SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of

exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog

against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted

in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of

the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of

First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of

interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the

entire proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the

receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all

cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals

certified the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for

different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by

record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have

been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable

time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has

abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy

which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,

unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a

question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or

asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure

affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such

relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86

A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that

the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the

action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred

from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and

conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be

tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and

encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question

the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61

L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659).

And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party

who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to

secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a

penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the

resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we

frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and

then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,

when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591,

September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-

15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-

20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on

July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court

of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the

sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the

original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several

stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it

invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its

case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was

rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of

jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be

declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was

commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their

Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but

revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have

become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval,

the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for

execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with

costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZG.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982

Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition.

Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment.

Issue: W/N dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment

No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it

must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case.

The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.

G.R. No. 154295.  July 29, 2005]

METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA GOKONGWIE-PE,

petitioner, vs. JOHNNY PASTORIN, respondent.

FACTS

Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the petitioner

company, but because of the timely intervention of the union, the dismissal was not

effected. However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a

magazine dealer and when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped collecting the

outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After requiring him to explain, respondent

admitted his failure to pay the loan but gave no definitive explanation for the same. 

Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to do field

work, and was transferred to a new position. Despite the completion of his

suspension, respondent stopped reporting for work and sent a letter communicating

his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed a complaint for constructive dismissal,

non-payment of backwages and other money claims with the labor arbiter.

The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent.  Petitioner lodged an appeal with

the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over

respondent’s complaint. Significally, this issue was not raised by petitioner in the

proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.

The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no jurisdiction

over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the voluntary

arbitrator.  However, the CA reinstated the ruling of the CA. The CA held that the

active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with

his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the

action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness

to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning

the court or body’s jurisdiction. 

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA

during appeal.

HELD

The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA

during appeal.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action

is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.

The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even

on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which

stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be

regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which

were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in

Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-

waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine

had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as

the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time

honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly

depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.  If it had no

jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,

the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same

'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or

by estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and

decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,

the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to

assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the

principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does

not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction, petitioner is not

estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on

appeal.

Decision of the CA is set aside