ENPOSS2016Program

Wednesday,August24

12:00-13:45 Registration(ForestHouselobby,Unioninkatu40)13:45-14:00 Openingwords

14:00-15:30 Invitedtalk:HelenLongino(Stanford):ScaleMatters—InEpistemologyandinSocialAnalysis(room6)

15:30-16:00 Coffee

16:00-18:00 Parallelsessions A1(room8)

JackWright:Howdoweknowwhichmodelsprovideuswithcausalinformation?(UNABLETOPRESENT)LorenzoCasini&GianlucaManzo:Agent-basedModelsandCausality:AMethodologicalAppraisalLuisMireles-Flores:Causalinferenceandtheempiricalevidenceonthebenefitsoffreetrade

B1(room12)EsaDiazLeon:KindsofSocialConstructionJaanaVirta:SocialConstructionofGenderintheTheoryofGenderPerformativityTuomasVesterinen:TheKindsofLoopingEffects

Thursday,August25

9:30-11:30 Parallelsessions

A2(room8)RobertoFumagalli:How‘Thin’RationalChoiceTheoryExplainsKateVredenburgh:TheExplanatoryProblemforClassicalRationalChoiceTheoryRichardLauer,AndréAriew&RandallWestgren:MicrofoundationsinStrategyandExplanatoryReductionism

B2(room12)MichiruNagatsu&MikkoSalmela:Emotionalnudges:theoreticalandethicalchallengesElinaVessonen:RTMandpsychometricsaspartialapproachestomeasurementAnnaMichalska:Pathologyasasocialscientificconcept

11:30-12:00 Coffee

12:00-13:20 Parallelsessions A3(room8)

CorinnaElsenbroich&HarkoVerhagen:“Isitjustme?”:Mechanisms,Agent-BasedModellingandMethodologicalIndividualismTuukkaKaidesoja:Threetypesofcausalmechanisms

B3(room12)InkeriKoskinen&KristinaRolin:SocialEpistemologyofScientific/IntellectualMovements:TheCaseofIndigenousStudiesPierreWillaime:ExpertiseinOnlineEpistemicCommunities

13:20-14:30 Lunch

14:30-16:00 Invitedtalk:BrianEpstein(Tufts):Whataresocialgroups?Theirmetaphysicsandhowtoclassifythem(room6)

16:00-16:30 Coffee

16:30-17:50 Parallelsessions A4(room8)

N.EmrahAydinonat&EminKoksal:ExplanationParadoxResolvedAkiLehtinen&JaakkoKuorikoski:DSGEmodelsandAdHocness

B4(room12)MikołajRatajczak:PhilosophyofLanguageandCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy:AnAccountfromthePerspectiveoftheContemporaryItalianPoliticalPhilosophyRemcoHeesen,LiamKofiBright&AndrewZucker:VindicatingMethodologicalTriangulation(UNABLETOPRESENT)

19:00 ConferenceDinner

Friday,August26

10:00-12:00 Parallelsessions

A5(room8)LauraValentini:WheninRomeDoastheRomansDo:Respect,PositiveNorms,andtheObligationtoObeytheLawJoonasOttman:TheEpistemicConditionsforSuccessfulNorm-InducedBehavioralInterventionsThomasNoah:OnTheFailureofSeparatingCustomsfromMoralNormsintheTheoryofSocialNorms

B5(room12)KaisaKärki:TheProblemofActivityandPassivityofIntentionalOmissionsEivindBalsvik:InterpretationandtheproblemofconfabulationJuliusElster:Reflectionsonreflexivityineverydaylife-rapprochementbetweenintra-activityandsocialembeddedness

12:00-13:00 Lunch

13:00-15:00 Parallelsessions A6(room8)

HardySchilgen:IntegrativePluralismintheSocialSciencesMarkTheunissen:Naturalism,PluralismandtheInterestsofSocialInquiryJaanaEigi:Wouldyouremakescienceunderthephilosopher’sguidance?Onphilosophicalproposalsandpoliticalmotivation

B6(room12)ThomasBoyer-Kassem&CyrilleImbert:Preferencefalsification,reputationalcascadesandgroupdeliberations(UNABLETOPRESENT)MatteoBianchin:SocialCognitionandHypotheticalContractsEnricoTerrone:TheBandofTheseus.SocialOntologyandMentalFiles

15:00-15:30 Coffee

15:30-17:00 Invitedtalk:ChristianList(LSE):Whatisitliketobeagroupagent?(room6)

17:00-17:10 Concludingwords

17:10-17:30 Coffee

1AndréAriew,RichardLauerandRandallWestgren:MicrofoundationsinStrategyandExplanatoryReductionismFrom its inception as a field of study within the domain of managementscholarship, strategic management has focused on decision processes andoutcomesatthefirmlevel.Earlyon,theplanningor“design”schooldominated,whereinmodelsdescribingtheobjectivesandstrategiesoffirmsinahierarchicalform were elaborated (Mintzberg 1990, p. 147; Mintzberg 1994; Mintzberg,Ahlstrand and Lampel 1998). Later schools of strategy concerning corporateportfolio management, firm resources, and re-configuration have focused ondecisions at the top of strategic business units, conglomerates, and firms. Thebroad approach taken in strategic management research is holistic in thatexplanations of firm behavior appeal to social entities, e.g. “routines” or“capabilities”(byKincaid(1996)’sdefinitionofholism).Management scholars who want to establish microfoundations for strategicmanagementopposetheholistictendencypresentintheliterature(cf.FelinandFoss 2005; Foss and Lindenberg 2013; Barney and Felin 2013). The appeal tomicrofoundations can be understood as an endorsement of methodologicalindividualism, a reductionist thesiswhich states that social scienceexplanationsmustmakereferencetotheindividualscausingsocialphenomena(Kincaid1993;Kincaid2015b).Theefforttoformulatemicrofoundationsmaybeseenaspartofalargerprojectconcerningthefoundationsoforganizationtheoryandevolutionaryeconomics (Abell, Felin, and Foss 2008; Gavetti 2005; Vromen 2006). We candistinguishbetweendifferentgradesofdisagreementwiththeholisticdispositionof research in strategic management – we can distinguish betweenmicrofoundationalists and microfundamentalists. The former acknowledge theexistence and value of holistic explanations in strategic management, butnevertheless prefer individualist explanations of strategic outcomes. The latterarguethatindividualistexplanationsrenderholisticexplanationsdispensable.Bothcampssee themselvesaspresentinga superiorapproach to thestraightforwardholisminthestrategicmanagementliterature.

Wearguethattheprojectofestablishingmicrofoundationsforstrategyresearchrequires sensitivity to the variety of explanatory interests of social scientists,especially where those explanatory interests concern decisions betweenindividualistandholistexplanations.Inparticular,weareconcernedwithwhatwewillcall“explanatoryreductionism”.Explanatoryreductionismisnotmetaphysicalreductionism (weexplain thedifferencebetweenexplanatory andmetaphysicalreduction),butaformofareductionismthattreatsreductionasanexplanatorystrategy. Thus, according to explanatory reductionism, the extent to which areductionistexplanation isadequatedependson itssuitability toaddressingtheexplanation-seeking question at hand. Accordingly, explanatory reductionismimpliesthatwhetherareductionistexplanationisadequateisanaposteriori,andnot an a priori, matter. However, this approach may still yield interestingmetaphysicalconclusionsaboutthesocialworld(wewilldiscussthisprospectattheendofourdiscussion),thussuggestingthatthemetaphysicsofsocialsciencecanbeconstruedasanaposteriori,ratherthananapriori,matter.To theextent thatour approachwarrants inferencesabout theontologyof thesocialworld,itstandsincontrasttoapproachestosocialontologythatholdthatthere issomecontributionthatcontemporaryanalyticmetaphysicscanmaketoconstructing a social ontology (Epstein 2015; Searle 2009). Our approach, bycontrast, appeals to themanner in which existing social scientific theories andmethodsserviceexplanatoryinterestsandusesthisasajustificationfordrawingfurtherconclusionsaboutthenatureofthesystemsinquestion,andthusissimilartotheapproachestakenbyKincaid(2015a)andDupré(1993),whogroundtheirscientificontologyintheorieswithstrongempiricalsupport.However,wewillalsodiscuss reasons onemight avoid drawing firm ontological conclusions from thisapproachtosocialontology.We believe our approach to thinking about reduction in the social sciences(particularly strategic management) to be a more modest proposal than thesweepingindividualismimpliedinsomeofthediscussioninthemicrofoundationsliterature. We will discuss four issues relevant to delimiting explanatoryreductionisminstrategicmanagement.First,wediscussthepracticeofempirical

2confirmation,animportantconsiderationinchoosinganexplanation.Wedescribecasesfrombiologywherepreferenceforreductionistexplanationswasinformedbyscientificpractice.Thesecondissueconcernsthedecomposabilityofcomplexsystems.Thedegreetowhichasystem,suchasacomplexorganizationgovernedby a coherent strategy, can be decomposed into separable and distinct units –down to the level of teams and individuals – matters for the adequacy ofreductionist social scientificexplanations.The third, issue,which flows fromthelessons learned in our first discussions, involves the practice of scientificexplanation. In particular, we evaluate dispensability arguments in themicrofoundationsliterature.Ourthesisisecumenical:thepresenceofindividualistexplanationsdoesnotrenderholistexplanationsdispensable.Whetherweoughtto prefer micro-level or macro-level explanations depends on social scientists’explanatoryinterests.Fourth,wewillpresentcasesinwhichreductionistandnon-reductionist explanations seem appropriate in social scientific research (inparticular, organizational science and strategic management) and thecorrespondingontologicalcommitmentsourapproachmaywarrant.

N.EmrahAydinonatandEminKoksal:ExplanationParadoxResolvedRecently Reiss (2012) argued for the existence of an explanation paradox ineconomics. According to Reiss, philosophers of economics commonly hold thefollowingbeliefsconcerningeconomicmodels:“(1)economicmodelsarefalse;(2)economicmodelsareneverthelessexplanatory;and(3)onlytrueaccountsexplain”(Reiss,2012,p.43).Sincethesebeliefsorhypothesesabouteconomicmodelsaremutually inconsistent, there seems to be a paradox, and according to Reiss allattempts to solve this paradox have failed. Reiss’ argument has already beencriticized by others (e.g., see Alexandrova & Northcott, 2013; Hausman, 2013;Mäki,2013;Rol,2013;Sugden,2013).Althoughthepresentpaperbuildsontheseattempts in order to resolve three misunderstandings concerning models,explanation and understanding in economics, it does not aim at presenting yetanothercritiqueofReiss(2012).Instead,usingtheapparentexplanationparadoxasourstartingpointthepaperaimsatcontributingtothephilosophicalliteratureon models and explanation. Three important presumptions that lead to theapparentexplanationparadoxareofinterestforphilosophersofscience:(i)Thatmodelsarenecessarilyexplanations,(ii)thatabstracttheoreticalmodelsprovidesingular explanations, and (iii) that a single model—e.g., the Hotelling (1929)model—istheunitofphilosophicalanalysis.Thesepresumptionsbring frontthefollowingquestions:Aremodelsexplanations?Howaretheoreticalmodelsrelatedto (singular and theoretical) explanations? Could we account for the epistemicimportofahighlyabstractmodelineconomicsbywayofattemptingtoanalyzeitinisolationfromallothermodelsthataimatexplainingsamephenomenon?Theliteratureonmodelsandexplanationisnotentirelyclearconcerningtheanswersto these questions. Recently, Rohwer and Rice (2015) brought some of thesequestiontotheforefront,andattemptedtoprovideaframeworkformakingsenseof the relation between models and explanation and the epistemic role(s) ofmodels. In the present paper, we contribute to a better understanding of thisrelationandoftheepistemicimportofhighlyabstractmodelsineconomicsbywayofpresentingacasestudyofReiss’favoriteexample,theHotelling(1929)model.

3We set forth the following arguments concerning the Hotelling model: TheHotellingmodeldoesnotrepresentanyparticularrealworldtarget.It iscontextsensitiveandnotrobust.TheHotellingmodelneitherexplainsaparticularcaseofcompetition, nor provides a "true account" of any particular instance ofcompetition.Nevertheless,asReissalsoargues,themodelfeelsexplanatory.Moreimportantly,economistsconsidertheHotellingmodelasanimportant,useful,andexplanatorymodel.Reisstakes itthatarguingthattheHotelling(1929)model is“explanatory”,knowingthat it is“false”andassumingthatonly true“accounts”explainconstitutesaparadox. Inthepresentpaper,weshowthatthisapparentparadoxdisappearsifonerecognizesthatitsimplicitpresumptionsaremistaken.WearguethatonecannotfullyunderstandthecontributionoftheHotellingmodel,ifoneisolatesitfromtheclusterofmodelsitbelongsto.Adoptingtheclusterofviewofmodels (Ylikoski&Aydinonat, 2014)we show that theHotelling (1929)modelis“explanatory”(i.e.,itimprovesourunderstanding)despitethefactthatitis “false” (i.e., it containsmany unrealistic assumptions). Themodel provides apartialtheoreticalexplanationthatcouldbeusedindevelopingpotential(singular)explanations.TheHotellingmodelimprovesourunderstandingbecauseitexpandsthe menu of possible explanations in the industrial organization literature. Itenhanceseconomists’abilitytoprovidebettersingularexplanationsforobservedeconomiceventsandfacts.Thatis,itexpandsourunderstandingwhenevaluatedinthecontextofrelatedmodels.LiteratureontheHotellingmodelalsoillustratesthat the model sparked the development of new models that explore severalpossibilities, further expanding the menu of possible explanations in industrialorganization.OurdiscussionoftheHotellingmodelillustratesthat(i)amodelisnotalwaysanexplanation, (ii) one should not conflate theoretical explanations with singularexplanations, and (iii) epistemic role of highly abstract theoretical models ineconomicscannotbeappropriatelyunderstoodifoneanalysesamodelinisolationfromotherrelatedmodels.Moreover,theoreticalmodelsshouldnotbeevaluatedwith criteria that are appropriate for singular explanations. In sum, the

aforementionedpresumptionsaremistakenandtheapparentexplanationparadoxdisappearsifonedispenseswiththesepresumptions.ReferencesAlexandrova,A.,&Northcott,R.(2013).It’sjustafeeling:whyeconomicmodelsdo not explain. Journal of Economic Methodology, 20(3), 262–267.http://doi.og/10.1080/1350178X.2013.828873Hausman,D.M. (2013). Paradoxpostponed. Journalof EconomicMethodology,20(3),250–254.http://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2013.828868Hotelling,H.(1929).StabilityinCompetition.TheEconomicJournal,39(153),41–57.Mäki, U. (2013). On a Paradox of Truth, or How Not to Obscure the Issue ofWhether Explanatory Models Can Be True. Journal of Economic Methodology,20(3),268–279.http://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2013.828869Reiss,J.(2012).Theexplanationparadox.JournalofEconomicMethodology,19(1),43–62.http://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2012.661069Rohwer, Y., & Rice, C. (2015). How are Models and Explanations Related?Erkenntnis.http://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9788-0Rol,M.(2013).ReplytoJulianReiss.JournalofEconomicMethodology,20(3),244–249.http://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2013.828870Sugden, R. (2013). How fictional accounts can explain. Journal of EconomicMethodology,20(3),237–243.http://doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2013.828872Ylikoski, P., & Aydinonat, N. E. (2014). Understanding with theoretical models.Journal of Economic Methodology, 21(1), 19–36. Retrieved fromhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2014.886470

4EivindBalsvik:InterpretationandtheproblemofconfabulationThereisalongstandingtraditionwithinthesocialsciencestoregardsocialbehavioras being under rational, conscious control. A case in point is that interpreters,accordingtotheprincipleofcharity,areunderabasicmethodologicalconstraintto interpret so as to construe people as predominantly rational in thought andaction, and as predominantly correct in their beliefs. The presumption of first-person authority holds that people’s self-ascriptions of occurrentmental statesshould in the first instancebetakentobetrue,withoutneedofsupplementaryevidence,eveniferrorandcorrectionispossible.WhereasDavidson(1980;1984;2001) depicts these principles as being a priori, yet empirically defeasiblepresuppositions of interpretation, Quine (1960) depicts them as being theempirically most likely hypotheses. However, since then, more and morepsychological studies suggest that social behavior is both less rational, and lesscontrolled thanpreviouslypresumed, and claims toprivilegedandauthoritativeaccess have been strongly opposed. In the light of such studies, interpretationtheoryandinterpretivistsocialscienceseemtorestonabadpsychology.Thepurposeofthispresentation istwo-fold: Iwishtorecountthepsychologicalresearch which challenges the presuppositions of interpretation theory, anddiscusswhether it ispossible to incorporate these findings,withoutabandoningtheguidingideathatsocialphenomenaandsocialactionshouldatleastinpartbeunderstoodfromthepointofviewofthosebeingstudied.Henderson(1987;1993)provides the general framework for how I believe this psychological updatingshouldbeaccomplished.Psychologicalfindingsposeachallengetointerpretationtheorybecauseitseemstoundermineboththetenabilityoftheprincipleofcharityandthepresumptionoffirst-person authority. The tenability of principle of charity seems to beunderminedbyexperimentswhichshowthathumanbeingstendtosystematicallyandreliablyfailtoconformtothenormsofrationalityspelledoutbyclassicallogic,probability theory, epistemology, and decision theory (Ariely 2008; Kahneman2011). The tenability of the presumption of first-person authority seems to be

underminedbystudieswhichshowthatpeoplehavea tendencytoconfabulateexplanationsof theirbehavior,because theirconsciousselvesdonotknowwhytheydowhattheydo,andthereforecreatetheexplanationsthatmakemostsense(Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wilson 2002; Carruthers 2011, Haidt 2012; Cassam2015).Henderson(1987;1993)recommendsthatweshouldfollowQuineinregardingthepresumptions of rationality in interpretation theory as an empirical hypothesis.“[T]he weighting of the principle of charity is to be informed by psychologicaltheory regarding the relative likelihood of various types of error.” (Henderson1993,43)Hendersonalsosuggeststhattheprincipleofcharityshouldberefinedintowhathecallstheprincipleofexplicability:“so[interpret]astomaximizetheexplicabilityofbeliefsandactionsattributedtosubjects.”(Henderson1987,324)Henderson(1993)tellsushowtodealwiththeproblemofirrationality,buthedoesnotdiscuss theconfabulation-dataor thestatusand roleof thepresumptionoffirst-person authority in interpretation theory. I shall focus on the questionwhether the confabulation-data forces us to abandon the presumption of first-personauthorityandprivilegeasamethodologicalconstraintoninterpretation,assuggested by Carruthers (2011) ISA theory, and Cassam’s (2015) inferentialism.Carruthers and Cassam take the confabulation data to suggest that there is nodifferenceinprinciplebetweenhowapersonknowshisownmind,andthemindsof others. They therefore take these data to rebut the principle of first-personauthority.I take it as shown that the psychological research demonstrates that people’srationalcapacitiesandtheirprivilegedandauthoritativeknowledgeoftheirownmind is limited.However,manypsychologists think theevidenceof irrationalityandtheconfabulation-dataarecompatiblewiththeclaimthatasignificantportionofsocialbehaviorissubjecttorational,consciouscontrol,andcanbeinterpretedas such. (Wilson 2002; Baumeister, Masicampo and Vauhs (2011); Bargh andBaumeister 2014; Fazio and Olsen 2014) There remains a problem of how toincorporatethisintointerpretationtheory.

