the oceans. Hence the futility of proposals to index all social knowledge for machine retrieval—quite aside from the inherent ambiguity of so m u c h h u m a n data, which cannot be rendered unambiguous by arbitrary quantification and which age relentlessly like yesterday's newspaper. W h e n , with great labour or luck, social scientists come upon an order of significant data that indeed illumines and m a y even help to solve a significant social problem, the problem soon changes, the data lose their value and they must resume their sisyphean labours.

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Recent examples of such short-lived victories are the rise of quantitative testing as an objective means of selecting able college students and its subsequent condemnation as a biased instrument of middle-class cultural hegemony; and the success of the 'new economics' under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, which n o w seems based as m u c h on fortunate circumstances and bequeathing troubles to the next administration as on any 'fine tuning' of a coarse economy. The notion of a well-functioning, even a conformist, social system, on which m u c h of anthropological and sociological theory was based, seemed appropriate to the 1950s but failed utterly to account for the rebellious years that followed. H o w superficial is a theory that neither discerns nor conceives of the molten forces lodging beneath the mantle of society! A n d h o w simple are the scholars w h o think that, amidst economic crisis, political discord, social disorder and disarray, problems of crime, education, transportation, poverty, garbage disposal, and so forth—problems of waxing demands and waning restraints, of a society that has gone off the rails—can still be solved, as once they might, by computer models and the answers to multiple choice questions. ' W h a t ! Has G o d given into our hands the keys and the most secret springs of His power; has H e bound Himself not to overstep the limits of our knowledge?' Montaigne asked. Not even a humble and honest m a n binds himself to do tomorrow what he did today, nor, even if he knows and wishes, can he give into the scholar's hands the secret springs of his action.

It is said, the pen is mightier than the sword. That is a specious claim, for the sword wounds every time it strikes whereas no one can foresee which of the torrent of words that flow into the caverns of time will be marked for awhile in their passage. N o r is the influence of ideas proportionate to their truth, for contradictory ideas (such as the doctrines of racial equality and inequality) have been equally influential at different times and places and even at the same time and place. '. . . only in logic are contradictions unable to exist: in feelings they quite happily continue alongside each other,' Freud once remarked.1 For an idea to be influential, it need only be believed; less: it need only be at hand.

Accordingly, it is vain to infer from the rising use of social science by government any increase in the rationality of government, as if w e were more clever than our parents or the administrations of Presidents Johnson and Nixon were wiser than those of Jefferson and Lincoln. Thirty other explanations and consequences are closer to the truth though, being less flattering, they are mentioned less often.

'I hire a lawyer,' J. P . Morgan once said (I paraphrase), 'to tell m e h o w to do what I want. ' That m a y not cover all the uses of the social sciences by government, but it covers a good many .

A good government and good politics requires the consideration of as m a n y contingencies as planning for a hundred wars that will not be fought. T o commission two hundred studies of which a hundred yield fruit and ten

1. Letter to Martha Bernays, 8 July, 1882, quoted in Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 1, p. 112, Basic Books, N e w York, N . Y . , 1953.

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are acted upon selectively lets the action rest upon the turn of events and the choice of the administration, not the judgement of the social scientist whose number happens to turn up.

F r o m what u n h u m a n source does the social scientist derive the superior rationality that is more apparent to him than to his fellow citizens? Hath he not hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Is he not fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same disease, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer , as a citizen is?

If, under the influence of science, reason is indeed more widespread, w h y has our sense of community and c o m m o n purpose and the legitimacy of authority so diminished? Is reason inimical to good sense? Does it serve every special interest and no c o m m o n interest? Is it solely an instrument of critical analysis, not constructive action; of special pleading, not special mercy; an instrument of politics and passion, not compassion?

Social facts approximate points on a nautical chart of a restless sea with shifting shoals, tides and weather. In a storm, there is no sure passage h o m e and the ship m a y founder; under w a y or at anchor, all is at hazard. In calm weather, the social scientist plots the currents, the reefs and the seabed. In a storm, he makes hectic soundings but the position of the ship and the value of the m a p is then uncertain. The analogy is not entirely apt, for every political party and every intellectual school issues its o w n charts, disasters are blamed on the other party, and it is hard to say if a safe voyage is due to good soundings, good seamanship or good luck. N o major voyage is exactly like another and the nation as a whole never arrives but only proceeds.

By fostering the illusion that w e k n o w where w e are going and h o w to get there, academic social science functions essentially as a secular religion. ' W e m a y protest in all honesty and with deep conviction that this is not our intent or desire, that w e wish to function as scientists, pure and simple', Dwight W a l d o writes, '•—but if old legitimacies crumble in the modern "crisis of authority", does not science itself raise a claim to legitimatize decision? . . . there is no denying that the social scientist will exercise m u c h the same social role and function as the R o m a n temple priest w h o read the future from the entrails of oxen—though the social scientist reads it from graph, from report, from computer.'1 The deepest ignominy of the social scientist is not his aspiration but his failure to divine the meaning of events.

Harold Orlans is Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies in the Brookings Institution, Washington. He has published a number of books and articles on science policy, social research and other subjects. His latest books include Government-Sponsored Social Research (forthcoming) and The N o n Profit Research Institute (1972).

1. Dwight Waldo, 'Comments' , n Research for Public Policy, p. 28, Washington, D . C . , Brookkings Institution, 1961.

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Paul Davidson Reynolds O n the protection of h u m a n subjects and social science1

F r o m A . D . 200 to A . D . 1543 (when Seven Books on the Structure of the Human Body by the Italian, Andreas Vesalius, was published) the most influential writings on the h u m a n anatomy were those of Claudius Galen ( A . D . 130-200), a Greek living in R o m e . Yet his anatomical research was exclusively devoted to the dissection of animals : pigs, sheep, oxen, cats, dogs, horses, lions, at least one elephant, wolves, fish, birds, monkeys and apes. '. . . Nowhere throughout the breadth and width of the R o m a n Empire was he given permission to dissect the h u m a n body.' This was in spite of the fact that, between 332 B . C . and 280 B.c., Herophilus dissected between 200 and 600 h u m a n cadavers, produced a wealth of information about the h u m a n anatomy (which was destroyed when the libraries at Alexandria were burned) and produced one of the only two existing h u m a n skeletons (the other was assembled by his colleague, Erasistratus) that served for 'many years and centuries' as the only available h u m a n skeletons for study in the Mediterranean world. Changes in attitudes toward the deceased h u m a n body between 300 B.c. in Alexandria and A . D . 200, 500 years later in the R o m a n Empire, were not reversed until ten centuries later, when Fredrick II, Emperor of Germany and the two Sicilies, made h u m a n dissection legal in 1240. Even then, h u m a n dissections were so rare, that some countries permitted only a single dissection every five years, that they were performed before large mixed audiences and, as such, were not suitable occasions for serious research.

This led to the illegal resurrection of the dead for medical research and instruction—four medical students were apprehended in 1319 in Italy in such an endeavour—a practice which extended into the twentieth century. (Abstracted from Lassek, 1958.)

By 1957, the following statute was law in the state of N e w York: ' A person . . . w h o , not a member of a jury, records or listens to by means of instrument

1. Although this paper represents views and suggestions inspired or borrowed from others, including Ellen S. Berscheid, George W . Bohrnstedt, T h o m a s J. Bouchard, Jr, Paul C . Rosenblatt, Roberta G . Simmons and Karl E . Weick, and discussions held with the members of the Psychology Ethics Seminar conducted by Berscheid and Weick, the author takes full responsibility for their presentation and applicability.

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the deliberations of such jury or w h o aids, authorizes, employs, procures, or permits another to do so; is guilty of eavesdropping. (In the state of N e w York , eavesdropping is considered a felony punishable by imprisonment.)' (Ruebhau-sen and Brim, 1966, p . 428.)

Just as physicians were prevented from understanding the structure and mechanisms of the h u m a n body for 1,500 years—who knows h o w m u c h h u m a n suffering was caused by this lack of knowledge?—it appears that ignorance about the structure and mechanisms that lead to a decision by a jury will persist for some time, due to the religious faith placed in these decisions by the advocates of the legal system.1

These examples are presented to m a k e one point clear—-the average citizen, when aroused, m a y place restrictions upon research far beyond any scientist's imagination, such as prohibiting the dissection of h u m a n cadavers, making the study of live juries illegal, or insisting on a prior review of all research. If the lay public perceives that social scientists are engaged in thoughtless or damaging research, the reaction, fostered by ignorance and prejudice, will quite likely be a severe restriction or prohibition of any research, regardless of its potential benefit to society. This suggests that social scientists have no choice but to prevent such a reaction by developing their o w n mechanisms of self-control, both in an attempt to prevent the occasional mistreatment of those participating in research and to demonstrate, to the public, concern with this problem and willingness to regulate research activity within the profession(s). The focus of this article is the development of the desirable characteristics of such a system.

The article is divided into three parts. In the first, the effects of research on the individual are examined; in the second, the effects of systems of control on the development of science are discussed; and in the third, a suggested control system that seems to provide a balance between the two issues is presented.

I. The protection of human subjects

EFFECTS OF RESEARCH O N SUBJECTS: A TYPOLOGY

It is possible to classify research procedures into five categories, based on the direct effects (excluding indirect effects, such as time taken from other activities) of the research procedure on those w h o participate in the research.2

These are presented in order of increasing severity: 1. No effect. Absolutely no effect, positive or negative, on any of those parti

cipating in the research. 2. Temporary discomfort. The participant experiences some discomfort, such

as anxiety, tension or physical pain, but the discomfort terminates at the end of the study and is no greater than that encountered in everyday life.

1. A n y social scientist acquainted with the research on decision-making in small groups, including the Strodbeck (1957) study of 'mock' juries, would have difficulty justifying the product of group decision-making as 'justice'.

2. See Wolfensberger (1967) for a similar three-level typology.

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3. Unusual levels of temporary discomfort. The participant m a y experience unusually high levels of discomfort, and these m a y last beyond the research procedure, but participants eventually return to their pre-research state as a result of natural processes or a post-experimental treatment administered by the investigator.

4. Risk of permanent damage. Based on past experience, the researcher m a y in such cases expect there to be a risk of permanent damage, a permanent change with negative effects, for the subject. 'Risk' implies a probabilistic relationship—it is not clear which participant will suffer permanent damage, or that, in a given study, any participants will experience permanent damage. It is in the judgements of the researcher(s) that there is some 'risk'—and that it is not negligible.

5. Certainty of permanent damage. In such research, permanent damage is expected to occur for participants as a result of the research procedure. The probabilistic connotations of the work 'risk' are absent since there is a high degree of certainty that damage will occur.

A substantial amount of research on social and h u m a n processes produces no effect on the individuals involved in the research; indeed, subjects frequently do not k n o w they have been involved in research. This occurs w h e n data collected for one purpose is used for another research project, such as census data, or when the data is collected in such a way that individuals have no knowledge of the data-collection activity, such as photographs of a sporting event used to study crowd behaviour (Unobstrusive Measures by W e b b et al., 1966, has m a n y more examples).

However, except for research at this first level (where the participants are unaware of the research activity), any research produces effects at the second level, temporary discomfort, even if it is only the 'discomfort' of being diverted from another activity or asked to contribute data to the project. Effects at the third level, 'unusual levels of temporary discomfort', are frequent in medical research, but seem to be relatively u n c o m m o n in social science. 'Risk of permanent damage ' clearly accompanies a significant portion of medical research, but is almost absent in social science. I k n o w of no documented case of permanent damage caused by research on social or psychological phenomena. Finally, research at the fifth level, 'certainty of permanent damage' , is extremely rare in any type of research.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH A N D ' D A M A G E ' TO RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

O n e major point, almost completely obscured in discussions of the 'ethics' of social science research, is that there is absolutely no evidence of any permanent damage to any individual as a direct result of participation in social science research. Further, in the majority of social science research (over 95 per cent), there is no possible way in which the participant could be 'damaged'—or, usually, permanently affected.

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Paul Davidson Reynolds

In fact, a long-term effect on subjects, resistant to natural processes, is so rare that its occurrence in social science is a rather dramatic event.1 In short, most social science research falls under the first two levels of effect on participants, 'no effect' or 'temporary discomfort', while a small, but significant proportion is situated at the third level, 'unusual levels of discomfort'. Several illustrations substantiate this point.

Consideration of two of the 'horrible examples' of social science research m a y help to demonstrate the innocuous nature of the effects on the subjects. Milgram's (1965) study of obedience to authority, demonstrated that average Americans, acting as teachers, would administer strong electrical shocks to adult 'pupils', strong enough to kill a person with a heart condition, in obeying the orders of a 'scientist'. Those w h o select this as an example of 'damaging' research (Kelman, 1966; Baumrind, 1964; and Rubin, 1970) conveniently overlook the fact that in this dramatic study there is absolutely no evidence of any damage to any subject, considerable evidence of anxiety and tension during the study, but no evidence of permanent damage , in spite of the fact that '. . . a University (Yale) psychiatrist, experienced in out-patient treatment, interviewed a sample of experimental subjects with the aim of uncovering possible injurious effects resulting from participation' (Milgram, 1965, p. 244). O n a post-experimental questionnaire mailed to all the subjects after completion of the research, only 1.3 per cent said they were sorry they had participated, a result which even the best university professor would be glad to get on a post-course evaluation. If subjects can survive the Milgram experiment without any evidence of damage, perhaps the vast majority of experimental studies are unlikely to have permanent negative effects on the participants.

M o r e recently, a similar controversy has been aroused by the publication of a study of homosexual behaviour a m o n g adult males in public rest-rooms (Humphreys, 1970). This caused some comment from the press (von Hoffman, 1970) and a spirited defence from sociologists (Horowitz and Rainwater, 1970). The basic issues seemed to be that sociologists should not study 'dirty things', despite the fact that there is a sizeable homosexual population in the United States, and that the researcher might have embarrassed the unwilling participants if he m a d e their names public (Humphreys was able to identify the participants by noting their automobile licence numbers, since the public rest-rooms were remotely situated in city parks and participants travelled by car for their brief visits; m u c h later, in disguise, he interviewed them in their homes). However, there is nothing that this investigator did that could not have been done by an ordinary citizen, or a journalist, and the subjects of his study were not damaged precisely because he was an ethical social scientist.

Another source of evidence to support the contention that social science research is relatively harmless comes from a draft version of a n e w set of

1. A n example of such an exception is Rokeach's (1970) study where the effects of a brief interview (in which the characteristics of the student's value structure were measured and discussed with the student—no manipulation was involved) with undergraduates was, two years later, systematically related to their choice of college major.

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O n the protection of h u m a n subjects and social science

standards for psychological research, compiled by the American Psychological Association A d H o c Committee on Ethical Standards in Psychological Research (Cook et al., 1971). This document presents seventy-five principles to guide investigators and hundreds of examples of 'ethical problems' encountered in research, submitted by members of the association. There is not a single instance of any individual suffering permanent damage as a result of participation in 'psychological' research amongst these examples. It is possible that this committee, for diplomatic reasons, did not include the examples involving evidence of damage, for some types of research are of such a nature that permanent damage could be expected in a small percentage of cases, e.g. research on the effects of drugs on mental illness. In fact, with no evidence of damage, it is difficult to justify such an elaborate set of principles to guide research.

The relatively harmless nature of social science research becomes quite salient when alleged social science abuses are compared to alleged medical abuses. Beecher (1966) has documented a number of 'unethical' examples from medical research—in one instance twenty-three subjects died because a treatment with k n o w n effectiveness was withheld from them so as to determine the potency of a new variation of the treatment. N o example in social science approaches this in demonstrating the potential of misused power in research.

In short, examination of the most widely k n o w n 'horrible examples' and a recent attempt to document abuses in psychology, indicate that in terms of actual damage to research participants, social science research has been relatively innocuous, particularly in comparison to medical research.

The world 'damage' has been used to refer to 'undesirable effects' in social science research, carrying m a n y of the connotations acquired in medical research (where research participants have died) and applied to situations where the effects on research participants are of a completely different magnitude. W h e n used in relation to social science research, 'damage' usually refers to one of six things: 1. Actual changes in the characteristics of an individual (i.e. attitudes, perso

nality, self-concept, physical health, etc.). 2. A n experience which creates tension or anxiety. 3. The collection of 'private' information which, if m a d e public, might

embarrass research participants or actually m a k e them liable to legal action.

4. Deception of the individual, the act of being deceived being considered as 'damaging'.

5. Providing participants with unpleasant, though true, information about themselves which they might not otherwise have to confront.

6. The 'invasion of privacy', the mere act of collecting certain types of information being considered as 'damaging', regardless of the consequences for the individual.

By throwing up this 'barrage of damage' related to social science research two central points are often obscured : (a) such damage is in no w a y comparable in magnitude to that occurring in medical research and (b) there is no real evidence of permanent negative effects on participants in social science research.

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F r o m the point of view of 'actual damage' to subjects and the freedom to conduct social science research with a m i n i m u m of restrictions, the attempts to create a 'sphere of privacy' around all individuals, a sphere the penetration of which constitutes 'damage' , regardless of the actual effects on the individual, is perhaps the most disturbing. The debate on this issue was quite lively in the mid-1960s focussing on personality tests, where personal feelings and fantasies are measured, and several issues of the American Psychologist (in 1966) are devoted to reporting this discussion. O n e of the more scholarly contributions (Ruebhausen and Brim, 1966) to this interchange suggests that investigators should seek to prevent public control by adopting self-control procedures to regulate the invasion of 'privacy', including the following principles (Ruebhausen and Brim, 1966, p. 437):

1. There should be a recognition, and an affirmation, of the claim to private personality.

2. There should be a positive commitment to respect private personality in the conduct of research.

A s frequently occurs, the key terms in these principles, 'private', 'recognition' and 'respect', sound very noble but are so vague that the principles themselves are rendered useless as a guide to research. For example, as norms change about what is private in a personality, the application of these principles to specific situations will vary. H o w will the investigator k n o w whether he is 'invading privacy'?

A more extreme position is presented by von Hoffman (1970, p. 6), commenting on Humphrey's (1970) study of homosexuals : ' N o information is valuable enough to obtain by nipping away at personal liberty, and that is true n o matter who's doing the gnawing . . . the conservatives over at the Justice Department or . . . the liberals over at the Sociology Department.' This statement reflects a c o m m o n tendency not to see any difference in the collection of 'data' by different individuals with different purposes and different attitudes towards protecting the source of the 'private' information. However, if one can argue that the subject will not be embarrassed or damaged when data is collected by a scientific investigator, it seems reasonable to suggest that scientists should be allowed to have access to 'confidential' information.

Unfortunately, the furore over the imagined 'damage' due to invasion of 'private thought', deception, manipulation of subjects, and so on has obscured the fact that law-abiding social scientists cannot guarantee that 'private' data will not be used against a participant in the United States. A major threat to participants in social science research, particularly survey research, is the potential for legal subpoena and public disclosure, in court, of research data. With the exception of occasional comments and an excellent analysis by Nejelski and Lerman (1971), very little attention has been paid to the lack of legal protection for research data. The threat m a y be quite real w h e n the research concerns illegal or politically sensitive topics, such as sexual deviance, the use of drugs, or radical political affiliations. While there have been no instances of the actual subpoena of research data, the threat is present and there is no guarantee that data will not be subpoenaed at some time in the future.

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It is ironic that research conducted for the purpose of improving the criminal justice system can legally be used to prosecute the participants w h o contribute the very data that might be used to help improve the system.

If it is assumed that, in the absence of the threat of subpoena, disclosure of 'confidential information' is unlikely to occur and that any permanent change in an individual, for good or bad, is unlikely in social science the six types of damage to research participants are thereby reduced to four : creation of anxiety and tension, the deception of trusting participants, confronting individuals with unpleasant information about themselves, and the 'invasion, of privacy'—the actual acquisition of the information constituting 'damage' . Since such things are likely to happen in m a n y projects, they deserve further attention.

M a n y of the ethical sermons being preached to social scientists seem to assume that those participating in research projects would never encounter given discomforts if they did not participate in the research. This is, of course, ridiculous, since such 'discomforts' are part of everyday life: any unfamiliar situation will create anxiety, everyone finds it interesting to have 'private' information about another, and deceptive infoimation is presented at every turn, particularly in advertising and political speeches. In fact, what m a y be unique about such 'discomforts' as are experienced in social science research is the fact that, upon the completion of the research, the social scientist 'confesses', and usually divulges complete information about the project, including the need for deception or the source of anxiety. If a salesman deliberately deceives a prospective customer, he makes no attempt, after the sale, to reveal this deception. If social scientists were not so honest, subjects would not be aware of the deception and, hence, not so upset about their treatment.

It has been suggested that social scientists, because of what they are, can be expected to be more honest and trustworthy than, for example, used-car salesmen. Perhaps his ability to create anxiety, deceive or collect 'private' information is based on the special trust the public invests in the social scientist. In short, social scientists should be above the ordinary moral code and s o m e h o w be cleaner than ordinary people. While this is a commendable objective, it does not seem to be a reasonable restriction to apply to the conduct of social science research—that is, to the study of natural phenomena and everyday life, but with techniques that are 'nicer' than 'real Ufe'. It would be impossible to conduct research under such conditions and would encourage the development of an increasingly strict moral code for social scientists.

However , it does seem reasonable that, once the research is completed, social scientists should give full and complete information to the participants about the nature and reason for any deception practised, anxiety caused, or private information elicited including the results of the research, as long as no 'private' information about individuals is divulged. This is roughly consistent with attempting to put things back in their place, after the research is completed In short, social scientists should be 'cleaner than clean', after the research is completed, but free to use techniques necessary to test the research hypothesis, as long as it is clear that no permanent damage will occur.

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Since anxiety, tension, deception, or invasion of privacy do not actually result in any kind of permanent change or damage, in the sense of permanent impairment, it m a y be more reasonable to refer to these states as 'temporary discomforts', which participants endure for the duration of the study only. Considering that research subjects are often paid for their contribution, it does not seem unreasonable to expect them to suffer such temporary discomforts : after all, medical research often makes exhausting physical demands upon the research subjects, with no ethical problems arising as long as there is no risk of permanent damage.

Since most individuals undergo temporary discomforts in the course of everyday life this suggests a w a y of distinguishing between levels of impact according to the typology of effects already described. Explicit research procedures (where the subject was fully aware of participation in a research project) would be considered at level two, 'Temporary discomfort', as long as: (a) anxiety produced was equivalent to that created w h e n a person is stopped by a police officer, engages in a job interview or takes a final examination in a college course; (b) invasion of privacy is equivalent to that required by a government census, job application or credit application form; (c) deception was equivalent to that expected from salesmen (who m a y even compliment a person to achieve a good impression), from advertisements or from political speeches; (d) unpleasant information would be equivalent to that expected from a candid friend or spouse.

If any type of discomfort exceeded these levels, the research procedure could be classified at level three, 'Unusual levels of temporary discomfort'.

The reason for attempting to provide such a classification is to suggest ways of defining when an investigator would be expected, or obliged, to consult colleagues. A s long as research creates effects at the first two levels (and the large majority would fit into this category), it seems impractical and unreasonable to expect the investigator to consult an ethics committee. If higher levels of discomfort, or any risk of permanent damage were expected, it would be appropriate for an ethics committee to counsel the investigator.

INFORMED CONSENT: THE MEDICAL M O D E L

Since h u m a n beings have been used in medical research for thousands of years, beginning before Christ, this section will briefly discuss the procedures adopted by medical investigators in attempting to minimize the ethical problems involved in research. The obvious dangers in medical research and the substantial influence a respected physician m a y have on subjects has focused m u c h of the discussion on the piinciple of 'informed consent', which has, as will be shown, some serious disadvantages.

If research canies with it the 'risk of permanent damage' or certainty of permanent damage' for the participants, two questions must be answered: 1. Is the potential benefit to medical science (and society) worth the risk to

participants? 2. W h o shall take the risk by being a participant?

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T h e procedures adopted to answer the second question m a y have a profound influence on the tendency to answer the first question in the affirmative.

O n e of the more remarkable answers to ' W h o shall take the risk?' is for the researcher to conduct the initial studies on himself. Unless the medical investigator is convinced that a therapeutic technique or research procedure is accompanied by a relative low risk for the research subject, or a very large potential benefit for society (or his career), he will clearly not use himself as a research subject. However, it is n o w rare for a medical investigator to use himself for research: w h e n one noted cancer specialist was asked w h y he did not perform an experiment on himself, he replied '. . . there are relatively few skilled cancer researchers, and it seemed stupid to take even the little risk' (Langor, 1964, p. 551). The experiment in question did not damage those volunteers, w h o were not cancer researchers, participating in the research.

Another traditional procedure for picking guinea pigs is to resort to those w h o m society has judged as useless or a burden: criminals and prisoners. The earliest dissections, mentioned above, in Alexandria in 300 B . C . were done on the corpses of criminals, as were the first legal dissections after the Dark Ages —'. . . with the anatomist deciding the type of execution' (Lassek, 1958, p. 63). This custom reached its most dramatic climax with the use of Nazi concentration c a m p inmates, considered useless by Nazi-controlled G e r m a n y , in a n u m ber of painful and brutal experiments, do determine, for instance, h o w long a h u m a n being can survive in ice water.

Out of the famous Nuremberg Trials came a code of ethics for the use of h u m a n subjects in research, the Nuremberg Code (reprinted in Science, 143, p. 553 as well as m a n y other places). This places heavy emphasis on the principle of informed consent, the notion that anyone w h o participates in research where he m a y run the risk of damage should be a true volunteer, one w h o voluntarily consents to participate in the research after being completely informed with respect to the risks and benefits to him as a participant. This principle is designed for research where the individual cannot personally benefit from the treatment, as distinct from situations where a physician m a y 'experiment' with different types of therapies in an attempt to improve a patient's condition.

The doctrine of informed consent, while commendable in its respect for the integrity of the individual and his rights, is, in practice, somewhat unsatisfactory. O n a practical level, it is almost impossible for anybody to be completely informed about the potential risks and harm which m a y result from certain types of research. It is difficult enough for the investigator and almost impossible for the participant, for if the risks and problems were already well k n o w n , there would be no reason to conduct the research.

