emotion in mentally retarded people

Australia and New Zealand Journal of Developmental Disabilities 1985, VOI. 10, NO. 4.201-213.

EMOTION IN MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE I

K.T. STRONGMAN

Universiv of Canterbury New Zealand

The aim of this paper is to consider the nature of emotion in mentally retarded people. Obvious issues will be addressed. For example, what are the similarities and differences between emotion in the retarded and the nonretarded people? In what ways has emotion in retarded people been studied? Are theories of emotion which have been developed with respect to nonretarded people applicable to the retarded? Is current thought and research on emotional development relevant to a consideration of emotion in the retarded? What are the most promising directions for the future study of emotion in the retarded? Does existing knowledge of emotional life of the mentally retarded have psychotherapeutic implications? And so on.

Defdtions Since these rather broad aims involve combining

a problematic area of human functioning and a pro-

1. The autbor is grateful to h. Nirbhay Singh for suggesting that this paper be written and to h. Jan Watt for her comments.

@uem for reprints should be sent to Pmfesa0rK.R Strongmm, Deputment of Psychology, Uniwnity of C~tcrbury. Christchurch 1, New &.laad.

blematic population, it is important to start with definitions. As far as mental retardation is concerned, this is relatively straightforward. The most concise defmition is that given in the 1983 revision of the A.A.M.D’s classification of mental retardation, although as will be seen later there are some grey areas in this document. Thus: “Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated with concurrent impairments in adaptive behaviour and manifested during the developmental period”. Within this definition, “general intellectual functioning” is further defined as that which is assessed by general intelligence tests, “significantly subaverage” is defined as IQ of 70 or below, “developmental period” is defined as the time between conception and 18th birthday, and “impairments in adaptive behaviour” are defined as limitations assessed clinically or by standardized scales.

Emotion cannot be dealt with so concisely. There have been well over 100 suggested definitions of emotion, some writers even foregoing the attempt altogether in favour of the gradual emergence of the concept as they talk around it. An idea of the range of the proposed definitions can be seen from the following selection.

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202 EMOTION IN MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE

“Emotion ... the association between certain widespread changes in ongoing operant behaviors and the presentation or removal of reinforcers”. (Millenson, 1967). “In my language, emotions are plans, neural programs which are engaged when the organism is disequilibriated”. (Pribram, 1970). “It is my basic assumption that the labels one attaches to a bodily state how one describes his feelings, are a joint function of ... cognitive factors and of a state of physiological arousal:. (Schachter, 1970). In a paper concerned with defhtion, Kleinginna and Kleinginna ( 1 98 1) seem to combine most previous attempts, with: “Emotion is a complex set of ~teracticm among subjective and objective factors, mediated by neural-hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arou~al, pleasure-displeasure; (b) generate Cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labelling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive, goal-directed and adaptive”. This is obviously an all-embracing, not to say

over-inclusive definition. There are a number of reasons why emotion has proved so difficult to define that after 100 years of trying, this rather cumbersome effort is the best to have emerged. Emotion is a very complex area of human functioning, it does have many facets, and the manner in which these facets reflect b m one another is p m blematic. These, with some of their attendant p m blems, are: (1) Subjectiue feelings. Althou& these might be of prime importance in the every day experience of emotion, how can they be studied? How is it possible to feel what another person feels? Do subjective feelings have a causal role in emotion? ( 2 ) Cognitions. These u s d y reckoned to be in the form of appraisals or evaluations. Do these precede or follow emotion? Do they have a causal role in emotion? (3) Behoviour. Is it possible to learn all there is to learn of emotion by studying only its expression? Is the b e h a v i d study of emotion in animals relevant to the human condition? (4) Physiology. Is physiological arousal a necessary condition for emotion? How can it be measured? Are there physiological response patterns for the various emotions? ( 5 ) The situation Can emotion be studied separately from its context? (6) Effects. How does emotion affect other areas of functioning? What is the relationship between emotion and nonemotion?

As will become evident later, each of these facets has given rise, either alone or in combination, to numerous theories and models of emotion. In the present context, the obvious starting point is to survey what is known about emotion in mentally retarded people based on empirical evidence, and to consider within which type of definition or theory the research has been conducted.

Research Almost the entire thrust of research and theory, if

it can be aggrandised with these terms, into emotion in mentally retarded people has been concerned with so-called emotional disorders. The probable reason for this is that traditionally mental retardation has been viewed as a medical problem, the domain of paediatricians and psychiatrists. Reasonably enough, these disciplines are! oriented to disturbance and disorder. Mentally retarded people are clearly disordered, behaviourally and cognitively, hence it is thought to be likely that their emotions are also disordered. This reasoning, although usually implicit rather than explicit, is nevertheless fallacious. It is an assumption which may or may not be warranted. Also, as will be seen, since the discussion of emotional disorders in mentally retarded people has been conducted mainly by those of a psychiatric background, such disturbance is usually equated with psyqhiatric disorder and tells us nothing about emotion. A com- pelling, if extreme, example of this comes in a book by Szymanski and Tanguay (1980) entitled “Emotional Disorders of Mentally Retarded Persons”. “Emotion” in this title shodd properly, have been replaced with “Psychiatric”. The entire book contains five pages dealing with emotional problems and even these are either merely speculative or but tangentially relevant to emotion.

