ethical issues in policy research: the investigation of community resettlement in newfoundland

Canadian Public Policy

Ethical Issues in Policy Research: The Investigation of Community Resettlement inNewfoundlandAuthor(s): Ralph MatthewsSource: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring, 1975), pp. 204-216Published by: University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public PolicyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3549510 .

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Ethical Issues in Policy Research: The Investigation of Community Resettlement in Newfoundland*

RALPH MATTHEWS I Department of Sociology, McMaster University

Though many researchers regularly undertake to evaluate government policy programs, few attempts are made to evaluate the process and consequences of this policy research. This paper derives from the writer's own experience in studying a government program of community resettlement in rural Newfoundland. As a result of this research, I am able to consider the issues of objectivity and value freedom in relation to the particular problems which I encountered. Based on this experience, this paper examines I) the relationship of the researcher to those funding him and to those he is studying, 2) the responsibility of the researcher to relate his scientific knowledge to the definition of policy goals, and 3) the extent to which value freedom and objectivity are possible when studying and assessing value based programs. My experience leads me to argue that policy researchers should go beyond evaluating the consequences of policy programs, and directly assess the policy goals, despite the methodological problems involved.

Si de nombreux chercheurs se consacrent a l'evaluation des politiques gouvernemen- tales, il y en a peu qui en 6valuent les methodes de recherche et les consequences. Cet article est le resultat de l'experience que l'auteur a acquise en etudiant un programme gouvernemental de relocalisation de populations rurales a Terre-Neuve. Grice a l'experience acquise dans ce domaine, I'auteur se pense en mesure de considerer en toute objectivite et neutralite, les problemes particuliers qu'il a rencontres. Dans cette optique, I'article analyse: I) les rapports existants entre le chercheur, ceux qui financent I'6tude et ceux qui en font l'objet; 2) la responsabilite du chercheur d'appliquer ses connaissances scientifiques a la definition des buts recherches et 3) la

neutralit6 et l'objectivit6 necessaires a l'atude et l'6valuation de programmes qui font appel a des jugements de valeur. L'experience de l'auteur l'amene a conclure que les chercheurs devraient depasser la simple evaluation des consequences de tels programmes pour en evaluer directement les objectifs et cela en depit des problemes methodologiques souleves par une telle demarche.

* I am extremely thankful for the extensive comments provided by the anonymous readers of an earlier draft of this paper. Their insights helped me expand my own ideas on the theoretical complexities involved in policy research.

CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY-ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES, 1: 2

spring/printemps 1975 Printed in Canada/Imprim6 au Canada



Ethical issues in policy research / 205

Whenever a social scientist undertakes to do policy research he faces ethical and moral dilemmas. This is particularly true if he is engaged in government sponsored research. In his capacity as an advisor to government he is called upon to either draft or evaluate programs of social change. No matter how neutral his final analysis may seem, such a researcher is engaged in the process of manipulating other people's behaviour. This paper grows out of my own experience in doing government sponsored research in Newfoundland, Canada, and examines some of the ethical problems of doing policy research.1

My research in Newfoundland provided federal and provincial government officials with an assessment of a community evacuation program that was destined to phase out hundreds of rural Newfoundland communities and resettle thousands of their former occupants. It presented numerous ethical issues, but I am certainly not the first to discover that this type of research entails such problems. The literature is now replete with essays on the process, ethics, and politics of doing evaluative studies (Suchman, 1967; Kelman, 1968; and Beals, 1969). This paper differs from these works in that it is not an abstract analysis of hypothetical problems, but an empirical investigation of an actual research study. My data in this paper are my own experiences in studying resettlement in Newfoundland. While there are numerous works on the theory of policy research, there are few studies which link this theory with actual research practices. Few researchers seem to have the confessional zeal to critically evaluate their own work and its consequences (one rare example is Leighton, 1949). By the time they have sufficient 'dis- tance' on their work to undertake such a task they are usually too fully involved in other work to do so.

