essay revisiting judicial review in foreign affairs

1263

ESSAY

REVISITINGJUDICIALREVIEWINFOREIGNAFFAIRS

ElenaChachko*

I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................1263 II. DRAWINGONADMINISTRATIVELAW........................1267

A. ExplainingGreaterJudicialInvolvement.............1271 B. JustifyingJudicialReview...........................................1275

III. TESTINGINSTITUTIONALCOMPETENCE..................1276 IV. CONCLUSION............................................................................1282

I.INTRODUCTIONProfessorFlaherty’sRestoring theGlobal Judiciary revisitsa

longstanding debate among legal scholars and practitioners: 1should courts intervene in foreign affairs and national security?Cantheydosoeffectively?

Roughly two diverging approaches to these questions haveemerged over time. 2 One camp has doubted the democraticlegitimacyofjudicialinterferencewithforeignaffairs.3Judgesarenotelected,membersofthatcamppointout.Theyarethereforeunaccountabletothepublic.Theyshouldnotopineonmattersthatimplicatehighdiplomacyandcorenationalinterests—thekindsofissuesthatfrequentlyariseintheforeignandsecuritydomain.

Additionally,skepticsofjudicialreviewinforeignaffairsandnationalsecurityhaveadvancedfunctionalargumentstoexplain

*DoctoralCandidateandLectureronLaw(Fall2019),HarvardLawSchool;GlobalOrderFellow,PerryWorldHouse,UniversityofPennsylvania.

1. See generally MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THESUPREMECOURTSHOULDRULEINU.S.FOREIGNAFFAIRS(2019).

2. Foranoverviewoftheseargumentsandrelatedscholarship,seeElenaChachko,ForeignAffairs in Court: Lessons fromCJEUTargeted Sanctions Jurisprudence, 44YALE J.INT’LL.1,1-3(2019).

3. Id.

1264 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.43:5

whycourtsshouldstayout.Courts,theyhaveargued,simplylackthe institutional competence to resolve complex foreign andsecuritymatters.Theydonothavethenecessaryexpertise.4Thenatureofjudicialadjudicationissuchthatitsimplycannotkeepupwith fast evolving, time sensitive foreign and securitydecisions.Anothercommonargumentisthatthereissimplynolawtoapplyin this area. Proponents of this approach also underscore thatcourtslackaccesstoclassifiedmaterial,whichtendstobeessentialforunderstanding the full scopeof thematterbeingadjudicatedandtheimplicationsofarulingonthemerits.5

Innationalsecurityemergenciesinparticular,theargumentgoes, courts know that they have no choice but to defer to thepoliticalbranches.6Judges riskdisobedience if theyventure intoforeignaffairsandnationalsecurityinsuchcircumstancesbecauseofthehighstakesofemergencies.Theconcernisthatpolicymakerswould be so convinced of the necessity of their actions forprotecting thenationandswayedbypublicexpectation forboldmeasures that they might violate a judicial order. Suchdisobedience would damage the separation of powers andundermine the stability of the already delicate balance amonggovernmentbranches.

The opposing camp, which seems to have grown since theSeptember 11 attacks,7rejects these premises.Members of thatcamp, including scholars like Harold Koh and Thomas Franck,assert that there isnoanalyticalorpracticaldifferencebetweenforeign and security policy and domestic policy, which courtsreviewallthetime.8Theystressthatforeignanddomesticmattershave become increasingly indistinguishable in an age ofglobalization and deep penetration of foreign factors andinternational law into the domestic sphere. Furthermore, theycriticize judicial abdication in an area that often involves

4. Id.5. Id.6 . See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,

LIBERTY AND THE COURTS 18 (2007) (“In emergencies, the judges have no sensiblealternativebuttodeferheavilytoexecutiveaction,andthejudgesknowthis”).

7. SeeinfraSectionII.A.8. See,e.g.,THOMASM.FRANCK,POLITICALQUESTIONS/JUDICIALANSWERS:DOESTHERULE

OFLAWAPPLYTOFOREIGNAFFAIRS?43(1992);HAROLDHONGJUKOH,THENATIONALSECURITYCONSTITUTION:SHARINGPOWERAFTERTHEIRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR146-48,218-24(1990).

2020] REVISITINGJUDICIALREVIEW 1265

significant harm to individual liberties and broad, ever moreambitiousassertionsofexecutivepower.

Thisdebatehasbecomeratherstagnant.Thesameargumentsare constantly repeated without resolution, and the chasmbetweenthetwocampsseemsattimestodefycompromise.Whatis more, different kinds of foreign affairs and national securitymattersareoftenlumpedtogetherunderthebroadcategoriesof“political questions” and other strands of non-justiciability andnon-reviewabilitydoctrine.Thetimehascometomovethisdebateforward.

New arguments are necessary in order to do so. It is alsoessential to disaggregate the category of foreign and securitymatters.Fromacourt’spointofview,adecisiontostartawarwithanother nation is not the same as a decision to target anAQAPoperative inYemenwith lethal force.Adecisionwith respect tosovereign immunity from judicial process is not the same as adecisiontorecognizea foreignstate.AndasZivotofskyv.Clintonhasestablished,9evendecisionsofthelatterkind—quintessentialforeign policy decisions predominantly guided by politics—mayhaveperfectly justiciable aspects.While the SupremeCourtwasnotreadytodecidethestatusofJerusalemasamatterofUSpolicy,itconcludedthatitwasentirelycapableofresolvingtherun-of-themill separation of powers question ofwho has the authority tomakeandenforcesuchapolicy—CongressorthePresident.TheCourtsubsequentlydidjustthatinZivotofskyv.Kerry.10

Professor Flaherty’s comprehensive book contributes tomoving the debate forward by offering new and creativejustifications for judicial review in foreign affairs. For instance,Flaherty draws on Anne-Marie Slaughter’s work aboutinternationalnetworks toargue thatcourtsshouldbemore,notless engaged in reviewing executive action in foreign affairs. Bynature, he maintains, the executive is far more active ininternationalnetworksofregulatorsandotherpolicymakersthanlegislatorsorjudges.Internationalnetworksthusserveasapowermultiplierforthealreadypowerfulexecutive.Theyexacerbatetheproblemofexecutiveoverreachandwidenthepowerdiscrepancy

9. 566U.S.189(2012)(holdingthatthepoliticalquestiondoctrinedoesnotbartheCourt’s jurisdiction todecidewhetherCongress could require thePresident to indicateIsraelastheplaceofbirthonapassportofanindividualborninJerusalem).

