energy transition in the power sector in europe: state of ... · 4.4 changes to nuclear generation...

Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016 Review on the Developments in 2016 and Outlook on 2017

*RES-Share of Gross Electricity Generation

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ANALYSIS

Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016

IMPRINT

ANALYSIS

Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016

Review on the Developments in 2016 and Out-look on 2017

AN ANALYSIS BY

Sandbag40 Bermondsey Street | London, SE1 3UD

Agora EnergiewendeAnna-Louisa-Karsch-Straße 2 | 10178 Berlin

Dave Jones

Mara Marthe Kleiner

Matthias Buck

Dr. Patrick Graichen

Contact: [email protected] [email protected]

106/03-A-2017/EN

Publication: January 2017

Typesetting: Juliane FranzCover: Own illustration

Please cite as:

Agora Energiewende and Sandbag (2017): Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016. Review on the Developments in 2016 and Outlook on 2017.

www.sandbag.org.uk

www.agora-energiewende.de

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Gas replaced coal, and hence European power sector emissions fell drastically by 4.5 %. Eu-ropean coal generation fell by 94 TWh and gas generation increased by 101 TWh, resulting in 48 Mt less CO2 emitted. Half of this happened in the UK, but also Italy, Netherlands, Germany and Greece saw switching from coal to gas. However, gas generation was far from reaching a record – it is still 168 TWh below the 2010 level, showing that more coal-gas switching is possi-ble without new infrastructure.

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4The structural oversupply of the EU-ETS has passed the landmark of 3 billion tonnes of CO2, as 2016 added another 255 million tonnes CO2. The reason is that ETS emissions are structurally below the cap – mocking the concept of a “cap-and-trade” system. To play a meaningful role in EU climate policy, the EU ETS needs to be fundamentally repaired.

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Electricity consumption rises slightly by 0.5 %, with European GDP rising by 1.7 %. Only two countries saw falls in electricity consumption in 2016, most had modest increases. Investment going into energy efficiency is apparently sufficient to prevent electricity consumption from ris-ing but not enough for electricity consumption to begin structurally falling.

Renewables increased only slightly from 29.2 % to 29.6 % of the electricity mix, mainly due to bad solar and wind conditions. Radical price falls give hope for future growth. Solar and wind conditions were generally below average in 2016, compared to well above average in 2015. However, with new capacity installed, overall generation still saw small increases. As to prices, 2016 saw record low renewables auction results with only 49,9 Euros/MWh for wind offshore and 53,8 Euros/MWh for solar, both in Denmark.

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The outlook for 2017 is for further big falls in fossil generation – but whether this is coal or gas is uncertain. 2016 gave a glimpse of the rapid falls in emissions that are possible with de-creased coal production. But a coherent European policy approach to continually increasing renewables and to a just transition in the context of a coal phase-out is needed to ensure that the CO2 reductions of 2016 are continued into the future.

Preface

Dear reader,

the energy transition – the transformation of the power sector from a fossil-based to a decarbonised world with renewables at the centre – is a joint Eu-ropean project. The power sector will play a crucial role in attaining the European climate targets, which aim to cut greenhouse gases by at least 40 percent by 2030 compared to 1990.

For this analysis, Sandbag and Agora Energiewende joined forces and present the state of affairs in the European power sector in 2016: Where are we co-ming from? Where do we stand today? Key topics include power generation, power consumption, CO2

emissions and prices. Overall, it is clear that the cur-rent power system is not yet fully equipped to deal with the main challenges ahead: securing power sup-ply at a reasonable price with as little emissions as possible. However, Europe is on the right path: almost 30 percent of the electricity produced already comes from renewable energy sources.

We hope you enjoy the reading!Kind regards

Patrick Graichen Director Agora EnergiewendeDave Jones Carbon & Power Analyst Sandbag

Key findings

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Agora Energiewende | Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016

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Inhalt1 Summary of changes in 2016 versus 2015 5

2 Efficiency gains only cover economic growth 9

3 Renewables growth was below trend; but rapid price falls give hope for future growth 11 3.1 New installations in 2016 13 3.2 Falls in renewables prices 13 3.3 Renewables generation in 2016 13 3.4 Growth by country 17

4 Power from conventionals 2016: The big shift from coal to gas 19 4.1 Coal closures 22 4.2 UK’s carbon price support 22 4.3 Temporary coal-gas switching 23 4.4 Changes to nuclear generation 23

5 Electricity interconnectors helped to keep grid secure 25

6 Power sector CO2 emissions fell by 4.5 percent in 2016 29

7 Outlook 33

8 Annex 35 8.1 Data 35 8.2 Methodology 36


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ANALYSIS | Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016

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1 Summary of changes in 2016 versus 2015

In the following, we show what we think are the three most important graphics from the report. Figure 1 shows the changes by fuel type in Europe. Key as-pects are very small changes in renewable generation in 2016, a huge fall in coal generation offset by a huge rise in gas generation, and a fall in nuclear generation.

Figure 2 shows the overall European electricity mix. Largest contribution of power came from renewa-bles, followed by nuclear, gas, hard coal and lig-nite. Most striking changes can be seen among gas and coal – gas increased its share from 15.5 percent to 18.6 percent while coal’s share dropped from 24.6 percent to 21.6 percent.

