enemies everywhere: terrorism, moral panic, and us civil society

ENEMIES EVERYWHERE: TERRORISM,

MORAL PANIC, AND US CIVIL SOCIETY

DAWN ROTHEWestern Michigan University

STEPHEN L. MUZZATTIRyerson University

Abstract. Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, terrorism has experienced aprominence in discourse across the U.S. The representations of terrorists and ter-

rorism by the news media and politi have contributed to the edice of terrorism as amoral panic. This treatise examines the social eects that have or may occur due tothe social construction of a moral panic of terrorism. The thematic frame is situated

within Cohens stages of a moral panic. We oer an analysis of the medias depictionand coverage of acts of terrorism, and legislative, political and legal responses in theform of social and cultural changes occurring from the creation of a moral panic. In

addition, we oer an analysis of the states vested interest in the social construction ofthis panic, leading to increased levels of fear, targeted at the general publics con-sciousness. This article concludes that the presentation of terrorism and terrorists bythe media and politi have contributed to unnecessary levels of panic and fear, mis-

guided public consciousness, and the development of legislation creating negativesocial ramications yet be seen.

Introduction

The American public has been inundated with highly mediated imagesof terrorists and terrorism since September 11, 2001. Perceived threatsand heightened security alerts abound in daily media coverage andpolitical speeches, leading to what may be termed a moral panic. Theedication of a moral panic among the U.S. population has exacerbateda culture embedded in fear. While the events of September 11, 2001 wereindeed tragic, the construction of a moral panic by the media andpoliticians to support their interests is a greater social tragedy.

The concept of moral panic has been used to dene social issues forthe past 30 years (See Becker 1963; Young 1971; Cohen 1972; Hallet al., 1978; Reiman and Levine 1989; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994;Burns and Crawford 1999; Muzzatti 2002, 2003 (unpublished)). Young

Critical Criminology 12: 327350, 2004.

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(1971) was the rst to coin the term, moral panic in, The Drugtakers (seeCohen 1971; Young 1971). Young examined the ideological role themedia has in constructing social meanings as well as the amplication ofdeviance. He provided linkages between the media, agents of socialcontrol and public opinion, which could ascend to a moral panic.

Cohen (1972) was the rst to present an inclusive denition of a moralpanic. The term,moral panic was used byCohen to depict the reactions ofthe media, the public, and agents of social control to relatively minordisturbances between theModandRocker youth cultures inEngland.Hisresearch illustrated how these reactions inuenced the enforcement andformation of social policy, law, and societal perceptions of threat and theyoung tribes. According to Cohen, a moral panic can occur, when:

A condition, episode, person or group of person emerges to becomedened as a threat to societal values or interests; its nature ispresented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the mass media;the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians orother right-thinking people . . . Sometimes the subject of the panic isquite novel and at other times it is something which has been inexistence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten . . . at other timesit has more serious and long lasting repercussion and might producesuch changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the waysociety conceives itself (Cohen 1972: 9).

Cohens work focused on the reactions of the media, agents of socialcontrol and the general public to relatively minor clashes betweenmembers of youth subcultures (the mods and the rockers) in England,and, as the above excerpt illustrates, the ways in which these reactionsinuenced the formation and enforcement of law, social policy, andsocietal conceptions of the youth culture-delinquency nexus.

While many subsequent scholars have similarly applied the conceptto youth subcultures (e.g. punks, skinheads, goths, ravers etc.) othershave gone beyond the original focus to apply it to more generalised andadult manifestations of deviant and criminal behaviour (e.g. soccerhooligans, motorcycle gangs, immigrants (both illegal and legal), wel-fare mothers, Satanists, paedophiles, squeegee merchants, serial killers,etc.). While some of the research is 30 years old, with antecedentsperhaps even a generation older, the concept of Moral Panic continuedto grow in importance in the 1990s and into the 21st century, spurringconsiderable theoretical development, particularly the emergence ofcritical cultural criminology.

DAWN ROTHE AND STEPHEN L. MUZZATTI328

Simply put, a moral panic is an exaggeration or distortion of someperceived deviant behavior or criminal activity. According to Cohen(1972: 31), this includes grossly exaggerating the seriousness of theevents according to criteria such as the numbers of people taking part,the number involved in violence, and the amount and eects of violenceand/or damage. This is, of course, not something that happens spon-taneously, but rather is a result of a complex interplay of behaviors andresponses involving several actors. For a moral panic to take hold, thereneed to be in place six sets of actors. These include: (1) folk devils, (2)rule enforcers, (3) the media, (4) politicians, (5) action groups, and, (6)the public. Folk devils are the individuals responsible for the deviant orcriminal behavior. Unlike normal deviants or criminals, these folks areunambiguously unfavorable symbols: the embodiment of evil.

As those responsible for the enforcement of norms, codes of conduct,and law, rule enforcers are a vital part of the moral panic. These groups/organizations, particularly the police, prosecutors, and the judiciary areexpected to detect, apprehend and punish the folk devils. These agentspresent the social situation as one that teeters on the brink of chaos if itwere not for them, deviance/crime and all that it entails would abound.They present themselves as the thin blue line, which separates order andcivilization frommayhem and anarchy. Depending upon the content andstrength of the discourse, it often includes calls for increased numbers ofrule enforcers andmore extensive authority (i.e., greater power) for them.

The media is likely the single most inuential actor in the orchestra-tion and promulgation of a moral panic. Media coverage of certain kindsof deviant/criminal behavior, particularly those involving perpetrators ofthe aforementioned type is usually distorted. It serves to inate theseriousness of the incidents, making them appear more heinous andfrequent than they truly are. Public anxiety is whipped up through the useof journalistic and linguistic devices. Special cover story, in-depthexpose or investigative report style coverage employs dramaticphotos, video, and sound bites with moralistic rhetoric.

