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The Emissions Gap Report 2013A UNEP Synthesis Report


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Published by the United Na ons Environment Programme (UNEP), November 2013

Copyright UNEP 2013

ISBN: 978-92-807-3353-2DEW/1742/NA

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The Emissions Gap Report 2013A UNEP Synthesis Report

November 2013

U N E P


4/64The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Acknowledgementsiv

Acknowledgements

Scien c Steering Commi eeJoseph Alcamo, Chair (UNEP, Kenya); Bert Metz (EuropeanClimate Founda on, Netherlands); Mnica Araya (Nivela,Costa Rica); Tomasz Chruszczow (Ministry of Environment,Poland); Simon Maxwell (Overseas Development Ins tute,United Kingdom); Klaus Mschen (Federal EnvironmentAgency, Germany); Ka a Simeonova (UNFCCC Secretariat,Germany); Youba Sokona (South Centre, Switzerland); MerlynVan Voore (UNEP, France); Ji Zou (Na onal Center for ClimateChange Strategy and Interna onal Coopera on, China).

Chapter 2Lead authors : Michel den Elzen (PBL NetherlandsEnvironmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), TarynFransen (World Resources Ins tute, USA), Hans-HolgerRogner (Interna onal Ins tute for Applied SystemsAnalysis, Austria).

Contribu ng authors: Giacomo Grassi (EuropeanCommissions Joint Research Centre, Italy), JohannesGtschow (Potsdam Ins tute for Climate Impact Research,Germany), Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Kelly Levin (WorldResources Ins tute, USA), Mark Roelfsema (PBL NetherlandsEnvironmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands),Elizabeth Sawin (Climate Interac ve, USA), ChristopherTaylor (Department of Energy and Climate Change, United

Kingdom), Zhao Xiusheng (Tshingua University, China).Reviewers: Joshua Busby (University of Texas at Aus n, USA),Joanna House (Bristol University, United Kingdom), ArianeLabat (European Commission, Belgium), Gunnar Luderer(Potsdam Ins tute for Climate Impact Research, Germany),Bert Metz (European Climate Founda on, Netherlands),Klaus Mschen (Federal Environment Agency, Germany),Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Roberto Schae er(Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Ka a Simeonova(UNFCCC Secretariat, Germany).

Other input: Jusen Asuka (Ins tute for Global EnvironmentalStudies, Japan), Priya Barua (World Resources Ins tute, USA),Jenna Blumenthal (World Resources Ins tute, USA), CaseyCronin (Climate Works Founda on, USA), Hannah Frster(ko Ins tut, Germany), Andries Hof (PBL NetherlandsEnvironmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Olivia

Kember (The Climate Ins tute, Australia), Kevin Kennedy(World Resources Ins tute, USA), Alexey Kokorin (WorldWildlife Founda on, Russian Federa on), Takeshi Kuramochi(Ins tute for Global Environmental Studies, Japan), ApurbaMitra (World Resources Ins tute, USA), Smita Nakhooda(Overseas Development Ins tute, United Kingdom),Gabriela Nio (Mexican Centre for Environmental Law,Mexico), Michael Obeiter (World Resources Ins tute, USA),Jos Olivier (PBL Netherlands Environmental AssessmentAgency, Netherlands), Le cia Pineda (Mexican Centre forEnvironmental Law, Mexico), Viviane Romeiro (University ofSo Paulo, Brazil), Kath Rowley (Climate Change Authority,Australia), Ranping Song (World Resources Ins tute,China), Carlos Tornel (Mexican Centre for EnvironmentalLaw, Mexico).

Chapter 3Lead authors: Gunnar Luderer (Potsdam Ins tute for ClimateImpact Research, Germany), Joeri Rogelj (ETH Zurich,Switzerland), Roberto Schae er (Federal University of Rio deJaneiro, Brazil).

Contribu ng authors: Rob Dellink (OECD, France), TatsuyaHanaoka (Na onal Ins tute for Environmental Studies,Japan), Kejun Jiang (Energy Research Ins tute, China), JasonLowe (MetO ce, United Kingdom), Michiel Schae er (Climate

Analy cs, USA), Keywan Riahi (Interna onal Ins tute forApplied Systems Analysis, Austria), Fu Sha (Na onal Centerfor Climate Change Strategy and Interna onal Coopera on,China), Detlef P. van Vuuren (PBL Netherlands EnvironmentalAssessment Agency, Netherlands).

Reviewers: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands EnvironmentalAssessment Agency, Netherlands), Bert Metz (EuropeanClimate Founda on, Netherlands), Klaus Mschen (FederalEnvironment Agency, Germany), Daniel Puig (UNEP RisCentre, Denmark), Massimo Tavoni (Fondazione Eni EnricoMa ei, Italy), Christopher Taylor (Department of Energy andClimate Change, United Kingdom).

Other input : Peter Kolp (Interna onal Ins tute for AppliedSystems Analysis, Austria).


5/64The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Acknowledgements v

Chapter 4Lead authors: Henry Neufeldt (World Agroforestry Centre -ICRAF, Kenya).

Contribu ng authors: Tapan K. Adhya (KIIT University,India), Jeanne Y. Coulibaly (AfricaRice, Benin), GabrielleKissinger (Lexeme Consul ng, Canada), Genxing Pan (NanjingAgricultural University, China).

Reviewers: Ane e Engelund Friis (Danish Agriculture and Food

Council, Denmark), Bert Metz (European Climate Founda on,Netherlands), William Moomaw (Tu s University, USA), KlausMschen (Federal Environment Agency, Germany), Chris neNegra (EcoAgriculture Partners, USA), Anne Olho (UNEP RisCentre, Denmark), Ka a Simeonova (UNFCCC Secretariat,Germany), Youba Sokona (South Centre, Switzerland).

Chapter 5Lead authors : Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), JenniferMorgan (World Resources Ins tute, USA).

Contribu ng authors: Yemi Katerere (IndependentConsultant, Zimbabwe), Lutz Weischer (World ResourcesIns tute, Germany), Durwood Zaelke (Ins tute forGovernance and Sustainable Development, USA).

Reviewers: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands EnvironmentalAssessment Agency, Netherlands), Johannes Gtschow(Potsdam Ins tute for Climate Impact Research, Germany),Ariane Labat (European Commission, Belgium), Kelly Levin(World Resources Ins tute, USA), Bert Metz (EuropeanClimate Founda on, Netherlands), Daniel Puig (UNEP RisCentre, Denmark), Christopher Taylor (Department of Energyand Climate Change, United Kingdom).

Chapter 6Lead authors : Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Anne Olho(UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark).

Contribu ng authors: Kornelis Blok (Ecofys, Netherlands),Taryn Fransen (World Resources Ins tute, USA).

Reviewers: Joshua Busby (University of Texas at Aus n, USA),Annie Dufey (Fundacin Chile, Chile), Asger Garnak (Ministryof Climate, Energy and Buildings, Denmark), Bert Metz(European Climate Founda on, Netherlands), Klaus Mschen(Federal Environment Agency, Germany), Daniel Puig (UNEPRis Centre, Denmark), Ka a Simeonova (UNFCCC Secretariat,

Germany), Youba Sokona (South Centre, Switzerland), KiranSura (PricewaterhouseCoopers, United Kingdom), EliotWhi ngton (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom).

Other Input: Annie Dufey (Fundacin Chile, Chile), YemiKaterere (Independent Consultant, Zimbabwe).

Thanks also to:Keith Alverson (UNEP, Kenya), Stuart Crane (UNEP, Kenya),David Crossley (Regulatory Assistance Project, Australia),Davide DAmbrosio (Interna onal Energy Agency, France),Shyamasree Dasgupta (Jadavpur University, India), Jus neGarre (Interna onal Energy Agency, France), AntoniaGawel (Independent Consultant, Bhutan), Michael Grubb(University of Cambridge, United Kingdom), James ArthurHaselip (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Michael Mendelsohn(Na onal Renewable Energy Laboratory, USA), Pedro Filipe

Paralta Carqueija (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), DanielPerczyk (Ins tuto Torcuato Di Tella, Argen na), Lynn Price(Lawrence Berkeley Na onal Laboratory, USA), WilsonRickerson (Meister Consultants Group, USA), Joyashree Roy(Jadavpur University, India), Misato Sato (London School ofEconomics, United Kingdom), Janet Sawin (Sunna Research,USA), Andrew Sco (Overseas Development Ins tute, UnitedKingdom), Jacob Krog Sbygaard (Ministry of Climate, Energyand Buildings, Denmark), Geng Yong (Na onal Academy ofSciences, China), Changhua Wu (The Climate Group, China).

Editorial Team:Joseph Alcamo (UNEP, Kenya), Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris Centre,Denmark), Anne Olho (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark),Volodymyr Demkine (UNEP, Kenya), Bert Metz (EuropeanClimate Founda on, Netherlands).

Project Coordina on:Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Anne Olho (UNEPRis Centre, Denmark), Tasia Spangsberg Christensen (UNEPRis Centre, Denmark), Volodymyr Demkine (UNEP, Kenya),John Christensen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Me eAnnelie Rasmussen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), SeraphineHaeussling (UNEP, France).

