ethics and hr

ABSTRACT. This paper reviews and develops theethical analysis of human resource management(HRM). Initially, the ethical perspective of HRM isdifferentiated from the “mainstream” and criticalperspectives of HRM. To date, the ethical analysis ofHRM has taken one of two forms: the applicationKantian and utilitarian ethical theories to the gestaltof HRM, and the application of theories of justiceand fairness to specific HRM practices. This paper isconcerned with the former, the ethical analysis ofHRM in its entirety. It shows that numeroustheoretical shortcomings exist, least of which is thedisregard of stakeholder theory. These deficiencies areexplored and, as such, the analysis is advanced. It isargued that such ethical analysis is outside the scopeof the modern corporation. A third way in whichethics may be applied to HRM is suggested. Ethicalconcerns are used as a basis to develop minimumstandards against which HRM, in its various guisesand practice, may be evaluated. Yet, even whenjudged by these standards, HRM is seriously lacking.This begs the question, not of whether HRM isethical, but of whether HRM can be ethical.

KEY WORDS: ethical analysis, ethics, humanresource management, Kantian ethics, stakeholdertheory, utilitarianism

Introduction

Human resource management (HRM) involvesthe effective management of people to achieveorganisational goals. The word “management” inthis context is a euphemism for “use”. Indeed,HRM is commonly defined as the “productiveuse of people in achieving the organisation’sstrategic business objectives and the satisfactionof individual employee needs” (Stone, 1998, p.4). Whether HRM is “hard” or “soft”, or somecombination of the two, it is only the nature andextent of this “use” which varies. HRM implic-itly accepts such “use”. This raises a number ofethical concerns. On the face of it, HRMviolates any number of ethical proscriptionsagainst using people. To call a person a resourceis already to tread dangerously close to placingthat human in the same category with officefurniture and computers. It is also hazardous tojustify HRM on the basis that it maximisespositive outcomes for those affected. Who is tosay what is good and who should be included?

A developing literature on the ethical dimen-sions of HRM has begun to examine these issues.There are, however a number of gaps in theethical analysis of HRM to date. Firstly, theassumptions underlying ethical theories are notmade explicit. Even to begin to apply ethicalstances to HRM is to make significant assump-tions about the purpose of the organisation, theroles and responsibilities of managers, and therights and obligations of employees (and otherstakeholders). Most ethical analysis, at the veryleast, assumes that employers have positive moralobligations towards their employees. Secondly,the treatment of ethical theory is at times overlysimplistic. Both the application of Kantianism

Ethics and HRM:A Review andConceptual Analysis

Michelle R. Greenwood

Journal of Business Ethics 36: 261–278, 2002.© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Michelle Greenwood teaches and researches in managementethics and corporate social responsibility in theDepartment of Management, Monash University,Australia. Her research interests include stakeholdertheory, social auditing and ethical issues in HRM. Shehas published in several international journals.

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and utilitarianism (see Legge, 1996; Legge, 1998)needs much greater attention. Related to thesetwo points is the third problem, the fact that therole of stakeholder theory in this debate has beenoverlooked. Stakeholder theory represents asignificant part of the debate in business ethicsand has many obvious connections to HRM.Finally, there is the concern that although thisanalysis may be of theoretical interest, it does notnecessarily assist in understanding how individ-uals or organisations make ethical assessments.Discourse involving ethical theory is of a toocomplex and impractical nature for managers(Rowan, 2000).

This paper seeks to further ethical analysis ofHRM. The first section identifies and examinestheoretical perspectives of HRM, considering thepervasiveness of the “mainstream” paradigm ofHRM, the substance of the alternative criticalperspective and the development of an ethicalperspective. The next section seeks to furtherthe ethical analysis of HRM by examining thedeficiencies in the existing literature in the area.Finally HRM in its various guises and practicesis examined and evaluated against a set ofminimal criteria. It is concluded that HRM isethically deficient.

Perspectives of HRM

A “mainstream” perspective of HRM

The existence of a “mainstream” perspective ofHRM, though rarely acknowledged, has beenalluded to recently by several authors (Kamocheand Mueller, 1998; Warren, 2000). It is con-tended in this discussion that there is a commonparadigm that is pervasive throughout researchand practice in HRM. The features of thismainstream viewpoint are that it tends to be U.S.based (Legge, 2000) and practitioner focused, itscontent is prescriptive and often relies on naïvegeneralisations that assume the value of HRM.Much of the writing has been concerned witheither the offer of practical advice or thepresentation of empirical data (Wright andMcMahan, 1992). It takes a systems maintenanceor functionalist approach, viewing HRM as amechanism for the attainment of organisationalgoals, and thus reflects concerns with improve-ment in efficiency that derive from classicalmanagement theory (Townley, 1993). It alsotends to assume an individualistic (focuses in theindividual employee as a unit) and unitarist(assumes singularity of purpose and goals) per-spective of the employment relationship (seeFigure 1).

262 Michelle R. Greenwood

Figure 1. Characteristics of HRM paradigms.

MAINSTREAM HRM CRITICAL HRM

U.S. based U.K. based

Individualist Collectivist

Unitarist Pluralist

Prescriptive Analytic

Practitioner oriented Academic oriented

Empirical investigation Conceptual investigation

Postivist methodology Social constructivist methodology(quantitative large scale data analysis) (in depth case analysis)

HRM as a valuable tool HRM as a control device

Reinforces power inequities Questions power inequities

The values and practices of this mainstreamview of HRM developed within the individual-istic enterprise ideology of the 1980’s andcontinue to reflect this ideological climate. Thisperspective continues to be dominant and per-vasive. There are a number of reasons for thismanagerialist orientation of HRM. Firstly, thereis the strategic focus of HRM. The link betweenstrategy and HRM developed from a need toestablish importance and distinctiveness for whatwas then a new discipline in the 1980’s. Oneimplication of this focus is that HRM is primarilyconcerned with those who determine andimplement strategy, namely senior managers(Clark et al., 1998). Secondly, in countries likethe U.K., Australia and New Zealand, a shiftfrom centralised, union negotiated, award-basedindustrial relations to enterprise based individualemployment agreements has resulted in a signif-icant change in the employment relationship(Moorhead et al., 1997). Managers now havegreater control over employment relations,employees are more likely to be employed onstaff (or to be on contract), and there is lesslikelihood of a union involved as a third party.The result is a more individualistic and unitaristenvironment. Thirdly, there is the significantinfluence of popular management writers andtheories. Books written by Peters and Waterman(1982) and Covey (1989) have sold in themillions and often reached best-seller lists. Thesewriters present simple, prescriptive, “new” waysof organising and communicating which will(supposedly) bring about more effective andsuccessful individuals and organisations.Influential and prolific HRM academics presenta quasi-empirical literature which parallels thework of the popular writers (see for exampleUlrich, 1998; Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999). This givesrise to the final point, that positivism is thedominant epistemological approach in HRM(Legge, 1995). Positivism “seeks to explain andpredict what happens in the social world bysearching for regularities and causal relationshipsbetween its constituent elements” (Legge, 1995,p. 308). The sorts of questions asked in HRMresearch tend to reinforce the status quo ratherthan question it.

