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JANUARY 2014

Engineering Peace:The Critical Role of Engineers inUN Peacekeeping

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS AND ADAM C. SMITH

Cover Image: Members of the Chinese

engineering company of the UN mission

in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (MONUC) work on a road

rehabilitation project in April 2008 to

allow greater access to the Ruzizi One

Dam Power Plant, the only source of

electricity for the east of the country.

UN Photo/Marie Frechon.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the authors

and not necessaril y those of IPI. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Director of PublicationsMarie O’Reilly, Associate EditorThong Nguyen, Editorial Assistant

Suggested Citation:

Arthur Boutellis and Adam C. Smith,

“Engineering Peace: The Critical Role of

Engineers in UN Peacekeeping,” New

York: International Peace Institute,

January 2014.

© by International Peace Institute, 2014

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS is a Non-Resident Adviser at the

International Peace Institute.

Email: [email protected]

ADAM C. SMITH is a Senior Fellow and Head of the Center

for Peace Operations at the International Peace Institute.

Email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to express their appreciation to the

Norwegian Ministry of Defense for its generous support of

this project. We would like to thank the many UN mission

staff who facilitated our field research in Haiti and South

Sudan, especially Laura Alcaide, Johannes Dreyer, Elie

Rizkallah, Guy Siri, and Nicolas Von Ruben. We appreciate

the helpful comments to earlier drafts provided by Anil

Arachchige, Sebastiano Bagnasco, Charles Callanan,

Andrew Hyslop, Naresh Perinpanayagam, Mamraj Sharma,

Guy Siri, Darryl Watters, and Paul Williams, among others.

Of course, the report owes much of its content to the

many UN staff, host government officials, member states,

peacekeeping troops, and NGOs who kindly agreed to be

interviewed in New York, Haiti, and South Sudan, and to

whom we are very grateful. The authors would also like to

thank IPI colleagues Bianca Selway, Marie O’Reilly, and

Adam Lupel for their editorial work.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Engineering Tasks and Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Types of Engineering CapacitiesAvailable to UN Peacekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Challenges in Mission Start-Up Phase. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Challenges in Mission Consolildation Phase . . . . . . . 17

Cross-Cutting Engineering Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Annex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. ENGINEERING ROLES AND SAMPLE ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . .5

Tables

1. SUMMARY OF MISSION ENGINEERING CAPACITIES . . . . . 6

2. PROS AND CONS OF MECS (RELATIVE TO COMMERCIAL CONTRACTORS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3. COST OF A ONE-TIME DEPLOYMENT OF A 175-PERSON ENGINEERING COMPANY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

4. PRIORITY ENGINEERING NEEDS IN DIFFERENT MISSION PHASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

5. MONTHLY COST OF MEC REIMBURSEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . 34

6. MONTHLY COST OF MEC SELF-SUSTAINMENT, FUEL, AND ROTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

7. OVERALL MONTHLY AND ANNUAL COST OF AN MEC (EXCLUDING MATERIALS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Abbreviations

C2 Command and Control

CIMIC Civic-Military Coordination

CMS Chief of Mission Support

COE Contingent-Owned Equipment

CSB County Support Base

CVR Community Violence Reduction

DFS Department of Field Support

DMS Director of Mission Support

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

GIS Geographic Information Systems

HMEC Horizontal Military Engineering Company

IC Individual Contractor

ILO International Labour Organization

IMC Inter-Mission Cooperation

IOM International Organization for Migration

JOTC Joint Operations and Tasking Center

LFE Light Field Engineering

MEC Military Engineering Company

MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MINUSTAH United Nations Mission in Haiti

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPC Mission Project Cell

NGO Nongovernmental Organizations

NSE National Support Element

PITF Programme Implementation Task Force

iv

PRC Prioritization Review Committee

QIP Quick Impact Project

SAG Special Advisory Group

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General

TCC Troop-Contributing Country

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

UNSAS United Nations Standby Arrangement System

UNV United Nations Volunteer

v

1

Executive Summary

The UN Security Council mandates peacekeepingoperations in some of the poorest, most conflict-prone areas of the world. These locations are oftenalso extremely remote and nearly inaccessible. Inthis context, engineering is one of the most criticalelements to the functioning of a UN peaceoperation; yet, it may be the least critically analyzedaspect of peacekeeping. During the start-up phaseof a mission, engineers design, prepare, and buildthe camps that allow the mission to exist. Very littlecan be achieved in peacekeeping without sanitaryand secure camps with electricity and passableroads or functional air strips. When there areengineering gaps coupled with major logisticalchallenges (as in the UN Mission in South Sudan),key elements of the mandate, such as the protectionof civilians or support to the extension of stateauthority, become much more difficult, andsometimes impossible, to fulfill. During themission consolidation phase, engineers can play acentral role in the peacebuilding support tasks of amission, working with the host country, UNagencies, and others to build capacity and deliverpeace dividends. Despite such central roles played by (and the

high cost of) peacekeeping engineers, relativelylittle is known about their various capacities ortasks; nor is much known about the challenges theUN faces in effectively and efficiently utilizing bothmilitary and commercial engineering capacities.The following report details the various tasksundertaken and roles played by engineers (missionsupport, state assistance, and development andhumanitarian roles). It then describes the types ofengineering capacities available to a peacekeepingmission: civilian, military, commercial, and the UNOffice for Project Services (UNOPS). Each type ofengineering has differing capacities and its ownbenefits and drawbacks. While each mission has acivilian engineering section to design, manage, andadminister engineering across the mission, UNpeacekeeping relies heavily on military engineeringcapacities, typically in the form of militaryengineering companies, to carry out constructiontasks.

Based on field visits to two UN missions, the UNMission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UNStabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), thereport then outlines a number of challenges to theeffective use of engineering, divided into threeparts: (a) during the mission start-up phase, (b)during the mission consolidation phase, and (c)cross-cutting engineering challenges. MISSION START-UP PHASE

Often, the gravest challenge during the start-upphase of a mission is a lack of national infrastruc-ture and national capacity. Typically, planning fora new UN mission does not adequately take intoaccount the size and importance of engineeringneeds during the start-up phase. Delays in therecruitment and arrival of military engineeringunits (currently occurring in the UN’s newestmission in Mali) have lasting effects for missionslike UNMISS.1 Operational caveats imposed bytroop-contri buting countries (TCCs), such as thosethat limit a unit’s area of operation, also have anadverse effect on the mission’s overall capabilities.During this critical start-up period, both the needsand expectations of the host government andpeople are at their highest, but often go unmet.Lastly, when presented with critical engineeringgaps, missions have few available options foracquiring surge engineering capacities in a timelymanner. This report recommends that the UN pursue all

avenues for developing the options available forrapid start-up and surge engineering capacities,including the following: furthering the UNDepartment of Field Support’s concept of“modularization”; agreeing to a global systemscontract with a commercial engineering provider;engaging in strategic outreach and providingincentives to member states for standbyengineering capacity (as part of or alongside themission); exploring modalities for more inter-mission cooperation; and signing a partnershipagreement with the UN Office for Project Servicesto augment mission capacity. MISSION CONSOLIDATION PHASE

In the mission consolidation phase, the keychallenges relate to ensuring the ideal use of

1 For a detailed explanation of the various delays and challenges associated with the process of generating and deploying military capabilities, see Adam C. Smithand Arthur Boutellis, “Rethinking Force Generation: Filling the Capability Gaps in UN Peacekeeping,” Providing for Peacekeeping No. 2, New York: InternationalPeace Institute, May 2013, available at www.ipinst.org/publication/detail/397-rethinking-force-generation-filling-capability-gaps-in-un-peacekeeping.html .

www.ipinst.org/publication/detail/397-rethinking-force-generation-filling-capability-gaps-in-un-peacekeeping.html

2 Arthur Boutellis and Adam C. Smith

engineering capacities to further the peacebuildingsupport goals of the mission. Given the highdemand from partners and the host governmentfor the mission’s engineering capacities, clearprioritization and tasking arrangements must bedeveloped that ensure adequate coherence andcoordination within the mission and maximize theuse of limited capacities. Mission leadership shouldalso be made aware of the possibilities and limits ofthe use of military engineering capabilities.Funding projects that fall outside of the missionsupport role is also a challenge, as assessed contri-butions are not often available for this purpose.Ideally, predictable and efficient partnerships withUN agencies and the host government provide thematerials for projects, while missions provide theheavy machinery and operators. This report recommends that standardized

memoranda of understanding between missionsand UN agencies be developed to reduce transac-tion time and costs, and that a central point ofcontact is developed for efficient coordination withthe host government. It also recommends adjustingUN procurement rules to allow missions to givehigher priority to using local companies (ratherthan regional or international companies) forconstruction works in order to help build sustain-able engineering capacity within the host country. CROSS-CUTTING CHALLENGES

There are several cross-cutting engineeringchallenges that missions face throughout theirlifecycle. First is the difficulty of analyzing anddeciding on the ideal configuration of militaryversus civilian or commercial versus UNOPScapacities. Given variable costs and unpredictableoutcomes, a generic cost-benefit analysis becomesdifficult, but it is sorely necessary. Second, TCCcapability can vary considerably from one militaryengineering company to another. The most prizedaspect of a military engineering company’s overallcapability is its flexibility and willingness to take onany job with which it is tasked. In this respect, someTCCs have more capability than others, butmission leaders have little ability to affect thisequation. Similarly, as needs change on the ground,and different types of engineering capacities areneeded and others become unnecessary, missions

have little ability to change the composition of TCCunits or their equipment lists. We suggest that military capability studies

conducted for each mission should regularlyinclude an assessment of the appropriateness of themission’s military engineering composition. TCCs’flexibility in adapting their contingent-ownedequipment as a result of these assessments shouldbe encouraged. Finally, the limited duration ofpeacekeeping mission mandates and budget cyclesaffects the ability of UN civilian and militaryplanners to do strategic planning for engineering.An annual engineering master plan for eachmission, including mission support tasks and non-mission support projects, would allow betterbudgeting (and procurement) planning. RECOMMENDATIONS

In sum, this report offers five overarching recom -mendations for UN peace operations:1. Develop rapid start-up or surge engineeringcapacities.

2. Better integrate engineering requirements intomission planning.

3. Adapt to changing needs in the mission conso -lidation phase.

4. Create win-win partnerships to address engi -neering needs beyond the mission.

5. Build local engineering and private-sectorcapacity for additional peace dividends.A detailed list of recommendations is included at

the end of the report.

Engineering Tasks and Roles

The most common types of engineering tasksperformed in a peacekeeping operation aregenerally the same and can be put into threecategories: major horizontal construction, majorvertical construction, and minor engineeringsupport.2

During the start-up phase of a peacekeepingoperation, horizontal construction is the first,largest, and arguably the most vital set of tasks to beundertaken. Such tasks include the preparation ofground sites for the construction of base camps

2 Military engineering tasks are more commonly categorized by (1) construction (vertical and horizontal); (2) general (water, electricity, quarrying activities, andwaste management); and (3) combat (field fortifications, mine clearing, and bomb disposal). Peacekeeping missions, however, include a civilian engineeringcomponent and rely less on combat engineering.

ENGINEERING PEACE 3

3 For more on the early peacebuilding role of peacekeepers, see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Peacekeeping andPeacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus,” September 2010, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20Peacebuilding%20Peacekeeping%20Nexus.pdf .

(clearing, compacting, and leveling land, as well aslaying building foundations) and the construction,maintenance, and repair of supply roads andbridges, airstrips, and helipads. Related to theseactivities are others, such as clearing rubble ortrash, constructing or improving drainage systems,and canalizing rivers. Major horizontal construc-tion tasks are typically carried out by horizontalmilitary engineering companies (HMECs) that aredeployed with the necessary heavy constructionequipment (bulldozers, excavators, cranes, etc.).Major vertical construction includes the cons -

truction of camps, rehabilitation of existingbuildings, and erection of prefabricated structures(office space and staff housing). This category canalso include well drilling. Vertical constructiontasks are undertaken throughout the various phasesof a mission and can be performed by militaryengineering companies or the mission’s civilianengineers (often through contracting with local,regional, or international construction companies). Minor engineering support entails maintenance

and repair of UN facilities, including electrical orplumbing repairs, and carpentry and masonry

work. Military engineering units are responsiblefor this work in their own camps and cansometimes be asked to undertake it for other UNcamps or facilities. Infantry units should have somesmall engineering capacity to undertake minorworks for their camps. Minor engineering work forlarge UN base camps is typically done by thecivilian engineering component of the missionusing local labor through the use of “individualcontractor” arrangements. The primary role of the engineering component

(including both civilian and military engineering) ofa UN peacekeeping mission is the mission supportrole: to establish and maintain mission infrastruc-ture, as well as supply routes and landing sites usedby the mission to sustain itself. Beyond this role,engineering components are sometimes also askedto support—within their capacity and depending onthe mission’s mandate—the host state and otherinterna tional or regional organizations, as well asUN agencies and humanitarian NGOs operating inthe same theater. This non-mission support role issometimes described as part of the “early peace -building” function of peace keepers.3

Military engineers from the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) work to clean debris blocking canalsaround Port-au-Prince in April 2012, in an attempt to minimize flooding during the upcoming rainyseason. UN Photo/Logan Abassi.

www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20Peacebuilding%20Peacekeeping%20Nexus.pdf

www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20Peacebuilding%20Peacekeeping%20Nexus.pdf