5Themajortheoretical frameworkforexplainingtheevidenceof irrationalityandthe confabulation-data is provided by dual-system theories of reasoning. Dual-systemtheoriesholdthathumancognitioniscomposedoftwodifferentreasoningsystems,oftencalledSystem1andSystem2.WhereasSystem1processingisheldto be fast, automatic and unconscious, System2 processing is held to be slow,controlled and conscious. My first suggestion is to follow Wilson (2002) andGoldman(2006)inalsoadoptingadual-methodtheoryofself-knowledgeinorderto explain the confabulation-data. According to dual-method theory, peoplesometimes have non-interpretative, privileged and authoritative access to theirownthoughtsandthoughtprocesses,whiletheyonotheroccasionsrelyonself-interpretations or theoretical inferences, even though they are under theimpression of introspecting. When people rely on self-interpretation or maketheoreticalinferences,theirresponseswillsometimesbeconfabulatory.Inorderforinterpreterstobeabletorelyuponfirst-personauthorityandprivilegedaccesswheninterpretingothers,weneedanaccountoftheconditionsunderwhichitisreasonabletoexpectpeopletobecapableofself-ascribingpropositionalattitudesin the privileged and authoritative first-person way, and the conditions underwhich it is likelythattheywill resorttounconscious,andperhapsconfabulatoryself-interpretation. I shall suggest a number of such criteria, drawn from thephilosophicalliteratureandthepsychologicalliteratureondual-systemtheoryandconfabulation.Thetheoreticalmodelemployed,willbeFazioandOlsen’s(2014)MODE-model.Ishallillustratemyapproachbydiscussinghowtohandlethedataof implicit racism, which have been much discussed by philosophers. (Gendler2008,Schwitzgebel2011)

MatteoBianchin:SocialCognitionandHypotheticalContractsSocialcontracttheory– inthehypotheticalcontractversion–traditionallyfacesthreeobjections.Thathypotheticalcontractsarenotbinding(Dworkin1973);thattheymodelactorsaccordingtoanunrealisticallyabstractconceptionofselfandagency (Sandel 1983); that the theory is circular (Nagel 1973; Pettit 1993;Habermas1995).Iarguethatcurrentworkinsocialcognitionprovidesthetoolstocopewith the second and the thirdworry, and to dealwith the first once it isframedas a stabilityproblem. I drawonTomasello’sworkon thepsychologicalinfrastructureofcooperationandonGoldman’ssimulationtheorytofigureoutthemechanisms atwork, and argue that theyprovide agentswith a framework forhandlinghypotheticalcontracts,graspingtheirnormativecontent,supportingthemotivationtocomply.Thebackground idea isthatsocialcontracttheorycanbegivenaplausiblemechanisticreading.IwillfocusonRawlsiancontractualism,butthe main tenets may apply mutatis mutandis to both contractualist andcontractariantheories.InthefirstsectionIframetheissueinthecontextofRawls’understandingoftheoriginalpositionasa“deviceofrepresentation”designedtoconvertaquestionofjustification into a deliberative problem. The original position models theconditions under which agents that regards themselves as free and equals aresupposedtoreachanagreementandthereforeconstrainswhatcanbeputforwardasagoodreasonindeliberatingtheprinciplesofjustice.Thisworksasaconstrainton deliberation insofar as it conveys an impartial and fair point of view thatexpressestheself-conceptionofagentsas freeandequal rationalbeings (Rawls1971, 1985; Freeman 2007; Barry 1995). Critics have objected both that thismisconstrues how actual agents understand themselves and that it circularlyintroducesintheinitialsituationthenormativecontentsthataresupposedtobetheoutputofthecontract.InthesecondsectionIarguethatcurrenttheoriesofsocialcognitionsupplythetoolstoworkoutapsychologicallyfeasibleunderstandingoftheoriginalpositionand to tackle these worries. Drawing on Tomasello’s work on the cognitive

6infrastructure of cooperation I take that (a) cooperative activities requireunderstandingtheequivalencebetweenselfandotherandthereforeacapacityforsocialcognitionthatsupportsperspectivetakingandrolereversal;and(b)thepro-socialmotives stemming from the early inclinations to help and share developthroughsocialinteractionintoadispositiontoreciprocity(Tomasello2009,2014).I further maintain that perspective taking and role reversal are supported bysimulative mindreading and rest on a single mechanism of imaginative self-projectionthatworksboth in intrapersonalactionplanningand in interpersonalcooperation(Goldman2006,2013;Bruckner,Carroll,2007).On thisbasis I argue that,although the limitedmindreadingcapacitiesandpro-social motives involved in early joint actions do not support the KantianinterpretationoftheoriginalpositionsuggestedbyRawls,anappropriatelygeneralandabstractunderstandingofagencyandintentionalpsychologycanbetakentodevelopoutofthemasarepresentationaltheoryofmindisacquiredinconnectionwith the syntax of sentential complements, which enables the attribution ofpropositionalattitudes,andsocialcognitionaccordinglyrearrangesinlinewiththefolk psychological vocabulary. In this context agents generalize the conditionsunderwhich joint actions are performed and learn to cooperate in anonymoussettings (Tomasello, Rakoczy 2003). We should expect that the self-otherequivalencethatgoesalongwithearlyjointactionsalsogeneralizestotheeffectthatindividualscometoconceivethemselvesmutuallyasrationalagentsendowedwithacapacityforself-monitoringandself-governance.Icontendthatthefairandimpartial point of view captured by the original position becomes accessible asagents come to see themselves as free and equal in this minimal sense andconsequently acquire a capacity to reason and act according to the normativeexpectationsofa“generalizedother”.Underthisreadingsocialcontracttheorydoesnotlookcircular,asitrestsontheworkingofsocio-cognitivemechanismsthatarenotmorallyloaded.Inparticular,no moral assumption is build in the understanding of agency and in the self-conception of agents that underlay the original position, in contrast with bothKantianconstructivism(Freeman2007,Korsgaard2009),andwiththeideaofmoral

personallegedlyfoundinthepoliticalcultureofdemocraticsocieties(Rawls1993).Deliberating in the original position just results from recruiting the self-otherequivalencethatgoesalongwithearlyjointactionsundertheabstractconceptionofagencyindividualsacquireinthecourseofdevelopingtheirsocio-cognitiveskills.In the final section I conjecture that theearlydisposition to reciprocatemayberecruited to yield a general system ofmutual normative expectations as socialcognition develops along the line sketched above. This may account for themotivationtoagreeonfairtermsofcooperationandtocomplywiththemoncetheyare inplace,whichallowsafairsystemofcooperationtobestableorself-supportinginRawls’sense.Bruckner,R.,Carroll,D.(2007),“Self-ProjectionandtheBrain.”TrendsinCognitiveSciences11(2):49-57.Dworkin,R.(1973),“TheOriginalPosition”,TheUniversityofChicagoLawReview,40(3):500-533.Freeman,S.(2007),JusticeandtheSocialContract,Oxford:OUP.Goldman,A.(2006),SimulatingMinds,Oxford:OUP.

- (2013),JointVentures,Oxford:OUP.Habermas,J.(1995),“Reconciliationthroughthepublicuseofreason”,JournalofPhilosophy92(3):109-31.Korsgaard,C.(2009),Self-Constitution,Oxford:OUP.Nagel,Th.(1973),“RawlsonJustice”,ThePhilosophicalReview,(82)2:220-234.Pettit,Ph.(1993),TheCommonMind,Oxford:OUP.Rawls,J.(1971),ATheoryofJustice,Cambridge(MA):HarvardUniversityPress.-(1985),“JusticeasFairness”,Philosophy&PublicAffairs(14)3:223-251.-(1993),PoliticalLiberalism,NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.Sandel,M.(1983),LiberalismandtheLimitsofJustice,Cambridge:CUP.Tomasello,M.(2009),WhyWeCooperate,Cambridge(MA):MITPress-(2014),ANaturalHistoryofHumanThinking,Cambridge(MA):HarvardUniversityPress.Tomasello,M.,RackoczyH.(2003),“WhatMakesHumanCognitionUnique?”,Mind&Language,(18)2:121-147

7ThomasBoyer-KassemandCyrilleImbert:PreferenceFalsification,ReputationalCascadesandGroupDeliberations(UNABLETOPRESENT)People sometimes misrepresent their opinions because others have expressedopposite views and public disagreement comes with various types of cost. Forinstance,youmaybereluctanttoleavefirstapartyinordernottodispleaseyourhost.NotbeingpubliclyapracticingJeworMuslimwasasaferhabitduringtheChristian reconquest in Spain. Kuran describes these behaviors as preferencefalsification: “the act of misrepresenting one’s genuine wants under perceivedsocialpressures”(1995,p.3).Hearguesthatthisphenomenoncanleadtosnowballeffects,orreputationalcascades.Forinstance,itiseasierforhomosexualstomaketheir coming out once many others have already done so. Various socialphenomena, like voting preferences or wearing of the Islamic veil, may beexplained thanks to this concept. Further, reputational cascades can havesignificantimpactsinourdemocraticlivesandpublicchoices(KuranandSunstein,2007).Ouraimsarethreefold:(1) First, we intend to specify Kuran's ideas, which are mainly qualitative orimplicitlyelaboratedonnon-discussedcontroversialassumptions,whenitcomesto showing results. This will be done by formalizing the idea of preferencefalsificationinthecontextofmulti-agentsimulations(inwhichparameterscannotbeleftimplicit).(2)Second,wewanttoextendKuran'spreferencefalsificationandcascadestothedomainof (social) epistemology. Importantly,mostmodelsofopiniondynamicsstudiedbyformalepistemologistsorcomputerscientistsignorethepossibilityofpreferencefalsification(seeforexample,HegselmannandKrause,2002,Weisbuchetal,2005,Zollman,2008,2012).Whilethisidealizationmayoftenbealegitimateone, in other cases such as deliberating groups, scientific expert panels (e.g.advisorypanelsfortheFDAortheEMA),orspecialistscommittees,itmaybelesslegitimate.

(3)Third,bystudyingthepropertiesofaformalmodelofpreferencefalsification,weplantogethintsonwhatcouldorshouldbedonetoneutralizetheharmfuleffectsofpreferencefalsification.Forinstance,howmuchcanachairmaninfluenceagroup'sdeliberationbyhaving themembers talk insomeorder rather than inanother? This is related to the question of sequential voting, as opposed tosimultaneousvoting,as studied for instancebyUrfalinoandCosta (2015)aboutadvisorypanelsfortheFDA.Also, ifpanelswanttoavoidreputationalcascades,shouldtheydeliberatequicklyormakeseveraltablerounds?To answer these questions, we propose a very simple model of preferencefalsificationforopinionsrepresentedin[0,1]:nagentsspeakpubliclyoneaftertheone,withseveraltablerounds.Eachagentkhasaprivateopinion,whichremainsfixed at all times, and a public opinion which is somewhere between her ownprivateopinionandwhathasbeenpubliclyexpressedrecently.Moreprecisely,herpublicopinionisgivenby:alpha*[privateopinion]+(1–alpha)*[meanofexpressedopinionsduringthelasttableround]withalphain[0,1].Thus,agentsdonotfullyexpresswhattheybelieve,becauseofthesocialpressure.Withaparameteralphacloseto1,theagenttakeslittleintoaccountherfellows'expressed opinions, and thus does notmisrepresent her private opinionmuch.Withaparameteralphacloseto0,theagentmainlyfollowsthegeneraltrendandhardlyexpressesherownopinion.Thismodeldeliversinterestingresultsinspiteofitssimplicity.Weshowthat,foranyinitialdistributionofopinions,theaverageoftheexpressedopinionsconvergesto theaverageof theprivateopinions.Althoughnoonehaseverexpressedherprivateopinion,thegroupmanagestoreachtheprivateaverage!Thisisactuallyadirectconsequenceofthelinearityofthemodel.However,thisresultistrueinthelongrunonly.Duringthefirsttablerounds(dependingonthespecificvaluesofthe

8parameters),thedifferencebetweenthemeanoftheprivateandoftheexpressedopinioncanbestilllarge.Thus,afirstrecommendationforpanelsseekingtoavoidreputationalcascadesistomakedeliberationslastlongenough,sothatexpressedopinionshavetimetoevolveandspuriouspublicconsensusdisappear.Thismodel ishoweverunabletogeneratepersistentreputationalcascades.Thisinvites to critically revise the model: in practice, opinions are generally notexpressed(ifnotunderstood)withaninfiniteprecision,andthegroupsometimesneedstosettleonabinaryanswer(yes/no)andtakeside.Soweconsidernowadiscrete version of themodel: private opinions are still in [0, 1], but expressedopinionscanonlytakediscretevalues,e.g.0.25or0.75.Therelationbetweentheexpressedandtheprivateopinionisthesame.Byinvestigatingthisdiscreteversionwithcomputersimulations,newfeaturescanbeobserved.There,theorderinwhichtheagentsarearrangedaroundthetableandspeakiscrucial:therearecasesinwhichforoneorder,alltheagentsendupexpressing 0.25 (say: no), while in the reverse order, all the agents end upexpressing 0.75 (say: yes). Discretizing the expressed opinion has introduced asupplementary falsification,andwemayconsider itasoneof theoriginsof theprivate/publicdifference.Thus,a secondrecommendation forpanels seeking toavoidreputationalcascadesistofindwaystohavetheirmembersexpressfiner-grainedopinions,ratherthancoarse-grainedones.Hegselmann,RainerandKrause,Ulrich (2002), “Opiniondynamicsandboundedconfidence:models, analysis and simulation”, Journal of Artificial Societies and SocialSimulation,5(3)Kuran,Timur(1995),PrivateTruth,PublicLies,HarvardUniversityPress.Kuran,TimurandSunstein,Cass,1999,“AvailabilityCascadesandRiskRegulation”,StanfordLawReview,51,4.Urfalino,PhilippeandPascalineCosta(2015),“Secret-PublicVotinginFDAAdvisoryCommittees,” inSecrecyandPublicity inVotesandDebates,ed.JonElster,165-194.CambridgeUniversityPress.

Weisbuch,Gérard,GuillaumeDeffuant,andFrédéricAmblard,2005,“PersuasionDynamics.”PhysicaA:StatisticalMechanicsandItsApplications353,555–75.Zollman,Kevin(2008),“SocialStructureandtheEffectsofConformity”,Synthese172(3):317-340Zollman, Kevin (2012), “Social Network Structure and the Achievement ofConsensusPolitics”,Philosophy,andEconomics11:26-44

9Lorenzo Casini and Gianluca Manzo: Agent-based Models and Causality: AMethodologicalAppraisalIn the social sciences, agent-based modeling is now regarded as a powerfulcomputational method to formalize mechanism-based explanations. Strongdisagreementremains,however,onwhetheragent-basedmodels(ABMs)canalsoestablish the existence of the postulated mechanisms, and thus aid causalinference on such mechanistic grounds (for negative views among simulationpractitioners, seeMacyandSato2008,andamongresearchers in thepotential-outcometradition,seeMorganandWinship2015,ch.10;forpositiveviews,seeBruchandMare2006,Ajellietal.2010,Thorneetal.2007).Suchdisagreementsarehardtoevaluate,though,intheabsenceofanexplicitandsystematicdiscussionofagent-basedmodelinginconnectionwithcausalanalysis,whichistodatestillmissing(HedströmandYlikoski,2010:62-64isasignificantillustration).Ourpaperaimsat filling thisgap, inparticularatdefendingandcontextualizing theroleofagent-basedmodelingforcausalinference.Weproceedinfoursteps.First, we point out that empirical research in the social sciences employs theconceptsofmechanismandcausalityindifferentways.Wedistinguishbetweena“horizontal”anda“vertical”(orgenerative)notionofmechanisms(Reiss,2013,ch.6), to which we associate, respectively, “dependence” and “production”understandings of causality (Hall, 2004). To each notion may be associated adifferentkindofevidenceforcausality.Differentmethodsproducedifferentkindsofevidenceand,asaconsequence,mustbeassessedintheirownright.Second, consistently with this theoretical orientation, and in order to set thegroundforassessingagent-basedmodeling’scapacitytowarrantcausalclaims,weofferanoverviewofitsdiverseapplications.AlthoughthevastmajorityofABMsarestillmotivatedbya“thoughtexperiment”approach,anincreasingnumberofmodelersareanimatedbyaquestforrealism.Thisquest,wenotice,takesoneormoreofthefollowingthreeforms:(i)low-level-assumptiontheoreticalrealism,(ii)low-level-assumption empirical calibration, and (iii) high-level-consequenceempiricalvalidation.

Third,wearguethatthejointsatisfactionof(i)to(iii)inprinciplesufficesforagent-basedmodelingtowarrantcausalconclusions.Atthesametime,wenoticethatinpracticemodelersalwaysfacetheproblemofinsufficientdataforcalibrationandvalidation,onlypartly compensatedby theuseof theoreticalexplorations–viz.“sensitivity”, “robustness”, “dispersion” and “model” analyses. However, agent-basedmodelingisnotexceptionalinthisrespect.“Horizontal”methodsforcausalinference (e.g., randomized controlled trials, instrumental variables, graphicalmethods)are,too,capabletogeneratecausally-relevantevidenceonlyifspecifichorizontal conditions are fulfilled. These methods, too, ultimately justify theircausalconclusionsbyargumentsthatdonotexclusivelyrelyonempiricaldata.Thesimplereasonforthisisthat,similarlytoagent-basedmodeling,theassumptionsrequired to causally interpret the observed connections cannot be testedempiricallybecauseof the lackofdataorbecause it is impossibletoempiricallyadjudicatethetruthofcertainassumptions.Fourthandfinal,wedrawtogethertheseresultsandrecommendasynergisticviewofthemethodologyforcausal inference,inparticular,aviewwherebothagent-basedmodelingandothermethodsplayindispensableandcomplementaryroles.We motivate this normative recommendation as follows. We argue thatacknowledgingthelegitimacyofavarietyofmethodsforcausalinferencedoesnotsufficetojustifyaradicalformofpluralismbutratherpromptsthequestionofhowscholarswithdifferentmethodologicalorientationscanstillfruitfullycommunicateabout causation.We answer this question by endorsing a pragmatist theory ofevidence(Reiss,2015)that,wemaintain,iskeytoreconstructinghowcausalclaimsaresupportedandwarrantedbythescientificcommunity.Wethenelaborateonthis view, andargue for the integrationofmethods thatproduceevidenceof aproductive and a dependence kind (Russo and Williamson, 2007). Finally, werationalizetheroleofagent-basedmodelinginthismethodologicalsynergy,byfirstpinpointingtheconditionsunderwhichavarietyofevidentialsourcesareeffectivefor causal inference (Schupbach, 2015) and then arguing that agent-basedmodelinganddata-drivenmethodssatisfytheseconditions.

10Ajellietal.(2010).ComparingLarge-ScaleComputationalApproachestoEpidemicModeling:Agent-BasedversusStructuredMetapopulationModels,BMCInfectiousDiseases,10:190.BruchE.andMareR.D.(2006).NeighborhoodChoiceandNeighborhoodChange.AmericanJournalofSociology,112(3):667-709.Hall,N. (2004).TwoConceptsofCausation. InCollins, J.,Hall,N.,andPaul,L.A.(eds.),CausationandCounterfactuals,pp.225–276.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.Hedström, P. and Ylikoski, P. (2010). CausalMechanisms in the Social Sciences,AnnualReviewofSociology,36:49-67.Macy,M.W., Sato,Y. (2008)Reply toWill andHegselmann. JournalofArtificialSocietiesandSocialSimulation,11(4):11.Morgan, S. L. and Winship, C. (2015). Counterfactuals and Causal Inference:MethodsandPrinciples for SocialResearch,2ndedition,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Reiss,J.(2013).PhilosophyofEconomics.AContemporaryIntroduction,NewYork:Routledge.Reiss,J.(2015).APragmatistTheoryofEvidence.PhilosophyofScience,82:341–362.Russo,F.andWilliamson,J.(2007).InterpretingCausalityintheHealthSciences,InternationalStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience,21:157-170.Schupbach.J.(2015).andProbabilisticIndependence.InMäki,U.,Votsis,I.,Ruphy,S.,andSchurz,G.(eds.),RecentDevelopmentsinthePhilosophyofScience:EPSA13Helsinki,pages305–316.Heidelberg:Springer.ThorneB.C.,BaileyA.M.andPeirceS.M. (2007).CombiningExperimentswithMulti-CellAgent-BasedModelingtoStudyBiologicalTissuePatterning,BriefingsinBioinformatics,8(4):245-257.