Secretariat and Media Support:Harsha Dave (UNEP, Kenya), Pia Riis Kofoed-Hansen (UNEPRis Centre, Denmark), Sunday A. Leonard (UNEP, Kenya),Me e Annelie Rasmussen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark),Shereen Zorba (UNEP, Kenya), Neeya Patel (UNEP, Kenya),Kelvin Memia (UNEP, Kenya).

Gap Model Calcula onsJrgen Fenhann (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Jacob IpsenHansen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark).

Climate Model Calcula onsJoeri Rogelj (ETH Zurich, Switzerland).

EditorBart Ullstein

Design and LayoutAudrey Ringler (UNEP)

Layout and Prin ngUNON, Publishing Services Sec on, ISO 14001:2004 cer ed


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7/64viiThe Emissions Gap Report 2013 Glossary vii

Glossary

The entries in this glossary are adapted from de ni onsprovided by authorita ve sources, such as the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Addi onality A criterion some mes applied to projectsaimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It s pulatesthat the emission reduc ons accomplished by the projectwould not have happened anyway had the project nottaken place.

Aerosols Airborne solid or liquid par cles, with a typical sizeof between 0.01 and 10 micrometer (a millionth of a meter)that reside in the atmosphere for at least several hours. Theymay in uence the climate directly through sca ering andabsorbing radia on, and indirectly by modifying the op calproper es and life me of clouds.

Agroforestry Farming management prac ce characterizedby the deliberate inclusion of woody perennials onfarms, which usually leads to signi cant economic and/orecological bene ts between woody and non-woody systemcomponents. In most documented cases of successfulagroforestry, tree-based systems are more produc ve, moresustainable and more a uned to peoples cultural or materialneeds than treeless alterna ves. Agroforestry also providessigni cant mi ga on bene ts by sequestering carbon fromthe atmosphere in the tree biomass.

Annex I countries The industrialised countries (and thosein transi on to a market economy) that took on obliga onsto reduce their greenhouse gas emissions under the UnitedNa ons Framework Conven on on Climate Change.

Biomass plus carbon capture and storage (BioCCS) Useof energy produced from biomass where the combus ongases are then captured and stored underground or used,for example, in industrial processes. Gases generatedthrough, for example, a fermenta on process (as opposedto combus on) can also be captured.

Black carbon The substance formed through the incompletecombus on of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass, which isemi ed in both anthropogenic and naturally occurring soot.It consists of pure carbon in several linked forms. Black

carbon warms the Earth by absorbing heat in the atmosphereand by reducing albedo, the ability to re ect sunlight, when

deposited on snow and ice.

Bo om-up model In the context of this report, a model thatrepresents a system by looking at its detailed underlyingparts. For example, a bo om-up model of emissions wouldcompute the various sources of emissions, sector-by-sector,and then add these components together to get a totalemissions es mate.

Business-as-usual In the context of this report, a scenarioused for projec ons of future emissions that assumes thatno new ac on will be taken to mi gate emissions.

Carbon credits Tradable permits which aim to reducegreenhouse gas emissions by giving them a monetary value.

Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2e) A simpli ed way to placeemissions of various radia ve forcing agents on a commonfoo ng by accoun ng for their e ect on climate. It describes,for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, theamount of carbon dioxide that would have the same globalwarming ability, when measured over a speci ed meperiod. For the purpose of this report, greenhouse gasemissions (unless otherwise speci ed) are the sum of thebasket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A of the Kyoto

Protocol, expressed as carbon dioxide equivalents assuminga 100-year global warming poten al.

Carbon leakage The increase in greenhouse gas emissionsoccurring outside countries taking domes c mi ga onac on.

Condi onal pledge Pledges made by some countries thatare con ngent on the ability of na onal legislatures to enactthe necessary laws, ambi ous ac on from other countries,realiza on of nance and technical support, or other factors.

Double coun ng In the context of this report, double coun-ng refers to a situa on in which the same emission reduc onsare counted towards mee ng two countries pledges.


8/64viii The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Glossaryviii

Emission pathway The trajectory of annual globalgreenhouse gas emissions over me.

Greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol Theseinclude the six main greenhouse gases, as listed inAnnex A of the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2); methane(CH4); nitrous oxide (N 2O); hydro uorocarbons (HFCs);per uorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexa uoride (SF 6).

Integrated assessment models Models that seek to combineknowledge from mul ple disciplines in the form of equa onsand/or algorithms in order to explore complex environmentalproblems. As such, they describe the full chain of climatechange, including relevant links and feedbacks betweensocio-economic and biophysical processes.

Interna onal coopera ve ini a ves Ini a ves outsideof the United Na ons Framework Conven on on ClimateChange aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gasesby promo ng ac ons that are less greenhouse gas intensive,compared to prevailing alterna ves.

Kyoto Protocol The interna onal environmental treatyintended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It buildsupon the United Na ons Framework Conven on onClimate Change.

Later-ac on scenarios Climate change mi ga on scenariosin which emission levels in the near term, typically up to2020 or 2030, are higher than those in the correspondingleast-cost scenarios.

Least-cost scenarios Climate change mi ga on scenariosassuming that emission reduc ons start immediately a er

the model base year, typically 2010, and are distributedop mally over me, such that aggregate costs of reachingthe climate target are minimized.

Lenient rules Pledge cases with maximum Annex I land use,land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplusemissions units, and maximum impact of double coun ng.

Likely chance A likelihood greater than 66 percent. Usedin this report to convey the probabili es of mee ngtemperature limits.

Medium chance A likelihood of 5066 percent. Used in thisreport to convey the probabili es of mee ng temperaturelimits.

Montreal Protocol The Montreal Protocol on Substancesthat Deplete the Ozone Layer is an interna onal treaty thatwas designed to reduce the produc on and consump onof ozone-deple ng substances in order to reduce theirabundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect theEarths ozone layer.

Non-Annex I countries A group of developing countriesthat have signed and ra ed the United Na ons Framework

Conven on on Climate Change. They do not have bindingemission reduc on targets.

No- llage agriculture Farming prac ce characterized bythe elimina on of soil ploughing by seeding a crop directlyunder the mulch layer from the previous crop. It relies onpermanent soil cover by organic amendments, and thediversi ca on of crop species grown in sequences and/orassocia on. This approach avoids emissions caused by soildisturbances related to ploughing, and from burning fossilfuels to run farm machinery for ploughing.

Pledge For the purpose of this report, pledges includeAnnex I targets and non-Annex I ac ons, as included inAppendix I and Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord, andsubsequently revised and updated in some instances.

Radia ve forcing Change in the net, downward minusupward, irradiance, expressed in wa s per square meter(W/m 2), at the tropopause due to a change in an externaldriver of climate change, such as, for example, a changein the concentra on of carbon dioxide or the output ofthe Sun. For the purposes of this report, radia ve forcingis further de ned as the change rela ve to the year 1750

and, unless otherwise noted, refers to a global and annualaverage value.

Scenario A descrip on of how the future may unfold basedon if-then proposi ons. Scenarios typically include an ini alsocio-economic situa on and a descrip on of the key drivingforces and future changes in emissions, temperature orother climate change-related variables.

Strict rules Pledge cases in which the impact of land use,land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplusemissions units are set to zero.

Top-down model A model that applies macroeconomictheory, econometric and op misa on techniques toaggregate economic variables. Using historical data onconsump on, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-downmodels assess nal demand for goods and services, andsupply from main sectors, such as energy, transporta on,agriculture and industry.

Transient climate response Measure of the temperature risethat occurs at the me of a doubling of CO 2 concentra on inthe atmosphere.

Transient climate response to cumula ve carbon emissions Measure of temperature rise per unit of cumula vecarbon emissions.

Uncondi onal pledges Pledges made by countries withoutcondi ons a ached.

20 th 80 th percen le range Results that fall within the2080 percent range of the frequency distribu on of resultsin this assessment.


9/64ixThe Emissions Gap Report 2013 Acronyms ix

Acronyms

AAU Assigned Amount UnitADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Pla orm

AR4 Fourth Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

AR5 Fi h Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

AWD Alternate We ng and DryingBaU Business-as-UsualBC black carbonBioCCS Bio-energy combined with Carbon Capture and

StorageBP Bri sh PetroleumBRT Bus Rapid TransitCCAC Climate and Clean Air Coali on to Reduce Short-

lived Climate PollutantsCCS Carbon Capture and StorageCDIAC Carbon Dioxide Informa on Analysis CenterCDM Clean Development MechanismCEM Clean Energy MinisterialCER Cer ed Emission Reduc onCFC chloro uorocarbonCO

2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent

COP Conference of the Par es to the United Na onsFramework Conven on on Climate Change

CP1 First Commitment Period of the Kyoto ProtocolCP2 Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto

ProtocolEDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric

ResearchEIA Energy Informa on Administra onERU Emission Reduc on UnitEU-ETS EU Emissions Trading SystemGDP Gross Domes c ProductGEA Global Energy Assessment

GHG greenhouse gasGt gigatonne

GWP Global Warming Poten alHCFC hydrochloro uorocarbonHFC hydro uorocarbonIAM Integrated Assessment ModelICAO Interna onal Civil Avia on Organiza onICI Interna onal Coopera ve Ini a veIEA Interna onal Energy AgencyIMO Interna onal Mari me Organiza onIPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeLULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and ForestryNAMA Na onally Appropriate Mi ga on Ac onNGO Non-Governmental Organiza onOC organic carbonODS ozone deple ng substancesPAM policies and measuresPPP Purchasing Power ParityPV photovoltaicRD&D research, development and demonstra onREDD+ Reduced Emissions from Deforesta on and

Forest Degrada onRPS Renewable Por olio StandardsSO

2 sulphur dioxide

SOC soil organic carbon

TCR transient climate responseTCRE transient climate response to cumula ve carbon

emissionsUDP urea deep placementUNEP United Na ons Environment ProgrammeUNFCCC United Na ons Framework Conven on on

Climate Change


10/64The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Chapter Namex The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Forewordx

Achim Steiner UN Under-Secretary-General,UNEP Execu ve Director

The latest assessment by Working Group I of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released

earlier this year, concluded that climate change remainsone of the greatest challenges facing society. Warmingof the climate system is unequivocal, human-in uenced,and many unprecedented changes have been observedthroughout the climate system since 1950. These changesthreaten life on Earth as we know it. Con nued emissions ofgreenhouse gases will cause further warming and changesin all components of the climate system. Limi ng climatechange will require substan al and sustained reduc onsof greenhouse gas emissions. But how much reduc onis needed?