10. 135S.Ct.2076,2087(2015).


among the branches. According to Flaherty, this structuraladvantagejustifiesrobustjudicialoversightofexecutiveactioninforeignaffairsandnationalsecurity,evenmoresothanindomesticpolicy.11

One could challenge this argument, but Iwill leave that foranother day. Instead, I briefly consider other underexploredavenues for advancing the conversationabout judicial review inforeignandsecuritymatters,buildingonmypreviousworkinthisarea. One such avenue is testing the validity of the functionalargumentsagainstjudicialreviewthroughempiricalresearch.Theother is developing administrative law approaches to judicialreviewinforeignaffairs,whichremainunderdevelopedincurrentUSscholarship.

It is important to note that these approaches bracket thenormativequestionofwhethercourtsshouldreviewforeignandsecuritymeasuresasamatterofdemocraticlegitimacy.Thisisnota question that can be fully resolved with purely empirical ordoctrinal tools. The answer depends on one’s normative priors.Thereissomethingalmostmythicalabouthowmanyinthelegalcommunity—especially judges—perceive and talk about foreignaffairsandnationalsecurity.Fromtheideaof“raisond’état”andits European provenance12 through Justice Sutherland’s famousCurtiss-Wright 13 dicta to countless paragraphs in modern-dayfederal court decisions and executive branch opinions, 14 many

11. SeeFLAHERTY,supranote1,at149-66.12. For an overview, see Walter Carlsnaes,Foreign Policy,HANDBOOK OF

INTERNATIONALRELATIONS298,299-301(WalterCarlsnaesetal.eds.,2013).13. UnitedStatesv.Curtiss-WrightExp.Corp.,299U.S.304,319–20(1936).14. See, e.g., Trumpv.Hawaii, 138S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018) (“when thePresident

adopts ‘a preventive measure . . . in the context of international affairs and nationalsecurity,’ he is ‘not required to conclusively link all of the pieces in the puzzle before[courts]grantweight to [his]empirical conclusions’”) (quotingHolderv.HumanitarianLawProject,561U.S.1,34-35(2010)).

WeareonewiththedissentthattheGovernment’s‘authorityandexpertiseinthesemattersdonotautomaticallytrumptheCourt’sownobligationtosecuretheprotectionthattheConstitutiongrantstoindividuals.’Butwhenitcomestocollecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, ‘the lack ofcompetence on the part of the courts is marked,’ and respect for the Gov-ernment’sconclusionsisappropriate.Onereasonforthatrespectisthatnationalsecurityandforeignpolicyconcernsariseinconnectionwitheffortstoconfrontevolvingthreatsinanareawhereinformationcanbedifficulttoobtainandtheimpactofcertainconductdifficulttoassess…Inthiscontext,conclusionsmustoftenbebasedoninformedjudgmentratherthanconcreteevidence,andthat


have consistently portrayed these matters as sui generis. Thisquasi-axiom has proved incredibly difficult to change.Nevertheless, fact-based and administrative law-focusedapproachesdoallowustomoveforwardfromabstractassertionsabout judicial institutional incompetenceanddearthofdoctrinaltoolstoamorenuancedandempiricallyinformedapproach.Evenif they cannot resolve the key normative question and fail topersuadetheadherentsofthedemocraticlegitimacycritique,theycouldundermine(or,indeed,support)importantelementsoftheconventionalwisdom.

II.DRAWINGONADMINISTRATIVELAWUntil fairly recently,administrative lawwasalmostentirely

absent from the scholarly conversation about judicial review inforeign affairs and national security. The debate has largelyfocused on constitutional concepts: separation of powers,executive power, Article III constraints on justiciability andfederalism. In certain areas, such as international human rightslitigationandforeignsovereignimmunity,thedebatehascenteredonparticularstatutoryframeworkssuchastheAlienTortStatute15andtheForeignSovereignImmunitiesAct.16Moreover,thefieldofforeignrelationslawhasgenerallytendedtofocusontraditionalformsofforeignandsecuritypolicymakingsuchasinternationalagreements and relatively large-scale use of military force.Attentioninthefieldtonovelforeignandsecuritypolicymeasuresthat increasinglycharacterizemodernpracticehasthusfarbeenlimited.17

Consequently, administrative law has remained on thesidelines of the conversation. Important contributions from

realityaffectswhatwemayreasonablyinsistonfromtheGovernment(citationsomitted).

See also Louis Fisher, The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From Curtiss-Wright toZivotofsky,31CONST.COMMENT.149(2016).

15. 28U.S.C§ 1350(2012). 16. 28U.S.C§1602-11(2016).17. For instance, a recent comprehensive edited volume on comparative foreign

relations law focuses on traditional questions of international agreements, federalism,domestic application of international law, engagement and disengagement frominternationalinstitutions,immunityandcomity,anduseofmilitaryforce.SeeTHEOXFORDHANDBOOKOFCOMPARATIVEFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW(CurtisA.Bradleyed.,2019).


severalscholars,includingCurtisBradley,18JeanGalbraith,DavidZaring, 19 and Ganesh Sitaraman, 20 have begun to exploreadministrativelawinrelationtojudicialreviewinforeignpolicyandnationalsecuritymatters.AdrianVermeuledrewonexamplesintheareasofforeignaffairsandnationalsecuritytoillustratehowflexible administrative lawdoctrine canbewhen courtswish todefertotheexecutive.21Still,thereismuchmoreworktobedone.

