Congressional

Documents received from Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs

1. Document entitled "Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda." 3 pages.(F2001-00630)

2. E-mail to Richard Glick from Michael Fourcher, dated May 22, 2000. Subject: RE: May26. 1 page. (F2001-00630)

3. E-mail to Arlene Estep from Doreen Williams, dated June 11, 2002. 1 page. (F2001-00630)

4. E-mail to Arlene Estep from Michael Ivahnenko, dated June 11, 2002. 1 page with oneenclosure. (F2001-00630)

A. Undated draft document entitled "SA Enron op-ed Draft." 2 pages.(F2001-00630)

Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda

10:45 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., Friday, May 26, 2000George R. Brown Convention Center, Room 302

1001 Avenida De Las AmericasHouston, Texas.

Open and closing statements are anticipated to be brief

1. State Senator Rodney Ellis2. Mayor Lee Brown3. Secretary Richardson4. Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, Bob Gee5. Open panel discussion, moderated by Bob Gee6. Closing by Bob Gee7. State Senator Rodney Ellis' closing remarks8. Mayor Lee Brown's closing remarks9. Secretary Richardson's closing remarks

Round Table Participants

Secretary Bill Richardson, Co-HostState Senator Rodney Ellis, Co-host

Congressman Gene Green

Houston Mayor Lee Brown

State Senator Rick Noriega

Brett PerlmanCommissionerTexas Public Utility Commission

Ken FiedlerSr. Vice PresidentCity Public Service of San Antonio

Michael McCluskeyManager, Fuels & MarketingAustin EnergyAustin, TX

02/

David KeaneSr. Director, Legislative AffairsDynegy Inc.Houston, TX

Steve KeanExecutive Vice PresidentEnron CorpDallas, TX

Steve SchaefferSr. Vice President - RegulatoryReliant Energy, Inc.Houston, TX

Paul PlunketExecutive VP - Regulatory AffairsTexas Utilities Co.Dallas, TX

Robert BryantPresident and General ManagerGolden Spread Electric Coop., Inc.Amarillo, TX

Gregory LuceroBusiness ManagerIBEW Local 66

Marty BuckleyVice President for EnergyAir Liquide America Corp.

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"vt ' Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda

11:00 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., Friday, May 26, 2000George R. Brown Convention Center, Room 302

1001 Avenida De Las AmericasHouston, Texas

Open and closing statements are anticipated to be brief.

1. State Rep. Rick Noriega2. State Senator Rodney Ellis3. Mayor Lee Brown4. Secretary Richardson5. Moderator, Bob Gee, Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy6. Open panel discussion, moderated by Bob Gee7. Closing by Bob Gee8. State Rep. Rick Noriega9. State Senator Rodney Ellis' closing remarks10. Mayor Lee Brown's closing remarks11. Secretary Richardson's closing remarks

Panelists:CO-HOST, Energy Secretary Bill RichardsonCO-HOST, State Senator Rodney EllisMayor Lee BrownState Rep. Rick NoriegaMichael McCluskey, Manager, Fuels and Marketing, Austin EnergySan Antonio City Public Service BoardComm. Brett Perlman, Texas Public Utility CommissionReliant Energy Inc.Steve Kean, Executive Vice President, EnronErle Nye, Chairman and CEO, Texas Utilities Co.David Keane, Sr. Director, Legislative Affairs, Dynegy Inc.Robert Bryant, President and General Manager, Golden Spread Electric Coop., Inc.Gregory Lucero, Business Manager, IBEW Local 66Marty Buckley, VP for Energy, Air Liquide America Corp.

Nolan. Betty

From: Fourcher. MichaelSent: Monday, May 22. 2000 10:37 AMTo: Glick, RichardCc: Nolan, BettySubject: RE: May 26

Rich-

Great! I sent Cynthia a copy of the latest agenda.

Also, Richard D. says Houston Mayor Lee Brown will come and participate.

-Mike

--- Original Message-From: Glick, RichardSent: Friday, May 19, 2000 6:09 PMTo: Fourcher, Michael; 'michael nolan'Subject: FW: May 26

-Original Message---From: Allison.Navin@enron.com%intemet [mailto:Allison.Navin@enron.com]Sent: Friday, May 19, 2000 6:05 PMTo: Glick, RichardCc: Cynthia.Sandherr@enron.com%internetSubject: May 26

Cynthia Sandherr asked me to let you know that Steve Kean, Enron'sExecutive Vice President and Chief of Staff, will be participating in theHouston electricity reliability roundtable next Friday, May 26. Thanks.