In another sense, to res~ct a consideration of emotion in mentally retarded people to psychiatric disorder is surprisingly naive. Surely, in any field or research, it is important to be@ without premncep tions, or at least without any that are too glaring.

A typical example of the psychiatric approach can be seen in an analysis by Menolascino (1 968). He classified four frequent types of emotional disturbance in a large group of retarded children as: “Chronic brain syndromes with behavioral and/or psychotic reactions, functional psychoses, adjust- ment reactions of childhood, and psychiatric disturbance not otherwise specified”. From the viewpoint of someone working within the field of emotion, these categories have very little to do with the topic. Webster (1970) makes a worthy attempt to list and describe the emotional disturbances he observed in some retarded children. These included inabilities to make what Webster regarded as emotional

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STRONGMAN 203

significant distinctions between the familiar and unfamiliar, between friends and strangers and between persons and places. Also he argued that their emotional development was impaired by not being able to produce new solutions to old frustrations and by the repetition and inflexibility which characterises the thoughts and behaviour of retarded people. In some cases, he also observed dullness or flatness of emotion, passivity, emotional simplicity, shyness, and so on. Bialer ( 1970) would add anxiety to this list. In passing, it is worth noting that all of these conditions can be routinely observed in nonretarded people. Webster himself concludes that present (that is, in 1970) knowledge does not permit a clear specification of what qualities of emotional development are associated with mental retardation.

Again in 1970, Chess states “Most psychiatric studies agree that emotional disturbances are pro- portionally more fnsuent among mentally retarded children than in the general population of children”, but also points out that in her own studies she has been unable to identify any emotional characteristics invariably associated with mental retardation. She concludes that the emotional disturbances that are shown by some mentally retarded people can be categoxised into brain damage difficulties, reactive disorders, neurosis and psychosis. Again, these categories have very little to do with emotion.

Updating this approach a little, Menolascino and Swanson (1 982) report a detailed analysis of 1 15 mentally retarded individuals. They suggest that these people have a higher that average risk of developing psychiatric disorders such as schize phrenia, personality disorders, psychoneurntic reactions and organic brain syndrome, Their paper is entitled “Emotional disorders in the mentally retarded” but once more has very little to do with emotion.

In a much more closely reasoned article than those that typify this approach, Reiss, Levitan and McNally ( 1 982) make a case for special therapeutic developments for mentally retarded persons who might also be emotionally disturbed. They predicate their plea on the idea that low intelligence may well increase the probability of emotional disturbance. Although a number of investigators, e.g. Eisenberg ( 1958), and Szymanski and Tanguay ( 1980) have produced plausible reasons why this might be so, it remains an article of faith. However, the basic prob lem with hiss et al’s ( 1982) discussion is that they define emotional disturbance (without first defining emotion) as referring to neurotic, psychotic and personality disturbance. Again, here are the standard psychiatric categories. The present argument is not that these have nothing to do with emotion, but rather that they are not primarily concerned with emotion, nor do they tell us much about it.

This same approach is adopted by Mulliken (1 983) in discussion the assessment of emotional disorders, although she does have the perspicacity to state at the outset that “There is no clear-cut definitive statement on emotional disturbance”. In this article, Mulliken makes a serious attempt to say a little for normal emotional development and to look at emotional disorder within this context. However, her analysis is of limited use in the present considerations since she makes little mention or mental retardation. Also, the American Federal definition ofthe emotionally disturbed ( 1977) again includes schizophrenia and is otherwise a sort of miscellaneous, by exclusion, sort of classification of the conditions which cannot be accounted for in other, more obvious ways. A very similar approach is adopted by Lewis and Maclean (1982) in a consideration of the treatment of emotional disorder in mentally retanied people.

Most recently, Benson and Reiss (1984) report a factor analytic study of the symptoms of 131 emotionally disturbed mentally retarded people. They conclude that those who are mentally retarded are at risk of a wide range 0fpsychiatn.c disorders, as well as the traditionally recognised impulse control and aggressive behaviour.

Without belabouring the point further, a similar equating of psychiatric and emotional disorder can be seen for example in Eaton and Menolascino (1 982), Jacobson ( 1982), Kazdin, Matson and Senatore ( 1983), Reid ( 1980). Reiss ( 1982), Reiss, Levitan and Szyszko (1983) and Russell and Tanguay ( 198 1 ). However, perhaps the fmal word should be given to the 1983 revision of the A.A. M. D. Classification in Mental Retardation Here, it is unequivocally stated that mentally retarded people are “known to be at significant risk for the development of emotional and behavioral disorders”. But thereder little reference is made to emotion, other than in similargeneralities. Instead, the list includes short attention span, poor peer relationships, hyperactivity, impulsivity, autism, stereotypy and pica, although aggression and dysphoria are mentioned. It is argued that “high intensity of emotional response” and “negative mood“ have been shown to be possible causes of behavioural disorders in retarded people. Again, there is an imprecision in the description and, like all the .reports that are available in this field, the A.A.M.D. statement on mental retardation tacitly makes emotional disorder congruent with, or at least overlap, psychiatric disorder. The clear conclusion is that while there are no psychiatric disorders specific to mentally retarded people, they experience such disorders more commonly than nonretarded people. All of which enables very little to be said about emotion in these who are retarded.