Politicians are also vital actors in a moral panic. As individuals, whomust operate in the court of public opinion, it is important that poli-ticians present themselves as purveyors of the moral high ground. Assuch, they often align themselves with the press and the rule enforcers ina struggle against the evils perpetrated by the folk devils.Self-righteousness and the politics of rage (Berry 1999) characterizethe response of politicians in dealing with crime/deviance. Even themost liberal politicians usually take a moralistic, no-nonsense, war oncrime stance, advocating reactionary and punitive strategies to deal with

ENEMIES EVERYWHERE 329

this new threat. Common calls include special hearings or sub-com-mittees to deal with the problem, zero tolerance policies, tougher lawsand harsher sentences.

The nal, and some would argue ultimately the most important,actor in a moral panic is the public. The success of the media, poli-ticians, rule enforcers and moral entrepreneurs in generating andsustaining a moral panic is ultimately contingent upon how success-fully they enrage the public and marshal their support against the folkdevils. The vox populi is enlisted as a front-line agent in the crusadeagainst the designated evil. Members of the public are relied upon toexpress contempt for the folk devils and support for the rule enforcers,to consume the media coverage, and wait for the latest pronounce-ments from politicians and/or action groups on how the problem is tobe solved.

Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) assess the dierence between a moralpanic and a normal societal concern with ve characteristics. Theseinclude: (1) the generation of heightened concern, (2) hostility, (3) asocietal consensus that the actions are injurious, (4) disproportionatesocietal reaction, and (5) volatility.

Societal concern about crime and deviance always exists at some level;however, heightened concern infers an increase in public dismay about acertain group or its impact. Assessing heightened concern can be quan-tied by newspaper reports, public opinion polls, and enhanced mediacoverage (Good and Ben-Yehuda 1994). Increased hostility is a necessarycatalyst for a moral panic. Hostility refers to heightened levels of intol-erance directed at the behavior of a group (evil-doers) accompanied bycontempt for those responsible. The third catalyst, consensus, refers topublic agreement that the evildoers are real as is the threat they impose tosociety. Consensus is not meant to necessarily incorporate all of a societymerely that it is widespread. Disproportionality refers to over-reaction toa problem and includes frequency, severity, and scope. This includes thebelief that greater harm is eminent. The nal tool for assessment is vol-atility. Simply stated, the precariousness of a moral panic can allow it toappear quickly and without warning. Interestingly, even after the dissi-pation of a moral panic, a litany of repressive social controls strategiesand mechanisms may be left in its wake (Muzzatti 2002).

This treatise will be situated within Cohens stages of moral panicintegrated with Goode and Ben-Yehudas characteristics assessing thata moral panic has occurred. Simply stated, we use Cohens model toassess the stages of a moral panic accompanied with Goode andBen-Yehudas model illustrating that a moral panic indeed occurred.


The terms terrorists and terrorism are entrenched in a denitionalquagmire. The diculty in dening (conceptualising) terrorism is thepejorative connotations it holds. It is subjective in terms of the socialand historical context. It is dependent on political power. The State canincrease its power (or perceived legitimate power) when the enemiesbecome labelled as terrorists (White 2003). The term terrorism has beendened in ocial U.S. documents as the calculated use of violence orthreat of violence to attain political, religious, or ideological goals.Terrorism is accomplished by means of intimidation, coercion, orinstilling fear (White House 2002). Laqueur and Alexander (1987)denes terrorism as the illegitimate use of force to achieve politicalobjectives by the targeting of innocent people. There is also a propa-gandist denition of terrorism (Chomsky 2001:90). It refers to terroristacts that are committed by our enemies against our allies or us per-sonally. This leads to the counter-terrorism measures that could also bedened as terrorism and to the today a freedom ghter-tomorrow aterrorist dichotomy. According to Solomon (1999), there is anOrwellian logic behind dening terrorism. Bombings by Third Worldcountries are dened as terrorism while bombings by the U.S. are vir-tuous strikes against terror. Discursively constituted, terrorism simu-lates the crisis of international order, and hence Counterterrorism iscounter-simulation an attempt to engender a new disciplinary order(Der Derian 1989). Such discursive practices serve the function ofprivileging State techno-bureaucrats, while simultaneously marginaliz-ing both critical criminologists, and even more disturbingly, the generalpublic. White (2003) posits that denitions of terrorism are useless, asthey do not account for the social or political nature of terrorism.Terrorism is politically associated as isolated events that are out ofcontext, disregarding the precipitating events leading to the terroristattack, leaving the perception of the perpetrators actions as unpro-voked and inexplicably evil (Herman and Sullivan 1989).

Regardless of the lack of consensus in what constitutes terrorism, thedenition and imagery put forth by the media and politi is real in itsconsequences; a socially constructed label that denes someone orsomething (folk-devils/evil-doers) as a threat to our values or interests.Having said this, the actual fear and impact that victims of randomviolence and terrorism experience must be acknowledged, and suchvictimisation should not minimised. The following sections will addressthe moral panic that emerged from the tragedy of September 11, 2001.This will be framed in Cohens thematic frame; the creation of a moralpanic, along with Goode and Ben-Yehudas characteristics assessing


whether a moral panic has taken hold. We have taken the generalframes of both, Cohen and Goode and Ben-Yehudas models, andestablished a model from which this analysis proceeds. In other words,we take Cohens criteria of actors and situation with Goode and Ben-Yehudas tools for assessing if it is indeed a moral panic or mere societalconcern. Beginning with a person or persons being dened as a threat,the media presents this perceived threat in a consistent and recognisableform (Erikson et al. 1989). This leads to a build-up of public concernand the generation of hostility. A societal consensus is formed acceptingthat the threat is real and injurious. This is fuelled by the moralentrepreneurship of politicians responding with disproportionate reac-tions to the portrayed threat. These reactions can then lead to longlasting and deleterious social change. We will analyze each of these stepsframed in the following sub-chapters: (1) someone dened as a threat tovalues and interests, (2) Threats depicted by media in a recognisableform, (3) a rapid build-up of public concern generating hostility, (4)response from authorities disproportionate reactions, and (5) socialchanges resulting from panic. Incorporated within the conclusion, weuse Goode and Ben-Yehudas model to ascertain that a moral panic didoccur.