Even more troublesome are the potential benefits to society. It is quite clear that unless the project has a very specific focus, perhaps the cure of a specific disease, the potential benefits are impossible to assess. T o expect the research particpant to m a k e a rational judgement and weigh the risks to himself and the benefits to society of a complex study involving poorly understood

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phenomena with no obvious practical significance is ludicrous. Yet such research m a y provide unexpected major benefits for society.

Moreover, there is some question as to just h o w m u c h of the decision is left to the subject. The oft-quoted c o m m e n t from C a h n (1961, p. 11) focuses on another major problem in the use of informed consent: ' O n e of the major malpractices of our era consists in the "engineering of consent". Sometimes this is effected simply by exploiting the conditions of necessitous m e n , as in certain Indian states where thousands of consents to sexual sterilization have been purchased by offering a trivial bounty to the members of a destitute caste. W h e n again, consent m a y be "engineered" by the kind of psychologist w h o takes it for granted that his assistants and students will submit to experiments and implies a threat to advancement if they raise objections. O r the total community m a y "engineer" a consent, as when the president, the generals, and the newspapers call with loud fanfare for a heroic crew of astronautical volunteers to attempt some ultrahazardous exploit. . . . n

A s a side issue, it should be mentioned that no committee on h u m a n subjects in research would have approved the experimental attempts to put m e n on the moon—the uncontrolled hazards are well documented by the three deaths on the launching pad (in the United States and the large number of unexplained corpses (both h u m a n and animal) which have returned from extended space voyages.

But the doctrine of informed consent involves a more serious problem. If taken literally, it shifts the burden of responsibility for participation on to the volunteer, if any damage occurs, it was because, fully informed of the hazards and benefits and of his o w n volition, he consented to take the risk. By routinely shifting complete responsibility on to the participant, it makes it easier to answer the prior question, 'Is the benefit to society worth the risk to the participants?', in the affirmative. In other words, the principle of informed consent by shifting the responibility for potential damage to the participant, makes it easier to conduct dangerous research, since answering the question of ' W h o shall take the risk?' is avoided.

If the principle of informed consent is used to shift responsibility for damage away from the investigator, and the research participant is unable to give truly informed consent, w h o is to bear the responsibility for damage resulting from research? If it is argued that society will benefit (again excluding research conducted for the direct benefit of the participant), then perhaps society should bear the responsibility for, or at least the cost of, damages. This argument leads directly to the suggestion that insurance, underwritten by either government or private firms, with the premiums paid by the research project, be provided for subjects (see Calabresi, 1969, for a more thorough discussion.)

1. 1 This interesting statement appears in an article concerned principally to point out that Sir Francis Bacon, one of the more influential writers of the Western world, was an absolute scoundrel, a corrupt and sadistic sexual deviant.

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Even the principle of informed consent is inapplicable to situations where there is certainty of permanent damage. Such situations are rare, and mostly involve a combination of research and therapy, such as the selection of patients to receive the benefits of artificial kidneys. F r o m the patients' point of view, this is a life-or-death decision, since gradual deterioration of the kidneys means certain death, which can only be avoided either by a transplant, an operation with some risk, or by bi-weekly treatment with an artificial kidney. Though the machines and staff required are extremely expensive (it costs approximately $10,000 per year for the treatments) there are more patients than facilities available. H o w shall the patients to receive treatment, and thus granted the right to live, be chosen?

In the United Kingdom, where the expense is borne by the State, the choice is limited to (de Wardener, 1966, p. 107) '. . . patients between puberty and menopause w h o are in their right mind and likely to be co-operative, and w h o are not suffering from some additional disease or from a generalized disease which dialysis (use of the artificial kidney) would not control. In addition, some would prefer to treat patients w h o have young children, and most of us would avoid starting treatment on patients in a moribund or agonal state . . .'. In a clinic in Seattle, where expenses are born by the patient, the criteria were (Schreiner, 1966, p . 128) '. . . under forty, free from cardiovascular disease, a pillar of the community, and a contributor to the economics of the community; such items as whether the person concerned was a churchgoer and was married were also considered to be important'.

A m o n g the physicians operating these clinics, there is apparently no consensus as to whether the decision itself should be m a d e by an individual or by a committee. The following comments is illuminating in this contest (Schreiner 1966, p. 128): '. . . attention (has been focused) on the committee (of laymen) which exists in Seattle to decide w h o shall live and w h o shall die. W e have never had such a committee in Washington, D . C . , and w e have no intention of having one. W e feel that this is a device to spread the responsibility to people w h o by experience and education are really less equipped to take the responsibilities than the physicians in charge of the case'. Apparently some physicians feel that, 'by experience and education', they are well equipped to decide w h o shall be awarded the gift of life.

W e m a y conclude by presenting some suggestions about the use of h u m a n subjects in research and the use of informed consent : 1. While the informed consent of subjects should be obtained whenever

feasible, considering the nature of the research, and particularly for research at the most dangerous levels—risk or certainty of permanent damage—it should not be considered a ritual that absolves the investigator or the research community of all responsibilities.

2. The procedure for answering the two questions—Is the research worth the risk to the participants? W h o shall be the participants and take the risks?— should be explicitly separated for all research at the two most dangerous levels, risk or certainty of permanent damage. Perhaps they should be dealt with by different persons or different committees.

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3. Compensating 'damaged' research participants in such a w a y that the investigator is not personally liable should be investigated. A system of insurance seems reasonable.

CONTROLLING THE USE OF H U M A N SUBJECTS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH AS A M O D E L FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE

Since h u m a n subjects have been used in medical research m u c h longer than in social science and because the abuses in the Nazi concentration camps have led to the development of principles for the use of h u m a n subjects in research, the 'medical model' has frequently been applied to the use of h u m a n subjects in social science research, with heavy emphasis on informed consent. It seems appropriate to consider some of the differences between medical and social science research and the appropriateness of the medical model.

First, there is the issue of the potential impact on those w h o participate in the research. There is absolutely no question that the damaging effects on participants in medical research is not only relatively easy to measure, but can often be quite dramatic.

However, if the dangers of medical research are greater, the potential benefits to society are also greater and easier to demonstrate. Life expectancy has been dramatically extended, primarily due to increased knowledge about the prevention and treatment of disease, most of which is based on controlled experimentation. While social science research m a y not be hazardous for the subjects, it is clearly harder to justify such hazards that do exist in terms of an obvious benefit to the population at large.

A third factor makes the medical model even less relevant. It is generally assumed that the subject's knowledge of the research techniques and the phen o m e n a to be studied will not affect the biological process under study. While this is not strictly true in some pharmaceutical studies (and it is for this reason that the double-blind experiment, where neither physician nor patient knows w h o is getting the active agent or the harmless placebo, has been developed) it is a useful assumption for most medical research. By contrast, it is well k n o w n that the study of social and h u m a n phenomena is often completely distorted by the reaction of the participants if they k n o w about the study and its purposes (the Hawthorn and experimenter effects are well-known illustrations of this problem). Only if one is collecting routine data about individuals or a social system can one assume that the respondent's knowledge of the purpose of the research will not affect their response to the situation. This has a major implication for the doctrine of informed consent (considered almost a sacred ritual in medical research, even though the patient cannot possibly appreciate the risks to himself in m a n y studies) and its automatic application to social science research, where the participant's knowledge of the project's purposes m a y effectively destroy the usefulness of the data acquired.

For these reasons, it seems reasonable to question the automatic transfer of the medical model for handling h u m a n research subjects to social science research.

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W H Y ARE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS C O N C E R N E D OVER RESEARCH PRACTICES?

There seems to be one fundamental problem underlying m a n y of the complaints within the social science disciplines (anthropology, political science, psychology and sociology), about the conduct of research and its effects on participants.

M a n y social scientists wish to achieve two objectives simultaneously: (a) to create scientific knowledge related to social and h u m a n phenomena and (b) to benefit mankind at large (or at least those w h o participate in research). These may be incompatible.

While the problem takes m a n y forms, it seems to pervade most of the discussion about ethics in social science research, damage to subjects, use of knowledge, source of financial support for research, motives of the investigator, etc., the extreme position being reflected in the ideology of 'radical sociology', where it is argued that any research should carry a direct benefit to society, and in particular, to those w h o participate in research.

With more developed sciences, such as the physical and biological ones, the general assumption has been that an increase in knowledge will increase the potential for creating social benefit. A s long as no damage to individuals is incurred, there is no problem with the ethics of conducting the research. However, there m a y be problems connected with the use of the knowledge, such as the construction of an atomic b o m b , which m a y , in the opinion of some, not always benefit society.

The emphasis on creating knowledge is often considered callous or insensitive when the research involves h u m a n subjects. The investigator is accused of being indifferent to the participants and therefore less than ' h u m a n ' . This type of argument is often advanced in relation to the way physicians treat patients. Compassionate concern for an ailing person m a y be a comfort to the patient or his relatives, but it is not necessarily related to an ability to cure the disease. O n e could even argue that the greater the emotional involvement, the less the capacity to provide an objective diagnosis of the problem, and the less the problem is likely to be solved: physicians do not usually treat themselves. Major contributions m a y be m a d e by persons w h o were scoundrels. (Francis Bacon is an interesting example, as w e have seen.)

In social science, where the potency of available knowledge is not so clearly demonstrated, it would appear that two other issues arise : 1. Lack of confidence in the potential of social science, present or future, to

provide general benefit to society, even if utilized to the fullest. 2. Lack of confidence that social science, even if potent and applicable, would

be used to benefit society by societal decision-makers. Both of these issues affect attitudes towards research with h u m a n subjects.

If it is felt that knowledge about social and h u m a n phenomena can be used to benefit society, then the issues related to the use of h u m a n subjects are similar to those in medical research. Dangerous research, as in medicine, is therefore justified on a cost/benefit basis because the potential benefits are high enough to offset the costs.

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If, on the other hand, there is doubt about the potential benefits of social science to society, even if properly used, then no damage to participants is justified. Essentially this is saying that, since the research results will, at best, be trivial and impotent no discomfort or damage to the participants is justified. If this were the reasoned judgement of the majority of social scientists, it might be best for the profession to disband and for individual social scientists to adopt n e w careers that provide direct and immediate benefits to society, perhaps with departments of sanitation.

The question of h o w existing knowledge is to be used in society, or h o w the political structure can be reorganized systematically to incorporate the contributions of social scientists is too complex for discussion here : as yet, no satisfactory solutions seemed to have emerged in most countries.

In summary , if social scientists have no confidence that the end result of their endeavour, social science, will be useful for improving individuals or society, they should abandon all attempts to create 'science' and focus on practical problems. O n the other hand, if social scientists have confidence that the body of knowledge that is being constructed through research with h u m a n subjects will be useful for mankind, they have no choice but to accept 'discomfort' to the participants as the price for creating scientific knowledge about social and h u m a n phenomena.

II. The protection of social science

While m u c h has been written about the dangers of research for the participants, both in medical and social science research, there is almost no attention paid to the effects of different 'control systems' on the creation of science. Participants will not be harmed if no research is conducted, but then there will be no empirically based scientific knowledge. If the creation of scientific knowledge is brought to a standstill by procedures designed to protect the subjects, is the problem solved? This section is devoted to an exploration of some issues involved in the development of scientific knowledge and h o w different control procedures m a y affect the creation of science.

W H Y SHOULD SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

D O RESEARCH ON H U M A N BEINGS? i

A major difference between scientific knowledge, composed of theories and research findings, and everyday knowledge, practical or common-sense ideas, is that scientific knowledge is presented in such a fashion that any competent person m a y test its usefulness or accuracy for himself. Everyday knowledge or c o m m o n sense does not always possess this feature, because it is often based on unique personal experiences. If a person develops a theory or idea about h o w others or social systems behave and it is not, or cannot, be tested by objective, empirical research (i.e. research that anyone can replicate), then such

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ideas or theories are not shared knowledge, other scientists are unlikely to regard them as useful, and they will not be accepted as part of science.1

T h e importance of empirical verification of scientific knowledge is that any idea m a y be wrong, no matter h o w confidently it is put forward.

While theory-building and the development of new conceptualizations are important, social science can progress only to the extent that theories can be tested against the results of empirical research done with real h u m a n beings and real social systems.

THE CREATION OF SCIENCE

Science is created. Breakthroughs in scientific knowledge involve the creation of n e w ways of describing existing events, or, as K u h n (1962) describes it, inventing new paradigms. O n the other hand, most scientific research is devoted to establishing the details or exploring the boundaries of existing paradigms or theoretical hypotheses, being relatively routine and predictable research. While detail-establishing research is important in locating the boundaries of a particular theory, to increase its practical utility, or the general confidence in the theory, the major advances in science involve the creation of new paradigms.

However, the creation of new paradigms, n e w conceptualizations of existing phenomena, is a very subtle and poorly understood matter. At an elementary level, the invention of n e w paradigms can be considered as the creation of n e w concepts and/or new relationships between concepts. Accepting this definition one m a y speculate on what is required for n e w paradigms to be created.

In developing a new concept, a scientist must take existing sensory input (sight, sounds, smells, tactile sensations, etc.) related to the phenomenon, resist the tendency to define these sensory inputs in established ways (which m a y have been built into the individual during his normal socialization or professional training), grope for new ways of organizing them, and then search for a way of describing them to other scientists. This last step, description, is m a d e difficult because existing terminology m a y not be adequate for describing a radically n e w concept. Once the individual has invented n e w concepts, he must develop statements describing a relationship a m o n g these concepts, the statements that form the basis for scientific theory. Finally, it is necessary for the scientists to test the usefulness of his new w a y of describing a particular phenom e n o n by doing empirical research.

It is misleading to think of this as a series of neat steps, for in most cases, the creative scientist will be simultaneously engaged in all three activities : (a) inventing concepts, (b) developing statements, and (c) conducting research to test the usefulness of the concepts and statements. Occasionally, the results of these activities will be the most important event in science, the development of a n e w theory that becomes the competitor of existing theories and, in some

1. This argument is elaborated in Reynolds (1971).

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cases, replaces them. Above all else, social scientists should try to encourage the occurence of this rare, but important, event—the creation of a new theory.

With this conception of the process, it is possible to speculate upon the conditions under which new paradigms are most likely to be developed. Several of the more obvious factors that come to mind are time to work on the problem, the resources to conduct research, and the training and skills necessary to engage in fruitful scientific activity. However, several factors are not so obvious, such as (a) an atmosphere of playful trial and error, (b) the freedom to pursue hunches, insights, and undefined or poorly clarified lines of inquiry without formalizing the hypotheses guiding the research, and (c) encouragement to consider alternatives to established patterns of behaviour or accepted ideas.

The first two points are illustrated by a review of autobiographical accounts of 'creative' people (Einstein, Poincaré, Dryden, Mozart, H o u s m a n , Wolfe, Stein), described in Wallach and K o g a n (1965, p. 13-15). O n e c o m m o n thread in the accounts of h o w creative ideas have occured is that ideas 'flow', 'bubble up' , emerge from 'combinatory play', or are '. . . a confus'd Mass of Thoughts, tumbling over one another in the Dark'. While most of these accounts concern areas in which it is easy to try a new idea (literature, music, or mathematics), it is clear that the freedom to experiment fearlessly with n e w ideas is crucial. Using this concept of creativity, Wallach and K o g a n discover that creativity, and intelligence, measured by analytical tests, are independent in junior high school students.

The third point, encouragement to re-examine established ideas and theories, is perhaps the most important. Most people are familiar with the objections to radically n e w theories, such as placing the sun, instead of the earth, at the centre of the solar system, or Darwin's notions about natural selection, instead of divine guidance, as the process creating present-day forms of life. Perhaps the opening example in this article, the lack of any research on h u m a n anatomy due to the prohibition against the dissection of h u m a n corpses is less well known.

The second point, the effects of premature formalization, is illustrated by a recent study (Reynolds, 1968) where subjects w h o were asked to learn concepts difficult to describe scored higher on a non-verbal test than those w h o studied these concepts in preparation for teaching them; in other words, those w h o knew in advance they would be expected to formalize their knowledge as verbal instructions were unable fully to understand the concepts. It seems reasonable to consider n e w scientific concepts, in the process of creation, as difficult to describe, particularly when no existing terminology m a y fit them. The impact of requiring premature formalization on the ability to create n e w concepts, related to understanding n e w phenomena, can only be estimated, but it could be of dramatic importance, encouraging routine but easily described research at the expense of more creative, innovations which are difficult to describe.

While it is widely k n o w n that new ideas and theories often meet considerable resistance before gaining acceptance, it is not so widely realized that the most vociferous opponents are not the lay public, w h o seldom understand the issues involved, but other scientists, w h o m a y find their life's work jeopardized

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by new theories. Barber (1961) describes in detail the m a n y obstacles which prominent physical scientists place in the w a y of new theories, either because they challenge their o w n work and stature in the scientific community, or because they are inconsistent with existing religious and philosophical d o g m a . Consequently, m a n y of these new theories took several scientific generations to gain acceptance. In social science, Freud was vilified and censured when he m a d e the first presentations of his ideas, not by the lay public, but by his o w n scientific colleagues

This leads to an important dilemma, for a social scientist's colleagues are the most qualified to evaluate the potential of research for harming innocent participants, yet a particular colleague m a y wish, perhaps unconsciously, to prevent research which m a y threaten theories or intellectual orientations to which he has m a d e a substantial commitment. The dilemma can be resolved by attempting to develop control systems with the following features : 1. The amount of research subjected to prior review, in any form, is

minimized. 2. All evaluations of research subjected to prior review must be restricted

to evaluating the potential for 'unnecessary discomfort' of the subjects, with no evaluation of the importance of conducting the research project itself. However, this would not prohibit a review committee, in an advisory capacity, from suggesting alternative research procedures which might accomplish the same scientific purposes with less discomfort to the subjects.

3. N o committee should have the power to prevent research from being conducted, although they m a y have the power to withhold resources for such research.

A n y systematic review of all social science research, even if conducted by social scientists (who are more acceptable than any other academic reviewing group) runs the risk of enhibiting or destroying the conditions which might lead to the development of a new paradigm by: (a) creating an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, where a social scientist's reputation or position m a y be endangered by his research ideas ; (b) preventing the full fruition of new ideas or paradigms by requiring premature formalization of exploratory ideas ; (c) preventing the testing of radically new paradigms or theories because of a reviewing colleague's unconscious desire to protect established theories.

A system (society, professional group, university, etc.) which pledges itself to the creation of knowledge and deliberately creates conditions to inhibit or prevent the creation of n e w ideas is not only inconsistent in its policies, but destroys the potential for making contributions to science and, as most of us hope, to mankind.

AMBIGUOUS DECISIONS A N D EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONALS

In general, persons only adhere to a formal set of rules if (a) they perceive it to be to their immediate personal advantage, (b) they expect disapproval from their close associates for violation of the rules, or (c) they expect imminent and important sanctions, punishment or reward, contingent upon their behaviour

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with regard to the rules. Mos t ordinary laws, such as traffic laws, those regarding criminal conduct, or laws regarding health practices (such as vaccinations) are adhered to for one or more of these reasons. Control of the 'average' person by other average citizens is made possible because the situations related to 'illegal' behaviour are relatively simple, unambiguous and easy to evaluate (i.e. to speed or not to speed).

Control of the conduct in applied professionals (such as medicine, law, certified public accounting and some types of engineering) is based on the same types of processes, but the implementation is somewhat different, due to the specialized and complex nature of professional activity. Applied professionals are often required to m a k e decisions about situations where ambiguity about the consequences of action m a y be at a m a x i m u m . Such decisions become a matter of judgement, a best guess about which of m a n y factors m a y be of importance, not the clear-cut application of neat rules (Scott, 1966).

If a judgement, or decision, is m a d e under ambiguity and the outcome is that the client suffers, it is often impossible to determine whether the individual was (a) 'unprofessional', by virtue of incompetent, careless or 'unethical' behaviour, or (b) diligent and competent but unable to control the outcome. In both cases, the client has suffered, but it is impossible to trace back responsibility, merely from the outcome, that is client suffering. For this reason, professionals prefer that responsibility be based on the circumstances of the case and the decisions made , rather than on the outcome. But if evaluations are to be made on the basis of the situation and the decisions, then the only competence to evaluate the decision-maker's conduct lies with other professionals, since only they understand the problems and issues involved in making specialized decisions in ambiguous situations.

A s a result, professionals prefer, and comply with, codes of ethics developed and enforced by other professionals. Decisions about ethical conduct made by laymen on the basis of outcomes, which the professional frequently cannot control, are considered irrelevant and unfair since they do not separate what the professional can influence from what is considered to be uncontrollable. In short, professional decisions are often the 'best judgement available' and professionals prefer to be evaluated in terms of what other professionals would do, not by absolute standards.

Professionals seem to rely on a number of factors to ensure that codes are both appropriate and observed: 1. The codes are developed and administered in such a manner that they

are, in large part, applicable and practicable for the day-to-day conduct of professional affairs.

2. Professional training often includes exposure to the ethics of the profession, both the content of the code and/or informally in discussion of specific cases.

3. The existence of an ethics committee, composed of professionals, charged with the responsibility of receiving and evaluating complaints and determining whether some member of the profession has acted incompetently, carelessly or to achieve personal gain at the expense of the clients' welfare.

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The ultimate sanction is to withdraw the privilege of practising the profession from an offender.

These three factors have such a powerful effect that professionals frequently express disapproval of colleagues perceived as acting 'unethically', which is important for insuring day-to-day compliance with an ethical code.

In summary, in the applied professions complex decisions about ambiguous problems have, in part, encouraged the creation of a collegiate system for control of professional conduct. If ambiguity about the outcome of decisions is high in the applied professions, there is no reason to think it will be lower in scientific research, where knowledge is deliberately being expanded in areas where ambiguity is at a m a x i m u m . Under such conditions, it would seem reasonable that ethical codes be developed and enforced along the same pattern as those in the applied professions. This will include :

1. Development of the code by the professionals. 2. Exposure to ethical issues as part of professional training. 3. Complaints about unethical conduct to be examined, and sanctions

applied by a collegiate review panel, where judgements can be m a d e about the actions of scientists, rather than the outcome of the research and its effects on innocent participants, which m a y not be under the complete control of social scientists.

THE G O L D E N RULE A N D EXPLORATION INTO THE U N K N O W N

Most codes for conduct, such as the Nuremberg Code and codes of ethics for applied professionals, are actually elaborations of the Golden Rule: D o unto others as you would have them do unto you. While this is an admirable rule for guiding one's life, it is based on one important assumption—that one knows the consequences of one's actions. If this were not true, h o w could one evaluate the effects of one's actions on others, or others' actions towards oneself, and determine whether or not they constitute a desirable experience?

In m a n y of the applied professions, where most decisions involve the application of knowledge in which there is a high degree of confidence, the golden rule is an appropriate axiom to guide the treatment of clients. However, if the effects of a procedure are unknown, or ambiguous, then there is some reason to doubt whether the golden rule is useful in guiding treatment of research subjects.

The solution m a y be to consider another way of prescribing appropriate behaviour in the use of h u m a n subjects. Rather than listing a set of forbidden activities, it m a y be preferable to list approved activities, which have been shown to be relatively harmless in the past. A s long as an approved procedure is employed, no matter what the scientific purpose, the investigator is considered to be ethical. This has the additional advantage of providing a more positive setting for the assessment of effects on subjects, by focusing on k n o w n and safe procedures rather than on imaginary and possibly injurious ones.

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ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY A N D THE PROTECTION OF THE INNOCENT

There are two basic procedures for controlling the activities of those dealing with h u m a n beings and protecting innocent individuals from unnecessary damage or discomfort. O n e is to review procedures before they are employed, the other to review complaints about unethical conduct after action has been taken. F r o m a practical standpoint, the most obvious differences between these two procedures are (a) the time and resources that must be devoted to ethical control and (b) the degree of protection offered to the participants.

Most of the applied professions deal with situations where the possible risk to the client is either slight or damages m a y be reversible (i.e. a legal suit to recover monetary damages for faulty engineering). In such situations, where there is reason to suspect that the professionals are competent and ethical and the client's risk is slight, a procedure of prior review before each decision would seem to be rather uneconomical. Requiring prior collegiate review would probably double the cost of providing the services, since such a review would need to be completed by other professionals and hence be time consuming as well as cumbersome.

But it should be m a d e clear that this is an optimal solution, providing a balance of the costs of prior review against the probability of damage to the clients. Despite the careful training and ethical socialization of professionals, patients die, innocent clients serve prison terms and bridges collapse; nevertheless it is assumed that the average client, and the public at large, are better served by a code and complaint procedure than prior review of every decision.

However, it is quite possible that there are professional decisions, in applied as well as scientific areas, where risks to the innocent, be they clients or research subjects, are very great. In such situations, prior collegiate review is not only appropriate, it is frequently sought by the professional himself. T h e best-known examples arise in medicine, where life-and-death decisions are clearly important to the patient. Perhaps less obvious is that frequent informal interaction a m o n g colleagues is fostered by uncertainty about certain procedures and the risks they m a y impose on the patient or subject. M o s t professionals, and particularly scientists, do not wish to be responsible for extreme damage to subjects, and desire collegiate consultation in determining whether the risk is necessary and can be reduced.

In s u m m a r y , it seems reasonable to assume that w h e n subject risk is small, then a system of prior review adds needlessly to the burden of conducting day-to-day professional activities. W h e n the risk to subjects is large, not only is prior review desirable from the subject's point of view, but most professionals would prefer such a review, if only to share the responsibility for the outcome with colleagues.

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On the protection of human subjects and social science

P R O T E C T I O N OF SOCIAL SCIENCE:

DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A C O N T R O L SYSTEM

The desirable characteristics of a control system to protect the potential for developing social science are as follows: 1. It should not discourage or significantly inhibit empirical research. 2. It should not discourage the creation and testing of new paradigms by:

(a) creating an atmosphere of suspicion or distrust, where an investigator m a y perceive that his reputation or position is endangered by the hypotheses he wishes to test; (b) preventing the full fruition of n e w ideas by requiring premature formalization of exploratory paradigms unless absolutely necessary; (c) encouraging cost/benefit analysis, where the importance of an idea is subjected to evaluation and m a y be rejected, perhaps unconsciously, by a reviewing colleague w h o considers it as threatening, unless the research procedure involves substantial risk for the participants.