EsaDiazLeon:KindsofSocialConstructionAn important issue in the debate regarding the nature of human kinds such asgender, race and sexual orientation is concernedwith the question ofwhetherthosehumankindsaresociallyconstructed(see,forinstance,thepaperscollectedinStein1992b).Inordertosettlethisdebate,amorefundamentalquestionneedstobeanswered:Whatdoesitmeantosaythatacategoryissociallyconstructed?Recently,somephilosophershavebecomeinterestedinthisquestion(e.g.Hacking1999,Mallon2007,Stein1992a),andmanyofthemagreethatthereisn’tasinglenotion of social construction, but rather, there are different notions of socialconstruction,fordifferentpurposes(Haslanger2003).Theimportantquestioninordertoformulateausefulnotionofsocialconstruction,then,istwo-fold:first,weneed to ask which project is at issue, and second, which notion of socialconstruction ismoreuseful for thepurposesof thatproject. In thispaper, Iwillfocusonan importantprojectformanytheoristsworkingonthetopicofsexualorientations,namely,toargueagainsttheuniversalityofatrait,that is,toshowthat a certainhumancategoryor kind isnot auniversal, trans-cultural, culture-independentpropertythatisapplicabletoothercultures,placesandtimes;andIwill discuss which notion of social construction (if any) is more useful for thisproject.Mymainquestion, then,willbe this:whichnotionof social constructionentailsthat ifX issociallyconstructed,thenX isnottrans-cultural inthatsense?Inthispaper,Iwillexaminesomerecentcharacterizationsofsocialconstruction,andIwillexplorewhethertheyhavethatimplicationornot.Thiswillalsogiverisetoanotherimportantquestion:howshouldweunderstand‘trans-cultural’?Regardingthedifferentnotionsof‘sociallyconstructed’,animportantdistinctionamongdifferentnotionsofsocialconstructionhastodowiththekindofentitiesthataresupposedtobeconstructed:ideasorrepresentationsontheonehand,vs.objects or kinds on the other (Hacking 1999,Mallon 2007). Another importantdistinction is concernedwith thekindof construction that is involved: it canbe

11understoodascausalconstructionorasconstitutiveconstruction(Haslanger2003,Mallon2008).Onewayofunderstandingthedistinction isas follows:XcausallyconstructsYifandonlyifXcausesYtoexistortopersist,whereasXconstitutivelyconstructsYifandonlyifX’sconceptualorsocialactivityregardinganindividualyismetaphysicallynecessaryforytobeaY(Mallon2008:5-6).Moreinparticular,wecansaythatxissociallyconstructedcausallyasanFifandonlyifsocialfactorsplayasignificantroleincausingxtohavethosefeaturesbyvirtueofwhichitcountsasanF,whereasxissociallyconstructedconstitutivelyasanFifandonlyifxisofakindorsortFsuchthatindefiningwhatitistobeFwemustmakereferencetosocialfactors(Haslanger2003:317-8).Regardingthedifferentnotionsoftransculturaloruniversal,wewillfocusontwodifferent notions. First, we could understand ‘trans-cultural’ as culture-independent:“no-oneis,independentofaculture,aheterosexualorhomosexual”(Stein1992a:340). In this sense, Iwillargue, it seemsclear that ifaproperty isconstitutivelysociallyconstructed(thatis,itispartofthedefinitionorthenatureofthepropertythatinordertoinstantiateit,onemustinstantiateacertainsocialrole),thenitwillindeedfollowthatitisnottrans-cultural,becausethatpropertywillbe instantiatedonly insocietieswherecertainpracticesand institutionsarealsoinstantiated.However,ifapropertyissociallyconstructedcausally(thatis,certainsocialfactorsplayacausalroleinbringingaboutthatfeature),thenitdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthat they are not trans-cultural in that sense. For example, even if sexualorientationsarecausedbycertainsocialpractices, it couldstillbe thecase thatsexualorientationsareinstantiatedatotherculturesandtimeseveniftheylackedthosesocialpractices,because thepropertiesmighthavebeencausedbyothermeans.Alternatively, we could understand ‘non universal’ or ‘non trans-cultural’ in astrongersense:asapropertysuchthatitdoesn’tevenmakesensetoapplyittootherculturesandtimes.Forinstance,itissometimesarguedthatitdoesn’tmakesense to ask whether, say, Socrates was homosexual or not. The following

arguments seem to involve this notion of non-universality: “Some socialconstructionists take it to show that since the categories of homosexual andheterosexual are culture specific, any general theorywhichmakes use of thesetermswillnecessarilybefalse”(Stein1992a:346);“Thesortsofsexuallivesthatpeopleliveinotherculturesaresodramaticallydifferentfromoursthatthewaywedescribesexualactivitiesinourculturecannotpossiblydescribetheircultures.Thefactofvarying“formsoflife”preventstransculturalapplicationoftheterms‘heterosexual’and‘homosexual’”(Stein1992a:348).Inresponse,Iwillarguethateven ifweunderstandsocialconstruction intheconstitutivesenseabove,thesearguments don’t work: even if social constructions require, by definition, thatcertainsocialpracticesareinstantiated,itmakesperfectsensetoaskwhethertherelevantsocialpracticeswereinstantiatedinsuchandsuchculture.Hacking,Ian(1999)TheSocialConstructionofWhat?,HarvardUniversityPress.Haslanger, Sally (2003) “Social Construction: The “Debunking” Project”, in F.Schmitt(ed.)SocializingMetaphysics,Rowman&Littlefield.Mallon, Ron (2007) “A FieldGuide to Social Construction”, PhilosophyCompass2(1):93-108.Mallon, Ron (2008) “Naturalistic Approaches to Social Construction”, StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.Stein,Edward(1992a)“TheEssentialsofConstructionismandtheConstructionofEssentialism”,inE.Stein(1992b).Stein, Edward (1992b) (ed.) Forms of Desire: Sexual Orientation and the SocialConstructionistControversy,Routledge.

12Jaana Eigi:Would you remake science under the philosopher’s guidance? OnphilosophicalproposalsandpoliticalmotivationRecentphilosophyofscienceischaracterisedbyconsiderableinterestinthesocialaspectsofscience.Someoftheseargumentsalsoincludeproposalsaboutchangestobemade in theway science is organised and governed: Philip Kitcher'swell-orderedscienceisaprominentexample.Theaimofmypresentationistodiscussan aspect of these proposals that has not received sufficient attention—thequestionwhetherthereexistsinsocietymotivationtobringtheseproposalstolife.OntheexampleofKitcher'sproposal,Ishowhowsuchaproposalmaybelimitedtodescribingacertainproblemsituationforscienceandoutliningaformofthesocialorganisationofsciencethatwouldresolveit.Itisneveraskedwhetherthereisanywillingnessinsocietytoactupontheproposaloutlined.Inordertoaddressthis omission, I present an approach to making proposals about the socialorganisationofsciencethattakestheproblemofthe(missing)motivationseriouslyand begins to overcome it by establishing a connection with developments incontemporarysciencepolicy.

CorinnaElsenbroichandHarkoVerhagen:“Is it justme?”:Mechanisms,Agent-BasedModellingandMethodologicalIndividualismAnalyticsociologyhasbroughtanewfocusonsocialmechanismsintothesocialsciences(HedströmandSwedberg,1998;Hedström,2005)andthelastdecadehasseenanincreasingattentionforanalyticalapproachesinsociology(Manzo2010,Wan2011).Evenifthishasnotledtoonecoherentprogram,thedifferentflavourssharemanycharacteristics.Amongtheseisthenotionofsocialmechanismsthatact upon and are recreated to by acting and interacting individuals. Thesemechanisms constitute a non-Humean view of causality in which causalconnections rely on ontological commitments to entities and dispositions oractivities(Machameretal,2000).Uncoveringasocialmechanismmeansbeingabletotellacausalnarrative,eitherwithinthesocialmicro-level,orlinkingthemicrotothemacro-level,possiblybyemergence.Agent-basedModelling(ABM)[1]hasoftenbeenalignedwithanalyticsociologyasitisabletoprovidemodelsexploringmechanismsleadingtotheemergenceofsocialmacrophenomena(HedströmandYikoski, 2010; Marchionni & Yilkoski, 2013). Both analytic sociology (and themechanismapproach)andABMhavebeenvariouslyalignedwithstrongformsofmethodologicalindividualism(MacyandWiller,2002;MacyandFlache,2012).Inthisarticleweaddresswhatweperceivetobeamisalignmentofthemechanismapproach with methodological individualism. Whilst it is correct that much ofanalytical sociology invokes a strong micro-foundationalism, seeing “humanindividualsand theiractivities”as thesolebasisof thesocialworldand invokesmechanism explanations as the basis of social science (Elster, 1989; Hedström,2005), there is no necessary association between the two commitments. Socialmechanisms are not committed to methodological individualism. For exampleKaidesoja(2013)arguesagainsttheconflationofmethodologicalindividualismandmechanismsapproaches.Twoclaimsareputforward:1.macro-socialactorscanhavecausalpowers2.mechanismscanoccurbetweenmacro-socialactors.

13Kaidesoja further refers to distributed cognition as a theoretical frameworksuitable formodellingmoremacro focussedmechanismswhileavoidingnotionssuchascollectivewill(Kaidesoja2012).Althoughweagreelargelywiththepositofmacro social actors and macro-causal mechanisms, the methodology for theirexplorationshouldbeABM.We followothers inasserting thatABM is apromisingmethodology touncovermechanisms (Demeulenaere, 2011, Elsenbroich, 2011). However, neither amechanismapproachtosocialsciencenorABMarecommittedtomethodologicalindividualism.1.Agentscanbeofvaryinglevelsofaggregation:Anagentdoesnotneedtobeanindividualbutcanbeahouseholdorafirm.OneofthehighestimpactmodelsofrecentyearshasbeentheSKINmodelofinnovation(Gilbertetal,2001).IntheSKINmodeltheagentsarefirmsratherthanindividualsandthemodelexplorestheroleof innovation in an ecology of firms. ABM focussing on policy domains such asenergyconsumptiondonotimplementindividualsbuthouseholds(Natarajanetal,2011).Aslongastheunitcanbeseentobetheunitofdecisionmaking,thatunitcanbemodelledasanagent.Ofcourse,dependingontheontologicalpositiononemightwanttotake,inthe“realworld”itisstillbetheindividualsmakingupthefirm or the household which determine the decision of the aggregate unit.However,thesemodelsshowthatthereisnonecessitymethodologicallytofocuson the individual as the behaviour of the aggregate is what is relevant to theanalysis.Marchionni&Yilkoski(2013)presentasimilarargument. 2.Individualsdonotneedtobeindividualistic:Evenifanagentisanindividual,itsdecisionmakingcanbecollective,inthesensethatitmakesdecisionsaspartofacollectiveratherthanasanindividual.Throughacollectivemodeofreasoningofindividuals,collectives,aggregatesocialentities,gainontologicalandcausalstatus.Such an approach is based on ideas of collective decision making, or teamreasoning,suchasBacharach(1999)andSugden(2003).Teamreasoningisbasedongametheorybutextendstheideaofutilitymaximisationbytheideathatitisnot necessarily the utility of the individual but that it can be the utility of thecollectivethatismaximised.Astheindividualrecognisesthecollectiveastheunitofdecisionmaking, thecollectivegainscausalpower.Note that this isdifferent

frommodellingaggregateagentsasthedecisionsofindividualsareattheheartofthe model but their decision making is not individualistic. A recent frameworkconceptualisingdifferenttypesofagency,includingcollectiveagency,canbefoundinElsenbroich&Verhagen(2015).Thispapercontributestothedebateonagentbasedmodelling,socialmechanismsandmethodological individualism,arguingthatthere isnonecessaryconceptualconnection.Thisbecomesparticularlyclearwhenarguingfromthemethodologicalapproachofagent-basedmodellingastheapproachissointimatelyconnectedtotheuncoveringofsocialmechanismwhilstnotbeingcommittedtomethodologicalindividualism.Inthispaperwesketchedtheroughargument.InthefullpaperwewilladdressfurthercriticismsofagentbasedmodellingsuchasEpstein(2011).

14Julius Elster: Reflections on Reflexivity in Everyday Life – RapprochementBetweenIntra-ActivityandSocialEmbeddednessThephilosophyofthesocialscienceshaslongbeenpreoccupiedwiththeconceptofreflexivity.However,duetotheambiguoustreatmentofreflexivityanddebatesaboutitsstatusarguingatcross-purposes,theconceptstillcallsforamoreconcisedefinitiontoavoidequivocation,internalincoherenceandcompatibilitywiththesocialworld.Thispaperintendstoprovidearefinedconceptualisationofreflexivityand intra-activity, while simultaneously set forth a fresh approach to an oldquestionofhowthesocialworldisproducedandreproducedthroughthesubject.Whereas some reflexive theories emphasise the introspection and voice of theresearcher, there appear to be two dominant positions in contemporary socialtheoryconcerningthenotionofreflexivityinregardstolaypersons.Itisthelatterfocusonreflexiveorientationsamonglaypersonsthatmypaperhopestocastlighton. One camp understands reflexivity as functioning in relation to the moreenduringfeaturesofembodieddispositions,habitsandthetakenforgranted,andismadeactiveasaresultofstructuraldisruption.Thesecondcamp,ontheotherhand, is hostile to any talk of embodied dispositions pertaining to reflexivecapacities. Instead, it highlights the mediating and generative potential ofreflexivityvis-à-visthesocialworld.MargaretArcherisaproponentofthelatterassheputstheaccentontheindispensabilityoftheactiveagentandthesubjectivepowersof reflexivitywhose role inmediating the social structures is invaluable.Archerian dualism, furthermore, is the paradigmatic picture of the sociallydisembeddedsubjectsinceit insistsonaseparationbetweenhumanagentsandthe ‘objective’ social conditions. This dualism, however, constitutes the keyobstacletoachievinganyrapprochementbetweena‘generative’takeonreflexivityandthemoredurableaspectsofagency.I argue that the first camp’s stress on reflexivity as an intra-active mediatingmechanismandtheothercamp’sfocusonhabitsandsocialembeddednesscanbereconciled by laying bare how reflexive orientations relate to the agent’sengagementinthesocialworldand‘stockofexperiences.’Byconstruingreflexivity

as subjective processes, moreover, that ‘bend back’ on the subject’s socialworldview, we can understand how our experiences of social conditions oftenaffectourowntrajectories.Ishallspeakofthisassignifyinga‘subject→object→subject formation.’ This construal has the following consequences for the ‘twocamps:’anyproposalofsocialstructuresascausallyefficaciousisinhotwatersincethemediating capacityof reflexiveorientations shows that social structuresarecausallyotioseandsimultaneously,embodieddispositionsare,themselves,partlyformed by the subject’s reflexive orientations. Therefore, if reflexivity is themediatory mechanism that ‘activates’ or ‘maintains’ structures, while beinginstrumentalinstockinguponknowledgeanddispositions,itmustbeanintegralfeatureofeverydaylife.Insteadof‘under-ascribing’reflexivitytoagency,then,asthe first camp do, I shall argue that reflexivity—aptly construed—is the mostadequateconceptionofthemediatingprocessesbetweensocietyandthesubject.My line of reasoning draws to some extent on phenomenologically inspiredsociologytomakeacompellingcaseforrethinkingthemediatoryandgenerativemechanismofprocessesinthesocialworld.Providedwestartwiththesubjectaswell as its intra-activity and experiences, we can systematise internalisationprocessesandlearnhowsubjectiveexperiencesofsocialconditionsandrelationsaffectour life trajectories. The ‘bending-back’potentialof this intra-activity is areflexiveone,furthermore,inthatthesubject→object→subjectprocessshapesoraffirms(ifonlyinaminuteway)howIgoaboutmylifeorseetheworldrightnowandinthefuture.Iamnot,here,advocatinga‘subject–objectdualism,’noramItakingastandwithregardstowhethertheobjectsthatweareconsciousof,or discern, actually exist or not. Since social, natural, cultural and ideationalphenomenaareoftenperceivedby the subject as ‘objects,’ Iwill, nevertheless,cling on to the term ‘object.’ An ‘object,’ thus, might merely be perceived asexternaltotheintellect,butisperhapsindeedinternal,perceivedasthecontentofconsciousness.Bytakingsubjectiveexperiencesandtheformationofsubject→object→subjectasourpointofdeparture,wecouldnotonlypointtowardsthemechanismthatmighttakeplace,say,attimet1,butalsowhyandhowsubjectS,ratherthanSʹ,

15mayobtainorhabitualiseaparticular(social)objectX.Thereis,hence,noneed,inmyview, tobringcausallyefficaciousstructuresormysterious social forces intosociologicalplay.WhatIamproposinginthispaper,thus,isthenotionofasubjectwhose experiences entail ongoing social relationships with other subjects. Thereflexiveprocessofsubject→object→subjectshowshowthesubjectinternalisesandmediateswhatitrelevantlyexperiences(asconstraintsorenablements)inthesocial world. This, I reckon, is not opposed to my claim that social structures,themselves,arecausallyotiose;nordoesitrendermynotionofthesubjectunder-oroversocialised.Asthesubjectobtainsexperiencethroughitsengagementintheworld, itaddsto itsstocksof(shared)knowledge.Thisreflexiveprocess—whereprevious,subjectiveexperiencesandstockofknowledgearemadeuseofasweconcernourselveswiththepresent—enablesustonavigatethesocialworldandincreasesourcapacityforinteractivediscourse.

RobertoFumagalli:How‘Thin’RationalChoiceTheoryExplainsTheproponentsofrationalchoicetheory(henceforth,RCT)frequentlyallegethatRCTprovidesinformativeexplanationsofobservedchoices(e.g.Becker,1976,SatzandFerejohn,1994).Conversely,manycriticscomplainthatRCTapplicationsfailto explain such choices. In particular, several authors (e.g. Alexandrova, 2008,Guala,2012,Morgan,2006, Sen,1987)buildon the contrastbetween so-called‘thick’and‘thin’interpretationsofRCTtoarguethatRCTfallspreytothefollowingdilemma.Ontheonehand,there isathick interpretationofRCT,whichregardschoices as the outcome of a process of instrumental reasoning and rests onempiricalassumptionsabouttheneuro-psychologicalsubstratesofchoice.Ontheotherhand,wefindathininterpretationofRCT,whichprovidesapurelyformalaxiomaticrepresentationofconsistentchoicepatternsandmakesnoclaimaboutthe neuro-psychological substrates of choice. Thick RCT can be used to explainchoices,butisvulnerabletofalsifyingempiricalevidencefromneuro-psychology.Conversely, thinRCT is insulated from falsifyingempirical evidence fromneuro-psychology,butcannotexplainchoices.If correct, these criticisms would have far-reaching implications for scientificmodellers,sinceRCTapplicationsfigureprominentlyinavastrangeofdisciplines(e.g.Boudon,2003,on sociology,GreenandShapiro,1994,onpolitical science,Sugden,1991,oneconomics).Inthispaper,Idrawonoften-citedapplicationsofRCT to demonstrate that contra such criticisms thin RCT can and does explainchoices.Thepaperisorganizedintwomainsections:InSection1,IidentifythreerespectsinwhichthinRCTapplicationsareexplanatoryandillustratemythesiswithexamplesfromeconomicsandotherdecisionsciences.My main argument proceeds as follows. Thin RCT abstracts away from allinformation concerning the neuro-psychological substrates of choice. Thisprecludes thin RCT applications from counting as explanatory under variousaccounts of scientific explanation (e.g. Craver, 2006, on mechanistic accounts,Salmon, 1984, on causal accounts), but does not detract from the explanatorypotentialofthinRCT.Onthecontrary,theaxiomaticderivationsatthecoreofthin

16RCT provide insights that are explanatory in at least three senses. First, theydemarcatetheclassofactual,possibleandcounterfactualsystemsthatcanexhibitchoiceswith the same structural patterns (structural component). Second, theyexplicatewhyagentswhodifferradicallyintheirneuro-psychologicalmakeupcanexhibitchoiceswiththestructural(e.g.consistency)patternsdefinedbythinRCTaxioms(unificationistcomponent).Andthird,theyenablemodellerstodeterminehowthechoicesofreal-worldagentsdeviatefromthechoicesoftheagentspositedby thin RCT under a set of actual, possible and counterfactual conditions(counterfactualcomponent).InSection2,IdefendmythesisthatthinRCTcanexplainchoicesfromaseriesofobjectionsputforwardbythecriticsofRCT.Morespecifically,Iaddressinturn:theobjectionfromspuriousexplanations(e.g.Guala,2012);theobjectionfromcausalexplanations (e.g. Reiss, 2012); the objection from partial explanations (e.g.Sugden,2011);theobjectionfromaxioms’untenability(e.g.Sen,1987);andtheobjectionfrominterdisciplinaryconsilience(e.g.CraverandAlexandrova,2008).Inaddressingtheseobjections,Idifferentiatemythesisfromotherauthors’accountsofhowmodelsthatabstractawayfromempiricalinformationabouttheirtargetscanbeexplanatory(e.g.Bokulich,2009,onthestructuralcomponent,Rice,2015,on the unificationist component, Hindriks, 2013, on the counterfactualcomponent). I then explicate my thesis’ implications for the ongoing debateconcerning the explanatory potential of RCT and the comparative merits ofentrenchedphilosophicalaccountsofscientificexplanation.REFERENCESAlexandrova,A.2008.MakingModelsCount.PhilosophyofScience,75,383-404.Becker,G.1976.TheEconomicApproachtoHumanBehavior.ChicagoUniversityPress.Bokulich,A.2009.HowScientificModelsCanExplain.Synthese,180,33-45.Boudon,R.2003.Beyondrationalchoicetheory.AnnualReviewofSociology,29,1-21.Craver,C.F.2006.Whenmechanisticmodelsexplain.Synthese,153,355-376.

Craver,C.F.andAlexandrova,A.2008.Norevolutionnecessary:neuralmechanismsforeconomics.EconomicsandPhilosophy,24,381-406.Green,D.P.andShapiro,I.1994.PathologiesofRationalChoiceTheory:ACritiqueofApplicationsinPoliticalScience.YaleUniversityPress.Guala,F.2012.Arepreferencesforreal?InA.Lehtinenetal.Economicsforreal:UskaliMakiandtheplaceoftruthineconomics.Routledge,137-155.Hindriks,F.2013.Explanation,understanding,andunrealisticmodels.Studies inHistoryandPhilosophyofScience,44,523-531.Morgan,M.S. 2006. Economicman asmodelman: ideal types, idealization andcaricatures.JournaloftheHistoryofEconomicThought,28,1-27.Reiss,J.2012.Theexplanationparadox.JournalofEconomicMethodology,19,43-62.Rice, C. 2015. Moving Beyond Causes: Optimality Models and ScientificExplanation.Noûs,49,589-615.Salmon,W. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of theWorld.PrincetonUniversityPress.Satz, D. and Ferejohn, J. 1994. Rational Choice and Social Theory. Journal ofPhilosophy,91,71-87.SenA.1987.Rationalbehavior.InEatwellJ.,MilgateM.,NewmanP.(Ed.),TheNewPalgrave:ADictionaryofEconomics.Macmillan,68-76.Sugden,R.1991.RationalChoice:ASurveyofContributionsfromEconomicsandPhilosophy.EconomicJournal,101,751-785.Sugden,R.2011.Explanationsinsearchofobservations.BiologyandPhilosophy,26,717-736.