Stage One of a Moral Panic: Someone or Something Denedas a Threat to Values or Interests

The atrocious nature of the attacks of September 11, 2001 was sucientfor the acts to be dened as a threat. According to Cohen (1972), thedening of something as a threat to values and interests is the rstelement in the creation of a moral panic. While the media began thisprocess immediately, the formal denition occurred, when PresidentBush declared, America was targeted for attack because were thebrightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And noone will keep that light from shining (President Bush 9/11/2001). Thedening of threatened values continued to be re-enforced by theAdministration.

Great tragedy has come to us, and we are meeting it with the bestthat is in our country, with courage and concern for others. Becausethis is America. This is who we are. This is what our enemies hateand have attacked. And this is why we will prevail (President Bush 9/15/2001).


The dening of actors is the second part of Cohens rst element. TheBush administration formally pronounced this with,

The people who did this act on America, and who may be planningfurther acts, are evil people. They dont represent an ideology; theydont represent a legitimate political group of people. Theyre atevil. Thats all they can think about, is evil (President Bush 9/28/2001).

The original identication of the enemy was Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network. During the gradient process of constructing andenlarging the folk devils, the enemy became increasingly broadly de-ned. The Administration began their initial targeting of the enemy withThe al Qaeda organisation is not an organisation of good, an orga-nisation of peace. Its an organisation based upon hate and evil(President Bush 9/24/2001). The threat to U.S. values and interestsgrew. A press release by the Presidents Press Secretary stated, The alQaeda organisation is present in, as youve heard from the President,more than 60 countries, and its links are its links are amorphous(Fleischer 9/18/2001).

Throughout the following year, those categorised as the enemycontinually expanded. The Administrations war on terror began withAl-Qaeda but did not stop there. It will not end until every terroristgroup of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated (Presi-dent Bush 9/23/2001). The State of the Union Address of 2002 set thestage for the Axis of Evil: Iran, North Korea, and Iraq.

The second actor involved in dening someone or something as athreat to values or interests is the media. The day of September 11, 2001,the media began the rst stages of a moral panic by dening the evil.The U.S. populace was presented with a barrage of newspaper headlinesthat escalated the shock of the attacks. The media are the vehicle ofmoral condemnation, and propagate a brutal fascination with the ter-rorist act (Baudrillard, quoted in Der Derian 1989) The media hadbecome terrorvision; a choreography of violence, fear, revulsion andhatred. The attachment of unambiguously unfavourable symbols(Cohen, 1972: 41) had begun; the hijackers (and by extension, as we willlater illustrate, those who allegedly supported, harboured, or defendedthem) were the embodiment of evil. The identication of terrorism,terrorists, and war were fed to the press by State information dissemi-nation. Oddly enough, before the State had formally identied theenemy, the media was clued in to prepare the U.S. citizens for the BushDoctrine that would follow. Already on September 11, 2001, media


reports connected Bin Laden with the terrorist attacks, All eyes look torich Arab terrorist . . . Bin Laden is the leading candidate said a seniorintelligence ocial (Billings Gazette 9/11/2001).

These examples were only the rst stage in an ongoing process ofidentifying someone or something as a threat. The depiction of thethreat of the folk devil by the media continued as stage two of Cohensmodel asserts: threat is depicted in a recognisable form by the media.Throughout the process of creating and maintaining a moral panic, themedia and politi have continuously re-enforced this identication ofterrorists to the embodiment of evil that threaten U.S. values andinterests.

Stage Two of a Moral Panic: Threat is Depicted in a RecognisableForm by the Media

For months after September 11, 2001, the press was consumed withcoverage of the event. Every hosted TV show, newspaper editorials,syndicate columns, panel of pundits, and news stories dwelled on theterrorist attacks (Parenti 2002). For one year and fty days,1 a total of17,744 stories ran in the New York Times regarding terror, 10,761 in theWashington Post, and 5,200 in the USA Today2 (Rothe and Bower2002). Objective journalists simply relating the facts informed us. ANY Times analysis stated, The perpetrators acted out of hatred for thevalues cherished in the West as freedom, tolerance, prosperity, religiouspluralism and universal surage (NY Times, 9/16, 2001). Barak (1998)addressed the role of the medias representations as being the mostsignicant communication that the average person will come to knowabout the world outside his/her immediate experiences. The media is theprinciple vehicle for popular views, ideology, and information. Societalfoci are commanded by media accounts of events and political dictates(Burns and Crawford 1999). The rigorous adherence to coverage of theevents of September 11, 2001, and the war on terrorism as doctrinaltruths and imminent threats, repeated day after day, succeeds in itspurpose of establishing a sacrosanct doctrine. The absence of alternativecoverage helped instil beliefs and a consensus of concern. As consumersof this coverage, the average American was transformed into a fac-totum (Der Derain 1989: 234) of State discourse, organising agent ofhegemony, and proactive resonator of terrorology.