Wright and McMahan (1992) express concern

regarding the lack of a theoretical framework inHRM. Kamoche and Mueller (1998) find the“apparent reluctance of many HR scholars,practitioners, and consultants to acknowledge therationale underpinning of the practice of HRM”to be “remarkable”. Alvesson and Willmott(1996) speak of a silence about issues such asinequality, conflict, domination and subordina-tion, and manipulation within both orthodox andmore progressive accounts of management andorganisational theory. At the very least, theproblem with “how-to” models of HRM is that,without theoretical underpinning, guidelinesalone can be ambiguous. Rules without reasonscan be interpreted and applied in a variety ofways. Wright and McMahan (Wright andMcMahan, 1992) argue that a strong theoreticalmodel is of great value to both researchers andpractitioners. For practitioners a cogent theoret-ical model will provide better predictions forbetter decision making. For researchers strongtheoretical models provide greater depth andunderstanding, and thus potential for furtherdevelopment in the discipline.

The work of Wright and McMahan (1992)and Jackson and Schuler (1995) advances “main-stream” quality HRM beyond the “how-to”atheoretical stance. They present theoreticalmodels of strategic HRM drawn from macro-level organisational theory, finance and eco-nomics. Several of these (resource-basedapproach, behavioural approach, human capitaltheory, general systems theory and agency/trans-action costs model) explain HRM in strategicand rational terms. The focus of these theoriesis efficiency. These models both assume andexplain organisational control of employees inorder to achieve strategic goals. Other theories,in contrast, focus on the relationship between anorganisation and its constituencies and, thus, oninstrumental and political determinants of HRMpractices. Institutional theory sees organisationsas social entities which conform to attain legiti-macy, whilst resource dependence/power modesuggests that organisations and groups gain powerover each other by controlling valued resources.Both these theories emphasise the irrational anddysfunctional characteristics of HRM and,thereby, challenge the centrality of efficiency.

Ethics and HRM 263

The political perspective of HRM assumes thatunwritten, informal activities have consequen-tial effects on the design and implementation ofHRM (Ferris et al., 1999). It is these “main-stream” theories which come closest toquestioning or being critical of the philosophyand practice of HRM. Jackson and Schuler(1995, p. 252), however, note that “availabletheories are inadequate . . . each deals withpieces of the larger phenomenon none addressesthe whole domain of HRM in context.”Nevertheless, in their opinion, research driven byincomplete theory is better than research drivenby no theory at all.

The critical view of HRM – an alternative perspective

A greater degree of critique of HRM has mostlyarisen from U.K. authors writing from a “criticalperspective” (Legge, 1996; Guest, 1997).Development of an alternative and critical per-spective of HRM was inevitable and necessaryfor the evolvement of the field. Writers from thedisciplines of sociology, political economy andlabour relations have distinct and importantperspectives on the workplace. In general, thecritical perspective sees HRM as rhetorical andmanipulative, and thus, as a tool of managementto control the workers (see Figure 1). Ratherthan being a way for employees to fully developand contribute in organisation, HRM practicesare a way of intervening in an employee’s life inorder to get employees to sacrifice more of them-selves to the needs of the organisation. HRM isaccused of redefining the meaning of work andthe organisation-employee relationship in orderto gain the acceptance of such intolerable actions.HRM was cleverly depicted by Keenoy as “asheep in wolf ’s clothing” as early as 1990 (as citedin Legge, 1995). Storey (Guest, 1987; Guest,1999) distinguished “soft” people-focused HRMfrom “hard” production-focused policies andpractices.1 Many sceptical commentators havesuggested that “soft HRM” is just a “hardHRM” in disguise.

Several theorists identify mainstream HRM’semployment of an unitarist framework (Guest,

1987; Kamoche, 1994; Legge, 1995). Kamoche(1994) identifies a revival of unitarist ethos of theorganisation, in order to achieve congruence ofpurpose within the organisation. He claims thatthe ideology of unitarism is being used to controlany divergence of interest between managers andsubordinates in order to achieve economic goals.In contrast to “mainstream” writers, “critical”theorists tend to assume a pluralist (multiplepurposes and goals) and collectivist (employees asa group or groups) nature to the workplace (seeFigure 1). They assume that the various partiesinvolved in the workplace have differing views,and thus potentially, goals. This view of theworkplace resonates with the stakeholder per-spective of the organisation which will bediscussed later.

In a significant example of this type of analysisTownley (1993) presents an interpretation ofHRM based on the work of Michel Foucault.She argues that HRM techniques are a means ofmeasuring and evaluating individuals in order torender them calculable and therefore manageable.Individuals can be “known” through the twoprocesses of examination and confession.Examination is a method of observing in orderto measure, rank and classify. External featuressuch as skill, performance, behaviour arecommonly measured in the workplace.Increasingly, the internal dimensions of theindividual such as attitudes and sentiments arealso being objectified. An individual’s confessionor exposure of self-knowledge allows for them tobe “known” in two ways. The technique ofconfession is identifiable in survey and applica-tion blanks and, particularly, in performanceappraisals. Firstly, the confession requires that theindividual breaks the bounds of discretion andsecondly, the confession produces informationthat becomes part of the individual’s self-under-standing. Thus, HRM practices function toconstitute the individual in a particular manner(Townley, 1993). According to Townley (1993,p. 538), HRM practices are

examples of procedures that constitute the subjectwith varying degrees in individual engagement andparticipation. There is the inculcation of requiredhabits, rules, and behaviour and socially con-structed definitions of the norm. However, the


status of the individual, that is, the individual’s rightto be different and everything that makes theindividual truly individual tends to get lost in theprocess.