Oneofthereasonswhyadministrativelawmayproveusefulin thinking about judicial review in foreign affairs and nationalsecurityistheevolvingnatureofforeignandsecuritypolicyinthe21st century. One aspect of this evolution is the significance ofinternational soft law and informal regulatory cooperation inmoderngovernance.GalbraithandZaringhavearguedthatjudicialoversight of these practices requires modification of generaladministrative law doctrine in light of foreign relations lawprinciples to allow the executive greater flexibility thanadministrativelawwouldotherwiseallow.22

Otherkey trends inhowUS foreignandsecuritypolicyhasbeenconducted in thepast twodecadeshavealsoexpandedtherole of administrative agencies in designing and implementingrelated measures. This new role goes beyond the traditionaldiplomatic and military work of foreign and security policy-dedicatedagenciesliketheStateandDefenseDepartmentsandtheintelligence community. Inpreviouswork Ihaveargued thatUSforeignandsecuritypolicyhasbecomeincreasinglyindividualizedinthepasttwodecades.23IshowthattheUnitedStateshasapplieda growing number of measures that target natural and legalpersonsdirectlytoadvanceavarietyofforeignandsecuritypolicygoals, from counterterrorism to combatting Russian electioninterference and Chinese nefarious cyber operations against US

18 . Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649

(2000).19. JeanGalbraith&DavidZaring,SoftLawasForeignRelationsLaw,99CORNELLL.

REV.735(2014).20. GaneshSitaraman,ForeignHardLookReview,66ADMIN.L.REV.489(2014).21. SeeAdrianVermeule,OurSchmittianAdministrativeLaw,122HARV.L.REV.1095

(2009).22. Galbraith&Zaring,supranote19,at736.23. ElenaChachko,AdministrativeNationalSecurity,108GEO.L.J.1063,1063(2020)

(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3440760[https://perma.cc/WG4H-RBLQ]).


companies and institutions. These measures include targetedkillings,detentions, targetedeconomicsanctions,no fly listsandother travel restrictions, as well as individualized cybercountermeasures such as indictments of individual hackers andtargetedoffensivecyberaction.

The individualization of US foreign and security policy hascoincidedwithgreaterparticipationofarangeofadministrativeagencies in designing and implementing individualizedmeasures.24AgenciesliketheTreasuryDepartment,theHomelandSecurity Department, the Justice Department and many othersoperateinthisareawithinbroadlegalframeworksthatCongressor the President have put in place over time. This has createdincreasingly independent bureaucratic mechanisms that havepersistedacrossadministrations.

Icallthistypeofgovernmentaction—administrativeagenciesrepeatedly imposing individualized foreign and security policymeasureswithinbroadlegalframeworks—administrativenationalsecurity. Administrative national security resembles ordinaryadministrativeadjudicationinthatitinvolvesapplicationoflawtofact in individualcases.Theconstantdevelopmentoftechnologythatallowsforprecisiontargetingofindividualsatrelativelylittlecostislikelytofurtherexpandthispractice.

Presidential supervision of administrative national securityhas largely decreased over time. Presidents have laid thegroundwork for these administrative mechanisms throughexecutiveordersanddirectivesatacertainpointintime.Butthebureaucraciesthatgrewoutoftheseactionshavegraduallycometo function with limited direct presidential oversight andengagement.25

Forexample,sanctionsexecutiveordersissuedbyPresidentBushintheareasofcounterterrorismandnon-proliferationnowserve as standing authorities that the Treasury and StateDepartments rely upon to impose individual sanctions againstsuspected terrorists and proliferators. A vast interagencywatchlisting system that grew out of Bush-era directives andorders was expanded and entrenched under the last twoadministrations. Interagency targeted killings practices

24. Id.25. Chachko,supranote23,SectionIII.A.1.


introducedbytheObamaadministrationsurvived,withimportantmodifications, under the Trump administration. 26 Internaloversight of targeted cyber action has become looser under theTrump administration. 27 The policies that the individualizedmeasures aim to advance have no expiration date and couldcontinueindefinitely.

The administrative national security bureaucracy creates apath dependency in the trajectory of US foreign and securitypolicy. 28 Calibrated measures for addressing key challenges atrelativelylittleeconomicandstrategiccostareappealingtoolsforadministrationstouse inaddressinghardpolicyproblems.Theycanbeappliedwithinexisting legal frameworkswithout furthercongressionalapproval—asignificantfeatureinaneraofpoliticalgridlock. Over time, public scrutiny of these practices hasatrophied, although once highly controversial individualizedmeasures like blacklisting and targeted killings continue to beappliedunderthepublicradar.29Administrativenationalsecuritythereforegivestheexecutiveoptionsthathavebecomeconvenientfallbacks for dealingwith awide variety of foreign and securitychallenges.Inaddition,administrationsmightcontinuerelyingonindividualizedmeasuressimplybyvirtueofbureaucraticinertia.These factors create structural incentives for reliance onadministrative national security going forward. Presidents arelikelytodefaultintousingthosemeasures.

What does all of this have to do with judicial review andadministrative law? First, the foregoing illustrates thatindividualized foreign policy and national security measuresapplied by administrative agencies have become an important

26. Id.SectionIII.A.1.a.27. SeeRobert Chesney,TheLawofMilitary CyberOperations and theNewNDAA,

LAWFARE (July 26, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-ndaa [https://perma.cc/6FRL-6QMB]; National Cyber Strategy of the UnitedStates of America, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/86G7-HAW6].Seealso,e.g.,EllenNakashima,WhiteHouseAuthorizes‘OffensiveCyberOperations’to Deter Foreign Adversaries, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2018),https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-authorizes-offensive-cyber-operations-to-deter-foreign-adversaries-bolton-says/2018/09/20/b5880578-bd0b-11e8-b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html[https://perma.cc/TBE6-FLK9].