As the extension of state authority has become acentral function of peace operations (as is the casefor both MINUSTAH and UNMISS), UN missionengineers are increasingly asked to providetargeted engineering support to the host country’sinfrastructure development and related institu-tions. For example, military engineers can be askedby the national government or local authorities todredge a trash-clogged canal, repair a roadway, orclear the ground for a port when the host govern-ment is unable to undertake the projects on its owndue to a lack of equipment or funding, or both. Inthe case of Haiti, requests for such activities arecoordinated through the mission leadership forapproval, and funding for any materials other thanfuel (such as sand, gravel, or asphalt) typically mustbe contributed by the government. State assistanceprojects tend to be a higher priority and are morefrequent during the consolidation or drawdownphases of a mission. During these periods themission can more easily redirect its engineeringassets from mission support to non-missionsupport functions. In addition, such projects maycontribute to the achievement of key benchmarksunder the mission’s mandate to support theextension of state authority.A second non-mission support role takes the

form of assistance to other international or regionalorganizations, as well as UN agencies and humani-tarian NGOs, by supporting them in their develop-ment and humanitarian mandates. Militaryengineering companies from a peacekeepingmission can provide niche engineering support andsignificant cost savings to these endeavors. Forexample, in Haiti, MINUSTAH’s militaryengineering capacity has contributed to roadconstruction for the “16/6 project,” a major post-earthquake resettlement project for internallydisplaced persons supported by the UN Office forProject Services (UNOPS), the InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM), theInternational Labour Organization (ILO), and theUN Development Programme (UNDP). UNOPSestimated that support from the mission’s militaryengineers allowed it to save an average 40–45percent of the project budget that would otherwisehave been used to rent heavy equipment. Thepartners were then able to reinvest the money

saved back into the project and hire additional locallabor. This humanitarian or development role canalso take the form of emergency response during anatural disaster, such as an earthquake or flood, orduring a refugee crisis. It can be argued that some engineering tasks fall

under multiple categories at the same time. Someof the engineering works done to support themission bring ancillary benefits to the localcommunities and the country as a whole. Thesocioeconomic “multiplier effect” of repairing amajor supply road or building a new airstrip in anisolated community (and even flying national andlocal state officials in UN aircrafts) can be seen asboth mission support and state assistance. Anotherexample is when military engineers are asked toassist other components of the peacekeepingmission, such as the civil affairs section, to helpimplement a “quick impact project” (QIP). QIPsare small-scale, low-cost projects implemented tobuild confidence in the mission, the mandate, orthe peace process. Depending on the project, theycould fall under any of the three above-mentionedcategories.4 Finally, many military engineeringunits also take on a limited amount of activities inthe community as part of their civil-militarycoordination (“CIMIC”) duties, small acts requiredof all military units to improve relations and buildconfidence with local civilians. See figure 1 for adiagram of the various roles and sample tasksperformed by engineering units.

Types of EngineeringCapacities Available to UNPeacekeeping

CIVILIAN ENGINEERING

Among the many civilian components of a UNpeacekeeping mission is civilian engineering. Theengineering section is responsible for the planning,design, construction, and maintenance of buildingsand physical infrastructure, and the operation andmaintenance of UN-owned engineering assets.Civilian engineering is headed by a chief engineerand falls under the mission support section, headedby the director of mission support (DMS) or chiefof mission support (CMS). The chief engineer

4 For more on the implementation and objective of QIPs, see UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, Civil Affairs Handbook(Durban: United Nations, 2012), ch. 12.

ENGINEERING PEACE 5

reports to the DMS/CMS through the chief ofintegrated support services. Each mission has adifferent assortment of civilian engineering capaci-ties (human resources, budgets, and equipment).For example, MINUSTAH’s engineeringcomponent had an approved staffing level of 20international staff, 99 national staff and 31 UNvolunteers (UNVs) in its 2012–13 budget.UNMISS’s engineering component had anapproved level of 45 international staff, 212national staff, and 48 UNVs during the samebudget cycle. The engineering staffing capacity wascut by 66 posts at the end of 2012. UNMISScurrently uses around 1,200 individual contractorsand has UN-owned equipment roughly equivalentto that of one horizontal military engineeringcompany.The MINUSTAH engineering section is

composed of various functional teams: powergeneration, geographic information systems (GIS),water and water supply, management of assets andmaterials, budget and registration, and planningand design. In Haiti, the civilian engineering staff is

divided among the seven regions of the countryand the capital, Port-au-Prince. In South Sudan, inaddition to the staff at mission headquarters inJuba, each of the ten states has its own civilianengineering component, including a chief engineeroperating under a state coordinator with somedelegated tasking authority and procurementauthority up to $4,000. However, these decentral-ized civilian engineering components do not haveaccess to heavy equipment and therefore largelyrely on the military engineering companiesdeployed in their regions for tasks involving suchequipment. MILITARY ENGINEERING

For major engineering tasks, peacekeepingmissions tend to rely primarily on the use ofengineers and equipment from troop-contributingcountries (TCCs). Military engineering units canrange in size from a platoon (25–30 troops) that isembedded within an infantry battalion to a fullmilitary engineering company (MEC) of up to 275troops. Military engineering companies can be

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Figure 1. Engineering roles and sample activities


made up of multiple platoons or teams, each withspecialized functions: well-drilling, force protec-tion, logistics, airfield or helipad construction, orroad and bridge construction. Depending on theneeds on the ground, the force requirements for afull MEC require some combination of theseplatoons. For instance, in South Sudan, the missionwas designed to employ horizontal militaryengineering companies (HMECs), which had tworoad and bridge construction platoons but no well-drilling platoons. Both UNMISS and MINUSTAHcurrently have four MECs each, although ofvarying sizes and capabilities (see table 1 below). Construction engineering companies are

expected to bring with them all the equipment—heavy and light—necessary for their work. Suchequipment is contingent-owned equipment (COE),and the depreciation of the equipment isreimbursed by the UN according to set rates in theUN’s COE manual.5 Much of the engineeringequipment—bulldozers, cranes, etc.—is heavy,expensive, and difficult to transport to the missionand within the mission area. This is particularlytrue in difficult terrains such as those in South

Sudan, where the rainy season considerably limitsroad movements for eight months of the year.Once in the mission area, heavy equipment is inhigh demand.Engineering companies are headed by a company

commander who receives tasking orders from theChief Integrated Support Service, in coordinationwith the force commander (via a millitaryengineering branch, when it exists within the forceheadquarters). The force commander retainsoperational command of all military units. Taskingarrangements can vary from mission to mission,however, and are discussed in more detail in thesection below on challenges in the mission consol-idation phase. Engineering companies are generallyexpected to be able to divide and operate simulta-neously in three locations within their area ofresponsibility, but this can vary according to eachTCC’s agreement with the UN. Militaryengineering units are also expected to be fully self-sustaining when deployed. This means that theybuild their own camps and require no engineeringor security support from the UN. In practice,however, most military engineering companies do

5 However, this does not include construction materials (sand, gravel, concrete, asphalt, fuel, etc.), which are provided or purchased by the UN mission. Suchmaterials can also be provided by partners working on projects with engineering companies, such as the host government or a UN agency. On some occasions,materials are purchased by the TCC itself (this cannot be reimbursed by the UN).

MINUSTAH UNMISS

Mission phase Consolidation (fewer mission support Start-up (many critical mission support needs) needs)

Engineering section $4.3 million $27.9 millionprojects budget(2012–2013)

Civilian engineering 150 (20 international) 305 (45 international)staff

Military engineering - 1 HMEC (~250 personnel) - 2 HMECs (~268 personnel each)personnel - 3 construction engineering companies - 2 construction engineering companies (~130–170 personnel each) (~275 personnel each) - 8 infantry engineering units - 4 light field engineering (LFE) units (~25 personnel each) (~50–120 personnel each)

Commercial capacity Some individual contractors, mostly Few individual contractors available(national) low-skilled

Commercial capacity A number of large Dominican and Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Ugandan firms(regional) American construction firms operate in the country.

Table 1. Summary of mission engineering capacities

ENGINEERING PEACE 7

6 New rules agreed to by the General Assembly in 2013 would make a twelve-month rotation standard for TCCs.7 All contracts above a value of $50,000 have to be awarded from bids solicited based on a request for proposals (RFP). Those that exceed $150,000 have to beapproved by a local committee on contracts. Contracts in excess of $500,000 have to be approved by UN Headquarters in New York.

8 Commercial contractors can be found for almost any job, anywhere; however, the security premiums charged by firms in the most risky areas can greatly exceedanything the UN mission is able to afford.

9 UN News Centre, “South Sudan: UN Officials, Security Council Condemn Deadly Attack on Peacekeepers,” April 9, 2013, available atwww.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44603 .

10 UN General Assembly Resolution 65/176 (December 2010), UN Doc. A/RES/65/176. See also, ECOSOC Resolution 2010/23 (July 2010) and the Executive BoardDecisions 2008/35 (September 2008), 2009/25 (September 2009), 2010/7 (January 2010), and 2010/21 (June 2010).

11 UN Office for Project Services, “Mission and Values,” available at www.unops.org/english/whoweare/Pages/Missionandvalues.aspx .

require support from the UN, often in the form offorce protection provided by infantry units.Military engineering personnel are rotated back totheir home country every six to twelve monthsdepending on the TCC.6 Force protection, rotationlength, and self-sustainment issues are discussed indetail in the section on cross-cutting challenges.COMMERCIAL ENGINEERING

UN missions have to rely on commerciallycontracted engineering capacities in many ways.For light engineering work, local individuals(“individual contractors,” or ICs) can be hired onshort (typically three month), renewable contracts.The number of these individual contractors canreach 1,000 in a mission like MINUSTAH, whichhas high recurring minor maintenance and repairneeds. IC contracts are relatively cheap for themission (compared to higher-skilled “nationalprofessional officers, or NPOs, for instance), andthey provide a source of training, employment, andincome to the local population. However, there arehigh transaction costs for the mission in processingcontracts every three months and in overseeing thework of so many contractors. And while cheap insome respects, IC contracts can be approximatelyfour to six times more expensive than prevailingwages in the local market. Missions also contract national, regional, and

international companies to take on largerengineering projects where needed and when cost-effective. The use of commercial assets for projectsmust go through the UN procurement process,using the “best value for money” formula. Thisprocess can be relatively quick for contracts under$50,000, but it can take between three and twelvemonths to complete if the value exceeds $50,000.7Given the state of the local economy in manymissions, national capacities are typically insuffi-cient or lacking experience, and the mission musttherefore rely on larger regional or internationalcompanies to provide reliable services. However, in

remote or particularly dangerous areas, it may bedifficult to find any commercial contractors willingor able to take on a particular project for a reason-able price.8 During the research visit to UNMISS inApril 2013, five civilian contractors for a commer-cially contracted water-drilling company escortedby UNMISS troops were killed in an ambush whilereturning from a project site in the conflict-pronestate of Jonglei.9

UN OFFICE FOR PROJECT SERVICES

One other option for engineering capacity withinthe UN system is for UN missions to work with theUN Office for Project Services. Mandated by theGeneral Assembly “as a central resource for theUnited Nations system in procurement andcontracts management as well as in civil works andphysical infrastructure development, including therelated capacity development activities,”10 UNOPSmission is “to expand the capacity of the UNsystem and its partners to implementpeacebuilding, humanitarian and developmentoperations that matter for people in need.”11

UNOPS was established in 1974 as part of theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP)and in 1995 became a separate entity, with amandate and focus on civil works and physicalinfrastructure development, and the relatedcapacity development activities. In 2008, the UNand UNOPS signed a memorandum ofunderstanding (MOU) that set out the arrange-ments governing the provision of services byUNOPS to offices and departments of the UN,United Nations peacekeeping operations, andspecial political missions. The MOU has beenoperationalized primarily by the UN Mine ActionService to help manage and implement mineclearance projects. Other offices and depart-ments—such as the DFS’ Information andCommunication Technology Division, the UNDepartment of Social and Economic Affairs, andthe Executive Office of the Secretary-General—

www.unops.org/english/whoweare/Pages/Missionandvalues.aspx

www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44603


have partnered with UNOPS through the MOU,though mainly for human resources services. Inaddition to human resources services, UNOPSoffers expertise in infrastructure, project manage-ment, procurement, and financial management. Until now, peacekeeping missions have found it

difficult to use the framework agreement to facili-tate collaboration with UNOPS on other projects.Despite the recognized needs and close coordina-tion to define scopes of work at the field level, onlya few times and for relatively small engagementswere missions able to take advantage of UNOPS.Other instances of joint projects have typically beendone through separate project-specific MOUs,which have been time-intensive and difficultbureaucratically to negotiate (particularly whenthese MOUs involve the UN mission, UNOPS, andalso the host government’s relevant ministries). InSouth Sudan, for instance, UNOPS constructed fivereferendum support bases for the earlier UNMission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2011. The originalplan was for UNOPS to play a larger role, but thiswas scaled back as bureaucratic difficultiesemerged. In South Sudan, UNOPS mostly workswith other UN partners and humanitarian ordevelopment agencies to implement engineeringprojects, including the rehabilitation of airstrips in

Bunj and Pibor, and various road constructions forhumanitarian access. To support the currentengineering teams in UNMISS to deliver on theirtasks, UNOPS has proposed assembling andmanaging a civilian engineering enabling unit(roughly the equivalent of one horizontal militaryengineering company). This would includenecessary heavy equipment along with onsiteproject management teams.In MINUSTAH, which has far less critical

mission support engineering needs than UNMISSat this stage of its lifecycle (consolidation phase),the partnership is the other way around. Ratherthan receiving services from UNOPS, MINUSTAHhas been providing heavy equipment and operatorsto support UNOPS and other UN agencies in theirreconstruction and development projects. A recentexample of this is the “16/6 project,” for whichMINUSTAH military engineering companiescompleted ground preparation for road construc-tion as part of a major refugee resettlement projectof the Haitian government (implemented jointly byUNOPS, UNDP, IOM, and ILO). In both Haiti andSouth Sudan, UNOPS has a close working relation-ship with the host government ministries respon-sible for public works (see the section on challengesin the mission consolidation phase below).