Sennett (1999) also targets particular aspectsof the modern corporation. He describes a“chameleon” organisation. Its form is a networkof semi-autonomous teams in constant flux.Workers are added or shed in response to marketdemand. Power is centralised in an elite tech-nical-managerial class. The inner managementcore gives orders to isolated cells or teams whoare told what to achieve not how to achieve it.The people in power do not witness what theycommand. Labour is seen as purely contractual.There is no commitment, no dependence. And,there is no social cohesion. Such an organisationno longer carries on the pretence of “soft”HRM.

An ethical view of HRM – a developing perspective

The introduction of ethical theory and stake-holder theory in the discussion of HRM is afairly rare and nascent occurrence. Whilst theaforementioned writers ruthlessly expose HRMpractices as objectifying individuals (Townley,1993), as suppressing resistance and confrontation(Sennett, 1999), in short, as manipulatingemployees, they take a critical rather than anormative stance. Questions such as “is this rightor wrong” or “how should organisations behave”do not seem to be addressed by HRMresearchers. The fact that the way employees aremanaged may invite ethical scrutiny appears tohave been overlooked (Winstanley and Woodall,2000). In their lengthy review of 80 years ofHRM science and practice Ferris et al. (1999)identify the issue of justice and HRM as aninteresting and potentially important direction forfuture work in HRM. The focus of the researchcited in this review is at the micro-level ofprocedural fairness of selection, performanceevaluation and compensation systems. Broaderethical issues are ignored, or mentioned inpassing, when they are arguably central to thediscussion. This is illustrated in the discussion of

accountability and HRM where the authors note“the presence of multiple audiences”, “account-ability perceptions” and the “moderating effectsof context and personality differences” (Ferris etal., 1999, pp. 402–403) yet fail to introducetheories of ethical development, corporate socialresponsibility or stakeholder management. Suchtheories can offer insight into HRM which isdifferent from, yet equally important to, othertheories of the organisation. It is this area whichwill be the focus of the remainder of thisdiscussion.

To date only a few theorists have attemptedto apply ethical theory to directly to HRM.Legge (1996, for example) uses both teleolog-ical (consequentialist) and deontological (non-consequentialist) ethical theories to evaluate“hard” and “soft” HRM. She arrives at thepredictable conclusion that the outcome of anyevaluation of a particular form of HRM willdepend upon which ethical principles areapplied. In contrast, Miller (1996) provides amicro-level analysis of HRM systems, proceduresand outcomes based on a framework of proce-dural justice. He argues ethical HRM can beachieved by applying principles of fairness andequality. He concludes that ethical or “good”HRM depends on good employment conditions,which in turn depends on good organisationalstrategy. This conclusion would come as nosurprise to many HRM researchers or practi-tioners. If high ethics are too philosophic andunattainable, and mainstream “how-to”s are tooscripted and atheoretical, then what form ofcritique do we need?

A perceived need to be more practitionerfocussed has led Winstanley, Woodall and Heery(1996a) to reconceive these ethical theories inmore user-friendly ethical frameworks for HRM(see Figure 2). Rowan (2000) also offersmanagers a set of more user-friendly guidelinesfor the moral foundation of employees rights (seeFigure 2). Whilst these frameworks are lessabstract and more accessible than the doctrinesof philosophic ethics employed by Legge (1996),they still represent a set of ideals to which indi-viduals and organisations may aspire. They stillimply that businesses have affirmative obligationsto society.

Ethics and HRM 265

Debate in the ethics of HRM has tended toextremes: either the macro-level (is the totalityof HR “ethical”?) or the micro-level (is theindividual HR practice “ethical”?) (Winstanleyand Woodall, 2000). At the micro-end of thescale, the ethical assessment of individual prac-tices has limited value. HRM research has movedwell beyond the exploration of individual prac-tices (see for example Guest, 1997). Mere listsof employees’ rights can be ambiguous and, assuch, open to a variety of interpretations andapplications (Rowan, 2000). At the macro end ofthe scale, an attempt has been made to drawethical theory into HRM theory. This analysisis at an early stage, has many gaps and requiressignificant development.

Firstly, the assumptions underlying the accep-tance of these ethical theories are not madeexplicit. Even to begin to apply these ethicalstances to HRM is to make significant assump-tions about the purpose of the organisation, theroles and responsibilities of managers, and therights and obligations of employees (and otherstakeholders). Most ethical analysis, at the veryleast, assumes that employers have positive moralobligations towards their employees. Secondly,the treatment of ethical theory is at times overlysimplistic. Both the application of utilitarianism2

and Kantianism3 needs much greater attention.Related to these two points is the third problem,the fact that the role of stakeholder theory in this

debate has been overlooked. Stakeholder theoryrepresents a significant part of the debate inbusiness ethics and has many obvious connectionsto HRM. Finally, there is the concern thatalthough this analysis may be of theoreticalinterest, it does not necessarily assist in under-standing how individuals or organisations makeethical assessments (Rowan, 2000). Discourseinvolving ethical theory is of a too complex andimpractical nature for managers (Rowan, 2000).This paper will attempt to address theseinadequacies in the ethical analysis of HRM todate.

Furthering ethical analysis

Assumptions of affirmative obligation

The significance of the acceptance of affirmativemoral obligation of business cannot be underes-timated. In the context of this discussion, theaffirmative or positive obligation of a corpora-tion is taken to mean the organisation’s respon-sibility to take action to promote the “good” foremployees (and other non-owner stakeholders).It must be understood that classic economic con-structs of the firm assume the complete oppositestance – that business has no responsibilitybeyond that of making profit for its shareholders(Friedman, 1970). To argue that business


Practitioner focused ethical theories Moral foundations of employee rights(Winstanley, Woodall and Heery, 1996a) (adapted from Rowan, 2000)

1. Basic human, civil and employment rights, 1. Fair pay based on concepts of equity,e.g. job security, feedback from tests, openess distributive justice, autonomy, respect.and consultation over matters which affect us. 2. Safety in the workplace based on the principles

2. Social and organisational justice, e.g. of avoiding harm and respect.proceduraljustice, egalitarianism, equity, 3. Due process in the workplace based on equal opportunity. concepts of respect, fairness and

3. Universalism, e.g. Kantian principle of an honesty.individual right not to be treated as a means 4. Privacy based on concepts of respect,toan end. freedom and autonomy.