It is also remarkable that in its 1983 document,

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when dealing with the assessment of mentally retatdad people the A A M D . considers only intelligence, coguitive stages, adaptive behaviour and socio-cnvimtuncntal measures of the family. There is no mention of emotiod development or maturity.

Moving on to a consideration of emotion rather than emational or psychiatric disorder in mentally retarded people an extensive literature match revealed only a very few scholarly articles, one of which was c o n c e r n e d with altruism and the others with emotional expression a d recognition.

Karpf (1977) studied 121 adolescents who were mentally retarded (with IQs between 50 and 80). He gave them a test of social inferenct (30 pictures which have to be interpreted with respect to social cues, interprctaths being elicited by standard questions). Subjects werealsogiventheopportunity to share some money with their class-mates following an induction of either positive or negative affect. Willingness to (altruism) was increased by positive affect induction, altbough negative affect induction had no effects. Induced & d v e states did not influence social inference scores, but there was a significant positive correlation between social inference and concern for athers. These results are similar to those faund in nonretardcd people (e.g. hen, 1970 Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973).

Doman( 1967) based her study on the hypothesis that the ability to recognise the appropriate relationship between expressive behaviour and the context in which it occurs is related to "intellectual maturation". She studied 105 mentalIy retarded people representing a wide range of disability, in their capacity to make a judgement about the emotional feelings being experienced by the central characters in a series of pictures. The conclusion drawn was that 8ccut8cy in this type of perception plus the ability to deal with inoongruities between expression and context both increase with mental age. By far the best study of emotion in mentally

retarded people is that of Gray, Fraser and Leuder (1 983), two psychologists and a psychiatrist, it is perhaps worth noting. They based their investigation on research and ideas developed within the mainstream of the study of emotional expression (e.g. Ekman, 197% Izard, 1971) and from a small collection of studies concerned with the interpretation of emotional expression by schizophrenics (e.g. Walker, Marriott, & Emery, 1980). Gray er a1 studied 13 subjects they defined as miMly retarded (IQ55-87)and 13theydefmedasseverelyretarded (IQ 41-53). More properly these should have been defined respectively as slow learners or borderline retarded and moderately retarded people. They showed them six s t a m h h e d - Phdograpb

representing joy, sadness, surprise, fear, anger and disgust,andtoldthemabriefstoryabouteach. Only subjects who definitely knew tbe meaning of each of the six emotion words were used. They were asked to pick out a pbtograph which portrayed a particular emotion. Results dunonstrated that performance was

comlatedwithintclligence,moreemxsbeingmade by those who were mildly retarded than by t h e who were moderately retarded, but all subjects in the study were less accurate than nonretaded people. Aiso, the conhions that occurred in their perceptions of emotional expression are Merent

relatively poor at mognising anger and fear, con- k i n g them with each other and with disgust and surprise. Generally, mentally retarded people can work on the pleasaatness/unpleasaniness dimen- sion of the recqgwo ' n of emotional expression as well as those who are nonretarded, but are less capable on the attentiodrejection and intensity dimensions. High intensity rejecting emotions are particularly poorly handled by those who are mentally retarded, especially those who are moderately retarded. From this one study of emotional recognition in mentally retarded people a great deal has been learned of similarities and dif5erence.s between them and the non-retarded population. However, althoughitbarelyscratchedthesurfaceof the topic, it provides virtually all the substantive, reliably researched information there is on emotion in retarded people.

The most appropriate summary of the state of knowledge about emotion in mentally retarded people is that it is almastnonexistent What there is mainly takes the fonn of speculation based on psychiatric observations and assumes that mentally retarded people are more at risk of emotional disorder than are those who are nonretarded. Within this tradition, the term"emotional disorder" appears t0beUsedsynonymouslywith"psy~iatric disorder". Other than this, then is a scant handful of empirical studies of emation in mentally retarded people, the most promising of which is that of Gray, er a1 (1983), not least because it demonstrates that such studies can be conducted. It is therefore possible to investigate emotion in mentally retarded people within the coI1ventions of scientifically based psychology rather than psychiatry. Before attempt- ing to discuss how this could best be achieved in the future, it might be helpful to give a little more consideration to possible reasons why it has not been done in the past.

At fmt sight d at a rather simple level of analysis, it seem surprising that so few resources havebeenputintoexploringthenatureofemotionin mentally re- people. Emotion is clearly a primitive, fuadamental, evolutionarily ancient

from those who ale nonretarded. They appear to be

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STRONGMAN 205

aspect of human and animal functioning. From earliest times it has been seen, with knowing and willing, as one of the three major strands of human existence and to occur from the primitive level of the expresdive warning tail-flash in rabbits to the com- plexities of guilt and pride in the human adult. Since emotion is usually regarded as such a primitive system, it might be expected to play a relatively significant part in the lives of mentally retarded people, who, by definition, are primitive intellec- tually. Ifit plays a significant role in the lives ofnon- retarded people, it should be even more sigdkant in the lives of retarded people. This argument would have little force if mentally retarded people were also regarded as emotionally retarded, but quite clearly in the terms of the A.A.M.D. definition for example, they are not.