3. It should not burden the investigator with unnecessary administration. 4. All review of dangerous research should be conducted by colleagues

w h o concern themselves only with the effects on the subjects, not the merit of the project, whenever practicable.

5. It should provide, upon request of the investigator, collegiate review of a procedure.

6. It should allow for change in knowledge about research procedures and their effects on subjects.

7. Guidance for investigators should be as specific as possible, so that they can m a k e decisions about research procedures with a m i n i m u m of ambiguity or danger to their professional careers.

III. Control of social science research

CONTROLLING PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY

A number of procedures which have been proposed or used are presented below. They are rank ordered in terms of increasing restrictiveness. 1. No restriction. This usually applies w h e n a profession is n e w or not

well k n o w n . It is only w h e n the public or the practitioners perceive that abuses are occurring or possible that they begin to consider control.

2. Control by journal editors. Beecher (1966) as well as others have suggested that journal editors reject articles submitted for publication which report on the use of 'unethical' procedures. Even if one ignores the problems of deceptive writing and the propensity to publish any important finding, no matter h o w it was established, this procedure fails to protect the research participants since the control is post hoc. Clearly this is a very weak and impotent control.

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3. Professional guardian for the subjects during the research. According to Mulford (1967), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ( N A S A ) sponsors a number of research projects which are extremely dangerous for participants. O n such projects, a physician, not otherwise connected with the research, is assigned to observe the subject and if, at any time, he feels the subject to be in danger, he has the authority and responsibility to terminate the research immediately. While this is a commendable mechanism, it is clearly inappropriate for research where there is no clear and immediate danger to the subjects, which is the majority of all research.

4. Professional code and complaint procedure. A s currently in use in the social sciences, this consists of an explicit code of ethics assumed to represent the standards of the professional group and of a committee to review charges of unethical conduct to determine whether a member of the group should be sanctioned for an infraction of the rules. Severe infractions would result in expulsion from the group. In the major empirical social sciences, two factors (a) the ambiguity of the rules governing research (see American Psychological Association, 1963, and American Sociological Association, 1968) and (b) the ability of social scientists to pursue a career without maintaining membership in the associations, m a k e this also a rather impotent control mechanism.

5. Professional licences. This mechanism, widely adopted in the applied professions, consists of training, both in the substance and ethics of the trade, and then assuming that the clients, patients or subjects are protected unless evidence to the contrary is presented. Fear of having the licence revoked and therefore of losing the right to practise is assumed to prevent most injuries to participants.

6. Prior review of major research projects. This is the mechanism that has been recently adopted by many government agencies and a number of universities in the United States. It consists of having a review panel examine and approve all research procedures involving h u m a n subjects. Whether or not the panel members are colleagues, in the sense that they can achieve a full understanding of the research procedures and the implication of the research hypotheses for that area of knowledge, is actually not clear. In many universities it is interpreted as applying to all federally funded research, in others it is applied to all funded research, no matter what the source. In either case, it excludes small pilot projects, student projects or projects done as part of training in research methodology.

7. Prior review of all research using human subjects. A n extension of the previous procedure, but merely extending the review to all research of any type involving h u m a n subjects.

8. Complete prohibition. Outstanding examples of this are described in the introduction to this article, for example the prohibition of the dissection of h u m a n cadavers and the study of live juries.

While all of these procedures have merit for certain situations, none appear to be appropriate for the control of those engaged in research with h u m a n

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subjects. There has never been an operational control procedure explicitly designed for those chiefly concerned with the scientific study of phenomena in h u m a n subjects. The most widely used control procedure, as applied in medical research, is primarily designed to control physicians as applied professionals, healing the sick, rather than medical researchers w h o happen to be physicians. The remainder of this article will therefore be devoted to a presentation of a control system which m a y satisfy the desirable characteristics outlined in the conclusion of the two previous parts, providing a balance between the need to protect subjects and the claims of social science.

RESEARCH PROTOCOL-LICENSED INVESTIGATORS CONTROL

This mechanism, a modification of the licensing procedure used by applied professionals, would include the following five features: (a) a procedure for licensing social science investigators; (b) a list of approved research procedures, or protocols, k n o w n to produce no effects for research participants more serious than temporary discomfort; (c) provision for modifying existing protocols or adding new ones to the list; (d) provision for collegiate review of research procedures that are not encompassed by the approved protocols; and (e) evaluation of complaints about the conduct of research or the treatment of h u m a n subjects and the sanctioning of licensed investigators found guilty of unethical behaviour, either through mistreatment of research participants or through failure to adhere to the procedures.

The most important aspect is the list of approved procedures, which makes explicit what is implied in most ethical codes in the applied professions: the current standards of professional practice. If any research procedure which produced effects for participants at the lowest two levels (no effects or temporary effects) was m a d e publicly available, then any licensed investigator could be entitled to use these procedures, regardless of the purpose of the research, without expecting unusual levels of discomfort for the participants.

If the investigator wished to conduct research which might produce more severe effects on the subjects (unusual levels of discomfort, risk of permanent damage or certainty of permanent damage) then he should expect, and voluntarily solicit, the advice and counsel of a committee of his peers. Such a committee would be expected to determine whether the potential benefit of the research was commensurate with the potential risk to the participants. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then the committee could cope with the next problem, h o w to select those to be exposed to the risk.

The professional social science associations should play a major role in the development of such mechanisms. They could find ways of approving research protocols, distribute lists of the approved protocols, provide the review committees (or the criteria for forming suitable review committees in research organizations) which would consult with investigators about dangerous research, evaluate and license professional investigators and receive and evaluate complaints about investigators and research procedures.

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Such initiatives would be possible only if the influence of the associations, both with the public (represented by government agencies) and their members , increased substantially. For a licence to be respected by investigators, it must be important in relation to their career. If it were considered a prerequisite to obtaining research funds or the legal right to conduct certain types of research, such a licence would be an important credential. O n the other hand, if an investigator followed the rules and prescribed procedures, he should be protected and supported by the professional association in the event that some problem of damage to subjects occurred. The association would be expected to provide legal counsel, expert testimony and perhaps insurance to compensate damaged participants. Unless the licensed investigator is offered special privileges and protection should an honest attempt to protect subjects and create useful knowledge fail, he has little incentive to respect the licence or operate within the system and there would be no reason to expect most investigators to engage in systematic efforts to protect participants.

If the professional associations took the initiative in the manner suggested, they m a y be able to achieve the support of national, state and regional governments in two ways. First, public agencies m a y be willing to restrict the allocation of research funds to licensed professionals and, second, they m a y allow the professional associations the privilege of controlling their o w n members . The public would benefit in two ways: assurance that those supervising research related to social and h u m a n phenomena attempt to protect the rights and welfare of participants and that the control of investigators attempts to balance the benefit to society (both current and long-term) with the risks to the participants. F r o m the point of view of social scientists, these are desirable features if compared to their alternatives: untrained laymen conducting research labelled as social science and control of social scientists by the lay public.

A D V A N T A G E S : THE PROTECTION OF H U M A N SUBJECTS

Several features of this procedure provide protection for the h u m a n subjects. First, it would encourage the use of research procedures (protocols) that are k n o w n , from past experience, to be safe for the subjects. Second, all procedures not on the approved list of protocols would automatically require review by a committee which would specifically concern itself with undesirable effects. Third, if the procedure could potentially produce permanent damage , the committee's decisions could be m a d e in such a way that the merit of the research be considered separately from the problem of participation. Fourth, the investigator is motivated to protect the subjects, since he m a y lose his privilege to conduct research if he is careless or thoughtless in his handling of them or of data. Fifth, in the event that any unnecessary discomfort occurs and the participant is upset he m a y appeal to a complaints committee with the power to investigate the matter.

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A D V A N T A G E S : THE PROTECTION OF SCIENCE

The major advantage of this procedure, in comparison to the others, is that it provides a m i n i m u m of interference with the process of creating science, first, because investigators k n o w exactly where they stand in relation to ethical issues at all times (they need not fear capricious and unreasonable enforcement of ambiguous principles), second, because the focus is on the treatment of the subjects in all but the most extreme cases, not on the value of the research. This would prevent unconscious attempts to quash a project because it is theoretically threatening. Third, the freedom to conduct research is maximized as long as (a) the research procedure is on the list of approved protocols and (b) a licensed investigator is involved in the project. Fourth, licensed investigators w h o adhere to the rules can expect the support and assistance of their professional group should a reasonable attempt to advance science produce undesirable effects for some subjects. Fifth, the entire structure would handle research activities that vary widely in their effects on subjects, from the innocuous to the most severe. Sixth, it is a dynamic system, allowing for changes in the approved protocols as evidence on their suitability changes.

DISADVANTAGE

The major disadvantage is that such a scheme takes a considerable amount of work and planning to operate, and particularly to initiate. O n the other hand, a serious commitment to protecting the research participants would suggest a willingness to invest the necessary time and m o n e y , particularly if the professional associations are also serious about advancing scientific knowledge about h u m a n and social phenomena. There is the possibility that investigators using radically new techniques m a y be slowed d o w n in their attempts to conduct research but that m a y be a necessary cost to prevent public control of social science research.

Conclusion

The focus of this article has been the problem of simultaneously protecting research participants without destroying the potential for developing scientific knowledge about social and h u m a n phenomena. The major points are as follows: 1. ' D a m a g e ' to participants in social science research is an infrequent

occurrence, there is no objective evidence that it occurs. 2. A s social science becomes more potent, some research questions m a y

require that subjects take 'risks' in order to advance knowledge—much as in medical science.

3. Social scientists cannot simultaneously attempt to develop a potent body of knowledge and expect to conduct 'harmless' research.

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4. A n y procedure designed to protect h u m a n subjects that destroys the potential for creating scientific knowledge about social and h u m a n phenomena is patently self-defeating.

5. A major commitment to both the protection of h u m a n subjects and the creation of science would suggest that substantial resources be committed to a procedure that attempts to achieve a reasonable balance, such as the 'approved research protocol—licensed investigator' procedure described.

6. If social scientists do not control the conduct of social science research, society will.

For 1,500 years no scientist could dissect a h u m a n corpse—-who k n o w s w h e n it will again be legal to study a live jury in the United States.

REFERENCES

A M E R I C A N P S Y C H O L O G I C A L A S S O C I A T I O N . 1963. Ethical standards of psychologists. American psychologist, vol. 18, p. 56-60.

A M E R I C A N S O C I O L O G I C A L A S S O C I A T I O N . 1968. Toward a code of ethics for sociologists. The American sociologist, vol. 3, p. 316-18.

B A R B E R , Bernard. 1961. Resistance by scientists to scientific discovery. Science, vol. 134, p. 596-602.

B A U M R I N D , Diana. 1964. S o m e thoughts on ethics of research : after reading Milgram 's 'Behavioral study of obedience'. American psychologist, vol. 19, p. 421-3.

B E E C H E R , Henry K . 1966. Ethics and clinical research. New England journal of medicine, vol. 274, p. 1354-60.

C A H N , E d m o n d . 1961. The lawyer as scientist and scoundrel: reflections on Francis Bacon's Quadricentennial. New York University law review, vol. 36, p. 1-12.

C A L A B R E S I , Guido. 1969. Reflections on medical experimentation in humans. Daedalus, vol. 98, p. 387-405.

COOK, S. W . ; KIMBLE, G. A.; HICKS, L. H . ; MCGUIRE, W . J.; SCHOGGEN, P. H . ; S M I T H , M . B . 1971. Ethical standards for psychological research: Proposed ethical principles submitted to the A P A membership for criticism and modification (by the) A d Hoc Committee on Ethical Standards in Psychological Research. American Psychological Association monitor, vol. 2, p. 9-28.

D E W A R D E N E R , H . E . 1966. Some ethical and economic problems associated with intermittent heamodialysis. In: G . E . W . Wolstenholme and Maeve O'Conner (eds.), Ethics in medical progress: with special reference to transplantation, p. 104-25. Boston, Mass., Little, Brown. (Ciba Foundation symposium.)

H O R O W I T Z , Irving, Louis; R A I N W A T E R , Lee. 1970. . . . journalistic moralizers. Transaction, vol. 7, p. 5-8.

H U M P H R E Y S , Laud. 1970. Impersonal sex in public places. Transaction, vol. 7, p. 10-25. K E L M A N , Herbert C . 1966. Deception in social research. Transaction, vol. 3, p. 20-4. K U H N , Thomas S. 1962. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, 111., University

of Chicago Press. L A N G O R , Elinor. 1964. H u m a n experimentation: cancer studies at Sloan-Kettering

stir public debate on medical ethics. Science, vol. 143, p. 551-3. L A S S E K , A . M . 1958. Human dissection: its drama and struggle. Springfield, 111.,

Charles C . Thomas.

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M I L G R A M , Stanley. 1965. S o m e conditions of obedience and disobedience to authority. In: Ivan D . Steiner and Martin Fishbein (eds.), Current studies in social psychology, p. 243-62. N e w York, N . Y . , Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

M U L F O R D , Robert D . 1967. Experimentation on h u m a n beings. Stanford law review, vol. 20, p. 99-117.

N E J E L S K I , Paul; L E R M A N , Lindsey Miller. 1971. A researcher-subject testimonial privilege: W h a t to do before the subpoena arrives. University of Wisconsin law review, vol. 1971. (In press.)

R E Y N O L D S , Paul Davidson. 1968. Certain effects of the expectation to transmit on concept attainment. Journal of educational psychology, vol. 59, p. 139-46.

. 1971. A primer in theory construction. Indianapolis, Ind., Bobbs-Merrill. R O K E A C H , Milton. 1970. Long-range experimental modification of values, attitudes

and behavior. (Presented to the 1970 meetings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.) (Mimeo.)

R U B I N , Zick. 1970. Jokers wild in the lab. Psychology today, December 1970, p. 18-24. R U E B H A U S E N , Oscar M . ; B R I M , Jr, Orville G . 1966. Privacy and behavioral research.

American psychologist, vol. 21, p. 423-37. S C H R E I N E R , G . E . 1966. Problems of ethics in relation to haemodialysis and trans

plantation. In: G . E . W . Wolstenholme and Maeve O'Conner (eds.), Ethics in medical progress: with special reference to transplantation, p. 126-33. Boston, Mass., Little, Brown. (Ciba Foundation symposium.)

S C O T T , W . Richard. 1966. Some implications of organization theory for research on health services. Milbank Memorial quarterly, vol. 44, p. 42-3, 45-7.

S T R O D T B E C K , Fred L . ; J A M E S , Rita M . ; H A W K I N S , Charles. 1957. Social status in jury deliberations. American sociological review, vol. 22, p. 713-19.

V O N H O F F M A N , Nicholas. 1970. Sociological snoopers and . . . Trans-action, vol. 7, p. 4, 6.

W E B B , Eugene J.; C A M P B E L L , Donald T . ; S C H W A R T Z , Richard D . ; S E C H R E S T , Lee. 1966. Unobstrusive measures: nonreactive research in the social sciences. Chicago, 111., Rand McNally.

W A L L A C H , Michael A . ; K O G A N , Nathan. 1965. Modes of thinking in young children. N e w York, N . Y . , Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

W O L F E N S B E R G E R , Wolf. 1967. Ethical issues in research with h u m a n subjects. Science, vol. 155, p. 47-51.

Paul Davidson Reynolds is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota. His Primer in Theory Construction was published in 1971 and he is engaged on research concerning social processes in small groups, on which he is also writing a book.

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Continuing debate

The main topic of the first issue of this Journal for the current year (Vol. X X I V , N o . 1) was 'Development Studies'. Wilfred Beckerman's article below is a further contribution to the discussion of this subject.

Several past issues of the Journal have also been devoted to the sociology of literature and the arts, especially Vol. X I X , N o . 4, 1967, 'The Sociology of Literary Creativity', and Vol. X X , N o . 4, 1968, 'The Arts in Society'. The article by Heinz Steinberg that follows carries on these concerns and at the same time contributes to the diverse Unesco activities marking International Book Year, 1972.

Wilfred Beckerman H u m a n resources and economic development: some problems of measurement

Introduction

There is little point in examining the problems that have to be faced in the attempt to measure something unless one first clarifies the objectives for which measurement is required. Almost all phenomena have m a n y different facets and the choice of those that need to be quantified should be guided by the use to which the measurements are to be put. This aspect of the problem of the appropriate way to quantify h u m a n resources does not seem to have been given adequate attention, so far, in the literature on the relationship between h u m a n resources and development, and it seems as if the time is n o w ripe for this omission to be remedied. This article begins, therefore, with a general discussion of the reasons w h y there is unlikely to be any multipurpose concept of h u m a n resources that could be used as a basis for measurement. The rest of the article then consists largely of a discussion of alternative ways in which h u m a n resources data might be important for policy purposes, particularly in developing countries, and the type of data which might be relevant for those purposes that are postulated as being of the greatest practical importance. Implicit in this approach is the view that some of the lines of inquiry into the statistical relationships between h u m a n resources and development that have been pursued in the past with great skill and subtlety have n o w reached a point where little further progress can be m a d e in the application of statistical techniques until decisions of a non-statistical character are reached concerning the way 'development' should be defined (a matter of value judgement) and the objectives that developing countries should set themselves in the field of h u m a n resource policy. Thus, although some practical statistical measurement problems are briefly discussed towards the end of this article, it follows from what has been said above that it has not been thought worth while going into the practical problems in great detail until some broad agreement is reached over the main objectives of the whole exercise.

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W h y there cannot be a single multi-purpose concept of human resources

The term ' h u m a n resources' is generally used to indicate various forms of h u m a n capital. A s Harry Johnson rightly pointed out, one of the most fruitful developments in economics in the post-war period has been 'the economics of the role of h u m a n beings in the productive process—based on the concept of " h u m a n capital" V Recognition of the relationship between h u m a n resources and the more conventional notion of capital in economic theory serves m a n y purposes and has greatly illuminated the w a y that various policy issues concerning h u m a n resources should be analysed. A further advantage, in the present context, of bearing in mind the relationship between h u m a n capital and conventional physical capital, is that the problems of measuring physical capital have long been the subject of extensive study in the conventional economics literature, particularly that pertaining to the practical and conceptual problems of national income accounting. Hence, whilst h u m a n capital raises its o w n problems, it is not necessary to start completely from scratch; some of the ground has already been covered in the more general discussions of the measurement of physical capital.2

This is not the place to attempt a summary of the present state of play in the arguments that have been raging fiercely for some time n o w about the concept of capital and its place in economic theory, nor is the present writer competent to provide a survey of this highly technical and difficult branch of economic theory.3 But although the two main schools of thought engaged in the current controversies over the theory of capital differ on m a n y fundamental issues they do seem to be in broad agreement on the one thing that is important in the present context, namely that there is no single unit in which to measure capital which is independent of income distribution and relative prices and which, except under most rigorous conditions pertaining to the existence of equilibrium over the relevant time period, will correctly reflect the m a n y different facets of capital, including its cost, its physical productivity and its future returns.

1. Harry G . Johnson, 'The Economic Approach to Social Questions', Económica, 1968. T h e capital dimension of h u m a n resources was not, of course, a new discovery in economics, having been discussed by A d a m Smith in 1776 (The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, C h . 10). But, as a result largely of Alfred Marshall's explicit, if not always entirely consistent, rejection of the notion of h u m a n capital, it received very little attention until the post-war rapid resurgence of interest, to which Johnson is referring, in the economics of education.

2. The point is very well made in John Sheehan's chapter ' O n H u m a n Capital' in Leite, Lynch, Norris, Sheehan and Vaizey, The Economics of Educational Costing, Vol. IIIA (Capital and Returns in Education), p. 15, Lisbon, 1965.

3. A brilliant survey of the main controversies in this field has been provided recently by G . C . Harcourt, 'Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital', in Journal of Economic Literature, June 1969. A simpler survey is contained in Sheehan, op. cit.; and the more specialized area of h u m a n capital is surveyed extensively in numerous sources, notably Gary Becker, Human Capital, a Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (New York, 1964) and various articles in Part O n e of Economics of Education 1 (readings) edited by M . Blaug (Harmondsworth, 1968).

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H u m a n resources and economic development: some problems of measurement

O f course, most of the protagonists in the debate only reach this conclusion with some reluctance, and some of them are probably more ready than others to settle on some unit of measure that they would regard as satisfactory for some purposes.1 The motive behind the search for a single, homogeneous unit of measurement for capital of any kind is the same as the motive behind the measurement of the components of national income in money terms, namely that it is the only way of adding apples and pears and any other goods and services produced. If governments are interested in the over-all availability of h u m a n resources in their countries, relative to other countries, it is not enough simply to add up the numbers of doctors, engineers, teachers and so on. 'Quality in the sense of product definition and categories are essential to quantification.'2 Does a doctor in country 1 m e a n the same thing as a doctor in country 2? If not, little significance can be attached to comparisons of the numbers of doctors in the two countries. Second, h o w can one compare x doctors plus y dentists in country 1 with m doctors and n dentists in country 2, unless some means of weighting them together can be found, whether this be their relative costs, their rates of return or the relative contribution (given by some statistical exercise) to some independently defined concept of economic development or growth, or some other concept. In other words, even if the first problem did not exist, so that w e could, as Joan Robinson put it, 'take it that an overcoat (Mark IV) is an overcoat (Mark IV) and no nonsense',3 there would still be the problem of adding together overcoats, hats, shoes and so on. In fact, it is this search for some method of adding together, into a meaningful total, various kinds of h u m a n resources, for purposes of international comparisons of total stocks of h u m a n resources, that has occupied the centre of the stage in connexion with the relationship between h u m a n resources and development, rather than the problem of the comparability of each specific type of h u m a n resource.

In the more general work on capital theory it is n o w more or less uniformly accepted that one of the reasons w h y simple, and apparently obvious, units of measurement are unable to reflect simultaneously various aspects of capital is that, in the real world of constant change, equilibrium does not exist for a sufficient length of time, if at all. This means that, for example, the costs of producing a capital asset m a y not equal the present discounted value of its future earnings. Hence, if assets were to be valued according to the present value of their future contribution to output the valuation would not be the same as the one that would be obtained if a cost of production basis had been used. In terms of h u m a n resource evaluation, a flagrant example of the implications of disequilibrium is the existence of large numbers of unemployed graduates in m a n y countries, including developing countries, so that there is little

1. It is also true that some well-known contributions to the measurement of 'human capital' take little or no account of the recent controversies about capital theory and seem to accept, if only unconsciously, a neo-classical production function approach of a fairly simple kind.

2. A . Allan Schmid, 'Nonmarket Values and Efficiency of Public Investment in Water Resources', American Economic Review, M a y 1967, p. 159.

3. Joan Robinson, 'The Production Function and the Theory of Capital', Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 21, 1953-54.

Wilfred Beckerman

relation between their valuation in terms of the costs of producing the level of education concerned and the future contribution to output made by the graduates in question.

With h u m a n capital these problems can be more acute than with physical capital. M a n y kinds of h u m a n capital are more specific than m a n y forms of physical capital. Furthermore, because the duration of h u m a n Ufe is far longer than of most physical capital (the pay-off period for m u c h physical investment is n o w often expected to be about five years) the importance of the discount rate in the valuation of the capital is m u c h greater.1 In addition, there is international trade in most forms of physical capital, so that local or national dis-equilibria tend to be modified, to some extent, by the possibilities opened up through international trade. U p to a point, of course, a similar phenomenon applies to h u m a n capital, and the 'brain drain' is a manifestation of international migration of h u m a n capital. But a h u m a n being is more likely to form roots in his native environment, where people speak the same language, than is a machine.

But the absence of equilibrium is not the only difficulty. The costs of producing, say, a science graduate in the United States m a y be vastly different from those in a country relatively lacking in the requisite training facilities to begin with. Also, the quality of the training m a y be very different so that a scientist is not a scientist 'and no nonsense'.2 Furthermore, the productivity of a scientist will depend partly on the nature of the other resources that he works with later in life. A n d in the same educational system, a scientist produced in one year m a y have very different qualifications from a scientist produced thirty years later. The vintage theory of capital applies as m u c h to h u m a n capital as to physical capital.

Thus, since these various difficulties with the concept of capital seem to apply at least as m u c h , and probably a lot more, to h u m a n capital as to physical capital, the case for concluding, with respect to h u m a n capital, that it m a y be a waste of time to search for some single valid concept for measuring it, based on some completely general and abstract principles and unrelated to the specific purposes for which the measures are required, is at least as great, and probably greater, than it is with respect to physical capital. A s Solow put it, 'For there is no reason to suppose that any single object called "capital" can be defined to sum up in one number a whole range of facts about time lags, gestation periods, inventories of materials, goods in process, and finished c o m m o dities, old and new machines and buildings of varying durability, and more or less permanent improvements to land. Only someone w h o is naively identifying all the m a n y aspects of capitalistic production with one of them, it does not matter which, would believe that the theory can be s u m m e d up by defining something called "capital" and calling the interest rate the marginal producti-

1. This point is made by Sheehan, op. cit., p. 26. 2. Thus one cannot here use the procedure preferred by Joan Robinson, which consists of

estimating the labour time absorbed in creating the capital, since the same years spent in the educational systems of different countries produce different results reflecting different capital (physical and h u m a n ) already existing in the different educational systems.

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vity of it.'1 But faced with this conclusion there are still two alternative procedures that can then be followed. First, one can 'botch up some conventional measure of capital' that will not fully satisfy anybody2 or, second, one can try to clarify the sort of questions that w e need to ask and to sort out those that are really important for purposes of planning h u m a n resource policy in various countries. A s Solow says, 'By asking planning questions, allocation questions, we can, as I hope to show, dodge m a n y embarrassing questions of definition and their ideological overtones. . . . If I a m right in thinking that m u c h empty controversy arises because the questions asked are pointless, then the planning point of view m a y be a useful one.'3

In the rest of this article, we shall adopt the second approach. That is, w e shall consider some of the ways data on the relationship between h u m a n resources and development might be used in order to see which of these uses correspond to valid policy questions. O f course, a clearer agreement as to the right questions to ask is only a necessary condition for progress to be m a d e in this area; it is by no means a sufficient condition, and there is little doubt that very important and difficult measurement problems will still have to be faced and will not be susceptible to rapid and easy solution.