Further to the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Cancn

agreements in 2010, interna onal e orts under the UnitedNa ons Framework Conven on on Climate Change arefocused on keeping the average rise in global temperatureto below 2 C, compared to pre-industrial levels. Currentcommitments and pledges by developed and developingna ons can take the world part of the way towards achievingthis 2 C target, but this assessment shows that the there iss ll a signi cant gap between poli cal ambi on and prac calreality. In short, addi onal emission reduc ons are needed.

With this fourth assessment of the gap between ambi onsand needs, the United Na ons Environment Programmeseeks to inform governments and the wider public on howfar the response to climate change has progressed over thepast year, and thus whether the world is on track to meetthe 2 C target. In addi on to reviewing na onal pledgesand ac ons, this years assessment, for the rst me, alsoreviews interna onal coopera ve ini a ves which, whilepoten ally overlapping, serve to complement na onalpledges and ac ons.

From a technical standpoint, mee ng the 2 C targetremains possible: it will take a combina on of fullimplementa on of current na onal pledges and ac ons, ascaling up of the most e ec ve interna onal coopera veini a ves, and addi onal mi ga on e orts at the countrylevel. All these e orts will require strengthened policiesaimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Crucially, theyalso require the promo on of development pathways thatcan concomitantly reduce emissions.

As in the previous assessment, this years report providesupdated analyses of a number of tried and tested sector-

speci c policy op ons to achieve this goal. Speci cally,we show that ac ons taken in the agricultural sector canlower emissions and boost the overall sustainability offood produc on. Replica ng these successful policies, andscaling them up, would provide one op on for countriesto go beyond their current pledges and help close theemissions gap.

The challenge we face is neither a technical nor policyone it is poli cal: the current pace of ac on is simplyinsu cient. The technologies to reduce emission levels toa level consistent with the 2 C target are available and weknow which policies we can use to deploy them. However,

the poli cal will to do so remains weak. This lack of poli calwill has a price: we will have to undertake steeper andmore costly ac ons to poten ally bridge the emissions gapby 2020.

This report is a call for poli cal ac on. I hope that,by providing high quality evidence and analysis, it willachieve its goal of suppor ng interna onal climatechange nego a ons.

Foreword


11/64xiThe Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execu ve summary xi

Execu ve summary

The emissions gap in 2020 is the di erence betweenemission levels in 2020 consistent with mee ng climate

targets, and levels expected in that year if country pledgesand commitments are met. As it becomes less and lesslikely that the emissions gap will be closed by 2020, theworld will have to rely on more di cult, costlier andriskier means a er 2020 of keeping the global averagetemperature increase below 2 C. If the emissions gap isnot closed, or signi cantly narrowed, by 2020, the door tomany op ons limi ng the temperature increase to 1.5 C atthe end of this century will be closed.

Ar cle 2 of the United Na ons Framework Conven onon Climate Change (Climate Conven on) declares thatits ul mate objec ve is to [stabilize] greenhouse gas

concentra ons in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with theclimate system . The par es to the Climate Conven on havetranslated this objec ve into an important, concrete targetfor limi ng the increase in global average temperature to2 C, compared to its pre-industrial levels. With the aimof mee ng this target, many of the par es have madeemission reduc on pledges, while others have commi ed toreduc ons under the recent extension of the Kyoto Protocol.

Since 2010, the United Na ons Environment Programmehas facilitated an annual independent analysis of thosepledges and commitments, to assess whether they areconsistent with a least-cost approach to keep global averagewarming below 2 C 1. This report con rms and strengthensthe conclusions of the three previous analyses that currentpledges and commitments fall short of that goal. It furthersays that, as emissions of greenhouse gases con nue torise rather than decline, it becomes less and less likely thatemissions will be low enough by 2020 to be on a least-costpathway towards mee ng the 2 C target 2.

As a result, a er 2020, the world will have to rely on moredi cult, costlier and riskier means of mee ng the target

the further from the least-cost level in 2020, the higherthese costs and the greater the risks will be. If the gap is not

closed or signi cantly narrowed by 2020, the door to manyop ons to limit temperature increase to 1.5 C at the end ofthis century will be closed, further increasing the need torely on accelerated energy-e ciency increases and biomasswith carbon capture and storage for reaching the target.

1. What are current global emissions?Current global greenhouse gas emission levels are

considerably higher than the levels in 2020 that are inline with mee ng the 1.5 C or 2 C targets, and are s llincreasing. In 2010, in absolute levels, developing countriesaccounted for about 60 percent of global greenhouse gas

emissions.The most recent es mates of global greenhouse gas

emissions are for 2010 and amount to 50.1 gigatonnes ofcarbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO 2e) per year (range: 45.654.6 GtCO2e per year). This is already 14 percent higher thanthe median es mate of the emission level in 2020 with alikely chance of achieving the least cost pathway towardsmee ng the 2 C target (44 GtCO 2e per year)

3. With regardsto emissions in 2010, the modelling groups report a medianvalue of 48.8 GtCO2e, which is within the uncertainty rangecited above. For consistency with emission scenarios, thegure of 48.8 GtCO 2e per year is used in the calcula on ofthe pledge case scenarios.

Rela ve contribu ons to global emissions from developingand developed countries changed li le from 1990 to 1999.However, the balance changed signi cantly between 2000and 2010 the developed country share decreased from51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing countryemissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent.Today developing and developed countries are responsiblefor roughly equal shares of cumula ve greenhouse gasemissions for the period 1850-2010.

____________________1 For this report, a least-cost approach means that emissions are reduced by thecheapest means available.2 For this report, a least-cost pathway or a least-cost emissions pathway or least-cost emission scenarios mean the same thing the temporal pathway of globalemissions that meets a climate target and that also takes advantage of the lowest-cost op ons available for reducing emissions.

____________________3 See footnote 2.


12/64xii The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execu ve summaryxii

2. What emission levels are an cipatedfor 2020?

Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are es matedat 59 GtCO 2e per year under a business-as-usual scenario.If implemented fully, pledges and commitments wouldreduce this by 37 GtCO 2e per year. It is only possibleto con rm that a few par es are on track to meet theirpledges and commitments by 2020.

Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are es mated at59 GtCO2e per year (range: 5660 GtCO 2e per year) undera business-as-usual scenario that is, a scenario that onlyconsiders exis ng mi ga on e orts. This is about 1 GtCO 2ehigher than the es mate in the 2012 emissions gap report.

There have been no signi cant changes in the pledges andcommitments made by par es to the Climate Conven onsince the 2012 assessment. However, both rules ofaccoun ng for land-use change and forestry, and rules forthe use of surplus allowances from the Kyoto Protocols rstcommitment period have been ghtened.

Implemen ng the pledges would reduce emissions by37 GtCO2e, compared to business-as-usual emission levels.

A review of available evidence from 13 of the par es to theClimate Conven on that have made pledges or commitmentsindicates that ve Australia, China, the European Union,India and the Russian Federa on appear to be on track tomeet their pledges. Four par es Canada, Japan, Mexicoand the U.S. may require further ac on and/or purchasedo sets to meet their pledges, according to government andindependent es mates of projected na onal emissionsin 2020. A h party the Republic of Korea may alsorequire further ac on but this could not be veri ed basedon government es mates. However, new ac ons nowbeing taken by all ve of these par es many enable themto meet their pledges, although the impact of these ac ons

have not been analyzed here. Not enough informa on isavailable concerning Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa. Itis worth no ng that being on track to implement pledgesdoes not equate to being on track to meet the 1.5 C or 2 Ctemperature targets.

3. What is the latest es mate of theemissions gap in 2020?

Even if pledges are fully implemented, the emissions gapin 2020 will be 812 GtCO 2e per year, assuming least-costemission pathways. Limited available informa on indicatesthat the emissions gap in 2020 to meet a 1.5 C target in2020 is a further 25 GtCO 2e per year wider.

Least-cost emission pathways consistent with a likelychance of keeping global mean temperature increases below2 C compared to pre-industrial levels have a median levelof 44 GtCO2e in 2020 (range: 3847 GtCO 2e)

4. Assumingfull implementa on of the pledges, the emissions gap thusamounts to between 812 GtCO 2e per year in 2020 (Table 1).