Why, then, has emotion in mentally retarded people largely been ignored? In my view there are three major rcasons for this. First, other than at the speculative level, emotion in nanretatrfed people was largely ignored for many years, certainly between the 1920s and the early 1960s. This is probably because it is botb difficult to define and difficult to study, some of the reasons for which have been discussed above. If anything, it is even more difficult to study in mentally retarded people. For example, if it is problematic to find out what other persons are experiencing emotionally when one can ask questions, it is presumably even more diflhlt to judge what a mentally retarded person is feeling. To analyse what, if anything, a person of IQ 40 is feeling is as difficult as it is to evaluate what, if anything, an animal is feeling. It might even be more difficult since the animal is probably better adapted to its environment than is the mentally retarded person. Similarly, it would be difficult to explicate the role of cognitions in the emotional reactions of mentally retarded people. However, it should not be more difficult to investigate emotional physiological changes and to measure emotional behaviour in mentally retarded people than in the nonretarded people.

The second major reason for the paucity of research into emotion in mentally retarded people has been explored earlier. Attitudes towards it have been pre-empted by psychiatrically based assumptions about emotional disturbance. This could easily have put off any wouldbe researchers, at least those who might approach the topic from a primary interest in emotion rather than in mentally retarded people. On the other hand, for those who have a main concern with mental retardation it would be difficult to see anything other than the assumption of emotional disturbance, particularly when confronted with the more obvious, indeed, the defining intellectual and behavioural impairments of mental retardation.

Finally, the study of emotion in mentally retarded people may have been neglected as part of the general neglect of retarded people. Until recent times, there has been a lack of interest in any psychological aspects of mental retardation. Doubt- less, in turn, there a n many possible reasons for this but they would go beyond the scope of the present analysis.

Emotion theory There are two ways in which a beginning might be

made into gaining an understanding of emotion in mentally retarded people. Consideration of the major theoretical approaches to emotion might prompt possible research models. Alternatively, analysis of recent research into emotional develop ment in nonnal children might have application to mentally retarded people. These possibilities will be considered in turn.

As was mentioned at the outset, there have been numerous theories of emotion, the first of any import in psychology being that of James (1884) and Lange (1885). However, theories of emotion began considerably before the last century in the writings of philosophers. This tradition has con- tinued in parallel to psychological theory, until recent times when philosophical and psychological theory are growing closer (e.g. Lyons, 1980). Here is not the place to reiterate all of the influential theoriesofemotion(seeStrongman, 1978,1981 for review). Instead, it is perhaps important to consider the major theoretical developments to have occurred in the last few years. For the most part, these have come from the domain of cognitive psychology and reflect what some have seen as the rediscovery of this aspect of human functioning.

Although Schachter (e.g. 1970) can reasonably be said to have aroused recent interest in the role of cognition in emotion, others have carried their analyses much further than him. Mandler (1 976, 1984) for example, argues that the perception of autonomic nervous system activity leads to undifferentiated arousal (which a number of theorists regard as a necessary but not sufficient condition for emotion), the conditions for which lean heavily on cognitive interpretations. This ideaofinterpretation is similar to earlier concepts of appraisal (e.g. Arnold, 1960). but in Mandler’s view goes further in being composed of mental structures, innate reactions and an evaluation of self-perceptions. So, like Schachter and others (even Lyons, 1980), Mandler views emotional experience andbehaviour as a result of an interaction between arousal and cognitive interpretation. Within this same type of conceptual framework, Leventhal(l980) offers a perceptual-motor theory of emotion in which experience and behaviour result from a constructive process involving perceptual and decision-action

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stages. Within the perceptual-motor system, Leventhal posits a hierarchy of three processing systems, expressive-motor, schematic and c o q tual. In particular, the schematic and conceptual attach different types of cognitive process to emotion.

Bower ( 1 98 1) takes a rather different approach to that of Mandler and Leventhal, starting from a consideration of the influence of emotion on memory and thinking. The results of his empirical rescamh led him to suggest that emotion acts as a unit of memory. When activated, this will then prompt memory of events associated with it. This then is a suggestion about an emotion memory, also discussed by Strongman ( 1982).

The analysis of the relationship between emotion and Cognition has been expressed in its most detailed famr in a debate between Zajonc (1 980, 1984) and Lazarus (1982,1984). Basically, and oversimpl@ing some very complex arguments, Zajonc assets that cognition does not precede emotion, as had been previously assumed by cognitive appraisaltheorists. Instead,hearguesthat emotion and cognition are two independent sub- systems and that emotion precedes cognition. Lazarus counters this with the suggestion that people are sources of meaning as well as information processoff and that they react emotionally to meaning without necessarily having complete information. So, in his view, the cognitive appraisal of meaning (the importaac e of a stimulus for well- being) underlies all emotional states.