17Remco Heesen, Liam Kofi Bright, Andrew Zucker: Vindicating MethodologicalTriangulation(UNABLETOPRESENT)Methodological pluralism is an entrenched fact of life for the working socialscientist,andinthispaperwedefendanoptimisticperspectiveonthisfact.Thereexistavarietyofdifferentmethodsofcarryingoutsocialscientificworkwhichareactually applied in the course of various research projects. While the contrastbetweenquantitativeandqualitativemethodsisthemoststriking,dependingonhowoneindividuatesmethodsonecanfindmethodologicaldifferencewithinaswell as between those categories. For instance, ethnographic participantobservationandhermeneutic textualanalysisaredistinctyetequallyqualitativemethods,whereasBayesianandfrequentiststatisticsprovidedifferentmethodsofrunningquantitativeanalysis.Ifoneisoptimistic,onemayconsidermethodologicalpluralismaresourcewhichcouldbeusedtobolster thereliabilityof resultsobtained inthesocialsciences.Onemethodofsodoingistoadvocatewhathascometobecalled‘methodologicaltriangulation’. The idea behind methodological triangulation is that theconvergenceofmultiplemethodsupona single conclusionbetter supports thatconclusionthanjustoneofthosemethodsarrivingattheconclusion.Againstthis,however,pessimistsmightthinkthatmethodologicalpluralismisbotharesultandasourceofconfusioninthesocialsciences,andthusbeunmovedbytheadvocacyoftriangulation.Afterall,somebodywhodeducesthat2+2=4neednothavetheirconfidencebolsteredbythefactthatsomebodywhosaysthatthesumofanytwonumbersis4hasconvergedonthesameanswerastheminthiscase.Norshouldtheybeconcernedbytheirlackoftriangulationwiththepersonwhoalwayssays‘5’.Tosomebodywhoseesmethodologicalpluralismasarisingfromwidespreadmethodologicalerror,quitewhymethodologicaltriangulationshouldbebeneficialmaythusremainopaque.In thispaperwedefend theoptimistic response tomethodologicalpluralismbydefendingmethodologicaltriangulation,developingideasfoundinW.E.B.DuBois'work.Wecontrastthisoptimisticresponsewithanattitudewecall‘methodological

purism’, which is the idea that one simply should not attempt to triangulatemethodologiessinceonlyonemethodreliablyleadstothetruth.Ourformalmodeltakesitscuefromvotingtheory, inviewingeachmethodasa‘vote’foraparticularanswertoaresearchquestion,whichispickedwithacertainprobability. Methodological triangulation then amounts to putting faith in thewinner of the vote, whereas methodological purism involves picking a favoredmethodwhose‘vote’isalwaysdecisive.Whichofthesetwostrategies–triangulationorpurism–ismorelikelytoleadtothecorrectanswerdependsontheprobabilitieswithwhichdifferentanswersarechosenbythemethods.Inthemostoptimisticscenario,eachmethodismorelikelytopickthecorrectanswerthananyotheranswer.InthiscaseananalogueoftheCondorcet Jury Theorem holds which guarantees not only that triangulation isbetterthanpurism,butmoreoverthattriangulationisvirtuallycertaintogivethecorrectanswerifthenumberofmethodsishighenough.Inalessoptimisticscenario,whichwethinkaproponentofpurismismorelikelytoaccept,thereisOneTrueMethodwhichalwayspicksthecorrectanswer,andallother methods are merely glorified guesswork. Perhaps surprisingly, in thisscenariowecanprovethattriangulationstilldoesbetterthanpurism,aslongasthepuristissubjecttosomedegreeofdiffidence:thepuristhasafavoredmethod,butshecannotbecertainthatthisistheOneTrueMethod.ThesameresultholdsalsoinamiddlingscenariowheretheOneTrueMethodisnotguaranteedtopickthecorrectanswer(buthassomebiasinitsfavor)buttheother methods are merely guesswork. Thus we see that triangulation benefitssocialscientists.Itcanincreasetheirconfidencethattheirmethodshaveproducedthecorrectanswer.Thisistrueevenwhenthepurist’sclaimthatonlyonemethodactuallyyieldsreliableanswersiscorrect,aslongasthereissignificantuncertaintyoverwhatmethodistheOneTrueMethod.Thisisclearlythecaseinpractice.

18Ourmodel differs from existing results in the formal literature focusing on the“variety-of-evidencethesis”or“consilience”.TheseexistingresultsbuildinvariousBayesianassumptions.Ourmodelisneutralonthisissue.Weconcludethattriangulationcanbevaluabletosocialscientistsinstrengtheningthedegreetowhichtheirresultsareconfirmed.

TuukkaKaidesoja:ThreeTypesofCausalMechanismsCausalmechanisms have beenwidely discussed both in the social sciences andphilosophyofthesocialsciences.Ashasbeenoftennoted,thereisnogenerallyaccepteddefinitionof this concept (e.g.Hedström&Ylikoski 2010).Rather, theconceptofcausalmechanismisusedindifferentwaysindifferentcontexts.Thepurposeofmypresentationistodifferentiatebetweenthreeinterpretationsoftheconcept of causalmechanism that have all been influential in social research. Iargue that uses of these three types of causal mechanisms include differentassumptionsnotonly about causationand causal inferencesbut also about thenatureofcausalmodelsandaimsofsocialresearch.In the first type, causal mechanisms are understood in terms of interveningvariables.ThisusageisconnectedtothetraditionalviewonelaborationthatwasdevelopedbyPaul Lazarsfeld (e.g. 1957) in1950’s. Thebasic idea is that causalmechanismsareunderstoodintermsofathirdvariablethatmediatestherelationbetweentheindependentanddependentvariablesthatcorrelatewitheachother.Thisview isentirelycompatiblewith theHumeanregularity theoryofcausationandithasbeenoftenassumedincausalinterpretationsofregressionmodels.Thesecondtypeofcausalmechanismscanbealsofoundinthecontextofstatisticalcausalmodeling,butthisaccountofcausalmechanismsisrelatedtotheusesofdirectedacyclicgraphs(DAG’s)andstructuralequationmodels.Italsopresupposesaninterventionist(ormanipulationist)theoryofcausationinwhichcausalrelationsareunderstoodasrelationsofdependencebetweenthevaluesofvariablesthatremaininvariantunder(certainrange)ofinterventions(e.g.Woodward2003).Inthisview,causalmechanismsarealsoconsideredasmodularinthesensethat“itispossibletodisruptorreplace(therelationshiprepresentedby)anyoneoftheequations in the system [i.e. structural equation model] by means of anintervention on (the magnitude corresponding) the dependent variable in thatequation,withoutdisruptingtheotherequations”(ibid.48).Forexample, JudeaPearl’s(2000)andJamesWoodward’s(2003)notionsofcausalmechanismbelongtothistype.

19Thethirdconceptionofcausalmechanismshasbeendevelopedincriticalrealismand analytical sociology where causal mechanisms are understood in terms ofgenerative processes that bring about empirically observable phenomena (e.g.Hedström&Swedberg1998;Hedström2005;Manicas2006).Forexample,PeterHedström (2005, 25)writes that “mechanisms canbe said to consist of entities(with theirproperties)and theactivities that theseentitiesengage in,eitherbythemselvesofinconcertwithotherentities.Theseactivitiesbringaboutchange,andthetypeofchangebroughtaboutdependsuponthepropertiesoftheentitiesandthewayinwhichtheyarelinkedtooneanother.”Inthisview,thecomponentsofsocialmechanismsaretypicallyunderstoodasbeingindividualactorsandtheiractions in different structural contexts. The focus in this view is on modelingcomplex social interactions of many individual actors that tend to bring aboutspecific observable effects. Though this view is not connected to any specificmethodofanalysis,analyticalsociologistshaverecentlyarguedthatbuildingagent-basedsimulationsisausefulmethodfortrackingcausalmechanismsofthiskind(e.g.Hedström2005,Chapter4;Macy&Flache2009).Iwillarguethatthisviewoncausalmechanisms presupposeswhat can be called “causal realism” (e.g. Little2011,275)accordingtowhichcausalrelationsareunderstoodintermsofcausalpowers,capacitiesandtendenciesofentities.Idonotclaimthatthislistofcausalmechanismtypesisexhaustive,butIthinkthatthesethreetypesincludeassumptionsaboutcausation,causalinferences,causalmodelsandaimsofsocialresearchthatarecruciallydifferent.Therefore,analysisoftheseviewsandtheirdifferenceshelpstoclarifydebatesonmechanism-basedexplanationsinthesocialsciences.Hedström,P.(2005)DissectingtheSocial:OnthePrinciplesofAnalyticalSociology,Cambridge:CambridgeUniverstiyPress:Cambridge.Hedström,P.&R.Swedberg(1998)“SocialMechanisms:AnIntroductoryEssay”,inP.Hedström&R.Swedberg(eds)SocialMechanisms:AnAnalyticalApproachtoSocialTheory,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Hedström, P. & P. Ylikoski (2010) “Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences,”AnnualReviewofSociology,36:49–67.Lazarsfeld, P. (1957) “Interpretation of Statistical Relations as a ResearchOperation,” In P. A. Lazarsfeld & M. Rosenberg (eds) The Language of SocialResearch,Glencoe:TheFreePress.Little, D. (2011) “CausalMechanisms in the Social Realm”, in P.McKay Illari, F.Russo,andJ.Williamson(eds)CausalityintheSciences.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Macy,M.&A.Flache(2009)“SocialDynamicsformtheBottomUp:Agent-BasedModels of Social Interaction”, in P. Hedström & P. Bearman (eds) The OxfordHandbookofAnalyticalSociology,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Manicas, P. (2006) A Realist Philosophy of Social Science: Explanation andUnderstanding,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Pearl,J.(2000)Causality:Models,Reasoning,anInference,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Woodward, J. (2003) Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

20Inkeri Koskinen, Kristina Rolin: Social Epistemology of Scientific/IntellectualMovements:TheCaseOfIndigenousStudiesMuchoftheliteratureinthesocialepistemologyofscientificknowledgefocuseseitheronscientificcommunities(e.g.,Longino1990,2002)oronresearchgroups(e.g.,Rolin2015;Wagenknecht2014;Wray2007).Inourpresentationwewishtodrawattentiontotheepistemicsignificanceofscientific/intellectualmovements(SIMs).AsScottFrickelandNeilGrossdefinethem,“SIMsarecollectiveeffortstopursueresearchprogramsorprojects for thought in the faceof resistance fromothers in the scientific or intellectual community” (2005, 206). So, whereasscientific communities are specialties where scientists are united by sharedconcepts, beliefs, and epistemic values (Kuhn 1996), SIMs are sub-communitieswhere scientistsareunitedbyaprogram for scientific change.Even though theKuhnianviewofscientificcommunitiesstressestheirunity,HelenLongino(1990,2002)amongothers,emphasizestheepistemicimportanceofdiversityanddissentwithinscientificcommunities.ThenotionofSIMisofepistemicinterestbecauseitdrawsattentiontosocialunitsthatcreatediversityandturnscientificcommunitiesintositesfordisagreementandpowerstruggle.InordertoanalyzetheepistemicsignificanceofSIMs,wewillfocusonindigenousstudies – a multidisciplinary SIM in the process of being transformed into adiscipline.LikemanyotherSIMs,indigenousstudiesisaspin-offofalargersocialmovement active inmanyother areasof society.And likemanyother SIMs, itsknowledge-producing aims go hand-in-hand with its moral, social, and politicalaims. That indigenous studies has by now achieved the institutional status of adisciplineinseveraluniversities,andtherebyastandingthatensuresitscontinuity,canbeseennotonlyasa scientific/intellectual success storybutalsoapoliticalone.Kristina Rolin (2016) argues that SIMs are epistemically significant when theyenablescientiststogenerateevidenceunderconditionswhererelationsofpowertend to suppress or distort evidence, or when they provide scientists with anepistemiccommunitywheretheycanreceivefruitfulcriticismforresearchwhich

may be ignored in the larger scientific community. In amore critical tone, RicoHauswald (forthcoming) argues that activist research communities or sub-communities are typically biased towards such theoretical and methodologicalapproachesthatsuitthepoliticalgoalstheactivistsshare.ThismeansalsothatthecriticismresearchersreceivewithinaSIMislikelytobelimited.Wearguethatboththeepistemicadvantages(outlinedbyRolin),aswellasthedisadvantages(outlinedbyHauswald),arepresentinindigenousstudies.Moreover,theemergingdisciplineofindigenousstudieshastwootherepistemicallyinterestingfeatures.First,itisaninter-andmultidisciplinarymovement,while itneverthelessaimstoachievetheinstitutionalstatusofadiscipline.Second,therangeofdifferentdisciplinesisnotemphasizedwithinthemovementnearlyasmuchastheattempttoreachoutsideacademia: indigenous studies aims to integrate indigenous knowledge withscientific knowledge (Koskinen 2014, 2015). By using indigenous studies as anexample,weexaminetheepistemicroleofSIMsbothassub-communitieswithinlarger epistemic communities, and as units that can reshape the institutional,disciplinarycontextwithinwhichepistemiccommunitiestypicallyfunction.Inthefirstsection,weexplainageneraltheoryofSIMs.Inthesecondsection,wediscuss the organizational and institutional development of indigenous studiesinternationallyandespeciallyattheUniversityofHelsinki,whereithasjustrecentlyachievedthefullinstitutionalstatusofadiscipline.Inthethirdsection,weexploretheepistemicaimsofindigenousstudiesbyanalyzingsomekeyworksinthefieldaswellasinterviewmaterialwithkeyactorsinHelsinki.Inthefourthsection,weexploretheepistemicsignificanceofSIMsinthecaseofindigenousstudies.Finally,we want to raise some potential problems that may be involved in SIMs andproposesolutionstothem.

21JaakkoKuorikoskiandAkiLehtinen:DSGEModelsandAdHocnessGiven the perceived inability to predict the ongoing economic crisis, faith inmacroeconomic theory in general and in the DSGE-based New Neoclassicalconsensusinparticular,hasbeenseverelyrocked.TheoreticalandmethodologicalcriticismoftheDSGEframeworkhasalsointensified(seee.g.,Colanderetal.2008;Kirman 2010a; 2010b). The use of representative-agent constructs has beenclaimednottobetheoreticallyjustifiedbecauseresultswithingeneralequilibriumtheoryshowthattherationalitypropertiesofindividualsdonotaggregatenicelyandthat,consequently,therationalmicro-foundationsdonothaveanyimportantconsequences at the macro level. In effect, a consequence of the use of suchconstructs in DSGE models is that economic phenomena resulting fromcoordinationproblemsamongheterogeneousagentscannotarisebyassumption.One cannot safely draw causal conclusions about alternative policieswith suchmodels,becausethereactionsoftherepresentativeagenttoshocksorparameterchangesduringeconomiccrisesmaynotcoincidewiththeaggregatereactionsofthe actual agents. These arguments have been used to suggest that the DSGEmodelcannotbeinterpretedasacausalmodelofthemarketeconomybasedonassumptionsaboutthemarketmechanism.Another set of contentious methodological issues relates to the empiricalassessment ofmodels. Although the officialmethodology ofmodel ‘calibration’wasoriginally intended toallow for theestimationof crucialmodelparameters(suchasriskpreferencesorsubjectivediscountratesofconsumers)frommultipleindependentsourcesofdata,inpracticecalibrationhasoftenmeantcurve-fittingthemodeltoavailablemacroeconomictime-seriesorlongrunaverages(suchasaggregatelabour).Theinterestingquestionthenremains:isthisempiricalstrategysuitablefordiscriminatingbetweenthecrucialcausalhypothesesaboutthelikelyconsequencesofdifferentpolicyinterventions.Yetthereseemstobesomejustificationforusingthesemodels.DSGEisbecomingthe standard platform in which to conducts policy analysis. They are clearlysuperior to previous macromodels in being able to incorporate imperfect

competition, nominal rigidities and the non-neutrality of money in a generalequilibriumsetting(i.e.,takingallimportantmarketsintoaccountsimultaneously).Theyalsohavesomeclaimforpredictivesuccessinthattheyseemtopredictbetterthanfullya-theoreticalVARmodels(SmetsandWouters2003).In this paper we explore theway in which DSGEmodels are used in academiceconomicresearch(researchonthe impactofsocalledfiscaldevaluation intheeuroarea)aswellasinmorepolicy-orientedresearchintheBankofFinland.Weshowhowthesemodelsarenotused inastraightforwardmannerofproducingpoint predictions from given empirical inputs. Instead, DSGEmodeling involvessignificantamountofseeminglyad-hocparameteradjustments,fiddlingwiththestructural assumptions and multiple runs in producing what is judged to bereasonable predictions. As such, they work more like platforms for integratingexpert judgements, rather than according to the standard understanding oftheoreticalmodels inphilosophyof science.Weexplore theepistemic rationaleandconsequencesofsuchmodelingactivity.All participants to the methodological discussion on DSGEmodels charge theiropponentsforbeingadhoc.Thepuristsconsideranymodel-elementsthatcannotbederivedfromutilitymaximizationasadhoc.ThenewKeynesiansconsiderthepurists’ choice of consistency with idealized microbehaviour or the use of therepresentative consumer as ad hoc. Finally, central bankers may cheerfullyembraceadhoccerybecausetheyarewellawareofbeingunabletoputtheDSGEmodelintousewithoutadhocchoices.TheDSGEmodellersarefacingadilemma:theirmacromodels can perhaps bemade roughly consistentwithmacrodata ormicrodata,orthemicroeconomicmaximizationassumption,butnotallatthesametime.Tractability isan importantaspectoftheproblem: itwouldbepossible, inprinciple to generate all the necessary price and wage rigidities and lags frommicrofoundations,butatcurrentthetaskissimplytoodifficult.We distinguish between three kinds of ad hocness (Popperian, Lakatosian, andengineering ad hocness) and argue that whether the ad hocness of a certainmodelingassumptionisproblematicornotshouldbejudgedinrelationtotherole

22of DSGE as an integrating platform for various empirical inputs and expertjudgement.Colander,D.,Howitt,P.,Kirman,A.,Leijonhufvud,A.&Mehrling,P.2008"BeyondDSGE Models: Toward an Empirically Based Macroeconomics", The AmericanEconomicReview,vol.98,2:236-240.Kirman, A. 2010a. Complex Economics: Individual and Collective Rationality.Routledge,London.Kirman, A.2010b “The Economic Crisis is a Crisis for Economic Theory”, CESifoEconomicStudies.56(4):498-535.Smets, F. & Wouters, R. 2003. “An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic GeneralEquilibrium Model of the Euro Area”, Journal of the European EconomicAssociationSeptember20031(5):1123-1175.

KaisaKärki:TheProblemofActivityandPassivityofIntentionalOmissionsWhatdowemeanbyactivitywhenwearetalkingaboutdeliberatenotdoings,i.e.,intentionalomissions?Inthispapermyaimistoquestionthenotionsofactivityand passivity of intentional omissions that can be taken for granted in socialscientificdiscussions.Forexample,inthediscussionsofactivecitizenshipomissionsareoftentreatedaspassivity.Butwhendiscussingcivildisobedience,intentionalomissionsaretreatedasactiveinterferinginthecausalrelationsofsociety.Inthefirstpartofthepaperthisproblemisaddressed.InthesecondpartIcomparetwopossiblestances toactivityorpassivityof intentionalomissions, that is, thestance of Benjamin Mossell (2009) and the notions of activity and passivity inintentionalbehaviourproposedbyHarryFranfkurt(1988).InthethirdpartofthepaperIstresstheambiguityofthenotionsofactivityandpassivitywhenappliedtointentionalomissions,andshowhowintentionalomissionscanincludeactivityandpassivityondifferentlevels.Anagentcantakeanactivestancetoherownbodilyurgesinintentionalomission,butpreventingbodilyurgesisjustonekindofactivitythatcanbe included in intentionalomissions.Theagentcanalso takeanactivestancetowhat'shappeningaroundherinanintentionalomission,whichiswhatweneedtobetterunderstandinthesocialscientificdiscussions.In analytic philosophy of action, intentional omissions necessarily include orpresupposesomementalactivity,thatis,intending,planning,decidingoratleastrecognizingthepossibilityofsomeactionthatisleftundone.Inthephilosophyofintentional omissions, they have been are treated as allowing something tohappen,butsomesocietallysignificantintentionalomissionswouldnotseemtobeconceptuallygraspedby theconceptofallowing. Forexample,beingonhungerstrikeisnotfullygraspedbythedescriptionofallowingoneselftostarve.Onesolutiontothisproblematicisdefiningintentionalomissionsinsuchawaythattheycontainnoactivity,effort,ortrying(e.g.,Mossell2009).AccordingtoMossell,only positive actions, that necessarily include bodily movement, can involveactivity.Buttheproblemwiththissolutionisthatmanyintentionalomissionsdo

23seem to contain activemental components, intentions, decisions, restrainingofoneself,etc.Therealsoseemstobeaconceptualdifferencebetweenmentalandphysicalactivity thatneeds tobe taken intoaccountwhenanalysing intentionalomissions.AccordingtoFrankfurt(1988)activityisnotjustphysicaleffort,butitcanmeantheagenttakinganactivestancetoherownbodilyurges,ortakinganactivestancetowhat'shappeningaroundher,atasocietal level.Passivityontheotherhand, inFranfkurt'stheory,isasituationwheretheagentisinapositionofabystanderinrelationtoherownbehaviour.Frankfurt'sconceptionmakesthenotionsofactivityandpassivitymorecomplexwhenappliedtopositiveactions,thatis, intentionalactions that necessarily include bodilymovement. Frankfurt's theory recognizesthat,forexample,raisingahandtosupportanewpresidentinameetingcanbepassive positive action, whereas not raising one's hand, and defying a socialexpectation,mightrequireamoreactivestancefromtheagentnotsupportingthenewpresident.InthispaperIapplyFrankfurt'sconceptionsofactivityandpassivitytointentionalomissionsandshowthatactivityinanintentionalomissioncanhappenindifferentlevels. For example, in refraining to act, an agent can take an active stance inrelationtoherownbodilyurgesbypreventingthemfrombeingeffective.Butanagentcanalsotakeanactivestancetohersurroundingsbyintentionalnotdoingsomething.Thenotionsofpassivityandactivityofintentionalomissionsinsocialsciencescanbe problematic unless the conceptual issues are addressed. If we allow thatintentional omissions can be active resistance, then the active citizenship idealshouldtakeintoconsiderationtheobservationthatnon-participationcaninvolveactive resistance. On the other hand, if all not doings are seen as active, thedifferencebetweenmereomissionsand intentionalomissions isnotrecognized.Notallintentionalomissionsareactive,otherthaninthesensethattheycontainanactivementalcomponent.Buttheycanincludebodilyactivities,andactivityinasocietallevel.Iftheactivityofintentionalomissionsistakenforgranted,many

apparently ineffective ways of resistance can be seen as dignified means ofdefiance. Not all intentional omissions are necessarily effective interfering,however,andmanyintentionalomissionscanplausiblybedescribedasallowingsomethinghappen.Thecomplexityof thenotionsofactivityandpassivitywhenappliedtointentionalomissionsiswhatthispaperistryingtoaddress.Intentionalomissionsareimportantpartsofhumanagency–justaswellaspositiveactions,mentalactionsandpersonhood.Inordertounderstandhumanresistancein social sciences, we need conceptual tools to somehow identify activity inintentional omissions. Philosophical inquiry is needed, because intentionalomissionscannotplausiblyberecognizedfromomissions,ormerepassivityfromtheoutsideperspective.Onlytheagentcanreliablytellbetweenheromissionandintentionalomission,whichiswhyfirstpersonperspectiveisneededtounderstandwhethertheagentistakinganactivestancetohersurroundingsocietyornot.