H u m a n resource endowment as indicators of development

The title of this article is partly a reflection of the long-standing and widespread view that the relative development of countries is not something that can be adequately s u m m e d u p in a single figure, such as the size of national product, which has traditionally been the most commonly used indicator of development. It has been argued that, for example, differences between countries with respect to their G N P s m a y not correspond exactly to differences with respect to their h u m a n resource endowment and that, for some reason or other, the latter differences should be taken into account separately in assessing levels of development. In a sense this amounts to saying that the concept of'development' has several dimensions, of which one is the level of h u m a n resource endowment, and that this cannot adequately be transformed into an equivalent amount of the G N P dimension and hence simply added to, or included in, G N P . T o some extent this is a purely practical question arising out of the fact that the 'production capital' component of h u m a n capital (i.e. its contribution to output) should be reflected in the national accounts measures of output, whereas the 'consumption capital' component (i.e. 'the flow of services enjoyed directly and therefore contributing to utility') are not amenable to measurement.4

1. Robert M . Solow, Capital Theory and the Rate of Return, p. 13-14, Amsterdam, 1963. 2. Joan Robinson, op. cit., p. 39. 3. Solow, op. cit., p. 16. 4. H . G . Johnson, 'Towards a Generalized Capital Accumulation Approach to Economic

Development', in The Residual Factor and Economic Growth, p. 222, Paris, O E C D , 1964.

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But some of the search for a measure of development that takes independent account of h u m a n resources (and other factors) is based on conceptual rather than statistical considerations. The issue is whether the concept of development covers aspects of a country's economic, social and political situation that, as a matter of principle, not practice, cannot, in Pigou's famous phrase, 'be brought directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring rod of money' . 1

This has led to various extremely sophisticated and ingenious statistical analyses aimed at discovering which particular indicators of h u m a n resources in particular, or other candidates for inclusion in the wider concept of welfare, demonstrate the 'best' relationship to development (according to some criteria of 'best' statistical relationship in the present context). This work, some of which has been stimulated by Unesco's interest in the relationship between h u m a n resources and development, has shed a lot of light on the mathematical and statistical problems involved in selecting appropriate indicators from a large number of possible indicators. S o m e of the results obtained m a y well be of m u c h greater practical value after there has been some clarification of certain value judgements that first need to be m a d e about the concept of development.

For, in the end, it is impossible to evade the fact that the concept of development is not one that depends on any empirical investigation at all, since it is ultimately an arbitrary value judgement. That is to say, the decision as to whether 'development' is a matter of the size of national product, or the crime rate, or the beauty of the architecture, or the purity of the environment, or some suitably weighted combination of these and m a n y other factors, is a pure value judgement. If one person says that development is only a matter of G N P and another says it is only a matter of the stock of h u m a n resources, they are not really making positive statements about the real world; they are making statements about their value judgements. Hence there is no conceivable empirical test that can enable us to discriminate between their rival propositions. For there are questions of definition, not of fact: no amount of statistical manipulation will tell us whether the number of doctors per head is a 'better' guide to the index of 'development' than the number of motor cars per head. In other words, if, for example, it were found that, as between two countries of equal G N P per head, one had fewer doctors per head than the other, this only indicates that it is less developed if w e had already decided as a matter of value judgement that the number of doctors per head was an independent indicator of development, and this decision did not depend in any way on any statistical calculation. The search for some statistical method of making our value judgements for us is the search for a chimera.

The same situation has been well k n o w n in national accounts theory for a very long time, of course ; in fact, it is clear in Pigou's classic discussion of the problem fifty years ago. The concepts of national product and the detailed definitions which, by convention, have become attached to it constitute one

1. Pigou, Economics of Welfare, 4th ed., p. 11, 1932.

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vast package of value judgements about what constitutes 'goods'.1 After all, national product is frequently described as the unduplicated flow of 'goods and services', and it is impossible to envisage a more value-loaded term than 'goods'. Nor do all countries m a k e the same value judgements about this: for example, some products or services included as part of final output and hence of G N P in most Western countries are not so included in the Socialist countries.

Indeed, there is quite a distinguished body of economists, including Simon Kuznets, w h o maintain that m a n y of the items that are included in the definition of national product are not 'goods' at all but are part of the necessary evils, or costs, of modern industrial society and should be excluded. The detailed list of items included in the definition of G N P conventionally used in most countries has not been drawn up as a product of any statistical calculations. It did not represent the outcome of any correlation analysis of which items of expenditure were associated with others, or with some aggregate, in any particular way , and if it had been drawn up in this way, it is quite likely that m a n y items currently included in G N P would have failed to gain admission since they vary from country to country in an erratic manner. The definitions adopted for the detailed components of G N P have been drawn up in the light of considerations of (a) basic value judgements about what economic activities were 'good' (b) judgements that were mixtures of value judgements and factual appreciation, of what activities were 'important' to measure, and (c) statistical convenience and feasibility.2

'National product', as a whole, like 'development' or 'welfare' or 'utility', is simply a word the definition of which must depend on one's preference functions and hence be a matter of value judgement par excellence. It is inevitable, therefore, that unresolvable differences of opinion will exist as to h o w these various concepts should be interpreted. A s Denison has put it, quite bluntly and, in the opinion of the present writer, correctly, ' A single, generally acceptable index of welfare cannot be constructed'.3 The same applies to 'development ' or any similar concept.

H u m a n resources as a separate component of 'development'

O f course, the corollary of all this is that there is no reason w h y one should not adopt the value judgement that development does comprise more than national product and then, having explicitly specified what other things it does comprise, there are the statistical problems of measuring them. This would raise genuine measurement problems, which would then have to be considered.

1. See, for example, J. de V . GraafT, Theoretical Welfare Economics, p. 14-15, Cambridge, 1967. 2. For a detailed discussion of this see W . Beckerman, An Introduction to National Income

Analysis, Ch. 2, London, 1968. 3. Ed Denison, 'Welfare Measurement and the G N P ' , Survey of Current Business (Washington),

January 1971, p. 1.

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There is no doubt that G N P is far from being a comprehensive index of 'development' if, by this term, w e imply some notion of welfare, or even of economic welfare. In addition to all the well-known problems of valuation arising out of market imperfections and so on, there are large areas of economic activity of a quasi-economic character which affect welfare but are not included at all in national product estimates. For example, no attempt is m a d e to include leisure time, although there is reason to believe that this m a y be of great importance.1 If it is decided that some value judgements can be m a d e about h o w far certain items should be measured, in addition to G N P , in order to fill some of the gap between G N P and some wider welfare-oriented concept of 'development', or rather between changes in G N P and changes in development, problems then arise as to h o w to measure and define these items.2 These problems have to be faced at the outset in defining precisely what value judgements are, in fact, to be m a d e ; i.e. in deciding exactly what items should be taken into account, in addition to G N P , in arriving at the concept of 'development'. The definitional problems and the measurement problems are not separable.

Nevertheless one or two general problems arise that should be noted prior to any more detailed discussion of what definitions would be appropriate. First, if the whole object of the exercise is to supplement G N P as an index of development (or welfare), it would be necessary either (a) to include only h u m a n resource indicators that are not already reflected in G N P , or (b) to specify precisely w h y the output of h u m a n capital, which is already largely reflected in G N P , is not given its 'correct' relative weight in the context of a welfare- or productivity-oriented concept of development. For although it is true that no h u m a n resource indicators are directly included in G N P , any more than are any indicators of physical capital (since both are stocks, whereas G N P measures a flow), it must be recognized that the flows emanating from physical capital are included in G N P , and the same applies to the 'production capital' component of h u m a n capital. That is to say, the services of doctors, dentists, teachers, scientists and so on are generally included in G N P . It is necessary to ask, therefore, whether any more purpose is served by duplicating, or double-counting, part of the usual G N P data with data on these h u m a n resources, than with data on other forms of capital the output of which is already in G N P , or, for that matter, with other individual flows that are already in G N P . The mere fact that relative national products will not correspond exactly to relative levels of h u m a n resources is no more a sufficient reason for including h u m a n resources separately than it would be for including separately the tobacco consumption per head on the grounds that this is not proportional to G N P . It is well k n o w n

1. See the estimates by Sametz in 'Production of Goods and Services', Chapter 3 of Sheldon and Moore (eds.), Indicators of Social Change.

2. Strictly speaking, it only makes sense to talk about the gap in terms of changes in G N P and in development, since, like utility or 'welfare', both these concepts are ordinal, not cardinal, to begin with, so that no meaning can be attached to the notion of the gap between G N P and 'development' at any one m o m e n t of time. For example, it cannot make any sense to say that G N P this year is 10 billion whereas 'development' is only 8 billion.

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that countries have different levels of national product and that they spend them in different ways; some spend a lot on roads, others on having bathrooms in every house, others on higher education, and so on. There is nothing new about this, or, for that matter, about the fact that some items (such as food or clothing consumption) are better correlated with G N P than others.

Hence, if it is thought that the duplication or double-counting is to serve some purpose, this must presumably be based on the view that the weights attached to the flows in G N P that correspond to the stocks of h u m a n resources are in some sense 'wrong' as indicators of development. N o w there are several reasons w h y this view could be adopted. For various reasons, some reflecting particular value judgements and others reflecting views on the positive way that the market mechanism works, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that the weights in the G N P estimates which w e attached to the flows in question do not correspond to the weights that reflect the genuine relative contributions of these resources to a welfare-oriented (or even a productivity-oriented) concept of 'development'. For example, one of the illustrations of the applicability of the capital concept to h u m a n capital problems given by H . G . Johnson is 'that the motive of protecting past educational investments also explains m a n y of the restrictive practices of professional bodies and associations, which frequently serve either to restrict entry, or to prevent competition a m o n g qualified practitioners from reducing the price of professional services'.1 In other words, there is often a monopolistic element in the market for h u m a n resources that leads to the same sort of distortion (from the welfare or productivity point of view) in the allocation of resources and in prices as do monopolistic conditions in the economy in general. Taxes and subsidies will also have a distorting effect.

But if this is the position adopted, i.e. that the weights given to the output of h u m a n capital in G N P are 'wrong'—then it is necessary to propose some alternative weighting basis. At the very least, it is incumbent on those w h o reject the G N P weights to specify the criteria that should be used for attaching different weights. Without this, no amount of statistical manipulation of data on numbers of doctors, dentists, engineers and the like can ever add anything precise to any alternative concepts of 'development'. N o r would it be enough to point to the kind of distortion just enumerated and suggest that an attempt is m a d e to allow for them by appropriate adjustment of the figures, for similar distortions apply to all the other components of national product, so w h y only worry about those that affect the valuation of the services of h u m a n resources?

H u m a n resources as an independent item of interest

A quite different position that could be adopted would be that h u m a n resource data are required neither as an indicator of development, nor as a supplement to G N P (as one separate component of development), nor as a supplement to

1. Johnson, op. cit., p. 7.

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G N P on grounds of the incorrect weights for h u m a n resource output in G N P ; but that they are required because they are of some intrinsic interest, irrespective of h o w far they are already included in G N P . After all, enormous amounts of internationally comparable data are compiled of the detailed composition of G N P in different countries, such as the details of their consumption expenditures, or their central-government expenditures, or the pattern of investment by asset or industry, and so on. If these detailed data, which all relate to flows already counted in total G N P , are of interest, perhaps detailed data on h u m a n resources are also of interest, irrespective of any double-counting that m a y be involved.

For reasons which will be discussed in slightly more detail below, governments are rightly concerned with the need to formulate rational h u m a n resource policies, which raises the question of what data they should have for this purpose even though no attempt is necessarily m a d e to use the data for one or other of the purposes mentioned at the beginning of the last paragraph. Nevertheless, this still leaves open a wide choice as to which particular purposes are to be served by the h u m a n resource data, and it m a y well be that one or two can be excluded at the outset.

CONTRIBUTION OF H U M A N RESOURCES TO DEVELOPMENT

First.^one of the reasons for the widespread interest in the relation between h u m a n resources and development is that it is believed that, if the contribution of the former to the latter can be identified, it will provide some guidance to developing countries as to the degree of priority they should attach to the expansion of h u m a n resources. A s a result, there have been numerous efforts at identifying the relationships (as between different countries, or over time, or as between different industries) between levels of output or value added or G N P , on the one hand,1 and, on the other hand, levels of the stock of certain kinds of h u m a n resource. This is not the place to embark on a detailed survey of these various attempts, which range from fairly aggregative studies, such as those of Denison, in which the marginal productivity of each factor is assumed to be equal to its reward and the bulk of the effort is devoted to careful estimates of the change in the volume of the factors employed,2 to micro-studies attempting to relate output in some specific sectors to the employment therein of specific types of labour, such as the studies by Layard and Saigal.3 The latter results were generally very disappointing, even to the authors, w h o ascribe m u c h of the responsibility for the poor correlations obtained to international differences in the definition of various occupations

1. One such study used electricity output as the dependent variable, not G N P or some other aggregate. (See D . C . McClelland, 'Does Education Accelerate Economic Growth', in Economic Development and Cultural Change, April 1966.)

2. The present writer is on record as having strong reservations about the Denison approach. See his review of Denison's early book, Economic Journal, 1962; and Beckerman et al.. The British Economy in 1975, Ch. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1965.

3. Layard and Saigal, 'Educational and Occupational Characteristics of Manpower; an International Comparison", British Journal of Industrial Relations, July 1966.

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and educational levels. But even if no such statistical difficulties existed, good 'fits' would only be obtained from such comparisons if it were assumed that all countries were on the same production function, as far as the particular sector studied was concerned, with fixed coefficients of production. These assumptions would have to be m a d e to justify the expectation that countries could not vary the input of any of the classes of educated manpower concerned, relative to the output, to take advantage of differences in knowledge, for example, or of relative prices of other factors of production (including physical capital) and so on.

Even in some of the cases where apparently good correlations have been obtained, it is difficult to interpret the results. For example, one of the best k n o w n is by Harbison and Myers, in which they found a fairly high correlation between their so-called 'composite index' of h u m a n resource development and G N P per head.1 But the almost complete absence of any theoretical basis for their model makes it virtually impossible to k n o w h o w to use it, if at all. For example, the weights they used to combine different components of the educational situation appear to be quite arbitrary and do not correspond to either marginal products, marginal utilities or marginal costs of the c o m p o nents of the index. Also, as discussed later, there is a complete failure to reconcile the quasi-flow character of their h u m a n resource data (basically in terms of enrolments) and the stock character of any conceivable production-function relationship that might be expected to hold between output and the stock of h u m a n capital. Third, there is no discussions of the problem of ensuring that they are, in fact, measuring a production function rather than a consumption-function relationship.2 It is not surprising, therefore, that, as the authors say themselves, 'These quantitative relationships, however, do not establish causal relationships. The data do not permit a conclusion that an increase of x per cent in second-level or higher education will result in a y per cent increase in G N P per capita. . . . It is clear, therefore, that a more detailed qualitative analysis of the development of h u m a n resources in each of the four levels (of development) is necessary.' In fact, what is clear is that it will never be possible to establish causal relationships or draw any conclusions at all by more measurement that is not based on some explicit and coherent theory and a corresponding model.

If the main reason for the poor results usually obtained in international production-function analyses were the existing statistical incomparabilities, this might merely reinforce the case for devoting more effort to reducing international incomparabilities in the data on h u m a n resources. However, if the main reason is instead that the assumptions that would have to be

1. F . H . Harbison and C . A . Myers, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth, C h . 3, N e w York, 1964.

2. This does not, however, prevent the authors from concluding that 'it is clear that the highest rates of human resource development should be made by the countries in levels 1 and 2 ' (ibid). Mary Jean Bowman ' s perfectly justified criticisms of the Harbison and Myers results to the effect that 'lack of analytical sharpness will invite all too many readers to draw unjustified inferences despite occasional caveats' applies, perhaps, to the writers as well as to the readers. (See Journal of Political Economy, 1966.)

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satisfied to justify the expectation that such production functions could be found are intolerably restrictive and unrealistic, there is little point in putting effort into the statistical side of the exercise. A s between these two possible reasons, the latter seems by far the most probable, and the position has been admirably summarized by M a r k Blaug as follows: 'Are nations rich because they are better educated or are they better educated because they are rich? W e have seen that this simple question has no simple answer. . . . Countries progress along a variety of manpower growth paths and the range of alternatives is almost as wide as the range of their living standards. Difference in attitudes and in political systems, not to mention the costs and finance of educational systems, widen the range even further. In short, w e learn from international comparisons, at least in this area, that w e do not learn from international comparisons.'1

Even more generally, the causes of different rates of economic growth between nations are little understood. It is clear that capital accumulation has something to do with it, and that this must include h u m a n capital as well as physical capital, but vast efforts have been m a d e (to no avail) to estimate precise relationships between capital inputs and growth. So far, one is forced to the conclusion that the complex social, political and economic factors conducive to economic growth cannot as yet be unscrambled by statistical means. In that case, if the object of the exercise were largely to measure the contribution to growth m a d e just by h u m a n resources, there would be little point in straining at the gnat of improving the data on h u m a n resources w h e n so little progress has been m a d e in measuring the contribution of all the other factors, some of which are intrinsically easier to quantify.

Finally, the various points just enumerated are essentially reasons w h y it is most unlikely that any good correlations will be found even between two flow variables namely incomes per head per a n n u m and numbers of people graduating with particular educational qualifications. The arguments against finding good correlations between incomes per head and the stock variable in which w e are ultimately interested here, namely h u m a n resources, apply a fortiori. For the stock of, say, scientists or doctors in a community in any one period (say a year) reflects the net addition to the stock over a relatively very long period. Hence, even if there were a very close correlation internationally (or inter-temporally) between incomes and the numbers of graduates with certain educational qualifications, no correlation between incomes in any one year and the stock of people in the same year having that education could be expected except under wildly unrealistic assumptions about the path of income change over the preceding thirty to forty years (the length of life, in the stock, of people with higher education attainments of one kind or another).2 For example, if incomes fell for two or three years, a close correlation between incomes and the demand for education would m e a n a fall in

1. An Introduction to the Economics of Education, p. 100, Harmondsworth, 1970. 2. This point is also made in connexion with the Harbison and Myers results, mentioned above,

in A . K . Sen, 'Economic Approaches to Education and Manpower Planning', Indian Economic Review, Vol. 1, 1966.

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the numbers being educated in those years. But the net effect of this on the total size of the stock would be relatively small. Even under extremely favourable assumptions, such as that the stock has been of constant size for, say, forty years and that the fall in income for three years led to a complete cessation of higher education of the type concerned, this would only reduce the stock by three-fortieths. If the stock had been rising, so that the age group retiring would be m u c h smaller than one-fortieth of the stock, the effect on the stock would be correspondingly less. In view of all these considerations, therefore, the likelihood of finding any good cross-country, or time series, or combined relationships between incomes and h u m a n resources would appear to be quite remote.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS A GUIDE TO H U M A N RESOURCE D E M A N D S

This possible use of statistical relationships between development and h u m a n resources is very similar to the previous one, although the assumed direction of causality would be the reverse. The previous function was postulated as showing that different levels of h u m a n resources led to, or at least contributed to, different levels of output or growth. But the need to estimate the relationship between development and h u m a n resources is also often postulated on the grounds that it will indicate to developing countries the future demand, by their populations, for various levels of attainment of h u m a n capital, and this would have a bearing on educational planning. In other words, the previous section was concerned with the relationship between h u m a n resources and development as a production-function relationship, and this section is concerned with it as a consumption-function relationship.

In reality, the relationship between h u m a n resources and development is, no doubt, a mixture of both the production- and consumption-function aspects. This constitutes a further technical statistical reason why, even if good statistical correlations are found between some index of development (or G N P ) and h u m a n resources, it is difficult to interpret the results, which m a y merely reflect the changing point of equilibrium, over time, between the demand for education and its supply. In other words, the consumption-function aspect of the development-human resource relationship can [be regarded as a d e m a n d curve (showing the demand for education at different levels of income), and the production functions aspect as the supply curve (showing h o w m u c h education countries have been willing to supply at different levels of income) and the actual stock of h u m a n resources, at any point of time, will be the outcome of past points of intersection between the demands for, and supplies of, the education.1

Indeed, it is quite likely that the fact that ex-post observations of certain h u m a n resource phenoma reflect the intersection of both demand and

1. This 'identification' problem in the context of analysing education, and which invalidates much of the work in this field, is correctly described in Blaug (op. cit., 1970), p. 73-4.

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supply functions explains some of the statistical relationships certain researchers have brought to light. For example, a very stimulating study by Johan Galtung,1

shows that, in one case (Diagram 2, p. 20) the number law graduates in the country concerned rose rapidly between 1915 and 1945, together with a modest rise in G N P , but fell off sharply in the following twenty years in spite of a faster rate of growth of G N P . O n e possible explanation is that there was a disequilibrium between demand and supply of law graduates in the later period, leading to greater difficulties of finding jobs and possibly lower remuneration, so that, in the end, after a long time-lag due partly to the usual inadequacy of information about market prospects for various kinds of educated labour, the demand for law studies declined. O f course, there are other possible explanations, such as that as the opportunities to study other subjects (particularly sciences) expanded or the relative attraction of a scientific education expanded, so that students simply switched from law to the other subjects. In fact, since different forms of higher education are partial substitutes for each other, a satisfactory analysis of any single one is impossible on a partial basis and would have to be conducted as an analysis of several mutually determining markets, rather like some models used for analysing the market in used automobiles or houses of different types and age.

Even leaving aside the identification problem, the attempt to predict the demand for education of particular kinds by means of some relationship between income levels, on the one hand, and the stocks of h u m a n resources, on the other, must encounter the same sort of problems as discussed above in connexion with the attempt to establish supply relationships. That is to say, it is a priori implausible to suppose that all countries are on anything like the same demand curves for h u m a n resources. Differences in 'tastes', income distributions, social and political traditions, cultural backgrounds and relative 'prices' of education will all enter into the inter-country differences in demand for education of various kinds and hence explain part of the poor results obtained from attempts to find statistical relationships as between different national development levels and h u m a n resource endowments.

H u m a n resources and resource allocation

U p to this point the argument has been negative and destructive, one way or another. Various familiar uses of h u m a n resource data in relation to development have been considered in order to see h o w far they can really provide answers to valid, empirical questions in the context of which the

1. 'Diachronie Analysis of Relationships between H u m a n Resources Components and the Rate of Economic Growth in Selected Countries', paper submitted to Unesco, October 1969 (doc. C O M / W S / 1 3 1 ) . The particular 'diachronic' method used by Galtung to overcome what, as he rightly points out, are some of the limitations on cross-section studies is, of course, by no means new. For example, it was used by A . W . Phillips in 'The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money W a g e Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957', Económica, 1958. (See, for example, Phillips' Figure 2.)

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measurement problems could be further examined. For, as argued at the outset, the methods used to measure h u m a n resources must depend on the purpose in hand. For example, if the object was to evaluate the contribution to national income made by h u m a n resources it would be inappropriate to measure them in terms of the present value of their future income streams, since this method would beg a large part of the question to be examined.1 But it has been argued above that the various uses of h u m a n resource data in relation to development considered so far are not particularly useful questions to pursue. They constitute either (a) statistical attempts to discover what is not discoverable by empirical means, namely how'development'should be defined given the value judgements of those making the definitions, or (b) hopeless attempts to discover some uniformity in the production or consumption functions relating 'income' levels (or some similar variable) to the stock of educated manpower of various kinds, w h e n there are strong prima facie reasons for believing that no such uniformity is likely to exist.

Does all this m e a n that no purpose at all is served by collecting data on h u m a n resources? Certainly not. In the first place, applied value judgements are not independent of facts. That is to say, governments will set themselves targets or objectives for development that will reflect, to some extent, their knowledge of other countries' social conditions and h u m a n resource endowments. Second, the implications of the above line of argument is that h u m a n resource data are needed to answer questions different from the conventional ones. There are basically two questions to be posed, but they are very big ones, and raise a host of other smaller ones, each of which leads to problems of measurement. The basic big questions are the usual ones that crop up whether one is discussing human , physical or any other resource, namely (a) what is the 'opt imum' investment in this particular kind of resource, and (b) h o w efficiently are existing h u m a n resources employed?

The first of these two questions is also often posed in terms of 'what is the rate of return' on the resources in question. For it is optimal to push investment in any resource up to the point where its rate of return is equal to the rate at which society discounts the future (assuming that the second order conditions for this being an equilibrium point are also satisfied). If this is accepted as being a fundamental resource allocation problem which applies to any scarce resource, h u m a n or inhuman, the next two steps to take are (a) clarify its relationship to the development problem and (b) clarify the subquestions to which the main basic question gives rise. It will then be possible to see what sort of data are needed to answer the questions that are finally selected, and this will set the stage for a subsequent analysis of the conceptual and statistical problems of obtaining the requisite data.

A s to the first step, the problem of the rate of return on h u m a n capital is related directly to the development problem because the latter is merely one of allocating resources over time. That is to say, since faster economic

1. See Mary J. B o w m a n , 'Schultz, Denison and the Contribution of "Eds" to National Income Growth', Journal of Political Economy, October 1964.

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growth or development involves costs, its pursuit is not an unqualified objective. In the context of the choice between alternative growth paths, the relevant costs are the sacrifice of consumption today in order to invest in resources, h u m a n or physical, which are needed to add to consumption tomorrow. If the additional consumption tomorrow does not compensate for the sacrifice of today's consumption (which implies that the marginal productivity of the investment did not offset the rate at which the future is discounted) then resources have not been optimally allocated over time. The optimum rate of economic growth, or development, is that at which resources are optimally allocated over time.