4. Community of purpose, e.g. social contract of theorganisation, shareholder view of the firm.

Figure 2. User-friendly ethical models for HRM.

organisations have affirmative obligations tosociety has far reaching implications (Beauchampand Bowie, 1993): Firstly, there is the concernthat the obligations of the corporation to do“good” can be expanded without limit. Secondly,that the injunction to take social responsibilitiesinto account and to assist in solving socialproblems may make impossible demands upon acorporation. Thirdly, that any such injunctionignores the impact that such activities may haveon profit. And finally, there is the question ofwho is going to define the social problems anddetermine which has priority. Friedman (1970)went as far as call the principle of social respon-sibility a “fundamentally subversive doctrine” ina free society.

The middle ground in this debate is occupiedby concepts of the “moral minimum”. Thisstance is distinguished by the denial of obligationfor businesses to undertake affirmative duties.Simon, Powers and Gunnemann (1993), forexample, maintain that all individuals and socialinstitutions ought to adhere to certain moralstandards, but that these are negative injunctions.There is a difference between requiring theorganisation to cause no harm and requiring itto actively promote the good. The precept thatthere is a minimum standard of behaviourexpected of business by society was evenacknowledged by Milton Friedman (1970) in hismanifesto of the narrow view of corporate socialresponsibility. He wrote that business in itspursuit of profit must “stay within the rules ofthe game, which is to say, engage in open andfree competition without deception or fraud”.

At the other end of the spectrum are ethicalframeworks and models that assume positiveobligation. These include utilitarianism andstakeholder theory.

The role of stakeholder theory

Stakeholder theory is conspicuously absent frommany discussions regarding the theoretical under-pinning of HRM (see Wright and McMahan,1992; Jackson and Schuler, 1995; Ferris et al.,1999). This is despite the fact that the belief thatemployees are legitimate stakeholders in the

organisation is often taken for granted eitherexplicitly or implicitly (see for example Handy,1991; Legge, 1998). The stakeholder concept hasgrown in prominence over recent years due toincreased coverage in the media, public interestand concern about corporate governance, and itsadoption by “third-way” politics (Metcalfe,1998). The examination of practices at the levelof social transactions and interactions betweenorganisational members (managers, employeesand other stakeholders) could help bridge the gapbetween academic theory and practice (Corneliusand Gagnon, 1999). The stakeholder perspectiveis in keeping with a pluralist view of employmentrelations which assumes that there are distinctgroups with their own valid needs and interestswith respect to the organisation. Credit is dueto Winstanley and Woodall (2000) for recentlybeginning a dialogue on the employee as a stake-holder.

The stakeholder theory of the corporation, asdeveloped by Freeman (1984), is characterised bythe notion that managers have a duty to attendto all those who have a stake in or claim on theorganisation. This contrasts with the classic view(sometimes called shareholder value theory) thatmanagers bear a special relationship with theowners of the organisation (see for exampleFriedman, 1970; Rappaport, 1986). The obviousquestions raised by the stakeholder view are; whois a legitimate stakeholder, and, what is the natureof the stakeholder relationship? These issues havebeen addressed somewhat in the literature withsome pattern developing in the responses (for amore detailed discussion see Mitchell et al., 1997;Greenwood, 2001).

Generally, stakeholders may be seen in one oftwo manners: instrumental or functional; ornormative. It was noted by Goodpaster (1991)that stakeholders may be considered in a mannerthat has nothing to do with ethics. A companymight analyse its action in order to take intoaccount any positive and negative effects onstakeholder for no other reason than thatoffended stakeholders might resist and retaliate.Just as a company has the potential to affect itsstakeholders, the stakeholders have the capacityto affect the company. It is the stakeholders’capacity to affect the company positively and

Ethics and HRM 267

negatively (especially) through political or marketmechanisms that is of concern to the company.“Hard” HRM, where employees are viewedinstrumentally as a means to achieve organisa-tional goals, is in line with this strategic consid-eration of stakeholders. However “soft” HRMpractices are not always without strategic intent.According to Ojeifo and Winstaley (cited inWinstanley and Woodall, 2000, pp. 13–14):

it is too easy for approaches to involvement basedon stakeholding to be used manipulatively andduplicitously by employers anxious to bindemployees into a rhetorics of excellence and enter-prise, for example where employee empowermentis introduced for cost-cutting reasons but promotedon the basis of its involvement of staff in decisionmaking.

This, of course, has significant implications for“soft” HRM.

On the other hand, stakeholders may beconsidered from an ethical perspective apart fromtheir instrumental, economic or legal potentialto affect the organisation. Under this moral viewof the stakeholder, the care of the interest ofvarious stakeholders may involve a trading off ofthe economic advantage of the shareholdersagainst the interest of others. The primacy of themanager’s relationship with the shareholder is nolonger assumed and is replaced with the notionthat the managers must act in the interests of theall stakeholders in the organisation (Evan andFreeman, 1988). Stakeholder theory is cast as aform of Kantian capitalism (i.e. based on theprinciple that no individual should be usedmerely as a means to an end). “Soft” HRM,which suggests that the employee be seen as morethan instrumental, is more in line with the moralaccount of stakeholders. In organisational terms,each of the stakeholder groups has a right to notbe treated merely as a means to some end, andtherefore must participate in determining thefuture direction of the firm in which they havea stake. It is, therefore, the company’s potentialto affect the stakeholder that is of concern. Sucha view of the organisation, its purpose andresponsibilities, is quite revolutionary, or asFriedman (1970) would say, subversive. It impliesa reconceptualisation of capitalism.

The notion that the instrumental and norma-tive view of the stakeholder may not necessarilybe divergent theoretical positions has beendebated in the literature at length. Some writerssuggest that neither approach is complete withoutthe other, and as such any theory needs to incor-porate both views (Donaldson, 1999; Jones andWicks, 1999). Jones and Wick (1999) proposethe development of a normatively and instru-mentally convergent stakeholder theory. Otherwriters disagree suggesting that there are funda-mental flaws in the idea of convergence(Freeman, 1999; Trevino and Weaver, 1999).Whether or not a distinction should be drawnbetween the two in theory, in practice instru-mental and normative stakeholder approachesoften converge. This is reflected in the old adagethat good ethics is good for business (Lagan,2000). The two stakeholder perspectives exist asdiscrete phenomena only in as much as they areideal types. This is also the case for the “soft”and “hard” models of HRM. The soft-harddichotomy has been well established in norma-tive models of HRM, and this distinction needsto be taken into account in conceptualisationsof HRM (Truss et al., 1997). However, a studyby Truss et al. (1997) showed that no pureexample of either form of HRM existed. Legge(1995) notes that most normative statements ofHRM contain elements of both “soft” and“hard” models.