Governments have agreed to more stringent interna onalaccoun ng rules for land-use change and surplus allowancesfor the par es to the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is highlyuncertain whether the condi ons currently a ached to thehigh end of country pledges will be met. Therefore, it is moreprobable than not that the gap in 2020 will be at the highend of the 812 GtCO 2e range.

Limi ng increases in global average temperature further to1.5 C compared to pre-industrial levels requires emissions in2020 to be even lower, if a least-cost path towards achievingthis objec ve is followed. Based on a limited number of newstudies, least-cost emission pathways consistent with the1.5 C target have emission levels in 2020 of 3744 GtCO 2eper year, declining rapidly therea er.

Note:Following the 2012 conference of the par es to the Climate Conven on in Doha, a group of countries has adopted reduc on commitments for thesecond commitment period under the Kyoto ProtocolSource: United Na ons Framework Conven on on Climate Change

____________________4 See footnote 2.

Quan ed commitments for the secondcommitment period under the Kyoto Protocoland pledges under the Cancn Agreements

Pledges formulated in terms of economy-wide emissionreduc ons under the Cancn Agreements

Submi ed mi ga onac ons under theCancn Agreements

Countries withno pledges


13/64


14/64xiv The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execu ve summaryxiv

The emissions gap

40

45

55

60

C a s e

1

C a s e

2

C a s e

3

C a s e 4

50

Time (years)

A n n u a l G

l o b a l T o t a

l G r e e n

h o u s e G a s E m i s s i o n s

( G t C O e

)

2010 2020

Median es mate of levelconsistent with 2 C:44 GtCO e (range 41 47)

Shaded area shows likely range (66%)to limit global temperature increaseto below 2 C during the 21 century

2 C range

Remaininggap to staywithin 2 Climit

Business as usual

59 G tCO e (range 56 60)

Case 1 12 GtCO

e

Case 2 11 GtCO

e

Case 3 10 GtCO

e

Case 4 8 GtCO

e

20402000 2020 2060 2080 2100-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1.5 C range

Peak before 2020 Rapid decline a erwards

2 C range


15/64xvThe Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execu ve summary xv

Median es mate of levelconsistent with 2 C:44 GtCO e (range 41 47)

Shaded area shows likely range ( 66%)to limit global temperature increaseto below 2 C during 21 century

1 7 G t C O

e

( 1 4

2 0

)

Power sector(2.2 3.9 GtCO e)

Transport**

(1.7 2.5 GtCO e)

Buildings(1.4 2.9 GtCO e)

Forestry(1.3 4.2 GtCO e)

Agriculture(1.1 4.3 GtCO e)

Waste(about 0.8 GtCO e)

*based on results from Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 2011**including shipping and avia on

Industry(1.5 4.6 GtCO e )

How to bridge the gap: results from sectoral policy analysis*

40

45

55

60

50

Time (years)

A n n u a

l G l o b a l T o t a

l G r e e n

h o u s e G a s E m i s s i o n s

( G t C O e

)

2010 2020

2 C range


16/64xvi The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execu ve summaryxvi

Third, the near-term rate of temperature increase is higher,which implies greater near-term climate impacts. Lastly,when ac on is delayed, op ons to achieve stringent levels ofclimate protec on are increasingly lost.

7. Can the gap be bridged by 2020?The technical poten al for reducing emissions to levels in

2020 is s ll es mated at about 17 3 GtCO 2e. This is enoughto close the gap between business-as-usual emissionlevels and levels that meet the 2 C target, but me isrunning out.

Sector-level studies of emission reduc ons reveal that,at marginal costs below US $50100 per tonne of carbondioxide equivalent, emissions in 2020 could be reducedby 17 3 GtCO2e, compared to business-as-usual levels inthat same year. While this poten al would, in principle, beenough to reach the least-cost target of 44 GtCO 2e in 2020,there is li le me le .

There are many opportuni es to narrow the emissionsgap in 2020 as noted in following paragraphs, ranging fromapplying more stringent accoun ng prac ces for emissionreduc on pledges, to increasing the scope of pledges. Tobridge the emissions gap by 2020, all op ons should bebrought into play.

8. What are the op ons to bridge theemissions gap?

The applica on of strict accoun ng rules for na onalmi ga on ac on could narrow the gap by 12 GtCO 2e. Inaddi on, moving from uncondi onal to condi onal pledgescould narrow the gap by 23 GtCO 2e, and increasing thescope of current pledges could further narrow the gap by1.8 GtCO

2e. These three steps can bring us halfway to

bridging the gap. The remaining gap can be bridgedthrough further na onal and interna onal ac on, includinginterna onal coopera ve ini a ves. Much of this ac onwill help ful l na onal interests outside of climate policy.

Minimizing the use of lenient land-use credits and ofsurplus emission reduc ons, and avoiding double coun ngof o sets could narrow the gap by about 12 GtCO 2e.Implemen ng the more ambi ous condi onal pledges(rather than the uncondi onal pledges) could narrow thegap by 23 GtCO2e. A range of ac ons aimed at increasingthe scope of current pledges could narrow the gap by an

addi onal 1.8 GtCO 2e. (These include covering all emissionsin na onal pledges, having all countries pledge emissionreduc ons, and reducing emissions from interna onaltransport). Adding together the more stringent accoun ngprac ces, the more ambi ous pledges, and the increasedscope of current pledges, reduces the gap around 6 GtCO 2eor by about a half.

The remaining gap can be bridged through further na onaland interna onal ac on, including interna onal coopera veini a ves (see next point). Also important is the fact thatmany ac ons to reduce emissions can help meet otherna onal and local development objec ves such as reducing

air pollu on or tra c conges on, or saving householdenergy costs.

9. How can interna onal coopera veini a ves contribute to narrowingthe gap?

There is an increasing number of interna onal coopera veini a ves, through which groups of countries and/or otheren es cooperate to promote technologies and policiesthat have climate bene ts, even though climate changemi ga on may not be the primary goal of the ini a ve.These e orts have the poten al to help bridge the gap byseveral GtCO2e in 2020.

Interna onal coopera ve ini a ves take the form of eitherglobal dialogues (to exchange informa on and understandna onal priori es), formal mul -lateral processes(addressing issues that are relevant to the reduc on ofGHG emissions), or implementa on ini a ves (o enstructured around technical dialogue fora or sector-speci cimplementa on projects). Some make a direct contribu onto climate change mi ga on, by e ec vely helping countriesreduce emissions, while others contribute to this goalindirectly, for example through consensus building e orts orthe sharing of good prac ces among members.

The most important areas for interna onal coopera veini a ves appear to be:

- Energy e ciency (up to 2 GtCO 2e by 2020): covered bya substan al number of ini a ves.

- Fossil fuel subsidy reform (0.42 GtCO2e by 2020): thenumber of ini a ves and clear commitments in thisarea is limited.

- Methane and other short-lived climate pollutants(0.61.1 GtCO2e by 2020); this area is covered by oneoverarching and several speci c ini a ves. (Reduc onshere may occur as a side e ect of other climatemi ga on.)

- Renewable energy (13 GtCO 2e by 2020): severalini a ves have been started in this area.

Based on limited evidence, the following provisionscould arguably enhance the e ec veness of Interna onalCoopera ve Ini a ves: (i) a clearly de ned vision andmandate with clearly ar culated goals; (ii) the right mix ofpar cipants appropriate for that mandate, going beyondtradi onal climate nego ators; (iii) stronger par cipa onfrom developing country actors; (iv) su cient funding andan ins tu onal structure that supports implementa on andfollow-up, but maintains exibility; and (v) and incen ves for

par cipants.

10. How can na onal agricultural policiespromote development while substan allyreducing emissions?

Agriculture now contributes about 11 percent to globalgreenhouse gas emissions. The es mated emissionreduc on poten al for the sector ranges from 1.1 GtCO 2eto 4.3 GtCO 2e in 2020. Emission reduc ons achieved bythese ini a ves may partly overlap with na onal pledges,but in some cases may also be addi onal to these.

Not many countries have speci ed ac on in the

agriculture sector as part of implemen ng their pledges. Yet,es mates of emission reduc on poten als for the sectorare high, ranging from 1.1 GtCO 2e to 4.3 GtCO2e a widerange, re ec ng uncertain es in the es mate. In this yearsupdate we describe policies that have proved to be e ec ve


17/64xviiThe Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execu ve summary xvii

Table 1 Emissions reduc ons with respect to business-as-usual and emissions gap in 2020, by pledge case

Case Pledge type Rule type Median emission levelsand range (GtCO2e per year)

Reduc ons with respect tobusiness-as-usual in 2020

(GtCO2e per year)

Emissions gap in 2020(GtCO2e per year)

Case 1 Uncondi onal Lenient 56 (5456) 3 12

Case 2 Uncondi onal Strict 55 (5355) 4 11

Case 3 Condi onal Lenient 54 (5254) 5 10

Case 4 Condi onal Strict 52 (5052) 7 8

Note: In this report, an uncondi onal pledge is one made without condi ons a ached. A condi onal pledge might depend on the ability of ana onal legislature to enact necessary laws, or may depend on ac on from other countries, or on the provision of nance or technical support.Strict rules means that allowances from land use, land-use change and forestry accoun ng and surplus emission credits will not be counted aspart of a countrys mee ng their emissions reduc on pledges. Under lenient rules, these elements can be counted.

in reducing emissions and increasing carbon uptake in theagricultural sector.