Yet it is only by going back and examining our research and its consequences that we can really obtain an assessment of its effects. In this paper I am concerned with three aspects of policy research which provided thorny ethical problems for my own work. These are I) the relationship of the social scientist researcher to those funding him and to those he is studying, 2) the responsibility of the researcher to relate his scientific knowledge to the definition of policy goals, and 3) the extent to which value freedom and objectivity are possible when studying and assessing value based programs. However, before proceeding to this analysis, a brief introduction to New- foundland and a r6sume of my research is necessary.

RESETTLEMENT IN NEWFOUNDLAND

In 1961 the population of Newfoundland was 457,853 located in 1,104 communities scattered around its 6,o00oo miles coastline. Most of these communities were small and isolated. Over 400 had less than 200 inhabitants and 815 had less than 300 inhabitants.2 The small size and isolation of these communities was a direct result of the historical Newfoundland dependence on the inshore cod-fishery. However, by the mid-twentieth century the

I For those interested, some of my findings are to be found in Iverson and Matthews (1968, 1970, 1973) and Matthews (1970).

2 Compiled from the Census of Canada, i961 and Census of Canada, 1966 as well as from

unpublished data provided by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, St. John's, Newfoundland.



20o6 / Ralph Matthews

number of fish coming near shore had notably declined as a result of offshore hunting of fish by deep-sea draggers. The traditional economic base of the Newfoundland 'outport' was largely supplanted.

Just as this was occurring, Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949 as her tenth province. The immediate result was a rapid development of transporta- tion and communication facilities and a flood of Canadian development re- sources. Many Newfoundlanders deserted their isolated villages and took up residence and jobs in the larger towns. Others, wishing to do so but unable to bear the costs involved, petitioned the provincial government for assistance in moving.

In response to their pleas, in 1953, the Newfoundland Government set up a small assistance fund to help those desiring to move. The unique provision of this 'centralization program' was that Ioo per cent of a community had to certify its willingness to move before any assistance would be granted. De- spite this restriction, and even though the assistance never exceeded $600o per family, I 15 communities containing 7,500 persons moved during the I I years of the program (Lane, 1968, 564).

In 1965, the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland jointly formulated a new 'resettlement program' for Newfoundland as part of their more comprehensive development strategies. This program greatly increased the financial incentive to move and provided assistance if 80o per cent of the community signified willingness to resettle. It was widely publi- cized and in the first five years of its operation, it evacuated I 19 communities containing i6, 114 persons (Government of Newfoundland, mimeo).3

This writer was one of two principal researchers employed by the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Newfoundland's Memorial University to direct a study of resettlement during the summer of 1966. Though we were not directly employed by any governmental department or agency, the funds for our work came directly from the Canadian Department of Fisheries. This Department had responsibility for Newfoundland Resettlement at the Federal level and provided approximately two-thirds of the cost of the program.4 As this was their first experience with this type of program, they were naturally interested in its social (and probably political) consequences. The terms of reference of our contract were simple. We were to spend the summer of 1966 gathering data in Newfoundland, and we were to submit a preliminary report to the Canadian Department of Fisheries (via the Institute of Social and Economic Research) by January 1967. This was to be followed later that year

3 It is worth noting that the 'natural' movers of the I94o's tended to move to larger centres in order to obtain new types of employment, while most of those who moved under either the provincial 'centralization' program of the 1950's or the federal-provincial 'resettlement' program of the I96o's and 197o's tended to move into slightly larger nearby communities. One of the major differences between the two programs was a provision in the latter that all those who intended to move had to have their choice of a new community approved by government officials. This was deliberately aimed at preventing people from moving from one declining community to another. However, it seems to have had little effect.