28. Chachko,supranote23,SectionIII.A.2.29. Id.


featureoftheUSpolicylandscape.Thisistrueacrosspolicyareasanddifferentkindsofmeasures.Technologicaldevelopmentsandpath dependency make it likely that administrative nationalsecurity will remain an important feature of US policy for theforeseeable future. Hence, courts are likely to face related legalissues. Administrative law, I suggest below, seems to providerelevantframeworksandvocabularyforcourtsinreviewingthem.Second,conceivingofadministrativenationalsecurityasadistinctcategory of foreign and security policymaking allowsus to bothexplainandjustifytherelativelygreaterinvolvementofcourtsinreviewing foreign affairs and national security measures in thepasttwodecades.Prospectively,pastexperienceplacesaspotlightonrelevantdoctrinaltoolsfromadministrativelawforthecourtstouse.

A.ExplainingGreaterJudicialInvolvementScholars like Shirin Sinnar, 30 Andrew Kent, 31 Ganesh

Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth, 32 Ashley Deeks, 33 and SteveVladeck34haveagreedthatcourtshavebecomemoreinvolvedinforeignandsecuritymattersthantheywerepriorto9/11,eveniftheystilloftenavoiddecidingrelatedcasesonthemerits.Studyingadministrativenationalsecurityhelpsexplainwhythisisso.Themainfeaturesofadministrativenationalsecurity—thetargetingofindividualsandthecentralroleofadministrativeagencies—makemeasuresinthiscategorymorelikelytobereviewableincourt.Inparticular,administrativenationalsecuritymeasureshavegreaterchancesofmeetingAPAreviewabilityrequirements.

30. SeegenerallyShirinSinnar,ProceduralExperimentationandNationalSecurityin

theCourts,106CALIF.L.REV.991(2018).31 . See generally Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging

Domains:Changing IndividualRightsProtection inNational SecurityandForeignAffairs,115COLUM.L.REV.1029(2015).

32. SeegenerallyGaneshSitaraman&IngridWuerth,TheNormalizationofForeignRelationsLaw,128HARV.L.REV.1897(2015).

33. AshleyS.Deeks,TheObserverEffect:NationalSecurityLitigation,ExecutivePolicyChanges,andJudicialDeference,82FORDHAML.REV.827,873-74(2013).

34. StephenI.Vladeck,TheDemiseofMerits-BasedAdjudicationinPost-9/11NationalSecurityLitigation,64DRAKEL.REV.1035,1040(2016)(“Evenbyconservativeestimates,therehavebeenhundredsofcivillawsuitsbroughtoverthepast14-plusyearschallengingsomeaspectofpost-9/11nationalsecurityorcounterterrorismpolicies.”).


First,individualstargetedbyadministrativenationalsecuritymeasures are more likely to take legal action than a group ofindirectvictimsoflessspecificforeignandsecuritypolicyactioninthefirstplace.Second,plaintiffsinadministrativenationalsecuritycases are more likely to have constitutional standing, whichrequiresaconcrete,particularized“injuryinfact”thataffectstheplaintiff in a personal way; 35 a causal connection between theinjuryandthewrongfulbehavior;andredressability.36Asseveralfederal courts have already recognized, deprivation of access toassets,37restrictionoflibertyandmovement,38anddeprivationoflife39allsatisfytheinjuryinfactcondition.Becauseadministrativenational security measures are tailored to individual targets,resultinginjuriesarerelativelyeasytotracebacktogovernmentaction.

Furthermore,theAPAgrantsstatutorystandingtoindividualsdirectlyaffectedbyagencyaction.Section702oftheAPAwaivesthefederalgovernment’ssovereignimmunityfornaturalandlegalpersonschallengingwrongfulagencyaction.40ThisincludesalienswithoutsubstantialtiestotheUnitedStates—thetypicaltargetsofindividualized US measures. Therefore, administrative nationalsecurity expands the class of potential plaintiffs able to sue thegovernment in federal court over foreign and security policyaction. Even when they cannot benefit from the protection ofconstitutionalprovisionslikethedueprocessclausebecausetheylacksufficienttiestotheUnitedStates,41theAPAstillallowsthem

35. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568U.S. 398, 402 (2013) (civil societyplaintiffslackedstandingtochallengeanNSAsurveillanceprogrambecausetheycouldnotshowthattheirpersonalcommunicationswerelikelytobeintercepted).

36. See,e.g.,Lujanv.Defs.ofWildlife,504U.S.555,560–61(1992).37. See,e.g.,AlHaramainIslamicFound.,Inc.v.U.S.Dep’toftheTreasury,686F.3d

965(9thCir.2012).38. Kashemv.Barr,941F.3d358(9thCir.2019);Latifv.Holder,28F.Supp.3d1134

(D.Or.2014).39. Zaidanv.Trump,317F.Supp.3d8(D.D.C.2018).40. 5U.S.C.§702(2012)(“Apersonsufferinglegalwrongbecauseofagencyaction,

or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevantstatute,isentitledtojudicialreviewthereof.”).

41 . See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liensreceiveconstitutionalprotections[only]whentheyhavecomewithintheterritoryoftheUnitedStatesanddevelopedsubstantialconnectionswiththiscountry.”);seealsoClapperv.AmnestyInt’lUSA,568U.S.398,421(2013)(notingthatanattorney’s“foreignclientmightnothaveaviableFourthAmendmentclaim”(citingVerdugo-Urquidez,494U.S.at261));32Cty.SovereigntyComm.v.U.S.Dep’tofState,292F.3d797,799(D.C.Cir.2002)


to seek review under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious andsubstantialevidencestandards.42

For instance, although alleged al-Qaeda financier YassinAbdullahKadididnothaveUScitizenship,hewasabletochallengehis designation by the Treasury Department as a “SpeciallyDesignated Global Terrorist” before the D.C. District Court. HereliedontheAPA,theInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct (IEEPA) and Executive Order 13,224. The District Courtdismissedhissubstantiveclaimsin2012.43