In addi on to contribu ng to climate change mi ga on,these measures enhance the sectors environmentalsustainability and, depending on the measure and situa on,may provide other bene ts such as higher yields, lowerfer lizer costs or extra pro ts from wood supply. Three

examples are:- Usage of no- llage prac ces: no- llage refers to theelimina on of ploughing by direct seeding under themulch layer of the previous seasons crop. This reducesgreenhouse gas emissions from soil disturbance andfrom fossil-fuel use of farm machinery.

- Improved nutrient and water management in riceproduc on: this includes innova ve cropping prac cessuch as alternate we ng and drying and urea deepplacement that reduce methane and nitrous oxideemissions.

- Agroforestry: this consists of di erent managementprac ces that all deliberately include woody perennials

on farms and the landscape, and which increasethe uptake and storage of carbon dioxide from theatmosphere in biomass and soils.


18/64


19/6411The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Introduc on 1

Introduc onChapter 1

In December of 2009, 114 par es to the United Na onsFramework Conven on on Climate Change (the ClimateConven on) agreed to the Copenhagen Accord 1. Among theimportant provisions of the accord was the call to par es tosubmit voluntary emission reduc on pledges for the year2020. To date, 42 developed countries have respondedto this call and submi ed economy-wide greenhouse gasemission reduc on pledges, 16 developing countries havesubmi ed mul -sector expected emission reduc ons, andin addi on 39 other developing countries have submi edpledges related to sectoral goals 2. Another importantprovision was the se ng of a target to keep the increasein global average temperature below 2C rela ve to pre-industrial levels. In the wake of these two provisions, somevery cri cal ques ons arose:

- Are the pledges for 2020 enough to keep the world ontrack to meet the 2 C target?

- Will there be a gap between where we need to be in2020 versus where we expect to be?

UNEP, together with the scien c community, took onthese ques ons in a report published just ahead of theClimate Conven on mee ng in Cancn in late 2010 (UNEP,2010). This emissions gap report synthesized the latestscien c knowledge about the possible gap between theglobal emissions levels in 2020 consistent with the 2 C

target versus the expected levels if countries ful l theiremission reduc on pledges. Many par es to the ClimateConven on found this analysis useful as a reference pointfor establishing the level of ambi on that countries neededto pursue in controlling their greenhouse gas emissions. Asa result they asked UNEP to produce annual follow-ups, withupdates of the gap and advice on how to close it.

Besides upda ng the es mates of the emissions gap, the2011 report also looked at feasible ways of bridging the gapfrom two perspec ves (UNEP, 2011). The rst was from thetop-down viewpoint of integrated models, which showedthat feasible transforma ons in the energy system and other

sectors would lower global emissions enough to meet the2 C target. The second was a bo om-up perspec ve, which

examined the emissions reduc on poten al in each of themain emissions-producing sectors of the economy. Thesebo om-up es mates showed that enough total poten alexists to bridge the emissions gap in 2020.

The 2012 report presented an update of the gap butalso good examples of best-prac ce policy instrumentsfor reducing emissions. Among these were ac ons suchas implemen ng appliance standards and vehicle fuel-e ciency guidelines, which are working successfully in manyparts of the world and are ready for applica on elsewhere tohelp reduce emissions.

The current report reviews the latest es mates of theemissions gap in 2020 and provides plen ful addi onalinforma on relevant to the climate nego a ons. Includedare the latest es mates of:

- the current level of global greenhouse gas emissionsbased on authorita ve sources;

- na onal emission levels, both current (2010) andprojected (2020), consistent with current pledges andother commitments;

- global emission levels consistent with the 2 C target in2020, 2030 and 2050;

- progress being made in di erent parts of the world toachieve substan al emission reduc ons.

New to this fourth report is an assessment of the extent towhich countries are on track to meet their na onal pledges.Also new is a descrip on of the many coopera ve climateini a ves being undertaken interna onally among manydi erent actors public, private, and from civil society.

Special a en on is given to analysing new scenariosthat assume later ac on for mi ga on, compared to thoseused earlier to compute the emissions gap. The report alsodescribes new ndings from scien c literature about theimpacts of later ac on to reduce global emissions.

This year the report reviews best prac ces in reducingemissions in an o en-overlooked emissions-producingsector agriculture. Innova ve ideas are described for

transforming agriculture into a more sustainable, low-emissions form.As in previous years, this report has been prepared by a

wide range of scien sts from around the world. This year ____________________1 Since then, the number of par es agreeing to the Accord has risen to 141 (seeh ps://unfccc.int/mee ngs/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php).2 With the 28 member states of the European Union counted as one party.


20/642 The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Introduc on2

70 scien sts from 44 scien c groups in 17 countries havecontributed to the assessment.

The informa on contained in the report providesinvaluable inputs to the current debate on global climatepolicy and the ac ons needed to meet interna onal climate

targets. Mee ng these targets is instrumental for limi ngthe adverse impacts of climate change and associatedadapta on gaps as illustrated in Box 1.1. UNEP hopes thatthis fourth update will help catalyse ac on in the forthcomingclimate nego a ons.

Box 1.1 From emissions gap to adapta on gap

This reports de ni on of the emissions gap is based on the interna onally agreed limit to the increase in globalaverage temperature of 2 C (or possibly 1.5C). Chapter 3 summarizes the latest scien c ndings regardingboth least-cost and later-ac on scenarios for mee ng that 1.5 or 2 C target. The chapter concludes that,with later-ac on scenarios, the cost and risk of not mee ng the target increases signi cantly, compared toleast-cost scenarios.

The 2 C target has become associated with what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) termeddangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system , even though the IPCC has thus far nevera ached a speci c temperature threshold to the concept. Nevertheless, the IPCC has characterised dangerousanthropogenic interference through ve reasons for concern , namely risk to unique and threatened systems,risk of extreme weather events, dispari es of impacts and vulnerabili es, aggregate damage and risks of large-scale discon nui es.

These reasons for concern would thus gain par cular relevance in the event that the world followed a later-ac onscenario emissions trajectory that in the end failed to meet the 1.5 or 2 C target. Today, when the choice betweenleast-cost and later-ac on scenarios is s ll available to us, later-ac on scenarios highlight a growing adapta onproblem which, by analogy with the emissions gap, could be termed an adapta on gap.

The adapta on gap is more of a challenge to assess than the emissions gap. Whereas carbon dioxide and itsequivalents provide a common metric for quan fying the emissions gap, we lack a comparable metric forquan fying the adapta on gap and assessing the impacts of e orts to close it. While the emissions gap indicatesthe quan ty of greenhouse gas emissions that need to be abated, the adapta on gap could measure vulnerabili eswhich need to be reduced but are not accounted for in any funded programme for reducing adapta on risks.Alterna vely, it could es mate the gap between the level of funding needed for adapta on and the level of fundingactually commi ed to the task. Developing countries needs for adapta on are believed to cost in the range ofUS $100 billion per year (UNFCCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). By comparison the funds made available by the major

mul lateral funding mechanisms that generate and disperse adapta on nance add up to a total of around US$3.9 billion to date. From a funding perspec ve therefore, the adapta on gap is signi cant 3.

The concept of the adapta on gap is in line with the IPCCs Working Group IIs use of the term adapta on de cit ,which is used to describe the de cit between the current state of a country or management system and a statethat would minimize the adverse impacts of current climate condi ons.

Framing the adapta on gap in a way useful for policy making also requires a be er understanding of how thecosts of adapta on vary with di erent temperature projec ons. Data on the costs of adapta on under business-as-usual, and best- and worst-case emission scenarios could help policy makers be er understand the rela onshipbetween adapta on to, and mi ga on of climate change. Adapta on cost es mates also put the true costs ofclimate change, as opposed to only looking at the costs of mi ga ng it, into a broader and clearer perspec ve.

There is also a knowledge gap between what we know and what we need to know to successfully adapt to climatechange. It is true that we already have enough knowledge to act on adapta on, but not enough to act well. Forexample, we lack informa on about how much exis ng and planned policies can reduce peoples vulnerability.Evalua ng the e ec veness of various interven ons would arguably be a very e ec ve way of measuring progresstowards adapta on.

____________________3 The US $3.9 billion gure is a rough es mate based on informa on from thefollowing major mul lateral funding mechanisms for adapta on: an equivalent ofUS $399 million has been commi ed by the EUs Global Climate Change Alliancefrom 2008 to 2013 (GCCA, 2013). (It should be noted that part of these fundshave supported clean energy, Reducing Emissions from Deforestaon and Forest

Degrada on (REDD) and Disaster Risk Reduc on programme); cumula ve pledgesto the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fundamounted to a total of US $863 million from their incep on to May 2013, (GEF,2013); US $2.3 billion has been pledged to the Strategic Climate Fund Trust fund asof December 31, 2012 (World Bank, 2013); and the Adapta on Fund had receivedresources amoun ng to US $324 billion as of 30 November, 2012 (Adapta onFund, 2012).