This leads to the subquestions to be examined. In brief, what w e want to k n o w is the rate of return on investment in h u m a n resources, in order to compare it with the rate of return in other forms of resource use (and also, perhaps, with the social rate of time preference). A rate of return calculation basically requires two kinds of data: data relating to the returns from different kinds of h u m a n resources, i.e. to the benefits derived from them, and data relating to the costs of producing them.

H o w can the previous work on, for example, international comparisons of h u m a n resources endowment, or related education demands, help answer these questions? Such work could have been interpreted as a contribution to estimating the benefits side of the rate of return calculation. The future private benefits from education, for example, will be higher, other things being equal, the faster is the rise in private demand for education as incomes rise ; and the future social benefits will also be higher the greater the contribution m a d e by more educated manpower to development of society in general. Hence, in so far as any of the studies have led to firm conclusions about the international relationship between development and h u m a n resources, they would have m a d e a valuable contribution to the evaluation of the benefits from more investment in h u m a n resources. The fact that, for reasons such as those discussed above, they have not led to statistically very convincing results merely means that different lines of attack must n o w be pursued. It would appear that what is n o w required, as far as the benefits from investment in h u m a n resources are concerned, is more analysis at a purely national level, of the returns in each country to greater investment in h u m a n resources of different kinds.

At this point it is relevant to digress slightly in order to consider a question to which only brief allusion was m a d e earlier, namely w h y governments need to have a h u m a n resource policy whereas they do not need to have policies to deal with every form of resource allocation in the economy. The basic reason is that investment in h u m a n resources, like certain other forms of resource allocation such as those concerned with the preservation of the environment, will not be optimally allocated by the market mechanism, even under fairly restrictive assumptions, such as absence of externalities. For a general increase in knowledge resulting from more education and its associated research activities is partly a 'public good', in the technical sense that an increase in its use by one person does not necessarily subtract from the

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amount available to others.1 Furthermore, there are externalities in education in that, for example, society as a whole m a y gain from an educated populace in ways not reflected in the financial or other private gain accruing to the educated individuals. Finally, the usual simplifying assumptions that need to be m a d e to ensure optimum resource allocation even with respect to private goods that have no external ('spillover') effects, such as full information, mobility of factors, freedom of entry and perfect competition and so on, are likely to be even more unrealistic as regards most h u m a n resources than applied to more conventional forms of resource.

T o return to the mainstream of the argument, the problem is to obtain data that will indicate to governments h o w far resources are optimally allocated in their country from the point of view of the amount devoted to investment in h u m a n resources. A s stated above, although international data m a y be of some use in this context, the most important data will be national. For example, it is well k n o w n that unemployment amongst arts graduates in India is enormous. This constitutes prima facie evidence that there is little point in investing further resources in the education of arts graduates in India irrespective of any international correlations that m a y be found between income levels and the stock of arts graduates.

Once this principle is adopted most of the conceptual problems of international comparability disappear. W h a t is needed are data about the rates of return in the countries of the governments taking decisions about their o w n h u m a n resource policies. Given the limited contribution of international data to the benefits side of the rate of return calculation discussed above, countries should concentrate on the collection of the relevant national data.

H o w should they proceed? In principle they should begin with those areas where there is some prima facie reason to believe that the existing resource mis-allocation is greatest. Unfortunately, this would not be k n o w n a priori; it is, in fact, the answer to the second basic question specified above, and in m a n y countries little will be k n o w n about the allocation of existing h u m a n resources.

Hence it will often be desirable to start with this second question, which means beginning with a rough inventory of the distribution of the existing stock of h u m a n resources, classified by the main categories conventionally used in the country concerned, and of their earnings in various uses. This would correspond to similar studies of the stock of physical capital in various industries and the degree of their utilization. There is, again, no reason w h y countries should depart from their o w n national classification, which will generally be more appropriate to their o w n economic and social conditions. For example, m a n y of the important categories of h u m a n resource in a less-developed country highly dependent on tropical agriculture would probably not exist in an advanced and entirely industrialized country, and vice versa.

The earnings data will also be useful for purposes of seeking answers to the first question, namely the rate of return on investment in h u m a n resources.

1. See Johnson, op. cit.

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O f course, comparisons of the earnings of different categories of h u m a n capital m a y not be very good indicators of the 'benefits' to be obtained by society from investment in the particular resource concerned for it is well known that earnings differentials m a y exist for reasons other than the amount of embodied education (e.g. intelligence, family background and connexions, restrictions on entry into certain occupations, and so on). But, whilst these qualifications m a y seriously impair the validity of certain calculations of the returns to, say, higher education as a whole in any country, they are far less likely to affect the validity of comparisons between the rates of return on different classes of educated manpower, since m a n y of the extraneous variables will be c o m m o n to the different categories of h u m a n resource identified. In any case, one of the advantages of this approach is that even though great difficulties m a y have to be overcome before the information can eventually contribute to decisions about the rate at which the stock of h u m a n resources should be increased, it will still help answer the second basic question posed above, i.e. the extent of existing mis-allocation of h u m a n resources as between different industries and occupations. A n d there is some presumption that resource mis-allocation at any m o m e n t is just as serious a problem as resource mis-allocation over time. Another advantage of the approach suggested here is that, again, one avoids m a n y of the terribly difficult problems of achieving some international uniformity of classification. For the reason given above, what matters is whether data are available for the stock and earnings of different kinds of h u m a n resource according to the definitions used in each country, both as regards the different kinds of h u m a n resources and also as regards their distributions between different sectors of the economy.

O f course, there will still be numerous problems to be solved in the national context of each country, such as : 1. The definitions used to classify a particular kind of h u m a n resource,

such as an engineer, will not always be uniform throughout any one country to begin with.

2. There are various questions concerning the definition of 'earnings'. In principle, one should be interested in the lifelong earnings profiles of the h u m a n resource categories concerned, since this will correspond more closely to the rate of return over their whole life than will earnings in any particular year. But in the probable absence of good data on lifelong earnings profiles, it will probably be necessary to settle for some more modest data on, for example, the average expectation of duration of employment in the category concerned and, possibly, some sample information on earnings at three points in the life cycle (starting salary, mid-term salary and final salary).

3. There will also be problems associated with the coverage of the concept of earnings; for example, the extent to which fringe benefits, overtime, bonuses, family allowances, insurance contributions, etc. are included.

4. A far more difficult type of methodological problem that needs to be faced concerns the adjustment for that part of the social benefits which are in any case external to the person whose earnings are being calculated. There

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are various ways in which the social benefits might differ from the private benefits. S o m e of them have been mentioned above in connexion with the reasons w h y the private returns to education m a y not be adequately reflected in earnings differentials. But there are others, such as the fact that there is no well-organized market in the services of some forms of h u m a n resources, such as public servants, teachers or doctors in hospital practice, and so on.1 Although a serious disequilibrium in the social demand and supply for such h u m a n resources does tend, in the end, to be reflected in their relative earnings, the time lags m a y be so great in m a n y cases that static comparisons could be highly misleading. Also, for certain classes of educated person, such as the research scientist, the social demand will be a very poor indicator of the real contribution m a d e to society by science since the judges of the value of work will normally be the scientists themselves.2

5. In addition, there is the well-known problem of allowing for the consumption-capital aspect of education referred to above, namely that the gain to society should include the increase in welfare that the educated person obtains merely as a result of the greater enjoyment or appreciation of life that he m a y get (not always, of course) as a result of greater education and irrespective of the increase in his earnings.3

6. Another whole class of difficult methodological problems arises from the need to allow for the fact that the contribution to output m a d e by any one form of h u m a n resource will often depend heavily on the other factors of production, including other h u m a n resources, with which it is co-operating. A graduate engineer is likely to be more effective in conjunction with skilled technicians than with completely unskilled labour. There will be difficulties in disentangling the contribution of the various classes of h u m a n resource in m a n y cases.

8. Other important problems arise concerning the data on the cost side of the story. Rates of return depend as m u c h on the costs as on the benefits, and basic data on the costs of achieving different types of h u m a n resource should be collected. Again, since w e are only interested in the rates of return in each country, there is no need to be concerned with international

1. Blaug suggests that in m a n y African countries 'as m u c h as 50 to 60 per cent of all highly educated manpower is employed in the public sector and it is salaries in the private sector that are tied to government pay scales, rather than the other way around. Thus, for all practical purposes, the earnings of college graduates in these countries are never effectively submitted to a market test' (Blaug, op. cit., p. 209).

2. This point is developed by H . G . Johnson in ' S o m e Economic Aspects of Science', Minerva, January 1972.

3. W e propose to ignore here the possibility of taking the view similar to the one commonly encountered in connexion with health economics, namely that the value to society of, say, educating somebody is not his total contribution to output but his contribution to output less the amount of this extra output that he will consume himself. Whilst this approach m a y be justified in the context of a calculation of the costs and benefits of, for example, saving somebody's life (for it is then rational to consider making the calculation as the basis of society excluding the person concerned), there is no reason to adopt this form of welfare function in connexion with changes in the welfare of people w h o are going to exist whatever choice is made concerning their education.

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comparability of data, or to allow for international differences in price levels and so on. It is the costs in each country's o w n prices that reflect, given certain assumptions, its real resource costs. It is not even necessary to achieve internationally comparable classifications of the main classes of cost that have to be covered. Naturally, it will be desirable to include capital costs as well as current costs, and various methodological problems arise in this connexion, such as the correct allowance for length of life of the h u m a n resources in question as well as corrections for price distortions, such as those arising out of the existence of indirect taxes (including tariffs and other trade obstacles) and subsidies. It will also be necessary to allow for output foregone whilst people are receiving education. Another problem will be the correct allocation of m a n y items of joint costs and overhead facilities.

Conclusions

1. It has been argued above that there is no point in proceeding further with a detailed examination of the problems of measuring h u m a n resources in relation to development until the purposes to which the data are to be put are clarified and agreed.

2. Several possible applications of the data are reviewed and it is concluded that those which appear to require internationally comparable data on h u m a n resources have probably n o w been pushed as far as they can profitably go pending further progress in other directions (such as the formulation of value judgements concerning the definition of development).

3. Studies based on international data on h u m a n resources have tended to confirm a prime facie case that no simple relationships can be expected to hold as between national levels of development and stocks of h u m a n resources.

4. Consequently, it is proposed that attention n o w be turned towards the development of data that have a direct bearing on the rate of return on education in h u m a n resources in individual countries, and the efficiency with which existing stocks of h u m a n resources are allocated in each country, and it is maintained that internationally comparable data are m u c h less useful—and hence m u c h less necessary to collect—in this context than certain forms of national data.

5. S o m e of the main types of problem that will have to be faced in collecting the requisite national data are enumerated, but since the main conclusions of this article imply a substantial change in the direction of effort in this area, it would appear desirable to consider the main line of approach before embarking on a more detailed analysis of the measurement problems implied by it.

Finally, it seems likely that if a few countries succeed in making progress in estimating the efficiency with which their h u m a n resources are allocated, both

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as between different uses and over time, the calculations will be of general interest to m a n y other countries, both as regards the methodology and the substantive results Fruitful international comparisons are more likely to be achieved by this route than by the further attempt to draw up international models of development which the previous studies have n o w demonstrated to be oversimplified and hence misleading.

Wilfred Beckerman is professor of Political Economy in the University of London and head of the Department of Political Economy at University College, London. He was previously a fellow and tutor in economics at Balliol College, Oxford. He was an economic consultant at the Department of Economic Affairs, 1964-65, and economic adviser to the Board of Trade, 1967-69. His publications include The British E c o n o m y in 1975 (with associates) and A n Introduction to National Income Analysis.

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Hdnz Steinberg Books and readers as a subject of research in Europe and America

TÛX Where books are concerned, Europeans feel superior to Americans. Three thousand years of history, which would be unthinkable without books, sustain this feeling of superiority, of which even Americans able to see for themselves h o w Europeans treat books are sensible and which they acknowledge as just.

Let us imagine an American travelling in Europe. H e begins by visiting the oldest library in the world to have functioned without interruption, the Bibliotheca Capitulare in Verona, and admires the priceless treasures that have survived there through the turmoil of history and that date back to times when America was still undiscovered. H e travels on to Ravenna, and in the world-famous mosaics of St Appolinare N u o v o with reverence marvels at the Early Fathers of the Church, each of w h o m , as a symbol of his status, holds out before him a book, alternately in the form of a roll and a codex. Then, in Switzerland, he is fascinated by the indescribable splendour of the monastery library of St Gallen, in which each book that is exhibited seems to be surrounded by an aureole.

Let us also imagine that our American, with such experiences behind him, travels on to Paris and has abundant opportunity to study the, to him, quite unfamiliar public role that the homme de lettres plays even nowadays in the 'City of Light'. Finally, at the G e r m a n book fair in Frankfurt, he is overwhelmed when he finds himself at the centre of the world-wide book trade of today, with all the glamorous window-dressing that is given to books. Because America was not discovered till half a century after Gutenberg's invention, books in Europe gained a lead that still impresses itself on the American consciousness. America regards the book as belonging to the European tradition and is inclined to see this lead—despite its o w n separate development—as a qualitative one.

Yet what Europeans and Americans commonly imagine as being their attitude to books is, in the main, the reverse of the truth. This surprising fact, which will have to be illustrated, warrants attention being paid to European and American research in this area. Such research, however, is bound to be biased, since even scientific inquiry has not remained i m m u n e from prevailing misconceptions.

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Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXTV, No. 4, 1972

Books and readers in Europe and America

In the United States research into reading is generally carried out by librarians and sociologists as an advisory service to libraries. The actual research, therefore, is often done in libraries and by university institutes of librarianship or sociology. Frequently it is directed almost exclusively to the practical needs of libraries, and the world of books outside tends to be overlooked.

Research in Europe, mainly sponsored by booksellers and publishers, is empirical in nature and so, often, commercially oriented and consequently biased in its findings. There are exceptions. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the research done by Brian Groombridge [l]1 was subsidized by the British Library Association, while in Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden) it has also been librarians w h o have both initiated and generally carried out studies and then interpreted their findings [2]. However, in the case of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands in particular the rule holds good, and the research sponsored by booksellers and publishers in these countries has been carried out almost altogether independently of American efforts.

O f course, European sociologists working for booksellers and publishers are familiar with the work done by Lasswell, Katz, Lazarsfeld, S c h r a m m , Festinger and others w h o have written about communications research in America. Yet Douglas Waples—to n a m e but one, w h o is certainly the most influential professor of research in reading and whose monographs, based on his teaching activities at the Library School of the University of Chicago, were for the most part published during the Second World War—is unknown on the Continent, although a few years before, and then again after, the war he visited European libraries and librarians [3].

Waples, w h o was a psychologist closely connected with the world-famed team working at the Chicago School of Sociology, really seems to have been the first to see reading as a social process to be investigated by empirical means. W h a t distinguishes his work from otherwise comparable approaches in Europe —as for example by the G e r m a n librarian Walter H o f m a n n , w h o m he got to k n o w in Leipzig [4]—is his single-minded pursuit of the facts, as they are, without any preconceived ideas as to what is desirable.

Waples worked in close association with the American librarians Berelson, Bradshaw and Carnovsky. H e pioneered the methodical approach and for his time found a valid answer to the big question, ' W h a t does reading do for people?' Today it is hard to conceive h o w , in Europe, it was at all possible to train librarians in ignorance of these endeavours, but at least it shows h o w m u c h the teaching of librarianship in the Old World is in need of renewal.

Conversely, European research into reading, as carried out chiefly in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands over the past ten years, has received no notice in America. It is therefore the aim of this article to build a bridge between the Old and the N e w World, across language barriers (which still seem to be astonishingly high), and also between librarians

1. Figures within square brackets refer to references at the end of the article.

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and booksellers (who, although the business of both of them is books and their readers, seem to be surprisingly ignorant of each other's work).

Just to show h o w hard it is going to be to bridge this gap, let us begin with a typical example of national prejudice in the matter—-a mistake made by a German opinion research organization which was commissioned by the association of the German book trade to conduct a survey of the German market. In 1968 this organization, the Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie, produced a voluminous report [5], the second sentence of which reads: 'It is astonishing h o w seldom Americans pick up a book. '

The institute was so pleased with this statement that it crops up twice more in the course of the report. A n d yet the mere evidence of one's eyes contradicts this assertion. A n y European w h o has bought a paperback even once in an American drugstore knows that Americans will pick up a book at least more frequently than Europeans. O f course it is difficult to produce internationally comparable statistics and data are also lacking in this field. However, one assumption at least m a y be made , that in the United States, whether w e take the number of titles published, the number of copies of books sold cr the money spent on them, proportionally speaking nearly twice as many books are bought as in the Federal Republic of Germany, while in libraries of one kind or another at least three times as many books are issued on loan [6].

In very small print the above-mentioned German institute tries to back up its astonishing assertion by referring to an American institute. In 1956 the Gallup Institute in the United States of America, Canada, Australia, England and Germany asked a representative cross-section of people the following question, ' D o you happen to be reading any books or novels at present?' Only 17 per cent of the Americans said 'Yes ' , while 34 per cent of the Germans said 'Yes ' . This is quite conceivable, and nearly all the Americans certainly told the truth. But it is just as certain that most of the Germans were lying.

Of course, Americans are not generally less prone to lying than Germans. T o the average American, however, a book is a tool that comes to hand as a matter of course, a means of study or entertainment. Whether the tool is used today or tomorrow or was used only last year is rather a matter of indifference. Americans generally see no reason to pride themselves on the fact that they read books. For Germans, however, books are a symbol of culture, and a sociologist, when he comes to interpret empirical data, should allow for the fact that no one likes to make a fool of himself in the presence of an interviewer. Especially when books become an object of enthusiasm in the Old World, there is always reason to be suspicious.

The reverence for books of Europe's educated middle classes—which, moreover, because it was claimed as a class privilege, has largely prevented the use of books from spreading to the working classes—is a phenomenon of 'secularization'. In other words, the prestige enjoyed by books in Europe has its source in religious tradition [7]. For hundreds of years, Christ was always portrayed with a book in his hand—the book. This in turn is naturally founded on Jewish tradition. It could be said that there is an unbroken line leading from Moses's Tables of the L a w to the book-minded educated middle classes of

746


modern Europe. In America, on the other hand, such ideological ties have long since faded into oblivion and a very pragmatic attitude led to the dissemination of books beyond class and race barriers.

European cultural pride was shocked by the first results of book market research. ' O n e household in three has no books', or 'Country people read absolutely nothing'-—headings such as these could be found in newspapers at the beginning of the sixties. M a n y intellectuals were at that time being carried along by a surge of romantic cultural pessimism and they found such headlines comforting. The masses—so prophesied these cultural pessimists—were every year reading less and less, and young people in particular preferred to play football or watch television instead of reading a good book.

Yet, more, not less, books have been produced, bought and issued on loan all over the world than at any time previously. A s far as young people are concerned, the first investigation, carried out in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as all subsequent ones in France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom showed they do not read less but more books than the older generation [8]. The older people are, the less they are interested in books; and this is a fact that holds good everywhere in Europe. It hardly entitles booklovers to talk disrespectfully about the young.

In America, too, the higher the age group, the less books are read. U n d o u b tedly the most important study on the subject, carried out by Jan Hajda on the basis of the female population of Baltimore within the framework of the Pratt Library Study, arrived at the tentative hypothesis that young people on average read more 'because many more of them have graduated from high school or college' [9].

Higher school-leaving ages certainly play a part here, but that they are not the only reason for the world-wide tendency among young people to read more, Hajda could have easily gleaned from a superficial comparison with European research findings. For in the Old World, although the tendency for young people to leave school at a later age can be proved statistically, it is undoubtedly less pronounced, yet there is probably an even stronger difference between the generations as regards the extent to which they read. Hajda could moreover just as easily have recognized, if he had made such a comparison, that the paradox which startled him, namely that the 'appreciation of intellectual products, such as books, is confined to a minority of adults, despite an unparalleled opportunity for a large majority to acquire higher education' [10], was not typical of America, but a world-wide phenomenon, and could at the same time have observed that his supposition as to the 'lower rate of book-reading among Americans' [11] rested on a misconception—originating, moreover, from the same source, i.e. Gallup, as the above-mentioned mistake by the Allensbach Institut für Demoskopie.

Admittedly the fact that Hajda did not take into consideration the findings of European research that were then available affected his results only marginally, since, above and beyond this question as to the influence of the school-leaving age, he went on to consider the really crucial question, namely 'Is it school that affects reading habits, or is it not rather the parents, w h o send their

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children to a particular school?' [12]. It is most unfortunate that Hajda's findings have so far found little recognition in Europe.

Hajda distinguishes between 'solitude' and 'loneliness'. T o quote him, solitude 'rejuvenates and refreshes; it reinforces . . . social ties, because it enables the individual to interact with others with increased attention, or to enjoy another's company more . O n the other hand, loneliness is an unsought, painful, meaningless affliction, imposed on the individual against his will. . . . Solitude is an aspect of social integration ; loneliness is an aspect of exclusion from social participation. . . . Books call for a harmonious response, for a sympathetic engagement with the very world which condemns the person to loneliness. Reading books also requires an effort. . . . This in itself makes book reading unattractive to a lonely person whose general level of interest and activity is considerably lower than that of an engaged person' [13].

In a nutshell, what Hajda is getting at is that while it is impossible to read without solitude, loneliness leads people to drop the book-reading habit. This fact has obvious practical consequences for libraries and for the book trade, especially as far as any form of publicity is concerned. Clear ideas based on empirical findings are more likely to lead to such economically exploitable conclusions than a short-sighted attempt to narrow the scope of the inquiry from economic considerations.

Catholics read less than Protestants, both in America and in Europe, although the R o m a n Catholic Church, particularly in the Netherlands, but also some parts of the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y , makes considerable efforts to promote good literature, chiefly through the large sums of money that it spends on Catholic libraries. In the case of America, it is difficult to see what the reasons are, and w e will not go into the question whether Hajda, in this part of his investigation, did justice to the complicated ethnic and economic structures of the United States in their manifold interlocking with religious affiliations—although it m a y be expressly doubted whether he did so in the particularly interesting, but also particularly difficult case of the Jews, especially since here he comes up against the mathematical difficulty of delimiting his sample.

In the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y the startling fact that Catholics read less than others has led to the production of various colourful theories by historians, but it can largely be explained by the fact that it is a false correlation. In the Federal Republic of Germany , as in the Netherlands, Catholics are over-represented in rural areas [14]. A n d everywhere in the world rural people read less than town people, whether they are Catholics, Protestants or Muslims, whether they are young or old, male or female. N o religious organization can change this state of affairs, nor can booksellers or librarians, except by doing something to break d o w n the information barrier that rural people c o m e up against, using, for example, mobile libraries.

With a computer any series of figures can easily be correlated with any other. Thus in Europe and in America it was definitely established that m e n read more than w o m e n , although in childhood it is often the reverse that is true. But if m e n were then to feel themselves superior, they would be misinterpreting

748


the facts. W o m e n do not read less because they are w o m e n , but because, generally, they have received less schooling.

People's disastrous tendency to send their sons to university in order that they can get a university degree but to regard this as unnecessary in the case of their daughter—since they can always marry university graduates—creates a mental barrier hostile to books. Whether or not a girl later marries a graduate, she will at all events read less as an adult because she learnt less as a child and therefore is not used to books.

All the same—to stick to this particular example—the girl w h o manages to hook someone with a university degree has a chance of reading rather more than the girl whose parents' plan misfires, because as a rule w o m e n adapt themselves to the habits of their husbands. Books in Europe are a means of mass communication only in a very special sense, but they are a class symbol through and through. This has been shown very impressively by the French Syndicat National des Éditeurs in a psychological study entitled Études sur la Lecture et le Livre en France [15].

Even in the lower classes of European society the usual commonplaces about books are current—as for example concerning their national importance for education. But what people really think about books is revealed by their attitude when they are confronted with a picture of a young w o m a n comfortably settled in an armchair reading. 'She'd be better off doing the washing-u p ' is a fairly mild comment. O n the other hand, there is often a definitely hostile attitude towards the spectacled young m a n in a similar position, w h o is accused of being an arrogant and unlikeable intellectual.

O n the other hand, educated people too—contrary to their fine phrases about cultural good deeds, when for example they call for the setting up of libraries for the less well-off—often react in a strongly biased manner against members of the lower orders when they meet those reading. Books as an alleged middle-class status symbol are still very m u c h therefore a subject of taboo. This broadly then is the picture (with additional information from other European investigations) presented by public attitudes in France. A n d the same sort of thing is certainly to be reckoned with in central and southern Europe.

In European education, let us add, one m a y expect to find no less of a discrepancy between overt theory and covert practice. A n y adult will probably concede that books are a good thing for children—but h o w often the same adult will disturb a child absorbed in the reading of a book! By preventing the solitude (to use Hajda's terminology) necessary for reading, one increases the danger of loneliness, to which every h u m a n being, including the child, is exposed —and at the same time one m a y , with the soundest of consciences, be mouthing the usual cultural clichés, without at all noticing the contradiction.

Brian Groombridge [16] has elegantly shown the contradiction between such attitudes by means of a typical example. H e divides his sample up into three groups: public-library subscribers, former subscribers and non-readers.

First of all, he asked the non-readers why they did not visit a library. A s was to be expected, nearly half those questioned said they did not have the

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time ; only 11 per cent stated that they preferred to watch television. G r o o m -bridge then asked the reading group w h y they thought other people did not visit a library. This time half of them replied that it was because of the television, while the answer 'no time' was given by only one in five.

This means that if other people—the so-called masses—do not read books, this is naturally because they are always watching television. But if I do not read, the position is quite different, because I do not belong to the 'hoi polloV and m y reason is therefore naturally that I do not have the time.

The answers are contradictory and in most cases are probably both untrue. For there are two things to be learned from the results of this research. The answer 'no time' is generally an excuse. Someone w h o has no time to read is really less interested in doing so because he prefers another occupation. A s to the reference to television, on the other hand, this is an expression of cultural pessimism. In the Federal Republic of Germany, at any rate, the rejection of television was, until well into the sixties, undoubtedly typical of such a romantic attitude.