I:EstpA.leIne -:..-' i:.::^ : .- -.- : .. .From: Williams, DoreenSent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 4:09 PMTo: Estep, Arlene

Business Card given to Dan Brouillette

Enron Corp. search: John Sheik1775 Eye St., NW, Suite 800Washington, DC 20006202 466 9172john.shelk()enron.com-

EstWep, A.rlene, ; " -^ - --From: Ivahnenko, MichaelSent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 11:37 AMTo: Estep, ArleneSubject: Enron Doc's

Importance: High

Enron op-ed.Draft Enron op-eed draft 02 Enron op-ed.Drafl

l.doc Ol.docink I found this on my computer andobviously I was not here in January....So I have no idea who wrote this. Thanks

SA Enron op-edDraft

The fall of Texas-based Enron - as recently as a year ago the nation's 7th largest company- may very well go down in the annals of business history as the most spectacularcorporate collapse ever seen. And as with the rise or fall of any commercial behemoth,there are invariably lessons to be learned. Unfortunately it looks as if the first lessonsbeing drawn from the precipitous collapse of Enron are ones we would do best to avoid.

A host of knee-jerk commentators and political activists are using the Enron downfall tocampaign against one of the left's most reliable bogeymen: deregulation.

The Boston Globe pointed to "a diminishing faith in markets." A Miami Herald headlineread "Energy Deregulation Loses Steam." An outfit called the Foundation for Taxpayerand Consumer Rights cited the Enron debacle evidence of deregulation's evils. Big-government politicians in Washington and in state capitals are saying this provesgovernment must control energy industries.

There's just one problem with this approach: It's wrong. What's clear as the dust beginsto settle is that Enron's fall had nothing to do with how California's or the nation'selectricity markets are or aren't regulated.

In the mid-1990s Enron grew to prominence as a company that traded various energies ascommodities. More recently, it expanded into a conglomerate that dealt in a host ofdifferent industries, energy being just one. It ran paper mills and was the seventh largestsupplier of newsprint in North America. It pioneered telecommunications bandwidthtrading. It manufactured plastics and glass. It handled real estate, directed Internetservices, and even sold insurance. Enron was still a large player in the energy industry,but it was becoming less and less an energy company everyday.

Still, because of its size Enron was a tempting target for California politicians whowanted to deflect attention from their disastrous attempts at what some calledderegulation. What really happened was a perverse system of regulation where one partof the market was freed, but not the other.

In a nutshell, California set strict controls on retail prices - that is, they capped the priceswhich utilities could charge consumers (read, voters). They did not cap the prices utilitieshad to pay from wholesalers. And as the demand for electricity grew, those prices wentup. Here's the kicker: California mandated that the utilities buy as much electricity as thepublic wanted.

As could be predicted, Californians gorged themselves on cheap electricity, the utilitieswere forced to the point of bankruptcy, and we found ourselves in the middle of anenergy crisis threatening large parts of the country. And the politicians who brought us

that mess blamed deregulation.

An analogy might help. Consider the market as a captive, unfairly imprisoned. WhatCalifornia did is like unshackling one leg but not the other, and when no progress ismade, saying, "See, freedom doesn't work."Blasting the straw man of deregulation is merely a smokescreen for saying that thegovernment should be in control of the major decisions about energy production andconsumption. Most notably this means that the government should set price controls.

But price controls have never worked. We tried them on oil and gas in the 1970s. Theywere an utter failure. They led to shortages and rationing and the idea that America wasgripped by malaise. Further price controls oh electricity will only lead to misery andblackouts while doing nothing to address the steps that must be taken to create acompetitive market for electricity in this country.

So what did happen to Enron? There is plenty of evidence to suggest that corporateoverreaching and questionable accounting practices played the largest part in the fall ofEnron. There appears to be no connection, however, to the California electricity situation.

Whether anything improper or illegal occurred is a matter for the securities regulators andthe relevant congressional committees. My concern as Energy Secretary is with theimpact on energy markets, and the need for stable markets.

To that end, it is important to repeat this Administration's commitment to pursuingthriving and stable markets with a minimum of government direction. One of the crucialinitiatives promoted by the president's National Energy Policy is broad electricityrestructuring according to free-market principles.

We are working closely with the House and the Senate, as well as with the various stategovernments, to do this in a bipartisan fashion. But we shouldn't let those with anideological beef against free markets distort the news in an effort to derail this muchneeded reform.

752 words

SA Enron op-edDraft

The fall of Texas-based Enron - as recently as a year ago the nation's 7" largest company- may very well go down in the annals of business history as the most spectacularcorporate collapse ever seen. And as with the rise or fall of any commercial behemoth,there are invariably lessons to be learned. Unfortunately it looks as if the first lessonsbeing drawn from the precipitous collapse of Enron are ones we would do best to avoid.

A host of knee-jerk commentators and political activists are using the Enron downfall tocampaign against one of the left's most reliable bogeymen: deregulation.