Kantian ethics

According to Kant (1964, p. 96), one must “actin such a way that you always treat humanity,whether in your own person or in the person ofanother, never simply as a means, but always atthe same time.” It should be noted that thisdictum demands that we never treat peopleentirely as a means rather than that we never treatpeople as a means. Treating people simply as ameans is to regard them as something we use forour own purposes without their full and freeconsents. Rawls (1972, p. 83) also holds thatpeople are “self-originating sources of validclaims” and that they matter from a moral pointof view because they are “ends in themselves”.


Rawlsian social justice can only be achievedthrough social contracts and the existence ofinstitutions to support such contracts. Theviolation of the ethical rights of individuals, whohave entered such a contract, gives rise to thenecessity for external monitoring and enforce-ment of rights. Effectively, this is the moralargument used to justify “soft” HRM. Where themarket mechanism has failed to safeguardindividual rights (as is the case with “hard”HRM), corporations intervene ostensibly toprmote the rights of employees (hence “soft”HRM).

To treat a person as end-in-themselves is toprovide them with some of the end-thingsneeded for their sustenance and well-being.Proponents who claim that “soft” HRM treatsemployees as a subject-in-themselves, base thisclaim primarily on the provision of meaningfulwork. Indeed, Bowie (1998) argues that, from aKantian perspective, one of the moral obligationsof a firm is provision of meaningful work foremployees. Meaningful work, according toBowie (1998, p. 1087) is:

work that is freely entered into, that provides awage sufficient for physical welfare, that supportsthe moral development of employees and that isnot paternalistic in the sense of interfering withthe worker’s conception of how she wishes toobtain happiness.

This is a high set of standards for an organisa-tion to achieve. Many would claim that they doso, or attempt to do so, through the implemen-tation of “best (HRM) practice”. Such practicesinclude as participation and empowerment,training and skill development and teams devel-opment.

Critical theorists, however, view these prac-tices differently. Absence of clear lines ofauthority, for example, encourages greater con-tribution and cross-skilling but also frees man-agement to shift and adapt and rationalisewithout needing to justify their actions (Sennett,1998; Warren, 2000). Team working encouragesemployee involvement and sharing but also allowsthe avoidance of managerial responsibility andsuppresses resistance and confrontation (Sennett,1998). From this perspective, “best practice”

HRM in no way offers employees the respect andautonomy necessary to be treated as subjects-in-themselves.

Understanding utilitarianism

A great deal of utilitarian thinking is present in theway which business justifies itself. . . . Business andany other practical activity must pay attention toresults to remain viable and to remain ethical.(Grace and Cohen, 1998, p. 12)

Utilitarianism offers the criterion of producingthe greatest good for the greatest number ofpeople. Under this measure both the “soft” and“hard” types of HRM can be judged as ethical.Legge (1996, p. 35) proffers this as a relief:“Happily, utilitarianism sends a far more reas-suring message”. Such analysis, however, isincomplete. Utilitarianism is commonly misun-derstood as being nothing more than a minimalistor managerialist argument in support of the“business case”. It is true that utilitarianism hasbeen used to support the classical view or share-holder model by evoking the argument, knownas the “invisible hand” doctrine, that, if left toits own devices, a market driven economy willproduce greatest good for the greatest number(Evan and Freeman, 1988). Utilitarianism cannot,however, be used to justify the business actingin self-interest to maximise its own utility,4 thatis, to support the “business case”. As a corollary,utilitarianism can also be used to support the casefor the opposing view – the stakeholder model.Stakeholder theory is founded on the principlesthat “the corporation and its managers areresponsible for the effects of their actions onothers”, and that “the corporation should bemanaged for the benefit of its stakeholders”, thatis, those who affect or can be affected by thecorporation (Evan and Freeman, 1988, pp. 79and 82).

HRM policies and practices, therefore, canonly be viewed as ethical using the criteria ofutilitarianism on the condition that it can provedtheir outcome is indeed the maximisation ofutility for those affected. It is at this point thatboth utilitarianism and HRM reach some majorobstacles. There are three significant problems:

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the problem of identifying outcomes, thequestion of who is affected, and issue of deter-mining the interests of others.

Firstly, how can the outcome of a particularHRM practice, or “bundle” of practices, be“proved”? This would require the demonstrationof causal relationships between constituentelements. The link between HRM and organi-sational outcome is the focus of much HRMresearch. As previously noted, many mainstreamwriters suggest that there is HRM “best practice”that can be universally applied for organisationalsuccess (e.g. Wood, 1995; Huselid, 1995, as citedin Purcell, 1999). In contrast, other writersquestion both the methods and the findings ofmuch of this research (Purcell, 1999; Becker andGerhart, 1996). Guest (1999) suggests that anyanalysis of influences on company profits orfactory outputs or even absence levels quicklyleads to the conclusion that factors other thanHRM are involved. Purcell (1999) identifies anumber of significant problems with large-scalequantitative analysis that could potentially resultin unreliable data. Becker and Gerhart (1996) alsosuggest that the use of large numbers of firms inorder to test the relationship between HR andfirm performance provides little insight into theprocess involved. They describe a “black box”5

of intervening variables between a firm’s HRsystem and the firm’s bottom line which mustbe investigated and tested with more completemodels. Without such knowledge it is difficult toexplain how HR influences firm performanceand to rule out alternative explanations such asreverse causation. As an example, Becker andGerhart note that the fact that profit sharing isoften correlated with higher profits can be inter-preted in at least two ways: profit sharing causeshigher profits, or firms with higher profits aremore likely to implement profit sharing. Theysuggest that studies within a single industry orcompany, case studies of single firms or plantsprovide a clearer, if more narrow picture of theprocess of HRM. They call for deeper qualita-tive research to complement the large-scalemultiple firm studies.