24AnnaMichalska:PathologyasaSocialScientificConceptThe presentantion addresses the question of whether or not the notion ofpathologyisapplicableatthesocial(grouplevel).Istheconceptofsocialpathologywarranted?Isitexplanatory?Two problems emerge in this connection. The first has to do with a possiblecategorialmistakeofutilizingatthesocial levelacategorythatwasdesignedtoapplytotheindividual(psychologyandmedicine).Thesedaysonecanfindfairlymanyattempts,inbothjournalismandacademia,atapproachingthefunctioningof whole societies or cultures in terms of mental disorders (group paranoia ordelusion,culturallytransferredtrauma,etc.).Isitarhetoric,orarewereallysayingsomethingofsubstancehere?Assumingthelatteristhecase,weneedaprecisesenseofwhatisbeingsaidwhenthecategoryofpathologyisinvokedinreferencetosocialphenoman.What ismissing isaclearconceptwith rulesofapplicationcapableofproducingaccurateempiricalpredictions.Thesecondproblemismoregeneric,andisconnectedwiththenotionofpathologyitself.Somephilosophers(e.g.LarryLaudan)andpractitioners(mentalhealthcareprofessionals, e.g. those advising in parental custody cases, or somepsychotherapists)prefertosteerclearofitbecauseofitsallegedlydiscriminatoryundertone,orbecauseofhelplessnessandstigmaitmightinduceorstrenghten.Ontopofthat,pathologyasasocialscientificconceptbringswithitatemptationtoreviveallproblematicclaimsofculturaluniversalism.AlthoughIrejecttheideaofdoingawaywiththeconceptofpathologyaltogether,Idorealizethatinordertoavoidany formofexclusivism,onemustbeverycautiouswhendefiningandapplyingtheconcept.In developing the concept of social pathology, I follow the lines of Habermas'stheoryof communicativeaction (TCA). TCAprovidesa conceptual framework inwhich the social pathology can be thorougly investigated; it basically presentsmentaldisorderandsocialpathologyastwosidesofthesamething.IshallstartwithclarifyingafewconceptscentraltoHabermasiantheory.Toproperlyexplicate

andapplytheconceptof–atthispointsimplycommunicative–pathology,onemusthaveaclearsenseofwhat,accordingtoTCA,thetelosofcommunicationis.ThisseemstobethemostmisunderstoodnotioninHabermas'stheory.AsIshalltrytoshow,telos(mutualunderstanding)isatthesametimeanideal(somethingtostrivefor)andsomething“alwaysalready”thereaspartofthelifeworld.Assuch,theconceptoftelosofcommunicationprovidesasolidnormativegroundforthedefinition,diagnosisandevaluationofsocialpathology.Inthislight,thedifferencebetween mis-communication (or failed communication) and pathologicalcommunication (pseudo-communication) appears warranted and appealing.According to Habermas (Reflections on Communicative Pathology, 1974),communicative pathology results from a collapse of either the claim to moralrightness,ortheclaimtosincerity(butnevertheclaimtoobjectivetruth). Iwillpushthisconslusionabitfurtherandconsiderthepossibilitythatallcomminicativepathologiescomedowntoacollapseinthesinceritydimension,whichwouldbetosaythatapartfromeverythingelse,thepathology isaformofself-perpetuatingself-deception. Pathology follows the tacit logic of self-preservation; it is, bydefinition,chronic,notacute,andassuchitshouldbedistinguishedfromanykindof“stateofemergency”thatmightsuperficiallyresemblefullyblowndisorder,and,undercertainconditions,evolveintoit.Pathologybuilssystemarounditself;hencethesocialramificationsoftheindividualpathology.Withviewtoshowingthattheconceptofpathologyindeedmakesadifference,IshallrecapitulatethecrucialpointsofthedebatebetweenHabermasandRobertBrandom.Asshallbedemonstrated,thedebatecanbeframedasacontroversyover the applicability of the concept of pathology in social scientific domain.Whereas Brandom proclaims self-corrective and self-healing potential ofdiscoursive practice, Habermas makes us sensitive to the posibility that thelinguisticpracticemightinfactservetoconcealpathologicalpatternsofintra-andinter-personalinteraction.OnBrandommodel,actsinterruptingthepathologicalexchange are qualified as simply non-discoursive and hence inappropriate. OnHabermasian theory, the same acts must under certain circumstances beconsidered as a legitimate means to prevent a pathology from unfolding. Thecorollaryisthat,ifproperlyunderstoodandemployed,theconceptof(pathology)

25isnotastrictlyspeakingcriticaltool,itsrole,however,becomesmuchpronouncedinmetatheoreticandtherapeuticdiscourse.Thisfeatureoftheconcept–itsactuallevelofapplicability–precludesitsbeingusedtoserveadiscriminatorypurpose.Againstx this background, we can circle back to the problem of interrelationbetweenpathologyasmentaldisorderandpathologyassocialphenomena.Ishallargue that pathology, strictly speaking, is always individual – it is typified bydisorderedpatternsofperception,cognition,andaction.Thisnotwithstanding,itisimportanttotakeanotethatthedisorderedpatternofsocialinteractionwhichresults fromaccumulationof individualpathologies– themeasureofwhicharecommunicativedysfunctions–hasanemergentcharacter.Wheremajorityofthoseconcernedarecompromisedinatleastsomerespects(i.e.,notnecessarlyclinicallydisordered), pathology becomes a social phenomenon: pathological patterns ofinteraction emerge; theybecome institutionalized and internalized. This higher-order disorder amplifies the exising pathologies, and is very likely, throughfeedback loops, to both severe existing deficits and produce new instances ofmentaldisorder.Thecommunityasawholebecomestherebymoresusceptibletonegative influencesof those exhibiting extreme formsof pathology (personalitydisorders, psycho- and sociopathy), which corrodes the lifeworld even further.Disorderedpatternsovergrowculture toprotect them.Sinceat thispointsocialpathology isverydifficult todealwith,weshouldbeall themoremindfulofallpotentially damaging patterns of interaction encoded in, i.a., legislation,communication rules in corporation,parentinghabits,which, thoughnotper sepathological, may promote an emergence of serious individual and socialpathologies.

LuisMireles-Flores:Causal inferenceandempiricalevidenceonthebenefitsoffreetradeInarecentarticle,RobertDriskill(2012)questionswhymosteconomistsbelievesouncriticallythatfreetradeisbeneficial,evenwhenallargumentsofferedtosupportthat belief do not survive critical scrutiny. He claims that the rhetoric used tosupport the claim “free trade causes economic benefits” is based on a ratherflawedargumentation.Driskill’sanalysisfocusesentirelyontheoreticalargumentsand models used to conceptually support that free trade is beneficial. In thepresentarticle, I analyse theempiricalevidence that ismost commonlyused tosupportthecase in favourof freetrade.Myanalysis is, thus,complementarytoDriskill’s theoreticalappraisal, in that it contributes toassesswhether therearesome empirical grounds that could justify the widespread belief that trade-liberalisationpoliciesarealwaysbeneficial.Ahugeamountofempiricalresearchhasbeenproducedwiththeaimofsupportingor rejecting the hypothesis that: (more) trade liberalisation causes (more)economicimprovements(intermsofgrowth,investment,employment,andsoon).Iexploretheevidenceofferedbydefendersandopponentsoffreetradeinordertocharacterisewhichtypeofevidenceandwhichevidentialmethodsareemployedtosupporttheirresults.Threemethodologicalissuesemerge:a)thelackofdefinitereferentsfortherelevantcausalrelata;b)theuseofeconometricmethodsasa“golden standard” of scientific evidence, which in turn restricts the kind ofinferences that can be reliablymade about policy implementations; and c) theproblemsofsomeformsofevidenceamalgamationoriginallyintendedtoenhancethe confidence on purported policy-oriented causal generalisations. Even if theexistingempiricalevidencecouldbetakenasacceptabletosupportthatthereis“some”causalrelationbetweentradeliberalisationandeconomicbenefits(usuallyas an average causal effect estimated using well-established econometrictechniques),Iarguethattheevidenceisneitherconclusivenorsufficienttosupportconcretepolicyrecommendationsfor individualcountriesandtheirownspecificsocio-economicconditions.

26Themethodological analysis offered in this article also contributes to themoregeneralphilosophicaldiscussionsonthepracticalrelevanceofcausalknowledgeandtheuses(andmisuses)ofevidencetosupportpolicyinterventionsonthebasisofscientificresearch.Giventhatthereissomeproperlyestablishedscientificcausalknowledge,whataretheconditionsforgettingeffectivepolicyrecommendationson the bases of it?What kind of evidential support is required to evaluate theefficacyofcausalgeneralisations,andwhatkindofevidentialsupportisrequiredin order to warrant the effectiveness of concrete policy implementations? Inparticular,Ianalysethebasicframeworkofsomeeconometricmethodsemployedin empirical economics to elicit causal effects, namely the “potential-outcomesframework”. Many assumptions have to be made in order for econometricmethodstowork;understandingthespecificrolesoftheseassumptionsshedslightonthelimitationsandpossibleapplicationsofcausaleffectsforpolicypurposes.FollowingadistinctionabouttypesofevidenceputforwardbyJulianReiss(2015),Iexplainhowtheprocessoftestingahypothesisforcausalefficacyconstitutesonly“indirect” evidence (rather than “direct”) for any related hypothesis about theeffectivenessofanactualpolicyimplementation.Mycontributionisaphilosophicalanalysisofthewaysinwhicheconomistsandtheusersofscientificresearchinterpretandemploytheresultsofempiricalstudiesininternational-trade economics. The tools I use come from recent philosophicalresearchon causality, causal inference, and evidence,which are topics of greatimportance in economics and in the social sciences in general, but whichunfortunatelyarecommonlynotunderstoodordiscussedinaclearandsystematicwayoutsidesmall specialisedcircles.Thebenefitsof trade-liberalisationpoliciesarean issuethathasbeenhistoricallydiscussedonmanydifferentgrounds,butthatisstilltodaynotclearlyunderstoodbythepublicingeneral,bymanypolicymakers,andbyagoodamountofacademics.Manyconceptsandmethodologicaltoolsrelatedtotheempiricalstudyofthebenefitsoffreetradeareambiguouslyemployedandmisinterpretedbymanypotentialusersoftheresults,whichcouldleadtoineffectiveornegativeeffectsinrelationtopracticalpolicyapplications.

MichiruNagatsuandMikkoSalmela:EmotionalNudges:TheoreticalandEthicalChallengesThereisadiscrepancybetweenexistingtheoreticalunderstandingontheroleofemotions,andtheiractualusesinnudging--behavioralpolicyinterventionsinthechoice environment aiming at encouraging beneficial individual choiceswithoutincentive change or coercion (cf. Grüne-Yanoff forthcoming). On the one hand,theoriesofnudgingfocusonperceptualandcognitiveprocessesandmechanismsthat are involved in behavioral change, without paying specific and systematicattentiontowaysinwhichemotionsinfluenceperception,cognition,anddecision-making.Ontheotherhand,therearemanyexamplesofactualnudgesthateitherexplicitlyorimplicitlyinvokeemotionsasamechanismofnudging.Theseincludeimplicitcasessuchas(a)lossaversionintheframingeffectinwhichoptionsframedas(probabilitiesof)lossesareshunnedinpartbecauseofthefearthattheyelicit(DeMartinoetal.2006),andexplicitcasessuchas(b)invokingfearofsmokingbygraphic images of dirty lungs and other consequences of smoking on cigarettepacks(Greenetal.2016);andinsocialcontexts,(c)nudgesinvokingsocialidentity,asinthewell-known“Don’tmesswithTexas”anti-litteringcampaign(ThalerandSunstein 2008, ch. 3), inwhich the group-based Texan pridewas an importantmechanisminsolvingacollectiveactionproblem(X2015).Giventhatthesenudgeswork,whathaveemotionstodowiththeirsuccess?Apossiblereasonforthisdiscrepancybetweenthetheoryandpracticeconcerningthe role of emotions in nudges is the common categorical identification ofemotionswithSystem1typeofresponses.Theso-called“affectheuristics”---afamily of mechanisms through which feelings and emotions aid judgment anddecisionmaking---presupposeaschematicdichotomybetweentheemotionalandrationalprocesses(cf.Slovicetal.2007;Kahneman2011).Indeed,leadingnudgingtheorists Slovic (2010) and Sunstein (2013) havemisgivings about the ability ofemotiontoofferuspracticalguidance.E.g.Sunsteinarguesthatintenseemotionalreactionscanleadpeopletobeafraidoffairlytrivialrisksandneglectseriousones.Thesemisgivingsaboutemotionexplainwhyitsitsuncomfortablywithinexistingtheoriesofnudging.

27In this paper, we argue that the understanding according to which emotionsoperate largely in the automatic, unconscious, cognitively effortless System1 ismisguided.More precisely, we argue that the dual-processmodel is useful butinsufficienttofullyunderstandthefunctionalandalgorithmiclevelsofanalysisatwhichcognition figures inhumanemotionsand thereforealso inchoice-guidingcognition(Y2014).Weproposeamorecomprehensiveframeworkbasedontheconverging consensus in interdisciplinary emotion research concerning howemotions figure inourcognitiveandaffectiveprocesses.Accordingtothisview,emotionsdonotnecessarilybypassordistortcognitionanddecision-making,butratheraiditinseveralimportantways(Damasio1995;Loewenstein&Lerner2003;Isen 2013). Positive emotions in particular lead to more flexibility in focus ofattention,aswellastobroaderthinkingandabilitytoprocessandintegratemoreaspectsofsituationsandstimuli(Isen2013).Negativeemotionscanalsoofferusphenomenological acquaintancewith the consequences of our choices, therebyhelpingustoavoidharmfulchoices(Rossi&Yudell,2012).This neo-cognitivist viewenables us to seewhy emotions, especially those thatinvolve both Systems 1 and 2 types of processing are particularly suitablemechanismsfornudging.As“perceptionsofsalience”(deSousa1987),theydirectour attention to some objects, thoughts, or choices rather than to others.Moreover,theydisposeustoactinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeemotionalappraisalofthesituation,withoutstillremovingourabilitytoactotherwise(opt-out)ifwesodecide(e.g.Frijda1986;Pacherie2002;Scarantino2010).Concern-based group identification, which is often regarded as irrational in socialpsychology, can also contribute to “good game-theoretic reasoning” and solvesocialdilemmas(Bacharach2006).Ouraccountclarifiesnotonlyhowemotionscancontributetosuccessfulnudges,butalsohowtheycanbeethicallyacceptable,thatis,howtheycansatisfythekeyrequirementthatnudgesshouldnotbypassorcompromiseourcapacityofrationaldecision-making while guiding it towards a certain direction. In particular, incontrast to Thaler and Sunstein (2008) andmanyof their critics,we argue that

emotionalnudgescanrespectindividualrationalityandpersonalautonomy(Mills2015)eveniftheyinvolvecognitiveprocessesthatarelargelyoutsideofconsciousawareness.Bacharach, M. (2006) Team Reasoning: Beyond Individual Choice. PrincetonUniversityPress.Damasio,A.1995.Descartes’Error.NewYork:AvonBooks.DeMartino,B.,Kumaran,D.,Seymour,B.&Dolan,R.J.2006.Frames,BiasesandRationalDecision-MakingintheHumanBrain.Science313,684-687.DeSousa,R.1987.RationalityofEmotion.Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress.Frijda,N.1986.TheEmotions.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Green,A.E.,Mays,D.,Falk,E.B.,Vallone,D.,Gallagher,N.,Richardson,A.,Tercyak,K.P.Abrams,D.B.,&Niaura,R.S.2016.Youngadultsmokers'neuralresponsetographiccigarettewarninglabels.AddictiveBehaviorsReports3,28-32.Grüne-Yanoff, Till (forthcoming) Why Behavioural Policy Needs MechanisticEvidence.EconomicsandPhilosophyIsen,A.2013.SomeWaysinWhichPositiveAffectInfluencesDecision-MakingandProblem Solving. In M. Lewis, J. Haviland-Jones & L. Feldman Barrett (Eds):HandbookofEmotions,3rdEdition(pp.548-573).NewYork&London:TheGuilfordPress.Kahneman,D.2011.ThinkingFastandSlow.London:PenguinBooks.Loewenstein,G.&Lerner, J.S.2003.TheRoleofAffect inDecision-Making. InR.Davidson,KScherer,&H.HillGoldsmith(Eds):HandbookofAffectiveSciences(pp.619-642).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Mills, C. 2015. TheHeteronomyof ChoiceArchitecture. Reviewof PhilosophicalPsychology6,495-509.X2015Pacherie,E.2002.TheRoleofEmotionsintheExplanationofAction.In:EuropeanReviewofPhilosophy5,EmotionandAction(ed.byE.Pacherie),53–92.Rossi, J. & Yudell, M. 2012. Value-Ladenness and Rationality in HealthCommunication.TheAmericanJournalofBioethics12,20-23.Y2014

28Slovic,P.2010IfILookattheMassIWillNeverAct:PsychicNumbingandGenocide.InS.Roeser(ed):EmotionsandRiskyTechnologies(pp.37-60).Dordrecht:Springer.Slovic,P.,Finucane,M.L.,Peters,E.&MacGregor,D.G.2007.TheAffectHeuristic.EuropeanJournalofOperationalResearch177,1333–1352Sunstein,C.2013IfMisfearingistheProblem,IsCost-BenefitAnalysistheSolution?In E. Shafir (ed.): The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy (pp. 231-242).PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress.Thaler,R.H.&Sunstein,C.R.2008.Nudge.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

ThomasNoah:OnTheFailureofSeparatingCustomsfromMoralNormsintheTheoryofSocialNormsCristina Bicchieri's "Theory of SocialNorms" is becoming increasingly influentialboth inside and outside of academia, finding uptake with philosophers, socialscientists, UNICEF, and governmental officials. The theorymakes use of simpleconceptual tools drawn from game theory and psychology to give causalexplanationsofcollectivepatternsofbehavior,andthetheorydiagnosesfourkindsofcollectivepatternofbehavior:custom,moralnorm,descriptivenorm,andsocialnorm.Iwillarguethatthetheory'sconceptualtoolsaretoosimpleandthatthetheorycannotmaintainthedistinctionbetweencustomsandmoralnorms(orself-interestandmorality).Further,anyattemptstobuildmoreintothetheoryinordertoexplain thedifferencebetween customsandmoralnormsmustdrawon theresources of philosophical ethics, and those resources are both complex andcontentious.Let’sfocusononeparticulardistinctionthatBicchieriuses:thedistinction,familiarfromgametheory,betweensociallyunconditionalandconditionalpreferences.ApreferencetoφissociallyconditionaljustincaseIchoosetoengageinthebehaviorbecauseIbelievethatotherswhomattertomealsoφorbecauseIbelievethatotherswhomatter tome believe that I shouldφ. A preference toφ is sociallyunconditionaljustincaseitisnotsociallyconditional–thatis,justincaseIprefertoφregardlessofwhat Ibelievethatothersdoorofwhat IbelievethatothersbelievethatIshoulddo.AccordingtoBicchieri,customsandmoralnormsresult fromagentsactingfromsociallyunconditionalpreferences,anddescriptivenormsandsocialnormsresultfromagentsactingfromsociallyconditionalpreferences.However,grantingforthesakeofargumentthatsociallyunconditionalpreferencesdrivebothcustomsandmoralnorms,howarewetodistinguishthetwo?Intheoriginalconstructionofthetheoryofsocialnormsfrom2006’sTheGrammarof Society, Bicchieri distinguishes customs from moral norms on the basis of