Figure 3 shows the power production by source since 2010. Most remarkably: despite the rapid rise in gas generation for the second year in a row, gas genera-tion is still 168 Terawatt hours below levels in 2010. Factors driving the observed changes are explained in subsequent section of this report.

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Changes in gross electricity generation and consumption 2015 to 2016 Figure 1

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Nuclear26,9%

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Generation mix in 2015 and 2016 Figure 2

Own calculations

Agora Energiewende | Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016 ANALYSIS | Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2016

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Power generation since 2010–2016 Figure 3

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Electricity consumption increased by 0.5 percent in 2016, falling in only two countries – in Germany and Italy. It is the second year in a row that electricity consumption has increased, now being back at 2013 levels. But that does not mean the trend is up – 2014 was, after all, the mildest year on record. Over the last six years, European real GDP has grown by 7 percent, and European electricity consumption has fallen by 3 percent – see figure 4.

Even across countries, electricity consumption seems quite unchanged throughout this decade. Although electricity consumption seems to be growing in eas-

tern European countries and falling in western and southern European countries, the changes have been small – see figure 5. Poland and Bulgaria saw the fas-test increases but only averaged 1 percent per year; Italy, Sweden and UK saw the biggest falls but only averaging 1 percent per year.

So, while it seems there is sufficient energy effi-ciency happening to keep overall European electri-city consumption from rising significantly, it does not look like electricity consumption is structurally falling. The pick-up in the economy apparently does not increase energy efficiency investment to the level

2 Efficiency gains only cover economic growth

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Electricity consumption and gross domestic product of the EU Figure 4

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needed for reaching European efficiency targets. In order to compensate the increase in power consump-tion due to electrification of transport, heating and cooling, a renewed focus on energy efficiency is nee-ded.1

1 It is worth mentioning a caveat: Although the data used for this report is the best publically available, the data quality is far from perfect. Specifically looking at small ch-anges in electricity consumption can be subject to errors, because of the proportional effect of the data errors, and of annual weather patterns impacting electricity consumpti-on.

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Change in Electricity Consumption from 2010 to 2016 Figure 5

Own calculations


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Renewables generation pauses for breath after a bumper 2015, rising from 29.2 percent to 29.6 percent of all electricity generated2. Solar and wind conditions were generally below average in 2016, compared to well above average in 2015, which led to the huge jump in 2015, and the low growth in 2016. Because of the poorer weather con-ditions, it was perhaps a surprise that new capacity installations were still sufficient to enable renewa-ble generation to slightly rise.

2 Figures are slightly different from EUROSTAT’s official reporting of renewables electricity, which use “normalised hydro”. Here, non-normalised data is used.

The installation rate of new renewables was behind trend. Wind installations in 2016 probably did not beat last year’s record but was in line with the 2010–2015 average. Solar installations hit the 100 Gigawatt landmark in 2016, but new installations were lower than 2015. Biomass also slowed significantly: bio-mass generation, which is less impacted by weather than solar and wind, saw its generation increase by only three Terawatt hours in 2016, compared to an average 11 Terawatt hours increase in 2010–2015.

3 Renewables growth was below trend; but rapid price falls give hope for future growth

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Renewables share of gross electricity production Figure 6



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3.1 New installations in 2016

Wind: Up to now, no official estimates on wind capa-city additions have been published for 2016. German installations fell from 6.0 Gigawatt in 2015 to 5 Giga-watt in 2016, so we assume that European-wide capacity additions will not hit the records of 2015, in which 12.8 Gigawatt were installed. However, the 2016 additions will be in line with the high levels of the past six years in which 10–12 Gigawatt were in-stalled annually.

The biggest change in 2016 is the pick-up of wind offshore investment. According to data by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, in total 25.8 billion dollar was invested in European offshore wind. The outlook is also promising on future offshore wind, with Ger-many planning to deploy an average 730 Megawatt a year up to 2030, the UK having made a political com-mitment to install one Gigawatt a year in the 2020s and the Netherlands deploying 700 Megawatt a year up to 2020. 3

Solar: Europe celebrated hitting a major landmark in 2016, with 100 Gigawatt now installed. In 2016, new solar installations fell slightly – from 8.2 Gigawatt in 2015 to around 7.3 Gigawatt, as estimated by Solar-Power Europe in June4. The fall is mostly due to the abrupt end to the UK’s subsidies for solar. This is well below the record for new installation of 23 Gigawatt set in 2011, and only just above half the 2010 to 2015 average of 13 Gigawatts per year. SolarPower Europe believe that growth will pick up again from 2017, but there remains a large difference between their low and high scenario even to 2020. Globally, solar capa-city installations set a record: 70 Gigawatt in 2016, 17 Gigawatts more than in 2015. 5

3 See BNEF 2017: https://about.bnef.com/blog/record- 30bn-year-offshore-wind-overall-investment/

4 See page 30 of SolarPower Europe’s Global Market Outlook

5 See BNEF 2017: https://about.bnef.com/blog/record- 30bn-year-offshore-wind-overall-investment/

3.2 Falls in renewables prices

Offshore wind: Many observers were stunned at the huge declines in prices for offshore wind, which more than halved in price in 2016. In 2015, the best price signed for offshore wind was 103 Euros/MWh (Vattenfall’s Horns Rev 3). In 2016, new records were constantly beaten, until November when Vattenfall signed for Denmark’s Kriegers Flak at an incredible 49.9 Euros/MWh (before grid connection of around 5 Euro/MWh).

