essay smaele access to information as a crucial element in the balance of power between media &...

8/11/2019 Essay Smaele Access to Information as a Crucial Element in the Balance of Power Between Media & Politics

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Whos in control?

Access to information as a crucial element in the balance of power

between media and politics

Hedwig de Smaele

The interdependent relationship of media and politics

Dependency of politics on media

All political actors whether political parties, governments, public organizations, pressure

groups or terrorist organizations have in common that they rely heavily on the media to get in

touch with the world outside their own circles. Media occupy a crucial position in between the

citizens and the political world, and the information flow between these two worlds is to a high

degree a mediated flow. Although not a totally one-way flow, the information flow is pretty

unbalanced as well. oing down are party programs, government decisions, appeals or

promises, published in the media and reported upon, commented and analyzed. oing up are the

results of opinion polls, reported on in the media !and often organized by the media themselves"

and letters to the editors !Mc#air, $%%&, p. &".

'olitical actors cannot chose not to communicate. (he need for legitimacy forces them to

communicate with the people. )n a democracy, politicians and political parties see* every four

to si+ years the consent of the voters. 'oliticians have to win trust, ma*e *nown their proposals

and achievements, or simply themselves. )n order to do so, they need media e+posure. (hey need

media. (hey need ournalists.

(his way of considering the relation between media and politics stresses the power and

influence of media above politics. onceptual views such as the mediatization of politics, or

politics increasingly becoming politainment !Meyer, //, p. &0", bear testimony to this

interpretation. A strong concept in its genre is that of the colonizationof politics by the media

!Meyer, //". 12rgen 3abermas introduced the notion of the colonization of one societal domain

by the rules of another, as a result of which the original rules are either abrogated entirely or

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made dependent on the second set. Meyer applies this notion to the domains of politics and

media4 the sphere of politics became almost entirely dependent on the medias rules and logic.

Media logic affects the selection focus on events, persons, and conflicts5 the pro+imity rule as

well as the presentation personification, dramatization, entertainment, commodification of

!political" news. (he political time !long-term, processes" collides with media time !short-

term, deadlines" but loses, and adapts. (he result is described by Meyer !//" as stage-managed

politics4 issueless and symbolic politics, and image building. 6emocracy became media

democracy. (he political world has surrendered voluntarily, almost eagerly it seems, driven by

power-see*ing via media e+posure4 (he leitmotif of effective spin-control is that you can only

control the media by submitting to them. !Meyer, //, p. &". 'oliticians outside the media

spotlights remain ignored or in the best case are used as unformed raw materials for the

medias own productions !Meyer, //, p. &0".

Dependency of media on politics

'olitics is not powerless either. 3ence, media need politics as hard as politics need media. Media

are in constant need for news, for content. 'olitics has always been, and will be for the times

coming, a very important supplier of news, whether hardpolitical news !issue-oriented" orsoft

news in the margin, rumors and scandals surrounding politicians whether in love or business. )n

order to access news, preferably scoops, media wor*ers are prepared to obey politicians to a

sometimes unhealthy degree. Media agendas and political agendas are often fine-tuned.

(his way of considering the relation between media and politics stresses the power and

influence of politics above media. (hepoliticizationof media is only the natural outcome of this.

'oliticization is realized mainly through staff appointments that assure politicians indirectly

informational control. 'oliticians can pressure media also by other means4 administrative control,

financial control !subsidies or financial conditions", media regulation and policy, granting or

refusing access to information, accreditation of ournalists, or indeed blunt manipulation and even

violence.

Access to information appears as a crucial element in the balance of power between media

and politics as information is e+actly the property of politics most wanted by the media.

(herefore it is a mighty weapon in the hands of political actors if they can decide who gets access

to what *ind of information and when.