Although the nature of the relationship between emotion and cognition is very interesting and the debate between Zajonc and Lazaxus is particularly fascinating and representative of some of the most recent ideas on emotion for the present purposes it is important to judge its relevance to the study of emotion in retarded people. Take for example an idea such as cognitive appraisal. There is nothing about the behaviour of mentally retarded people to suggest that they do not make cognitive appraisals, even though these may not be as qhisticated as those of the nonretarded population. By the same token, there is no reason to suppose that if emotion results from an interaction between arousal and cognition in persons within the n o d range of intellectual abiity that it should not also be SO in retarded peaple. However, how would this type of analysis assist in the investigation of emotion in mentally retaded people? Herein lies the difficulty, because the type of research which bas given rise to cognitive theories of emotion and which they in turn have prompted, depends very much on sophisticated verbal material (e.g. Bower, 1981; Strong- man, 1982). Whilst it may be possible to investigate processes such as appraisal in mildly retarded people, particularly following Bower's (1981) use

of hypnosis in studying mood-state-dependent effectsonmcmory, i t w o u l d b e v e r y d t o d o s o in those who are more than mildlymtaded. This would require tbe development of research techniques which arc not immediately obvious. Although the cognitive approach has been the

mostiafluentialandpmmishgintherecentanalysis ofemotiOningeneralitIMYbethattbebehaViOUlYll traditi0noffersamaeusefulaknat.w ' einstudying emotion in retaFded people. Th behaViOUlYll approach to d u n goes back to Watson's ( 191 9) XY, and Zfactors and has frequently beenthought to be too limited in the study of human adults. Although the rtscIvch techniques to which it bas

, they have not been given rise are succcsshlly applied to the mopc complex human emotions. There have been fewer objections to the behavioural approach to the study of emotion in animals and, to somc extent, in children. It may be thatit isalso~intheinvest i~t i~ofemotionin mentally retarded people.

Again, this is not the place torehearse all of the behavioural apjnoaches to emotioll (see Strong- man, 1978). Illustrations from the Skiuncrian tradition and from rccent rcscarch into emotional expression will suf?ice to demonstrate their relevance. the research procedure for the study of conditioned emotional responding (CER) involves the establishment of some ongoing operant behaviour at a steady rate. A classical conditioniag procedure is then supeximposed on this. A neutral stimulus is presented briefly and is termhated with thepresentationofanunconditidstimulus(US) whichisknowntoevdreemotionalbehaviour. Most frequently, with rats as subjects, the operant behaviour has been bar-pressing and the super- kBposedeventshavebeenatightorbuzzrrasacorr ditioning stimulus and an electric shuck as the US. As an example of CER, this specific procedure is &n nferred to as umditioned anxiety or conditioned suppression. Initially, the electric shock has the effect of suppressing all bar-pressing for a while and then as the number of pairings between CS and US increases, so the suppression in bar- pressingbecomesntothetimewhenthecs is present and recovers again immediately after the US (shock) has terminated. Although reliable, the extent of this effect depends on many variables such asUSintensity,durationofCSandthenatureofthe operant baseline.

It is easy to see why this procedure is termed conditioned suppression or conditioned anxiety. By those who have worked in this field (e.g. Millenson, 1967) it is clearly thaught to be a conditioned emotiond effect, an example of circumstances which are thought toaccur duringthe normal course of development. However, this type of conditioned anxiety is only one of a number of possibilities for

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STRONGMAN 201

studying CER The others are:- B.oclii CS-s- cs+s+ cs+#- cs+p+

Postitive mxiety elation - mwr

Here, the positive baseline refers to some ongoing operant behaviour which is maintained by positive reinforcement (e.g. food) and the negative baseline refers to some ongoing operant behavim maintained by negative reinforcement (e.g. avoidance of shock). Superimposed on these baselines can be a CS which p d e s four types of emotion-evoking US S- (e.g. electric shock), S+ (e.g. food), S- (e.g timeoutfromelectricshock), and$+(e.g.time out from food). This leads to the six possibilities shown, the remaining two cells in the table involving such improbably complex conditions as to not merit consideration.

Each ofthe wnditions has been investigated, particularly conditioned anxiety and each has its many examples in every day lie. However, some people would argue that they are far removed from emotion, particularly since they have been studied mainly using rats and pigeons. Is it reasonable to speak of anxiety, elation, anger and relief in such animals? Is it reasonable to study emotion only through change in simple behaviour such as bar- pressing? Most important of all, is it appropriate to study emotion in this indirect way, always looking at its effect on a baseline of some other (operant) behaviour? Ultimately, emotion must be analysed in its own right for a proper understanding, rather than considering only its enhancing or disruptive effects.

Although these possibilities may appear to be reducing the effects of emotion to a minimal level, researchers such as Millenson (1%7), following very much in Watson's tradition, argue that while these types of emotional reaction are basic, others are simply compounds of these and others differ from one another only in intensity. Without debat- ingthepossiblemeritsandshortcomiogsoftheCER procedures and the views to which they have given rise, it is evident that such procedures would adapt readily to the study of wnditioned emotion in mentaUy retarded people. Much oftheir behaviour can be said to resemble that of relatively simple bar- pressing and it is also the case that emotion-cvolcing events must OcCBsionally become superimposed on this. In their typically somewhat restricted environment and with their relatively restricted behavioural repertoire, the study of CERs should be a straightforward matter and could give considerable insights into effects of emotion-provoking effects on their lives.