4 At the Federal level, responsibility for administering the Resettlement Program was turned over to the Department of Regional Economic Expansion when that Department was created in 1969. At approximately the same time, the Provincial responsibility was placed in the hands of their new Department of Community and Social Development.




by a more complete analysis of our findings. The sole condition laid down by the Department of Fisheries was that we 'investigate the attitudes of those families already moved under the Resettlement Program.' We were also requested to advise the government of any changes which we felt would contribute to the smoother operation of the program. While we didn't realize it at the time, we had been hired to investigate one of the major social development programs in Canadian history, and one of the largest mass movements of population ever planned by a Canadian federal or provincial government.

THE RESETTLEMENT STUDY: WORKING WITH GOVERNMENT AND WITH THE PEOPLE

The broad scope of our frame of reference can best be explained by the paucity of information on resettlement. The first several weeks of our investigation were occupied simply in collecting basic information on the two resettlement programs. These efforts revealed two problem areas involving our relationship with both governments and the selection of our sample.

It quickly became obvious that the resettlement planners in the Newfound- land government were not sympathetic to our task. We had been hired by the federal government to investigate the implementation of the resettlement program, but the provincial government officials were the ones responsible for implementing it. They were naturally wary of our efforts. Indeed, we later learned that they had argued unsuccessfully with the federal officials to postpone our study for several years, as they felt it was still too early to evaluate the effects of the program. It is to the credit of these provincial officials that they were generally co-operative. They answered all our questions and showed us any documents we requested. Only occasionally did we learn of documents which we had not requested and had, therefore, not been shown. However, in the early days of our research we were blissfully unaware of this latent conflict and the threatening nature of our task. Without even knowing it, we had fallen victim to a situation which must face many policy researchers in Canada (and the United States). Moreover, this basic conflict of interests of federal and provincial officials was destined to colour the reception of our findings by the two levels of Government.

If our very presence made us unpopular with the provincial officials, our sampling and research design decreased our popularity with federal ones. To some extent the provincial officials had been right, and it was still too early to begin a full study of the new Program. By June of 1966, only 82 families had actually resettled, although 25 communities had already been approved for resettlement. Most of those already moved came from only four communities. Thus, even though we were committed to interview 'families already moved,' there were not yet enough of them to make our study practical.

In order to overcome this difficulty, we decided to expand our study to include a sample of households which had re-located under the provincial centralization program of 1952-1965. This, we reasoned, would provide a longitudinal dimension. By matching communities from the same geographi- cal area that had moved under each program, we hoped to keep constant some



208 / Ralph Matthews

extraneous variables and thus be able to assess the different effects of each plan. It was our belief that this design not only lived up to our original committment, but that it would also provide valuable indepth information to guide those making decisions concerning the wisdom of future moves.

We undoubtedly failed to communicate these advantages to the various government officials involved. The federal officials seemed to regard the old provincial plan as a welfare program, largely irrelevant to their use of resettlement as a strategy of development. Moreover, when our final report received widespread newspaper coverage, few newspaper columnists made a distinction between the two programs. As a result, the federal officials often found themselves attacked for previous provincial failures. In our defense, it should be noted that one of our major findings was that, among those who had been the first to move under it, there appeared to be no major differences in either the process or effects of the resettlement program when compared to the previous centralization program. Moreover, there were no indications which would lead us to expect any significantly different patterns among those who had yet to move.

In comparison with these problems of co-operation and research design, our actual field work was easy. In a two month period, we obtained extensive interviews with 128 families. Seventy one of these were from nine communities which had moved under the new Federal-Provincial Program. In- deed, one of the most significant findings of our research was the willingness of rural Newfoundlanders to be interviewed. Though considerable social research had been done in Newfoundland prior to 1966, it had all been based on participant observation. As we prepared our own study we were con- stantly warned by those earlier researchers that rural Newfoundlanders would be intimidated by structured interviews and clip-boards. However, because of our time limitations we felt compelled to try formal interviewing.

The vast majority of the people with whom we talked were extremely willing to answer our questions. They readily gave up their normal routine of splitting fish, cutting hay, or building new homes to talk with us. This willingness to give up their time may partly reflect a different conception of the value of time among rural Newfoundlanders. If this is the case, it is an indication that resettlement to urban life requires major psychological adjustments in addition to the social ones.