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Interdependency

Media need politics, and politics need media. A merger of the content !production" sector and the

distribution sector is not an aw*ward outcome of this observation. (he goals of both sectors are

united in the common goal of reaching as many people as possible4 audience for the media, voters

for the politicians. (he close alliance !voluntary, but not eagerly admitted" is obvious in concepts

such as the mediapolitical system !eg. 7assours*y, $%%%, ///". 1ournalists and politicians live

together in a mediapolitical atmosphere, in a give-and-ta*e relationship. (he citizens and their

interests are left aside in this power-balance-play between media and political actors. (o what

degree do they accept8

(he climate of acceptance brings us to the sphere of behaviors and attitudes, norms and

values, in other words culture. 9hat is the prevailing attitude in a certain society towards

information, the openness and closeness of information, the status of information8 )n order to

e+plore this topic, we introduce the concept of information culture.

The concept of information culture

Information culture

)n political science, the concept of political culture has ta*en hold strongly and is widely

elaborated on. )t has taught us that a certain political system !structure" is or must be

supported by a certain political culture as a set of attitudes, beliefs, values. 'ioneering research on

this topic was done by abriel Almond and :idney ;erba, in The Civic Culture!$%rig, $%


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ulture is a difficult concept to grasp. (he danger of cultural determinism is always looming

somewhere. 3owever, it is not because the concept may be difficult or even dangerous, that it has

no meaning or no use. ulture provides a lin* both between present, past and future !vertical

dimension" and between different subsystems within society !horizontal dimension". 3ence, we

consider the media system as an integral part of the broader societal system. (he media system is

a social system, encompassing media-institutions, media wor*ers !ournalists", the public, the

politicians and news sources as well as the relations between all these actors, settled by laws,

institutions and norms. McCuail !$%%B, p. " defines the media system as a social institution,

with its own distinctive set of norms and practices but with the scope of its activities subect to

definition and limitation by the wider society. Dn the one hand, the media system operates

according to intrinsic values and strives for autonomy. Dn the other hand, and at the same time, it

is not an isolated system but it operates in close connection with the respective political,

economical, and uridical systems as it is grounded in basically the same culture. ulture, here,

is considered a set of values, norms and beliefs that shape behaviour, as shared by a !relatively

large section of" society !horizontal" and transmitted from one generation into another !vertical".

(he concept of culture supposes a great deal of inertia and continuity otherwise the term would

not be able to e+ist !9yman, ///, p. $/=". (riandis !$%%&, B" has put the vertical dimension

aptly4 ulture is to society, what memory is to individuals.

Universalism as a measure for information culture

9hat values do determine the prevailing attitude towards information8 (he values of

universalism versus particularism appear as a useful tool to describe this particular attitude. )n

short and in general, the distinction between universalism and particularism comes down to the

precedence of general rules, codes, values and standards over particular needs and claims of

friends and relations !universalism" or, in contrast, the precedence of human friendship, relations,

and situations over rules !particularism".

)n the original, theologicalsense, universalism points to the belief that ultimately all man will

be saved by ods grace. 'articularism, on the other hand, holds that only the chosen will be

saved. )n thesociologicalsense, the pair universalism-particularism refers first and foremost to

the !dichotomic" pattern-variables of (alcott 'arsons !$%%/". (hese are inherently patterns of

cultural value-orientation, but they become integrated both in personalities and in societal

B


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systems. )n the ontological or philosophical-anthropological sense, as underlying the Erench

Fevolution and the Gnlightenment, universalism sees all man as eHual. Iniversalism then is the

treatment of all persons ali*e based upon general criteria and not upon any special or uniHue

characteristics of the persons themselves !Drum et al., $%%%, p. &0B" whereas particularism is

the treatment of people as special individuals, based on their personal features, rather than as

members of some broader class or group !Drum et al., $%%%, p. &


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(he #orthern countries !#etherlands, 6enmar*, :weden and #orway" are the most universal,

followed by the central group !Erance, reat-?ritain, ?elgium, 9est-ermany, )reland, and the

I.:." and, at last, the :outhern countries !:pain, )taly, 'ortugal". (he e+-communist countries of

Gastern Gurope all have lower values on universalism than the :outhern countries of 9estern

Gurope !;erbeeren, ///, p. =-$&".