The Boston Globe pointed to "a diminishing faith in markets." A Miami Herald headlineread "Energy Deregulation Loses Steam." An outfit called the Foundation for Taxpayerand Consumer Rights cited the Enron debacle evidence of deregulation's evils. Big-government politicians in Washington and in state capitals are saying this provesgovernment must control energy industries.

There's just one problem with this approach: It's wrong. What's clear as the dust beginsto settle is that Enron's fall had nothing to do with how California's or the nation'selectricity markets are or aren't regulated.

In the mid-1990s Enron grew to prominence as a company that traded various energies ascommodities. More recently, it expanded into a conglomerate that dealt in a host ofdifferent industries, energy being just one. It ran paper mills and was the seventh largestsupplier of newsprint in North America. It pioneered telecommunications bandwidthtrading. It manufactured plastics and glass. It handled real estate, directed Internetservices, and even sold insurance. Enron was still a large player in the energy industry,but it was becoming less and less an energy company everyday.

Still, because of its size Enron was a tempting target for California politicians whowanted to deflect attention from their disastrous attempts at what some calledderegulation. What really happened was a perverse system of regulation where one partof the market was freed, but not the other.

In a nutshell, California set strict controls on retail prices - that is, they capped the priceswhich utilities could charge consumers (read, voters). They did not cap the prices utilitieshad to pay from wholesalers. And as the demand for electricity grew, those prices wentup. Here's the kicker: California mandated that the utilities buy as much electricity as thepublic wanted.

As could be predicted, Californians gorged themselves on cheap electricity, the utilitieswere forced to the point of bankruptcy, and we found ourselves in the middle of anenergy crisis threatening large parts of the country. And the politicians who brought us

that mess blamed deregulation.

An analogy might help. Consider the market as a captive, unfairly imprisoned. WhatCalifornia did is like unshackling one leg but not the other, ard when no progress ismade, saying, "See, freedom doesn't work."Blasting the straw man of deregulation is merely a smokescreen for saying that thegovernment should be in control of the major decisions about energy production andconsumption. Most notably this means that the government should set price controls.

But price controls have never worked. We tried them on oil and gas in the 1970s. Theywere an utter failure. They led to shortages and rationing and the idea that America wasgripped by malaise. Further price controls on electricity will only lead to misery andblackouts while doing nothing to address the steps that must be taken to create acompetitive market for electricity in this country.

So what did happen to Enron? There is plenty of evidence to suggest that corporateoverreaching and questionable accounting practices played the largest part in the fall ofEnron. There appears to be no connection, however, to the California electricity situation.

Whether anything improper or illegal occurred is a matter for the securities regulators andthe relevant congressional committees. My concern as Energy Secretary is with theimpact on energy markets, and the need for stable markets.

To that end, it is important to repeat this Administration's commitment to pursuingthriving and stable markets with a minimum of government direction. One of the crucialinitiatives promoted by the president's National Energy Policy is broad electricityrestructuring according to free-market principles.

We are working closely with the House and the Senate, as well as with the various stategovernments, to do this in a bipartisan fashion. But we shouldn't let those with anideological beef against free markets distort the news in an effort to derail this muchneeded reform.

752 words

SA Enron op-edDraft

The fall of Texas-based Enron - as recently as a year ago the nation's 7th largest company- may very well go down in the annals of business history as the most spectacularcorporate collapse ever seen. And as with the rise or fall of any commercial behemoth,there are invariably lessons to be learned. Unfortunately it looks as if the first lessonsbeing drawn from the precipitous collapse of Enron are ones we would do best to avoid.

A host of knee-jerk commentators and political activists are using the Enron downfall tocampaign against one of the left's most reliable bogeymen: deregulation.

The Boston Globe pointed to "a diminishing faith in markets." A Miami Herald headlineread "Energy Deregulation Loses Steam." An outfit called the Foundation for Taxpayerand Consumer Rights cited the Enron debacle evidence of deregulation's evils. Big-government politicians in Washington and in state capitals are saying this provesgovernment must control energy industries.

There's just one problem with this approach: It's wrong. What's clear as the dust beginsto settle is that Enron's fall had nothing to do with how California's or the nation'selectricity markets are or aren't regulated.

In the mid- 1990s Enron grew to prominence as a company that traded various energies ascommodities. More recently, it expanded into a conglomerate that dealt in a host ofdifferent industries, energy being just one. It ran paper mills and was the seventh largestsupplier of newsprint in North America. It pioneered telecommunications bandwidthtrading. It manufactured plastics and glass. It handled real estate, directed Internetservices, and even sold insurance. Enron was still a large player in the energy industry,but it was becoming less and less an energy company everyday.

Still, because of its size Enron was a tempting target for California politicians whowanted to deflect attention from their disastrous attempts at what some calledderegulation. What really happened was a perverse system of regulation where one partof the market was freed, but not the other.