Solar: German solar auctions prices fell by 14 percent in 2016. They fell from 80 Euros/MWh in the Decem-ber 2015 auction to 69 Euros/MWh in the Decem-ber 2016 auction. Most stunningly, the cross-border German-Danish auction in December 2016 cleared at only 54 Euros/MWh.6 SolarPower Europe calculated, that when you adjust the German prices for increa-sed sunshine, the price would fall to 45 Euros/MWh in Madrid and Athens7. Elsewhere in the world, new records have also been seen, with Masdar and Abu Dhabi auctions both clearing at around an incredible 25 dollar/MWh.

Solar panel prices fell aggressively by 30 percent across 2016, mostly at the end of the year, signalling even more power price declines are yet to come.

3.3 Renewables generation in 2016

The generation from renewables (excluding hydro) increased by 11 Terawatt hours in 2016, compared to an incredible 72 Terawatt hours increase in 2015 – see figure 8. The renewable generation increases have averaged 51 Terawatt hours per year from 2010 to 2016.

6 Since all of this was won by one Danish investor, specific circumstances might have yielded this result. However, this does not alter the overall trend.

7 See page 37 of SolarPower Europe’s Global Market Outlook


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Solar and wind conditions were generally below average in 2016, compared to well above average in 2015. Because of the poorer weather conditions, it was perhaps a surprise that new capacity installa-tions were still sufficient to even enable an over-all increase in renewable generation. All renewable sources recorded very small increases in gene-ration compared to 2015: wind by 1 percent, so-lar by 4 percent, biomass by 1 percent, and hydro by 2 percent.

The changes since 2010 are dramatic. Wind genera-tion has doubled from 150 Terawatt hours in 2010 to 306 Terawatt hours in 2016, solar generation has ne-arly quadrupled from 23 Terawatt hours to 114 Tera-watt hours, and biomass has increased 44 percent from 130 Terawatt hours to 188 Terawatt hours.

This is shown by country in figure 9 and 10 below. Biomass generation growth has slowed dramatically in 2016, see figure 11.

Hydro power production varies throughout the years according to the rain conditions. Hydro recorded in-creases after the drought in 2015 across the Iberian peninsular, although this was offset by dry Nordic conditions – see figure 12.

Nearly three quarters of the so-called “new renewab-les” (i. e. excl. hydro) were produced in only six coun-tries – see figure 13. Germany was the main contri-butor (28 percent), followed by the UK (13 percent), Spain and Italy (11 percent each), France (6 percent) and Sweden (4 percent).

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3.4 Growth by country

It is useful to recap how far Europe has come since 2010. Renewables increased from 20 percent to 30 percent of the electricity mix from 2010 to 2016 – a rise of 10 percentage points (pp) for Europe in total. However, this change has been very uneven by country.

Denmark saw the best growth of 25 percentage points, followed by Lithuania and, perhaps sur-prisingly for many, the UK was in third place with 17 percentage points. Germany and Greece both came in at 14 percentage points increase. Some of the worst performers were surprisingly western Euro-pean countries – Netherlands at 2 pp, Austria at 4 pp, France and Belgium at 5 percentage points.

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Increase of the share of Renewables in the electricity mix 2010–2016 (in percentage points) Figure 14

Own calculations;


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The biggest change in the European electricity sys-tem in 2016 was a large shift from coal generation to gas generation, reducing coal generation by 94 Tera-watt hours (12 percent) and increasing gas genera-tion by 101 Terawatt hours (20 percent). This, alone, led to European power sector CO2 emissions falling by 4.5 percent, to 1018 Mt CO2, due to gas being less carbon-intensive than coal. Non-CO2 pollutants would have fallen even more aggressively, since the difference between coal and gas is even larger for non-CO2 pollutants than for CO2.

Coal generation fell by 12 percent, from 788 Tera-watt hours to 694 Terawatt hours, reducing its share of the European electricity mix from 24.6 percent of

the electricity mix to 21.6 percent. Of the 94 Terawatt hour fall in coal generation, 4/5th of it was hard coal generation falling, and only 1/5th of it was lignite ge-neration falling. Half this change happened in the UK, where wind generation exceeded coal generation in 2016 for the first time.

Gas generation increased by 20 percent, from 497 Terawatt hours to 598 Terawatt hours, increa-sing its share of the European electricity mix from 15.5 percent of the electricity mix to 18.6 percent. This was the second year in a row gas generation in Eu-rope has risen, after four consecutive years of losses, as renewable generation has increased – see figure 17. However, despite this increase in 2015 and 2016,

4 Power from conventionals 2016: The big shift from coal to gas

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gas generation was still 168 Terawatt hours below that in 2010. In addition, even after the 12 percent fall in coal generation in 2016, coal has still suffered less from renewables than gas generation – having fallen 125 Terawatt hours since 2010, compared to 168 Tera-watt hours for gas. It is clear that the opportunity exists for a further shift from coal to gas generation without needing to build any new power stations or upstream infrastructure.