Eigure $4 (he score on Iniversalism in Gurope !based on the 9orld ;alues :urvey"

:ource4 ;erbeeren J de :maele, //B

(hese findings are confirmed in other studies as well. :uvarierol !//B" has studied the

communication habits of Guropean ommission officials and observed a clear #ord-:outh

dimension according to the degree of universalism causing different communication behavior

patterns. )n general, a parallel between universalism and transparency of governance

interpreted as openness of government information can be observed. (he #orthern countries,

which score high on universalism according to different approaches !:uvarierol, //B5 ;erbeeren,

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///" are frontrunners on the domain of transparency of governance as well. :weden !together

with Einland" was the first Guropean country to install in $= the Act on the Ereedom of

'ublishing and the Fight of Access to Dfficial 6ocuments. :weden was followed by the other

#orthern countries #orway and 6enmar*, as well as universalist #etherlands and Erance.

(ransparency of governance in entral and :outhern Guropean countries was the subect of

legislative acts only much later, and legislation is still inadeHuately implemented.

Case: Information culture in Russia

(he concept of information culture, inspired by the values of universalism whether particularism,

will be illustrated by the case of communist and post-communist Fussia. 9hat values, and

conseHuently what attitude towards information, prevails in Fussia8

Information culture in the Soviet Union

6espite its theoretical universal ambitions, ommunist Fussia was particularistic rather than

universalistic4 )mportant features of the @eninist type were that it was not based on citizenship

and that it was not, despite its protestations, universalisticin the real sense of the word, because

entitlement to social benefits depended upon being a loyal wor*er or employee of the state write

MareO, Musil and FabuOic !$%%B, p.


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was the norm. )n addition, information has never been available to everyone on the same

conditions. )n sharp contrast with the theoretical ideal of the classless society, the :oviet Inion

was characterized by a strong vertical segregation of society with the elite !party leaders" on the

one hand and the mass on the other hand. #ovosel !$%%&" spea*s of first class and second

class citizens. (he first class was a privileged class, which privileges were institutionalised by

the nomenlaturasystem. (hese privileges not only encompassed material privileges !such as

housing, food, health care, and education" but also enhanced access to information, going from

the right to see forbidden films or read forbidden boo*s !that is, films and boo*s not

considered suitable for general distribution" !e.g. ?enn, $%%, p. %" to the receipt of the special

foreign news bulletins, put together on a daily basis by (A:: and distributed on differently

coloured paper according to the degree of detail and the targeted readers !@endvai, $%


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)n the transition from communism to post-communism, privileged access to information

played a crucial role in the process of privatizations, which became *nown as insider

privatizations !e.g. Ari*, $%%%, p. &-&0". :tate property was privatized according to rules written

by the elite for itself !Androunas, $%%0, p. B&". (ogether with @edeneva !$%%


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the situation throughout the $%%/s. Gspecially difficult to obtain are bare facts, figures, and

documents. @ittle has changed in this respect since :oviet times. (he e+ecutive branch has the

worst reputation with regard to openness of information, followed by the security services,

commercial, state and financial companies. :tate organisations have generally become !compared

to the :oviet Inion" less transparent with less clearly defined functions and competences !:vitich

and :hiryaeva, $%%, p. $&B-$=/".

(he lac* of access to information provo*ed the 'residential 1udicial hamber for )nformation

6isputes and the Inion of Fussian 1ournalists in $%%& to issue a oint recommendation on the

freedom of mass information and the responsibility of ournalists !'rice et al., //, p. 00%-

0B".0According to this statement, only parliament is sufficiently open to the press. As far as the

presidential structures, government circles, and administrative offices are concerned, however,

they are sealed off from ournalists5 they are more closed than the former party committees

!'rice et al., //, p. 0B$". (he numerous press centres, press services, press secretaries, and

others of their il* that have been established everywhere, did not brea* through this tide. Dn the

contrary4 )n theory, they were intended to facilitate ournalists access to information. )n practice,

they have turned into insurmountable barriers and supply only the information that is of interest

to the given structure. !'rice et al., //, p. 0B$".

ommercial and financial companies hide behind the new commercial secret

!ommerchesaya ta%na" while state bureaucracies have state secrets and military structures

military secrets at their disposal. (he vague notion of protection of state and other law-

protective secrets, including commercial secrets, thwarts and subverts the general right to

information as guaranteed by the $%%0 onstitution and the $%%$ @aw on Mass Media.