A team of Japanese engineers helps the government of South Sudan with road construction activities inJuba in February 2012. UN Photo/Isaac Billy.

ENGINEERING PEACE 9

12 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, June 11, 2009, UN Doc. A/63/881,paras. 3 and 4.

13 African Development Bank, “South Sudan Interim Country Strategy Paper: 2012-2014,” October 2012.

Challenges in Mission Start-Up Phase

The immediate post-conflict period offers awindow of opportunity to provide basicsecurity, deliver peace dividends, shore up andbuild confidence in the political process, andstrengthen core national capacity to leadpeacebuilding efforts. If countries succeed inthese core areas early on, it substantiallyincreases the chances for sustainable peace —and reduces the risk of relapse into conflict ….In too many cases, we have missed this earlywindow.12

Engineering capacities are most critically neededduring the start-up phase of a mission. For themission to exist, camps must first be built. Heavyequipment must be transported to the missionarea; ground must be cleared; perimeter protectionconstructed; and electricity, water, and sewagesystems provided for. Access roads and airstripsmust be repaired or constructed anew. Speed is ofobvious importance during this period. Host-population needs and their expectations are at theirhighest during the initial deployment of a peaceoperation. As the quote above from the secretary-general’s report on peacebuilding in the immediateaftermath of conflict makes clear, this early periodis a window of opportunity to build confidence inthe political process and create buy-in among thehost population. The UN’s actions during thisperiod can be highly determinative of its futuresuccess. South Sudan provides a dramatic example of just

how great the need for engineering capability canbe during a mission start-up. The newest countryin Africa is 644,000 square kilometers in area,larger than any country in Western Europe. Insidethis vast and impoverished country, where 83percent of the population lives in rural areas, only 2percent of the very few roads that exist are paved.13The few towns across the country are linkedinstead by dirt roads that become impassableduring the annual eight-to-nine month rainyseason in which the native black cotton soil turnsinto a thick mud. The country is land-locked, and

only three airports in South Sudan have pavedrunways. In addition to a lack of nationalinfrastructure, a legacy of five decades of conflictalso left a dearth of national capacity, includingexperienced and qualified personnel.Within this environment, the UN Mission in

South Sudan was mandated in July 2011 toimplement an array of ambitious tasks on behalf ofthe international community. To enable theimplementation of the mission’s mandates (toprotect civilians, support the extension of stateauthority, and monitor human rights, among manyothers), the 2011 concept of operations planned forthe establishment of a mission headquarters in thecapital, Juba, as well as ten state offices, and, later,thirty-five geographically dispersed county supportbases. Two years in, the operating environment has

become even more challenging. For 2012 and 2013,the government of South Sudan allocated only 2percent of its budget for infrastructure (160 millionSouth Sudanese pounds, or $40 million), whichsuffered further when oil production—repre -senting more than 90 percent of revenue—washalted in January 2012. In May 2012, followingpublic disclosure that approximately $4 billion (orabout one third of the then government ofSouthern Sudan’s income during the 2005—2011transitional period) was unaccounted for, relationswith bilateral donors were further strained, placingincreased pressure on UNMISS. In December 2012,South Sudan’s army (the Sudan People’s LiberationArmy/SPLA) shot down an UNMISS helicopter,resulting in additional air mobility restrictions forUNMISS. Since 2011, unresolved bilateral politicaltensions with Sudan also led to delays or stoppageof transportation of goods from Port Sudan via theNile, further restricting available national andinternational engineering supplies and equipmentin South Sudan. Given the significant and unpredictable

obstacles—environmental, security, political, andothers—and the ambitious goals of a mission andexpectations of the international communityduring a start-up phase, a UN peacekeepingmission must be able to count on having adequate


engineering capabilities, as well as appropriate andflexible planning, financing, management, andoversight systems to implement engineeringprojects.Adequate engineering capability means that the

equipment, manpower, and will are commensuratewith the tasks to be performed, but also that themission is provided with an adequate engineeringbudget—not least to procure materials and fuel. Inthis context, the equipment must arrive on theground in a timely fashion, be in good workingcondition, and be the appropriate equipment forthe tasks. The manpower must be correctly trained,and the units must have the will to go where theneeds are at a given moment. On the civilian side,the planning must take proper account of theoperating environment, the mission priorities, andany and all unplanned contingencies that can affectimplementation (for example, a delayed process ofacquiring land for UN camps). In a rapidlychanging environment and in a time of urgency,financing must be adequate, timely, and flexible.Finally, effective tasking, management, andoversight systems must be in place to ensure on-schedule project implementation and quality

control.For the UN, a number of challenges with regard

to the above set of conditions are consistentfeatures of mission start-ups globally. For the UNMission in South Sudan, still in start-up mode twoyears after its establishment in July 2011, thesechallenges have had a significant impact on theimplementation of its mandated tasks, most specif-ically on the field-based component of its protec-tion of civilians role. The head of UNMISS hasmade no secret of this fact, candidly telling areporter, “We cannot sustain a presence with thelogistical capacity that we have, with the problemswe have with air transport and by road. So wecannot protect civilians in big, big, big numbers.”14This sentiment has also been echoed by the hostgovernment. Following a December 2011 inter-ethnic attack that killed hundreds, the governor ofJonglei State blamed the slow response from thegovernment and the UN on the lack of roads in thearea.15

Beyond its civilian protection mandate, themission has also been limited in its ability tosupport the extension of state authority and thedevelopment of national capacity, given the slow

14 Hereward Holland, “Peacekeepers Cannot Protect Civilians in South Sudan’s East: UN,” Reuters, May 27, 2013.15 Jeffrey Gettleman, “U.N. Fact-Finding Team to Visit Site of South Sudan Killings,” New York Times, February 11, 2013.

Members of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) encounter challenging road conditions during the 2007rainy season in Chukudum, now part of South Sudan. UN Photo/Tim McKulka.

pace in building the envisioned county supportbases (CSBs). The aims of these bases are tosupport the government’s efforts to consolidatepeace and security and strengthen decentralizedservice delivery in areas where risks to peace andstability are considered high. This attempt toextend its presence beyond state capitals to thecounty level, however, has been a source of frustra-tion for the mission. Original plans called for thecompletion of thirty-five CSBs in three years, withnineteen operational by the end of 2012. In reality,only eight CSBs were suitable for full deploymentas of March 2013. A revised timeline plans forcompletion of all thirty-five by 2016. Some in themission and back in New York believe that this isalso an unrealistic goal and the total number to becompleted by 2016 should be reduced to twenty.16

OVERSTRETCH AND MISSIONPLANNING

One of the more obvious considerations related toengineering during mission start-up is that there isan enormous amount of work to be done, and thesooner it is completed, the sooner the mission canstart operating properly and implement itsmandate. As evidenced by the UNMISS exampleabove, almost two years into its existence (andseven years after the UN first deployed in the areaas part of the earlier UNMIS), extremely high-priority engineering projects have not beencompleted. For a number of reasons describedbelow, roads, airstrips, and helipads have not yetbeen rehabilitated, which severely impacts missionperformance. The short-run lack of roads andadequate airstrips also costs the UN a great deal inthe long run. Throughout its existence, UNMISShas been forced to use helicopters for nearly alltransport during the long rainy seasons rather thanthe more cost-effective trucks or fixed-wingaircrafts. Some estimated that the mission has over -spent by millions of dollars because of delays infinishing major supply roads and runways thatwould have allowed it to use cheaper forms oftransport than helicopters. In addition to mandate implementation and

financial costs, engineering delays can affectmission morale, including the performance andretention of personnel. Because of other, higherpriority engineering projects, the construction ofadequate accommodation for both military andcivilian staff has not yet been fully addressed. Inmission headquarters, the construction of hard-wall accommodations is currently on hold givencuts to the mission engineering budget. In the field,the military units have had to make do longer thanthe six-month self-sufficiency period in tents.17During the rainy season, this makes life in the fieldparticularly difficult. Planning for a new UN mission does not

adequately take into account the size andimportance of engineering needs during the start-up phase. UN peace operations must be plannedwithin a set of inflexible parameters established bythe UN Security Council. One of those parametersis the troop ceiling, which places a fixed limit onthe total number of uniformed personnel availableto the mission. In South Sudan, the troop ceiling is7,000. Approximately 4,500 of these troops areinfantry, and the rest compose different enablingunits (air, medical, engineering, etc.). Ideally, a troop ceiling would be much higher

during a mission start-up phase to address theincreased engineering needs during that period. Anearly “engineering surge” would save money in thelong run, and, more importantly, allow the missionto fully implement its peacekeeping andpeacebuilding support mandate during the criticalearly postconflict window of opportunity. In lieu ofhigher troop ceilings, force requirements for themission should, in cases like South Sudan, wherethe environmental and terrain challenges are soformidable, give higher priority to engineeringcapabilities. Simply put, the first twelve months ofa mission should include surge engineeringcapacity (both military and civilian) to set themission on its feet before the window of greatestopportunity has closed. For UNMISS, this extracapacity would have improved the mission’s abilityto implement its mandate while at the same timeaccruing significant cost savings.

ENGINEERING PEACE 11

16 See Diana Felix da Costa and Cedric de Coning, “UNMISS County Support Bases: Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding Nexus at Work?,” NUPI Policy Brief, April 2013.17 After the initial six-month period, the UN is required to have made hard-wall accommodations available for the troops. TCCs are reimbursed extra if the UN isunable to meet the six month timeline. This rule, however, is a holdover from an earlier time in peacekeeping, when deployments were more static than today.

TCC CAVEATS AND DELAYED DEPLOYMENTS

Despite the best planning, however, UN missionsare still subject to severe capability gaps resultingfrom largely exogenous factors, such as TCCcaveats and delayed deployments. The ForceRequirement document, drafted for each unit in apeacekeeping operation by the DPKO MilitaryPlanning Service, explains the individual unit’s“employment concept,” mission, area of operation,and tasks, and it lists the exact assets the unit isrequired to bring with it to the mission. Forcerequirements are based on the strategic concept ofoperations for the mission. TCCs that contribute aunit to a mission agree to contribute personnel andassets as detailed in the force requirements. Theyalso agree to the employment concept. DPKOoperational planning relies on the assumption thatTCCs will abide by the force requirements and, assuch, those exact capabilities will be available to themission without caveat. However, for a number ofreasons this is not always the case. TCCs may notarrive with the right equipment. This may be aresult of the pre-deployment MOU negotiations,when the TCC successfully negotiates to change therequired capabilities (e.g., to 10 cubic metercapacity dump trucks rather than the moreappropriate 20 cubic meter trucks), or, in a smallnumber of cases, it might result from a TCC simplyshowing up without certain required equipment. ATCC will not be reimbursed for missing ornonfunctional equipment, uncovered duringregular COE inspections, but is not otherwisepenalized for this capacity gap.18

A related issue is the use of caveats by TCCs,which can significantly affect the capability of aunit, particularly during mission start-up, when themission design has not yet been adjusted to accountfor the resulting capability gaps. Caveats typicallyrestrict the rules of engagement or the area ofoperation. In UNMISS, the decision by the Japanesegovernment to restrict the area of operation of its

horizontal military engineering company to a 20kilometer radius around the capital, Juba, haslimited the operational capacity of the mission.Because the pressing engineering needs in SouthSudan are located away from the capital, a sizeablepart of the mission’s military engineering capabilityhas been underused during the most critical periodof time. Meanwhile the mission has been unable toseek alternate means of filling this gap because offinancial limitations and the Security Council–imposed troop ceiling. In October 2013, theJapanese government agreed to expand the work ofits engineering unit to the three states of SouthSudan’s Equatoria region—the originally plannedarea of operations for this HMEC.19

Another significant blow to the capabilities(engineering and otherwise) of UN missionsduring start-up is the late arrival of TCC personnelor equipment. While force generation is a complexand time-intensive process,20 the delayed arrival ofengineering assets can have a proportionallygreater negative impact on the mission’soperations. In South Sudan, two of the mission’sfour planned horizontal military engineeringcompanies were not yet deployed twenty monthsafter the establishment of the mission. A SouthKorean engineering company, intended to deployto the most restive—and therefore critical—state,Jonglei, was delayed over a year and a half by theparliamentary approval process in Seoul. A secondengineering company, from India, was delayedover financial requests from the Indian govern-ment related to the rotation of their equipment,which slowed MOU negotiations with UNHeadquarters. Although an engineering companyfrom Bangladesh (held over from UNMIS) hasbeen operating in place of the Indian companyduring this period, its capacities have not been ofthe ideal composition (it is a constructionengineering company as opposed to an HMEC),and its equipment has suffered from extreme wearand tear over the years without being replaced.21


18 The “Report of the Senior Advisory Group on Rates of Reimbursement to Troop-Contributing Countries and Other Related Issues” (A/67/713) recommendedfurther financial penalties for non-functional or absent contingent-owned equipment. With some conditions, this was agreed to by the General Assembly’s FifthCommittee in May 2013, but it has not yet been implemented.

19 See “Japan to Expand Peacekeeping Work in S. Sudan Despite Safety Concerns,” Global Post, May 28, 2013, available atwww.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130528/japan-expand-peacekeeping-work-s-sudan-despite-safety- .