Figure 19 shows where the coal-gas changes hap-pened. Half of the coal-gas switch happened in the UK, which was due to coal plant closures and the in-crease in carbon price support. Spanish coal fell early in 2016 as hydro levels returned to normal; French gas generation increased aggressively in late 2016 because of widespread nuclear outages. Germany and Netherlands had a temporary coal-gas switch

because gas became cheaper than coal in August, September and October 2016. Greek gas generation took market share from lignite because of a lower gas price and the removal of a tax on gas in June. Italy saw a big change too.

We can split this coal-gas-switch roughly into four reasons, which by coincidence are about evenly split:

→ a quarter is from closures of 8 Gigawatt of old coal plants, mostly in the UK.

→ a quarter is from permanent coal-gas switching from the UK’s carbon price support

→ a quarter is from temporary coal-gas switching outside the UK because of low gas prices

→ a quarter is from factors related to one-off changes in nuclear and hydro generation 2016.

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Change of electricity production since 2010 Figure 18



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4.1 Coal closures

There was 8 Gigawatt of coal plant that closed in 2016.

→ 4.9 Gigawatt in UK: Longannet, Ferrybridge and Rugeley, mostly in March 2016. In addition, Drax unit 3 converted to biomass.

→ 1.6 Gigawatt in Netherlands: Amer 8, Borssele 12 and Gelderland closed end 2015.

→ 0.6 Gigawatt in Italy: Vado Ligure units 3 and 4 closed.

→ 0.6 Gigawatt in Belgium: Langerlo closed. → 0.6 Gigawatt in Germany: 392 Megawatt of lig-nite moved into the reserve (Buschhaus), and 284 Mega—watt of hard coal closed.

→ 0.2 Gigawatt in Poland: Two Tauron 110 MW units closed (Lagisza B5 and Siersza B5)

4.2 UK’s carbon price support

In April 2015, the UK’s carbon price support dou-bled to 18 pound/tonne of CO2, on top of the EU-ETS price, which means the power price must pay around 30 Euros/tonne for , compared to the EU-ETS price of around 5 Euros/tonne. This 30 Euros/tonne is suffi-cient to cause near-permanent switching of the merit order; in the UK, gas price needs to be at a high level before coal can compete with gas.

Although the price change was in April 2015, the impact was mostly felt in 2016, because coal power plants in 2015 had planned high levels of coal burn, and due to high coal deliveries and coal stocks that they could not unwind, they had to generate in 2015, despite the negative economics. This effect did not last to 2016, leading to a significant reduction in po-wer production of coal.

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TWh

Coal (Hard Coal + Lignite) Gas

Changes in power generation of gas and coal from 2015 to 2016 Figure 19



23

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Jan

15

Feb

15

Mar

15

Apr

15

May

15

Jun

15

Jul 1

5

Aug

15

Sep

15

Oct

15

Nov

15

Dec

15

Jan

16

Feb

16

Mar

16

Apr

16

May

16

Jun

16

Jul 1

6

Aug

16

Sep

16

Oct

16

Nov

16

Dec

16

2015 2016

EUR

/MW

h_el

Hard coal (old 35%)

Gas (CCGT; old, 50%)

Hard coal (old, 41%)

Gas (CCGT; old, 55%)

Hard coal (new 45%)

Gas (CCGT; new, 58%)

Marginal costs of standard-type power plants 2015 and 2016 Figure 20

Worldbank 2017; Bundesbank 2017, UBA 2015, DEhSt 2017, own calculations

4.3 Temporary coal-gas switching

Coal and gas prices were very volatile during 2016. Gas price fell very rapidly in Q1-2016, bringing the costs of coal-gas generation close throughout all of 2016, compared to 2015 when gas generation held a significant premium to coal throughout the year – see figure 20.

From April 2016, the coal-gas prices came close for the rest of the year, leading to some coal-gas swit-ching. However, the biggest price advantage, which led to the biggest switching was in August, September and October.

4.4 Changes to nuclear generation

The biggest changes happened in French nuclear generation, which fell by 33 Terawatt hours due to significant outages. This happened from July through to December – see figure 21. One-third of the nuclear shortfall was made up from increased French gas ge-neration, and two-thirds resulted in less exports to Belgium, UK and Germany. 8

There were other changes in nuclear generation, see figure 22. Both Belgium nuclear reactors came back online, increasing Belgium nuclear generation by 17 Terawatt hours. German nuclear generation fell in H1-2016, resulting from Grafenrheinfeld’s closure in Q3-2015. Sweden had a rather average year in 2016 after a poor year in 2015.

8 The next chapter analyses the change in electricity flows in 2016.


24

429 442 426 424 437 438 405

143 110 101 99 99 9487

62 69 70 71 64 7172

58 60 64 66 65 5763

62 58 62 57 57 5758

167 171 163 164 159 146 159

921 911 887 881 881 863 845

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*

Pow

er g

ener

atio

n (T

Wh)

France Germany UK Sweden Spain Other

Nuclear production 2010–2016: European total and top five countries Figure 22


-2

3

-5

3

-1 0

0

8

-28

3

25

-2

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro Imports Consumption

TWh

Jan-Jun Jul-Dec

Changes in French power production 2016 Figure 21


25

There were some interesting changes in electricity flows in 2016; however, most were just one-off ch-anges. France exported less electricity to Germany, Belgium and the UK because of its nuclear outages. German set another record for electricity exports, because of the French nuclear problems and a dry Nordic year (although there were substantially less exports to Netherlands because of return of the Bel-gium nuclear reactors).9

There was a severe increase in electricity prices in some countries in Q4-2016, because of the French nuclear problems and because of the UK coal plant closures, as there was limited capacity left in these countries – see figure 24. ENTSO-E communicated in their Winter Outlook that there was sufficient capa-city in neighbouring countries to avoid a security of supply incident.