What Der Derian referred to as media spasms of a seismic scaleand hyper production was clearly evidenced by the abundance of


books written about terrorism in response to the event. Similarly, fol-lowing a brief respite from its standard fare of exploding buildings andvehicles, Hollywood aired weekly drama shows with themes of terrorismand terrorists, always depicting the evil and horrors of the folk devil(The Shield, Third Watch, 24, and Law and Order). Conversely, moviereviewers wrote that this or that lm was a welcome antidote to theevents of September 11, 2001 (Parenti 2002). Travel agents encourageddomestic vacations as a healing experience and often, not so subtly,suggested that they were a patriotic way to aid a sagging economy.

Everywhere the U.S. populace turned, a reminder of the terroristsand their evil doings was present. Repeated reminders of the fear thatpeople in the U.S. should be experiencing echoed through the terror-vision. CNN journalists broadcasting from live from Kosovo remarked,I probably feel safer here than you do back home in the states (CNNNews, 2/2/2001). The terrorist and terrorism had been reied to a newreality. It had become a necessary truth, requiring no further evidence:the terrorists sought the violent transformation of all the things westand for while they only stand for apocalyptic nihilism (Ignatie,quoted in Chomsky 2001:117). The production and reproduction ofsuch pieties are an important discursive practice insofar as they serve tore-establish order and meaning by reinforcing State hegemony.

The interests of the media and entrepreneurs reect self-interest(economic interests), but also the narrow conformism of the media tothe State (Chomsky 1988). The media has two competing and con-tradictory roles. They control the ow of information (guided by thedissemination of information by the State) while making the newsentertaining to sell (White 2003). The media serve their function bydening the range of expressible views, framing the news reportingwithin assumptions laid down by the State, and excluding coveragedeemed inappropriate (Chomsky 1988). In a dark parody of thegeneral narrowness of debate on a host of social, political and eco-nomic issues in the U.S. media, over 75 percent of terrorist storiescome from State sources (Paletz 1982). This is in part a response to theState propaganda system, to wit guarantees the eectiveness of theState to ensure a moral panic, thereby serving the political interests ofthe Administration.

The restrictions imposed on the medias coverage included main-taining control over media access to information about the investigationinto the hijackings and Counterterrorism operations. The media werenot only limited by the political reigns, but high level executives, fearingState reprisals (i.e., being cut out of the loop) ordered correspondents


to remind viewers that the Taliban were evil and harboured terroriststhat killed thousands of Americans whenever they broadcast reports orfootage of civilian deaths, hunger, or devastation in Afghanistan as aresult of the U.S. war on terrorism (CNN Chair, Walter Isaacson,Quoted in Parenti 2002: 51). Such media subservience and theunquestioning reproduction of the States political economy of terro-rology exemplify its role as an ideological State apparatus. The outcomeof these restrictions has ensured that the media would feed the con-suming audience the propaganda necessary to create a moral panic.Creating a generalised fearfulness gives State leaders greater freedom ofaction to advance and justify exceptional legislation, encroach on civilliberty rights, and accomplish their geo-political agendas (Herman andSullivan 1989).

Stage Three of a Moral Panic: A Rapid Build-up of Public ConcernGenerating Hostility

Public concern about terrorism and terrorists escalated after September11, 2001, taking many forms. Patriotic jingoism was evidenced by theabundant sale and display of American ags, bumper stickers, lapelpins, and patriotic clothing all aimed at publicly signifying concern andunity. Rage, anger, and confusion proliferated (Parenti 2002: 33). At-tacks on Mosques were conducted, grati saying, bomb the terroristswas etched on vehicles; hate crimes escalated targeting the terroristboogeyman image.3 The media portrayed images of the united agwaving country: indeed, it was reactionism guised in a narrow, highlysuspect, and problematic patriotism while simultaneously remindingthe consuming audience of the evil that lurked around the corner.

The Bush Administration not only built on the public concern butalso fed it with political jargon that would pave the way for the State toensure its interests. The dichotomous, Either you are with us or youare with the terrorists speech by President Bush became typical. Anypublic dissent that contradicted the propaganda for a moral panic wasmet with political repression (Gumbell 2003). John Ashcroft addressedthe Senate Judiciary Committee by saying,

To those who scare peace loving people with phantoms of lostliberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for theyerode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They giveammunition to Americas enemies (Ashcroft 12/6/2001).


As the Administrations narrow war on terrorism, took hold; therallying for public concern and support continued. The New Republicran an editorial criticising dissidents for speaking out againstmilitary action, This nation is at war. And in such an environment,domestic political dissent is immoral (Parenti 2003: 8). Public con-cern turned to public support for getting the evil that threatened ourvalues and interests. Rooted in the sense of individual vulnerabilityand loss of national impunity, sentiments such as, If we go afterBin Laden, my family or I will be safe, become prominent (Bennis2003: 86).

As the political schema enlarged to include geo-political agendas ofimperialism, the level of public consensus and concern was even morerelevant. It was necessary to make the U.S. populace acutely sensitive tothe threat from a thousand cuts, so as to ensure their malleability andconcessions to the demands of the political elite (George 1991a). Fearwas continuously instilled in the public with escalations of terror alerts.Notications of things to be weary of included household products(bottles, suspicious mail, boxes). Air travel and public transportation(particularly subways) became less popular as the Administrationwarned that retaliatory attacks could occur due to the righteousdecisions of this Administration to rid the world of this terror. Smallpoxvaccinations were suggested as protection against a biological attack.The Anthrax scare was immediately associated with terrorists, aidingthe heightened level of public concern. Similarly, media speculationabout possible terrorism immediately arose surrounding other acts ofviolent crime, and was quickly discarded when the violence was linkedto traditional street criminals (the Washington Beltway snipers) ordetermined to be tragic accidents (e.g., the corporate and State-cor-porate criminality behind the Chicago nightclub stampede and thedisintegration of the Space shuttle Columbia respectively). The assertionthat there is no evidence of terrorist involvement accompanyingnewsworthy violence became a strangely banal component of themedia lexicon.