20 See Smith and Boutellis, “Rethinking Force Generation.” 21 UN rules do not allow payment to a TCC to procure new equipment ahead of deployment or replace equipment that has been worn down on the job, onlyreimbursement for the estimated depreciation of already purchased equipment. In some ways this could be seen as providing an incentive for TCCs not to usetheir equipment, lest it soon need to be replaced at the TCC’s expense. Bangladesh has employed its engineering equipment throughout its deployment, yet couldostensibly receive less reimbursement because some equipment may become non-functional in the process.

www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130528/japan-expand-peacekeeping-work-s-sudan-despite-safety-


Quick deployment of enabling capabilities ispossible when there is both political will andstrategic airlift available. A recent exampleoccurred following the January 2010 earthquake inHaiti. The Japanese engineering company, alongwith its equipment, was able to deploy to Port-au-Prince within weeks, largely due to the fact thatJapan self-deployed by air (i.e., it did not rely in theUN to ship its equipment by sea) and that MOUnegotiations were worked out ex-post facto. Amilitary engineering company from South Koreawas also able to deploy rapidly to MINUSTAH,arriving shortly after the Japanese unit. Thecontrasting experience of South Korea’sengineering company (in Haiti versus SouthSudan) underlines the unpredictability of forcegeneration, something that UN leadership and theSecurity Council members must take into accountwhen planning missions.A related challenge regards long delays

importing engineering equipment. This is particu-larly challenging in the South Sudanese context.Equipment, prefabricated housing containers, andother materials have all suffered long delays eitherdue to impassable terrain or customs problems. Asnoted above, many such goods have also been stuckfor months at the Port of Sudan or the Sudanesecity of Kosti (just north of the border with South

Sudan) due to actions taken by the government ofSudan that prevented their timely release.LACK OF OPTIONS FOR SURGEENGINEERING CAPACITY

In South Sudan, the mission was unable to fill thesignificant capability gap created by the absence ofone MEC and the caveat of another. As explainedabove, this lingering gap has had enormous effectson mandate implementation, while also costing theUN financially given the resulting over-reliance onhelicopter transit. The engineering gap wentunaddressed for several reasons. An obvious one isthat the mission never actually knew when theKoreans would deploy or when the Japanese wouldlift their caveat, so mission leadership optimisti-cally continued to wait. More importantly,however, the mission was constrained by a lack offeasible contingency options to fill the gap. A 2010meeting between UN Procurement Division andDFS focused on the lack of engineering surgecapacity for peacekeeping missions. An outcome ofthis meeting was the intention of the parties todevelop a workable contract for engineering surgecapacity, something that has yet to occur. A related need for engineering surge capacity is

to allow the UN to rapidly start up (or expand)missions within ninety days of a Security Council

Japanese engineering peacekeepers serving with UNMISS upgrade Yei Road in Juba in August 2012. UNPhoto/Staton Winter.


resolution, something it has always had a hard timeaccomplishing. The most visible effort at present isthrough the “modularization” concept envisionedas part of the Department of Field Support’s GlobalField Support Strategy. As DFS puts it, “missionswill be deployed more rapidly to the field owing tothe use of predefined service packages, standardfunding models and streamlined recruitingpractices.”22 The strategy envisions the develop-ment of “a menu of modular solutions that willcombine equipment with enablers to arrive atservice packages to meet mission needs.”23 Inpractice, this would mean having the designs andmaterials to set up 1,000-, 200-, or 50-personcamps at the ready, presumably in stock at theRegional Service Center in Entebbe or the GlobalService Center in Brindisi, and a global servicecontract to ship the materials to a new missionwithin thirty days.According to DFS, three modular camps were

constructed in Mogadishu for the UN supportoffice for the African Union Mission in Somalia,but “pilots of modules as part of the UNMISS start-up in South Sudan were not carried out as a resultof regional redistribution of assets from liquidatedUNMIS and MINURCAT missions.”24 Assumingthere are stocks of materials ready to be shippedfrom Brindisi or Entebbe, the remaining obstaclesto rapidly-assembled modular camps are, first, theoften slow and complex land acquisition process;second, ground preparation; and third, having areliable, trained labor capacity to assemble thecamps. For the last two tasks the UN would needeither an MEC already deployed (or on standby)with heavy equipment and trained to put togetherprefabricated camps; or a commercially contractedvendor, or UNOPS, on a standby contract. (Analternative could be for the UN to purchase its ownheavy equipment and spare parts, stored in Brindisior Entebbe, to be used by either commerciallycontracted operators or a TCC unit of engineeringoperators).There are a few potential options (civilian and

military) for engineering surge capacity. Many ofthese options are unavailable at present to apeacekeeping mission, and still others might only

be available in the right political context. Aselection of these options and related challenges totheir effective use is described below. Military Engineering Standby SurgeCapacity

On the military side, strict troop ceilings prevent atemporary influx of military engineers duringmission start-up or when other circumstancesmake it necessary. To keep below the troop limit, amission would have to adjust its ratio of militarypersonnel (infantry versus enablers), which provesdifficult given that infantry are also sorely neededduring mission start-up. Military capability studiesare periodically conducted by UN Headquarters toassess such needs, but rarely lead to dramaticchanges in the composition of its militarycomponent. Even if they did, the process ofgenerating new, different military capabilities is along one, and the costs (political and financial)associated with rotating out certain units andequipment and rotating in different ones is signifi-cant. To shorten the force generation and deployment

timeline, the UN Standby Arrangement System(UNSAS) was created as a repository of potentiallyavailable member-state capacities on standby foruse in peacekeeping. The system has never workedas a rapid-response mechanism but rather exists asa way to induct new troop-contributing countries(via the UNSAS MOU). In its present state UNSASwould need to be wholly repurposed to be usefulfor the identification of rapid-response peace -keeping capabilities. Even when willing TCCs with engineering

capacity are identified, however, it still takes sometime to negotiate an MOU and arrange for themovement of personnel and heavy equipmentacross oceans. The ideal scenario is therefore tofind military engineering TCCs that can (and arewilling to) self-deploy. This is a very small subset ofmember states, however, given the scarcity of largetransport aircrafts available and the prohibitivecost of airlifting major equipment. If, then, militaryengineering capability were put on standby for theUN by a member state or group of member states

22 United Nations Secretary-General, Third Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the Global Field Support Strategy, December 2012, UN Doc. A/67/633.23 United Nations Secretary-General, Global Field Support Strategy, January 2010, UN Doc. A/64/633.24 United Nations Secretary-General, Third Annual Progress Report.


with self-deploying capability (or stationed inBrindisi or Entebbe in a reserve capacity), it wouldbecome an ideal start-up or surge option. TCCs that do not want to remain in a UN

mission for an indefinite period of time and preferto deploy for one year only may find a time-definedrole (a “bridging” role) attractive. There is someprecedent for this, but it involved a partnershipwith a regional organization for rapid missionstart-up. Specifically, in 2008 the European Uniondeployed a one-year-long bridging force thatinitially included a heavy engineering capability. Itthus successfully prepared a number of camp sites,which were later turned over to the UN’s secondmission in the Central African Republic and Chad(MINURCAT II). The EU force was not, of course,on standby for the UN, but it was able to rapidlydeploy. These engineering units also enjoyed otheradvantages to UN military engineers: they wereable to self-protect, and the force had no fundinglimitations for high-quality construction materials. One complication regarding standby capabilities

is that the composition of the capability and thefinancial arrangements would need to be negoti-ated in a generic context, and therefore the mix ofequipment that the unit has ready and deploys maynot be exactly what is required for a particularmission. (In one way or another, the four MECsthat provided the surge capacity to MINUSTAHafter the earthquake all had issues in this regard).Furthermore, some TCCs would want to retaincontrol over which theaters or countries theydeploy to, based on security considerations andnational interest—as is the case for most contribu-tions of military units to peacekeeping. However,should such an arrangement be agreed to withcertain engineering TCCs ahead of time (and withthe possibility of adjusting the list of equipmentsomewhat, based on the specific circumstances andterrain), it would likely be the ideal surgeengineering option. Inter-Mission Cooperation

Inter-mission cooperation (IMC) has steadily beengaining acceptance among member states as a wayto share peacekeeping assets among missions in the

same subregion when urgent needs arise. Havingone engineering battalion within a subregionsupporting multiple missions might produce costsavings and serve as a mechanism for rapid-response engineering capacity. However, IMC hasuntil now only been used in situations of potentialsecurity crises rather than for support enablers,such as engineering (the transfer of attack helicop-ters and infantry from Liberia to Côte d’Ivoireduring the 2010–2011 post-election crisis, forexample). In addition, many TCCs are still hesitantto commit their assets beyond one area ofoperation within one country, let alone acrossseveral countries. A debate on IMC was held in theSecurity Council in December 2012. One area ofcooperation cited in the meeting’s concept paperwas to achieve “efficiency gains or savings throughthe sharing or pooling of logistical, military orother assets.”25

In practice, there would need to be adequatefinancial incentives developed in exchange forcontributing a flexible asset designed for IMC orput on standby and rapidly deployed. In thisregard, in 2013 the secretary-general’s report onthe implementation of the recommendations of theSenior Advisory Group on troop reimbursementrates outlined the circumstances for a premium (upto 15 percent) to be paid for the provision of keyenabling capabilities that have been persistentlymissing in a particular mission.26 Such a premiumis a step in the right direction and might helpinfluence some countries to prepare engineeringcapabilities for UN deployment, but it is not clearat this point if the payment could be used to rewardIMC or standby contributions.Commercial

An alternative to using military engineering forsurge capacity would be to contract with a regionalor international commercial contractor—providing equipment and operators to differentUN missions. Unlike with the military capabilities,this option would not depend on finding TCCswith the political will to contribute high-qualityengineering capabilities without caveats or delay,or with the ability to self-deploy. It is also possible

25 This concept paper was drafted by the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations in its capacity as chair of the Security Council Working Group onPeacekeeping Operations and dated December 2012. It is not publically available.

26 United Nations Secretary-General, Implementation of the Report of the Senior Advisory Group on Rates of Reimbursement to Troop-Contributing Countries andOther Related Issues, January 29, 2013, UN Doc. A/67/713.

to hold commercial contractors responsiblefinancially for the quality and timeliness of theirwork (unlike TCC units). At the same time, given UN procurement rules

and timelines with processes sometimes lastingmore than twelve months for large contracts, thecommercial route for major engineering has notbeen an ideal one for missions in search of quickengineering capabilities. Rather than missionscontracting on an ad hoc basis, then, DPKO/DFSwould need to establish a global systems contract.Developing such a broad, expensive contract withone firm has also proven to be difficult given thestrictures of the UN procurement system.However, even if the Secretariat were able toestablish a global systems contract with an interna-tional construction firm, it is unlikely that the firmwould agree to operate in every environment inevery peacekeeping mission given safety concerns.27It is also unlikely that the firm would be able toguarantee deployment of its equipment to any areaof the world within an acceptable time period.

UNOPS

A related option is to engage the services ofUNOPS for surge engineering capacity. In 2010 theGeneral Assembly “reaffirmed the role of UNOPSas a central resource for the United Nations systemin procurement and contracts management as wellas in civil works and physical infrastructuredevelopment, including the related capacitydevelopment activities.”28 Although the UNSecretariat and UNOPS have had a frameworkagreement in operation since 2008, it has primarilybeen utilized in peacekeeping contexts in a limitedmanner, typically only for mine action projects.There have been ongoing discussions within theUN over the last few years regarding the possibilityof using UNOPS to fill the gaps in start-up or surgeengineering project needs to augment existingcapacity for UN peacekeeping missions. UNOPScould pre-arrange support with one or severalcommercial contractors for ground preparationwork in any new or current mission and, ifpossible, take advantage of local contractor


27 The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM at one point tried to use a firm under a systems contract with the UN, but because of security concerns thecontractor would not work in Mogadishu unless a prohibitively high premium was paid for private security.

28 At its annual 2013 session, in decision 2013/23, the executive board of UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS called on United Nations system organizations to actively seekefficiency gains through greater collaboration, taking into account the competitive advantages of UNOPS in its mandated areas of expertise: procurement,infrastructure, and project management, including provision of implementation, transactional, and management advisory services.

Members of the Brazilian engineering battalion of MINUSTAH assemble a bridge to improve access toBoucan Carré, a small village 60 kilometers north of Port-au-Prince, in October 2009. UN Photo/MarcoDormino.

capacity. UNOPS could manage the groundpreparation project and provide the labor andmanagement for the construction of modular basecamps. DPKO and DFS would be able to call onUNOPS to augment mission capacity in the start-up phase and when other projects arise that falloutside of the scope of responsibilities or availablecapacity of MECs. Despite some heads of mission urging field

support to further develop this type of operationalpartnership with UNOPS, progress at UNHeadquarters on this front has been stalled, due inpart to concerns by the UN Procurement Division.The first set of concerns centers on the differencesbetween UN Secretariat procurement rules andUNOPS procurement rules. The procedures aresimilar (both rules are based on the principles offairness and best value for money), UNOPSprocurement rules are acceptable to the UN Boardof Audit, and the results are acceptable for use bythe UN for joint procurement, according to the UNfinancial rules. However, the UN ProcurementDivision is concerned that UNOPS’ procurementrules do not include the requirement to advertiserequests for proposals internationally and tend tohave shorter bid periods. While this has the benefit(attractive to mission leaders) of facilitating quickresponses to engineering and infrastructurerequirements of the mission, this same featureconcerns some in the UN Secretariat headquarters,who think that the use of UNOPS is not thoroughenough and amounts to a bypass of well-established UN DPKO procurement rules. Bothorganizations can cite a handful of prior experi-ences working together in which the communica-tion was poor or changes to the project design orcircumstances led to sub-par results. However,there is considerable goodwill on the part ofDPKO, DFS, the engineering section, and otheroffices to use UNOPS more as a consistentimplementing partner, to augment existingcapacity, if a more streamlined and consistentmechanism for partnering can be found.