However, that did not stop the market seeing large price increases. Power prices rose up in France and UK, but also in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and Switzerland – see figure 25. This created a large di-vision across Europe, with Germany, Poland and the Nordic region seeing much lower prices.

9 A note on data: we have assumed there is seven Terawatt hours flowing between Italy and Austria which are not re-ported in ENTSO-E. Otherwise, the ENTSO-E flows would be substantially different from national data, which would make no sense.

5 Electricity interconnectors helped to keep grid secure


26

Physical electricity flows in TWh Figure 23

ENTSO-E 2017

GE45 | 49

ES-5 | -13

PT-2 | 5

PL0 | -2

FR59 | 37

UK-21 | -18

NO14 | 15

SE22 | 12

FI-16 | -19

RU5 | 8

IT-44 | -42

AT-2 | -2

CH-8 | -4

IE-1 | 0

CZ

EE1 | 2

LV-2 | -1

LT-7 | -8

RU

GR-10 | -9

HR-8 | -6

HU-14 | -13

0 | 1

-2 | -3

RO7 | 5

BU2 | -1SE

1 | 1

AL-1 | 0

B&A2 | 4

UK4 | 4

ME

MK

NL-9 | -5

-21 | -6

DK-6 | -5

RS

BE2 | 1

TU3 | 1

17 | 15

4 | 6

4

2

1 | 1

0 | 0

2 | 1

24 | 16

17 | 6

8 | 8

1 | 0

1

8

0 | 1

0 | 0

2 | 1

1 | 0

2 | 1

2 | 1

3 | 1

3 | 3

1 | 1

3 | 7

0 | 3

11 | 8

11 | 6

5 | 3

13 | 11

2

5

14 |

12

0 | 1

10 | 9

10 | 8

1 | 1

1 | 1

1 | 2

6 | 43 | 2

2 | 15

| 24

| 3

5 | 4

5 | 3

9 | 7

1 | 1

1 | 1

1 | 1

4 | 4

0 |

0

4 | 2

5 | 5

6 |

4

2 2 2 | 1

7 | 8

11 |

153 | 2

12 |

10

12 |

7

3 | 3

5 | 3

2 | 2

6 | 6

25 | 20

0 | 1

2 | 2

14 |

10

2 | 3

0 |

1

0 |

0SV

13 | 11 SK

BE

M

2015 2016

Displayed are net physical

flows between countries´.


27

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Mon

thly

ave

rage

day

-ahe

ad p

rices

(E

UR

/MW

h)

IT

CH

ES

PT

UK

BE

FR

NL

PL

DE-AT

Nordpool

Day-ahead prices in selected European countries Figure 24

EEX 2017, EPEX 2017, APX 2017, OMEL 2017, GME 2017, PGE 2017, Nordpool 2017


28

Average day-ahead power prices in Europe in Q4 2016 Figure 25

EEX 2017, EPEX 2017, APX 2017, OMEL 2017, GME 2017, PGE 2017, Nordpool 2017

38

5656

37

60

60

35

56

58

41

58

2015 2016


29

We estimate last year’s power sector emissions have fallen by 4.5 percent – down 48 million tonnes from 1066 million tonnes in 2015 to 1018 million ton-nes in 2016. The reasons for this is the large co-al-gas switch discussed earlier in this document. For non-power ETS emissions, Sandbag forecast a slight fall of 1 million tonnes – this assumes that industry continues to show little structural abatement, and that the massive 30 percent fall in UK steel produc-tion is offset by rises in cement production reported in Germany and Greece.

This means our forecast for total 2016 EU emissions covered by the emissions trading scheme is to fall by

2.7 percent from 1803 million tonnes to 1754 mil-lion tonnes. This is significantly above our forecast in summer 2016 of 1718 million tonnes; not all the emis-sions reductions we forecasted happened because of the significant French nuclear outages and a low Q4 wind speeds, which both resulted in significantly more fossil generation than we anticipated.

This would mean that in the last four years, ETS emissions have fallen at an average of 3.0 percent per year – see figure 26 – but with a big difference between the power sector and non-power sector. The power sector fell by 4.5 percent per year, and the non-power sector fell by 0.7 percent per year.