Despite the ever-present threat of terrorism, and ongoing specu-lation of possible terrorist involvement which abounded, the nationwas not to be paralysed by fear. Entrepreneurs opened stores tar-geting the existing fears (Safe At Home Store).4 The media continued togrip America with stories of how to be prepared. Whether it wasupdates about the status of the availability of plastic sheeting and ducttape at the local hardware store or the appearance of the HomelandSecurity Director Tom Ridge on NBCs Today Show showing the ration


of canned goods, bottled water, and a rst aid kit they keep in acardboard box in their home, the media continued to feed theconsuming public safety tips generated by the Administration.

The general public is one of the key actors in a moral panic. Thesuccess of the politicians and media in generating and sustaining amoral panic is contingent on how successfully they enrage the publicand marshal their support against the evil-doers (Muzzatti 2002). Thecrusade against evil requires the public to express contempt for the folkdevil and support for the decisions from politicians on how the problemis best solved.

Initially, public concern was not limited to domestic concerns.Immediately after the event of September 11, 2001, the internationalsociety united in condolences and support. The response to terrorismand terrorists was felt throughout the world. Of course, each nation/state had its own vested interests in sharing the immediate concerns ofthe U.S. populace and politi. It is these vested interests that stood in theshadows of international society as they grasped, used, or objected tothe Bush Administrations public and private reactions (e.g. Israeli PMSharon implemented Bushs jargon to diract his actions against thePalestinians). Condemnation after condemnation of terrorism and ter-rorists were publicly stated, domestically and internationally, whilecounter-terrorism actions escalated. State criminality (and/or encour-agement for human rights violations) was neutralised, and ceased to beof concern; in fact, it disappeared through discursive strategies. Whatinternational society had previously viewed as a state in violation ofhuman rights became redened as a State using self-defence againstterrorism. While international terrorism had been at the forefront ofmany nations problems, after September 11th many utilised Bushsjargon to transmogrify their own State criminality into a defence againstterrorism.

While overwhelmingly sympathetic and supportive of the U.S. in theimmediate wake of terrorist attacks, international society becameincreasingly uneasy with the U.S. plan for addressing the evil-doers. Inthe U.S., the concept of unilateral actions necessary to ensure victoryover the folk devil was being portrayed to the public as natural andnecessary; however, international society began to worry about thehidden Imperialist agenda of the Bush Administration. Still, the pro-paganda at home continued: We are in imminent danger and pre-emptive measures are now necessary. Through prohibitive reliance onState sources and terrorologists (who themselves are often substantiallysupported by federal funding sources), the media reied terrorism


(Chomsky 1989; Herman and OSullivan 1989 ,1991; George 1991b;Herman 1992).

Stage Four of a Moral Panic: Response from Authorities, Politicians,and Moral Entrepreneurs: Disproportionate Reactions

A call to war and Legislative Responses section is perhaps the mostsignicant part of this created moral panic. It is the disproportionatereactions of politicians that can craft negative social ramications,leaving long-term social consequences. Therefore, this section will bedivided into two separate types of responses from authorities, namely, acall to war and legislative responses.

A Call To War and Legislative Responses

The initial response from the State took the form of a massive mobili-sation of military, strategic, and diplomatic power: a call to war. Themedia had made this connection for the State prior to the formalannouncement as headlines read War at Home (The Dallas MorningNews 9/11/2001), ITS WAR (Daily News, 9/11/2001), and ACTSOF WAR (The Day 9/11/2001). Early coverage of the event by TVAnchor Tom Brokaw declared, This is a war zone, we are at war. Theinitial war on terrorism was portrayed to the public as the means tocapture those responsible for the events of September 11, 2001; how-ever, the folk devil, terrorist, quickly grew to tens of thousands of ter-rorists that remained at large, threatening our very way of life and ourfundamental values and interests. Bush stated, Tens of thousands oftrained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view the entire worldas a battleeld, and we must pursue them wherever they are (Bush 9/24/2001).

September 11, 2001 was identied by President Bush as an attack ofall the civilised nations (Bush 2003: White House archived addresses).The need to legitimise the war on terror was a concern for theAdministration, and hence it felt the need to escalate public fear athome, muster pseudo-international support, and increase threat levelsto mask the global war that was under way.

The rst ocial response to the crisis of September 11, 2001 was onSeptember 13, when the Senate and House of Representatives voted toapprove the administrations Authorization for Use of MilitaryForce. The bill gave President Bush a virtually unlimited mandate,


To use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com-mitted, or aided terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,2001, or harboured such organizations or persons in order to preventany future acts of international terrorism against the United States(White House 2003).

This opened the doors for the utilisation of a moral panic to aid theAdministration in expanding its doctrine. Terrorology was employedto neutralise those who might pose an impediment to the Adminis-trations agenda by raising constitutional questions. When read, itbecomes clear why the connection of Iraq to Bin Laden was essential.Without the acquiescence of the public and the legislative branchesregarding the connection between Hussein and Bin Laden, the Presi-dent must have Congress make the Call to War according to theU.S. Constitution.