Third, administrative national security measures are morelikelytomeetthe“agencyaction”reviewabilityrequirementunderthe APA. A government measure must constitute final agencyactiontobereviewable.44Theterm“agency”isdefinedinSection701(b) of the APA as “each authority of the Government of theUnited States,” with eight enumerated exceptions. 45 ThoseexceptionsencompassactionbyCongress,thecourts,aswellastheexerciseofmilitaryauthorityonthebattlefield.46

Theterm“agencyaction”iscontested,47butthecourtshaveprovided some guiding principles. First, the President is not anagency.Hisactionsarethereforenon-reviewableundertheAPA.Thecase lawsuggests that thisexclusionalsoextends toagencyactionthatrequiresthePresident’sfinalapproval.48Furthermore,thechallengedagency“action”cannotbegeneralconduct.Itmust (concluding that foreign organizations designated as Foreign Terrorist OrganizationsunderAEDPAfor links to the IRA lackedasufficientpresence in theUnitedStates,andcouldnotassertconstitutionaldueprocessrights);People’sMojahedinOrg.ofIranv.U.S.Dep’tofState,182F.3d17,22(D.C.Cir.1999)(same).

42. See5U.S.C.§706(2)(1996).43. Kadiv.Geithner,42F.Supp.3d1(D.D.C.2012).44. See5U.S.C.§704(1996).45.5U.S.C.§701(b)(1996). 46 . 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2011). Under 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2011), “‘agency action’

includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or theequivalentordenialthereof,orfailuretoact.”

47. SeeAdrianVermeule,OurSchmittianAdministrativeLaw,122HARV.L.REV.1095,1107-12 (2009) (“[T]he staggering variety of governmental bodies, and the extremeheterogeneity of the circumstances inwhich they operate, havemade it pragmaticallyimpossibleforcourtstoadherestrictlytotherestrictivestructureoftheAPA’sdefinitionof‘agency’....”).

48. SeeDaltonv.Specter,114S.Ct.1719,1724-25(1994)(findingachallengetotheimplementation of the President’s decision to close a Philadelphia naval shipyardunreviewableundertheAPA);Franklinv.Massachusetts,112S.Ct.2767,2774-75(1992)(holding that theAPAdoes not apply to the President because the President is not anagencywithinthemeaningoftheAPA).


be “circumscribed” and “discrete”.49Foreign and security policyofteninvolvesthePresident,anditisgenerallydifficulttoidentifysufficiently discrete agency action to challenge. These factors,amongothers,haveprotectedthisareafromjudicialreviewundertheAPA.

These features are present in administrative nationalsecurity, but they are significantly diminished. Therefore,administrativenationalsecuritymeasureshavegreaterchancesofmeetingthe“agencyaction”requirement.AsIhavearguedbefore,

Whatever the outer limits of “agency action” may be, it isdifficulttothinkofmorediscreteactionthanameasurethattargetsaspecificpersonorentitybyname,deprivingthemofliberty, property, and even their lives. Moreover . . . thePresident is only peripherally involved in the application ofmanyoftheindividualizedmeasuresthatformthiscategory.He has delegated significant policymaking and executionpowertoadministrativeagenciesthatdoqualifyas“agencies”undertheAPA.ThePresidentmaybeabovetheAPA,butmostagencies that apply administrative national securitymeasures—including the Departments of Treasury, State,HomelandSecurity,andDefense—arenot.50For example, in Zaidan v. Trump, 51 a case brought by

individualswhoclaimedthattheUSgovernmenthaddesignatedthemfortargetedkilling,theD.C.DistrictCourtconcludedthatthecase was reviewable under the APA. The Court found that adecision toplace theplaintiffson theso-calledgovernment “KillList”wasnot coveredby themilitaryauthority exception to theAPA’sdefinitionof“agency.”52Thisconclusionreliedinlargeparton the Washington, D.C.-centered, bureaucratic nature of thetargetedkillingsprocess—anelaborate,multiagencyprocessthatwasputinplacebytheObamaadministrationandmaintainedwithmodificationsbyhissuccessor.53Inotherwords,thecourtframedadecisionthatonecouldthinkofastraditionalmilitaryactionasordinaryagencyactionscoveredbytheAPA.

49. SeeDalton,114S.Ct.at1724-25.ButseeChachko,supranote23,at1133-34.50. Chachko,supranote23,at1133.51. Zaidanv.Trump,317F.Supp.3d8(D.D.C.2018).52. Id.at22.53. Forfurtheranalysisofthecase,seeChachko,supranote23,at1079-80.


Finally, cases pertaining to individuals should be harder todismissonpoliticalquestiongroundsthangeneralizedchallengestopolicy.InZivotofskyv.Clinton,ChiefJusticeRobertshighlightedtwo factors that should govern the application of the politicalquestion doctrine: the existence of a “textually demonstrableconstitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politicaldepartment” and “judicially discoverable and manageablestandards” for resolving the question at issue. 54 There is inprinciple law to apply in the area of administrative nationalsecurity,wherethekeyissueisthelegalityoftheoutcomeofanagency adjudication of an individual case. If the individual isprotectedbytheConstitution,applicablelawincludestheAPAandrelevant statutes, due process, and possibly other constitutionalprovisions.IfthetargetedindividualisanaliennotprotectedbytheConstitution,thereremainsAPAarbitraryandcapriciousnessreview.Thesestandardsarearguablyjudiciallymanageable.

B.JustifyingJudicialReviewAccountingforadministrativenationalsecurityalsooffersa

justification for judicial review in this category. It challengesfunctionalassumptionstheconventionalwisdomabouttheroleofcourtsinforeignaffairsandnationalsecurityhaslongreliedupon.First, government action in this category directly affectsindividuals and resembles ordinary administrative adjudication.Resolving related cases does not necessarily require uniqueexpertise,butratherapplicationofrun-of-the-milladministrativelaw anddueprocess doctrine. This task is hardly foreign to thejudiciary.