THE RESETTLEMENT REPORT: GOAL AND POLICY DEFINITION

We had been aware of the policy implications of our research from the beginning. Indeed, our research had been expressly funded by the federal government so that they could use our findings to 'better' their Program. The ethical question raised by this type of research centers on the goals of the policy. A social planning policy is, above all else, a goal-value system. The goals or objectives of the plan are claimed by the planners, from their value position, to be in the best interest of the society at large, and perhaps also in the best interest of those directly affected by the program. Moreover, as appears to be partly the case with the Resettlement Program, the planners may well be planning for future generations at the expense of the existing




population. Though our research revealed that some people benefitted by resettlement, it also indicated that others did not benefit no matter what criteria were used. These people often felt that they had been coerced by the government into moving. Thus, to the extent that we provided information to the government concerning the effects of their program, we were potentially assisting them in implementing their goals at the expense of the wishes of the people. To some extent, the organization of our report helped to counterbal- ance this difficulty. Each of the data chapters presented an analytic descrip- tion of all the difficulties encountered by those who had resettled, together with an assessment of their attitudes toward the Program. Thus, our analysis highlighted the conflict which existed between the values and aspirations of the people and those of the planners. Nevertheless, as we shall see shortly, this is no real protection if a government is really committed to a policy. Though they may be moved to alleviate some of the more striking inequities, they are likely to continue their program.

Policy research presents an intricate web of ethical dilemmas. When a social researcher undertakes to go beyond simply providing information, and begins to make suggestions about desirable policy changes, he is on consid- erably more complicated grounds. Any suggestions that he makes are themselves based on values. His suggestions may be in accordance with the values and goals of the planners, the values and goals of the people, or may be based on an entirely different value framework. As we shall also see later, the whole debate concerning the validity and scientific basis for policy research hinges almost totally on this issue. Suggestions about policy change can take two forms. A researcher can restrict himself to considering whether a particular policy does accomplish the goals for which it was designed, and limit his suggestions to a consideration of ways the goals can be better accomplished. Or, he can expand his framework to a critical evaluation of the desirability of the goals themselves.

In undertaking our research, we had agreed to advise the government about desirable changes in their program and much of the concluding chapter of our report was devoted to suggestions about policy change. All of our recommendations resulted from our very real concern with the problems encountered by those who resettled. Yet a close examination of these recommendations will reveal that not one of them questions in any way, the goals of the Program.5 Instead, every single one of them is an attempt to make the policy more efficient by easing the difficulties encountered by migrants in moving from one community to another. More important still, I now realize that we never considered doing anything else. Undoubtedly, like many policy researchers,

5 Our recommendations were as follows: (i) that the government take a more active role in the actual resettlement process than they were currently taking; (ii) that the government collect more information on communities applying for resettlement before they made their decisions; (iii) that the government establish a body of community development workers to assist the people in the process of moving; (iv) that criteria for Growth Centres be better defined; (v) that the provincial administrators be included in meetings of the Federal Provincial Resettlement Committee; (vi) that more money be provided for housing; (vii) that extra assistance be provided for people with large families, for the aged, and for those with special problems; (viii) that more attention be given to the problems of integration into the new communities.



21 / Ralph Matthews

we were so caught up with easing the day to day problems of our informants as they coped with a situation which was largely beyond their control, that we simply never directly questioned whether this situation was necessary in the first place.