On September 12, 2001 the US called the UN Security Council(UNSC) into special session. The outcome was Resolution 1368 whichcalled on nations/states to work together to bring to justice the perpe-trators and sponsors of the terrorist attacks. This was not an authori-sation for war, nor did it invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter (self-defence clause). On September 28th, 2001, Resolution 1373 was passedand although it did not condone military force, it did provide economicmeasures to cut terrorist access to funds (United Nations, 2003).However, the disproportionate reactions by politicians and the rush todeclare war on unknown enemies overpowered the internationallegalities of war. The Bush Doctrine of war was begun in a cloud ofillegalities and will continue on that course throughout the duration ofthe Administrations ability to induce fear and inoculate the public fromthe realities of its underlying political interests. A pre-emptive, unilat-eral rst strike would set a terrible international precedent.

Along with the change of course doctrine comes the understandingthat history is irrelevant, the lessons of the past no longer matter andconventional tactics can be disposed of (Chomsky 1988). As a nation,we no longer need to adhere to previous studies and advice provided bythe Pentagons Defence Science Board (1997) that showed a strongcorrelation between U.S. involvement in international situations and anincrease in terrorist attacks against the U.S. Instead, the U.S. must takepreventative measures against the imminent threat that terror, terror-ism, and terrorists pose. The Axis of Evil must be contained. Especiallythe one posing the greatest threat: Iraq.


Regardless of reality, the rhetoric of propaganda assured the U.S.public that Iraq was among the existential terrorist threat. It would havebeen dicult to convince the public that Saddam Hussein really was athreat to the U.S. had Iraq not been included in the Evil Empire thatwas poised to attack: amongst the evil doers the terrorists. Adminis-tration ocials seemed to think that simply repeating the phrase Iraqis a threat to America would somehow validate a war. Sadly, asBenjamins (1936, 1968) sociological inquiry into demagoguery illus-trated, saying something frequently and loudly through the conduit ofpolitical power does often make it so.

During November 2002, British and U.S. warplanes attacked Iraqsdefences daily, and made practice runs on other targets, and U.S.Special Forces were deployed in Western and Northern Iraq. In manyways, the war on Iraq had already begun well before 19 March 2003. Toinduce fear, the propaganda system was utilised to conjure up the newHitler/Satan. The inducement of fear to obtain the acquiescence ofthe public to policies it may oppose was continually attempted by theAdministration through the use of inammatory rhetorical strategies(Chomsky 1988).

Other disproportionate reactions by the polity included the crea-tion of a large bureaucracy to ensure domestic security: the Oce ofHomeland Security. The Bush Administration also instituted an alertsystem to keep the public informed as to what level or how muchfear we should be experiencing: The Homeland Security AdvisorySystem. The ocial purpose of the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem is a means to disseminate information regarding the risk ofterrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities and to theAmerican people (White House, Division of Homeland Security2003). However, the vague information (i.e., an unspecied threat)given about changes in the alert is not adequate enough for otheragencies or the U.S. populace to know what to look for or expect. Itis however, an eective tool for maintaining fear and suppression ofits citizens.

Still other reactions included the legislation of the Uniting andStrengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required toIntercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) and theHomeland Security Act (2001). Both of these legislative documents werea direct response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

A time for international justice for the perpetrators of September 11,2001 had expired. The opposition to using the international society as aforum for justice against the terrorists reinforced the disproportionate


reaction by political leaders: the perpetrators must be dealt withimmediately by the US in a unilateral position.

On November 13, 2001 President Bush signed an Executive Orderauthorising military tribunals for suspected terrorists. This sets a newprecedent that is in violation of international law (Geneva ConventionsArticle 5: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and theUN Principles of Protection Under any Form of Detention of Impris-onment). Under Bushs Executive Order, any foreign national who hasbeen designated as a suspected terrorist or as a terrorists aid could bedetained, tried, convicted, and executed without a public trial orcounsel, without the proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, andwithout right of appeal. Ironically, the State has enacted an order that ithas denounced. The State Department has routinely criticised the use ofmilitary tribunals, practices of secret trials that do not adhere to fairpublic trials, and omissions of due processes in similar situationsaround the world. In the annual Human Rights Practices CountryReports the US has condemned Burma in 1990, China in 2000,Colombia in 1996, Egypt in 2000, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia in 1975,Nigeria from 1966 to 1999, Peru in 1996, Russia in 1999, Sudan in 2000,and Turkey.

Direct legislation regarding terrorism is not the only response fromauthorities to the events of September 11, 2001. Many other responsesinclude the expansion of the military budget. Major social aid cutbackswere initiated (to fund the escalating military expenses, corporate crimebailouts, and to oset the tax relief to the minute percentage of wealthyAmericans). Additionally, a renewed passion and support for the starwars project suddenly overcame previous opposition. This occurred inconjunction with President Bushs declaration that the U.S. was uni-laterally breaking the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with Russia. Bushstated, It hinders us from developing an anti-missile shield that willdeter an attack from a rogue state (President Bush, quoted in the NewYork Times 12/13/2001).

The Pentagon had become increasingly weary of any unltered mediaexposure, which would lead to public awareness (especially interna-tional awareness) of civilian casualties in the counterterrorism war. Thewarnings given by reporters to remember the folk-devil did not have assignicant of an impact when charred or mangled bodies were televised.In response to this, the Pentagon established the Oce of StrategicInuence (OSI). The OSI purpose was to feed information to interna-tional press; including news dissemination to the international public,dropping leaets promoting rewards for information about the where-


abouts of Osama bin Laden, and radio scripts. The radio scripts,according to Rumsfeld, counter the lies that this was a war against theAfghan people or a war against the Muslims, which it isnt (Wash-ington Post 2/25/2002). When a leak exposed this department, theAdministration shut it down. It was replaced, however, with the Coa-lition Information Center (CIC). The CIC coordinates the publicinformation output by the State, providing sound bites for internationalsociety (Bennis 2002).