It is worth noting that another much investigated aspect of emotional responding in animals, the tius- tration effect (Amsel & Russell, 1952) could be similarly studied with comparative ease in mentally re- people, but to date has not been, although it has been investigated in nometarcled children (e.g. Ryan & Watson, 1968). The frustration effect is an increase in the vigour of responding wbich typically occurs when an organism experiences nonreward in circumstances in which reward has previously been experienced.

Another, and completely Merent aspect of the behavioural analysis of emotion which would be of considerable interest to study in mentally retarded people stems from investigations of emotional expression and its recognition. The research of hard( 1971,1977) and Ekman (1972) has become increasingly sophisticated and a great deal is known about the determinants of emotional expression, what influences it, its cross-cultural similarities and differences, how it can be used to make predictions, and how it can be changed. Within this context, M(1977) is a convincing proselytizer of his dif- ferential theory of emotion, which, at its simplest, suggests that certain fundamental emotions are built into us and are discrete and differentiable, although modifiable by experience. Although predicated on research into emotional expression, this theory, wing against the idea of emotion as a unitary concept as it does, is very similar to the more strictly behaviourist views of such as MiIlenson (1967).

As Gray el a1 (1982) have demonstrated, it is fully possible to study emotional expression and recognition in mentally retarded people. However, this study, even though meritorious, had barely made a beginning. Most of the techniques of study used in investigations of emotional expression in nonretarded could readily be extended to retarded people. Apart from the obvious comparisons of emotional expression which could be made between nonretarded and retarded people, there is a wide range of basic information that could be gathered about emotional expression in those who are retarded. Also, it would be important to ascertain the extent to which they are capable of the accurate rewgnition of emotion in other persons, both retarded and nonrctarded persons, and to detennine the extent to which emotional expressions in the retarded reflect discreet differentiable emotions. Finally, it would be of particular significance to mentally retarded people to attempt to manipulate their emotional expressions in order to alter (improve) their mood or emotional experience, should this be thought appropriate.

Emotional development Having established that there are aspects of

research and theory in emotion in general which can

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be extended to the study of emotion in mentally retarded people it is important to consider a similar possible extension of knowledge, theory and research techniques from the area of emotional development. For very many years, the received wisdom concerning emotional development was surprisingly unsagacious - it had developed little further than the massively influential Bridges (1933). The generally accepted idea was that emotional expression and experience begins in the infant as broadly undifferentiated, this being the innate component. Thereafter, it becomes increasingly differentiated into discrete emotions as a function of age. It was never made clear by Bridges or by the textbook authors who so carefully recapitulated her ideas during the following 50 years or so, whether these age-related effects were maturational (and hence innately influenced) or environmental. However, very recently, there have at last been some new developments in the study of emotion in children.

Malatesta (1982) describes three studies in which she takes the kind of typological approach exemplified byIzard(1971,1977),EIunan(1972, 1973) and Tomkins (1962, 1963). The stress is placed on discrete emotions as reflected in particular experiences and expressions. Results with infants (based on detailed observations and ques- tionnaires of mother/infaat interactions) showed that three to six months olds learn to make their emotional facial expressions similar to W e of their mothers. This implies that emotion in very young infants is not undifferentiated. Results also showed that mothers attempt to shape infant emotional expression by modelliig and by making contingent responsrs. These studies also demonstrated that infants are very responsive to nonverbal emotional messages which seem both to arouse and to main- tain attention.

Malatesta (1 982) argues that " ... the expression of emotion is subject to social influence and that the impact is probably substantial". Also, some emotions appear to be more important than others for particular individuals as they grow and mature, something which may well hinge on constitutional factors. However, Malatesta draws special attention to the idea of emotion socialization, considering how people learn the rules which govern emotional expression and how such rules might change with age.

Lewis and Michalson (1982) also consider the manner in which emotion might be socialized, rest- ing their analysis on the view that the most important role in emotional development is played by a child's social environment. They consider in some detail the significance of mother as the major (although not necessarily the sole) socializing agent and the possible importance of biological factors.

They argue that modeis of emotional development which are based on the idea OF socialization "... suggest that expenence and state may not be con- nected in a one to one fashion and that the socialization task is to connect them". (their italics). Socialization accomplishes a match between the cultural expectations of experience with particular emotional states seen in emotional expressions in particular situations elicited by certain stimuli. As an example, Lewis and Michalson suggest that children may experience fear "only to the degree to which they have been socialized" rather than automatically through being in a fearful state. The emotional socialization itselfthey believe to depend on the interpretation, labelling and interactive behaviours of others. In their view then, it is the socialization process which brings about the differentiation of emotions into the highly complex cognitively based matters that they become in the developing child.