21/64The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementa on 3

Emission trends, pledges and theirimplementa on

Chapter 2

2.1 Introduc onThis chapter presents an update, based on the scien c

literature, of the following cri cal topics:- current (2010 global) emissions of greenhouse gases;- projected emissions (to 2020) of greenhouse gases

under a business-as-usual (BaU) scenario;- projec ons (to 2020) of greenhouse gas emissions

under four di erent sets of assump ons regardingimplementa on of na onal pledges to reduceemissions;

- the extent to which par es are posi oned to implementtheir pledges, in light of their current policy por oliosand plausible assump ons regarding macroeconomictrends and o sets.

The es mated emission level in 2020 under a business-as-usual scenario is 1 gigatonne of carbon dioxide equivalent(GtCO2e) higher compared to last years emissions gapreport 1. While the emission levels in 2020 for the strict-rulescases are higher by roughly 1 GtCO 2e (uncondi onal) andare comparable to last years emission level (condi onal),the emission levels associated with the two lenient-rulescases are lower by roughly 1 GtCO 2e, as compared to lastyears es mates. These changes are mainly due to decisionson surpluses made by countries during the Doha climatenego a ons and downward revisions to the assump onson double coun ng of o sets. They illustrate that increasingstringency through the climate nego a ons can helpreduce emission levels in 2020 under lenient-rules cases.However, they do not re ect an increase in ambi on or

ac on, but represent a move towards stricter accoun ngrules. To illustrate, in last years emissions gap report,emission levels associated with the strict-rules cases were3 GtCO2e lower than those of the lenient-rules cases, whereasthis year they are lower by around 1 GtCO 2e (uncondi onal)and 2 GtCO2e (condi onal).

While previous reports assumed full pledgeimplementa on, this year we also explore the extentto which 13 par es, accoun ng for 72 percent of global

greenhouse gas emissions, are already on track to implementtheir pledges, and where further policy implementa on oro sets are likely to be required.

2.2 Current global emissionsLast years report es mated total global greenhouse

gas emissions in 2010 at 50.1 GtCO 2e, with a 95 percentuncertainty range of 45.654.6 GtCO 2e

2. This bo om-upes mate from the EDGAR database (JRC/PBL, 2012) hasnot been updated since and is considered a comprehensiveassessment of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 3.Figure 2.1 shows emission levels by major economic groupingfor the period 19702010, using this database 4. Thesemay di er from data derived from the Na onal InventoryReports, which are the latest es mate of emissions for mostdeveloped countries. The latest global es mates of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions show a con nued increasefor the years 2011 and 2012, although at a lower pace thanthe average since the beginning of the 21 st century (Olivieret al ., 2013)5.

Lead authors : Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Taryn Fransen (World ResourcesIns tute, USA), Hans-Holger Rogner (Interna onal Ins tute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria)

Contribu ng authors: Johannes Gtschow (Potsdam Ins tute for Climate Impact Research, Germany), Giacomo Grassi (EuropeanCommissions Joint Research Centre, Italy), Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Kelly Levin (World Resources Ins tute, USA), Elizabeth

Sawin (Climate Interac ve, USA), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Christopher Taylor(Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom), Zhao Xiusheng (Tshingua University, China)

____________________1 Unless otherwise stated, all emissions in this report are expressed in GtCO 2e.

This is the sum of six of the greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol (thatis CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6), weighted by their global warming poten al(GWP) (UNFCCC, 2002). Not included are ozone deple ng substances (ODS), blackcarbon (BC), and organic carbon (OC). While nitrogen tri uoride (NF 3) has recentlybeen added to the Kyoto Protocol, it has not been included in this analysis. Unlessotherwise stated, data include emissions from land use, land-use change andforestry (LULUCF).

____________________2

This es mate included all six Kyoto gases and also takes into account emissionsfrom land use, land-use change and forestry.3 Another comprehensive assessment of global GHG emissions is WRIs CAITdatabase that es mated total global GHG emissions in 2010 at 47.2 GtCO 2e.4 The reader is referred to last years report (UNEP 2012a) for a breakdownby gas.5 The reader is referred to Appendix 2A for further details.


22/64The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementa on4

Figure 2.1: Trend in global greenhouse gas emissions 19702010 by major economic groupingNote: The data plo ed has been calculated using global warming poten al values as used for UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol repor ng.The graph shows emissions of 50.1 GtCO2e in 2010, as derived from bo om-up emission inventories.Source: EDGAR 4.2 FT2010 (JRC/PBL, 2012. Percentages refer to shares in global emissions in 2010.

While the last decade of the 20th century saw li lechange in the rela ve regional contribu ons to annualglobal greenhouse gas emissions, this changed dras callyduring the rst decade of the 21st century. Between 2000and 2010, the developed country share decreased from51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing countryemissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent (JRC/PBL, 2012). Referring to Figure 2.1, between 2000 and 2010the share of global emissions of the non-OECD G20 countries(i.e. Argen na, China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, the RussianFedera on, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) increased by8.7 percent, while the share of all OECD countries and otherindustrialized countries declined by 9.0 percent, and theshare of the remaining developing countries changed li le.Today developing and developed countries are responsiblefor roughly equal shares of cumula ve greenhouse gas

emissions for the period 1850-2010 (den Elzen et al., 2013b).Greenhouse gas emission es mates are uncertain due todi erences in de ni ons and in the accoun ng of na onalemissions. To produce a sta s cally signi cant assessmentof the uncertainty associated with those emission es mates,a large number of independent but consistent datasets isrequired, which at present is not the case (Appendix 2.A).It is nonetheless clear that energy-related carbon dioxideemissions have the lowest uncertainty (UNEP, 2012a),while land use and land-use change emissions of di erentgreenhouse gases have the highest.

2.3 Projected global emissions underbusiness-as-usual scenariosBusiness-as-usual scenarios of future developments are

generally based on an extrapola on of current economic,social and technological trends. They usually re ect policies

that have taken e ect as of a recent cut-o date, for example,2010 8. However, in some cases they may include policiesthat, while approved, will only enter into force at a futuredate (DEA/OECD/URC, 2013).

Business-as-usual scenarios of greenhouse gases arebenchmarks against which the e ec veness of mi ga onpolicies and measures can be tested. They are also used inthis report to assess the extent to which par es pledges canmeet the 2 o C or 1.5o C targets.

Business-as-usual emissions for 2020 were derivedfrom es mates by 12 modelling groups that analyzed thereduc on proposals of par es, as described in Sec on 2.4 9.Most of the modelling groups followed the same approachwith regards to the types of policies included in the BaUscenario they did not include new policies with a poten ale ect on greenhouse gas emissions beyond those in e ect

at the cut-o date10

. Some of the modelling groups used theBaU scenarios that the par es provided.Based on the analysis by these 12 modelling groups,

global greenhouse gas emissions for 2020 are es matedat 59 GtCO2e (range 5660 GtCO 2e) in 2020 under BaUassump ons, which is about 1 GtCO2e higher than the gurein the 2012 emissions gap report 11. Two key factors explain

____________________8 BaU scenarios typically vary with regard to which policies they take into accountfor a variety of reasons, including: the cut-o year for their inclusion; whetherpolicies have to be planned, adopted, and/or implemented if they are to be

included; methodologies for quan fying the e ect of included policies; and thedetermina on of whether a policy will have a signi cant e ect that warrantsinclusion.9 See Table B.1 in Appendix 2.B for a lis ng of the modelling groups.10 The cut-o date for exclusion of policies varies among the modelling groups.11 Unless stated otherwise, all ranges in the report are expressed as 20 th 80thpercen les.

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

G t C O

e

Bunkers Least developed countries Other developing countries

OECD La n America OECD Europe OECD North America

Non-OECD G20 members Other industrialized countries OECD Pacic

60

2.2%

4.7%

16.3%

42.5%

2.1%5.2%1.5%

11.0%

14.5%

50

40

30

20

10

0

Years



this increase: using the BaU numbers from Chinas secondna onal communica on to UNFCCC (Government of China,2012), and moving the base year from 2005 to 2010 in moremodel studies 12.

To test the robustness of the 59 GtCO 2e BaU es mate, wecompare our es mates with those of several interna onalmodelling groups, including six that are par cipa ng in thestudies discussed in Sec on 2.4 (Kriegler et al ., 2013)13.The BaU scenarios with which we compared our es mates(24 scenarios, developed by 12 di erent models) givea median of 58 GtCO 2e, with a range of 5560 GtCO2e. Inspite of the di erent lower bound, this median, 58 GtCO 2e,is consistent with that obtained by the modelling groupscontribu ng to this report.

2.4 Projected global emissions under pledgeassump ons

Under the 2010 Cancn Agreements of the ClimateConven on, 42 developed-country par es have submi edquan ed economy-wide emission reduc on proposals for2020. Since November 2012, when the last emissions gapreport was released, only New Zealand has signi cantlychanged its pledge 14. Some countries, notably Mexico, have

changed underlying assump ons that e ec vely changetheir pledge 15.

At the latest Conference of the Par es (COP) to the ClimateConven on, held in in Doha in late 2012, par es agreed ona second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Thisperiod will run from 2013 to 2020 and provides for quan edemission reduc on targets for the following Annex I par es:Australia, Belarus, the European Union and its memberstates, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland andUkraine. No binding emission reduc on targets were set forany other Climate Conven on par es, neither Annex-I nornon-Annex I.