But, more important still, we could if we wanted to, actually legitimate our failure to consider policy goals. Indeed, this is the approach to social policy research which is advocated by most social scientists concerned with preserv- ing objectivity in social science. These theorists distinguish between policy research which is designed to suggest new policy (i.e. policy research which recommends new goals), and policy research which restricts itself to evaluating the adequacy of the existing regulations for achieving the declared goal (i.e. policy research which evaluates the effectiveness of the means chosen by planners, but does not evaluate either the legitimacy of these means or the legitimacy of the goals being sought) (Weber, 1949, 52-54). Those who make this distinction usually argue that there is no scientific basis (i.e. objectively valid basis) upon which to either evaluate the goals of policy or to suggest new goals. To do so would call for 'value judgements.' However, they contend that value judgements are not required in order to assess the ability of the policy to achieve the policy goal. One recent writer has summed up this perspective by claiming that 'the purpose of social science research should be to deepen, broaden, and extend the policy-makers capacity for judgement - not to provide him with answers' (Millikan, 1970, 35-36).

If our experience is an indication, there are major moral problems with this facile solution. Contrary to the popular belief that government sponsored research reports remain unread on bureaucrats' shelves, we found an amazing willingness among federal and provincial officials to both read our reports and implement our suggestions. Thus, our conclusion that the 'means' of the resettlement program were inadequate was taken as an impetus to change these 'means.' As a result of these changes, the resettlement process was actually speeded up, and more people than ever before were encouraged (and likely felt coerced) to resettle. It might be argued that our suggestions concerning the direction these changes should take were unnecessarily specific. Perhaps we should have been content to simply indicate the problem areas, without also indicating how these problems might be overcome. But even if we had simply outlined the problem areas, would we really have been any less responsible for the streamlining of the resettlement program which then took place?

For those who think that my concern is out of proportion to the problem, a discussion of the outcome of two of our suggestions is relevant. In our report we argued that a corps of community development workers should be estab- lished. We hoped that these people could assist in a number of ways those who had decided to resettle, thereby making resettlement less traumatic. It would seem that the Government officials agreed with this suggestion, for a group of such workers was appointed. However, from the information received, it would appear that these 'development workers' did little to assist those who resettled, in any of the ways we had intended, though it is difficult to see how we could have been any more specific concerning the function we intended them to perform. Instead, they functioned primarily as regional public rela-



Ethical issues in policy research / 21 I

tions men for the resettlement program, encouraging more and more people to resettle.

Ironically, these 'resettlement workers' can justify their role by referring to yet another of our suggestions. In the course of our investigation we disco- vered that false rumors about the operation of the resettlement program were common in communities where 'moving fever' existed. We recommended that the Government more accurately inform those concerned of the actual workings of the program. Presumably, these resettlement workers are also the Government's response to this request.

Thus, our study of the resettlement program led to an expansion of resettlement with almost no questionning of the legitimacy of its goals. As a result, it is now my belief that policy research must take a more activist role, and must directly investigate and question the goals of social policy. This is not to say that there are some instances where the goals of a program are so blatantly illegitimate that the policy can and should be rejected after little investigation. Moreover, there may indeed be some programs whose legitimacy is similarly self-evident and the researcher can approve of their goals after a relatively short inquiry. In such instances, however, he might be advised to delay his approval until he has investigated the 'latent' consequences of the program in more detail. But even in these extreme cases, the research should be oriented toward an examination of the goals of social policy.

Such research would be challenged by many social scientists on theoretical and methodological grounds. They would argue that the study of policy goals involves the social scientists in non-scientific evaluation and consequently should not be undertaken. While agreeing with them that the study of goals does indeed involve evaluation, I would contend that this should be an integral part of policy research. Consequently, before concluding this paper, I would like to examine these more abstract issues.

POLICY RESEARCH AND VALUE FREEDOM

There has been a long held belief that social scientific investigation should be 'value free.' This conflicts with the obvious fact that the formation of social policy implies making decisions in terms of a set of values. Thus, even when, as in our case, social scientists are employed to evaluate programs rather than formulate them, they often feel that such evaluations also require them to make value judgements.

This leads directly to the issue concerning the policy researcher's responsibility to his employers and to those he studies. As he is often in the employ of policy makers, the policy researcher may find himself obtaining information from those affected by a program, which will be used against them in the battle over the program's implementation. As those most directly affected usually have no access to his findings, they are unable to protect themselves from this unfair exploitation of their goodwill. Significantly, the two issues of value freedom and political neutrality come together in the widely accepted belief that social scientists, in order to maintain their value neutrality, should be 'free floating intellectuals' not allied with any power group.