Continuing to take this type of theoretical perspective For the moment, Fogel ( 1982) considers questions such as whether emotions in infants occur in predictable sequences, must there be sequences of emotion, and what makes an infant's emotional experiences change in the course of development? Fogel builds his studies on Field's (1 977, 1980, 198 I ) optimal-stimulation model of emotion and interaction. Field's model has it that on those occasions on which the adult gives too much or too little stimulation, the infant withdraws. The optimal amount of stimulation will depend on various characteristics of the infant. Also important in this context are Sroufe and Waters (1 976) influential data which show that infant's arousal levels fluctuate regularly but not too far from same optimal level. There is a gradual increase in emotional tension and then its release. Sroufe and Waters found that their heart rate measure of tension (arousal) relate to behaviours such as smiling. On the basis of his researches following from

these models, Fogel himself (1982) constructs a model of emotional sequences in early mother- infant interactions. The model predicted a sequence of high intensity infant emotion (smiles and eye gazes) at the start of interaction. This would be followed by withdrawal, all leading via more experiences to the infant gradually gaining more control over the sequences of arousal. Fogel accounts for these developmental changes with a theory of af'rective tolerance, developed by Eptein (1 967) and Woman ( 1980), whereby individuals gradually come to be able to reduce that arousal to an originally highly arousing stimulus, without dis- engaging themselves from it entirely. This is thought to occur through a simultaneous development of a physiological tolerance for the arousal and an "addiction" to the stimulus.

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STRONGMAN 209

The recent research and ideas outlined in this section are clearly relevant to the study of emotion in mentally retarded people. This can be most easily expressed through a list of research questions, none of which has yet been addressed in mentally retarded people. It is worth bearing in mind that each of these questions arises from the results of research conducted on preverbal infants, with all of its attendant difficulties. Any research designs and techniques appropriate for use with infants can surely be adapted with minimal Mad t i e s to the study of mentally retarded people.

Are mentally retarded people responsive to nonverbal expressions in others, particularly their primary caretakers? Do their emotional expressions model those of whoever is around them? Do they learn any rules governing the expression of emotion, and if so, how? Are the rules which govern their emotional expression similar to those which govern emotional expression in nometanhi children? If not, how do they differ? In other words, does emotional expression in mentally retarded people add to the understanding of its apparent univer- sality? How does emotional expression in mentally retarded people change with age? Does it differ at different levels of retardation? Does it run in sequences of increasing and decreasing arousal similar to those seen in nonretarded infants? Can mentally retarded people experience one emotion for long periods of time? What brings about changes of expression in mentally retarded people? What are the sequences of emotional interaction between mentally retarded people and their caretakers? How important is the social environment to the develop ment of emotional expression and experience in mentally retarded people? And so on,

At this point, it is perhaps apposite to speculate a little. A firm prediction would be that as one moves from mildly to profoundly mentally retarded people so the likelihood of cognitive involvement decreases. If, as seems highly probable, cognition and emotion are intimately interrelated, and if mental retardation is defined as it is, then a decrease in cognitive involvement with greater degrees of retardation must follow. This again suggests, as was mentioned earlier, the appropriateness of studying emotion in profoundly and severely retarded people using b e h a v i d procedures such as CER It is likely that the emotional lives of profoundly and severely retarded people is simple, direct a d unsophisticated with few compound emotions and few subtle shadings. Ifthis is indeed found to be so, it would then be interesting to observe ifthey are capable ofbeing taught or learning some more complex- ities and richness of emotional experience through socio-emotional interaction with adults.

Moving to moderately and mildly retarded people, the prediction would be that their emotional

lives would be little different from that of nonretarded people. More controversially, it is even possible that a full emotional life could be experienced potentially by persons at any level of mental retardation, Emotion is after all mediated in different areas of the central nervous system than are cognitive capacities. These areas may well be entirely unimpairad, n o d in structure.

This possibility is perhaps the most important reason of all for increasing the study of emotion in mentally r e W people. Within western cultures, most people are taught to suppress emotions rather thantolearntocontro1,useanddirectthem. Inother words, the education of the emotions has been almost entirely neglected. It is possible that mentally retarded people could learn to control, change, use and in general, educate their emotions more easily than they could the cognitive or intellectual aspects of their lives, even though both aspects interact.

Although there appears to be a wide open field of research into emotion in mentally retarded people, which could be simply derived h.om recent investigations with normal infants, there are a number of problems which would have to be considered by anyone who walks in this field. Close attention to an interesting summary article by Dunn ( 1982) on the problems of research into emotion in infancy would provide a good starting point.

Dunn (1982) points out that the recent develop ments in infant emotional research have made it quite clear that in order to paint an accurate picture it is crucial to study an infant’s behaviour in ordinary, relaxed, playful interaction with its mother or father. This point should be equally applied to the study of emotion in mentally retarded people. Such work with infants has demonstrated that from the s&rt they are particularly responsive to people, the mother is generally very sensitive to them socially, the infant behaves differently to its mother from objects and strangers, and is particularly sensitive to any unusual maternal behaviour. Does all this apply to mentally retarded people? What little attention has so far been paid to infant development, although Sroufe and Waters (1 976) are an exception, is to study emoti00 and cognitive development “as twin aspects of a single process’’ (Dunn, 1982). Although some emotion theorists would debate this implicit theory, it is an idea worthy of consideration. Dunn (1982) lays great stress on what particular

experiences (including emotion) mean to a child However, it is difficult to see how this can be judged either in idants or in mentally retarded people at anything more than the sheerly speculative level. In this context though, it is Fogel (1 982) who gives an insightful discussion of a possible relationship between emotion and cognition. He suggests,

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following Tomlrins (1962) that emotion both organises experience and provides a sense of meaning, but also argues that changes in emotional tension depend on cognitions from an infant’s evaluation of a stimulus - this is the OM appraisal process.