Second, arguments for increased deference related toexpertise,secrecy,anddispatchlosemuchoftheirforceincasespertaining to administrative national security. As for dispatch,individuals are generally only able to challenge the measurestargeting them after the fact—that is, after their assets werefrozen,oraftertheywereblacklisted,detained,orshotatfromadrone.55Themeasurespresumptivelyremaininplacethroughoutthe judicial proceedings. Consequently, judicial review inadministrativenationalsecurityisunlikelytoimpedeanyurgent

54. 566U.S.189,195(2012).55. See,forexample,thecasescitedsupranotes37-39.


foreign policy or national security action. It does not require aquickdecisionthatcourtshavebeensaidtobeincapableof.

With respect to expertise and secrecy, the universe ofevidencethatthegovernmentmightberequiredtoprovide,andcourtsneedtoprocess,inadministrativenationalsecuritycasesisrelativelynarrow. It should include the factsrenderingapersontargetable under the relevant authorities. It does not requirecourts to understand complex international dynamics andinterests and grapple with abstract policy problems. Concernsabout “sacrificing” classified information are mitigated by theavailabilityofexparte,incameraconsideration.

To be sure, these functional arguments do not go to thedemocratic legitimacyandaccountabilityprongof theargumentfor increased judicial deference in foreign affairs and nationalsecurity. I do not suggest that debate. “These arguments do,however, call for a more nuanced approach to the judicial rolewhen it comes to administrative national security—and offer ajustificationforjudicialreviewinrelatedcases.”56

III.TESTINGINSTITUTIONALCOMPETENCEDo courts have sufficient expertise to decide foreign and

securitymatters?Cantheydosodespitenothavingfullaccesstoclassifiedmaterialorthenecessarypersonneltoassessitsvalidityandmeaning?Cancourtsmovefastenoughtoensurethatnoharmwould come to national foreign and security interests due todelayed action? What are the broader policy implications ofjudicialreviewinforeignaffairs?

Thesequestions lend themselves toempirical investigation,yet few comprehensive studieshavebeen conducted thus far toattempttoshinenewlightonthem.Muchoftheexistingempiricalscholarshipfocusesonexplainingwhycourtsdefertothepoliticalbranches on foreign and security policy and gauging how oftentheydoso.57Inotherwords,thefocushasbeenonexplainingand

56. Chachko,supranote23,at1137.57 . See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME SILENCE DURINGWAR 71 (2003); Lee

Epsteinetal.,TheSupremeCourtDuringCrisis:HowWarAffectsOnlyNon-warCases,80N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum ofDeference:SupremeCourtTreatmentofAgencyStatutoryInterpretationsfromChevrontoHamdan,96GEO.L.J.1083(2008);CassR.Sunstein,JudgingNationalSecurityPost-9/11,2008SUP.CT.REV.269.SeealsoDeeks,supranote33,at876-79.


documenting judicial behavior, not gauging its externalimplications.IamawareofonlyahandfulofUSempiricalstudiesthat assess the impact of judicial review on policy outside thecourts,whichisessentialforevaluatingthecommoninstitutionalargumentsagainst judicial review in foreignaffairsandnationalsecurity.58

One of the reasons for this relative lack of research is thedearthofcaselawinwhichcourtshaveinfactweighedinonthemeritsofforeignaffairsandnationalsecurityquestions.Rarerstillare examples of sustained judicial engagementwith such issuesoversufficientlylongperiodsoftimetoallowforcomprehensiveanalysisofthepolicyimpactofjudicialreview.Thegreatvarietyofforeignandsecuritycasesandtheirunevenproceduralposturesalso make it difficult to draw any general conclusions throughsystematicinquiry.

Inaddition,itisnoteasytomeasurethefullimpactofjudicialengagementonpolicyinthisarea.Unlikedomesticpolicy,wherepolicymakersarerequiredbylawtomeetcertainpublicationandtransparency requirements, foreign and security action isnotoriously non-transparent. Government action in this area isprotectedbylayersofcovertorsecretinteractions,classificationand statutory exemptions, from the APA’s foreign affairs andmilitary functions exception to exemptions from disclosure inFreedomofInformationAct(“FOIA”).59Nevertheless,casestudiesexistandcanbebetterutilizedbyresearchers.

In previouswork I took on this task, albeit outside the UScontext.60IfocusedonthecasestudyoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropean Union’s (“CJEU”) targeted economic sanctionsjurisprudence. The EU courts have been conducting vigorousjudicial review of hundreds of individualized targeted sanctionsthat the European Union has levied against natural and legalpersons to advance its Common Foreign and Security Policy(“CFSP”). These sanctions typically freeze the assets of those

58 . See, e.g., Aziz Huq,What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2010)(empiricallystudyingtheimpactoftheSupremeCourtdecisioninBoumedienev.Bush,553U.S. 723 (2008), on US detention policy). Compare Yoav Dotan, Legalizing theUnlegalizable:Terrorism,SecretServicesandJudicialReviewinIsrael1970-2001,JUDICIALREVIEWANDBUREAUCRATICIMPACT190(MarcHertogh&SimonHallidayeds.,2004).

59. See5U.S.C.§553(a)(1)(1966);5U.S.C.§554(a)(4)(1978);5U.S.C.§552(b)(1)(2016).

60. SeeChachko,supranote2.


designated, impose related financial restrictions, or bandesignatedpersonsfromenteringtheEU.

AsIpreviouslywrote,“[t]heEUcourtshavewalkedafinelinebetweenprotectingdesignatedpersonsandentitiesfromarbitrarydesignation and overtly interferingwith EU foreign policy.” Thecourtshave consistentlydeferred to theEUpolitical institutionswhen it came to foreign and security policy decisions, such asdesigning sanctions criteria or selecting whom to target withsanctions. “When thecourts struckdownsanctions,” Iobserved,“theydidsoonlyondueprocessgrounds,suchas theEuropeanUnion’sfailuretostatethereasonssupportingitsdecisiontoplacea particular entity under sanctions or to provide sufficientevidencetosubstantiatethosereasons.”61

Bylimitinginterventiontotheproceduralaspectsofsanctionsdecisions, the EU courts have preserved the Council of theEuropean Union’s (“the Council”) policy discretion. They haveallowedtheCounciltomaintainitspolicydecisionsbyfixingtheprocedural flaws identified by the courts and re-imposingsanctionsthatthecourtspreviouslystruckdown.Thisprocedure-orientedapproachprovidedausefulcasestudyforassessingtheimpactofprocess-focusedjudicialreviewofforeignandsecuritymatters.