As my account of my own experiences shows, this neutral stance is virtu-




ally impossible. Moreover, I would argue that many of the reservations about policy research come from a misunderstanding of the thinking on value neutrality and objectivity of classical social theorists. Thus, Weber is often held up as the proponent of a 'value free sociology' (Gouldner, 1963, 39), without acknowledging that Weber explicitly argued for 'the scientific treat- ment of value judgements' (Weber, 1949, 54). Weber simply argued that it was quite possible to evaluate the effectiveness of social policy to reach its declared goal, without ever questioning the legitimacy of that goal (1949, 52).

Yet, as my own research indicates, even though there is little scientific basis for assessing the goals of policies, the social scientist who confines himself to simply examining the means and not the goals is obviously being blind to the realities of the situation. Like the nuclear rocket expert characterized by comic Tom Lehrer who 'just sends them up' but does not 'bring them down,' he is refusing to accept responsibility for his actions. Indeed, I would argue that the policy researcher's responsibility goes beyond communicating his findings to those with power and those who lack it as Mills has argued (I961, 185).

To the extent that his research is helping make policy more efficient, the social scientist has an obligation to assess the desirability of the policy itself, particularly for those most affected by it. The policy researcher must realize that policy is an attempt to alter the condition of people's lives. Even if one accepts that there is little scientific basis for making value assessments, one should also realize that the social scientist is probably the only person who has consulted all parties involved. Consequently, his knowledge has the potential of being more broadly based than that of the other concerned parties. If not as a scientist, then as a person, the social scientist investigating policy questions has a responsibility to speak out. As Gray has argued, not to speak out is to be both hypocritical and irresponsible, 'for if the discipline which claims to know the most about the nature of social life does not offer its most reasoned judgements, to whom does the obligation fall? It would seem to those less competent to make them - which would also seem absurd' (Gray, 1968, 180).

This very absurdity has led to a considerable re-examination of the doctrine of value freedom in social research, and of what we have come to call the separation of means and goals in policy research. At the most general level, Friedrichs (1968, 1972) analysed the social research process and concluded that any research, either pure or applied, involves value decisions at every stage.

The decisions we make regarding problem selection, the appropriation of conceptual tools and their accompanying grammars and logics, the risking of hypotheses, the approximation of control, the impact of observation, the level of error admissible, the impact of prediction on future behavior, selectivity in communication, and the attitude we take regarding the application of the findings - all either demand or imply a value committment that transcends the empirically given. (1968, I I)

He concluded that, what passes for value-freedom, is instead an 'embaras- singly real value judgement' to adopt an attitude of indifference toward the application of research findings.




In a similar vein, Becker (1966) argued that there are social structural reasons which make it impossible for a sociologist to avoid taking sides when actually studying policy related areas. He argues that any social structure has a 'hierarchy of credibility' in that 'credibility and the right to be heard are differientially distributed through the ranks of the system' (241). Thus, whenever we start listening to 'underdogs,' we can expect to be accused of taking sides. The usual charge is that 'in the course of our work and for who knows what private reasons, we fall into deep sympathy with the people we are studying. ... Because of this we do not give a balanced picture' (240). Becker calls on us to realize that there is no way out of this dilemma for 'there is no position from which sociological research can be done that is not biased in one way or another' (245). His advice is simply 'to avoid sentimentality' (246), and to explicitly indicate whose side we are on (247).

While agreeing with Becker that it is impossible to be value free, Gouldner has countered that Becker has simply replaced the myth of value freedom with 'a new myth, the myth of the sentiment-free social scientist' (1968, io5). He further argues that 'a bland confession of partisanship merely betrays smugness and naivete. It is smug because it assumes that the values that we have are good enough; it is naive because it assumes that we know the values we have' (I 12). He calls on us to condemn complacency rather than sentimentality for it is complacent to think 'that we have solved the problem of objectivity by good-naturedly confessing that we do indeed have a standpoint and by openly specifying what it is' (I 12).