29personalnormativebelief.Althoughbothcustomsandmoralnormsaredrivenbysociallyunconditionalpreferences,moralnormsarealsomarkedbythepresenceofpersonalnormativebeliefwhilecustomsarenot.I argue that thismove is inadequate to distinguish customs frommoral norms.Personalnormativebeliefsarefirst-orderbeliefsaboutwhichactionssomeagentorothershoulddo.Thecontrastclassconcernsfactualbeliefs,whicharebeliefsaboutwhichfactsobtain.Butthelogicalformofpersonalnormativebeliefisthis:“Ibelievethat[agent]shouldφ.”Iarguethatpersonalnormativebelief ispartandparcelofallactionassuch(asopposedtomerenon-intentionalbehavior)andsocannotserveasthebasis fordistinguishingcustomsandmoralnorms.Thatis,personalnormativebelieffactorsintocustoms,moralnorms,descriptivenormsandsocialnormsbecausepersonalnormative belief has the logical form of the “all-things-considered-should.” Sopersonalnormativebelief,assuch,cannotmarkthedifferencebetweencustomsandmoralnorms.Inmorerecentwork,Bicchieritriestorespondtothisobjectionbygrantingthatpersonalnormativebeliefispresentinbothcustomsandmoralnorms.However,hertheorydoesnotevadethechargethatitfailstodistinguishbetweencustomsandmoralnorms.InNormsintheWild,Bicchierisurveysdifferentmethodsforseparatingcustomsandmoralnorms.Sherejectsmostofthesemethods,suchastypingbyemotionsorbycontent.Thereareothermethodsthatareavailable,buttheseviolateotherdesiderataofthetheory,suchassimplicity,testability,andintuitivesense.Attheend of the analysis of moral norms, we are left with merely a negativecharacterization.Butyoucannotmeasurenegativecharacterizations,sothetheoryiswoefullyincomplete(andbyitsownlights)In the end, I argue that the onlyway Bicchieri canmake a distinction betweencustomandmoralnormsisbyappealtoadistinctionbetweentwokindsofreasons:

prudentialandmoral.Thisdistinction,however,cannotcomefromgametheoryorpsychology,forthedistinctionisoneinethicaltheory.And,inethicaltheory,thedistinctionbetweenprudenceandmorality isnotsimple, ishighlycontroversial,andmaynotlenditselftotesting.The upshot is that we can add the distinction between prudential and moralreasons to the theory of social norms in order to get the distinction betweencustomsandmoralnorms,butwedosoattheexpenseofsomeofthetheoreticaldesiderata that motivated the account originally. Or we can preserve thedesiderata but only at the expense of not being able to distinguish betweencustomsandmoralnorms,henceviolatingadesideratumthatthetheorybeusefulformeasuringbehaviorsandcreating interventionstochangeharmfulcollectivepatternsofbehavior.Iclosewithconsideringanobjectiontomyargument:thetheoryofsocialnormsisatheoryofsocialnorms,sowhocaresifthetheoryisunabletodistinguishbetweencustomsandmorality?Solongasthetheorypicksoutsocialnorms,thetheoryisfineforitsintendedpurpose.Ipresenttworeplies:first,suchanobjectionisadhocinabadway.Thetheorywasoriginally meant to be a general purpose theory of motivations for collectivepatternsofbehavior.Second, identifyingmoralnorms(ormoralreasons) isveryimportantfortheprojectoftypingsocialnorms.Accordingtothetheory,wemustbeabletotellthedifferencebetweenwhenasocialnormisendorsedandwhenitisnot.Thismeansthatwemusttellpeople’smoralbeliefsareinconsensuswiththeirnormativeexpectations (theirbeliefsaboutothers’normativebeliefs).Theconditions of endorsed social norm and pluralistic ignorance are different andrequire that we can measure the difference. This is because the interventionstrategiesforthesetwotypesofsocialnormconditionsareradicallydifferent.Youcannot have the distinction between endorsed and unendorsed social normswithoutaclearstatementofwhatpeople’smoralbeliefsare.Thetheorycannotwalkawayfromthiscriticismbyclaimingtobeuninterestedinmoralbehavior.

30Joonas Ottman: The Epistemic Conditions for Successful Norm-InducedBehavioralInterventionsTherecentliteratureonsocialnormsinthesocialsciencesisvastanddiverse.Evenif you focus only on the role social norms play in behavioral change, there’s aconsiderable amount of relevant theories covering norm change and normcompliance. Despite this diversity, some important questions have receivedsurprisinglylittleattention.Eventhoughthere’salotofresearchonthenatureanddynamicsofsocialnorms,littleofitfocusesontheconditionsthatmakeitpossiblefor social norms to function effectively in given institutional settings. There’sadmittedly a wide range of research literature on the role of social norms indifferent typesof institutions.However, inmostgeneral theoriesof institutions,thesenormsaretreatedasexogenousvariablesthatchangeveryslowly,ifatall.The more recent accounts of social norms, in contrast, treat social norms asendogenous variables that can evolve rapidly if people’s mutual expectationschange.Yettheselatteraccountshavefocusedlessonhowsocialnormsrelatetotheinstitutionsinwhichtheyfunction.Thisisstartlingbecausetheseaccountsinparticularhavebeenconsideredusefulindesigningbehavioralpolicyinterventions.I investigate the conditions that must be met if we want our norm-inducedbehavioral interventions to have lasting effects in their target institutions. Myanalysis is built on top of Cristina Bicchieri’s account of social norms. Moreprecisely, I provide an answer to the following question:Underwhat epistemicconditions is it possible to manipulate social norms to achieve sustainablebehavioralchangeinagiventypeofinstitution?Inotherwords,howdoweknowifagivenbehavioralinterventionbasedonthemanipulationofsocialnormswillbeeffectiveinagiveninstitutionalsetting?TheconditionsthatIoutlinedemonstratethat ifwehope touse themanipulationof socialnormsasa seriousmeans forachievingbehavioralchange,itisn’tenoughthatwemasterthedynamicsofsocialnorms per se. We must also understand how social norms depend on theinstitutionalsettingsinwhichweimplementournorm-inducedinterventionsandpolicies.

Ibeginwiththeaforementionedframingoftheresearchquestion.Next,IpresentBicchieri’s account of social norms and provide the main reasons why somepolicymakers have justly found it useful in designing behavioral interventions.Bicchieri’s account has a number of features that enable it to account for bothnormchangeandnormcompliance.Theystemfromthekeybuildingblocksofhertheory,namely,conditionalpreferences,referencenetworks,andbothempiricalandnormativeexpectations.Anothernotable feature inher account is that themere existence of a social norm doesn’t imply anyone’s compliance with it.Conformity to a norm requires the belief that sufficiently many other peopleconformto itandalsoexpectyoutoconformto it.Ontheonehand,Bicchieri’sapproachisabletoaccountforthefactthatmanyharmfulpracticeshaveproventobeextremelydifficulttochangeevenwhenmostofthepeopletakingpartinthepracticecondemnit(e.g.,corruption).Ontheotherhand,heraccountalsoentailsthe possibility of bringing about substantial behavioral change only bymanipulating social norms. The trick is to target the empirical and normativeexpectationspeoplehaveofeachother.Iftheseexpectationschange,behavioralchange will follow due to the conditionality of people’s preferences. Changingpeople’smutual expectationsmight not always be easy, but Bicchieri’s accountnevertheless implies thepossibilityofachievingdrasticbehavioralchangesevenrapidly. In cases of pluralistic ignorance, for example, a public opinionpollmayreveal that people’s beliefs about their mutual expectations are false, thusimmediatelycausingachangeineveryone’snorm-inducedbehavior.After presenting Bicchieri’s account and its virtues, I turn to a case study: anextensivelystudiedanti-bullyingprogramappliedinmorethanhundredschools.IarguethatBicchieri'saccountofsocialnormsisabletoaccountfortheprogram'seffectiveness and can provide important and practical insight for it’s futuredevelopment.Atthesametime,Iusethecasestudytodemonstratethatwhenitcomestotacklingconcretebehavioralinterventions,heraccountsuffersfromthelackofattentiongiventotheconditionsunderwhichsocialnormsfunctioningiveninstitutionalsettings.IderivetheseconditionspartlyfromBicchieri’saccountandpartlyfrommyanalysisofhowtherelevantsocialnormsinthecasestudycanbesustainedinaschoolenvironment.

31MikołajRatajczak:PhilosophyofLanguageandCritiqueofPoliticalEconomy:AnAccountfromthePerspectiveoftheContemporaryItalianPoliticalPhilosophyThe role of language and communication in the contemporary economy is anundisputed fact, but there’s still no generally accepted way of using toolstraditionally applied to investigations into language and communication in acritiqueof political economy, especially theeconomybasedon knowledge. It isespecially evident in the case of language.More traditional critical analyses oflanguageine.g.Marxistphilosophyoflanguage(e.g.Voloshinov)stressedmostlytheideologicalor/andpurelyphilosophicalaspectsoftheproblem(likedialectics,theoryofreasonetc.,whatwecouldseeine.g.Habermas,butalsoChomsky)orwererelatedtotheproblemoftheclassstructureinsociety(e.g.Bourdieu).Evenincontemporaryphilosophylanguageismostlythematisedfromthepointofviewof the politics of subject in different strains of social critique (feminism, queerstudies,discourseanalysis)and,unchangeably,critiqueofideologyandtheoryofhegemony (Lacanian left). But in an economy based on knowledge languagebecomes aneconomic factor in itself – asoneof themost importantmeansofproduction and distribution of an important economic wealth (knowledge andinformation).Withmore andmore attention directed towards the problems ofcreativity,informationdistributionand–asitwasrecentlyformulatedbyJeremyRifkin – the rise of the zero-marginal cost society, it becomesmore andmoreurgent to develop a critique of political economy using tools of linguistics andphilosophyoflanguageinamannerdifferentfromapurelyanalyticalmode(whichwouldbereducedtoaphilosophicalanalysisofeconomictheoriesanddiscoursesof economics). To develop a critique of political economy using the tools of aphilosophyoflanguage.Nowadayssuchperspectiveinabroadfieldofthephilosophyoflanguagecanbefound, in my opinion, in the contemporary Italian philosophy (which is beingincreasinglyoftenreferredtoas“ItalianTheory”),especiallyinauthorsfocusedonthe theory of cognitive capitalism or immaterial labour. It is a very diverseintellectual movement (which for this reason, among others, makes the label“Italian Theory” an inadequate one), which nevertheless has a rich tradition of

joininglanguageanalysisandsocialandeconomiccritique.Itwasinthelatesixtiesand the seventies that many Italian theorists from the fields of aesthetics,philosophyoflanguage,politicaltheoryorphilosophystartedlookingatlanguage(or linguistic disposition) as a directly economic problem – first and foremostFerruccioRossi-Landi’sthesisonthehomologybetweenlanguageandlabour,butalsoEmilioGarroni’swritingsonhumancreativity,MassimoCacciari’sstudiesonthecrisisofphilosophyandpoliticaleconomyandhis researchonthenotionof“socialbrain”andpost-operaistanalysesof thesocialworkerandnew formsoflabour (amongwhichwe should underline notes byAntonioNegri, butwithoutreducingtheissuetohisinput).WithatraditionalpreoccupationofItalianscholarswiththeproblemsoflanguageandsemiologyononehand,andagrowinginterestinthetransformationandcrisisoftheFordisteconomy,itwasinItalywhereoneof themost original philosophical contributions into a critiqueof contemporaryeconomywereformulated.AuthorssuchasanalreadymentionedNegri,butalsoPaoloVirno,ChristianMarazzi,MaurizioLazzarato,FeliceCimatti,CarloVercellone(althoughsomeofthemworkingoutsideofItaly)havedevotedalotofenergytodevelop ways of analysing language from the point of view of labour andaccumulationofcapital.In my paper I will elaborate on the thesis that within the diverse field ofcontemporary Italian political philosophy we can find notions and concepts todevelopphilosophical investigationsof language thatcouldprovidemeans foracritique of contemporary economy. I will focus on thewritings by Paolo Virno,FeliceCimatti,ChristianMarazziandtheoristsofcognitivecapitalismtopresentasyntheticinterpretationoftheperspectivefromwhichtheyanalyselanguage.Firstofall,Iwillstressthedifferencebetweenlanguageandlinguisticdispositionandpresent a philosophical theory of creativity that the Italians elaborate, drawingextensively,butalsodivergingfromChomsky’sbiolinguistics.Itisalsoaproblemoflinguistic disposition that introduces the question of potentiality andtransindividuality, both being of the highest importance when it comes to aphilosophical research into capitalism that reduces labour to labour-power (or,speaking differently, capacity – faculty, potentiality – to labour). Thirdly, I willreconstruct after Virno the most important logical elements of language as a

32dispositive of subjectivization, namely the absolute performative, the infiniteregressionandnegation,andrelatethemtothestructureofthehighlyfinancializedeconomy,whichisbasedonsimilarlogical-linguisticmechanism.ThemainpartofthepaperwillbefocusedontheusethatChristianMarazzimakesofVirnocategoriesinthefieldofthephilosophyoflanguagepreciselyinordertodevelopasystematicaccountofacritiqueofpoliticaleconomybasedonlanguageanalysis. It is though not enough to show analogies or homologies betweenlanguageandlabour,languageandmoney,languageandcapitaletc.,butthetaskistoshowtheroleoflanguageincontemporaryformsoflabour,monetarypoliticsand capital flows (especially flows of financial capital) and therefore theimportance of a philosophical investigations of language as a dispostive theconstitutes the economic relations in contemporary economy. The paper willconcludewithgeneralremarksconcerningthecritiqueofcognitivecapitalismasanewregimeofaccumulationthatdevelopsmeanstoextractsurplusvaluedirectlyfrom linguistic disposition andwill try to formulate initial answers to questionsstretching both towards a critique of political economy and the philosophy oflanguage: what does this new situation we find ourselves in tell us about thetransformationsofthenewregimesofaccumulationandwhatdoesittellusaboutusasspeakingbeings.

HardySchilgen:IntegrativePluralismintheSocialSciencesPhilosophers have come up with a number of different accounts of scientificpluralismovertime.Iwanttoraisethefollowingquestion:Arethesetheoreticalaccountsofpluralismput forward inphilosophyable to captureall instancesofscientificpluralismastheycurrentlyappearinscientificpractice?Myanswertothisquestion will be ‘no’. Even though current accounts of pluralism are able tocorrectlycapturesomeinstancesofpluralityinscientificpractice,theymissothers.Thisleavesagapbetweeninstancesofpluralityastheyappearinscientificpracticeandaccountsofpluralismasputforwardinphilosophy.Suchagapisproblematicforanyphilosopherofsciencewithanaturalistictakeonhissubjectfield,ashis/hergoalistomakesenseof(i.e.conceptualize)instancesofpluralityastheyappearinscientificpractice.Inordertoaccusephilosophicalaccountsofpluralismofsuchashortcoming,onenaturallyhasto identifythesefirst.Analysingthe literature leavesonewithtwomajor categories of pluralism that have dominated the debate until recently:competitive and weakly complementary accounts of pluralism. Both thesecategorieshavemultiplemanifestationsthatdifferwithregardtotheunitstheytake pluralism to be constituted by – be it theories, scientific fields, scientificparadigms,orwholedisciplines.Regardlessofwhatexactunitspluralismistakentobeconstitutedby,competitiveaccountsofpluralism take theseunits to stand ina competitive relation tooneanother.Often, theunderlying idea is thatacontinuouscompetitionbetweenapluralityofapproachesisbesttofosterscientificprogress(Lakatos,1978).Onmostaccounts, competitiveplurality is said tobemerely instrumentaland temporaryandultimatelyassumedtoresolveintomonism(Kuhn,1962).Weak complementarity, according to Marchionni (2008), holds when “twoexplanations are both legitimate and autonomous, and are complementary invirtue of different explanatory virtues” (p. 315). Some of the most prominentaccounts of pluralism put forward in philosophy subscribe to weak

33complementarity (e.g., Jackson & Pettit’s (1992) ‘explanatory ecumenism’ and,morerecently,Weber&VanBouwel’s(2008)pragmatictakeonpluralism).Now, while these competitive and weakly complementary accounts correctlycapturesomeinstancesofpluralityastheyappearinpractice,theyfailtocaptureothers.Most notably, they fail to capture instances of strong complementaritywhichholdswhen“twoexplanationsmutuallycomplementeachother,andwhenintegrated,(…)providebetter(…)explanations”(Marchionni,2008:315).Mitchell(2009)has shown that instancesof strong complementarity are frequent in thebiologicalsciencesandarguesthat,inordertocapturethese,philosophersneedtocomeupwithanewandradicallydistinctaccountofpluralism–oneshelaterreferstoas‘integrativepluralism’.My goal is to further develop Mitchell’s integrative account of pluralism byconsideringitsapplicationinthesocialsciences.WhileMitchellrepeatedlyhintsattheapplicabilityofherfindingsto‘complexphenomena’inothersciences,shedoesnot attempt such applications herself. To do so I will focus on the frequentlydiscussed‘complexphenomenon’ofeconomicinequality.Firstly, I argue that economic inequality is a similar multilevel, interactivephenomenonrequiringintegrativeexplanatoryefforts.Thisappearstobeausefulclarification, foreven thoughrecentexplanatoryattemptsof inequality (Piketty,2013;Atkinson,2015)identifymultiplecausalfactorsdeterminingtheoveralllevelof inequality, these are normally being examined in an isolationist (i.e. non-integrated)manner.Suchastrictlevels-of-analysisdivisionoflabourisflawedhere.Secondly, Iwanttoshowhowthe interactionbetweenfirst-ordercausal factorsinfluencing the overall level of inequality and the (political-)institutionalenvironment represents a slightly distinct kind of interaction as the one thatunderliesMitchell’scasestudiesfrombiology.Asaresult,thiscallsforadifferent(or, extended) notion of integration and integrative pluralism respectively. Thisshall eventually help to come up with a more thorough account of integrative

pluralismwhichhasonlyrecentlyandsparselybeenintroduced–mainlyconfinedtothephilosophyofbiology.Thirdly, I want to talk about grounding one’s epistemological suggestions onontological features of the explanandum. Recent work on scientific pluralismexplicitlybansallontologicalconsiderationsforpragmaticreasons. Ithinkthis iswrong.Whileoneshouldn’twait forultimatetruthsaboutontology, there isnoharm inusing thosebitsofknowledgeaboutontology thatarewell-understoodandempiricallydocumented.Atkinson,A.B.(2015)Inequality–Whatcanbedone?,Harvard:HarvardUniversityPress.Jackson& Pettit (1992) ‘In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism’, Economics andPhilosophy,vol.8,no.1,pp.1-21.Kuhn,T.(1962)TheStructureofScientificRevolutions,Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Lakatos,I.(1978)Themethodologyofscientificresearchprogrammes,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityProgramme.Marchionni, C. (2008) ‘Explanatory Pluralism and Complementarity: FromAutonomytoIntegration’,PhilosophyoftheSocialSciences,vol.38,pp.314-333.Mitchell, S. (2009) Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity and Policy, Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Piketty,T.(2014)CapitalintheTwenty-Firstcentury,Harvard:HarvardUniversityPress.Weber, E.; Van Bouwel, J. (2008) ‘A pragmatic defence of non-relativisticexplanatorypluralism inhistoryand social science’,HistoryandTheory, vol. 47,no.2,pp.168-182.

34EnricoTerrone:TheBandofTheseus.SocialOntologyandMentalFilesTheshipofTheseus isathoughtexperimentthatweowetoPlutarch:“TheshipwhereinTheseusandtheyouthofAthensreturnedfromCretehadthirtyoars,andwaspreservedbytheAtheniansdowneventothetimeofDemetriusPhalereus,for theytookawaytheoldplanksastheydecayed,putting innewandstrongertimberintheirplaces,insomuchthatthisshipbecameastandingexampleamongthephilosophers,forthelogicalquestionofthingsthatgrow;onesideholdingthattheshipremainedthesame,andtheothercontendingthatitwasnotthesame.”Hobbescomplicatedthepuzzlebywonderingwhatwouldhappen if theoriginalplankswereusedtobuildasecondship:whichship,ifeither,wouldbetheoriginalshipofTheseus?I will discuss a version of the thought experiment that concerns social objects.Suppose that Theseus is the singer of the rock band ‛The Ship’ that he startedtogetherwithaguitarist,abassist,adrummer.Afterawhiletheguitarist leavesthebandand is replaced; then,also thebassistand thedrummerare replaced;finally, Theseus himself is replaced. Furthermore, we can add a HobbesiancomplicationbysupposingthatTheseusandhisformerpartnersdecidetostartanewbandcalled‛TheShop’.Interestingly,inthesocialversionofthethoughtexperiment,thepurportedpuzzleisnolongerapuzzle.WehavestrongintuitionsthatTheShopisanewbandwhichisdistinctfromTheShip,inspiteofthefactthatthemembersofTheShopweretheformermembersofTheShip.Thecasecanbecomparedtothatofafootballteamthathiresall theplayersofanother football team,andyet the twoteamsremainsdistinctentities.The upshot of the thought experiment is that the identity of a social collectiverevealsitselftobemoresharplyindependentofitsconstituentsthantheidentityofamaterialobject.Hereistheexplanandumthatcallsforanexplanation.Giventhat the identity of a social collective such as a band or a team is sharplyindependentofitsparticularsmembers,onwhatdoesthisidentitydepend?