Secondly, there is the issue of whose interestsare at stake. According to stakeholder theory,corporations have stakeholders who are individ-

uals or groups who benefit from or are harmedby corporate actions (Evan and Freeman, 1988).However, according to Mitchell et al. (1997),stakeholder theory “offers a maddening varietyof signals on how questions of stakeholderidentity might be answered”. From a utilitarianperspective “everyone” would mean the set of allpeople (or even sentient beings) that affected interms of utility. In considering the outcomes ofHRM it seems natural to consider outcomes forthe organisation (commonly interpreted as valuefor shareholders) and outcomes for the employeethemselves. But what about the managers? Weare strongly encouraged by Willmott (1997) tosee the manager as more than an agent ofcapitalist priorities, but as human subjects, whoalso are sellers of labour and targets of control.In terms of stakeholder theory, managers have thepotential to be stakeholders in the organisation,as do customers, suppliers, and community. Thenthere are competitors, government, the environ-ment, and future generations. Most writers agreethat such individuals and groups potentially allcan have a stake in the company (Mitchell et al.,1997). It is the existence and nature of the stake,however, that is in dispute.

There is also the question of whether thoseaffected have equivalent interests. The doctrineof utilitarianism does not allow a moral agent todifferentiate between the claims of intimates ordependents and those of independents (Petit,1991). Rawls (1972) is highly critical of thisprinciple on the grounds that it denies any dis-tinction amongst persons.

In addition, there is the striking feature of theprinciple of utility that it does not matter howthe sum of benefits is distributed among indi-viduals. Thus, there is no reason in principle whythe greater gains of some should not compen-sate for the lesser losses of others. According toRawls (1972), this doctrine is irrational becauseit is in total contradiction with the fact that inindividual liberties are fundamental to a justsociety. Indeed, individual rights are entrenchedin law and unable to be traded off against thegreater needs of society. Acceptance of thisargument undermines the utilitarian justificationof many HRM policies and practices. Forexample, in recent years, most industrialised


countries have seen a spate of factory closuresor company downsizing. Moreover, the businesscommunity now considers downsizing normalpractice at large (Orlando, 1999). The empiricalresearch on the effects on retrenched employeesof downsizing shows that these individuals suffergreatly (Orlando, 1999). Yet, these actions arejustified by being, not only in the interests of theowners, but of society as a whole (more com-petitive industry, cheaper goods, etc.). Such anethical justification, which fails to recognise,whatsoever, the rights of others as a constrainton action may be seen as fundamentally flawed.

Finally, how do we know what is in people’sbest interests? We can make certain assumptions,but what if we are wrong? Is not the act ofassuming we know what is best for someone elsean ethical problem in itself? Clark, Mabey andSkinner (1998) suggest that “the voice of thoseat the receiving end has tended to be under-represented in the HRM literature”. The pre-dominance of a managerialist orientation inmainstream HRM research has been identifiedearlier in this discussion. Yet it is the employeeswho are the recipients and the consumers ofHRM. Normative stakeholder theory wouldsuggest that employees have a legitimate claimwhich must be attended. Further more,employees have a right to be involved in deci-sions regarding their well being. According toEvan and Freeman (1988, p. 82),

The corporation should be managed for thebenefits of its stakeholders: its customers, suppliers,owners, employees, and local communities. Therights of these groups must be ensured, and further,the groups must participate, in some sense, indecisions that substantially affect their welfare.

Yet the interests of employees are overridden bythe organisation imperative to achieve economicgoals (Kamoche, 1994). The difficulties involvedin carrying out this principle in the corporationare clearly significant. It has been argued thatto accept such an ethical relationship withstakeholders is almost as problematic as ignoringstakeholders (ethically) altogether (Goodpaster,1991). This is even recognised by Evan andFreeman when they state “the task of manage-

ment is akin to that of King Solomon” (1988,p. 81).

Evaluating HRM

Legge (1998) suggests that only HRM whichtreats employees as more than a means to an endis ethical. Corporations would be expected, forexample, to offer training and developmentwhich would focus on the enhancement of theemployees’ career path, not just on the skillsrequired by the workplace. In contrast, Vallance(1995) suggests that any practice which is not“productive of the business aim” is unjustifiableon the grounds that it may interfere with anindividual’s liberty. Stakeholder theory claims amoral relationship with employees (and all otherstakeholders). In opposition, shareholder valuetheory denies such a relationship. Sennett (1999)argues that organisations should be paternalistic.Handy (1989) argues that they should not. In thelight of this spectrum of ethical offerings it issuggested that there is a need for principleswhich may be fairly acceptable across the board(could not be denied from any perspective) andtherefore, which might be considered as a basisfor a minimum standard to evaluate HR. Thenext stage of debate will deal with this questionof non-negotiable ethical criteria against whichHRM can be evaluated. However, beforeaddressing this issue, greater consideration mustbe given to the nature of HRM.

The dual nature of HRM in modern organisations

It is the “soft” model of HRM, the version thatpurports to care for the employee, which is ofgreatest concern from an ethical standpointbecause it is viewed as a more subtle and poten-tially insidious (Guest, 1997; Warren, 2000).Popular theorists (for example Pfeffer, 1994)describe the modern organisation as characterisedby a number of practices including flexibility,team work, cultural management and focus oncore competencies. The rhetoric of the main-stream paradigm suggests that these practicesprovide employees the opportunity to participate,

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gain greater skills, perform a wider range of tasksand have more control over their work. Thesuggestion is that the organisation feels anobligation to care for its employees. Measuredagainst the Kantian dicta of seeing employees asan end in themselves, and respecting the rightsof the individual, “soft” HRM appears to scorewell. Critical theorists, however, as discussedearlier, have identified the other side of a double-edged sword. Even if the rhetoric of HRM is“soft” the reality is almost always “hard” (Legge,1995). If the potential duality of these practicesis accepted and we are no longer assured thatindividual’s rights are being respected then theirapproval under the conditions of Kantian ethicsis precarious.

Soft HRM practices are evaluated againstKantian criteria as ethical if the individual is notseen entirely as a means to an end that is con-sidered at least in part as having intrinsic value.Hard HRM practices are seen as unethical fromthe same perspective as they only treat employeesas a means to an end. There is, however, analternative way of looking at this argument. If wecannot be assured of the soft nature of HRMpractices (cannot be assured that the sheep is nota wolf in sheep’s clothing) then it is more dan-gerous for the employee to be exposed to suchpractices than for them to be faced with blatanthard HRM practices. Surely a wolf provides lessthreat than a wolf in sheep’s clothes because weknow to approach with caution. In practice,could the removal of soft HRM rhetoric havean empowering and liberating effect onemployees? Vallance (1995) suggests that anypractice which is not “productive of the businessaim” is unjustifiable on the grounds that it mayinterfere with an individual’s liberty. In the lightof this blurring of lines between “soft” and“hard” HRM the question of ethical concern israised: under what circumstances, if any, is itallowable for employees to be “used” as a meansto an end.