Challenges in MissionConsolidation Phase

Engineering activities for a UN field mission in asteady-state or consolidation phase are differentfrom those during mission start-up, and generallyinvolve more maintenance-type tasks (includingmaintenance of camps and supply roads) ratherthan major horizontal and vertical works related tothe preparation of sites and erection of facilities.This can allow the use of mission’s military

engineering capacities for other types of projects,including some humanitarian and developmentprojects in support of the host state and its popula-tion. Such projects are undertaken provided thatthe mission has “sufficient” or “excess” engineeringcapacity (meaning all basic mission supportengineering tasks are fulfilled), sufficient budgetand/or materials available, and that the projects fitwithin the overall mandate of the mission. However, such expanded scope of work beyond

traditional mission support roles creates a new setof challenges for the UN mission and its leadership,in terms of prioritization and tasking, the acquisi-tion of materials, the coordination of the work ofmilitary engineers with others within and outsidethe mission, and the design and execution of theprojects—including in partnership with otherorganizations. These challenges are analyzed in detail in this

section of the report using lessons from Haiti,where, following the January 2010 earthquake, thefive-year-old UN mission received an additionalfour military engineering units (in addition to thetwo it already had) and an increase in its overallbudget. But it was also given additional tasks for itsengineers (under Security Council Resolutions1927 and 201229) to assist the government of Haitiin rebuilding its infrastructure—and later inmitigating the spread of cholera. MINUSTAHtherefore became a laboratory for this “new role” ofmilitary engineering units in peacekeeping.


29 UN Security Council Resolution 1927 (June 4, 2010), UN Doc. S/RES/1927, and UN Security Council Resolution 2012 (October 14, 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/2012.Security Council Resolution 1927 recognized “the need for expanded assistance by the international community to the Government of Haiti in order to allowState institutions to continue operations, provide basic services and build State capacity, and acknowledging the valuable supporting role MINUSTAH can play inthis regard” and “encourage[d] MINUSTAH to provide logistical support and technical expertise, within available means, to assist the Government of Haiti, asrequested.”

PRIORITIZING, TASKING, ANDINTERNAL COORDINATION

One of the challenges MINUSTAH has wrestledwith since acquiring additional militaryengineering capacity has been how to make the bestand most use of it, and avoid valuable engineeringequipment sitting idle in camps when the needs areso great outside. Prioritizing

Faced with many requests for engineering andother kinds of support from UN humanitarianagencies and NGOs, as well as the government ofHaiti, MINUSTAH initially managed thesethrough its Joint Operations and Tasking Center(JOTC), which was created immediately after theearthquake (and ended in June 2012). The JOTCfunctioned as a hub for all outside requests formilitary or police assistance to the mission; itassessed and prioritized these, and then allocatedresources based on site surveys and humanitariancluster leader priorities. This mechanism enabledNGOs to remain independent from direct militaryengagement and enabled the military to managethe requests for assistance.As MINUSTAH reorganized itself and the

additional military engineering companies startedarriving, the mission created a more formalmechanism in mid-2010 to review outside requestssubmitted through the JOTC or MINUSTAH’sregional offices: the Prioritization ReviewCommittee (PRC). The PRC was chaired by themission’s chief of staff and tasked to review theserequests and advise the special representative of thesecretary-general (SRSG) on whether or not themission’s military engineering assets shouldprovide support. While both military (“U8”branch30) and civilian engineers were present on thePRC, the lack of criteria for prioritizing one projectover another, the limited knowledge of the actualmilitary engineering capacity of the mission (what itcould or could not do), and the fact that these didnot feed into a six to twelve month work plan led to

a largely ad hoc and inefficient approach, whichsometimes raised expectations of requesterswithout the mission being able to deliver afterward.While support to the government of Haiti hadbeen a mandated activity since the earthquake,mission priorities requiring engineering supporthad not been clearly laid out. The new SRSG anddirector of mission support (DMS) thereforedecided to articulate the four priority areas for themission in terms of its engineering support to thegovernment of Haiti.31

Tasking and Command & ControlArrangements

As an attempt to improve both prioritization andtasking, MINUSTAH established the MissionProject Cell (MPC) in September 2011. The MPCwas conceived of as a tool for the efficient manage-ment, planning, coordination, and tasking of themission’s military and civilian engineering“pooled” resources, according to the standardoperating procedure for the MPC issued byMINUSTAH’s Division of Mission Support inOctober 2011. The idea was to bring together themilitary and civilian engineering capacities ofMINUSTAH under one structure—pulling stafffrom the engineering section and MEC liaisonofficers—under the overall tasking authority of thedirector of mission support (DMS). The MPC wasinitially headed by a civilian consultant, with the U-8 (military engineering) chief as his deputy. According to both MPC staff and the MECs, the

MPC has contributed to better coordinationbetween military engineering companies (withheavy equipment and manpower the rest of themission lacks) and the civilian engineering sectionof the mission (which purchases and allocatesmaterials for engineering projects). One of themain achievements of the MPC has been a muchmore efficient tasking and monitoring of themission’s military engineering companies, whichled to an increase in the average utilization rate ofMECs by approximately 30 percent.32


30 The U-8 Engineering Branch was created in Force Headquarters in August 2011 to better align the mission to contribute to long-term reconstruction anddevelopment efforts within Haiti.

31 These four priorities were articulated in an internal mission memorandum dated September 30, 2011, as follows: “(1) Mitigating the effects and limiting thespread of cholera in Haiti through water treatment, well-digging and effective waste management projects; support of health services projects; (2) Ensuring safetyand security… through the implementation of street lighting projects… ; (3) Improving traffic flow through the rehabilitation of infrastructure including roads,bridges and drainage, bearing in mind that the Mission’s mandate does not allow for large scale road works… ; (4) Providing support to the GoH in efforts tostrengthen the rule of law, eg through projects to construct Tribunaux de Paix in the regions as well as infrastructural/equipment support to different GoHinstitutions in Port-au-Prince.”

32 This figure is an estimate given by MINUSTAH staff during interviews.

In MINUSTAH, the director of missionsupport—through the MPC—has tasking authorityover MECs, but the force commander (or hisdeputy) co-signs tasking orders for the units. UNcommand and control (“C2”) arrangementsformally place MECs, as military units, under theoperational command of the force commander.But in a peacekeeping context and particularlyduring a consolidation phase, MECs have becomean integral part of the overall support capacities ofthe mission rather than only a military enablingcapacity; they are therefore tasked by the supportcomponent of the mission.33 The peacekeepingmission in South Sudan (UNMISS) also givesmission support the authority for overall tasking ofMECs (through the DMS, delegated to the chiefengineering officer), as part of the mission’s overallengineering work plan.The willingness of MECs and their commanders

(and the TCC more generally) to be flexible and todo what the mission requests is always an essentialpart of the capability a unit brings to the mission. Akey tasking/C2 challenge, however, comes from thefact that some MECs occasionally undertake theirown projects, potentially outside the scope of the

mission mandate and tasking orders, thereforediverting mission engineering capabilities andcreating coherence and liability issues for themission (see the next section). Whether this issuewould be better addressed with differing commandand control arrangements is doubtful, as theproblem originates in TCC capitals and wouldneed to be addressed at the political level. Coordination Within the Mission

While the creation of the MPC improved theefficiency and focused the agenda of the MECs,some substantive sections of the mission (politicalaffairs and civil affairs) raised the need for greatercoordination between MINUSTAH engineeringworks and other activities of the mission. This wasof particular concern when the MPC first took overthe prioritization function previously held by thePRC. At that time, the MPC may have agreed tocertain projects without sufficient coordinationwith the rest of the mission. Substantive sectionswere not represented in the MPC at its inception(although the civil affairs section had been invitedto participate), which made the MPC look like apurely technical entity. In practice, the MPC’sdecisions can have significant political implications.


33 Under any exceptional circumstances, the force commander retains the ability to directly task all military enablers, including MECs.

Members of the Chilean and Brazilian contingents of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti(MINUSTAH) construct a new road to the general dump in Port-au-Prince on September 8, 2009. UNPhoto/Logan Abassi.

Internal mission coordination was strengthenedsix months after the creation of the MPC bycreating a new oversight and decision-makingbody called the Programme Implementation TaskForce (PITF) and composed of mission leader-ship—including the two deputy special representa-tives of the secretary-general (DSRSGs), the DMS,and the force commander. The PITF effectivelyreplaced the PRC and met every second month, onaverage, to discuss the projects that would costmore than $50,000. Some of the same issues thatexisted in the PRC remain, however, as this is still ademand-driven system in which the missionleadership does not always have a clear picture ofwhat the mission’s overall engineering capabilitiesare (i.e., if we undertake this road project, whatother projects are we not able to do?). Thissituation arises in part due to the absence of anoverall plan for mission projects with clearresource allocation (of MECs and budget ormaterials) that is based on mission priorities. An additional concern was that the MPC initially

intended to oversee all mission projects, includingthe civil affairs section’s quick impact projects(QIPs) and community violence reduction (CVR)projects, rather than only those involving the use ofMECs.34 Both the civil affairs and CVR sectionsobjected to this proposal, however, arguing thattheir projects were smaller in scale with already well-defined but different objectives (focused on hiringlocal labor rather than using heavy equipment), andtherefore should not be under the MPC’s purview.In the end, it was decided that the MPC wouldalmost exclusively oversee and task MEC projects,not QIP or CVR projects. In 2012, an estimated 90percent of the tasking done by the MPC concernedMECs, as they represent the bulk of the mission’sengineering capabilities, and the MPC estimatedthat 70 to 80 percent of MECs were used for projectsin support of the government of Haiti.FUNDING PROJECTS

One of the main limitations of using MECs fornon-mission support projects is that the missiondoes not necessarily have money in its budget to

purchase the construction materials required toundertake such projects. Sometimes the UNmission can purchase (through its assessed budgetor some kind of ad hoc trust fund) and providethese materials, such as gravel or laterite, to theMECs. When it is not the mission, an externalpartner (UN agency, nongovernmental organiza-tion, or the host government) may be able toprovide materials. In a few instances a TCC hasprovided its MEC with a small budget of its own(usually under its “CIMIC” budget for civil-military coordination).35 All of these fundingoptions present opportunities and challenges. Funding Projects Through the MissionBudget (Assessed Contributions)

As highlighted above, after the January 2010earthquake in Haiti MINUSTAH found itself in theunique situation of having not only extra militaryengineering capacity but also additional funds thatits new mandate allowed it to use toward non-mission support engineering projects. However,UN missions are not currently configured to dothis. The long budget cycle and slow procurementprocess for missions (projects need to be includedin the “mission acquisition plan” from the outset)require advance planning that is often not possiblefor small-scale, demand-driven engineeringprojects.36 Mission budgets are also not configuredfor the kinds of adjustments often required duringthe implementation of complicated engineeringprojects. This procurement of materials is done by the

civilian components of the mission, through thecivilian engineering section (made up of about 150international and national staff in MINUSTAH),which is responsible to UN auditors for the use ofall funds and materials. In addition, the procure-ment of materials for the MECs representsadditional work for the civilian engineering andprocurement sections, which were not compen-sated with additional capacity when the surge ofMECs arrived following the earthquake. Thecivilian engineering section therefore finds itselfstruggling to meet both mission support require-


34 This was reflected in the internal mission memorandum of September 30, 2011, which indicated that for one year, “approximately USD 22 million has beenidentified from the Mission budget, which could be broadly used in support of the GoH. This includes USD 7.5 million and a portion of USD 9 million in QIPsand CVR funding respectively, as well as USD 6 million in financial support for the six military engineering companies deployed to MINUSTAH.”

35 Every TCC/military unit deployed in a UN peacekeeping mission is required to carry out civil-military coordination, or “CIMIC,” activities under the MOU, buttheir respective CIMIC budgets vary greatly.

36 For instance, it was said that it took MINUSTAH eight months to procure a water treatment plant as part of the response to the cholera outbreak.

ments and additional MPC requests to supportoutside projects. Some mission staff continued to caution the use

of the mission budget (assessed contributions) onprojects outside of traditional mission support,despite MINUSTAH’s Security Council mandate tosupport the reconstruction effort. As one stafferput it, “If we have spent funds on materials forexternal projects, then we will suffer internally,”and “when IPSAS will kick in, it will be moredifficult to do this.”37 Leaving aside the question ofwhether assessed contributions should be used fornon-mission support projects,38 the fact thatmission support and outside projects are drawnfrom the same budget can lead to a lack of clarityon the total amount dedicated to each.As MINUSTAH entered a consolidation phase in

late 2012, its engineering capacity was reduced bytwo MECs (Japan and Korea) and the mission wasasked to cut its overall budget by $250 million(likely meaning cuts to both the civilianengineering staffing and the money available forprojects). Because of such cuts, it is unlikely thatthe MPC could continue implementing non-mission support projects at the previous level.Some have argued that the opposite approachshould be taken—that as the UN peacekeepingmission prepares to leave, instead of going back topre-earthquake levels of engineering capacities andbudget, the consolidation and drawdown phaserequires more engineering capacities (although notnecessarily military) to support national counter-parts and the UN country team in theirpeacebuilding projects.Short of a dedicated budget for non-mission

support engineering projects within the mission,MECs can support existing mission projects thathave their own budget as outlined in the exampleinvolving MINUSTAH’s community violencereduction section in box 1.Funding Projects Through Trust Funds

From a transparency and accountability stand -point, using a trust fund would help separate theassessed budget dedicated to mission support from


37 The UN’s adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) is meant to strengthen transparency and accountability in the managementof its assets and to help make more informed financial decisions.

38 The original CIVCAP report called for “flexibility for missions to undertake programmatic tasks” using its assessed budget.