Iwilladdressthisissuebymeansofthenotionofamentalfile,understoodasamentalparticularthatfunctionsasavehicleofsingularthought,i.e.as“arepositoryofinformationthattheagenttakestobeaboutasingleindividual”(Jeshion,2010,131).ThementalfilesthatarerelevantforsocialontologyarethosethatRecanaticalls“publicfiles”,i.e.“filessharedbydistinctindividualsinacommunity”(2012,205). A public files is an entry in a sort of implicitly shared encyclopedia. Forinstance,whenTheseusandhispartnersstartedTheShip,theyimplicitlycreatedapublicfile,i.e.asharedrepositoryofinformationthatthecommunitytakestobeaboutasinglesocialobject,namelyTheShip.Public files differ from ordinary mental files since the latter depend on theexistence of the objects they are about, whereas the former are such that theobjects they are about depend on the files themselves. For example, if oneencountersa lion,onecanopenamentalfileaboutthat lion,butthelionexistsindependentlyofanymentalfileaboutit;conversely,onecannotencounterarockbandifnobodyhaseveropenedapublicfileaboutthatband.Inthecaseofsocialobjects, theopeningofa fileaboutanobject isnot justapossibleeffectof theexistenceoftheobject;rather,thepublicfilebringstheobjectintoexistence.The public file is not to be confused with what Searle (2010) calls “collectiveintentionality”.Theformerisasharedrepositoryofinformationwhereasthelatterisasharedintention.Arguablycollectiveintentionalitycansignificantlycontributetothecreationofapublic file.Yet, Icontend,whatunderlies theexistenceofasocialobjectsuchasabandisapublicfile,notcollectiveintentionality.Inordertodefendthelatterclaim,letusgobacktothecaseofthebandofTheseus.WhydoesthecommunitykeepontreatingTheShipasthesamebandinspiteofthefactthatTheseusandtheotherformermembersdonolongerplayinthisband?Because the community share a public file which is about The Ship as a singleobject.Suchasharingcanbeaneffectofcollectiveintentionalityormaybejustofhabitsor conformism.Whatmatters is that thesubstitutionofaperformer justinvolvesanupdateintheinformationinthepublicfileaboutthebandinsteadofthecreationofanewpublicfileaboutanewband.Bycontrast,whenTheseusandhis former partners started The Shop, a new public file is created inwhich the

35community storesnew informationabout thisnewband.Henceforth, therearetwobandsinthiscommunity,namelyTheShipandTheShop,becausetherearetwopublicfilesaboutthem.Theintroductionofapropernameisoftenasymptomthatanewpublicfilehasbeenopenandthereforeanewsocialentityhasbeencreated.Yet,publicfilesarenottobeconfusedwithpropernames.Thepropernameisjustapeculiarpieceofinformation that can be stored in the file. A band can change its name whileremainingthesameband,justasitcanchangeitsmemberswhileremainingthesameband.EvenifTheseusandhispartnersstopcallingtheirnewband‛TheShop’andrenameit‛TheShip’,thisbandremainsanentitythatisontologicallydistinctfromtheotherbandalsocalled‛TheShip’.Thatisbecausethecommunitykeepstwodistinctpublicfilesaboutthesebands.

MarkTheunissen:Naturalism,PluralismandtheInterestsofSocialInquiryMuchofphilosophyofsocialscience iscommittedto(1)anaturalismaboutthesocial and (2) a methodological pluralism across or within the different socialscientificdisciplines.Themotivation for theseviews is thatnaturalismgenerallyguarantees realism, as the regulative ideal of scientific inquiry, whilemethodological pluralism accommodates subsequent and specific epistemicinterestsparticular to thedifferentsocial scientificdisciplines,aswellas furthernormative interests. This (what I call) “naturalistic-pluralism” aims to secure ascientificfootingforulteriornon-epistemicinterestsofinquirywhileatthesametimeconstrainingtheseinterestsfrombendingsocialrealitytotheirwill.Thefirstsectionofthepaperdefinesnaturalismandmethodologicalpluralismandsome of the flavors on offer in the philosophy of social science. In the secondsection, I argue that naturalistic-pluralism assumes that its epistemic goals arenormativelyneutralwithregardtotheotherpossibleinterestsofsocialinquiry(i.e.,the interests of critique, morality and social policy, etc.). Philosophy of socialsciencethusinthefirstinstancedivorcesitselffromnormativetheory,claimingtoprovidethebasisforsocial inquiryasapurelydescriptiveundertaking.Althoughboth theproper typeofnaturalismandmethodologicalpluralismare stillmuchdebated inachieving this task, eachassumes that theepistemic interest canbeisolatedfromanyothernormativecommitments.In the third section I argue that the natural/normative distinction underlyingnaturalistic-pluralismisunsustainable.Ipresentasetofexamplesthatshowhownaturalistic-pluralismfailstobeneutralinconcretecases.Iarguethattheepistemicinterestof thenatural-pluralistorientationrequiresanunstatedbutsubstantivenormative orientation regarding the object, method and aim of inquiry. Thispositionisnormativelybiasedagainstotherinterestsofsocialinquiry,inparticularthecritical,moral,andinterventionist intereststhatshapeaccountsofthesamesocialphenomena.Mybroaderpointisthatsocialphenomenacannotappearasneutralobjectsofknowledgedivorcedfromourpossible interestof inquiry.Theepistemic interests of social inquiry require unstated value commitments that

36distort our understanding of the phenomena. This distortion precludes otherperspectives, ones that cannot be accommodated to a neutral “naturalistic-pluralism.”In the fourth section, I present two alternative accounts that defend explicitlynormative orientations with respects to the proper interest or hierarchy ofinterests for social inquiry. These accounts represent two extremes of possiblenormative orientations of philosophy with respect to social inquiry: the firstdefendsasubstantivecriticalinterestinlightofcriteriaoftheproperfunctioningofsocialinstitutionsthatareclaimedtobeuniversallyvalid;theseconddefendsamuchthinnernormativeinterestinlightofcriteriafortheacceptanceorrejectionof particular practices developed immanently from the context of the practicesunderconsideration.Theseviewsprovideadifferent,richercharacterizationofthephenomena in theexamplesdiscussed in theprevious sections. Theyalso showhowtheepistemicmodelsacceptabletonaturalistic-pluralismpreventaccesstomanydimensionsofsociallife.I conclude that the social sciencesmust avoid assumingneutrality in explainingsocial domains.Although this is anold criticism, its prevalence innew formsofinquiryshowsthatthelessonstillhasnotbeenfullylearned.

LauraValentini:WheninRome,DoastheRomansDo:Respect,PositiveNormsandtheObligationtoObeytheLawMostofusconformtolocalpositivenorms.Icertainlydo.WhenIwaitforthebusinEngland,Idutifullyplacemyselfinthequeue.InItalythough,theideaofqueuingatthebusstopdoesnotevenoccurtome.WhenIamaguestatOxbridgeHighTable,Ifollowlocalcustomsandstandupasgraceisbeingsaidbeforedinner.Thispre-dinnerritual,however,isoneIwouldneverperformathome.Thelistcouldgoon,butIbetterstophere.Thepointshouldbeclearenough.I,likemanyothers,tendtofollowtheoldsaying:“WheninRome,doastheRomansdo.”Inthispaper,Iwanttoinvestigatewhetherwehaveaprotantomoralobligationtoadheretothisrule,namelytoobeythepositivenormsthatexistinthecontextsweinhabit.By“positivenorms,”Imeannotonlythelawsoftheland,butalsotheestablishedrulesofetiquette,decency,andmorality.Tosaythatwehaveaprotantoobligationtoobeygivennormsistosaythatweoughttoperformoravoidcertainactionsbecausepositivenormsprescribeorprohibitthem.Tobesure,the“ought”inquestionmaybeoutweighedbyothermoraldemands:itismerely“protanto.”Butwhennocompetingorweightiermoral concernsapply,obeying thenorms iswhatweall-things-consideredought todo.So,dowehave suchaprotantoobligation?Andifwedo,whatgroundsit?I answer this questionby bringing together insights frommoral philosophy andsocialontology.Iarguethat,providedpositivenormsmeetindependentcriteriaofmoralacceptability,respectforthosewhoacceptthemgroundsanobligationtoobeythem.Thisconclusionshedslightonthemuch-discussedprotantoobligationtoobeythelaw.IfIamright,thelatterisbestunderstoodasaparticularlysalientinstanceofthegeneralrespect-basedobligationtoobeypositivenorms.Myargumentproceedsasfollows.InSection1,Iintroducethephenomenonunderdiscussion:positivenorms.Idistinguishpositivenormsfrom“mereconventions,”and explain how the former, unlike the latter, require common acceptance ofcertain“oughts.”InSection2,Imotivatemyinquirybygivingexamplesofactions

37whoseintuitivelywrongfulnaturecanbeexplainedonlyifwehypothesizethatwehaveprotantoobligationstoobeypositivenorms.Tocorroboratethishypothesis,inSection3,Iturntotherelationshipbetweenourobligationtotreatotherswithrespectandpositivenorms.Idistinguishbetweentwotypesof respect.The first, “personrespect,” is the respectowedtohumanbeingsquaequalmoralpersons.Honouringthiskindofrespecttypicallydemandsactingconsistentlywithindividuals’fundamentalrights(e.g.,“humanrights”).Thesecond,“identityrespect,”istherespectowedtoindividualsgivenwhotheyare,theirparticulargoals,commitmentsandidentities.Iarguethat,providedpositivenormsareconsistentwithpersonrespect,wehaveidentity-respectobligations toobey them,since thesenormsstructurepracticesthatindividualnorm-supportersvalueandidentifywith.Consider, for instance,thenormthatrequiresstandingupwhengrace issaidatHighTabledinner.Thisnormispartofthebroaderpracticeof“Oxbridgecollegelife.”Many individuals, includingdonsand students, careabout thispractice, inpartidentifywiththeroleofbeingastudentoradon,andregardtheirparticipationinthepracticeasanimportantdimensionintheirlifeprojects.Identityrespectforthem, i.e., for thecommunityof individualssupportingthenorm,requiresus toobeyit.Similar considerations, I claim, apply in the case of any positive norm,whetherformal or informal. And the stronger norm-supporters’ identification with therelevant practice is, the weightier the identity-respect obligation to obey thecorrespondingnorms.Forinstance,thismaymeanthatourobligationtotakeoffourshoeswhenenteringaHindutempleismorestringentthan,say,ourobligationtostandinlineatthebusstopinLondon.Why?BecauseadherentsofHinduismpresumablyseethenormsstructuringtheirreligiousworshipasbeingmorecentraltotheiridentitythanLondonersseethepracticeofqueuingforthebus.InSection4,Iapplymyidentity-respectaccountoftheobligationtoobeypositivenormstoaparticularlysalientclassofsuchnorms:legalones.Iargue,contraryto

what is often assumed in the literature, that legal norms are not morally “suigeneris,”butareinsteadaspecialcaseofpositivenorms.Consequently,Isuggestthatthegroundfortheobligationtoobeythelawisnottobefoundinconsent,fair play, the natural duty of justice, democratic participation, communitymembershipandother,familiarcandidateexplanations.Instead,ourobligationtoobeythelawisoneinstantiationofthegeneral,identity-respect-basedobligationtoobeypositivenorms.Section5addressesobjections.Section6concludes.

38ElinaVessonen:RTMandPsychometricsasPartialApproachestoMeasurementIt is widely recognized that there are, broadly speaking, two approaches tomeasurement in the social sciences: representational theory of measurement(RTM)andpsychometrics(Angner2011).AccordingtoRTM,measurementinvolves“theconstructionofhomomorphisms(scales)fromempiricalrelationalstructuresof interest to numerical structures that are useful.” (Krantz et al 1971, 9) Theconstructionofsuchhomomorphisms, i.e.many-onemappings, involvesprovingtwo types of theorems. A representation theorem establishes that if a givenempirical relational structure of interest satisfies certain (non-contradictory)axioms, then a homomorphism ϕ to a certain numerical structure can beestablished.Auniquenesstheoremestablishesthepermissibletransformationsofϕ that also yield a homomorphism to the same numerical structure. Thepsychometricapproach,bycontrast,startsoffbyproposingameasureofthetargetconstructsuchaswell-beingorintelligence,usuallyintheformofaquestionnaire.To infer that the measure indeed tracks the target construct, one employsstatistical teststostudyrelationshipsbetweentheproposedmeasureandothermeasuresofthesameconstructortheoreticallyrelatedconstructs.Ifthepatternofvariancesandcovariancesconformstoexpectationsthatareformedonthebasisof a theory of the target construct, that provides evidence that the proposedmeasureindeedisameasureofthetargetconstruct.Bothoftheseapproachesaresomewhatwidelyusedinsocialsciences,buttheirmethodologicalconnectionsareunderexplored.Ontheonehand,thereseemstobe very little interaction and exchange between the two approaches (Judd &McClelland 1998). On the other hand, it has been suggested that the twoapproaches have potential to inform each other and even to be used in acomplementarymanner (ibid.). In this paper I study RTM and psychometrics inrelation to one another. To do so, I juxtapose my account of RTM andpsychometricswith that of ErikAngner,whohaswritten several paperson thisotherwiselessexploredareaofphilosophyofsocialsciences.

AccordingtoAngner(2011),RTMandpsychometricsareincompatiblealternatives.Hewritesthat(2011,124)“thesimultaneousendorsementofthetwoapproachestomeasurement would lead to inconsistency.” This inconsistency claim can beunderstoodintwoways.Ontheonehand,Angnerarguesthat“sinceitispossibleto satisfy the strictures imposedby theone approach tomeasurementwithoutsatisfying those imposed by the other, a measure that has been validated inaccordance with the one approach has not necessarily been validated inaccordancewiththeother.”Thethought isthatasimultaneousendorsementofthetwoapproachesleadstoasituationwhereagivenmeasurebothisandisnotvalidated.Andthat is inconsistent.Ontheotherhand,Angner(ibid.131)arguesthat “[RTM] entails that an observable ordering satisfying certain axioms isnecessaryformeasurementwhereasthepsychometricapproachentailsthatitisnot”.And itwouldbe inconsistent to say that a givenaspectboth is and isnotnecessaryformeasurement.Ithinkbothofthesewaysofunderstandingtheinconsistencyclaimbuildonthesame mistaken assumption: that RTM and psychometrics are full-fledgedapproaches tomeasurement, that is,bothapproachesdealwithconditions thatare sufficient formeasurement. If, on the other hand, the two approaches arepartial in the sense that they deal with different non-sufficient, but necessaryconditions ofmeasurement, there is nothing inconsistent about endorsingbothapproaches simultaneously. In that case it is not true that the psychometricapproach entails that an ordering satisfying certain axioms is not necessary formeasurement.Furthermore,sayingthatameasurehasbeenvalidatedintermsofpsychometricsbutnotintermsofRTMdoesnotmeanthatthemeasurebothisand is not validated.Rather, itmeans thatonenon-sufficient condition for full-fledgedmeasurementhasbeensatisfiedviapsychometricsandthatsomeothercondition(s)hasnotbeendealtwith.In this paper I argue that RTMandpsychometrics do indeed focus on differentaspects of measurement, both of which have to be dealt with in order formeasurementtotakeplace. Icall theseaspectsrepresentational interpretabilityandproceduralvalidity,wheretheformerconcernstheconditionsforanumerical

39representationtobemeaningfullyinterpretedintermsofthetargetedempiricalsystem,andthelatterconcernstheconditionsunderwhichaprocedurecanbesaidto capture the correct target attribute. Thus, instead of conceiving of RTMandpsychometricsasfull-fledgedapproachestomeasurement,weshouldviewthemaspartialapproaches.IfRTMandpsychometricssolvedifferentsubproblems,wecanestablishwhatIcalltheconsistencyclaim:simultaneousendorsementofRTMandpsychometricsisconsistent.This argument does more than just disputes Angner’s interpretation of RTM,psychometricsandtheirrelation.Asmentioned,ithasbeenclaimedthatRTMandpsychometricsmightlendthemselvestocomplementaryusage.ByarguingagainstAngner’s inconsistency claim, I pave the way for further research oncomplementaryusageofRTMandpsychometrics.Inaddition,byuncoveringthepartial nature of RTM and psychometrics, I map out ways in which the twoapproachescaninformeachother.Angner, Erik. 2011. “Current Trends in Welfare Measurement” in The ElgarCompaniontoRecentEconomicMethodology,eds.J.B.DavisandD.WadeHands,121–154.Northampton:EdwardElgar.Judd,CharlesandGaryMcClelland.1998.“Measurement” inHandbookofsocialpsychology, 4th edition, eds. Fiske, Susan, Daniel Gilbert and Gardner Lindzey.Boston:McGraw-Hill.Krantz, David, R. Duncan Luce, Amos Tversky, and Patrick Suppes. 1971.FoundationsofMeasurementVolumeI:AdditiveandPolynomialRepresentations.SanDiegoandLondon:AcademicPress.

TuomasVesterinen:TheKindsofLoopingEffectsIn this paper, I analyze the looping effects involved in scientific classifying andlabeling.AccordingtoIanHacking(e.g.1999),classificationsinthehumansciencesareoften interactive. Theclassificationsand thepeoplebeing classified interactwith one another. Hacking has labeled this two-way interaction as the loopingeffect.Arguablyitisthecoredifferencebetweenthehumanandnaturalsciences.Inthefollowing, Iwill firstanalyzethedifferentargumentsonthenatureoftheloopingeffect.Subsequently,basedontheresults,Iwillarguethattherearefourgeneraltypesofloopingeffectsthatcanbedistinguishedaccordingtothedepthandwidthoftheirloops.InHacking’sanalysis, the loopingeffectconsistsof twoarcs. In the firstarc, thescientific classificationhasan impacton thepeoplebeing classified.Thepeoplemaystarttobehaveaccordingtotheclassificationortheymayresentthelabel.Atanyrate,thereisneveranexactfitbetweenthelabelandthebehaviorittriestoportray. And once further studies are conducted they may show the slightdifferencesnotcapturedbytheclassificationbefore.Therefore,inthesecondarc,the scientific classificationhas tobeamended tomatch the changesornoticedvariationsinthekindunderstudy.Thisinteractionbetweentheclassificationandthe kind may iterate indefinitely. Because of the dynamic nature of the kindsinfluencedbytheloopingeffect,Hackingcallsthem“movingtargets”orinteractivekinds(i.e.,humankinds),incontrasttoindifferentnaturalkinds.However,asmanyhaveargued(e.g.Khalidi2010,Cooper2004),theloopingeffectisnotrestrictedtotheexamplesinvolvinghumanbehaviorthatHackingoffers,butaffectsprototypicalnaturalkindsaswell(e.g.bacteria,domesticatedanimals).Thisthreatenstomaketheloopingeffectasademarcationcriterionfutileandportrayssomebiological kindsasnotamenable toexplanationsand inductive inferencesduetotheloopingeffect’sdestabilizingconsequences.There have been two general strategies to respond to the argument. Hacking(1999: 31) has responded to it by claiming that looping happens through the

40awareness of the people being classified. In addition, he has tried to separatesemantically interactive kinds from indifferent kindsby appealing to the causal-historical theory of reference (Hacking 1999: 122). The responses areinterconnected:itistheawarenessofthepeoplebeingclassifiedofthemeaningsof the labels that alters the kinds (and eventually themeanings aswell) understudy.Incontrast,thereferentsofindifferentkindtermsstayintactthroughtheloopingchanges.Accordingtothisinterpretation,Hackingseemstobeingclaimingthatthattheloopingeffectismeaning-based.Ontheotherhand,anotherstrategyhasbeentoexcepttheextensionoftheloopingeffecttotraditionalnaturalkindsbyamendingtheanalysisoftheloopingeffectsothatthekindsinvolvedsubmittoexplanationsandinductiveinferences(cf.Cooper2004,PöyhönenandKuorikoski2012).In the firstpartof thepaper, IwillargueagainstHacking’s interpretationof theloopingeffect.IwillbuildonTsou’s(2007)andDrabek’s(2010)ideasbyshowingthatHacking’sappealtoawarenessisanunfoundedmovefromunderwritingthemethodological differencebetween the sciences to emphasizing theontologicaldifferencebetweenthekindsstudiedbythesciences.Inaddition,Iwillarguethatbyemphasizingthesemanticdistinctionbetweenthe interactiveand indifferentkindsHacking is in factdefendingan interpretative interpretationof thehumansciences.However,onceacausalmechanisticunderstandingoftheloopingeffectisadapted,thereisnocleardistinctionbetweenhumanandnaturalkindsorthecorresponding sciences. I will also argue that Hacking is not consistent in hissemanticdistinction,andinanycase,thedistinctionisunjustifiedforbothsemanticandempiricalreasons.Inthesecondpartofthepaper,Iwillformataxonomyofthepossiblevariationsoftheloopingeffect.Iwillshowthatloopingeffectscanbedividedintofourtypes:conceptual looping, looping through awareness, environmental looping, andenforcedlooping.Alloftheseloopingeffectscanbestableorunstable.Conceptualloopingissolelybasedonbeliefsandhasnocausal influence,butitmayleadtoartificial kind looping. For example, William Pietz (1987) argues that the term“fetish”acquireditsmeaningthroughtheinteractionbetweenthePortugueseand

theWestAfricans.EventuallytheinteractiontransformedthewoodenidolsthatthePortuguesemistakenlythoughtheWestAfricansworshiped.Finally,Iwillgointodetailsoverthedifferentcausalmechanismsinvolvedinthreeoftheloopingkinds(awareness,environmentalandenforcedloopings).Iwillarguethattheycanbedistinguishedbasedonthedepthandwidthoftheloops.Ontheone hand, how fine-grained the loop is (how regularly the same properties orsymptomsmanifesttogether)revelsthedepthoftheloop:themorefine-grainedthe properties, the more aware the labeled people are of the labels and thestrongertheinfluenceontheirself-concepts.Ontheotherhand,thewidthoftheloopdependsonsocialnormsandbiologicalpredispositions.Theymaystabilizeorenforce labelsonpeople.Toprovethepoint, IwilluseRunciman’s (2009)threelevelsofbehavior(evokedbehavior,acquiredbehavior,andimposedbehavior)toanalyzeexamplesdrawnfrompsychiatry.Cooper, Rachel 2004: Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds. The BritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience,55,73-85.Drabek,MattL.2010:InteractiveClassificationandPracticeintheSocialScinces:ExpandingIanHacking’sTreatmentofInteractiveKinds.Poroi,6,62-80.Hacking, Ian 1999: The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress.Khalidi,MuhammadAli 2010: Interactive Kinds. British Journal of Philosophy ofScience,61,v335-360.Kuorikoski, Jaakko and Pöyhönen, Samuli 2012: Looping Kinds and SocialMechanisms.SociologicalTheory,30,187-205.Pietz,William1987:TheProblemof theFetish, II:TheOriginof theFetish.RES:AnthropologyandAesthetics,13,23-45Runciman,W.G. 2009: The Theory of Cultural and Social Selection. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Tsou,Jonathan2007:HackingontheLoopingEffectsofPsychiatricClassifications:WhatIsanInteractiveandIndifferentKind?InternationalStudiesinthePhilosophyofScience,21,329-344.