To date 55 developing country par es and the Africangroup have submi ed na onally appropriate mi ga onac ons (NAMAs) to Climate Conven on (UNFCCC, 2013). Ofthese, 16 have been framed in terms of mul -sector expectedgreenhouse gas emission reduc ons 16. The remaining 39 areexpressed as sectoral goals or, in fewer instances, speci cmi ga on projects. In this assessment only the former 16are considered 17. Together, the 42 developed country par eswith reduc on targets and the 16 developing country par esaccounted for about 75 percent of global emissions in 2010.

____________________12 This resulted in higher emission levels, as economic ac vity and thus emissionlevels was higher in the period 20052010, compared to the previous base year. 13 The es mates in this report do not include new policies a ec ng greenhouse

gas emissions a er the cut-o year.14 In August 2013, New Zealand announced a single 5 percent reduc on targetwith respect to its 1990 emission levels, replacing its ini al 1020 percent target.15 The Mexican government recently updated the countrys BaU scenario for 2020.This updated scenario leads to 960 MtCO 2e emissions, which is above the previousBaU es mate, and also a ects the 2020 emissions resul ng from the pledge(see Box 2.1).

____________________16 China and India have expressed their mi ga on goals in terms of emissionreduc ons per unit of GDP; Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and theRepublic of Korea, in terms of devia ons below their respec ve BaU emissionscenarios; An gua and Barbuda, Marshall Islands and Republic of Moldova, interms of absolute greenhouse gas emission reduc ons; and Costa Rica and theMaldives, in terms of a carbon neutrality goal. The reader is referred to Appendix2.C for addi onal details on these goals.17 Quan fying the emission reduc ons resul ng from these 39 ac ons is di cult.For this reason, this assessment assumes no reduc ons below BaU emissionscenarios for these countries. This might be a conserva ve assump on.18 For example, in November 2012, as a part of the countrys second na onalcommunica on to the Climate Conven on, the Chinese government released

na onal BaU and mi ga on scenarios for the rst me (Government of China,2012). The BaU scenario excludes all climate-related policies implementedsince 2005, which leads to energy-related carbon dioxide emissions of14.4 GtCO2 in 2020. The mi ga on scenario re ects both domes c policies and thecountrys interna onal emission-intensity target and results in emissions levels of4.5 GtCO2 below BaU levels. Similarly, the Mexican government recently updatedthe countrys BaU scenario for 2020.

Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC par es with a pledge

Figure 2.2 shows past (1990, 2005 and 2010) as expected and future (2020) emission levels for 13 ClimateConven on par es that have submi ed quan ta ve emission reduc on pledges. Four di erent projec onsto 2020 are presented: the na onal BaU scenario, the median BaU value from several interna onal modellingstudies, and the emission levels resul ng from implementa on of two emission reduc on pledge cases (see thenext sec on for a descrip on of the di erent pledge cases).

Annex I par es have de ned their commitments in terms of emission reduc ons in 2020 rela ve to historicalemission levels, typically emission levels in 1990. Conversely, non-Annex I par es have de ned them in terms ofemission reduc ons in 2020 rela ve to hypothe cal future emission levels, typically against BaU levels in 2020, orin terms of greenhouse gas emission intensity. In this second case, the uncertainty about actual emission levels in2020 is carried over into the es mate of the emission reduc ons commitment.

Most na onal BaU scenarios from non-Annex I par es are rela vely high compared to the range in the correspondingscenario by 12 modelling studies. The reasons for this are numerous, including di erences in de ni ons, notablyas to which policies are considered in the baseline, as well in the nature of the assump ons made (DEA/OECD/URC, 2013). Crucially, some developing countries are increasingly clarifying those assump ons and the methodsused to calculate the baseline 18.



Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC par es with a pledge (con nued)

Figure 2.2. Greenhouse gas emissions, including land-use change, for 1990, 2005, 2010 and for 2020 under a na onal BaU(if available), median of the BaU assumed by modelling groups, uncondi onal pledge and condi onal pledge for UNFCCC par esincluded in the G20 with a pledge, taking the European Union as a group.Note: For developed countries, emissions exclude emissions from land-use change.Note: European Union data include all current European Union member countries except Croa a, which joined the EuropeanUnion on 1 July, 2013.Source: EDGAR (JRC/PBL, 2012)19

____________________19 Na onal BaUs were obtained from the following sources. For developedcountries, we use the best representa on of a with-policies BaU scenario, i.e.:Australia (Department of Climate Change and Energy E ciency, 2012); Canada(Environment Canada, 2012); European Union (European Environment Agency,2012); Japan: not available; Russia (Government of the Russian Federaon, 2010);USA (EIA, 2012; Biancoet al ., 2013). For developing countries without-policies BaUscenarios (den Elzen et al., 2013a), i.e.: Brazil (Brazilian Government, 2010); China

(Government of China, 2012), supplemented with the average es mate non-energy CO2 emission projec on from den Elzen et al., 2013a and es mates fromClimate Ac on Tracker; India (Planning Commission, 2011); Indonesia (Ministry ofEnvironment, 2010), Mexico (NCCS, 2013); South Africa (South Africa. Departmentof Environmental A airs, 2011); Korea, Republic of (Republic of Korea, 2011). Notethat the na onal BaUs for South Africa and India were reported as a range. For thegures, the mid-point has been used.

Some pledges are uncondi onal, whereas others havebeen made condi onal on the ability of a na onal legislatureto enact necessary laws, the ac on of other countries, or theprovision of nancial or technical support. We refer to thesepledges as, respec vely, uncondi onal and condi onal.Some countries have submi ed one of each type, whereasothers have submi ed only a condi onal or only anuncondi onal pledge. This creates a range of possiblecollec ve impacts from the pledges, bounded on the lowend if only uncondi onal pledges are implemented, andon the high end if all condi onal pledges are implemented.Emission levels in 2020 resul ng from implementa on ofthe pledges also depend on the rules used to account forboth land use and land-use change credits and debits, andsurplus emission units. These concepts are introduced inthe following sec ons, followed by a quan ca on of the

emission reduc ons resul ng from di erent combina ons ofpledge cases.

2.4.1 Use of land use, land-use change andforestry credits and debits

Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I par es may receivecredits or debits from land use, land-use change and forestry(LULUCF) ac vi es dependent on a set of complex accoun ngrules that contribute to the achievement of their individualemission reduc on targets. During the seventeenthConference of the Par es to the Climate Conven on, heldin Durban in late 2011, new LULUCF accoun ng rules forcountries par cipa ng in the second commitment period(CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol were agreed (UNFCCC, 2012a).The poten al contribu on of LULUCF accoun ng underthese new rules appears to be rela vely modest for AnnexI par es that joined the rst commitment period of theKyoto Protocol (Grassi et al ., 2012): a di erence of up toabout 2 percent of 1990 emissions between strict andlenient accoun ng, equal to about 0.3 GtCO 2e per year. Ifthe USA, which did not join the rst commitment period ofthe Kyoto Protocol, followed these rules, the number wouldincrease to 0.45 GtCO 2e per year

20. While these es mates

____________________20 For the USA, the es mated poten al contribu on from LULUCF credits isabout 0.15 GtCO 2e per year. This is calculated as follows: for forest management,assuming 2005 as reference year and given the available projec ons for 2020(United States Department of State, 2010), the credit is es mated at about0.07 GtCO2e per year; an addi onal credit of about 0.08 GtCO 2e per year ises mated from a oresta on/reforesta on and deforesta on (EPA, 2005).

1990 2010 na onal BaU 2020 BaU 2020 2020-uncondi onal 2020-conditonal2005

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

E m i s s i o n s ( M t C O

e )

A u s t r a l i a

B r a z i l

C a n a d a

C h i n a

E

U 2 7

I n d i a

I n d o n e s i a

J a p a n

M e x i c o

R u s s i a

S o u t h A f r i c a

K o r e a ,

R e p u b l i c o f

U S A



____________________21 For example, in the case of Russia, if the appropriate accoun ng of the poten alof the forestry sector (UNFCCC, 2012c) is interpreted as not applying the cap onforest management credits agreed in Durban, LULUCF credits in Russia alone mayreach 0.3 GtCO2e per year, instead of the 0.1 GtCO 2e per year assumed in thisassessment.22 This would apply if all surplus credits were purchased by par es with pledgesthat do require emission reduc ons, displacing mi ga on ac on in buying par es.23 The European Union stated in Doha that their legisla on does not allow the

use of carried over surplus units (UNFCCC, 2012b). However, it is unclear if thisstatement is fully binding. Purchase of units was not excluded by the EuropeanUnion, but is highly unlikely to happen, as the European Union holds the largestshare of surplus units.24 In their respec ve pledges, the governments of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarusproposed target emission levels above that 2008-2010 emissions average. Furtherdetails are available in Chen et al . (2013) and Kollmuss (2013).

____________________25

Calcula ons assume as a star ng point the ini al assigned amounts of the rstcommitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The uncertainty ranges come from thefuture decisions of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. If these countries stay in thesecond commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and lower their commitments totheir 2008-2010 emission levels, they can make use of surplus emissions.26 At least in theory, emission reduc ons could also be shared, with a certainpercentage a ributed to the buyer and the seller retaining the remainder.

are generally consistent with the informa on contained inUNFCCC (2012c), they may underes mate emissions fromthose countries that may adopt di erent accoun ng rulesfrom those of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, Canada,Japan, New Zealand and Russia 21.