The aforementioned examples of legislation and disproportionateresponses by the State to September 11, 2001 are not exhaustive. How-ever, they do provide examples of the States use of terrorism to: (1) ensuealternative political interests (the war on Iraq), (2) maintain legitimacyfor public concern, and (3) continue the generation of a moral panicthrough intimidation, coercion, and induced fear. Just as the CommunistBoogeyman role aided US imperialism and military supremacy (andwhile generating tremendous prots for military contractors, did little toenhance national security) during the Reagan administrations, the Ter-rorist Boogeyman is aiding the Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, andWolfowitzDoctrine of Imperialism and military supremacy.

Stage Five of a Moral Panic: Panic results in Social Changes

The nal stage in Cohens moral panic states that while the panic oftenpasses and is forgotten, it has serious and long lasting repercussions.This moral panic was created in such a way that its diusion isimpossible. There are, undoubtedly, serious social ramications hithertobe comprehended.

One of the earliest signs of negative social changes was reected inthe Uniform Crime Report (UCR) gures or hate crimes. Prior to2001, the fewest number of hate crimes incidents resulted from ethnic ornational origin bias. Crime incidents motivated by bias against thisgroup became the second largest reported bias in 2001, more thandoubling the number of incidents. The anti-other ethnicity/nationalorigin category quadrupled in incidents, victims, oences, and knownoenders. Anti-Islamic incidents (once the second lowest) became thesecond highest reported among religious bias incidents: a growth ofmore than 1,600 Percent over the 2000 volume. The FBI Forewordstated, The distribution changed in 2001, presumably as a result of theheinous incidents that occurred on September 11 (FBI Hate CrimeDivision-Uniform Crime Statistics 2002).


Controversy over antiterrorist legislation surfaces whenever a Statereacts to terrorism with the implementation of new laws. The laws giverise to concerns about the infringement of civil liberties. Critics maintainthat anti-terrorist legislation is based on a political schema versus anobjective evaluation of the real threat (White 2003). Americans havebeen lled with terrorist anxiety, fear, and panic, which is conducive tothe overregulation of society without opposition. Suce to it to say,. . . the price of freedom is high when hysteria is the norm and moralityhas gone on holiday (George 1991a: 91).

Legislation and the use of enemy combatant labels are alsoproblematic today and certainly in the future. The Bush Administrationset a new precedent using the Executive Order to classify any individualas an enemy combatant the Administration deems a threat or danger tothe U.S. This includes U.S. citizens. A document led in the US DistrictCourt recognizes citizens as possible enemy combatant: citizens whoassociating themselves with the enemy and with its aid, guidance, anddirection, or enter into this country bent on hostile acts are enemybelligerents (US v. Padilla 2002) (Rothe 2003). The Justice Departmentstates that individuals so labeled may be denied counsel, held incom-municado, without due process, and without review of the designationas enemy combatant by the US Court of Appeals. The implementationof the label, enemy combatant, contradicts both International Law(Geneva Conventions: Article 3) and the U.S. Constitution posingmomentous ramications for U.S. policy, constitutional guarantees, thejudicial processes, and the correctional facilities (Rothe 2003). The waron terrorism has not been myopic in nature (Muzzatti 2003 (unpub-lished); Rothe 2003).

New precedents have been set in the legal realm. Some of these arereected in changes occurring in the prison facilities. Justice Depart-ment Ocials have stated their concerns over the alleged recruitment ofpotential terrorists among prison inmates. All though ocials havestopped short of publicly proclaiming state and federal prison ocialshave been put on alert, they have warned that prison ocials should bealert to internal conversations among inmates. This can lead to over-stepping the bounds of monitoring conversations between inmates. Thisexplicit attention has been reected in the monitoring of religiousgatherings and religious groups that could be linked to terrorist activ-ities (Rothe 2003).

The USA Patriot Act has many potential long-term negative socialimpacts. The implications for the 20 million immigrants, non-citizens,and short-term visa holders include potential subjection to military


tribunals, expedited deportation, and detention (for an undeterminedtime) if they are suspected of having something to do with terrorism. Itis not only the non-US citizen that is at risk, but US citizens now facethe potential to be classied as enemy combatant and or stripped ofcitizenship. The power given to the State to snoop on citizens over-turns some previous restriction placed on the State from previousabuses of such powers. As Nancy Chang, attorney for the Center ofConstitutional Rights, has stated, the Bush Administrations actionssince September 11th portend a wholesale suspension of civil libertiesthat will reach far beyond those who are involved in terrorist activities(Chang, quoted in Zinn 2002: 40). Legitimate political dissent mayqualify for criminal proceedings.

On November 1, 2001 President Bush signed yet another ExecutiveOrder that allows a sitting president to keep secret the papers of aprevious president, even if any previous president wanted his paperspublic (White House 2002). This too, has been legitimised under therubric of post-September 11th national security, as potentially beingdangerous information to give to any terrorist. In eect, what it hasdone is rescinded many of the advances of the Freedom of InformationAct that were gained in the 1960s as a check for State power. Themotivations of and for presidential decisions are no longer available forthe public to scrutinise. This can have major social ramications andcarries a resemblance to Stalinism. Stalin also closed the books,removed access to who was involved in the Russian Revolution, andessentially attempted to wipe out traces of history (Zinn 2002). Thissuggests that Bush is closing the door to citizens learning the motivationbehind decisions of presidents (ironically, his fathers records areincluded in this).