In point of fact, as is confirmed by French, Dutch, Swedish and G e r m a n findings [17] the triumphal progress of television in Europe—despite the fine prophecies of the book ideologists—far from harming, has actually helped book consumption, in as m u c h as the 'multiplier' effect of television enhances the impact of all direct references to books, and above all the indirect references which underlie any broadcast, so that the European book trade over the past two decades could hardly have gained a more effective ally than the television set, denounced as its foe. Although the understandably complicated relationship between reading and televiewing has often been the subject of colourful speculation—an extreme example being the work of Marshall McLuhan—this has not yet been the subject of anything like enough factual investigation, either in Europe or in America. W h a t Lazarsfeld once did in the case of radio [18] still has to be done for television as far as its relationship to books is concerned.

Another subject on which a great deal more investigation needs to be done is on the various questions arising in connexion with book clubs [19]. In the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y , for example, no one knows anything about the possible connexion between belonging to a book club and being a library subscriber. However, the G e r m a n Library Association has just commissioned the Institute of Sociology of the University of H a m b u r g to carry out a study of this, and some light m a y be thrown on the matter.

It is to be assumed that satisfactory answers to such questions can hardly be found at a national level, for individual peculiarities can only be identified as such on the basis of international comparison. In this connexion it would, for example, be interesting to carry out a comparison of G e r m a n and French book clubs. The latter, which go less for quantity, obviously have different aims (i.e. not low-price editions, but fancier bindings). The two therefore would seem to be appealing to different sections of the population. But here too it is really essential to k n o w what America's experience has been with its large number of specialized book clubs.

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The varying development of the paperback market, too, calls for a sociological comparison between European countries and between each of them and the United States. In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany it is known, thanks to the Aliensbach Institut für Demoskopie, that young people prefer paperbacks, perhaps not because of their lower cost, but because they do not share the preference of the older generation for books in traditional binding. Yet in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Switzerland and in Austria, paperbacks are far from playing—or at any rate still far from playing—the same part that they do in the United States or even in the United Kingdom. Although the number of paperback titles and probably the number of copies produced certainly rose steeply in central Europe during the past decade, the central European market was certainly not revolutionized by paperbacks as America has been [20].

W h y not? The explanation is unlikely to be because the expansion of book clubs prevented a correspondingly large expansion of the paperback. The main reason should probably be sought rather in the different methods of distribution. W e in Europe do not have the American drugstore, which prints information in the shape of paperbacks literally within arm's reach of the potential customer. The fact that w e do not have them, however, raises not only economic but also sociological or, more precisely, socio-psychological questions, since distribution both rests on communication and generates it.

It is evident that the higher book consumption in the United States is linked to the longer average period of formal education in that country. But European book consumption is not rising automatically with the prolongation of formal education: it is more closely connected with the library facilities of the schools which are thus being attended for a more extended period, and these are as yet comparable to the American ones only in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden. Converting individual symptoms into absolutes influences diagnosis.

First w e would emphasize on the basis of this experience that the situation concerning books can only be properly understood if books are viewed in all their manifold aspects and manifestations, viewed, moreover, not in isolation but in relation to other media. Books are a subject of communication research and if w e do not want to invalidate the results of such research w e cannot disregard the fact that there are also direct, 'immediate' forms of communi cation and others which pass through other 'media'. Everyone w h o has a concern for books must keep in view the full field of communications, to the elucidation of which the theory of the multi-stage nature of the communication flow, propounded by Katz and Lazarsfeld, has contributed a great deal, and could certainly contribute more as far as books are concerned.

W h e n British booksellers subsidized the researches of Peter H . M a n n [21] at Sheffield University, they showed themselves to be more generous than their German counterparts. Obviously inspired by Groombridge, M a n n investigated in particular the relationship between the book trade and libraries. In their detail, his findings are just as instructive for booksellers as for librarians, and it would be worth examining whether they are applicable to other countries.

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Heinz Steinberg

Generally speaking, M a n n was able to show that there is no real competition between booksellers and libraries. Rather do they both stand to profit if they lie close together. The selling of books does not seem to be diminished at all by the presence of libraries, and the more books someone borrows, the more books he generally buys.

S o m e useful advice emerged for the booksellers w h o commissioned the study. M a n n ' s students, for example, had to ask a sample of booksellers for a title that had long been out of print. M a n y of those questioned answered that they had unfortunately just sold the last copy [22]. This is not just an amusing story, but a serious suggestion for anyone w h o wants to improve the service provided by booksellers.

M a n n ' s theoretical standpoint is perhaps less sound than his practical findings. If, for example, he pragmatically correlates the content of books with the motive for reading, he is really concealing a problem, since it cannot be denied that one person m a y derive instruction from a book, while it is merely read for enjoyment by someone else. A method developed by Hajda for categorizing readers [23] is preferable.

A s to the quality of books, opinions vary, and even when a book is unanimously declared good it still cannot be said whether and in what way it is good for the individual reader. However, Hajda's method makes it possible to count 'quality readers', without seeing any of the books they read.

According to his definition, a 'quality reader' must fulfil three conditions: he must have read at least ten books during the past year ; he must read book reviews at least once a month; and he must not be influenced by the popularity of a book, particularly of a bestseller. Whoever satisfies all three conditions is a 'quality reader'. In practice, establishing whether these conditions are met m a y pose some difficulties and at least not be without risk. At any rate, European investigators should try out this American method at least once, but without making any changes, so as to ensure comparability of results.

The French investigation, which on the whole is probably the most successful of European endeavours in this field to date, discovered a connexion that will surprise anyone w h o has not freed himself from the traditional European picture of people w h o read as being intellectualized, introvert people w h o are inclined to shy away from the world. The French sociologists found a positive correlation between reading and sport.

A s young people on the whole both read more and are keener on sport, it might at first have been supposed that this was not a true correlation. But another investigation established, in the case of the Federal Republic of Germ a n y , that those young people w h o go in more for sport at the same time also read more [24].

A factor analysis is necessary. At any rate, this finding fits in well with the best part of the survey carried out by the Allensbach Institut für D e m o s kopie, which obviously is also bringing about corresponding practical changes in the thinking of booksellers. French sociologists had already discovered that an important motive for reading was the wish to discuss things that one had read with other people. Gerhard Schmidtchen, w h o conducted the Allensbach

752


investigation and wrote the report on it, added the observation, based on exact empirical evidence, that readers are better listeners than non-readers [25].

The results of such research reveal a new contemporary picture of the reader. Readers are certainly not isolated people, rather do they seek contact in society. They are good listeners, but at the same time have the wish to communicate their thoughts to others by means of conversation. They are people then w h o seek to influence society, and in turn expose themselves to the influence of that society. They are not introvert, for escapist reading is only marginal, but are on the contrary characterized by openness to c o m munication.

This finding is confirmed by independent findings of Jan Hajda, whose thesis occupies m u c h the same seminal position in American research as does the French investigation in European research, though it must be said that in Europe, where to date only tentative endeavours have been made along these lines, there is nothing to compare with the user research carried out by scientific libraries in America. Hajda has, for example, found that among w o m e n of the same age and with the same level of education, and w h o have the same living standards, widows read considerably less than married w o m e n [26]. W h y ? O n the whole, widows should have more time for reading. Once again, the time argument is wrong, because in the case of reading, it is not a question of the time that one has but of the time that one makes available.

W i d o w s have lost their most important communication partner and the ties that were created through their dead husbands loosen themselves more and more. O n the whole, widows are less active, but in order to be a reader (and, if possible, a quality reader) one must be active.

Modern readers in America and in Europe are more communicative in their activity and vitality than non-readers. They do not read to escape from the world, but to live in it better. This really puts the main finding of research in the matter to date in a nutshell.

In order to individualize this general picture more psychological than sociological research m a y in future be required; but economists and historians too have a vital contribution to make . It would certainly be desirable that hitherto dispersed research be concentrated in the hands of institutes working in a continuous manner, national ones and at least one international one, whose main task would be to promote comparability of the individual results and from time to time, in regard to one aspect or another, m a p out an over-all picture, which could be particularly useful to the developing countries.

[Translated from German]

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REFERENCES

1. Brian Groombridge, The Londoner and his Library, London, Research Institute for Consumer Affairs, 1964.

2. See in particular B . V . Elberling, 'The Danish School of Librarianship's Sociological Laboratory', in Unesco Bulletin for Libraries, Vol. 20, 1966, p. 184-8. So as not to have to keep on referring to it, w e would also at this point refer readers once and for all to Forschungsobjekt Buch. Internationale Bibliographie zur Soziologie und Psychologie des Lesens [International Bibliography on the Sociology and Psychology of Reading], prepared by Eymar Fertig, edited by Heinz Steinberg (München-Pullach, Verlag Dokumentation, 1971 ; N e w York, R . R . Bowker, 1971). The contents of the bibliography, which has been edited and provided with an introduction by the author of this article, are also subdivided according to country in the subject index, so that, for instance, the national contribution of Hungary and other East European countries—which has not been mentioned in this article—is readily visible.

3. Details m a y be found in the author's introductory article in Buch und Bibliothek, January 1971, p. 9-15.

4. If a comparison were m a d e between Waples and Hofmann , it might afford a decisively important contribution to the history of libraries in both countries. In the interim, w e would refer the reader to Margaret Chaplan, 'American Ideas in the G e r m a n Public Libraries. Three Periods', Library Quarterly, Vol. 41, N o . 1, 1971, p. 35-53.

5. Gerhard Schmidtchen, 'Lesekultur in Deutschland', Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel, 30 August 1968. M o r e important however is the same authoi 's article 'Eine Politik für das Buch', Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel, 20 December 1968 {Archiv für Soziologie und Wirtschaftsfragen des Buchhandels, V und VI).

6. cf. Lesen, Leihen und Kaufen von Büchern. Ein Internationaler Vergleich ( H a m burg, Verlag für Buchmarkt-Forschung, 1968, also containing repoits of the Institut für Buchmarkt-Forschung, 41), especially p. 33. This publication is based on a lecture of the Netherlands writer, R . E . M . van den Blink, w h o has done successful work in the field of international comparisons, delivered in English at the eighteenth conference of the International Publishers Association (Amsterdam, 1968).

7. See Ernst Robert Curtius, Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter (Berne, Francke, 1948), in particular the chapter 'Das Buch als Symbol', which has recently been supplemented by Klaus Schreiner: '. . . wie Maria Geleichet einem Puch: Beiträge zur Buchmetaphorik des Hohen und Späten Mittelalters', Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel, 20 March 1970 (Historischer Teil L X X V I I ) , p. 651-64.

8. The best prepared material was the data on the purchase and lending of books in Buch und Leser in den Niederlanden. Eine Untersuchung der Stichting Speurwerk betreffende het Boek in Amsterdam (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1963). See also Ilse Lichstenstein-Rother (ed.), Jugend und Buch in Europa (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1967), again, above all, the contribution concerning the Netherlands.

9. Jan Hajda, An American Paradox. People and Books in a Metropolis, p. 61. Chicago, HI., 1963. (Thesis.)

10. ibid., p. 1. 11. ibid., p. 302.

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12. ibid., p. 62. 13. ibid., p. 231. 14. cf. Ludwig M u t h , 'Das Katholische Leserdefizit. Neue Fragen an die Buchmarkt-

Forschung', Börsenblatt für den Deutschen Buchhandel, 2 M a y 1966, p. 886. 15. Paris, 1960. 16. Groombridge, op. cit. (Reference l), p. 47, 59, 69, 17. The evidence is presented by the author in his contribution ( 'Dem Leser auf

der Spur? Versuch einer Zwischenbilanz Empirischer Bemühungen u m das Buch') to Das Buch in der Dynamischen Gesellschaft, Festschrift für Wolfgang Straub zum 60. Geburtstag (Trier, Spee-Verlag, 1970). Deserving particular attention are the important relevant data of the Divo-Institute in Buch und Leser in Deutschland (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 1965). See especially p. 188-90.

18. Paul Lazarsfeld, Radio and the Printed Page, N e w York, 1940. 19. The true position was impressively demonstrated in 1964 by Wolf H e r m a n n in:

'Die Buchgemeinschaften im Streit der Meinungen', Bertelsmann Briefe, N o . 29, 1964, p. 15-22.

20. cf. Hans K . Platte, Soziologie der Massenkommunikationsmittel (München, Reinhardt, 1966).

21. Peter H . M a n n and Jacqueline L . Burgoyne, Books and Reading, London, André Deutsch, 1969. Recently substantially supplemented by Peter H . M a n n , Books— Buyers and Borrowers (London, André Deutsch, 1971).

22. ibid., p. 87. 23. Hajda, op. cit. (Reference 9), p. 13. 24. See Chapter VII of the investigation carried out by the Emnid Institute in

Bielefeld, which is not obtainable through the trade: Jugend, Bildung und Freizeit (Ed. Viggo Graf Blücher), 1966.

25. Schmidtchen, 'Eine Politik für das Buch', op. cit. (Reference 5). 26. Hajda, op. cit. (Reference 9), p. 225.

Heinz Steinberg directs the Department of Further Education of the municipality of West Berlin. He teaches a course on the sociology of books at the Free University of the same city.

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Approaching international conferences

Documents and publications of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies

Books received

World Index of Social Science Institutions

Approaching international conferences'

1973 Chicago

N e w York

N e w York

Bangkok

Council for the Study of Mankind Inc. : World Mankind Youth Conference Council for the Study of Mankind Inc., P.O. Box 895, Santa Monica, California 90406 (United States)

International Association of Family Sociology : First World Congress of Family Sociology International Association of Family Sociology, Mr Man Sing Das, Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois 60115 (United States)

United Nations: Seminar on evaluation and utilization of population census data United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States)

United Nations: Symposium on population and human rights United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States)

United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Seminar on evaluation and utilization of population data ECAFE, Population Division, Sala Santitham, Bangkok (Thailand)

No further details concerning these meetings can oe obtained through this Journal.

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Int. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXIV, No . 4. 1972


February San José, Costa Rica

23-25 February Chicago

Spring Bucharest

Spring Western Europe

Spring Jerusalem

1973 April Säo Paulo

5-7 April Brussels

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Society for International Development: Thirteenth World Conference SID, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N . W . , Washington, D . C . 20036 (United States)

Midwest Conference for a Relevant Social Science William A . Pelz, M C R S S Coordinator, 1237 West Shore Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60626 (United States)

International Economic History Association: Colloquium (Theme: Urbanization and environment) Professor Dr J. F. Bergier, Rindermarkt 6, Zurich (Switzerland)

Institute of Management Sciences: Twentieth International Meeting General Chairman, Institute of Management Sciences, P.O. Box 6112, Providence, Rhode Island 02904 (United States)

Israel Association for Asian Studies: Annual Conference Dr Martin Rudner, Hon. Sec. Israel Association for Asian Studies, c/o Institute of Asian and African Studies, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Israel)

Interamerican Society of Psychology: Fourteenth Interamerican Congress of Psychology ISP, Box 88, El Paso, Texas 79968 (United States)

Foundation V a n Cle: International Scientific Congress (Theme: Leisure activities in the industrial society) Managing Secretary, Foundation Van Cle, Grote Markt 9, B-2000 Antwerpen (Belgium)


5-9 April Liverpool

26-28 April N e w Orleans

25 June to Vienna 6 July

Late June to Granada, beginning of July Spain

13-20 July Oxford

16-22 July Paris

19-25 August Montreal


26-31 August Abidjan

British Psychological Society: Annual Meeting General Secretary, British Psychological Society, Tavistock House, Tavistock Square, London W.C. 1 (United Kingdom)

Population Association of America: Annual Meeting PAA, P.O. Box 14182, Benjamin Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 (United States)

International Council of W o m e n : Twentieth Triennial Meeting International Council of Women, 23 Rue de Caumartin, 75 Parish (France)

International Council of Social Welfare: Seventh European Colloquium ICSW, Office Régional Européen, 5 Rue Las Cases, 75 Paris-7e (France)

International Association of Youth Magistrates: Meeting IA YM, Tribunal de la Jeunesse, 13 Rue des Quatre-Bras, 1000 Brussels (Belgium)

International Union of Orientalists: Twenty-ninth International Congress 29e Congrès des Orientalis, Collège de France, Place Marcelin-Berthelot, 75 Paris-5e (France)

International Political Science Association: Ninth World Congress IPSA, 43 Rue des Champs Élysées, 1050 Brussels (Belgium)

American Psychological Association: Meeting Dr K. B. Little, APS, 1200 17th Street, N . W . , Washington, D.C. 20036 (United States)

World Peace through L a w Center: 1973 World Conference on World Peace through L a w (Theme:

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Africa, the world and international law) World Peace through Law Center, 75 Rue de Lyon, 1200 Geneva (Switzerland)

27-30 August N e w York American Sociological Association: Annual meeting ASA, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N . W . Washington, D . C . 20036 (United States)

27 August to Liège 1 September

International Union for the Scientific Study of Population: General Assembly and General Conference IUSSP, 5 Rue Forgeur, 4000 Liège (Belgium)

Early September Netherlands International Conference for the Sociology of Religion: Conference Mr J. Verscheure, Secrétariat Général, Conférence Internationale de Sociologie Religieuse, 39 Rue de la Monnaie, 59 Lille (France)

1-8 September Chicago International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences: Ninth International Congress Professor Sol Tax, President, IUAES, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637 (United States)

2-6 September Jerusalem The International Society of Criminology/Israel Government Authorities/The Hebrew University of Jerusalem: First International Symposium on Victimology First International Symposium on Victimology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, P.O. Box 4051, Jerusalem (Israel)

3-7 September London International Industrial Relations Association: Third World Congress IIRA, 154 Rue de Lausanne, 1211 Geneva (Switzerland)

762


8-10 November Deauville, Florida

December United States

27-30 December N e w York City

1974 — Europe

Bucharest

25-27 March Jerusalem

Gerontological Society: Annual Scientific Meeting E. Kaskowitz, Gerontological Society, One, DuPont Circle, Washington, D . C . 20036 (United States)

Econometric Society: Conference P.O. Box 1264, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 (United States)

American Statistical Association, American Economic Association and other allied societies: 133rd Annual Meeting John Lehman, Executive Director, ASA, 806 15th Street, N . W . , Washington, D . C . 20005 (United States)

International Association of Educators for World Peace: First World Congress IAEWP, International Secretariat, Huntsville, Alabama 35762 (United States)

International Association of South-East European Studies: Third Congress I ASEES, 9 Rue I.C. Frimu, Bucharest (Romania)

Israel Association for Asian Studies and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem: International Conference on the Role of the Military in Asia (Theme : The military as a social institution engaged in political and economic functions in the Asian experience) Dr Ben-Ami Shillony, Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, Institute of Asian and African Studies, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Israel)

763


July Nairobi

August Copenhagen

18-24 August Toronto

19-30 August N e w York


September United States

1975 — H o n g K o n g

International Council on Social Welfare: Seventeenth International Conference Mrs Kate Katzki, International Council on Social Welfare, 345 East 46th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States)

International Economic History Association : Sixth Congress Professor Dr J. F. Bergier, Rindermarkt 6, Zurich (Switzerland)

International Sociological Association: Eigth World Congress of Sociology (Theme: Sociology and revolution in today's societies) ISA, Via Daverio 7,20122 Milan (Italy)

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs : Third World Population Conference Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017 (United States)

American Sociological Association: Annual Meeting ASA, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N . W . , Washington, D.C. 20036 (United States)

Econometric Society: Third World Congress P.O. Box 1264, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 (United States)

International Council on Social Welfare: Regional Asian and Western Pacific Seminar Miss Shirley Lian, Hong Kong Committee ICSW, Ann Black Red Cross Building, Harcourt Road, P.O. Box 474, Hong Kong

764


25-28 August San Francisco


1976 — France


American Sociological Association: Annual Meeting ASA, 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N . W . , Washington, D . C . 20036 (United States)


International Union of Psychological Science: Twenty-first International Congress Professor E. Jacobson, Secretary-General, Department of Psychology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan (United States)


765

Documents and publications of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies1

Population, health, food

POPULATION

Population Commission. 16th Session. A series of documents. The United Nations Population Commission held its sixteenth session in Geneva from 1 to 12 November 1971. O n this occasion it reviewed in detail the activities of the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and various international institutes in regard to demographic studies and population policy in the widest sense of the term. The working papers used bear the following reference numbers: U N / E / C N . 9 / 2 3 7 to U N / E / C N . 9 / 2 6 2 .

African Population Conference. A series of documents. [St. BL] A n African conference on population was held in Accra from 9 to 18 December 1971. The documents published on this occasion deal in particular with recent mortality trends ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 3 9 , 14 October 1971, 29 p.), health aspects ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 4 3 , 28 October 1971, 18 p.; U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 4 7 , 23 November 1971, 9 p.), population growth and its repercussions on social development ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 4 2 , 23 November 1971, 31 p.) and educational implications of population trends ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / P O P / 4 1 , 18 October 1971, 19 p.).

The African population programme. Prepared by the Economic Commission for Africa. 26 November 1971. 18 p., including annex. ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / C A D . 1 / 2 . )

Prepared for the Conference of African Demographers (Accra, 20-22 December 1971). Functions of the Population Programme Centre of the Economic Commission for Africa. Its programme for 1971-76.

1. A s a general rule, no mention is m a d e of publications and documents which are issued more or less automatically: regular administrative reports, minutes of meetings, etc. N o abstract is m a d e of those whose content is self-evident. Free translations have been given of the titles of some publications and documents which w e were unable to obtain in time in English. In this case the title is preceded by an asterisk. T h e following conventional abbreviations have been used: Bl. = Contains a particularly interesting bibliography. St. = Specially important or rare statistics.

766

Documents and publications

Manual on demographic sample surveys in Africa. 20 September 1971. ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / C A S . 7 / 1 7 . )

Prepared jointly by the Economic Commission for Africa and Unesco. Surveys and sampling. Population samples. Themes. Methods. Samples. Questionnaires. Organization of work in the field. Very detailed and practical.

HEALTH

The Use of Cannabis. 1971.47 p. $1 ; 3 Swiss francs. (Technical Reports series, no. 478.) ( W H O . )

Present knowledge of the effects of cannabis. Areas in which further research is required.

World health statistics report. Vol. 25, no. 2, 1972, 73 p. $4; 12 ¡Swiss francs. Vol. 25, no. 3, 1972, 50 p. $7 ; 3 Swiss francs. ( W H O . )

[St.] Fascicles of a permanent collection of statistics concerning the prevalence of various diseases. Covers the whole world. Each fascicle contains special studies in addition to the basic tables which are repeated regularly. N o . 2 of 1972 contains statistics on trends in the principal causes of death from 1955 to 1968 (continuation of a study begun in N o . 1, 1972) and N o . 3 contains a survey of sources of medico-social documentation on the aged.

ENVIRONMENT

The United Nations Development Programme and natural resources. Report of the Administrator of the Programme. 2 December 1971. 32 p. ( U N / E / C . 7 / 2 2 . )

[St.] The activities of the United Nations Special Fund and their repercussions on the environment and natural resources. Water. Power. Mineral resources. Conservation of soils and fauna.

Report of the 1st All-African Seminar on the Human Environment (Addis Ababa, 23-28 August 1971). 11 October 1971. 43 p., including annexes, ( U N / E / C N . 14/532.)

Natural resources forum. N o . 1. 77 p. M a y 1971. $2. ( S T / E C A / 1 4 2 . ) [Bl.] First issue of a trilingual periodical (English, French and Spanish) devoted to the problems of conservation and management of natural resources.

Latin American Regional Seminar on Problems of the Human Environment and Development. 28 October 1971. 38 p. (UN/ST/ECLA/Conf.40/L.5/Rev.l.)

[Bl.] This seminar took place in Mexico from 6 to 11 September 1971. Relations between environment policy and general planning. International aspects.

Symposium on the Impact of Urbanization on Man's Environment. June, 1971. 167 p. ( U N / S T / T A O / S E R . C / 1 30.)

The symposium was held at Onaway, Michigan, from 13 to 20 June 1970. Main trends in urbanization. Measures already taken and measures to be taken. Technology for freedom. Man in Environment. The ILO contribution. 1972. 58 p. $3;

8 Swiss francs. (ILO.)

767


First part of the report presented by the Director-General of I L O at the fifty-seventh session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, 1972). The 'sorcerer's apprentice'. The ecological picture today. Trends. Responsibility and participation. The developing countries.

Economics

STATISTICS, STATISTICAL METHODS

Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Far East. 1970. 400 p. August 1971. $7. [St. Bl.] Bilingual (English-Fiench) third edition of the yearbook. Comparative data for the whole region, including the Chinese Mainland.

Report of the Working Group on Social Statistics (of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East). 20 October 1971. 36 p. ( U N / E / C N / 1 1 / L . 3 1 4 . )

[Bl.] Situation with regard to social statistics in the various countries of this region of the world. Problems involved in integrated systems.

Report of the 7 th session of the Conference of African Statisticians. (Dakar, 13-22 October 1971.) 24 November 1971. 54 p. ( U N / E / C N . 14/547.)

[Bl.] Situation with regard to the problems raised by the necessity of developing statistical machinery in Africa in line with the exigencies of economic and social growth and the national accounting system.

Report of the Working Group on Production Accounts, Commodity Balances and Input-Output Analysis at both Current and Constant Prices (Dakar, 4-12 October 1971). 24 November 1971. 34 p. ( U N / E / C N . 14/548.)

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INCLUDING GENERAL DEVELOPMENT), INDUSTRIALIZATION

World Plan of Action for the Application of Science and Technology to Development. October 1971. 286 p. $4. (uN/E/4962/Rev.l.) ( S T / E C A / 1 4 6 . )

Priority fields in which science and technology can best serve development. More detailed proposals.

The transfer of technical know-how in the steel industry in Brazil. Prepared by Bruno Leuschner. October 1971. 122 p. ( U N / E / C N . 12/922.)

[St. Bl.] This report is part of a vast study undertaken by the Economic Commission for Latin America, the Intei-American Development Bank and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, on the flow of technical know-h o w in Brazil. The situation with regard to steel.