6 Power sector CO2 emissions fell by 4.5 percent in 2016

-2.0

% -1.3

%

-1.7

%

-0.5

%

-4.1

%

-1.9

%

-5.1

%

-1.9

%

-3.8

%

-7.8

%

-0.5

%

-5.0

%

-0.8

%

-0.4

%

-0.6

%

-4.5

%

-0.1

%

-2.7

%

-9%

-8%

-7%

-6%

-5%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

Power Non-power Total EU-ETS

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*

Changes of EU ETS emissions (stationary sources) 2011–2016 Figure 26



30

902

443

896

829

406

7648

28

429

80

0845

388

790

88

8

338

758

856

309

74379

1

283

74078

0

286

737

691

327

736

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Coal power Other Power Non-power

Mt

CO2

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*

ETS emissions from coal, other power and non-power sectors 2008–2016 Figure 27

1904

1814 18021754

1500

1600

1700

1800

1900

2000

2100

2200

2013 2014 2015 2016* 2017 2018 2019 2020

Mt

CO2

Actual EU-ETS emissions Cap

-

-

9%

11%

Sandbag forecast: 1754 Mt CO2

ETS cap 2013–2020 and actual emissions 2013–2016 Figure 28



31

The fall in EU-ETS emissions has been accelerating specifically because of the rapid fall in coal power emissions – see figure 27. Despite these falls, coal po-wer emissions will still be 40 percent of all EU-ETS emissions in 2016. Therefore, to understand the EU-ETS, one must understand coal generation. However, also, 2016 will be the first year ever that coal power emissions will have fallen below non-power sector emissions, with non-power emissions expecting to have fallen just 1 percent in three years.

This means emissions are falling faster than the cap – see figure 28. In 2013, emissions were 9 percent be-low the cap, creating a structural surplus. By 2016, emissions were 11 percent below the cap. This means the structural surplus will have increased by around 255 million tonnes in 2016 alone.

The EU ETS surplus in the market shrunk in 2016, from about 1.8 billion tonnes to 1.7 billion tonnes. This is because not all supply is coming to market, because of back-loading of certificates into the market stabi-lity reserve, partial cessations and not issuing all new entrant reserve. However, as long as there is no rule that would permanently cancel surplus certificates from the market stability reserve, these certificates currently held back will one day enter the market.

Therefore, the structural surplus in the EU ETS is get-ting bigger every year; the cap is just so much higher than actual emissions. In 2016, this surplus has in-creased to above 3 billion tonnes for the first time – see figure 29.

-34220

508

966

1763

2088 20671785

1656

69

377

682

1137

1877

2186

26722902

3157

-500

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016*

Mt

CO2

Cumulative Surplus currently available to market Cumulative Surplus relative to cap

ETS surplus 2008–2016 Figure 29



32


33

The outlook on consumption is for continued stag-nation, until there is a big successful push on energy efficiency to ensure that economic growth increases efficiency investments. The European Commission is forecasting EU GDP growth of 1.5 percent in 2017 and 1.7 percent in 2018, with growth higher in eastern European countries10 – if this is not met by additional efforts in efficiency and clean power production in those countries, this could mean rising emissions in power production in Eastern Europe.

The outlook on renewables is mixed – in 2017, we would expect the level of installations to be at least as

10 See EC’s Autumn Forecast http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2016_autumn_forecast_en.htm

high as in 2016 as EU Member States seek to achieve their respective 2020 renewable energy targets. Price falls, especially in solar and offshore wind, give con-fidence of continued renewables build. The aver-age 2011 to 2016 renewables generation growth was 51 Terawatt hours per year; it seems reasonable to assume this going forward. However, post 2020, no reliable EU renewables framework exists nor is pro-posed to ensure that the EU’s 2030 renewables target is met, which could drive new investments in clean power throughout Europe. The more we approach 2020, the more the future of renewables in Europe becomes uncertain.

The outlook for fossil generation is bleak. Fossil ge-neration should fall by at least 70 Terawatt hours in

7 Outlook32

6

344

347

333

325

324

308

494

497

545

528

474

464

386

766

704

586

511

461

497

598

1,734 1,6791,611

1,4941,379 1,404 1,408

1,338 1,296 1,255 1,204

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* 2017 2018 2019 2020

TWh

Lignite Hard coal Gas Other fossil Total fossil

Fossil power production 2010-2016 and projected total fossil production 2017-2020 Figure 30



34

2017, due to a return to normalised French nuclear generation, a return to normalised wind and solar conditions and new renewables. Then it will continue to fall to 2020, with the continued addition of more renewable capacity. The less predictable factor is whether the fall in fossil generation will be coal or gas. This would be most driven by two factors: closures of old coal plants, and the coal-gas switching price.

Coal power plants amounting to 7 Gigawatt have an-nounced to close in 2017-2020, representing less than 5 percent of the European coal fleet. In Germany, some 2.5 Gigawatt of hard coal will come offline in 2017 and 2.4 Gigawatt of lignite will further go into reserve by October 2019 (of which 0.6 Gigawatt in 2017). In the Netherlands, one Gigawatt at Maasvlakte 1 + 2 must close, covering very small units in Poland, Romania, Spain, Croatia and Italy. Closing 5 percent of the coal fleet over the next four years will do little to change overall emissions. However, more coal plants will likely announce to close, given the vast over-ca-pacity in many countries still.

On the coal-gas-price-switch, two factors could lead to gas power plants becoming cheaper than coal:

→ First, global LNG oversupply could lead to gas prices to crash again, as new Australian gas in 2017 floods the market, which caused the coal-gas swit-ching in 2016. However, although this may hap-pen, it is hard to see this as permanent, especially with the costs of coal extraction so low and the coal market once again returning to oversupply.