However, all of this would be 'academic' if it were not for the criticism that sociological and anthropoligical work on resettlement has received. It is epitomized in the analysis by Copes, an economist, who duplicates the form of critique specified by Becker.

It is easy for social scientists and writers with an interest in rural societies to become genuinely commited to the welfare of the people they have studied and have come to know, admire, and love. Thus, some may become emotionally averse to rural depopu- lation, which would mean loss of the subjects of their concern. They may be driven to rationalize arguments that will seek to conserve or restore the rural environment to which they have formed an emotional and intellectual attachment. (I972, 147)

Copes is carefully vague about which 'social scientists and writers' he is referring to, but his charge is broad enough to implicate my own work and to call into question its reliability. The irony is that I now feel that my efforts were actually too value-free in that they were restricted to a consideration of the means of resettlement and did not directly examine the policy's goals. To counter his charge, along the lines of Friedrichs' analysis, I must point out to Copes that indifference to the plight of those resettled does not constitute value freedom.

Yet this reply seems inadequate on two grounds. First, even if we accept that value freedom is a myth, our assertion of concern for the plight of our fellow man still does not ensure against the possibility that our analysis might simply be wrong. Even if we accept Becker's contention that we must take sides, and then follow his advice by publicly declaring the direction of our




allegiance, we may still make mistakes in our analysis. Under normal circumstances charges such as those of Copes might be answered by demonstrating our objectivity based on value freedom. But if we deny the necessity or possibility of value freedom, we must ask what replaces the traditional can- nons of objectivity in such circumstances? Second, our reply does not squarely face the issue of how and when one undertakes the evaluation of program goals. Does one maintain that they are separable from the operation of the program itself, and that we can and should assess the policy program prior to evaluating its goals? Or does one contend that they are analytically inseparable and undertake an analysis of both simultaneously?

Gouldner provides a basis for dealing with the first of these issues. He argues that a sociologist's value committment is not merely an inescapable fact of nature as Becker has claimed, but that it can also be viewed 'as a necessary condition of his objectivity' (1968, I 13). He likens the role of the sociologist to that of ajudge. Though ajudge may indeed give all the benefits to one party, he is still considered to have made an impartial decision. His decisions are respected for their impartiality and objectivity, not because they are value-free, but because they are made in terms of some clearly defined and explicit set of values. Similarly, the role of a sociologist is not simply a matter of choosing sides, but of offering judgements with reference to a clearly defined system of values. A sociologist is complacent when he makes value judgements without struggling to understand his own values and motives. 'Normative objectivity' begins with self-awareness. Thus, from this perspective, the social scientists who have analysed the process of resettlement and its consequences cannot be faulted for siding with the subjects of their concern. But they can be criticized if they have failed to examine their own values and the extent to which these affect their decisions.

This focus on values is obviously a long way removed from Weber's formulations and leads us directly to the issue of the separability of analysis and evaluation. Weber hoped to maintain objectivity through the segregation of facts and values. He argued that, although values govern the choice of our problem, the analysis of that problem can and should be done without value judgements. Significantly, even some of those who argue for a relevant sociology still maintain that the analysis of the situation should be undertaken free from value judgements. They contend that any evaluation can only be undertaken after the evidence is in. Gray provides the clearest exposition of this position.

By no means is one recommending a license to offer value judgements at random, resulting in a "this I believe" type of sociology. Rather it is to proceed as significant minds always have - that is, after a careful, fairminded and reasonably objective consideration of the facts - to offer whatever meaningful judgement seems approp- riate. (1968, 180)

Yet, this position seems little different from that propounded by Weber who still permitted his social researcher the right as a citizen, but not as a scientist, to make judgements about policy goals. Moreover, it ignores the strong analysis of Friedrichs that value judgements are actually incorporated in




every stage of the research process, as well as the reasoning of Becker that value freedom is a myth, and the argument by Gouldner that a focus on his own values and those of others is the sociologist's only real assurance of objectivity. Such arguments would certainly lead us to question whether any stage in the study of policy research can be truly value free. Like the supposed separability of fact from value, the assessment of policy means, separate from a consideration and judgement of the goals of that policy, may actually be more a theoretical distinction than an actual possibility.