41PierreWillaime:ExpertiseinOnlineEpistemicCommunitiesThis talk is about expertise in online epistemic communities. Such webcommunitiesoftenrelyonaprincipleofanonymityandtheirepistemicagentshaveverylimitedinformationsabouteachother.Theseconstraintsmakethedetectionofexpertisequite trickyand interesting.Moreover, epistemicwebcommunitiesaretraditionallyseparatedintwokinds:agentcenteredandgroupcenteredones.Theyrepresentdifferentsocialorgani-zationsofcognitivelaborforthepursuitofknowledge.Duringthistalk,Iwillfocusontwooftheseepistemiccommunitiesontheweb:WikipediaandStackExchange.Thefirstone is theparagonof theanti-individualist and egalitarian approach when the second one is based on anidentification of some experts who will lead the community by holdingadministrator privileges.My purpose is (1.) to analyze whatmethods are used(implicitlyorexplicitly)todetectanexpertonthesewebsitesand(2.)towonderwhatkindof“expertise”wearetalkingaboutintheseprecisecases.Tosaytheleast,Wikipediaisnotanexpert-orientedwebsite.Indeed,wikipediansfavortheshareoflimitedpiecesofinformationbyseveralindividualsmorethanacomprehensive explanation by one very compe- tent expert. According to thewisdom of crowds principle, “themany are smarter than the few” (Surowiecki2004).Onecouldthink(forexample:Sanger2009)thisparticipativeandbottom-up epistemic system drives off experts – and support the idea that there is nodecentplaceforwhatwecall“agent”or“individual”expertiseinWikipedia.Oursecond case study, StackExchange, is a network of several experts-orientedthematiccommunities.ThestructurebehindtheseStackExchangewebsitesaimsto internally evaluate the reliability of eachmember of the community. At theoppositeofmanyexpertsorientedwebsites,StackExchangedoesnottrytoimporta previous expertise acknowledgement; agent expertise is evaluated only frominteractionsinsidethewebcommunity.These two cases studies seems to be two opposite ways of build an epistemiccommunity.However,withthehelpofafewexamples,Iwillarguetheyarenotsodifferent.Inafamousarticle,AlvinGoldman(2001)analyzesthepossiblerational

reactionsofalaymanconfrontedtotwoexpertsinadisagreement.Hissolutionistojudge,aposteriori,theexpertsabouttheirpasttrackrecords.Themainideaistheopinionofoneexpertthatarenotyetlikelytobeaccessible(forexample:aprediction)willbeprobablyavailabletothelaymaninthefuture.Itisverydifficulttojudgecomplexarguments;itiseasiertorecognizeordenythepertinenceofathesiswithsomedistance.Wemustthereforeanalyzethepastofexpertsratherthan their (often esoteric) current positions. I will argue in this talk Wikipediafunctionsinthesameway.Athoroughanalyzeofrules,structuresandbehavioursgoverning the twoexamples shows that thereare (mostly implicit)processes inWikipediaaimedtodetectindividualexpertise.Infact,eveniftheexplicitepistemicsystemofWikipedia is focusedonthewaytobring informationsratherthanonagents, individuals are implicitly evaluated by the community. Moreover, thisexpertisedoesnotrepresentonlythecapabilitytofitintothecommunityandtorespect its rules but is a truly epistemic one. On StackExchange, the implicitprocesses of Wikipedia regarding expertise become explicit. In fact, the twoepistemiccommunitiesarenotsodifferent.Oneconsequenceofmyargumentationisthatexpertisemustbeinternallyformedinside the community to be accepted. Many experts-oriented alternatives toWikipedia (Citizendium, Veropedia, ...) failed because they use an uprootedconception of expertise taken from another community (like the academiccommunity). One other consequence of this case study is to question thephilosophical framework needed to understand expertise. In my examples, itseems that expertise cannot be fully understood without a strong focus onepistemicagentsandtheirspecificfeatures.Therefore,Iwillarguethata(social)epistemology which fully explains expertise must adopt an agent-orientedframework(likevirtueepistemologyoragentreliabilism)ratherthanaprocesses-orientedone(i.e.processreliabilism).Coady,David (2011), “AnEpistemicDefenceof theBlogosphere”, in: JournalofAppliedPhilosophy28.3,pp.277–294.Fallis, Don (2008), “Toward an epistemology of Wikipedia”, in: Journal of theAmericanSocietyforInformationScienceandTechnology59.10,pp.1662–1674.

42Goldman, Alvin I. (1979), “What is Justified Belief?”, in: Justification andKnowledge,ed.byGeorgeSotirosPappas,vol.17,PhilosophicalStudiesSeriesinPhilosophy, Springer Netherlands, pp. 1–23, trans. by Em- manuelle Glon as“Qu’est-cequ’unecroyancejustifiée?”(Paris:J.Vrin,2005).— (2001), “Experts: which ones should you trust?”, in: Philosophy andPhenomenologicalResearch63.1,pp.85–110.Greco, John (1999), “AgentReliabilism”, in:Noûs33 (Supplement: PhilosophicalPerspectives,13),pp.273–296,JSTOR:2676106.Sanger,LawrenceM.(2009),“ThefateofexpertiseafterWikipedia”,in:Episteme6.01,pp.52–73.Surowiecki,James(2004),Thewisdomofcrowds:whythemanyaresmarterthanthe few and how collectivewisdom shapes business, economies, societies, andnations,1sted,NewYork:Doubleday,296pp.

JaanaVirta:SocialConstructionofGenderintheTheoryofGenderPerformativityInher famousbookGenderTrouble (1990) JudithButlerpresents the theoryofgenderperformativity.Accordingtothetheorygenderisconstructedviaconstantiterationofgenderperformatives.Thebasic ideaisthatgenderissomethingwedo,ratherthansomethingwepossessorexpress.Onthisviewgenderisaproductofhumanaction,andthusclearlysociallyconstructed.Butwhatdoesthismean?ThetheoreticalbackgroundforButler'stheoryistobefoundinMichelFoucault’snotionsofgenealogyanddiscourses,andinL.J.Austin’sspeechacttheory,wherethe(termandthe)conceptofa'performative'isoriginallyfrom.AlthoughAustinwasmainlyconcernedwithspeechacts,forButler‘performative’referstoallkindsofactsthathavesociallysharedmeaning.Genderperformativesareacceptedacts,i.e repeated gendered ways and habits of doing things, for example genderedbodilygestures,clothes, tonesofvoiceanddifferentkindsofgenderedchoices.Many gender performatives are highly norm-laden, and deviations, such asperforming performatives not appropriately (in one's society) linked to one'sgender,oftenresultinsanctionsinsomeformoranother.AcentralideainButler'stheoryisthatwedon'thaveagenderthatprecedes,orcanbeseparatedfrom,ouractsandactions:anindividualproducestheirgenderbytheconsistentrepetitionofgenderperformatives.Whenwemovebeyondthe levelofthe individual,theiteration of gender performatives also create “the illusion of an interior andorganizinggendercore”(Butler1990/2007,186);althoughgenderedactsareoftenthoughtofasanexpressionofsomeinneressence,accordingtoButlerthereisinfactnosuchmorefundamentallevelbeyondthegenderedactsthemselves.Thisdenial of a kind of inner essence to the object under study, just waiting to beunearthed,isalsothestartingpointinFoucault'smethodofgenealogicalresearch,wheretheobjectofresearchistakentobeaproductofdiscursivepracticesandpowerrelations.InButler'sworkongender,theideathatpeoplehaveanabidinggendered innate essence is a discursively maintained illusion in a Foucauldiansense.

43Socialconstructionisatermwhichcomesupinvariousplaces.Oftenwhatismeantbythetermisnotexplained,andsometimesitisnotevenmentionedthatitisusedin multiple senses. According to Sally Haslanger “[s]omething is a socialconstruction[…]incaseitisanintendedorunintendedproductofasocialpractice”(Haslanger2012,86).Allsortsofthings–money,electrons,emotions,reality,andsoon,andinparticularhumantraitssuchasgender,raceandsocialclass–havebeenarguedtobesociallyconstructed.Studyingsuchthingsassociallyconstructedhas proved valuable, but clearly they differ in many significant and substantialregards. Ron Mallon (2014) notes that although social construction claims arecommonlyphrasedinthepassivevoice,“Yissociallyconstructed”,theyaremoreperspicuouslyformulatedintermsofthetwo-placerelation:“XsociallyconstructsY”.Inthisformitiseasiertoseethattheclaiminvolvesthreeelements:1)ThereissomeXthatdoestheconstruction.(theagent)2)ThereissomeYthatisconstructed.(theproduct)3)ThereisthesocialconstructionofYbyX,anactorprocessthatcantakedifferentforms, e.g. causal form of construction or constitutive form of construction, adistinctionintroducedbyHaslanger.AccountsofsocialconstructiondiffernotonlyonwhatistheYthatisheldtobeconstructed–althoughthisisusuallythemainpointofcontention–butalsoonwhoorwhatistheXthatconstructsorcausesYtobeconstructed,andonwhatitmeanstosaythatXsociallyconstructsY.PuttingthesedistinctionstouseincaseofButler’stheoryofgenderperformativity,wecannowask:Whoorwhatisitthatdoestheconstruction?Whatpreciselyisitthatisconstructed?Andjustwhatsortofconstructionisinvolved?IarguethattherearetwoaspectstoButler'stheorythatdiffersignificantlyontheiranswerstothesequestions.ForButlertherearetwodistinctthingsthataresociallyconstructed:1)thegenderofaparticularpersonasanindividualfeatureorattribute2)theillusionthatpeoplehaveaninnategenderedessence

Bothofthesearecentralandessentialtothetheory,butastheyareconstructedin different ways by different agents, it is instructive to study both of themindividually.Theparticularmanneroftheirconstructionalsosetsthetwoproductsapartwhenitcomestotheirmetaphysicalnature.Despiteoftheirdifferences,forButlertheyarebothconstructedbymeansofgenderperformatives.AccordingtoButler's theory gender as a feature is the result of a constitutive form ofconstructioneffectedmainlybythepersonwhosefeatureitis,bytheirperforminggender performatives. In other words, what is constructed or produced is thehumanfeatureofaparticularindividualthatistheirgender,andwhatitmeanstohaveaparticulargender in thissense is toconstantly repeatgenderedacts inacertain way. On the other hand, the illusion of gendered innate essences is aproduct of a causal form of construction,where it is produced andmaintainedmainlybyimpersonalagents(media,practices,discourses,etc.),aswellasthefactof people performing gender performatives. Being an illusion, the product is arepresentationthatpeoplehave,whichtheyobtainasaresultoflivinginasocietythatininnumerablesubtleandlesssubtlewaysreinforcesthenotionofgenderassomethinginnateandessential,afactofnature,andfromconstantlywitnessingothers(andoftenthemselves)actinginawaythatadherestothesocialnormsoftheirgender.Theillusionofgenderasanessenceaffordsasociallysanctionedandseeminglynaturalandinevitableexplanationforthisfacetofbehavior,theirsandothers'.

44KateVredenburgh:TheExplanatoryProblemforClassicalRationalChoiceTheoryIn this paper, I discuss what Christian List and Franz Dietrich (2015) call TheExplanatory Problem for the classical theory of rational choice.Using resourcesfromthephilosophyofscience,Iarguefortworesponsesonbehalfoftheclassicalrationalchoicetheorist,correspondingtotwodifferentwaysofunderstandingtheproblem.Acommoncomplaintaboutclassicalrationalchoicetheoryisthatitisnotproperlyexplanatory. The complaint usually goes something like the following: Rationalchoicetheoryseekstoexplainanagent’schoice(thus itsveryaptname).(Moreproperly,ra-tionalchoicetheoryseekstoexplainrationalchoice;thiswillbecomeimportantshortly.)Thewaythatclassicalversionsofrationalchoicetheorywentaboutthisprojectwastoascribeapreferencerelationovertheavailableoptions,andthentoarguethatthispref-erencerelationexplainstheagent’schoicesif,inanysituation,shechooseswhatshemostprefers.Sofar,sogood.However,suchapreferencerelation,atleastasunderstoodbyclassicalrationaldecisiontheory,isn’t an explanation of those choices (with heavy stress on “explanation”). AsDietrichandListsay,“whenweareasked,whydidyouchooseteachingratherthanbankingasyourcareer,simplysayingbecauseIpreferredonetotheotherisnotveryilluminating”(2).Theintuitionissupposedtobethatmerepreferenceisnotexplanatoryofchoicebehavior;inordertoexplainchoicebehavior,somefurtherfactmustbecited.WhileIamsympathetictoListandDietrich’sintuition,it’sfairlydifficulttospelloutexactlywhereclassicalrationalchoicetheorygoeswrong,explanatorily.Ithereforefirstspellouttwopossibleversionsoftheexplanatoryproblemforclassicalrationalchoicetheory,andthenIdiscusstwopotentialresponses.Onthefirstwayofspellingouttheproblem,classicalrationalchoicetheorydoesn’texplain choice because it does not give the constraints that determine choice.(Theseconstraintswillbenormative,sincerationalchoicetheoryaimstoexplainrational choice.) The background picture of explanation lurking behind this

objectionisthefollowing:Togiveanexplanationistosaywhattheexplanandumdependson,orwhatmakes it thecase(eithercausally,metaphysically,orsomeothersenseof“making.”)Theobjectionthenarguesthatclassicalrationalchoicetheorydoesnotgiveinformationaboutwhattheexplanandumdependson,sincefactsaboutchoicedoesnotdependonfactsaboutpreferences.Iftheobjectionistowork,thesenseof“depends”herecannotbecausaldependence,since,ifweunderstand preference as mental phenomena, an agent’s choices can surelycasuallydependonherpreferences.Thesenseof“depends”hereismetaphysicaldependence:Evenifmychoicescausallydependonmypreferences,myrationalchoicedependsonotherfacts.Therearetwoobviouswaysofresistingthisversionoftheproblem:(1)theinsistthat rational choice doesmetaphysically depend on preference; (2) to adopt adifferentback-groundconceptionofexplanation.Ipursuestrategy(2),andarguethattheclassicalrationalchoicetheoristshouldadoptabackgroundunificationistpictureofexplanation.Briefly,unificationistviewsofexplanation,espousedmostnotably by Philip Kitcher (1989), argue that to explain an event is to provide aunified account of different phe- nomena. On the unificationist view ofexplanation,theexplanationsofrationalchoicegivenbyclassicalrationalchoicetheoryaregoodexplanationsbecause theygiveaunifiedaccountofa rangeofdifferentchoicesintermsofapreferencefunction.Asbehaviorists,manyclassicalrational choice theorists took the preference function to just be a conve- nientshorthandsummaryofchoicebehavioracrossdifferencechoicecontexts.Suchaposition is certainly objectionable under an interpretation of explanation asprovidinginformationaboutconstraints,sincechoicedoesnotconstraintchoice,itfitsnicelywithaunificationistpictureofexplanation.Onthesecondwayofspellingouttheproblem,theexplanationsgivingbyclassicalratio-nal choice theoryare self-explanatory: inotherwords, theyexplaina factaboutchoicepartiallyinvirtueofthatfactitself.Thisversionoftheproblemrelieson a behaviorist interpretation of classical rational choice theory, where thepreference function, as stated above, just is a convenient summary of choicebehavior across different contexts. Since preferences are just formal

45representationsofchoices, theyarenotgenuinelyexplanatory,sinceanychoicewill be explained partially in virtue of itself. In otherwords, on the behavioristinterpretationofclassicalchoicetheory,anychoiceispartiallyexplainedbyitself.However, nothing is (partially or fully) explained by itself. So, the behavioristinterpretationofclassicalrationalchoicetheorycannotbeexplanatory.ThisargumentissimilartoaclassicobjectiontoHumeanviewsoflawsofnature.On that objection, any particular matter of fact partially explains itself: Sinc“eHumeanlawsofnatureareexplainedbyallthelocalmattersoffact,andlawsofnatureexplainlocalmattersoffact, localmattersoffactexplainthemselves.So,theobjectiongoes,Humeanlawsofnaturearenotexplanatory.Iarguethat,asinthe case of Humean laws of nature, the explanatory circularity exhibited byexplanationsofclassicalrationalchoicetheoryisnotvicious,sinceallthechoicesrepresentedbythepreferencefunctionexplainanyparticularchoice(ratherthananyparticularchoiceexplainingitselfalone).Inotherwords,argumentsonbehalfof Humeans about laws of nature that give us reason to think that partial self-explanation is acceptable can be leveraged in favor of classical rational choicetheory.Inshort,Ithinkthattheexplanatoryproblemforclassicalrationalchoicetheoryisnotasobviousasitisoftenmadeouttobeintheliterature,andthattwoplausibleversions of the problem can be resisted from considerations originating in thephilosophyofscience.Dietrich,FranzandChristianList.2016.”Reason-basedchoiceandcontextdepen-dence: An explanatory framework.“ Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kitcher, Philip. 1989. ”Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of theWorld,“ in Scientific Explanation, ed. P. Kitcher and W. Salmon. Minneapolis:UniversityofMin-neapolisPress,410-505

JackWright:Howdoweknowwhichmodelsprovideuswithcausalinformation?(UNABLETOPRESENT)Ifwecouldgaincausalknowledgefromidealiseddeductivemodelssuchasthoseineconomics,howwouldweknow?Inthelivelydebateabouttheepistemicvalueof economicmodels philosophers have taken sharply different positions. Somehaveargued thateconomicmodelsare inherentlyunable toprovide thesortofknowledgethatacontrolledexperimentdoes,othershaveclaimedarguablytheopposite—thatmodelsareexperimentsandviceversa.Yetothersarguethatwecanlearnfrommodelsevenwhentheylooknothinglikeexperiments.InthispaperIwillthatarguetherecanbenofurtherprogressonthisquestionbypursuinganyoftheselinesofargument.Noanswertotheepistemicquestioncancomefromtheevaluationof intrinsicfeaturesofmodels. Iconsidertwocurrentcharacterisationsofmodelsandtheirepistemicvalue,arguingagainsttheminturn.I will argue that Julian Reiss’s elaboration of Nancy Cartwright’s GalileanIdealisations to partition between acceptable and unacceptable idealisationsdoesn’twork.Thetypesofassumptionshesuggestsareacceptablerestonotherhidden assumptions that are not. I will then argue that Uskali Mäki’s identitymodels=experiments recognises but fails to deal with the consequences ofimportant differences betweenexperiments andmodels;most importantly thatexperimentsmanipulatetheworldinwaysthatmodelsdonot.Thereisnoclearpartitionbetweenacceptableandunacceptabletypesofassumptions,butmodelsshouldnotjustbeassessedintermsofexternalvaliditylikeexperiments.To know whether we can learn from models, and which models, we need toexaminetheirextrinsicratherthanintrinsicfeatures.Iwillexplainwhatthismeansby a reappraisal of the experiments-models analogy, by discussing their crucialdifferencesaswellastheirsimilarities.