→ Second, a higher carbon price. It is clear from the UK that a 30 Euro/tonne carbon price would lead to a near-complete hard coal-gas switching. Howe-ver, even if the ETS reforms voted by the European Parliament‘s environment committee in Decem-ber 2016 were adopted by the Parliament and the Council, it is unlikely that this would raise the carbon price by much. The reason is the structural oversupply, as described in the chapter above.

Regarding European energy policy, 2017 will see the beginning of the legislative procedure on the “Clean Energy for All Europeans”-package of proposals and possibly finalization of further reforms of the EU ETS and the effort-sharing decision. Thus, energy policy is back on the agenda in Europe 2017 – covering the whole range of policies from energy efficiency, re-newables, power market design and climate policy instruments.

Absent much more drastic reforms, the enormous and ever-growing emissions surplus in the ETS suggests prices for emissions allowances will not have a sig-nificant effect on power market investments at least until 2030. If the ETS does not push coal out of the market, we expect more national initiatives to acce-lerate the shut-down of coal-fired generators – or more member states to adopt a carbon price support mechanism like the UK. The issue of “just transition” that also addresses the socio-economic challenges of a coal phase-out, particularly in regions with mining activities, is thus likely to gain momentum in the cle-an-energy-package negotiations.

Furthermore, we expect the issue of the future of re-newables to be one of the key fields of debate in 2017. Given that the stunningly low prices seen for wind and solar in 2016 were far below the levels expec-ted by the European Commission when proposing the 2030 climate and energy targets, there is a case to revisit both the EU’s 2030 renewables target and the mechanisms proposed in the renewables directive. There is certainly a need for stable and robust regula-tion coupled with smart financing tools to guarantee low risk premiums, so that Europe can reap the full potential of energy efficiency and renewables, also beyond 2020.


35

8.1 Data

This report is mostly focused around the changes in generation by country in 2016 versus 2015. Table 1 shows the Terawatt hours changes, which form the basis of the report; the methodology is outlined in the section below.

8 Annex

Blue cells are using mostly ENTSO-E data; pink cells are using mostly national system operator data

Lign

ite

Har

d Co

al

Oth

er

foss

il

Gas

Nu

clea

r

Hyd

ro

Sola

r

Win

d

Bio

mas

s et

c

Impo

rts

Con

sum

p-

tio

n

CO2 (

Mt)

EU28 -15.8 -77.8 1.4 101.4 -18.5 6.3 4.0 3.9 2.7 6.2 13.6 -48

Austria 0 -1 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 -1 2 -1

Belgium 0 -2 0 -1 17 0 0 0 0 -14 0 -2

Bulgaria -2 -1 0 1 1 -2 0 0 0 3 0 -2

Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Czech Republic 1 0 0 1 -3 0 0 0 0 2 0 2

Denmark 0 2 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 2 0 2 1

Estonia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0

Finland 0 2 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 0 2 2 1

France 0 -1 0 13 -33 3 1 0 1 22 5 4

Germany -5 -8 0 17 -7 3 0 1 1 -4 -2 -5

Greece -4 0 0 5 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 -5

Hungary 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0

Ireland 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 1

Italy 0 -6 -2 10 0 -4 0 2 0 -5 -5 -1

Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Lithuania 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0

Netherlands 0 -3 6 -1 0 1 1 -1 -2 2 0

Poland -2 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 -1 0 1 -1

Portugal 0 -2 0 2 0 7 0 1 0 -7 0 -1

Romania -2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 -2

Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0

Spain -2 -14 0 1 1 8 0 1 0 7 2 -14

Sweden 0 0 1 0 6 -12 0 -1 0 8 2 0

United Kingdom 0 -44 0 45 1 -1 2 -1 1 -3 1 -22

Terawatt hour changes by fuel type by country in 2016 versus 2015 Table 1


36

Flow chart: Calculation of annual electricity generation

Öko-Institut 2016

Does annual Eurostat data

exists?

Does monthly Eu-rostat data

exists?

Does monthly ENTSO-E data

exist?

Extrapolate data via previous

month and scale with relative

seasonal factor

Aggregation of different

energy sources and producers

Disaggregation of conventional thermal using

generation share from previous

year

Use monthly data from ENTSO-E

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

8.2 Methodology

When working with recent European power data, va-rious obstacles occur. This applies mostly to genera-tion data, but also export data are not always com-plete. Annual Eurostat data for generation is in most cases available until 2014.

We then add on the generation differences for 2015 and 2016. We primarily get these from ENTSO-E monthly aggregated data. However, ENTSO-E did not start reporting all relevant data until mid-January 2015, and changed their methodology in 2016, whilst they also had their website offline for most of 2016. The ENTSO-E aggregated data is lagged, and for many countries the data is only available to August 2016. Therefore, we also supplement and cross-check this data with national governments and national energy institutions, and also with some ENTSO-E hourly data from the transparency platform.

We welcome insights to better, more reliable, more recent data and to the used methodology for the EU.

If not indicated otherwise, all figures in this report are gross values. Gross consumption is calculated as follows:

Gross consumption = gross production–exports+ imports–grid losses–pump storage losses

Eurostat reports annual data in a very detailed fas-hion. We aggregated the various energy sources ac-cording to the following table 2.