2.4.2 Surplus emissions unitsEs mates of emission levels in 2020 can also be in uenced

by the poten al use of surplus emission units. These surplusunits could arise either when par es actual emissions arebelow their emission targets for the rst commitment periodof the Kyoto Protocol, or when their emissions in 2020 arebelow their target for that year, when this does not requiresigni cant emission reduc ons. Note that surplus emissionunits refers to surpluses arising from di erent types ofallowances assigned amount units, emission reduc onunits and cer ed emission reduc ons all introduced inthe next paragraphs.

The 2012 emissions gap report es mated the maximumemission reduc on in 2020 due to surplus credits at1.8 GtCO

2e 22. However, as a result of the rules for using

such surplus allowances agreed to in Doha, these es matesneed to be revised (UNFCCC, 2012b; Kollmuss, 2013). Thepar es agreed that allowances, referred to as assignedamount units (AAUs), not used in the rst commitmentperiod can be carried over to the next period. However,recent decisions on surplus emission units signi cantlylimit the use of such surplus allowances and prevent thebuild-up of new ones. Only par es par cipa ng in thesecond commitment period can sell their surplus assignedamount units. This will exclude Russia, which is the largestholder of surplus assigned amount units, but which willnot par cipate in the second commitment period. Buyercountries can only purchase surplus assigned amount unitsup to a quan ty of 2 percent of their own ini al assignedamount for the rst commitment period. In addi on,Australia, Japan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway andSwitzerland have said that they will not purchase units fromothers, while the European Union has declared that theywill not use any surplus emissions units (UNFCCC, 2012b)23.

Finally, new surplus allowances are prevented by the factthat allowances that exceed the par es average emissionlevels in the period 20082010 will be cancelled. This rulea ects Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 24.

These decisions reduce the impact of surplus emissionsin 2020. Based on Chen et al. (2013) and Gtschow (2013),the impact of Kyoto surpluses on 2020 pledges is es matedto be about 0.05 GtCO 2e (range 0.050.15 GtCO 2e) for the

uncondi onal pledge scenario and 0.55 GtCO 2e (range 0.50.6 GtCO2e) for the condi onal pledge scenario, down from1.8 GtCO2e as previously es mated

25.The di erence between scenarios stems from the

European Unions declara on in Doha that its internallegisla on will not allow the use of surplus assigned amountunits carried over from the rst commitment period, forcomplying with its 20 percent uncondi onal pledge. For its30 percent condi onal pledge, the European Union has morethan enough Kyoto surplus emissions to realize the requiredemission reduc ons. The impact of surplus emissions couldalso be zero if the European Union decides not to use any ofits Kyoto surplus emissions for complying with its 30 percentcondi onal target.

In addi on to the assigned amount units, two of the KyotoProtocols exible mechanisms, the Joint Implementa onand the Clean Development Mechanism, provide creditsthat par es can use in the form of emission reduc onunits (ERUs) in the case of Joint Implementa on, andcer ed emission reduc ons (CERs) in the case of the CleanDevelopment Mechanism. These credits can be carried overto the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The2012 Conference of the Par es to the Climate Conven ondid not change the rules for these credits: cer ed emissionreduc ons and emission reduc on units can each be carriedover up to 2.5 percent of the ini al assigned amount of therst commitment period. There are no restric ons on theiruse. Those units add to a total impact of 0.2 GtCO 2e in 2020.

2.4.3 The poten al impact of o setsO sets could a ect the emissions levels associated

with the pledges in two ways. First, double coun ng ofo sets could arise where emission reduc ons in developingcountries achieved through o sets, such as cer ed emissionreduc ons, are counted towards mee ng the pledges ofboth countries. Second, some of the o sets may actually notachieve the intended, addi onal emission reduc ons.

It is clear that emission reduc ons associated with emissionreduc on units and cer ed emission reduc ons or withthe Kyoto Protocols third exible mechanism emissionstrading, should not be double counted 26. Nevertheless,rules for avoiding double coun ng have not been agreedto. A rough es mate of the impact of double coun ng is asfollows. If all par es o sets were counted twice a likely

overes mate of double coun ng global emissions wouldbe 0.40 GtCO2e higher in the case of condi onal pledges,and 0.55 GtCO2e higher in the case of uncondi onal pledges.In the 2012 emissions gap report (UNEP, 2012a) double


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Figure 2.3: Emissions in 2020 under BaU and as a result of pledges under four cases.Note: To ensure a consistent comparison of the pathways and pledges the data have been harmonized to the same 2005emissions of 45 GtCO 2e, except for Grantham.Source: See Appendix 2.B

2.5 Na onal progress: do policies matchpledges?

Sec on 2.4 examined four scenarios for na onal andglobal greenhouse gas emissions assuming that par espledges would be fully implemented that is, assumingthat, in 2020, par es will emit the amount indicated by theirpledges. As 2020 approaches, however, the me is ripe totake stock of the extent to which par es are, in fact, on trackto achieve their pledges.

This sec on considers the likely impact of current domes cpolicies, describing par es climate-policy por olios andexamining the extent to which these policies, in combina onwith other factors, have put par es on track to mee ngtheir pledges. The sec on focuses on the 13 par es whoseeconomies are amongst the 20 largest in the world and whohave formulated a quan ta ve pledge 31.

It is important to note that the 13 par es pledges variedin terms of the extent to which they required devia onfrom various BaU es mates, as discussed in Appendix 2.D.The larger the devia on, the more di cult it is to achievethe pledge and the more important the role of addi onalpolicies becomes.

In order to assess whether par es expected greenhousegas trajectories are in line with 2020 pledges, projected 2020emission scenarios that take into account currently adoptedpolicies (current trajectory for 2020) were compared to the2020 emission levels needed to achieve each pledge through

domes c abatement (pledge threshold for 2020)32

.

____________________31 These par es account for 72 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. Theyare: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan,Mexico, the Russian Federa on, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and the USA.

____________________32 We consider o sets only when a country has explicitly stated its intent topurchase a speci c quan ty of o sets.33 This contrasts with the BaU ranges presented in earlier sec ons of this report,which include es mates that do not factor in these e ects.

To establish the current trajectory for 2020, we iden edemission scenarios that factor in the e ects of currentlyadopted policies 33. We based this trajectory on o ciales mates presented in na onal communica ons to theClimate Conven on and other government sources, andcorroborated these es mates with other available literature(Table 2.1), adjus ng where necessary to ensure consistencywith o cial gures, for example, in the treatment of LULUCF.An o cial trajectory was not available for the Republicof Korea.

To establish the pledge threshold, we sought to iden fythe maximum level of 2020 emissions that each party wouldconsider to be consistent with mee ng its pledge throughdomes c abatement. Where a pledge is presented as arange, we adopted the higher quan ty of resul ng emissionsas the pledge threshold for example, if a country statesit will reduce its emissions by 510 percent, our pledgethreshold represents the 5 percent reduc on. Note, if 10percent were used, countries would have lower expectedemissions in 2020.

For each of the 13 par es examined, Table 2.1 belowpresents both o cial and independent es mates ofemission levels in 2020. Five par es Australia, China, theEuropean Union, India and Russia appear to be on track tomeet their pledges under the policies they have adopted todate, given current assump ons about macroeconomic andtechnology trends and o sets. Of these, three China, India

1990 2005 2010 2020

BAU

2020

Uncondi onalLenient

rules

2020

Uncondi onalStrict

rules

2020

Condi onalLenient rules

2020

Condi onalStrict

rules

G t C O

e

Global emissions, harmonized, including LULUCF emissions

CAT OECD CROADS FEEM Grantham PBLPNNLPIK IIASA NIES ECN

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

MedianUNEP Ris



countries with a greenhouse gas pledge 37

ac on but this could not be veri ed based on governmentes mates. However, new ac ons now being taken byall ve of these par es may enable them to meet theirpledges, although the impact of these ac ons have not beenanalyzed here. Examples of new ac ons include Mexicowhich has recently adopted comprehensive climate-changelegisla on, and is in the process of developing its secondspecial programme on climate change (NCCS, 2013) 36.Table 2.1 Pledges versus current trajectories for G20

____________________34 Regardless of whether China and India needed new policies to meet theirgreenhouse gas-intensity pledges, both countries have implemented signi cantnew climate-related policies since 2009.35

Australia has announced its intent to meet its pledge half through domes cabatement under its new carbon-pricing mechanism and half throughinterna onally sourced o sets 100 MtCO 2e each (DCCEE, 2012). Australias newcoali on government, however, has announced its intent to repeal the carbon-pricing mechanism; while there is bipar san support for Australias pledge, it isnot clear how Australia would deliver on the pledge without the carbon-pricingmechanism (Kember et al ., 2013).

and Russia had pledges that, by some es mates, were lessdependent on policy interven ons a er 2009 34. Australiaand the European Union, on the other hand, needed tostrengthen their policy por olios and, in Australias case,purchase o sets to meet their uncondi onal pledges 35.

Four par es Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the USA mayrequire further ac on and/or purchased o sets to meettheir pledges, according to government and independentes mates of projected na ona

emissions gap report 2013_

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