)nadmissible misuse of freedom of mass communication !Art. B of the Mass Media @aw"

includes, among others, the use of mass media for purposes of divulging information maing up

a state secret or any other law-protective secret. (he law on Mass Media gives no further

description of law-protective secrets but Art. %-B of the Fussian onstitution stipulates that the

list of information constituting a state secret must be determined by federal law. :uch a law on

state secrets was adopted by the :tate 6uma on 1uly $, $%%0 !amended in Dctober $%%". Art. &

of this law contains a list of information categories that could be classified as state secrets

01oint Fecommendation of the 'residential 1udicial hamber for )nformation 6isputes and the Inion of Fussian

1ournalists on the Ereedom of Mass )nformation and the Fesponsibility of 1ournalists of $& 1une $%%&, translated byErances Eoster from #ossi%saya (azeta, $$ 1uly $%%&, for publication in )ost-Soviet *edia +aw , )olicy

ewsletter, :eptember $%%&, at. %, and reprinted in 'rice et al., //, p. 00%-0B.

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!)erechen$ svedeni%' otnesennyh gosudarstvenno% ta%ne.. (hese categories are, for e+ample,

military information, information on foreign politics and economics, science and technology,

intelligence /rasvedyvatel$no%.and counter-intelligence !ontrrazvedyvatel$no%", the fight against

criminal activities !operativno-rozysno% deyatel$nosti" and the organization of the protection of

state secrets. Dnly broadly defined, these categories are open for divergent interpretations.BArt. %

of the law reHuires the president to elaborate and approve the list of information already classified

as a state secret via the publication of a public !R" decree.&As such, a clear-cut hierarchical system

for classifying information as secret was established in Fussia4 the federal law defines the list of

information categories comprising state secrets5 the presidential decree defines its own list that

outlines each category of secret information indicated in the law. Dn the basis of the presidents

list, ministries are permitted to restrict access to specific information under their control !'avlov,

///". A reference to politics or ideologies does not occur any more, but the broad categories of

secret information do allow for a large measure of control. Eor e+ample, any information

regarding the Ministry of 6efence and the military-industrial comple+ could fall under the rubric

of military secrets. )nformation in this area, therefore, remains difficult to obtain. )van

Ponovalov !//, p. &", military correspondent of (;: (elevision, even observes a change for

the worse.

Ponovalov !//, p. B%" sees the only remedy in maintaining close and personal connections

with the 6efence Ministry and the security services. (he observation of ;ladimir Grmolin !//,

p. " is identical4 1ournalists dont receive rights by laws, but by the personal preference of !state"

officials and press services. ?y law, the media are eHual, but by preference some media are more

eHual than others. ode words in the process of information gathering in Fussia remain trust,

relations, and integration !?anai, $%%, p. B". Authorities have relations with some media

professionals, who enoy privileges to receive information unavailable to the rest of the media.

Among the privileged media in the Seltsin era were, according to ulyaev !$%%=, p. $B", news

agencies such as )(AF-(A:: andInterfas, newspapers such as0ommersantandIzvestiya, and

wee*lies such asArgumenti i &aty1 (he most important private channel #(; has had changing

BArt. of the law on state secrets, on the other hand, contains information that cannotbe considered secret, such as

information on natural disasters that can endanger the health and safety of the citizens, ecological and demographicdata, information on privileges and advantages of state functionaries, human right violations, information on the

presidents health, etc. )n the :oviet Inion, all this information was considered secret. Ma*ing this information

e+plicitly public can be considered a brea* with the past.&(he presidential decree of 0/ #ovember $%%& !with amendments of B 1anuary $%%


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relationships with the president and his administration !from neutral or opposition in $%%B-