Perhaps the most signicant social change that has and will occur isthe U.S. expansion of American hegemony and imperialism. The eventsof September 11, 2001 (as horric as they were) provided the Admin-istration with the excuse to act on its simmering geo-political agenda.The orchestration of the Administrations intentions had begun prior tothe terrorist attacks. Prior to his appointment as Secretary of DefenseRumsfeld told President Bush that US military power was needed todiscipline the world (Woodward and Balz, January 28, 2002, quoted inBennis 2002: 86). Then came the terrorist attacks. The time was perfect,an excuse had been given to them, and the ease of creating andenhancing a moral panic to ensure public conformity was ripe. Over-looked by many, the intentions of the Administration were slightlycaptured when Bush himself made reference to the attacks of September


11, 2001 as an opportunity to strengthen America. The media alsohinted at the opportune time given to this administration claiming Bushshould take advantage of the unique political climate and to assert hisleadership not just on security and foreign policy but across the board(Wall Street Journal, quoted in Parenti 2002: 2). Clearly, the terroristinspired boundaries of the nations insecurity culture serve multipleimperatives, both domestic as well as foreign.

The implications of the imperialistic agenda are far reaching,heightens world tension, creates a further chasm within theinternational community, and debases international laws, charters,treatise, the United Nations, and the International Criminal Court.Simply stated, it is pitting the U.S. against the rest of the world andis proclaiming U.S. justice and values as the only ones with merit.Remember the doctrine, your with us or against us. Many othernegative social ramications (both manifested and latent) arehitherto be comprehended.

Conclusion

The use of a moral panic by the media and polity has been illustratedaccording to Cohens (1972) stages; however, an argument could bemade that it is less a moral panic and more normative concerns. Goodeand Ben-Yehudas (1994) have provided ve characteristics that deter-mine if a moral panic has taken hold which re-enforces our position: amoral panic does exist. Indeed, heightened concern has been illustratedby societal reactions and media coverage. The second characteristic,hostility, abounds. Political agents and individual responses have suc-cessfully generated intolerance, and contempt for terrorists and terror-ism, and indeed even dissenters. The third characteristic, consensus thatthe evildoers are real and pose a serious threat has been fullled. Again,the consensus does not need to incorporate all of society, merely bewidespread in nature. The mass amount of media coverage coupled withthe Bush Administrations constant reminder to the U.S. public that weare under a real and imminent threat has ensured a large proportion ofsociety unquestioningly accept this moral panic.5 The fourth charac-teristic, disproportionality, or over-reaction to a problem by severity,frequency, and scope has undoubtedly been met. The scope of thepolitical decisions, war on terrorism, and overly stated imminent threatsmeets this criterion. The mass mobilisation for a call to war concurrently


with enactments of legislation aimed at enhancing the Administrationspower while simultaneously limiting civil liberties reaches beyond dis-proportionate reactions. The nal characteristic, volatility, has also beenmet. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001 brought terrorism to the forefront of Americanconsciousness resulting in a quick and extreme moral panic.

In lieu of the detrimental and traumatic eects a moral panic canhave on policy and levels of societal fear, the images, denitions, andprojections of terrorism should be presented in an integrated and multi-positioned frame. The current use of terrorism by the polity and mediais one-dimensional: them or us. It is not until the media apply multi-level factual coverage to terrorism and the potential threat will the U.S.populace be able to make a broad assessment and to voice a knowl-edgeable position on the reactions by social agents of control. Terro-rology must be replaced by cultural readings of retail-terrorism whichsituates it historically and geo-politically, and must involve . . . not onlyan inquiry into the States archival accretions but also into its mostsensitive secretions (Der Derian 1989: 231). Peoples eorts should bedirected toward deconstructing political propaganda and demystifyingjargon rather than supporting with blind faith unsubstantiated threatsabout evildoers.

The Bush Administration would be hard pressed to explain to thepublic how its responses have or will destroy existing terrorist cells orend terrorism. The reality of protecting the U.S. populaces from ter-rorism is far reaching, leaving the creation of the Homeland SecurityDepartment nothing more than a mask of appeasement and opportu-nity to pass legislation fullling political agendas.

The September 11th crisis was seen as a great gift (Bennis 2002: xv)for President Bush. It enabled him to strengthen his faltering credibilityand to implement the long-standing right wing agenda. September 11thbrought the opportunity to vastly enhance State power, erode civilliberties, undermine environmental defences, reject and ignore foreignpolicy imposed on the rest of the world, and establish an empire (Bennis2002). The responses of the Administration were not solely aboutbringing anyone to justice for the terrorist attacks. It was also aboutexpanding U.S. global power and conquest all in the name of righ-teousness. Yet, the rhetoric gushed at the American people serves tomask this reality:

America will always stand rm for the non-negotiable demands ofhuman dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state;


respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; andreligious tolerance. America will take the side of the brave men andwomen who advocate these values around the world, including theIslamic world, because wee have a greater objective than eliminatingthreats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peacefulworld beyond the war on terror (State of the Union Address, 2002).

Between the lines of propaganda and rhetoric, the generation of publicfear stands to suppress opposition to the legitimacy of a war againstenemies that have been so broadly dened, the end is not in sight.Today, the moral panic continues: the Olympics of terror. Regrettably,future research on negative latent and manifest social implications maywell abound with information.

Notes

1. The 50 days was added to encompass the coverage of the one-year anniversary of 9/11 and the following days.

2. The three newspapers used in the content analysis were searched via the computerdatabase LexisNexis.

3. The social changes that occurred will include a detailed look at the eects of social

concern in the form of hate crimes.4. Just blocks from ground Zero this store opened to sell survival tools (e.g. gas

masks).

5. Mass movements have begun to surface showing support for the administration andadmonishing protesters as dissidents and anti-American.

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