In a nutshell, California set strict controls on retail prices - that is, they capped the priceswhich utilities could charge consumers (read, voters). They did not cap the prices utilitieshad to pay from wholesalers. And as the demand for electricity grew, those prices wentup. Here's the kicker: California mandated that the utilities buy as much electricity as thepublic wanted.

As could be predicted, Californians gorged themselves on cheap electricity, the utilitieswere forced to the point of bankruptcy, and we found ourselves in the middle of anenergy crisis threatening large parts of the country. And the politicians who brought us

that mess blamed deregulation.

An analogy might help. Consider the market as a captive, unfairly imprisoned. WhatCalifornia did is like unshackling one leg but not the other, and when no progress ismade, saying, "See, freedom doesn't work."Blasting the straw man of deregulation is merely a smokescreen for saying that thegovernment should be in control of the major decisions about energy production andconsumption. Most notably this means that the government should set price controls.

But price controls have never worked. We tried them on oil and gas in the 1970s. Theywere an utter failure. They led to shortages and rationing and the idea that America wasgripped by malaise. Further price controls oh electricity will only lead to misery andblackouts while doing nothing to address the steps that must be taken to create acompetitive market for electricity in this country.

So what did happen to Enron? There is plenty of evidence to suggest that corporateoverreaching and questionable accounting practices played the largest part in the fall ofEnron. There appears to be no connection, however, to the California electricity situation.

Whether anything improper or illegal occurred is a matter for the securities regulators andthe relevant congressional committees. My concern as Energy Secretary is with theimpact on energy markets, and the need for stable markets.

To that end, it is important to repeat this Administration's commitment to pursuingthriving and stable markets with a minimum of government direction. One of the crucialinitiatives promoted by the president's National Energy Policy is broad electricityrestructuring according to free-market principles.

We are working closely with the House and the Senate, as well as with the various stategovernments, to do this in a bipartisan fashion. But we shouldn't let those with anideological beef against free markets distort the news in an effort to derail this muchneeded reform.

752 words

Freedom of Information Act RequestCertification

To: Laura Brown

Request # F2001-00630 Date: June 7, 2002

The attached request has been referred to your office, or action. Please complete this form andreturn it along with any responsive documents toat, . Direct any questions to me on 6-6. !

Please check/complete where appropriate:

The documents transmitted herewith contain no classified or unclassified information ontechnologies supporting nuclear weapons design and production, etc.

The documents transmitted herewith were found to contain classified or unclassifiedinformation on technologies supporting nuclear weapons design and production, etc., and havebeen referred for review (memo attached).

We have been unable to locate any documents responsive to this request.

12 Pages (Number) of documents have been identified.

It is recommended that the documents transmitted herewith be:

Released in their entirety

XXX Partially withheld for the reasons stated in the attachment

Withheld in their entirety for the reasons stated in the attachment

A thorough search has been conducted for records/information responsive to this request. Also,please fill in the following:

Search Time/Hourly Rate:

Review time/hourly rate:

I certify by signature that all responsive material has ben brought to the attention of the FOIA/Privacy act office.

Laura I. Brown _ ._ 7__ _

Authorizing Official Print Name "Signature

Congressional and IntergovernmentalAffairs, CI-03 June 13, 2002

Title Director, Resource Mgmt. Date

Please Note: When releasing or denying information this form can only be signed by thedesignated Authorizing/Denying Officials.

ent ,||l Gus Ac^ w^.i~t4 ;ton,DC oar ties 4 1-- w' C.- h

SUBJECT: FOI Request #F2001-00630--ENRON Documents

n response to your request dated June 7, 2002, a file search was conducted by staff in the Offce

of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs (CI) for files concerning ENRON, and the

following documents have been located:

N

Aitairs, C1-03

SUBJECT: FOI Request #F2001-00630--ENRON Documents

In response to your request dated June 7, 2002, a file search was conducted by staff in the Officeof Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs (CI) for files concerning ENRON, and thefollowing documents have been located:

1. Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda for May 26, 2002, identifying Round TableParticipants;

2. Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda for May 26, 2002, identifying Panelists;

3. E-mail from Michael Fourcher to Richard Glick dated May 22, 2000, regarding May 26agenda;

4. E-mail from Doreen Williams stating that Dan Brouillette, Assistant Secretary/CI,provided his business card to Enron rep;

5. E-mail from Michael Ivahnenko stating that the following documents regarding Enronwere located on his computer. Mr. Ivahnenko also states that the writer is unknown. Thecomputer currently used by Mr. Ivahnenko was previously assigned to Mr. Ellis Dischwho has since departed from DOE. The documents are: Enrol op-ed Draft 01; Enronop-ed draft 02 and Enron op-ed Draft 01. It is recommended that these three documentsunder item #5, not be released since there is no knowledge of the writer, what or who thedocuments were prepared for, or whether they are DOE documents.

If you have any questions, please give me a call (x65524).

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