Issues of rights, obligations and interference

The idea that obligation and commitment in theemployment relationship has recently changed

significantly has been discussed in the literature(Robinson et al., 1994; Dunford, 1999; Sennett,1999). According to Rousseau and Parks (1992)mutual obligations are the essence of a “psycho-logical contract” between employers andemployees. Legal and contractual models of theemployment relationship need to be “stretchedto encompass a psychological dimension”(Winstanley et al., 1996b, p. 191). Various anddeep changes to working relationships betweenemployers and employees over recent years havebeen identified (Anderson and Schalk, 1998).Organisational restructuring has significantlychanged the nature of this contract (Dunford,1999). Where a contact is not fulfilled or ischanged without agreement it can be seen as“violated”. Such violation can “run the gamutfrom subtle misinterpretation to stark breaches ofgood faith” (Rousseau, 1995, p. 111). Managershave decried the decline of employee loyalty atthe same time that employees have beencounselled to eschew reliance on job security oremployer commitment in favour of taking chargeof their own employability (Robinson et al.,1994). It has been claimed that contract viola-tion is the norm rather than the exception(Robinson and Rousseau, 1994). The trend inmodern management is to command and then todepart; to sacrifice authority and leadership forself-protection. Any kind of dependency, suchas existed in bureaucratic hierarchies ofcommand, is shunned (Sennett, 1999). The new“chameleon” organisation therefore hasenormous problems arousing commitment andloyalty among its employees. Dunford (1999)suggests that there are two contrasting positionsthat can be taken with respect to this experience.

An employment relationship free from oblig-ation and commitment may be characterised aschallenging, mature, free and creative (Dunford,1999). Loyalty and commitment can havenegative connotations, suggesting a less-than-mature stage of individual development, narrow-mindedness and oppression. Noer (cited in(Dunford, 1999, p. 73) describes the traditionalemployment relationship as one of “co-depen-dency” in which individuals “enable the systemto control their sense of worth and self-esteem”and in doing so “make themselves into perma-


nent victims”. That labour is seen as freed of anypaternalistic taint is widely proclaimed as a virtue(Sennett, 1999). If paternalism is carried too farit is at the expense of respect (Bowie, 1998).Loyalty is seen as a concept whose time haspassed, yet there is a striking resonance withmuch earlier conceptualisations of the employ-ment relationship. Hayek (as cited in Sennett,1999) and Friedman (1970) argued long ago thatthe workplace was not a source of social fulfil-ment. This version of the employment relation-ship is thus in keeping with a narrow or classicview of the organisation and also in keeping witha “hard” model of HRM.

Alternatively, an employment relationship freefrom obligation and commitment may be char-acterised as cynical, evasive, meaningless andexploitative. The claim that “our employees aremost valued asset” is common in many organi-sations. The importance of commitment andinvolvement in the organisation has been bothconceptually and empirically identified (Walton,1985; Lawler, 1992). Any benefit the organisa-tion may derive is likely to be threatened bypractices which are inconsistent with suchrhetoric. Senior management may find their ownrhetoric thrown back at them and a degree ofcynicism may develop among employees(Dunford, 1999). Sennett (1999) argues that theproblem with the modern organisation is a lackof commitment and dependence in the name ofautonomy. The result is a loss of social cohesionat work. He suggests that the failures, betrayalsand inadequacies people experience in theirdealings with one another serve as reasons forwithdrawal rather than for coming together:“There is a kind of negative magnetic charge”(Sennett, 1999, p. 27). He argues that mutualobligation, indeed paternalism, is necessary torestore social cohesion in the workplace therebyre-establishing the dignity of men and womenas workers. Such an argument can be seen aspromoting the “soft” model of HRM. Thisdebate introduces the ethical question: to whatextent, if at all, should the “organisation” carefor or protect employees?

Developing ethical criteria

As a result of this discussion, two questions ofethical concern have been raised. The first: Underwhat circumstances, if any, is it allowable for employeesto be “used” as a means to an end realisesquestions of individual’s rights. The second: Towhat extent, if at all, should the organisation act inthe interest of employees also brings forward ques-tions of individuals rights, but particularly withrespect to liberty. These ethical concerns can beused as a basis to form a set of ethical criteria bywhich to evaluate HRM.

Thus two propositions have been formed. Theproposition that individuals must be treated withrespect is not suggesting that people can never beused as a means to an end. Clearly, in organisa-tional terms the idea that employees cannot beused as a means to the company’s end is com-pletely untenable. The reason why people areemployed is to contribute to the achievement ofthe company’s goals. The most commonlyaccepted definitions of HRM assume effectiveuse of employees for the achievement of organ-isational purpose. Perhaps the suggestion shouldtherefore be that employees should not be usedexclusively as a means to an end, or not used as ameans to an end under specific circumstances. Thereare, therefore, certain moral rights that theemployee has which cannot be violated. Hence,the first proposition: that individuals (employees)must be treated with respect.

The stance that there are minimal require-ments of societal institutions is consistent withnotion that we should not interfere with thefreedom of others. The proposition that oneshould not interfere with another person’sfreedom is not suggesting that no one can everdo anything which impinges on another’s actions.Once again, in organisational terms, the idea thatthe company cannot ask its employees to doanything the employees do not wish to do iscompletely unworkable. The employmentcontract cannot precisely state everything that isexpected of an employee thereby allowing anemployee to refuse to do anything not explicitlyincluded. Through the selling of their labour toan organisation employees are selling their will-ingness to act in the interest of the company. The

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question then is when and how is it permissiblefor the company influence employees’ actions.Hence the second proposition: that one (a companyor manager) should not undermine the autonomy of anindividual.

Does HRM pass the ethics test?

HRM involves the effective management ofpeople to achieve organisational goals. The word“management” is in this context a euphemismfor “use”. Whether HRM is “hard” or “soft” orsome sort of combination of the two, it is onlythe nature and extent of this “use” which varies.HRM implicitly accepts such “use”. If one takesthe doctrine that an individual can never be usedas a means to an end, then any form of organi-sation would necessarily fail its demands. Hencethe less arduous proposition that individuals(employees) must be treated with respect.