$%%& to supporter during the $%%= presidential elections, and opposition in ///". 9ith each

phase the level of access to information shifted accordingly. )n the early years, when #(;

adopted an oppositional stand, access to the Premlin was forbidden for #(;-ournalists on

occasions !Dmri 6aily 6igest, $0 Eebruary $%%=". )n :eptember $%%=, however, the

collaborating channel received a broadcast license for the entire fourth channel by presidential

decree and enoyed privileges such as the same transmission rates as state channels and more

access to information. Acting in opposition again, the channel saw its privileges, and ultimately

its future, disappear. A more recent illustration is provided by the Premlins handling of the

Purs* disaster in the summer of ///. Media coverage was restricted, only one ournalist from

the state-controlled television channel, F(F, was granted full access to the scene. Ponovalov

!//, p. &$" calls the Purs* disaster crucial for dividing ournalists into ours !svoi"and others

!chuzhih". 1ournalists of state media, li*e F(F, are ours and conseHuently enoy enhanced

access to information. Ponovalov also ran*s the obedient media according to their pro+imity to

the Premlin !for television stations, in declining order4 F(F, DF(, #(;, (;-enter".

;ery few ournalists or media organs claim their right to receive information before court

!:vitich and :hiryaeva, $%%, p. $=/". (hey prefer to overcome the information barriers by other

means, such as maintaining privileged relations or bribing officials and openly purchasing

information from them. 1ournalists also only rarely send formal letters of inHuiry. Eormal inHuiry,

moreover, appears as a highly ineffective method in comparison with personal contacts and

physical visits to institutions and officials. An e+perimental study in ;oronezh is illustrative4

where appro+imately /T of formal letters of enHuiry resulted in the refusal of information, /T

of physical and personal visits to officials, in contrast, led to acceptance and access to

information !Arapova, //0". And, if these methods Ubac* doors, privileged relations, personal

contactsV are beyond them, they Uthe ournalistV resort to fabrication and conecture according to

the 'residential 1udicial hamber for )nformation 6isputes and the Inion of Fussian 1ournalists

in their $%%& oint recommendation on the freedom of mass information and the responsibility of

ournalists !'rice et al., //, p. 0B$". (he latter, thus, assigns responsibility for the

dissemination of untruthful information in the media to the closed administration4 Inreliability,

incompleteness, and distortion of information very often results from the inaccessibility of

sources of information !'rice et al., //, p. 0B$".

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Conclusion

'olitical actors need media institutions and ournalists in order to get media e+posure and to

establish communication with their voters. Media institutions and ournalists need politicians in

order to access information and generate content for their audiences. Access to information

appears as a crucial element in this balance of power between media and politics. ontrol over

the information flow is mostly in the hands of the political actors as they can decide who gets

access to what information and when. Media wor*ers and ournalists, from their side, can play it

hard !no information is no media e+posure" or can see* alliances with politicians. Felations

between them are established in a general climate or culture.

(he concept of information culture can be a useful concept in trying to understand why things

are as they are. 9hat is the prevailing attitude towards information and the distribution of

information in a given society8 9hat are the basic values underlying attitudes and situations8 (he

value pair of universalism and particularism appears in this conte+t as a powerful e+planatory

tool. Iniversalism can be measured on the individual level as well as on the level of a society, or

country. lusters of countries can be distinguished according to their particular degree of

universalism. 9e focused on the particular case of communist and post-communist Fussia to

illustrate the concept of information culture.

)t ma*es sense to state that the general information climate is shared by politicians and

ournalists and to a certain degree by the public at large. Feferring again to the ;oronezh study, it

appears that out of their own very few ournalists used formal letters, but indeed used personal

contacts instead. onseHuently, access to information was not really recognized as a problem by

them while outsiders, in contrast, might indeed detect a problem of access to information.

Iniversalists might have a hard time in a particularist environment.

References

Almond, .A. J ;erba, :. !$%


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http4NNwww.medialaw.ruNeWpagesNlawsNproectNr-0.htm.

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