Box 1. Military engineering support toMINUSTAH’s community violence reductionsectionOne positive example of synergies between asubstantive section of a peacekeeping missionand its military engineers is MINUSTAH’s“Wharf Jérémie” project. The communityviolence reduction (CVR) section ofMINUSTAH is the only substantive section torun its own trust fund, which received anincrease in its budget from $3 million to $14million after the earthquake. While all CVRprojects are aimed at involving local communi-ties and hiring and training local labor, in thiscase the section needed MINUSTAH’s MECsand their heavy equipment to help with theclearing of ravines and sewage, and for installingsolar panel for street lights (which CVR hadpurchased). The use of machines was only asmall part of the project, however, as CVR alsohired many members of the community andensured follow-up afterward in terms of thesocial impact and sustainability of the project. This was a win-win situation as it helped

improve the image of MINUSTAH military staffin these communities (where MINUSTAH alsocarries out robust operations against criminalgangs, in support of the Haitian police), at smallexpense to the mission budget. As one CVR staffmember put it, “not using military engineeringcapability would be mismanagement, becausethe mission already has it available.”Unlike the mission’s engineering projects,

CVR plans all of its projects well in advance,obligating funds the first year and completingthe projects the following year. Each CVRproject proposal is reviewed by the ProjectAppraisal Committee composed of the heads ofmost of MINUSTAH’s substantive sections(and subsequently approved by the SRSG, aftermodifications if necessary) to increasecoherence and impact.

the (more voluntary) funding dedicated to projectsin support of the government and UN agencies.Peacekeeping mission trust funds are rare inpractice, however. UN missions are not necessarilywell configured to manage such trust funds, in partdue to the overhead charged for voluntary contri-butions to mission trust funds (which is beingharmonized with UN agencies, from 13 percentdown to 7 percent), as well as the fact that the trustfunds do not come with the procurement and othersupport staff to manage such additional budgets.Trust funds for peacekeeping missions are rare alsobecause member-state donors tend to prefer to givedirectly to UN agencies or NGOs, rather than a UNpeacekeeping mission, which they’ve already givenmoney to as part of their assessed contributions tothe peacekeeping budget. Some member states alsobelieve that these kinds of projects should becompletely managed and implemented by develop-ment professionals, rather than a UN peacekeepingmission, which should be focused more on politicsand security. Funding Projects with TCC Money

While all contingents serving in peacekeeping areasked to undertake modest CIMIC activities attheir own expense, a few contingents and MECscome to the mission with considerable additionalresources. They may decide to use their ownresources to purchase materials to undertakelarger-scale projects, such as the building of aschool or a clinic. This was the case for MECs fromJapan and the Republic of Korea in bothMINUSTAH and UNMISS. The South KoreanMEC had recently arrived in UNMISS with anannual CIMIC budget of $1 million, while theJapanese MEC brought an accompanying supportelement with a separate office in Juba tasked withliaising with the South Sudanese government onprojects. While these budgets can be used topurchase materials toward engineering projects,such projects can be undertaken outside of theframework of the UN mission. In so doing, theycould represent a diversion of mission resources, asthe MECs are not necessarily supporting the workof the mission while committed to other bilateralworks.

Partnering with UN Agencies forProjects

Given the challenges highlighted above, partner-ships with UN agencies, the host government, orNGOs—in which the partners fund the projects—isoften the ideal scenario for leveraging MECs fornon-mission support projects.39 Such partnershipsare in many ways a win-win situation for all parties. MECs have a niche capacity, and they can have a

multiplier effect by contributing heavy equipment(with equipment operators) for short, targetedperiods of time. The partners would otherwise haveto contract or rent the equipment at very high costsand with delays, provided such capacities are evenavailable locally. In this situation, the UN agency orNGO brings not only the materials needed but alsothe project management expertise; procurement;flexible modalities and tested systems to hire (andpay) local labor;40 and the ability to monitor andevaluate projects during and after—to ensure somelevel of sustainability. In addition, some of theseUN agencies and NGOs bring a longstandingrelationship with government counterparts andlocal communities, which the UN mission does notnecessarily have due to its shorter lifetime. The benefits of such a partnership are well

illustrated by the collaboration betweenMINUSTAH MECs and UNOPS on infrastructureprojects in Haiti. According to UNOPS, on oneproject (detailed in box 2), the support of the MECsallowed it to save about 40–45 percent of theproject budget and to reinvest that money intohiring more local labor. Overall, the estimatedmonetary value of MINUSTAH’s in-kind contribu-tion to UNOPS projects since 2008 is nearly $1.5million, not including the land preparation for theconstruction of the Gonaives DepartmentalHospital (at negligible additional cost to themission, since it was paying for the personnel andequipment regardless and did not have criticalmission support needs to attend to in the last twoyears). MINUSTAH has also supported UNOPS attimes with security—military escorts, site surveil-lance, etc.—that has enabled it to operate in higherrisk areas of Port-au-Prince, such as Cité Soleil andMartissant. Similarly, UNDP indicated that it saved


39 The MPC eventually decided only to accept requests from UN agencies (including UNOPS and UNDP), IOM, and OCHA, but not direct requests from NGOs. 40 UN agencies have more flexible payment terms and can pay local labor on a daily basis. In contrast, UN missions can only employ local labor under “individualcontractor” (IC) contracts, which require a more complex hiring process and for which costs are much higher for the mission.

time and about $50,000 thanks to MINUSTAHMEC land preparation for a project building amaritime base for the Haitian Coast Guard, whichMINUSTAH is also supporting with training.

MINUSTAH partnerships with UN agencies orNGOs are implemented under the framework of anMOU, which is developed on an ad hoc basis foreach individual project. This has created unneces-sary delays due to the need for each organization toconsult with their respective legal services beforesigning such an MOU.41 In the case of the abovementioned 16/6 Project, for instance, MINUSTAH

and UNOPS had to enter a new MOU for each newsub-project (each individual road). While suchformal agreement may be needed to provideclearance on a case-by-case basis for partnershipson projects with non-UN entities, such as NGOs,an umbrella agreement between missions and UNagencies to facilitate partnership would save timeand money.There are many examples of successful win-win

partnerships between the mission and the UNagencies; yet, not all projects supported byMINUSTAH MECs present obvious added valuefor the mission. With high demand for such MECsupport, missions must establish—and stick to—clear priorities and decision-making processes forthe use of these important enablers.RISK OF UNDERMINING THE LOCALCOMMERCIAL MARKET

The risk of MECs doing work that could be done bythe local commercial market is often brought up asan issue of concern, including by member statesthat have raised the issue of the possible crowdingout of local contractors by MINUSTAH. However,this concern is misplaced in Haiti, particularly inlight of the immense needs and the lack ofappropriate Haitian contractors. Commercialcontractors—whether Haitian or international—bid to implement Haiti’s larger infrastructureprojects (main roads and larger buildings), whichare outside the scope of the capabilities and themandate of MINUSTAH’s MECs. The January2010 earthquake damaged the capacity of Haitiancommercial contractors. At the time, it wasestimated that with the existing heavy equipmentalready in country, it would take ten years to clearthe rubble. But 80 percent of the debris had alreadybeen removed by the end of 2012, due in part to theinflux of heavy equipment that came with commer-cial contractors—mostly from the DominicanRepublic and the United States. These internationalcontractors represent a much bigger threat to localHaitian markets than the MINUSTAH MECs,which provide short-term and small-scale supportto UN agencies, NGOs, and the government ofHaiti, and, in essence, are deployed to support themilitary activities as their primary task.


41 For instance, one UNDP staff member indicated they may have to pull out of a joint project with MINUSTAH (helping with land preparation and installingprefabricated buildings purchased by UNDP) in support of the Ministry of Justice due to delays in finalizing an MOU between MINUSTAH, the Ministry ofJustice, and UNDP.

Box 2. UNOPS contribution to “16/6 Project”gets multiplied thanks to MINUSTAH MECsThe 16/6 Project aims to rehabilitate and rebuildsixteen neighborhoods that were seriouslyaffected by the earthquake in Haiti, therebyfacilitating the return of 5,000 families living insix camps for internally displaced persons. It is agovernment of Haiti project, supported by theUnited Nations (UNDP, UNOPS, OIM, andILO). As part of this project, UNOPS designedand built earthquake-proof houses and roadsusing labor from local communities. However,the building of roads required land preparationthat only heavy equipment could do, whichwould have needed to be leased at high cost,using limited project funds.UNOPS therefore called on MINUSTAH

MECs for assistance with their machine to crushgravel and heavy equipment to prepare the landwhere concrete roads would then be built usinglocal labor, supervised by UNOPS. On oneproject, this brought the cost down from$900,000 to $500,000, allowing UNOPS toreinvest the $400,000 to hire more labor onbuilding more roads. UNOPS said that onaverage, MINUSTAH MECs support allowed itto save 40–45 percent on such projects. Inreturn, the participation of MECs in suchcommunity projects could also contribute toimproving MINUSTAH’s image amongHaitians.

With that said, UN missions could be moreconscious of the need to work with and build thecapacities of the local commercial market. This is,however, more of an issue with UN procurementrules and procedures than with militaryengineering companies per se. These concerns havebeen raised repeatedly, including in the 2011civilian capacity (CIVCAP) report, whichrecommended that “United Nations procurementrules should be revised so that they prioritizenational capacities and leverage local expertise andcomparative advantage where possible.”42 This hasnot yet happened. Based on UN procurement rules,procurement staff in the missions are not able toprioritize local procurement. However, in manymissions, chief procurement officers have ledoutreach in the local market to help explain thebidding process to local contractors and increasetheir capacity to bid on and win UN contractsthrough the normal procurement procedure. COORDINATING WITH AND BUILDINGTHE CAPACITY OF THE GOVERNMENT

The consent of the host country is one of the keyprinciples of UN peacekeeping, and adequate

collaboration and coordination with nationalauthorities is always a factor of success. In thecontext of military engineering, this means bothensuring that projects undertaken are in line withgovernment priorities and that consideration isgiven to the government’s capacities to sustain suchprojects once the UN mission departs. Coordination with the Government ofHaiti

A first issue in terms of coordinating infrastructureprojects with a host government is that coordina-tion between a UN mission and the governmenthappens at many different levels (mission leader-ship, support, and substantive sections—civilaffairs, justice, etc.), including for some projectsinvolving engineering-related works. It can happenthat an SRSG or another member of missionleadership may agree with a government official onsome kind of UN engineering support for a project,without having consulted the engineering section.In MINUSTAH, the vision for the MPC is that itwould become a central point of contact for theHaitian government’s Ministry of Public Works forengineering-related matters. Others in the mission,


42 Senior Advisory Group, “Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group,” February 22, 2011, UN Doc.A/65/747–S/2011/85, p. 39.

Following the destruction of the Haitian Parliament in the January 2010 earthquake, constructionworkers build a temporary Haitian Parliament facility with funds from MINUSTAH in March 2011. UNPhoto/Logan Abassi.

however, pointed to the risk that engineeringwould then become a “third leg” of the mission—instead of remaining a support function—andbelieved that the civil affairs section should remainthe focal point with local authorities. Finalizing MOUs with the government for

specific projects has led to considerable delays.MINUSTAH is therefore trying to formalize itsrelationship with the government for engineeringprojects through umbrella MOUs. For instance, aspart of the mission’s support to the government inmitigating the effects of cholera, it is finalizing anMOU with the Haitian National Directorate forWater Supply and Sanitation (DINEPA) in theMinistry of Public Works, so that DINEPA will beable to use four MINUSTAH water drilling units. The Haitian Minister of Public Works privately

expressed his frustration with the mission,lamenting the absence of “one person” inMINUSTAH who would be the counterpart for allinfrastructure projects. This appeared to be a recentissue resulting from several factors: frequent changesin government personnel,43 the halting of regularcoordination meetings at the ministry (with allinternational partners, the UN, and NGOs), the lackof a replacement for the head of the MPC, and thefact that MINUSTAH may have at times undertakenprojects with local authorities directly without goingthrough the central ministry. UNOPS, on the otherhand, had a much more established relationship, inpart because a branch of the UNOPS office is co-located within the Ministry of Public Works. One key issue with making MECs available to the

host government is that it can easily l ead tounreasonable expectations, given the specificcapacities and tasking orders of MECs. Forinstance, although MINUSTAH had an asphaltplant, horizontal MECs only have the capacity tobuild limited portions of two-lane roads, whereascommercial contractors are needed for the four-lane roads requested by the government. Anotherpotential risk is that the more the UN does in termsof infrastructure development, the less the govern-ment takes on (regardless of the capacity and fundsit has). This could limit its experience in developing

the systems and management to implement suchprojects after the UN’s departure.Capacity Building

One of the key issues raised by the Haitian govern-ment has been its desire for the UN to do capacitybuilding as part of its engineering support, both forthe government itself but also for Haitian commer-cial companies. The government was particularlygrateful for the Japanese MEC that worked with theHaitian Ministry of Public Works toward the endof its deployment. The Japanese engineers trainedfifty Haitians selected by the ministry to operatetheir heavy machinery, and it subsequentlydonated fourteen pieces of engineering equipmentto the ministry for its own use. Japan also leftbehind a number of spare parts for the machines. On a smaller scale, upon withdrawal, the Korean

MEC donated their base in Leogane, includinggenerators, to the Haitian government (specifically,to the Haitian police, stipulating that the base notbe used for military purposes). Ecuador (which alsocontributes an MEC to MINUSTAH, jointly withChile and Peru) also runs a capacity-buildingprogram in support of the government, but this isoutside the framework of MINUSTAH, with theobjective of creating a Haitian MEC should therebe a Haitian army in the future.44 A few Haitianengineers are currently undergoing training inEcuador for one year while the operators are beingtrained in Haiti.There is no question that such heavy equipment

and training are much needed in a country likeHaiti. The minister, for instance, indicated thatwhen he took office he found that 85 percent of theheavy equipment of the state-owned NationalEquip ment Center (CNE)45 was no longer func -tional. The above capacity-building examples were,however, the initiative of individual TCCs ratherthan a specific, coordinated effort by MINUSTAHtogether with the MECs to build the engineeringcapacity of the government. Also, there are somequestions as to how the donated equipment will beused by the government and whether it will findenough funds for fuel and proper maintenance.