Report of the African Ministerial Meeting preparatory to UNCTAD HI (Addis Ababa, 8-14 October 1971). 20 October 1971. 72 p. including annexes, ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / 5 4 5 . )

Report of the 6 th Meeting of the UNAC AST Regional Group for Africa (Addis Ababa, 18-21 October 1971). 12 November 1971. 21 p. ( U N / E / C N . 14/546.)

768


AGRICULTURE, BASIC COMMODITIES

Agricultural commodity projections. 1970-80. 2 vols. 1971. 329 p. and 407 p. ( F A O . )

FAO commodity review and outlook: 1970-71. 1972. 227 p. ( F A O . ) [St.] Trends in world agricultural trade as a whole. Principal factors. Short-term prospects. Situation and outlook by commodities, cereals, livestock products, tropical export crops, agricultural raw materials, fishery products, forestry products. Recent action in commodity problems : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, food aid, disposal of surpluses, regional economic integration.

Introduction and Effects of high-yielding varieties of rice in the Philippines. 1972. 47 p. ( F A O . )

Picture of the situation up to November 1969. The importance of the rice-growing sector. The 1966-70 programme for the development of rice production. Main economic, technical and institutional factors which contributed to the adoption of high-yielding varieties. Effects on total rice production.

Approaches to international action on world trade in oilseeds, oils and fats. 1972, 129 p. ( F A O . )

The international organization of trade in basic commodities. Principal problems. Measures which might be considered at the national and the international level.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Economic Survey of Latin America, 1969. 417 p. M a y 1971. $5. ( U N / E / C N . 12/851/ Rev.l.)

[St. Bl.] The evolution over the past ten years in various countries in the region. Goals of their economic policies. Analyses by country and by sector.

Survey of economic conditions in Africa: 1970. June 1971. 357 p. $5.50. (Part I.) (UN/E/CN.14/520.)

[St. Bl.] This first part contains a general account of trends noted in various sectors of the economy for the whole of the African countries. The second part is to comprise a critical analysis of the national accounts of a number of African countries.

INCOMES

Income distribution in Latin America. November 1971. 148 p. $2.50 ( U N / E / C N . 12/863.)

Society, living and working conditions, employment, social policy.

Society, living and working conditions, employment, social policy

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Activities of the ILO: 1971. 1972. 87 p. $4; 10 Swiss francs. (ILO.) Second part of the report of the Director-General of I L O to the fifty-seventh session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, 1972).

769


A R M A M E N T S A N D ECONOMIC A N D SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security. 12 November 1971. 190 p. (uN/A/8469/Add.l.)

[St.] Replies of twenty-five States and nine international agencies to a note from the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Level of military expenditure. Effects on economic and social development. Risks to the environment. Comparisons with social and cultural expenditure, with the science budget in particular.

URBANIZATION

Urban land policies and land-use control measures. Progress report of the Secretary-General. 13 August 1971. 20 p. including annex, ( U N / E / C C / 1 1 8 . )

State of progress of a study on a vast scale of land-use policy in various countries faced with urbanization and the struggle against speculation.

Economics of urban development. Proposals for an international research programme on the economics of urban development. 28 June 1971. 39 p. (uN/E/c.6/121/Add.l.)

Some regional development problems in Latin America. Linked to metropolitanization. 6 Septembei 1971. 57 p. ( U N / E / C N . 1 2 / 9 1 3 . )

[St.] The functioning of the economy in metropolitan zones. The case of Latin America. Countries centred on a single metropolis. Countries with several. Standards of living in these zones.

*Urban unemployment in the developing countries. By Paul Bairoch. 1972. 106 p . 12 Swiss francs; $4. (ILO.)

[St. Bl.] The extent of unemployment in the developing countries. Causes of the extreme rapidity of the urbanization process in the Third World. S u m m a r y of available information on the combination of the two phenomena. Urban unemployment and rural underemployment.

SOCIAL SERVICES, W O R K I N G CONDITIONS, E M P L O Y M E N T POLICY

The cost of social security. 1972. 429 p. 30 Swiss francs; $10. (ILO.) [St. Bl.] This seventh survey in a series prepared by I L O since the Second World W a r follows the methods adopted previously. It gives statistical data concerning the financial operations of national social security systems in 1964, 1965 and 1966. International comparisons and statistics by country.

Report of the Seminar on Housing Administration in Africa (English-speaking countries). (Copenhagen, 15 September-2 October 1971). 56 p. 12 October 1971.

( U N / E / C N . 14/539.) [Bl.] Functions of housing administration. Determining its aims. Legislation. Financing. Participants. List of working papers.

Inland Transport Committee (ninth session, Geneva, 1972). General report. 1972. 293 p. $3.50; 14 Swiss francs. (ILO.)

Measuies taken in various countries in the light of the conclusions adopted at previous sessions of the committee. Arrangements m a d e by the bureau to carry out the

770


studies and surveys proposed by the committee. Recent events and advances in inland transport. Working conditions and safety measures applicable to persons employed in the road transport industry. Basic vocational training and further training in road transport.

The public-works approach to low-end poverty problems: the new potentialities of an old answer. Paper prepared by John P . Lewis. 21 December 1971. 43 p. ( U N / E / A C . 5 4 / L.42.)

fBl.] Place of public works in anti-poverty programmes, in the light of the evolution in theories and practice.

Some elements in the strategy of employment promotion in developing countries. Paper prepared by the International Labour Office. 4 January 1972. 38 p. ( U N / E / A C . 5 4 / L.43.)

T h e most general principles which can be identified with regard to the policy to adopt in order to link a full-employment policy with industrialization programmes in developing countries. Underemployment and traditional poverty. Various levels of employment policy. Functions of the various sectors of the economy.

Measuring the adequacy of employment in developing countries. Paper prepared by the International Labour Office. 4 January 1972. 27 p. ( U N / E / C . 5 4 / L . 4 4 . )

Limitation of the concept of active population. Restatement of the problem. Data to be collected. Their analysis.

Employment strategies and poverty-reduction policies of developing countries: problems and issues in the light of experience in development planning. Paper prepared by the Centre for Development Planning.

Projections and policies of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. 31 January 1972. 54 p., including annex. ( U N / E / A C . 5 4 / L . 4 7 . )

{St. Bl.] Situation with regard to the unemployment and underemployment problem in the developing countries after twenty years' experience.

Labour and social implications of automation and other technical developments. 1972. 75 p. $3.50; 10 Swiss francs. (ILO.)

Social repercussions of new methods of cargo handling (docks). 1972. 41 p. $3; 8 Swiss francs. (ILO.)

Legal and political questions, h u m a n rights

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Review of the rôle of the International Court of Justice. Report of the Secretary-General. 15 September 1971. 130 p., annexes, ( U N / A / 8 3 8 2 . )

Replies of twenty-six States to a questionnaire on the present and future functions of the court. The opinion of the latter. Replies received after 15 September 1971 are given in annexes.

771


INDEPENDENCE

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations. Reply of Unesco. 24 January 1971. 135 p. ( U N / A / 8 3 1 4 / Add .6 . ) (Part II.)

Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and territories under Portuguese domination and in all other territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa. 6 December 1971. 183 p . (uN/A/8398/Add.l.)

[St. Bl.] The basic document (5 November 1971, 13 p.) described the work of the special committee set up by the United Nations General Assembly to study these problems. This annex contains detailed working papers on the activities of foreign firms operating in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, the Bahamas , Bermuda, N e w Guinea and Papua in particular. They were prepared by the United Nations Secretariat.

H U M A N RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION

Political rights of women. Report of the Secretary-General. 30 November 1971. 34 p. ( U N / A / 8 4 8 1 . )

[St. B L ] Recent trends in legislation in various countries. Data on the access of w o m e n to political responsibilities and senior administration.

International instruments and national standards relating to the status of women. Study of provisions in existing conventions that relate to the status of women. 21 January 1972. 65 p. including annexes, ( U N / E / C N . 6 / 5 5 2 . )

Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. 24 September 1971. 128 p. including annex, ( U N / A / 8 3 6 7 . )

Situation with regard to the preparations for this international year, on the basis of information provided by the States and international institutions. List of bodies concerned.

Seminar on the dangers of a recrudescence of intolerance in all its forms and the search for ways of preventing and combating it (Nice, France. 26 August-6 September 1971). 1971. 31 p. ( U N / S T / T A O / H R / 4 4 . )

T h e part played by social and economic factors in particular.

Apartheid. Its effects on education, science, culture and information. Second edition revised and enlarged. 1972. 256 p. $ 4 ; 16 F . (Unesco/SHC.70/D.63/A.)

Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. October 1971. 61 p. $1.50; 6.45 Swiss francs, ( U N / A / 8 4 1 8 . )

T h e committee's activities during the year. Consideration of reports submitted by

772


States and petitions. Situation with regard to ratifications of the 1971 international convention and adhesions.

DELINQUENCY

Report of the Advisory Committee of Experts on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders on its 5th session held from 19 to 26 July 1971. 27 p. 26 July 1971. ( U N / E / C N . 5 / 4 7 4 . )

Social defence and planning. M i n i m u m rules for the treatment of prisoners.

LABOUR L A W

Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. Vol. A : General report and observations concerning certain countries. 1972. 242 p. $4; 6 Swiss francs. (ILO.)

Submitted at the fifty-sixth session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, 1971). The committee's terms of reference and working methods. Observations concerning 110 countries.

Education, science

EDUCATION, SCIENCE

Conference of Ministers of Education and Those Responsible for the Promotion of Science and Technology in Relation to Development in Latin America and the Caribbean convened in co-operation with ECLA and O AS (Venezuela, 6-15 December 1971). Final Report. 21 March 1972. 89 p. (Unesco/ED/MD/22.)

P L ] Review of progress m a d e in education in the region since 1966. Problems. Recommendations.

Report of the Panel of Experts on Advanced Institutes for Applied Science and Technology in Africa (University of Manchester, 10-14 August 1970). 29 November 1971. 58 p. ( U N / E / C N . 14/541.)

Secondary education, social structure and development in Latin America. 25 November 1971. 61 p. ( U N / E / C N . 1 2 / 9 2 4 . )

[St.] Presented jointly by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning at the Conference of Ministers of Education and Science in Latin America and the Caribbean held in Venezuela from 6 to 15 December 1971 under the auspices of Unesco. Illiteracy. Current trends in attendance at the various levels of education. Efficiency of the educational system. Education and income. Secondary schools. Current trends. Review of its effects.

Planning the development of universities—/. Edited by Victor G . Onushkin. 318 p. $7; 28 F . 1971. (Unesco: International Institute for Educational Planning.)

773


Situation with regard to problems and methods in university planning, on the basis of the proceedings of an international seminar. General considerations. Monographs devoted to the University of Leningrad and the University of Sussex.

Systems approach to teacher training and curriculum development: the case of developing countries. B y Taker A . Razik. 157 p. 1972. $4.50; 18 F. (Unesco: International Institute for Educational Planning.)

[St. Bl.] Presentation of a model designed to allow for continuous controlled adaptation of the educational system in keeping with changes in the environment. Example of application to a particular country—Sudan. Glossary of terms used in systems theory.

Multinational meeting of representatives of Associated Schools in Asia (Seoul and Kyungju, 18-23 October 1971) .Final Report. 30 March 1972.7 p. (Unesco/ED/MD/23.)

The participants were people working in the Associated Schools programmes sponsored by Unesco in Asia for the purpose of promoting international understanding and exchange of ideas. Review of these activities. Recommendations for the future. List of participants (from ten countries).

SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION

Report of the Kampala Seminar on Science and Mass Media (Kampala, V23 to 27 November 1970). 14 December 1971. 56 p., including annexes, ( U N / E / C N . 1 4 / 5 4 3 . )

The popularization of science in Africa and the developing countries as a whole. General considerations and practical guidance.

774

Books received

Psychology

B Ü H L E R , Charlotte. La psychologie dans la vie de notre temps. Tr. de l'allemand par Chantal Mutschier, Mireille Nicklaus et Bernadette Runge-Féron; rev. scientifique par C . Mutschler et Martin Hirzel. Toulouse, Edouard Privat, Editeur, 1972. 518 p., illus, graphs, tables, bibliog., index.

C H E I N , Isidor. The science of behaviour and the image of man. London, Tavistock Publications, 1972. x + 347 p., index. £3.75.

F L A M A N D , Jacques. Le sexe et la personne: approche personnaliste. Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 1972. Ill p., bibliog.

G O R N E Y , Roderic. The human agenda. N e w York, N . Y . , Simon & Schuster, 1968. 698 p., bibliog., index. §12.95.

R U T T E R , Michael. Maternal deprivation reassessed. Harmondsworth, Middx, Penguin Books, 1972. 175 p.

Religion

S T A V R O P O U L O U , Alexandrou M . Pimantiki proetimasia ton mellonymphon. Athinai Ethnikon Kentron Kinonikon Erevnon, 1971. 172 p., bibliog., index.

Social sciences

G R A W I T Z , Madeleine. Méthodes des sciences sociales. Paris, Dalloz, 1972. 1,013 p. 44 F .

Sociology

A L L E R B E C K , K . Datenverarbeitung in der empirischen Sozialforschung: eine einführung für nichtprogrammierer. Stuttgart, B . G . Teubner, 1972. 187 p. D M . 7 . 8 0 .

D I M I T R A , Uia. Kinoniologia ke kinoniotechniki tis diadoseos ton gnoseon dia tin anaptyxin. Athinai, Ethnikon Kentron Kinonikon Erevnon, 1971. 134 p. bibliog.

775

Im. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1972


D I M T T R A S , Elie. Enquêtes sociologiques sur les emigrants grecs. Athènes, Centre National de Recherches Sociales, 1971. 3 parts: 1. Avant le départ de Grèce, viii + 117 p.; 2. Lors du séjour en Europe occidentale, viii + 219 p. ; 3. U p o n the return to Greece, xii + 131 p.

H U M M E L L , H . J. Probleme der mehrebenenanalyse. Stuttgart, B . G . Teubner, 1972. 160 p. graphs, tables, bibliog., index.

K O U K O U , Elenis E . Diamorphosis tis ellinikis kinonias kata tin Tourkokratian. Athinai, Ethnikon Kentron Kinonikon Erevnon, 1971. 177 p., bibliog., index.

M U R D O C K , George Peter. De la structure sociale. Tr. de l'américain par Sylvie Laroche et Massimo Giacometti; avant-propos de Michel Panoff. Paris, Payot, 1972. 357 p., tables, bibliog., index. 59 F .

T E N B R U C K , Friedrich H . Jugend und gesellschaft: soziologische Perspektiven: 2., durchgesehene und erweiterte aufläge. Freiburg, Verlag Rombach , 1965. 135 p.

U R I B E - V I L L E G A S , Oscar. Sociolingüistica doctrinaria. Mexico, Editorial Libros de Mexico, 1971. 114 p., graphs, bibliog.

Demography

B O S E , Ashish; D E S A I , P . B . ; JAIN, S. P . (comp.). Studies in demography. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 579 p., bibliog., index. $12.95.

C O A L E , Ansley J. The growth and structure of human populations: a mathematical investigation. Princeton, N.J . , Princeton University Press, 1972. xvii + 227 p. , glossary, graphs, fig., index. $9.50.

E S P E N S H A D E , T h o m a s J. A new method for estimating the level of natural fertility in populations practicing birth control. Berkeley, Calif., Department of Demography, College of Letters and Science, University of California, November 1971. p. 525-36, graphs. (Reprint Series, no. 389, Demography, vol. 8, no. 4, November 1971.)

R O B E R T , Bernard. Évolutions démographiques régionales et migrations intérieures de population, Province de Québec, 1941-66. Québec, Bureau de la Statistique, 1971. xxxiii + 445 p., graphs, maps , tables. (Matériaux pour l'étude des espaces démographiques régionaux.)

——. Profiles migratoires: comtés et régions, Province de Québec, 1961-66. Québec, Bureau de la Statistique du Québec, M a y 1971. 161 p., graphs, maps, tables. (Matériaux pour l'étude des espaces démographiques régionaux.)

. Structure par âge relative: comtés et régions, Province de Québec, 1966. Québec, Bureau de la Statistique du Québec, 1971. 176 p., graphs, maps, tables. (Matériaux pour l'étude des espaces démographiques régionaux.)

Political science

A P O D I M I , Ellines. Greeks abroad. Athens, National Centre of Social Science, 1972. 158 p., graphs, tables.

C H E R N S , A . B . ; S I N C L A I R , R . ; J E N K I N S , W . I. (eds.). Social science and government. (Proceedings of an International Social Science Council Conference on Social Science Policy, Paris, April 1970.) London, Tavistock Publications, 1972. xxxiii + 269 p.

C U R L E , A d a m . Mystics and militants: a study of awareness, identity and social action. London, Tavistock Publications, 1972. ix + 121 p., bibliog., index. £2.

776

Books received

D H A R A M P A L . Civil disobedience an Indian tradition; with some early nineteenth century documents. Varanasi, Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, 1971. 122 p. 30 rupees.

I N T E R N A T I O N A L U N I O N O F L O C A L A U T H O R I T I E S . Local governement as promotor of economic and social development. The Hague, International Union of Local Authorities, 1971. 100 p., maps, tables.

L A N D A U , Jacob M . (ed.). Man, state and society in the contemporary Middle East. N e w York, N . Y . , Praeger, 1972. viii + 532 p., bibliog., index. $13.50.

M A R K O G L O U , Emmanouil E . To endiaferon tou americanikou laon dia tin kritikin epanastasin 1866-69. Athinai, Ethnikon Kentron Kinonikon Erevnon, 1970. 163 p., bibliog.

M I L E S , Edward. International administration of space exploration and exploitation. Denver, The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1970-71. 51 p., tables. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 8, no. 4, 1970-71.)

P A T N A I K , N . Tribes and their development: a study of two tribal development blocks in Orissa. Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1972. 117 p., maps, tables. 15 rupees.

P R A N G E R , Robert J. Defense implications of international indeterminacy. Washington, D . C . , American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972. 31 p.

S E S H A D R I , K . ; JAIN, S. P . Panchayati Raj and political perceptions of electorate: a study of electoral behaviour in the mid-term poll of 1971 in Hyderbad constituency. Hyderabad, National Institute of Community Development, 1972. 99 p., tables. 14 rupees.

Political economy

A D E L L , B . L . ; C A R T E R , D . D . Collective bargaining for university faculty in Canada. Kingston, Ontario, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1972. xi + 95 p. $3.50.

B A N C A C O M M E R C I A L E I T A L I A N A . // portolano del mondo económico: cifre e notizie sistemáticamente ordinate paese per paese: paesi socialisti. Milano, Banca C o m merciale Italiana, 1972. xxi + 482 p., index.

B A X E V A N I S , John J. Economy and population movements in the Peloponnesos of Greece. Athens, National Centre of Social Research, 1972. 86 p., illus., maps, tables, graphs, bibliog.

B R E C H E R , Irving; A B B A S , S. A . Foreign aid and industrial development in Pakistan. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1972. xiv + 271 p., graphs, tables, bibliog., index. £6.60.

C A R V A L H O , Agostinho de. Relaçôes de produçâo e progresso técnico no quadro da agricultura de grupo. Lisboa, Fundacäo Calouste Gulbenkian, Centro de Estudos de Economia Agraria, 1971. 163 p., maps , graphs, tables, illus., bibliog.

C H A U L E T , Claudine. La Mitidja autogérée: enquête sur les exploitations autogérées agricoles d'une région d'Algérie, 1968-70. Alger, Société Nationale d'Édition et de Diffusion, 1971. 402 p., maps, tables, graphs.

C O L O M B I A . T H E N A T I O N A L P L A N N I N G D E P A R T M E N T . Guidelines for a new strategy. Bogotá, National Planning Department, 1972. iv + 159 p.

C O R D E N , W . M . Monetary integration. Princeton, N.J. , Princeton University, Department of Economics, International Finance Section, April 1972. 46 p. (Essays in International Finance, no. 93.)

777


C R E W , Michael A . ; R O W L E Y , Charles K . Anti-trust policy: the application of rules. Heslington, Institute of Social and Economic Research and Department of Economics, University of York, Autumn 1971. 14 p. (Institute of Social and Economic Research and Department of Economics, Reprint Series: Economics, no. 108.)

G A D O , Ottó (ed.). Reform of the economic mechanism in Hungary: development 1968-71; Trans, by T . Báckskai, G . Dienes, G . Hajdu and J. Rácz. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972. 313 p. $7.80.

G Ü N T E R , Hans (ed.). Transnational industrial relations: the impact of multinational corporations and economic regionalism on industrial relations; a symposium held at Geneva by the International Institute for Labour Studies. London, Macmillan, 1972. xvii + 480 p. bibliog, index. £7.

H E Y E R , Judith. A linear programming analysis of constraints on peasant farms in Kenya. Stanford, Calif., Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1971. 13 p. $1. (Studies in Tropical Development.) (Reprint.)

H U T C H E S O N , Thomas L . ; P O R T E R , Richard C . The cost of tying aid: a method and some Colombian estimates. Princeton, N.J . , Princeton University Press, Department of Economics, International Finance Section, March 1972. 53 p. $1. (Princeton Studies in International Finance, no. 30.)

K A T Z , Samuel I. The case for the par-value system, 1972. Princeton, N.J. , International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1972. 32 p. (Essays in International Finance, no. 92, March 1972.)

K E Y N E S , John Meynard. Essais sur la monnaie et l'économie: les cris de Cassandre. Tr. et présentation de Michel Panoff. Paris, Petite Bibliothèque Payot, 1971. 145 p.

O V E R S E A S D E V E L O P M E N T INSTITUTE L T D . A third force for the third world: a study of the channels for investment of Church Trust Funds in economic development. Report of a working party sponsored jointly by Christian Aid and the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development. London, O D I Ltd, 1972. iv + 19 p. £0.50.

P O N S O T , Pierre et al. Revista de la Universidad de Madrid, vol. 20, no. 78. Madrid, Prensa de la Universidad de Madrid, 1971. 254 p. 150 pesetas. (Estudios de historia económica, I.)

POTICHNYJ, Peter J. Soviet agricultural trade unions, 1917-70. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972. xix + 258 p., tables, bibliog., index. $12.50.

S O C I E T Y F O R I N T E R N A T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T , World Conference, 12, Ottawa, May 16-19, 1971. International development 1971: development targets for the 70's and jobs justice; selected papers. Ed. by Andrew E . Rice. N e w York, N . Y , , The Society, 1972. vi + 121 p. index. $6.50.

S T O R M - C L A R K , Christopher. The miners, 1870-1970: a test case for oral history. Heslington, Institute of Social and Economic Research and Department of Economics, University of York, September 1971. 74 p. (Institute of Social and Economic Research and Department of Economics, Reprint Series: Economics, no. 107.)

W Y N N , Margaret. Family policy: a study of the economic costs of rearing children and their social and political consequences. Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin Books, 1972. 384 p., illus., graphs, tables, bibliog. index. £0.65.

778

Books received

Law

F O T A K I , Nikolaou, S. To diazigion ex epopseos dikastikis psychiatrikis. Athinai, Ethnikon Kentron Kinonikon Erevnon, 1971. 181 p., bibliog.

Administrative sciences

L A N G R O D , Georges (ed.). La consultation dans Vadministration contemporaine. Préf. de Alfred Sauvy. Paris, Cujas, 1972. 971 p., bibliog., index. 100 F.

Social welfare

C O M I T É M É D I C A L E T M É D I C O - S O C I A L D ' A I D E A U X M I G R A N T S . La santé des migrants.

Paris, Société d'Édition Droits & Liberté, 1972. 187 p., illus., graphs. Conference on Psychology and Family Planning, August 1-2,1971, Nairobi. Proceed

ings. Ed. by Henri P. David. Washington, American Institute for Research, Transnational Family Research Institute, 1972. iv + 141 p. $3.

H E R M A N , Melvin. Administrative justice and supplementary benefits; a study of supplementary benefits appeal tribunals. London, G . Bell & Sons, 1972. 68 p. £1. (Occasional Papers on Social Administration, no. 47.)

P E R L M A N , Helen Harris. L'aide psychosociale interpersonnelle; présentation française de Marie-Anne Rupp. Paris, Édition du Centurion, 1972. 214 p., bibliog. (Trans of the original English ed. Social Casework, a problem.)

PoTHOU, Minóos E . Egklimatiké perioché ké symmorie anilikon. Athinai, Ethnikon Kentron Kinonikon Erevnon, 1971. 239 p., bibliog., indexes.

R A T C L I F F E , T . A . L'enfant et ses problèmes de vie: l'importance des facteurs de l'environnement dans l'approche des difficultés éducatives et familiales. Tr. de l'anglais de Simone Lavabre. Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 1972. 126 p. ('Mésopé' bibliothèque de l'action sociale, 33.) (Tr. de l'édition originale, The child and reality, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1970.) 12.90 F.

W I L K I N S O N , R . K . ; T A L B O T , Valerie. An investigation of the attitudes of families rehoused from slum and twilight areas in Bat ley, Leeds and York. Heslington, Institute of Social and Economic Research and Department of Economics, University of York, October 1971.26 p., tables. (Institute of Social and Economic Research and Department of Economics, Reprint Series: Economics no. 109.)

Education

T H E C A R N E G I E C O M M I S S I O N O N H I G H E R E D U C A T I O N . The fourth revolution: instructional technology in higher education: a report and recommendations. N e w York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Book Company, June 1972. 105 p., tables. $1.95.

. The more effective use of resources: an imperative for higher education; a report and recommendations. N e w York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Book Company , June 1972. xi + 201 p., bibliog. $3.95.

. Reform on campus: changing students, changing academic programs: a report and recommendations. N e w York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Book Company, June 1972. x + 137 p. $2.95.

779


H A R R A R I , Maurice. Global dimensions in U.S. education: the university. N e w York, N . Y . Center for War/Peace Studies; ISA Education Commission; American Political Science Association, 1972. 56 p. $1.50.

H A R R I S , Seymour E . A statistical portrait of higher education: a report for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. N e w York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Book C o m p a n y , 1972. xliv + 978 p., graphs, tables, bibliog. $25.