TheEUsanctionscasestudyisilluminatingbecauseithasrareattributesasfarasforeignandsecurityjudicialadjudicationgoes:itoffersalargenumberofEUsanctionscasesdecidedonthemeritsoverseveralyears,aswellasconstantandrelativelytransparentback-and-forth between EU policymakers and courts oversanctions thanks to the institutionalmechanics of the EuropeanUnion. This allowed for both a comprehensive and granularanalysisofthepolitical-judicialdialoguearoundthisissueandthepracticalimplicationsoftheEUcourts’formofinterventionintheforeignandsecurityspace—dueprocessreview.

The study relied on an original dataset that included 204decisionsissuedbyEUcourtsbetweenJuly2009andMarch2017.The decisions reviewed the legality of individual financialsanctionstheEUimposedintheframeworkof itsIranandSyriasanctionsregimes—bothsalientissuesatthetopoftheEUandtheglobalagendaduring theresearchperiod.Thestudy tracedhow

61. Id.at4.


theEUCouncilrespondedtojudicialintervention.ItdidnotonlydocumenttheCouncil’sspecificresponsetoeachjudicialdecision;the studyalsoexploredhow judicial intervention influenced thegeneralpolicyprinciplesbehindtheindividualsanctions.

The study produced several key findings. The rate ofindividualEU IranandSyriasanctions that theEUcourtsstruckdown on due process grounds was very high. Seventy-threepercentofthesanctionschallengedincourtforthefirsttimewerestruck down. If we account for repeat-challenges—sanctionschallengedforthesecondorthirdtimeafterbeingstruckdowninprevious litigation—invalidated sanctions constituted sixty-fourpercent of all reviewed sanctions in the dataset. The results ofsecond and third challenges, however, were better for the EUCouncil. It successfully defendedmost of the sanctions that thecourtshadpreviouslystruckdown(twenty-fiveoutofthirty-twosanctions).

Policymakers pushed back in response to the judicialdecisionsbyrelistingmanyofthepersonsandentitiesthatwonincourt. Sixty-two percent of the persons and entities whosedesignation the courts struck down remained listed despitejudicial intervention. At the same time, the EU Council did notreimposethirty-twopercentoftheannulledsanctions,andmoresanctions were probably eliminated in the shadow of judicialreview.

In other words, a substantial number of the reviewedsanctionswereeliminated in theprocessof judicialreview.Thisfact suggests that the process of reconsideration triggered byjudicialreviewledtheEUCounciltoforgonon-essentialsanctionsin the general scheme of its Iran and Syria sanctions policies.62Becausethecourtsonlyannulledsanctionsonproceduralgrounds,therelistingoptionwasalwaysavailabletotheEUCouncilincasesinwhichitdeemedthesanctionsimportantenoughtomaintain.

Finally,theCouncilexpandedlistingcriteriainboththeIranandSyriasanctionsregimes,atleastinparttoreducetheriskoffurther judicial intervention. The broader the criteria, the lesschallenging it should be for the Council tomeet the proceduralrequirementsof reasonsandevidencewithoutexposingsources

62 . Id. at Part 4.B. There are, of course, other plausible interpretations of these

findings.Idiscussthematgreaterlength.Id.at37-40.


andmethods.Itismucheasiertoprovethatsomeoneis“providingsupport to the government of Iran” or is a prominentbusinessperson inSyria than it is toprove that theyaredirectlyinvolved incovertnuclearproliferationorspecifichumanrightsviolations.

One could argue that the courts’ approach created anincentive structure that eventually resulted in greater potentialharm to individual rights, even if it somewhat improvedcompliancewithdueprocessinindividualcasesandhelpedweedout non-essential sanctions. By forcing the Council to expandlisting criteria inorder tomaintain certain sanctions, the courtsendedupexposingasignificantlylargercategoryofindividualstosanctions. This critique has some force, but it seems to beexaggerated. Other incentives counterbalance the incentive toexpand listing criteria solely for the instrumental reason ofshieldingsanctionsfromjudicialinvalidation.63

Theempiricalstudysuggests,then,thatjudicialreviewhadanimpact on both substantive EU policy decisions and the EUCouncil’s compliance with due process obligations. Granted,judicialannulmentofsanctionsultimatelydidnothelpdesignatedpersonsandentitiesinthemajorityofthecasesinthedataset,astheyremainedonthesanctionslists.Nevertheless,sanctionswerenotre-imposedinalmostathirdofthecases.AsIelaborateinthestudy, the fact that the Council did not reimpose judicially-invalidatedsanctionsinaboutonethirdofthecasesindicatesthatjudicialreviewsuccessfully“elicitedpolicymakerspreferencesastowhichindividualsanctionswereactuallyessentialtoachievingEU policy goals with regard to Iran and Syria, [eliminated]excessive sanctions, and [encouraged] the Council to adhere tomore robust procedures before imposing sanctions.” 64 Thefindings of the empirical study lend support to the claim thatprocedural judicial review could “reconcile some degree ofoversight of foreign policy and national securitymeasureswithinstitutionalconcernsthathave longstoodinthewayof judicialreviewinthoseareas.”65ByleavingsubstantivepolicyjudgmentstotheEUCouncilwhileenforcingstrictdueprocessrequirements,proceduralreview“facilitatedadynamicofaccountabilitywithout

63. Id.at41-33.64. Id.at5.65. Id.at6.


substantially hindering theCouncil’s ability to achieve its policygoals.”66

Ofcourse,thisstudyhasclearlimits.ThefindingsmightbeaproductofthedifferentconstitutionalstructureoftheEU,whichexplicitlygrantsstandingtodesignatedpersonsandentities,andamoreinterventionistinclinationoftheEUcourtscomparedtotheirAmerican counterparts. They may have been an artifact of thesubject matter—individual economic sanctions—and wouldthereforenottranslateverywelltootherareasof foreignaffairsandnationalsecurity.Furtherresearchisundoubtedlyrequired.