43 For instance, the recent change of minister of environment affected the finalizing of the above-mentioned MOU with DINEPA.44 See Arthur Boutellis, “What Army for Haiti?,” New York: International Peace Institute, November 2011, available at www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/340-what-army-for-haiti.html .

45 The former Préval government had created the CNE (National Equipment Center) to build and maintain local roads, as a way to bypass the Ministry of PublicWorks, by making it respond directly to the presidency.

www.ipinst.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/340-what-army-for-haiti.html

46 This is an estimated cost that includes reimbursements for troops, gear and equipment, personal weaponry and ammunition, the “specialist allowance,”allowances paid to troops in the field, major equipment, self-sustainment, rations, water, rotation costs, use of medical facilities, field defense, and fuel. However,the final cost will likely be higher given the recent agreement in the General Assembly to adjust troop reimbursement rates.

With better coordination between the UN andTCCs, the impact of such training and donation ofequipment could be amplified in the future. Suchgenerous donations from TCCs would also save theUN the costs associated with repatriating heavyengineering equipment back to the TCC’s capital.(The UN shipped the Korean engineering equip -ment from Haiti to Korea, only then to deploy muchof the same equipment to South Sudan a few monthslater when Korea deployed its MEC to UNMISS).

Cross-Cutting EngineeringChallenges

COSTS AND BENEFITS: MILITARYVERSUS CIVILIAN ENGINEERINGCAPACITIES

Although the overall costs of engineering in UNpeacekeeping is an important issue, it is a complexone, and no comprehensive cost-benefit analysishas yet been done to compare differing engineeringcapacities. The cost of a military engineeringcompany varies significantly, depending on the sizeof the unit and the type and quantity of major

equipment it brings. Roughly, it can go from $6million per year for a 175-person company to $10million for a full 275-person HMEC.46 (See theannex for a full breakdown of these costs.)However, for many reasons it would be misleadingto try to do a generic comparison of the costs of anMEC to a civilian contractor with similar capaci-ties. Although MEC costs are relatively straightfor-ward, there are no generic contractor rates to usefor comparison. Costs vary widely from place toplace and from time to time. Relative benefits arealso hard to quantify given the differences amongTCCs in terms of their capabilities. Contractors canalso vary greatly in their quality and reliability. Inaddition, the benefits to the mission’s image ofusing its military in a visible and constructive wayare also difficult to measure. In the end, thedecision between using military or civilian capaci-ties for engineering must be made contextually,depending on available commercial and militarycapacities and prevailing commercial rates. Military engineering companies form the

backbone of any UN mission’s overall engineeringcapabilities. However, given the military engi -


Brazilian military engineers with MINUSTAH use dump trucks to dispose of the debris from their formerbase in Bel Air, Port-au-Prince, in February 2010. The base collapsed in the January 2010 earthquake,killing seventeen Brazilian peacekeepers. UN Photo/Sophia Paris.

neering capability gaps that can arise early in amission, options for using commercial engineeringcapacities are always explored at the onset of themission to fill the short-term gaps and take onprojects too small or otherwise ill-suited formilitary engineering. Such capacities also comewith their own set of constraints and could never beseen as a panacea for early mission capability gaps.Strict UN procurement rules and long procure-ment timelines, as well as the challenge of findingcontractors that are cost-effective, reliable, andwilling to work in insecure environments, are allissues that limit UN missions’ ability to usecommercial engineering. Such capacities also comewith their own set of constraints and could never beseen as a panacea for early mission capability gaps.Strict UN procurement rules centralize decisionmaking on large contracts and use processes that,while effective in limiting corruption, do not facili-tate quick action in the field. As mentioned above,contracts that exceed $50,000 in value can take upto twelve months to finalize. (It must be said thatsome of the prolonged procurement timelines haveto do with expertise and coordination problems in

the field, not just with headquarters delays). Withsome exceptions, this makes the use of commercialcapacities to fill urgent engineering needs problem-atic. The other side of the coin is the limitations ofthe commercial heavy engineering marketplace. InSouth Sudan, there was no available capacity in thelocal market, and regional contractors have provenunreliable at times or unwilling to work (at areasonable price) in the least safe areas of thecountry. In part because of the difficulty of accurately

comparing military and civilian costs and benefits,during the initial stages of mission planning the idealcomposition of engineering capacities of a mission isnot typically analyzed in depth (i.e., what are thetotal engineering needs, and how much militaryversus civilian capacities are required?). Yet,understanding the costs and benefits is all the moreimportant in a time of financial austerity. Mostmission support staff agree that it is better to haveMECs than not to have them, of course. If themission were to get fewer MECs, they believe itwould probably not get increased budget and


Pros Cons

• MEC capacities are accurately known (orquickly become known).

• MECs have their own heavy equipment that hasalready been transported to the mission area.

• The mission can support MECs with additionalUN-owned or rented equipment.

• Procuring materials, although it may take timeunder UN rules and regulations, tends to befaster for the UN mission than doing largecommercial contracts (because of UN rules andregulations).

• MECs supervise their own work (whereascommercial contracts require supervision byUN civilian engineers).

• MECs can carry out work in places wherecommercial companies would refuse to gobecause of security issues and/or the fact thatthe project would not be profitable.

• MECs working on infrastructure projects canbenefit the image of the mission (and themilitary) in the host country.

• Short rotations (if six months long, only four ofthose months operational) can limit MECsoverall capacity by 25–33 percent.

• TCC caveats can significantly limit overall MECcapabilities.

• It is difficult to adjust the composition of theunit and equipment list if needs on the groundchange (requires MOU revision anddifficult/costly transport process).

• MECs only do smaller infrastructure projects,and the MECs can take longer than an experi-enced commercial contractor to complete aproject.

• MECs can lack flexibility and require newtasking orders when different, additional work isrequired.

• MECs are not responsible for any defects on theproject afterward, whereas commercial contrac-tors provide a warranty on the project aftercompletion and can be financially penalized.

• MECs are fully paid even when underutilized.

Table 2. Pros and cons of MECs (relative to commercial contractors)

civilian engineering capacities to compensate. Atleast with a mission support structure designedaround MECs, there is a reasonable assurance thatthe mission will—even during budget cuts—haveheavy equipment and operators available. See table 2for a list of considerations when comparingcommercial and military engineering capacities.COST, THE LENGTH OF DEPLOYMENTS,AND SHORT ROTATIONS

A key issue that reduces the capacity of MECs andincreases their costs are the short rotations (sixmonths for many MECs) and in some cases shortoverall deployment periods (two years, forinstance). As detailed in table 3, the cost of theinitial deployment and later of repatriation of anMEC are very high (about $2 million). Shortermission deployment periods make such fixed costsa large part of the annual cost of the unit. Thesecosts can be mitigated if a TCC donates someequipment to the host country (as described abovewith Japan in Haiti) or redeploys its equipmentdirectly from one UN mission to another if it is stillin good working condition. National Support Elements (NSEs) are equip -

ment and personnel that the TCC decides to bringwith a unit in addition to what is agreed to in itsMOU with the UN—to strengthen it withadditional administration and managementcapacities or for managing CIMIC activities.47NSEsare not included in the MOU with a TCC andtherefore are not reimbursed by the UN. Whilethese NSEs should not, in theory, be an additional

burden to the mission, there can be someadditional, hidden costs to the mission associatedwith their use of common UN facilities, and theyincrease the general footprint of the UN in the hostcountry.The relatively short rotation time for most MECs

(usually six months, although all units should soonmove to twelve-month rotation periods) increasescosts, but most importantly reduces the efficiencyof that unit. According to MEC staff, it takes themone month after arrival to become fully operationaland one month at the end of a rotation to preparefor departure. An MEC with six-month rotationswould therefore only be fully operational for eightof the twelve months of the year. This discontinuitycan also affect the ability of an MEC to carry outlonger projects. Extending the length of rotations for MECs and

for other military units was recommended by theSenior Advisory Group (SAG) on rates ofreimbursement to troop-contributing countriesand other related issues, and endorsed by the FifthCommittee in May 2013 (although with certainexemptions). The SAG report recommended that“in the interest of effective peacekeeping… thetypical rotation period be set at 12 months, exceptin cases where the Secretary-General determinesthat operational circumstances and requirementsdemand otherwise.” The subsequent report of theFifth Committee delayed enforcement of thisprovision until June 2015 for “individual unitscurrently deployed with rotation periods shorterthan 12 months” and for naval forces.48

MOBILITY AND FORCE PROTECTION

The manual for contingent-owned equipment, aswell as standard MOUs between the UN and TCCs,states that all peacekeeping contingents—includingMECs—need to be self-sustained for six monthsupon arrival in the mission during their initialdeployment, “with integral support and mainte-nance elements, to sustain its operations at thepermanent and temporary deployed locations.” Butit also states that after those six months, the UNmission is obligated to provide the contingentswith hard-wall accommodation. Constructing


Table 3. Cost of a one-time deploymentof a 175-person engineering company

Activity CostPainting/repainting $284,373Self-provisioning $127,238Deployment of equipment $500,000Repatriation of equipment $500,000Deployment of personnel $309,111Repatriation of personnel $278,244Total $1,998,966

47 For instance, the Korean MEC in MINUSTAH was running its own clinic, which also provided basic health services to Haitians from the community.48 “Report of the Senior Advisory Group on Rates of Reimbursement to Troop-Contributing Countries and Other Related Issues,” November 15, 2012, UN Doc.A/C.5/67/10, paras. 53 and 108(b), and “Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Report of theFifth Committee,” May 6, 2013, UN Doc. A/67/858, paras. 4–7.


hard-wall accommodation in every location wherea unit is deployed is resource-intensive for the UNmission, and the rule is largely a relic of traditionalpeacekeeping missions with static deployments,rather than contemporary missions that requiremobile and dynamic deployments. The hard-wall rule, but also the strict interpreta-

tion by TCCs of the “area of operation” provisionof each MOU, considerably limits the ability of themission to move contingents around, based onevolving needs in the mission area. This is particu-larly problematic when a new base needs to be setup and MECs are needed for site preparation. InUNMISS, the mission could not get an MEC in oneregion to deploy for a short period to work inJonglei, for instance (where the mission waswaiting for the arrival of the Korean MEC).Force Protection

The fact that MECs can ensure their own protec-tion is often put forward as one of their mainadvantages over civilian engineers or commercialcontractors, which both require additional forceprotection. The force requirements agreed to byeach contributing country state that all personnelin the MEC must have their own defense weapons,such as pistols, sub-machineguns, and/orautomatic assault rifles, and be able to protectthemselves (usually in up to three locations). Inpractice, however, most MECs still request force

protection by another unit (infantry unit or formedpolice unit) when operating outside of theimmediate vicinity of the UN camps. MECs alsorequire additional force protection when movingequipment from one location to another. With that said, even if not fully able to protect

themselves, MECs will usually be able to operate inriskier locations than UN civilians and commercialcontractors (see box 3). Of course, for a highenough price, a contractor can always be found.But the UN mission, host governments, and UNagencies cannot usually afford such a premium.THE RIGHT MIX OF CAPABILITIES ANDTHE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY

In the absence of codified standards for MECs,different TCCs bring very different capabilities toUN missions, as well as different ways of working. The issue of the optimal mix of equipment is a

challenging one, because the needs of a mission willvary depending on the tasks required and theterrain in the area of operation. In addition, theneeds change during the lifecycle of a mission. InMINUSTAH, the Brazilian MEC indicated thateven though all its personnel were working atalmost full capacity, it was only using about 45–50percent of its machines on a daily basis—mostlydump trucks, bulldozers, excavators, loaders, andcranes. Its asphalt plant, compacter, and mixer areless frequently used. Similarly, in UNMISS, supportstaff complained that the size of the dump trucksprovided by the MECs was too small, leading toadditional costs and delays. However, changing thecomposition of an MEC requires lengthy renegoti-ation with little incentive for the TCC to respond.And because it is typically costly to move heavyequipment, equipment lists and MEC compositionare rarely adjusted in the course of a mission,despite capability gaps or changing needs.Tasking Flexibility

Another issue, which is not unique to MECs andapplies to most military units in peacekeepingmissions, is the need for a TCC to display flexibilityand willingness to take on any job its unit is taskedwith—even tasks that are not typically performedby its military back at home. In MINUSTAH, forinstance, one MEC reportedly refused to carry outcertain tasks, which it considered too basic, such asusing its trucks for garbage removal. In contrast,another MEC was highly praised by mission

Box 3. MINUSTAH military engineers helpbuild midwifery school in Cité SoleilThe United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)in Haiti requested the support of MINUSTAHMECs for a joint project with the HaitianMinistry of Health located at the maternityhospital in Cité Soleil, a dangerous area in Port-au-Prince. The project consisted of rebuildingHaiti’s only midwifery school (destroyed duringthe earthquake) in a neighborhood where nocommercial contractor would work due to thesecurity situation in the area. During the time itwas doing site preparation and erecting prefab-ricated classrooms, the presence ofMINUSTAH’s Brazilian MEC allowed UNFPAto do its work in the adjacent maternity wardand, importantly, put a stop to ongoing nightlyattacks perpetrated against the women insidethe maternity ward.

leaders and government officials for being adaptiveand flexible in its activities.STRATEGIC MISSION PLANNING

The limited duration of peacekeeping missionmandates and budget cycles affects the ability ofUN civilian and military planners to do strategicplanning for engineering. In Haiti, for instance,some agencies plan projects for the next threeyears, which makes it possible to fundraise, allocateresources, hire staff, and develop coordinationmechanisms with the government. In contrast,MINUSTAH only has a one-year mandate andbudget, and both could change from one year to thenext. Even with such limitations, it is clear that UN

peacekeeping missions should be able to do a betterjob of developing a strategic plan for the use oftheir engineering assets. There is a need to shiftfrom a demand-driven approach (based on ad hocrequests coming from government and outsideactors) to a forward-looking planning culture. InMINUSTAH, an annual mission engineeringmaster plan, including mission support tasks andnon-mission support projects, would allow better

budgeting (and procurement) planning. Thiswould in turn facilitate more efficient tasking ofMECs over their deployment time and inaccordance with their capacities (e.g., heavyequipment). It would help prevent MECs beingtasked with activities that others (civilianengineers, local companies, etc.) could easily do(such as erecting prefabricated buildings) orgetting distracted with other non-mission activi-ties, such as CIMIC activities. In the case of UNMISS, better planning would

have accounted for the enormous (and oftenforeseeable) challenges of the start-up phase andthe gaps in the mission’s military engineeringcapabilities. Interviews with mission staff madeclear the large and continuing gulf between whatthe substantive side of the mission would like toaccomplish and what the support side believes ispossible given present limitations (e.g., funding,MEC capabilities, environment/terrain). Previousmission plans proved to be too ambitious in thisregard and led to unrealistic expectations on thepart of the host government and the internationalcommunity.