37

Öko-Institut 2016

Energy sources as used in this report Detailed energy carriers used in EUROSTAT

Lignite Lignite, peat, patent fuels and BKB (Braunkohlebrikett)

Hard Coal Hard coal, blast furnace gas, coke oven gas

Oil Bitumen, crude oil, diesel, naphtha, kerosene, residual fuel oil

Gas LPG, natural gas liquids, gas work gas and other recovered gases

Other Industrial waste, non-renewable municipal waste, shale oil, oil sands, gas coke, coal tar, coke oven coke, coking coal, petroleum coke

Biomass Gaseous, liquid and solid energy carriers plus the renewable share of waste, if reported separately

Other renewables Geothermal plus tide, wave and ocean

Hydropower

Should include run-of-river and storage, but no pumped storage for our purpose. However, hydropower from annual EUROSTAT data in-cludes generation from pumped storage. Therefore, hydropower is calculated from hydropower as reported by EUROSTAT minus pumped storage. Generation from pumped storage does not include energy from natural inflow; natural inflow is included in stored water.

Solar Photovoltaic and solar thermal

Classification of fuel type Table 2

38

Publications of Agora Energiewende

IN GERMAN

FAQ EEG – Energiewende: Was bedeuten die neuen Gesetze?Zehn Fragen und Antworten zu EEG 2017, Strommarkt- und Digitalisierungsgesetz

Eigenversorgung aus Solaranlagen Das Potenzial für Photovoltaik-Speicher-Systeme in Ein- und Zweifamilienhäusern, Landwirtschaft sowie im Lebensmittelhandel

Elf Eckpunkte für einen KohlekonsensKonzept zur schrittweisen Dekarbonisierung des deutschen Stromsektors (Lang- und Kurzfassung)

Der Klimaschutzbeitrag der Stromsektors bis 2040Entwicklungspfade für die deutschen Kohlekraftwerke und deren wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen

Wie hoch ist der Stromverbrauch in der Energiewende?Energiepolitische Zielszenarien 2050 - Rückwirkungen auf den Ausbaubedarf von Windenergie und Photovoltaik

Ein Kraftwerkspark im Einklang mit den KlimazielenHandlungslücke, Maßnahmen und Verteilungseffekte bis 2020

Transparenzdefizite der NetzregulierungBestandsaufnahme und Handlungsoptionen

Die Entwicklung der EEG-Kosten bis 2035Wie der Erneuerbaren-Ausbau entlang der langfristigen Ziele der Energiewende wirkt

Aktionsplan LastmanagementEndbericht einer Studie von Connect Energy Economics

Die Sonnenfinsternis 2015: Vorschau auf das Stromsystem 2030Herausforderungen für die Stromversorgung in Systemen mit hohen Anteilen an Wind- und Solarenergie

Die Rolle des Emissionshandels in der EnergiewendePerspektiven und Grenzen der aktuellen Reformvorschläge

Netzentgelte in DeutschlandHerausforderungen und Handlungsoptionen

Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz 3.0Konzept einer strukturellen EEG-Reform auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Strommarktdesign

39

Publications of Agora Energiewende

Stromspeicher in der EnergiewendeUntersuchung zum Bedarf an neuen Stromspeichern in Deutschland für den Erzeugungsausgleich, Systemdienstleistungen und im Verteilnetz

Energieeffizienz als GeschäftsmodellEin Umsetzungsmodell für Artikel 7 der europäischen Effizienzrichtlinie

Power-to-Heat zur Integration von ansonsten abgeregeltem Strom aus Erneuerbaren EnergienHandlungsvorschläge basierend auf einer Analyse von Potenzialen und energiewirtschaftlichen Effekten

Positive Effekte von Energieeffizienz auf den deutschen StromsektorEndbericht einer Studie von der Prognos AG und dem Institut für Elektrische Anlagen und Energiewirtschaft (IEAW)

12 Thesen zur EnergiewendeEin Diskussionsbeitrag zu den wichtigsten Herausforderungen im Strommarkt, (Lang- und Kurzfassung)

IN ENGLISH

FAQ EEG – Energiewende: What do the new laws mean?Ten questions and answers about EEG 2017, the Electricity Market Act, and the Digitisation Act

Reducing the cost of financing renewables in EuropeA proposal for an EU Renewable Energy Cost Reduction Facility ("RES-CRF")

Refining Short-Term Electricity Markets to Enhance FlexibilityStocktaking as well as Options for Reform in the Pentalateral Energy Forum Region

Energy Transition in the Power Sector in Europe: State of Affairs in 2015Review on the developments in 2015 and outlook on 2016

A Pragmatic Power Market Design for Europe's Energy TransitionThe Power Market Pentagon

Eleven Principles for a Consensus on CoalConcept for a stepwise decarbonisation of the German power sector (Short Version)

The Integration Costs of Wind and Solar PowerAn Overview of the Debate of the Effects of Adding Wind and Solar Photovoltaics into Power Systems

All publications are available on our website: www.agora-energiewende.de

Agora Energiewende is a joint initiative of the Mercator Foundation and the European Climate Foundation.

106/03-A-2017/EN

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