L A N F A N T , Marie-Françoise. Les théories du loisir: sociologie du loisir et idéologies. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1972. 254 p. 20 F .

P E T E R S O N , Richard E . American college and university enrollment trends in 1971. Berkeley, Calif., The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1972. 35 p., tables. $2. (The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education: Technical Report.)

S C H E I N , Edgar H . Professional education: some new directions. With the assistance of Diane W . K o m m e r s . N e w York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Book Company , 1972. xiii + 163 p., tables, bibliog., index. $5.95. (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education.)

T A U B M A N , Paul; W A L E S , Terence. Mental ability and higher educational attainment in the 20th century: a technical report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Berkeley, Calif., Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1972. 47 p. $1.50. (National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional Paper 118.)

W O L F E , Dael. The home of science: the role of the university. N e w York, N . Y . , McGraw-Hill Book Company/Carnegie Commission for the Advancement of Teaching, 1972. xii + 202 p., bibliog., index. $6.95. (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education Series of Profiles, no. 12.)

Social and cultural anthropology

B E R N D T , Roland M . ; L A W R E N C E , Peter (eds.). Politics in New Guinea: traditional and in the context of change some anthropological perspectives. Nedlands, University of Western Australia Press, 1971. viii + 430 p., index. $10.50.

E I B L - E I B E S F E L D T , Irenäus. Die! Ko-buschmann-gesellschaft: gruppenbindung und aggressionskontrolle bei einem Jäger- und Sammerlervolk. München, R . Piper & C o . Verlag, 1972. 223 p., bibliog., index. D M . 2 5 .

M A R A N D A , Pierre (ed.). Mythology; selected readings. Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin Books, 1972. 320 p., bibliog., index. £0.60.

R E I N I N G , Priscilla (ed.). Kinship studies in the Morgan Centennial Year. Washington, D . C . , The Anthropological Society, 1972. x + 188 p.

Biological sciences, ecology

B A T E S O N , Mary Catherine. Our own metaphor: a personal account of a conference on the effects of a conscious purpose on human adaptation. N e w York, N . Y . , Alfred A . Knopf Inc. 1972. 324 p., index. $8.95.

I N G E R , Robert F. et al. Man in the living environment. Madison, Wise., The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972. 288 p., maps, tables, graphs, index. $2.50.

K A Y , David A . ; S K O L N T K O F F , Eugene B . (eds.). World eco-crisis: international organizations in response. With an introduction by Maurice F . Strong. Madison, Wise., The University of Wisconsin Press, 1972. viii + 324 p. $2.50

780

Books received

LEISS, William. The domination of nature. N e w York, N . Y . , George Braziller, 1972. xii + 242 p., bibliog. index., $6.95.

S C H N E I D , Otto. The man-made hell: a search for rescue. Toronto, Source Books, 1970. xii + 392 p., index. $6.50.

Symposium on Political Economy of Environment, Paris, July 5-8, 1971. Political economy of environment: problem of method. Papers presented at the symposium. Paris, Mouton, 1972. 237 p., graphs, tables. (Environment and Social Sciences, 2.)

United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Panel of Experts, Founex, Switzerland, June 4-12, 1971. Development and environment: report and working papers of a panel of experts convened by the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment. Paris, Mouton, 1972. x + 225 p.

Physical planning

E U R O P E A N C U L T U R A L F O U N D A T I O N . Fears and hopes for European urbanization: ten prospective papers and three evaluations. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. vii + 256 p. 32.50 guilders. (Plan Europe 2000: Project 3, Urbanization planning h u m a n environment in Europe.)

. The future is tomorrow; 17 prospective studies. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. vii 310 p. Approx. 75 guilders. (Plan Europe 2000: General prospective studies.)

International Colloquium on the Mastery of Urban Growth, Brussels, 2-Í December 1969. The mastery of urban growth: report of the International Colloquium. Brussels, M e n s en Ruimte, 1971. 334 p., maps, graphs, charts, tables.

History

K O U M O U L I D E S , John T . A . Cyprus and the war of Greek independence, 1821-29. Foreword by Douglas Dakin. Athens, National Centre of Social Research, 1971. 134 p. [4]1. photos, maps .

S Y M E , Ronald. Danubian papers. Bucharest, Association Internationale d'Études du Sud-Est Européen, Bibliothèque d'Études du Sud-Est Européen, 1971. 252 p.

T O B I A S , Henry J. The Jewish Bund in Russia from its origins to 1905. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972. xvii + 409 p., bibliog., index. $16.50.

781

World index of social science institutions: research, advanced training, documentation and professional bodies

A special service of the International Social Science Journal

T h e basic edition of this card index, published in 1970, and its supplements contain systematic data on over 1,500 social science research, advanced training and documentation institutions and professional bodies. The index is bilingual, the English version appearing on the recto of each card, and the French on the verso. It is arranged in alphabetical order by n a m e of institution (in the appropriate language) for international bodies and subsequently under country headings and names of national institutions.

A regular updating service is provided, free of charge, to subscribers to the International Social Science Journal, with which are issued n e w cards for additional institutions and cards containing more recent information on institutions previously included in the index; no other updating service is available. T h e ninth set of such cards—to be cut out and inserted into the original index—is supplied with the present issue.

Information, giving details under as m a n y of the categories set out in the key as appropriate, concerning institutions and bodies not included in the present index, as well as corrections to existing entries m a y be addressed to: Social Science Documentation Centre, Unesco, Place de Fontenoy, 75007 Paris (France).

T h e index is available with or without a special ring binder of a format identical with that of this journal and m a y be ordered directly from the Distribution Division, Unesco, Place de Fontenoy, 75007 Paris, or through the national distributors listed at the end of this journal. Price: without ring binder, $9, £2.70, 36 F ; with ring binder, $15, £4.50, 60 F .

nt. Soc. Sei. J., Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1972

783

11. Band 1972. Heft 3

Abhandlungen und Aufsätze Friedrich Klein

Klaus Lange

Paavo Kastari

Berichte und Kritik Werner Krawietz

Christoph Böckenförde

Johannes Siemes

DER STAAT Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, öffentliches Recht und Verfassungsgeschichte

Herausgegeben von Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Gerhard Oestreich, Helmut Quaritsch, R o m a n Schnur, Werner Weber , H a n s J. Wolff

Die Regelung der Gemeinschaftsaufgaben von Bund und Ländern im Grundgesetz. Die Abhängigkeit der Ausgabenwirtschaft der Bundesregierung von der parlamentarischen Budgetbewilligung. Unabhängigkeit der Gerichte und Demokratisierung der Gerichte in rechtsvergleichender Sicht

Unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff, öffentliches Interesse und gesetzliche Gemeinwohlklauseln als juristisches Entscheidungsproblem. Konzertierte Aktion. Z u institutionellen Problemen der Globalsteuerung Karl Marx im Urteil des sozialen Rechts

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RASSEGNA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGÍA Anno XIII, n. 1, 1972 Trimestrale dt scienze sociali

C . P. Thomas Luckmann Alain Touraine

La grande paura La costituzione del linguaggio nel mondo delta vita quotidiana I movimenti sociali

C L A S S E POLÍTICA E S T R U T T U R E DI P A R T I T O

Paolo Farneti Giacomo Santi Giorgio Galli

Problemi di ricerca e di analisi délia classe política italiana Profilo dei dirigenti di partito Vinfluenza dell'organizzazione partitica sul voto

LlBRI E NOTIZ1E

Schede bibliografiche ; Documenti; Summaries

Redazione : Istituto di Studi e Ricerche Carlo Cattaneo, Via S. Stefano 6, Bologna (Italy).

Published four times a year by Società Editrice il Mulino, Via S. Stefano 6, Bologna (Italy)

Annual subscription: Lit. 5.000 (Italy) Lit. 6.000 (abroad) Single issue: Lit. 2.000

ACTA (ECONÓMICA ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICAE Vol. 8

N o . 2-3

A periodical of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

R . Hoch L. Mihályffy, Gy . Szakolczai S. Fabricant A . Rácz M . Markus, A . Hegedüs L. Lengyel P. Erdös

Gy. A d á m

G . Biró

I. Vajda, M . Simai (eds). B. Kádár V . NesVera

W . Galenson (éd.) J. Kóródi, G y . Köszegfalvi G . Tempel

Contents Real processes and market processes The optimal rate of growth of the capital stock Productivity in the tertiary sector Services—the tertiary sector Leisure time and division of labour Social policy in socialism Some reflections on national price levels—referring to texts of Marx and Ricardo Some implications and concomitants of worldwide sourcing

R E V I E W S The Hungarian Chamber of Commerce

B O O K R E V I E W S Foreign trade in a planned economy (E. Drahos) Small Countries in the world economy (Gy. Becsky) Investitionen in Österreich und in der Tschechoslowakei (G. Havas) Essays on employment (Zs. Mausecz) Urban development in Hungary (I. Bartke) Als war's der liebe Gott (Gy. A d á m )

B I B L I O G R A P H Y Publications of Hungarian economists in foreign languages, Part T w o (July 1, 1969-

December 31, 1970) B O O K S R E C E I V E D

Acta (Económica is published in eight issues, making up two volumes a year, some 400 pages each. Subscription rate per volume beginning with January 1973: U.S.$24.00; £9.60; D M . 9 0 Distributors: K U L T U R A , Budapest 62, P . O . Box 149, Hungary

,>

II 1828 1 \

T II

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Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (KZfS)

Begründet durch Leopold von Wiese f

Hrsg. im Forschungsinstitut für Soziologie an der Universität zu Köln von René König

Jährlich erscheinen 4 Hefte und ein Sonderheft. Bezugspreis: Einzelheft D M . 2 2 . Jahresabonnement D M . 8 0 . Gegen Studienbescheinigung D M . 4 0 ; jeweils zuzüglich Sonderheft (mit 50 % Ermäßigung) und Versandspesen.

"Die Bedeutung eines so zentralen Organs wie dieser Zeitschrift kann m a n heute bei der Vielfalt der Aufgaben, der Verwirrung der Verwaltungsmethoden, denen die in der Öffentlichkeit arbeitenden Männer und Frauen ausgeliefert sind, gar nicht hoch genug veranschlagen...

W e n n eine Zeitschrift solche Sonderhefte herausgeben kann, hat sie hohen Standard. Bedürfte es noch eine Beweise, daß die deutsche Soziologie bereit ist, sich ihres 'Provinzialismus' zu entledigen — hier wird er von der z u m Teil noch ganz jungen Forschergeneration der Gegenwart erbracht."

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

Sonderhefte

Heft 1 Soziologie der Gemeinde. 3. Aufl., 1966. 229 Seiten, kart. D M . 1 7 Heft 2 Soziologie der Jugendkriminalität. 5. Aufl., 1971. 188 Seiten, kart. D M . 2 0 Heft 3 Probleme der Medizinsoziologie. 4. Aufl., 1970. 336 Seiten, kart. D M . 2 3 Heft 4 Soziologie der Schule. 9. Aufl., 1971. 200 Seiten, kart. D M . 1 8 Heft 5 Soziale Schichtung und soziale Mobilität. 4. Aufl., 1970. 345 Seiten, kart. D M . 2 3 Heft 6 Probleme der Religionssoziologie. 3. Aufl., 1971. 289 Seiten, kart. D M . 2 4 Heft 7 M a x Weber zum Gedächtnis. 1963. 488 Seiten, kart. D M . 3 2 Heft 8 Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der D D R . 2. Aufl., 1971. 540 Seiten,

kart. D M . 3 8 Heft 9 Zur Soziologie der Wahl. 2. Aufl., 1968. 359 Seiten, kart. D M . 2 7 Heft 10 Kleingruppenforchung und Gruppe im Sport. 1966. 280 Seiten, kart. D M . 2 8 Heft 11 Studien und Materialien zur Rechtssoziologie. 2. Aufl., 1971. 412 Seiten, kart.

D M . 3 6 Heft 12 Beiträge sur Militärsoziologie. 1968. 360 Seiten, kart. D M 3 6 Heft 13 Aspekte der Entwicklungssoziologie. 1970. 816 Seiten, kart. D M . 6 9 Heft 14 Soziologie der Familie. 1970. 528 Seiten, kart. D M . 3 9 Heft 15 Soziologie der Sprache 1971. In Vorbereitung

Westdeutscher Verlag Opladen Federal Republic of Germany

Foro Internacional Revista trimestral publicada por el Colegio de México Fundador: Daniel Cosío Villegas Director: Rafael Segovia Director adjunto : María del Rosario Green Vol. XIII, n° 2 , octubre-diciembre, 1972

Artículos Lorenzo Meyer Olga Pellicer de Brody María del Rosario Green Blanca Torres

Luis Medina Bernardo Sepúlveda Rafael Segovia

Ricardo Valero

Cambio político y dependencia: México en el siglo XX Cambios recientes en la política exterior mexicana. Deuda pública externa y dependencia: el caso de México. México en la estructura del comercio y la cooperación internacional de los países socialistas México y la política exterior japonesa: limites y posibilidades Derecho del mar: apuntes sobre el sistema legal mexicana Nacionalismo y la visión del mundo exterior en los niños mexicanos La política exterior en la coyuntura actual de México

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El Colegio de México, Departamento de Publicaciones Guanajuato 125, México 7, D . F .

The journal of

conflict resolution A quarterly for research related to war and peace

Douglas G . Hartle and Richard M . Bird

Alan Dowty

David Osterberg and Fouad Ajami

David A . Baldwin

December 1971 (XV, 4)

The demand for local political autonomy : an individualistic theory

Foreign-linked factionalism as a historical pattern

The multinational corporation: expanding the frontiers of world politics

Inter-nation influence revisited

Other articles; gaming section; books received

$20 per year for individuals; $18 for institutions; $5 single issues.

Published by The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The University of Michigan, A n n Arbor, Michigan 48104

Université libre de Bruxelles Institut de sociologie (fondé par Ernest Solvay)

Revue de l'Institut de sociologie

Revue trimestrielle

Science politique, économie politique, économie sociale, sociologie du travail, sociologie africaine, psychologie sociale, sociographie, etc. Chronique démographique. Note critique. Notices bibliographiques.

Numéros spéciaux

L'Université européenne

Raisonnement et démarches de l'historien

Corps médical et assurance maladie

Sociologie de la « construction nationale » dans les nouveaux États

Aperçu sociologique sur le Québec

Image de l ' h o m m e et sociologie contemporaine

Sociologie de la littérature

L'ingénieur et l'information

Le plurilinguisme

La sociologie du droit et de la justice

L'automobile dans la société

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2.» época

Director: Lie. Raúl Benitez Zenteno

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Vol. X X X I V , n.° 2, 1972

Adolfo Mir

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Rubens Vaz da Costa

Louise Pare

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Orígenes Socioeconómicos, Status de la Escuela y Aspiraciones y Expectativas Educativas y Ocupacionales de Estudiantes de Secundaria

Religión y secularización entre campesinos y obreros

El milagro económico brasileño: ¿realidad o mito?

Perú: Los militares como un agente de cambio económico

Crescimento populacional e desenvolvimento económico

Diseño teórico para el estudio del caciquismo actual en México

Suscripción anual: m n $60; U . S . $ 5 Números atrasados: m n $20; U .S .$1 .60 Números sueltos (del ano): m n $15; U.S.$1.30

United Nations Department

of Economic and Social Affairs

The international social development review

Number 4

Theme Regional socio-economic development

Contents

John W . Durston Regional socio-economic development: a conceptual framework

Brian J. L . Berry Social change as a spatial process Akin L . Mabogunje The perceptual dimension in regional economic develop

ment: two African examples Kosta Mihailovié Socio-economic aspects of interregional migrations in

Yugoslavia Rubén D . Utria Some social aspects of regional development in Latin

America Raanan Weitz Social planning in rural regional development: the Israeli

experience Phaichitr Uathavikul Integrated social and economic development planning:

national and subnational problems and policy David Barkin A case study of the beneficiaries of regional development John Friedmann The implementation of regional development policies:

lessons of experience Recent United Nations activities in the field of regional development

Selected bibliography of recent works on regional socioeconomic development

Price: U . S . $ 3 (tentative) (or equivalent in other currencies) Sales N o . : E .71 . IV.9

United Nations publications m a y be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, N e w Y o r k or Geneva .

Revue internationale de recherches et de synthèses sociologiques

L ' h o m m e et la société N ° 23, janvier-février-mars 1972

S O M M A I R E

Henri Lefebvre Norman Birnbaum Jean-Marie Vincent Sampei Koseki Michel Dion Joachim Israel IvanKuvavic

S O C I O L O G I E CRITIQUE E T C R I T I Q U E D E L A S O C I O L O G I E

Débats, études théoriques, synthèses

La re-production des rapports de production (II) La crise de la sociologie marxiste D e Hegel à Parsons Pour une sociologie critique de la quotidienneté Sur les analyses du suicide de Durkheim et Halbwachs Changement social, empirisme et science sociale critique Marxisme et fonctionnalisme

Anouar Abdel-Malek Raymond Ledrut

Serge Jonas

Jean Ziegler

Jean-Jacques Pin Serge Latouche

Guy Dhoquois Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau Lucien Steinberg

Colloques et congrès

Le momen t historique du travail théorique D e la personnalité culturelle et de ses relations avec le type culturel et le système social La révolution scientifique et technique et la fin de la civilisation européenne La mort à Gomeia-éléments d'une théorie de la mort dans les théocraties de la diaspora africaine du Brésil

Recherches

Approche sociologique du phénomène drogue Y a-t-il une économie politique marxiste?

Études critiques

Sur les modes de production : l'idéologie Sur Ossowski Les catégories en histoire

Comptes rendus; Revue des revues (Jean-Marie Vincent); Livres reçus

Le numéro :18 F. Abonnement, 1 an (4 numéros) : France, 60 F ; étranger, 70 F C C T Paris 8 721 23.

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325.18-95.

Unesco publications

it is time Malcolm S. Adiseshiah to begin the h u m a n role

in development :

some further

reflections

for the seventies

A n edited and selected version of M r Adiseshiah's statements and published studies during his last three years as Deputy Director-General of Unesco in which he outlines some of the educational and cultural tasks for the 1970s. Themes explored include : Decade for Decision; Brain Drain from the Arab World: A Signal or A Storm?; Choices for Development; Perspectives of Education; Education for Democracy in India; Frontiers.

24 X 15.5 c m 182 p.

1972 U.S.$3.50;£1.05;14F

¿mucûM REVIEW

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A quarterly journal of African politics, development and international affairs. First issue: March 1971.

Launched primarily to encourage creative reflection on certain aspects of African life, its interest lies in providing facts and ideas which may help solve significant African problems, particularly those relating to development. The editors aim to provide provocative articles analysing the social, economic and political forces shaping the future of the African continent.

Contents: of Vol. 1, No. 2

R . Emerson

H . Kjekshus

A . H . Rweyemamu

Olu Okediji and Oladejo O . Okediji R . G . Saylor and I. Livingstone

K. A . Malima

Timothy C . Niblock

D . G . Anglin

Reginald Herbold Green

Elizabeth Isichei

Nations, nationalism and the Third World

The ombudsman in the Tanzania one-party system

Some reflections on contemporary African political institutions and their capacity to generate socio-economic development

African 'brain drain' to the highly industrialized nations

Regional planning in Tanzania

International trade and economic transformation of Tanzania

Tanzania foreign policy: analysis

Zambia and the recognition ofBiafra

Review article—anatomy of two assessments: Pearson, Jackson and development partnership

Review article—African patterns of thought

Within Africa Outside Africa

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Revue française de sociologie

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Analyse de systèmes en sciences sociales

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Hayward R . Alker

Eric Trist

Michel Crozier

Bernard Cazes

Georges Lavau

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Annick Percheron

Bernard-Pierre Lécuyer et Jean Padioleau

Introduction

La théorie moderne des systèmes : un guide pour faire face aux changements

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Le comportement directeur {directive behaviour). Essai sur l'orientation que devrait prendre la formalisation dans les sciences sociales

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Sentiments, organisations et systèmes

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T o m e XIII, n° 51, juillet-septembre 1972

Développement et transformations structurelles. L'expérience de l'Afrique (1950-1970).

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L a réforme agraire chilienne : hésitations ou impasse?

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Réflexions sur la question de la production agricole en Afrique tropicale.

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Bernai lecture 1971—Science and antiscience. Preface

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Communication and the reward system of science: a study of a national 'invisible college'

S o m e aspects of science policy research

The internal structure of technology

Models and assumptions in manpower planning in science and technology

Conformity and innovation in science

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Black boxism and the sociology of science: a discussion of the major developments in the field

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International review of administrative

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Management of resources and the environment: A problem in administrative coordination Problems of the history of public administration *

District agencies of government departments in Ceylon Informatics and secrecy in public administration * Water management in West Pakistan: Case history in organizational change S o m e institutional aspects of the Mekong Basin Development Committee The h u m a n factor in organizations *

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QUADERNI DI SOCIOLOGÍA

N . 2 - 1971

DOCUMENTAZIONI E RICERCHE

B . Maggi II comportamento para-assenteistico in una fabbrica metallurgica

M . Boffi, S . Cofini, Razionalizzazione urbanística e popolazione in due A . Giasanti, E . Mingione quartieri di Milano

NOTE CRITICHE

P . Braghin L a distribuzione dei redditi e la diseguaglianza sociale

A . Daolio L a sociología urbana di Jiri Musil

Schede

Panorama delle riviste

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S W I T Z E R L A N D : Europa Verlag, Rámistrasse 5, Z Ü R I C H ; Librairie Payot, 6, rue Grenus, 1211, G E N È V E

S Y R I A : Librairie Sayegh, Immeuble Diab, rue du Parlement, B.P. 704, D A M A S .

T A N Z A N I A : Dar es Salaam Bookshop, P . O . Box 9030, D A R ES S A L A A M .

T H A I L A N D : Suksapan Panit, Mansion 9, Rajdamnern Avenue, B A N G K O K .

T O G O : Librairie évangélique, B.P. 378, L O M E ; Librairie du Bon Pasteur, B.P. 1164, L O M É ; Librairie moderne, B.P. 777, L O M É .

TUNISIA: Société tunisienne de diffusion, 5, avenue de Carthage, T U N I S .

T U R K E Y : Librairie Hachette, 469 Istiklal Caddesi, Beyoglu, ISTANBUL.

U G A N D A : Uganda Bookshop, P . O . Box 145, K A M P A L A . U N I T E D K I N G D O M : H . M . Stationery Office, P . O .

Box 569, L O N D O N S.E.I 9NH.Government bookshops : London, Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Manchester.

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A : Unesco Publications Center P . O . Box 433, N E W Y O R K , N . Y . 10016.

U P P E R V O L T A : Librairie Attie, B.P. 64, O U A G A D O U G O U ; Librairie catholique 'Jeunesse d'Afrique', O U A G A D O U G O U .

U R U G U A Y : Editorial Losada Uruguaya, S.A. Librería Losada, Maldonado 1902/Colonia 1340, M O N T E V I D E O .

U .S .S .R. : Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga, M O S K W A G-200. V E N E Z U E L A : Librería Historia, Monjas a Padre

Sierra, Edificio Oeste 2, n.° 6 (frente al Capitolio), apartado de correos 7320-101, C A R A C A S .

V I E T - N A M (REPUBLIC O F ) : Librairie-papeterie Xuan-Thu, 185-193, rue T u - D o , B .P . 283, S A I G O N .

Y U G O S L A V I A : Jugoslovenska Knjiga, Terazije 27, B E O G R A D ; Drzavna Zaluzba Slovenije, Mestni Trg 26, L J U B L J A N A .

R E P U B L I C O F Z A I R E : La Librairie, Institut politique congolais, B.P. 2307, K I N S H A S A ; Commission nationale de la République du Zaïre pour l'Unesco, Ministère de l'éducation nationale, K I N S H A S A .

UNESCO B O O K COUPONS Unesco Book Coupons can be used to purchase all books and periodicals of an educational, scientific or cultural character. For full information please write to: Unesco Coupon Office, Place de Fontenoy, 75 Paris-7*, France. [73]

Past topics1

F r o m 1949 to the end of 1958, this Journal appeared under the n a m e of International Social Science Bulletin, not all issues of which were devoted to a main topic.

Microfilms and microcards are available from University Microfilms Inc., 300 N . Zeeb Road, A n n Arbor, Michigan 48106 (United States of America). Reprint series are available from Kraus Reprint Corporation, 16 East 46th Street, N e w York, N . Y . (United States of America).

Vol. XI, 1959

N o . 1. Social aspects of mental health* N o . 2. Teaching of the social sciences

in the U.S .S .R .* N o . 3. The study and practice of

planning* N o . 4. Nomads and nomadism

in the arid zone*

'Vol. XII, I960

N o . 1. Citizen participation in political life*

N o . 2. The social sciences and peaceful co-operation*

N o . 3. Technical change and political decision*

N o . 4. Sociological aspects of leisure*

Vol. XIII, 1961

N o . 1. Post-war democratization in Japan*

N o . 2. Recent research on racial relations

N o . 3. The Yugoslav commune N o . 4. The parliamentary profession

Vol. XIV, 1962

N o . 1. Images of w o m e n in society* N o . 2. Communication and

information N o . 3. Changes in the family* N o . 4. Economics of education*

Vol. XV, 1963

N o . 1. Opinion surveys in developing countries

N o . 2. Compromise and conflict resolution

N o . 3. Old age N o . 4. Sociology of development

in Latin America

Vol. XVI, 1964

N o . 1. Data in comparative research*

N o . 2. Leadership and economic growth

N o . 3. Social aspects of African resource development

N o . 4. Problems of surveying the social sciences and humanities

Vol. XVII, 1965

N o . 1. M a x Weber today/Biological aspects of race*

N o . 2. Population studies N o . 3. Peace research* N o . 4. History and social science

Vol. XVIII, 1966

N o . 1. H u m a n rights in perspective* N o . 2. Modern methods in

criminology* N o . 3. Science and technology

as development factors* N o . 4. Social science in physical

planning*

Vol. XIX, 1967

N o . 1. Linguistics and communication*

1. T h e asterisk denotes issues out of print.