The rubric of “respect”, according to Rowan(2000) includes the rights of an employee suchas the right to freedom, the right to well beingand the right to equality. “The right to freedomincludes not only negative freedom, such as theright to not be physically restrained, but alsopositive freedom such as the right to not becoerced or hindered by the effect of externalforces” (Berlin, 1984 cited in Rowan, 2000, p.358). Controlling influences over an individualcan be described as a continuum which rangesfrom coercion to persuasion (Beauchamp, 1993).“Coercion” as a point on the continuum is acompletely controlling influence which removesand individuals freedom. “Persuasion” at theother end is a wholly non-controlling influencewhich in no way undermines a person’s freechoice. Between the two ends of the spectrumis “manipulation” – a class of influence whichare sometimes controlling. Manipulation is abroad category that includes any successfulattempt to elicit a desired response from anotherperson without the means of physical force(coercion) or rational argument (persuasion). Aperson who is manipulated makes a choice basedon incorrect or unsound reasoning, as a result ofa deliberate attempt by another to mislead ordeceive them. Such a situation would be con-

sidered as a denial of an individual’s right tofreedom. Modern management practices and“soft” HRM practices readily open themselvesup to claim of manipulation. Employee assistanceprograms which offer counselling, trainingprograms aimed at self-development, familyfriendly work policies (you can take yourchildren to work and your laptop to your home)are just a few examples of practices which couldbe construed as overly controlling. Rather thewolf than the wolf in sheep’s clothing.

The right to well-being can be understood asthe right of individuals to pursue their owninterests and goals (Rowan, 2000). The right ofan employee to purse their own goals does notnecessarily mean that the organisation mustpursue the interests of the employees (or anyother stakeholder for that matter) as would bedemanded by moral stakeholder theory. It doeshowever mean that the organisation must recog-nise the existence of employees’ interests andgoals. This is embodied by the InternationalLabour Organisations’s Declaration onFundamental Principles and Rights at Work(ILO, 1998) that all workers have the funda-mental rights of freedom of association and tocollective bargaining. “In the business context, asall persons have goals and interests, a managerwho herself is employed in an effort to pursueher goals cannot fail to recognise that heremployees are doing the same” (Rowan, 2000,p. 258). Acceptance of this argument poses aproblem for any unitarist or managerialist modelsof the workplace. A company which eitherexplicitly or implicitly treats their employees asnot having goals and interests which potentiallydiffer from those of the organisations would beconsidered to be infringing upon this right.Rather not the wolf at all (slinks away, tailbetween his legs).

Of the three rights demanded, the right toequality seems to pose the least difficulty. Equity,equal opportunity, fairness are all ideals whichare well accepted in both societal and organisa-tional contexts. However, taken in isolation ofthe rights to freedom and well-being, the rightto equality cannot be fulfilled. Equality impliesthat everyone has rights to freedom and well-being equally.


Conclusion

Interpretation of HRM has evolved significantlyin the last decade. Many of the writers providingsubstantive and theoretical analysis of HRMpolicy and practice are aligned with the criticalperspective. More recently some writers havebegan to use ethical theory in their inquiry. Theuse of such theory has limitations. Micro-levelanalysis of specific HRM practices or “bundles”of practices is of limited value and detract fromquestions surrounding the “big picture”. Macro-level analysis based on ethical theory has boththeoretical and practical failings. The significanceof, and difficulties involved in, the use of ethicalframeworks which evoke affirmative obligations,specifically utilitarianism, Kantian and stake-holder theory, have been comprehensivelydiscussed. At the very least, the acceptance ofsuch analysis will depend on whether oneembraces the original ethical framework.

In the light of this spectrum of ethical offer-ings it is suggested that there is a need forprinciples which may be fairly acceptable acrossthe board (could not be denied from any per-spective) which might be considered as a basis fora minimum standard to evaluate HR. Pursuit ofsuch an approach has its own limitations. Firstly,there is the concern that the development of anyethical standards for HRM could degenerate intoanother “best practice” recipe for HRM. Thiswould be ironic considering that the ethicalcritique of HRM has developed, at least in part,from the critical perspective’s abhorrence of sucha normative model. Secondly, there is theconcern that any minimal or “lowest-commondenominator” approach will degenerate into adiluted, ineffectual statement of rights.

Despite these limitations, it is contended inthis paper that the majority of people wouldaccept the ideas that an individual or organisa-tion must treat individuals with respect, and thatan individual or organisation does not have theright to interfere with the freedom of anindividual. These two minimum standards areused to assess HRM. HRM in its various guisesfails this evaluation.

The question is raised by this discussion as towhether human resource management polices

and practices, as applied by business organisationsin their current conception, can be ethical. Theonly alternative model given any credence inthe literature is the stakeholder model of theorganisation. Under these circumstances it wouldseem that research into HRM within a stake-holder model is a necessity.

Notes

1 The distinction between “hard” and “soft” modelsof HRM policies and practices was first made byStorey (Guest, 1987; Guest, 1999) The “hard” versionof HRM explicitly presents workers as a key resourcefor managers to exploit, thus reflecting the capitalistview of the worker as a commodity. Under this viewthe employment relationship is seen as an economicexchange to be terminated when no longer required.In contrast, the “soft” version of HRM views objectsas means rather than objects. This view sees HRMas a way of gaining the commitment of employees inorder to achieve organisational goals. The focus istherefore on winning the “hearts and minds” of theworkers. These models should be understood as“ideal” types which are unlikely to be seen in theirpure form.2 Utilitarianism is based on the writings of JeremyBentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill(1806–1873). Utilitarian theories hold that moralworth of actions or practices is determined solely bytheir consequences. Utilitarianism is committed to themaximisation of the good and the minimisation ofharm and evil (Beauchamp and Bowie, 1993, pp.21–22).3 From the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant(1724–1804) based on the respect-for-persons prin-ciple that persons should be treated as ends and neveronly as means. Respect for human beings is demandedbecause human beings possess a moral dignity andtherefore cannot be treated as if they merely have con-ditional value. “Respect for persons” has sometimesbeen expressed in corporate contexts as “respect forthe individual” (Beauchamp and Bowie, 1993).4 This is in fact the argument of ethical egoism (seeBeauchamp and Bowie, 1993).5 The question of the nature of the “black box” ofinternal HRM processes and outcomes has beendebated at length for many years. For Shuler andJackson (1987) the “black box” referred to employeeoutcomes such as employee commitment, job satis-faction, motivation and employee role behaviours.

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The debate is still continuing (see for exampleAcademy of Management, 2000).

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Department of Management,Faculty of Business and Economics,

Box 11e,Monash University,

Victoria 3800,Australia,

E-mail: [email protected]

ethics and hr

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