Start-up Consolidation phase

• Preparation of camp sites and rehabili-tation of supply roads are high missionpriorities.

• Great need for horizontal MECs(supported by LFEs in infantry units).

• Civilian engineering units needed tosupport erection of camps and self-sustainment.

• Most self-sustainment can be done bycivilian engineering units (andengineering elements within infantryunits).

Mission supportneeds

• MECs provide contingency capacity foruse during natural disasters andrefugee crises.

• MEC mission support projects canserve dual functions in assisting hostgovernment in the extension of stateauthority (e.g., UNMISS CSBs).

• Depending on mission mandate, host-government priorities require support.

• Partnerships with UN Agencies neededto ramp up peacebuilding effort.

• Need for horizontal MECs (and well-drilling in some contexts).

Non-missionsupport projects

Table 4. Priority engineering needs in different mission phases

Recommendations

The following recommendations are intended asways to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness ofUN peace operations in their use of engineeringcapacities. 1. Develop rapid start-up or surge engineering

capacities.Despite the continued existence of debilitatingengineering gaps in UN missions, there is presentlyno rapid start-up or surge engineering capacityavailable, although several potential options exist.DPKO and DFS should look to develop all of theseoptions for the future:• DFS should fully implement its vision forrapidly-assembled modular camps, including sitepreparation and required construction manage-ment elements (with or without militaryengineering capacities) as part of the Global FieldSupport Strategy, and assess it based on the fewtrial experiences so far.

• Procurement Division and DFS should renewefforts to develop a workable global systemscontract for commercial engineering start-upcapacities.

• DPKO and DFS should engage in targeted,strategic outreach to member states or groups ofmember states to find TCCs with self-deployingcapacity that would be willing and able to deploy

military engineering capacities either as part of orin parallel to a UN mission start up or surge. Asspecialized capacities in high demand and lowsupply, standby engineering capabilities shouldbe paid a premium during their first twelvemonths of deployment.

• DPKO and DFS should also further explore withmember states the possibility of including MECsas part of inter-mission cooperation (IMC)arrangements, as an alternative to standbyengineering capabilities.

• DPKO and DFS should develop a genericpartnership agreement with UNOPS to augmentcapacity in start-up or surge engineering projectneeds for UN peacekeeping missions, whererelevant.

Over the last decade, overall accountabilitythroughout the UN peacekeeping procurementchain has been enhanced. However, concernsabout delays in the DPKO/DFS procurementprocesses are increasingly frequent among missionstaff and within the UN Procurement Division inNew York. Procurement delays can have a signifi-cant effect on overall mission capability, impactingits ability to fulfill its mandate in a timely manneror respond efficiently to emerging needs.• A thorough review of the procurement systemfor UN peacekeeping should be conducted withan eye toward reducing roadblocks and, perhaps,increasing the procurement authority of the field.


Box 4. A Brazilian asphalt plant for MINUSTAHA Brazilian MEC first deployed to MINUSTAH in 2005 with 150 troops, and it increased to 250 troops in2008. During the MOU negotiation, Brazil offered to provide an asphalt plant as part of its MEC, which isnot standard equipment for an MEC in a UN peacekeeping mission. The plant made it possible forMINUSTAH MECs to participate in the bouche-trous campaign—a government-sponsored project fillingpotholes in the streets of Port-au-Prince—and may have contributed to improving the image of the mission.However, the asphalt plant has functioned at very low capacity because it requires the mission to buyexpensive asphalt (approximately $50,000 per one kilometer of road) and because it cannot transportasphalt outside of Port-au-Prince. (For one project, the Inter-American Development Bank purchased theasphalt for the MEC.) In addition, the government of Haiti tends to favor roads made of concrete or adoquin (paving) because

they last longer in Haiti’s heavy rains. MINUSTAH road projects consist mostly in the rehabilitation of “dirtroads” because it does not have the capacity to carry out large multilane projects. Some intervieweestherefore believed that such an asphalt plant is not needed in MINUSTAH, unlike a crusher plant (toproduce sand and gravel), which has been more useful to the work of this MEC as well as other MECs in themission.

2. Better integrate engineering requirementsinto mission planning.

Planning for a new mission does not adequatelytake into account the size and importance ofengineering needs during the start-up phase. • Troop ceilings should be higher during a missionstart-up phase to address the increasedengineering needs during that period. An early“engineering surge” would have brought signifi-cant cost savings in UNMISS and, moreimportantly, allowed the mission to fullyimplement its peacekeeping and peacebuildingsupport mandate during the critical earlypostconflict window of opportunity.

• In cases where the environmental and terrainchallenges are formidable, force requirements fora mission should give higher priority toengineering capabilities for the first twelvemonths in lieu of higher troop ceilings. (Thisshould include both full engineering companiesand light field engineering capacities embeddedwithin infantry battalions that can be rotated outand replaced with infantry at a later stage).

During the initial stages of mission planning, theideal composition of overall engineering capacitiesof a mission is not typically analyzed in-depth (i.e.,what the total engineering needs are and how muchmilitary versus civilian capacities are requiredbased on terrain, availability of local contractors,etc.). • DPKO and DFS should carry out a study tocompare the costs and benefits of military capaci-ties relative to available commercial capacities indifferent missions.

• Greater efforts should be made by DPKO andDFS together to come to a better understandingof the available engineering options early onduring the planning phase for a new mission.

Delayed deployments and TCC caveats severelyaffect all aspects of a mission’s ability to implementits mandate. Too often, politics intervenes duringTCC selection and capability requirements becomea lesser priority.• DPKO should not get “locked-in” by anengineering pledge if a TCC has uncertaindeployment timelines. Mission planning shouldalways include contingencies for the late arrivalof TCC engineering units (and/or their contin-

gent-owned equipment).• DPKO should reject TCC engineering pledgesthat include significant operational caveats. Themost prized aspect of an MEC’s overall capabilityis its flexibility and willingness to take on any jobits unit is tasked with. MECs should have moreflexible tasking orders from their capitals,allowing mission leaders to utilize them moreefficiently and effectively.

• Whenever possible, and assuming the equipmentis still functional, DPKO and DFS should worktogether with TCCs upon their withdrawal toredeploy their equipment directly from one UNmission to another if possible, rather thansending it back to the TCC capital and then toanother mission.

3. Adapt to changing needs in the missionconsolidation phase.

Despite the emergence of a specific capability gapor changing needs on the ground, equipment listsand MEC composition are rarely adjusted in thecourse of a mission. Changing the composition ofan MEC requires a lengthy MOU renegotiationwith little incentive for the TCC to respondpositively. And it is, of course, costly for the UN tomove heavy equipment from a mission to a TCCcapital and back. However, it is often worth theprice in order to adapt to the changing needs of themission. • Military capability studies undertaken in amission should regularly include an assessmentof the appropriateness of the mission’s militaryengineering capacities. TCC flexibility inadapting their contingent-owned equipment as aresult of these assessments should be encouragedand positively acknowledged by the UN.

In the mission consolidation phase, UNpeacekeeping missions should be able to do a betterjob of developing a strategic plan for the use of itsengineering assets, in part to avoid valuableengineering equipment sitting idle in camps whenthe needs are so great outside. There is a need toshift from a reactive, demand-driven approach(based on ad hoc requests coming from govern-ment and outside actors) to a forward-lookingplanning culture. • The development of annual mission engineeringplans would facilitate this more strategicapproach, including in terms of budgetary


provisions for construction materials in supportof engineering projects.

• This also implies that authority for overalltasking of MECs should reside with the directorof mission support (DMS), as part of themission’s overall engineering work plan, even ascommand and control (“C2”) arrangementsformally place MECs under the forcecommander. This would allow for better coordi-nation with the civilian engineering componentof the mission, which purchases and allocatesmaterials for projects.

• It is essential that substantive sections (such asthe civil affairs and political affairs sections) beconsulted throughout the development andimplementation of an engineering work plan,particularly when they involve non-missionsupport projects that can have significantpolitical implications.

• If and when a mission is mandated to undertakenon-mission support engineering projects, adedicated budget (separate from the assessedbudget) can provide greater transparency andflexibility. However, such trust funds require thatthe mission be provided with additional procure-ment and other support staff to manage thesesupplementary budgets.

4. Create win-win partnerships to addressengineering needs beyond the mission.

UN missions receive many demands from UNagencies, host governments, and others for MECsupport. Partnerships with UN agencies, the hostgovernment, or NGOs—where the partners fundthe projects—is often the ideal scenario forleveraging MECs for non-mission support projects.Such partnerships present many advantages andare in many ways a win-win situation for all parties. • Missions must develop—and stick to—clearpriorities and decision-making processes for theuse of these important enablers based on their

mandate, mission support priorities, and overallengineering capabilities. Mission leadership(SRSG, DSRSGs, force commander, and policecommissioner) also needs to be better educatedon the possibilities and limits in the use ofmilitary engineering capabilities and the differ-ences between military and civilian engineering.

• Peacekeeping missions and UN agencies shoulddevelop an umbrella agreement or standardizedMOU for the use of the mission’s engineeringcapacities. This would facilitate more productivepartnerships, save a significant amount of time,and lead to cost savings.

5. Build local engineering and private-sectorcapacity for additional peace dividends.

Based on UN procurement rules, procurement staffin the missions are not able to prioritize localprocurement, which has led to a lost opportunityfor producing valuable peace dividends. • As the 2011 civilian capacity report recom -mended, “United Nations procurement rulesshould be revised so that they prioritize nationalcapacities and leverage local expertise andcomparative advantage where possible.”49

• Mission procurement officers should be encour-aged to continue their outreach in the localmarket to help explain the bidding process tolocal contractors and enhance their capacity tobid on and win UN contracts through the normalprocurement procedure.

• Host countries would benefit if militaryengineering companies would engage in moretraining of local engineers as part of their CIMICactivities. Costs to the UN would also be reducedif a TCC donated (still functioning) equipmentand spare parts to the host country upon itswithdrawal (as described above with Japan inHaiti). Such contributions to the host countryshould receive public acknowledgment from theUN.


49 Senior Advisory Group, “Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict,” p. 39.

34

Annex

The Cost of Military Engineering Companies

Troop reimbursement (including specialist allowance) represents 25–35 percent of the monthly cost of anMEC, whereas reimbursement for major equipment (or contingent-owned equipment) represents 20–25percent of the total.

Major additional costs include self-sustainment (i.e., food, including fresh food and rations; bottled water; andaccoutrements), fuel, and the cost of rotating staff in and out, which is usually spread over a period of a fewmonths to ensure that the whole unit does not rotate at the same time and that there is a handover with theincoming unit.

Fuel costs vary a lot, of course, depending on the size of the unit and quantity of equipment and machines, butalso depending on the utilization rate of these units. For instance, in MINUSTAH after the January 2010earthquake, the six MECs cost approximately $40–60 million a year in troop and COE reimbursement, whichis within the average cost of an MEC. However, the mission spent a lot more than average on fuel because theMPC was tasking the MECs heavily (and the mission had the budget to pay for it, at least initially), sometimesspending over $50,000 per month—double the average—on fuel for one MEC.

Table 5. Monthly cost of MEC reimbursements

Cost Number of Troop cost Specialist allowance Major equipment personnel per unit ($1,028/month) ($303 for 25% of (COE) troop strength) reimbursement

Average 212 $218,000 $16,064 $133,762

Lowest 70 $71,960 $4,526 $56,747

Highest 335 $344,380 $25,376 $221,226

Table 6. Monthly cost of MEC self-sustainment, fuel, and rotations

Cost Number of Self-sustainment Fuel Rotations personnel per unit (food, rations, water, etc.)

Average 212 $86,386 $24,458 $63,619

Lowest 70 $27,412 $1,354 $21,000

Highest 335 $135,545 $40,159 $100,500

Table 7. Overall monthly and annual cost of an MEC (excluding materials)

Cost Number of Monthly cost Annual cost personnel per unit

Average 212 $661,345 $7.9 million

Lowest 70 $304,106 $3.65 million

Highest 335 $1,055,261 $12.66 million

ANNEX 35

These costs do not account for the purchase of materials needed for most engineering projects supported byMECs. While in some cases such materials are provided for free or at low cost from the host government (e.g.,gravel and sand in Haiti) or through a partnership with a UN agency, in other cases the host governmentcharges for it (e.g., South Sudan). Other materials simply have to be purchased by the mission because they arenot readily available. These additional costs are currently very difficult to estimate—for example, in the case ofMINUSTAH such materials were purchased in bulk by the mission for both mission support and projectpurposes, using the assessed budget.

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The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,

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more than twenty nationalities. It has offices facing United Nations

Headquarters in New York and offices in Vienna and Manama. IPI is

dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts

between and within states by strengthening international peace

and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix

of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.

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