In one sense, this brief discussion of meaning completes the circle. As was stated at the outset, the traditionalapproachtotheconsiderationofemotion in mentally retarded people has been psychiatrically based. If it is concerned with anything, psychiatry may be said, at least via psychoanalytic interpretation, to be concerned with meaning. The present aim has eschewed this approach, finding it at the least, unconvincing. However, from the research to date it appears that infants experience emotions the expressions of which are dbcrete and which have the appearance ofthe separate emotions as we have learned to label them in every day life. These expressions probably have meaning for the infants, it is di!licult tosay, but as Dunn( 1982) concludes, they certainly have meaning for their caretakers. Is the same true for those who are primarily concerned with the welfare of mentally retarded people? And are they in a reasonable position to say what the emotional experiences of mentally retarded peopk mean to the mentally retarded as they, the caretakers, observe it rather than through the mirror of their expressions?

Conclusions The aim of this paper was to analyse emotion in

mentally retarded people, the most surprising point proving to be the dearth of knowledge on the topic. There are two probable reasons for this. Firstly, mental retardation has, understandably, been viewed largely as a matter of intellectual or cognitive deficit, with emotion having no role to play. The second reason lies within the tradition of mental retardation being seen as a medical matter, primarily the domain of the psychiatrist. This has led to the tacit assumption that the only relevant emotional aspects of mental retardation are those of emotional disturbance. This, in turn, has been crudely equated with psychiatric disturbance and thereafter, with the exception of a very small number of studies, the question of emotion in mentally retarded people has been ignored.

Emotion is a very extensive topic, interest in which has experienced a resurgence during the last &en years or so. Analysis ofexisting research and theory suggests that there are two major approaches which have obvious and useful application to an understanding of mental retardation. The main theoretical thrust in the recent study of emotion has been concerned with the interplay between cognition and emotion. Although this might be of conceptual interest with respect to mental retardation, th

techniques of study to which it has given rise do not readily transpose to mental retadation. However, techniques which derive from the behavioural analysis of emotion are much more relevant to mental retadation. In particular, the procedures developedto~umditionedemotionalrespond- hgappeartoofferconsiderabkpnmise in the study ofconditioncd anxiety, elation, relief and anger in mentally retarded people. Also within the behavioural framework recent research and theory into emotional expression and its recognition are directly applicable to the study of mental retardation. Intenstingly, the best of the small group of methodologically and conceptually acceptable studies of emotion in mentally retarded people (Gray el 44 1983), was concerned with its expression.

Of even greater potential applicability to the StUdyofemotionin~tallyreWpeopkisvery recent research and theory into emotional develop ment in infants. This has been both conceptually and methodologically sophisticated (although within a ~turalist ic framework) and mainly involves the close observation of the interaction of infants with their primary caretakers, usually their mothers. This research is again a part extension of work in emotional expression in adults and prompts a rejection of the more (covertly) biological theories of emotional development that characterize discrete emotions as gradually unfolding from undifferentiated arousal as a hct ion of age. Research hdings concerning emotional develop-

ment in nonretarded human infants in the last few years suggest a series of relevant questions to ask about the emotional experience and expression of emotion in mentally retarded people. its reliance on socialization and interaction with primary caretakers and its relationship with cognition. The techniques of study developed with infants can be straightforwardly applied to mentally retarded people andcouldleadtothegatheringofmuchbasic information about this important aspect of their lives. The result could have much further-reaching implications for research, theory and therapy in mentally retarded people than the mere assumption of emotional disturbance. Emotion in mentally retarded people may not be disturbed at all and may be little different in its development and sources of influence from emotion in nonretarded people. It remains to be seen.

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STRONGMAN 21 1

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CALL FOR GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MENTAL HEALTH ASPECTS OF MENTAL RETARDATION

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS JUNE 8010,1987

An international, interdisciplinary conference on the mental health aspects of mental retardation will be held in Chicago on June 8- 1 0,1987. The purpose of the conference is to establish an international research agenda. Invited participants include distinguished researchers in the field.

Graduate students are invited to submit completed, unpublished research to the conference. Papers will be selected for presentation in poster sessions. The submitted research may be in any area relevant to the mental health aspects ofmental retardation such as epidemiology, etiology, diagnosis, assessment, treatment, and prevention of emotional disturbance.

All submissions must be in English and include three copies of a 500-wd abstract with address and phone numbers of authors and two self-addressed envelopes. The deadline for submission is December 15,1986.

Committee on graduate student participation:

Betsey A. Benson, University of Illinois at Chicago Patrick Schloss, Pennsylvania State University Andrea Zetlin, University of California, Los Angeles

Send to:

Betsey A. Benson ISDD Mental Health Prognun Department of Psychology University of Illiuois at Chicago Box 4348 Chicago, Illinois 60680

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emotion in mentally retarded people

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