Yet, the EU case study does allow us to study generalquestions of administrative law and institutional competence inforeignaffairsthatarerelevantfortheUSdebate.Itlendssupporttotheclaimthatproceduraljudicialreviewmightbeanacceptablecompromise between oversight and policy discretion in certainareasofforeignaffairsandnationalsecurity.Manyscholarshaveadvanced a similar claim in other areas of administrative andconstitutionallaw.67

66. Id.67. See,e.g.,ALEXANDERM.BICKEL,THELEASTDANGEROUSBRANCH:THESUPREMECOURT

AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 183-98 (2d ed. 1986) (describing how courts “can avoidconstitutionaladjudicationwithoutcausinghardshiptolitigants,byresorttospecialrulesof procedure or to techniques of statutory construction, or both”); JOHN HART ELY,DEMOCRACYANDDISTRUST:ATHEORYOFJUDICIALREVIEW73-74,87-88(HarvardUniversityPress1980)(advocating“aparticipation-orientedrepresentation-reinforcingapproachtojudicialreview”).SeealsoWILLIAMN.ESKRIDGE,JR.&PHILLIPP.FRICKEY,CASESANDMATERIALSONLEGISLATION:STATUTESANDTHECREATIONOFPUBLICPOLICY336-42 (1988) (describingvarious legalprocess theories); IttaiBar-Siman-Tov,ThePuzzlingResistance to JudicialReview of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1958-62 (2011) (critiquing theresistancetojudicialreviewofthelegislativeprocess);DanT.Coenen,AConstitutionofCollaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of InterbranchDialogue,42WM.&MARYL.REV.1575,1587(2001)(describingninetypesofstructuralrules that “[facilitate] a judicial ‘remand’ of a challenged program for reevaluation bynonjudicialgovernmentemployees”);HansA.Linde,DueProcessofLawmaking,55NEB.L.REV.197,200(1976)(examiningthemeaningofdueprocessinlawmakinginthecontextof judicial review); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: ConstitutionalDoctrineand the JudicialManipulationof LegislativeEnactmentCosts, 118YALEL.J. 2, 4(2008) (arguing that courts should “raise the costs to government decisionmakers ofenactingconstitutionallyproblematicpoliciesratherthanattemptingtodesignatecertaingovernmentactions...asimpermissible”);LaurenceH.Tribe,StructuralDueProcess,10HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 269, 269; Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law:Supplement,Sham,orSubstitute?,42WM.&MARYL.REV.1871(2001).

Inthenationalsecuritycontext,seegenerallySamuelIssacharoff&RichardH.Pildes,BetweenCivilLibertarianismandExecutiveUnilateralism:AnInstitutionalProcessApproachtoRightsDuringWartime,5THEORETICALINQ.L.1(2004)(demonstratingthatUScourts


The study suggests that courts are capable of addressingpressing foreignandsecuritymatterswithoutexcessively taxingpolicymakersandtheirpreferredpolicychoices.Itisanexampleofrelativelyaggressivejudicialreviewinforeignaffairsandnationalsecurity that has created what seems to be a sustainableequilibrium of cooperation between courts and policymakersaround individual sanctions decisions. The EU courts haveinvalidateddozensofsanctionsimposedtoaddresscriticalissues,andtheskydidnotfall.

Duetotheproceduralfocusofthecourts,policymakerswereabletomaintaintheiroriginalpolicychoiceswheretheydeemedthemnecessaryforadvancingEUinterests.Theyalsomanagedtoreduce judicial intervention by learning and improving the dueprocess aspects of their decisions. Judicial intervention did notseem to discourage the use of targeted sanctions in EU foreignpolicy,whichhasreliedheavilyontargetedsanctionsforwelloveradecadedespiteconstantjudicialintervention.

IV.CONCLUSIONProfessorFlaherty’sbookrevisitsadebatethathasbecome

stagnant:whether courts shouldweigh inon foreign affairs andnational security matters. The book advances this debate bylooking beyond traditional arguments and drawing on otherdisciplines.

Similarly,thisEssayinvitesscholarstothinkcreativelyaboutjudicial review in the foreign and security space and pursueunderexplored avenues for assessing and challenging theconventionalwisdom in thisarea. Inparticular, it calls formorecareful empirical evaluationof the functional arguments againstjudicialinterventioninforeignandsecuritymatters,andbuildingon administrative law to approach such matters in light of

have in fact applied procedural review in emergencies); Joseph Landau, MuscularProcedure: ConditionalDeference in theExecutiveDetentionCases, 84WASH.L.REV. 661(2009)(arguingthatUScourtshaveconditioneddeferenceinthenationalsecuritycontexton the executive’s compliance with procedural requirements); Cass R. Sunstein,Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2004) (defending a judicial minimalismapproach to national security cases that focuses on procedural requirements such ascongressional authorization and hearing rights); Cass R. Sunstein, Clear StatementPrinciples andNational Security: Hamdan andBeyond, 2006 SUP.CT.REV.1 (2006). Fordiscussionofthistheory,seeChachko,supranote2,at33-37.


developmentsinthenatureofUSforeignandsecuritypolicyinthe21stcentury.

Pursuing these research agendas would broaden ourperspective and allow us to move beyond the traditionalconstitutional vocabulary that both skeptics and supporters ofjudicial review in foreignaffairsandnational securityhave longframedtheirargumentsaround.Itwouldalsoprovidecourtswithmoresophisticateddoctrinaltoolswithwhichtoaddressrelatedcases—andperhapscastforeignpolicyandnationalsecurityinaslightlylessmythicallight.

essay revisiting judicial review in foreign affairs

Documents