As far as my own research is concerned, I feel that the descriptive approach, whereby we analysed each community's move as seen through the eyes of its inhabitants, came as close to objectivity as can reasonably be expected. However, as a result of my experience in studying resettlement, I now feel that I should have proceeded beyond an assessment of the policy program, to include an evaluation of its goals. But, as I noted at the beginning of this paper, a policy program is a goal-value system, and these policy goals are based on values. Any consideration of the goals of a social policy must, therefore, involve an assessment of the values on which they are based. Thus, I must side with Gouldner and conclude that the only basis for 'objectivity' in policy research is an acute awareness of the values implied in the policy, and above all an awareness (as far as humanly possible) of one's own values. Thus, in doing policy research, values must be the major focus of study rather than an avoided aspect of the work.

REFERENCES

Beals, Ralph L. (1969) Politics of Social Research (Chicago: Aldine) Becker, Howard S. (1966) 'Whose Side are We On,' Social Problems, 14, pp.

239-247.

Copes, Parzival (1972) The Resettlement of Fishing Communities in Newfoundland

(Ottawa: Canadian Council on Rural Development) Friedrichs, Robert W. (1968) 'Choice and Committment in Social Research,' The

American Sociologist, 3, pp. 8-1I. Friedrichs, Robert W. (1972) 'Dialectical Sociology: Toward a Resolution of the

Current "Crisis" in Western Sociology,' British Journal of Sociology, 23, PP. 263-273.

Gouldner, Alvin W. (1963) 'Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology' in M. Stein and A. Vidich eds., Sociology on Trial (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall)

Gouldner, Alvin W. (1968) 'The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State,' The American Sociologist, 3, pp. Io3-I 16.

Government of Newfoundland (no date) Statistics of the Federal Provincial Reset- tlement Program, First Five Year Period (Mimeo)

Gray, David J. (1968) 'Value-free Sociology: A Doctrine of Hypocrisy and Irrespon- sibility,' Sociological Quarterly, 9, pp. 176-185.

Iverson, Noel and D. Ralph Matthews (1968) Communities in Decline: An Examina- tion of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland, Newfoundland Social and Economic Studies, Number 6 (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland, Institute of Social and Economic Research) Reprinted 1974.



2 6 / Ralph Matthews

Iverson, Noel and D. Ralph Matthews (1970) 'Anderson's Cove' in W.E. Mann ed. Poverty and Social Policy in Canada (Copp Clark)

Iverson, Noel and D. Ralph Matthews (1973) 'The Fate of the Outport Newfound- lander' in Peter Neary ed. The Political Economy of Newfoundland, 1929-1972 (Copp Clark)

Kelman, Herbert C. (1968) A Time to Speak: On Human Values and Social Research

(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.) Lane, C. Max (1968) 'Centralizing our Population' in J.R. Smallwood ed., The Book

of Newfoundland, III (St. John's: Creative Printers) Leighton, Alexander H. (1949) Human Relations in a Changing World (New York:

E.P. Dutton & Company) Matthews, D. Ralph (1970) Communities in Transition: an Examination of Govern-

ment Initiated Community Migration in Rural Newfoundland. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota.

Millikan, Max F. (1970) 'Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action' in D.I. Offenbacher and C.H. Poster eds., Social Problems and Social Policy (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts)

Mills, C. Wright (1961) The Sociological Imagination (New York: Grove Press) Suchman, Edward A. (1967) Evaluative Research: Principles and Practice in Public

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ethical issues in policy research: the investigation of community resettlement in newfoundland

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