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Emerging-Market Corporate Debt Making the World’s Fastest-Growing Economies Work for You
May 2012
Shamaila Khan Portfolio Manager—Emerging Market Debt
Fraser Hughes is Research Director at the European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA) based in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. He joined EPRA in 2001. He was responsible for design and development of the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate Index series, now seen as the leading benchmark for global real estate securities. In conjunction with AXA Investment Management, he was instrumental in the creation of listed real estate exchange traded fund (ETFs) market. Currently there are seven FTSE EPRA/NAREIT ETFs, issued by Barclays iShares and AXA listed on NYSE, LIFFE and Euronext. He is a regular contributor to a broad range of publications, a frequent speaker at real estate conferences and a visiting lecturer at IPF/Cambridge International Land Institute led courses.
He started his career with Charterhouse Tilney in Liverpool, were he worked for five years. He worked for a number of Investment Banks in London before joining FTSE Group. At FTSE he gained an in-depth understanding of European equity indexation. He moved to Euronext Amsterdam in 1998 as a researcher where he worked developing new index and derivatives products, quoted on the exchange.
He holds a BA (Hons) in Finance and an MSc in Investment Management from City University, London.
Why emerging-market corporates?
What’s the best way to assess the opportunity? Some key analytical tools
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Perc
ent
Developed Markets
Emerging Economies
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Emerging Markets: Faster-Growing Economies, Better Credit Metrics
Historical analysis and current estimates do not guarantee future results.
As December 31, 2011
*As of October 31, 2011. Emerging economies are Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey; developed economies are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US.
Source: International Monetary Fund and AllianceBernstein
Public Debt as a Percentage of
GDP*
0
30
60
90
120
00 02 04 06 08 10 12E 14E
Pe
rce
nt
Developed Markets
Emerging Markets
Real GDP Growth
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929 903 994 990
1,174
1,320 1,440
340 436 549 561
605 709
867
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EM Sovereigns EM Corporates
4,000
1,100 867
US InvestmentGrade
US High Yield Emerging-MarketCorporates
Emerging-Market Opportunity Set Is Expanding—Driven by Corporates
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Estimated Corporate Debt Stock USD Billions
Current analysis and estimates do not guarantee future results.
As of December 31, 2011
*EM corporates include supranationals and quasi-sovereigns. Stock is the combination of US/hard currency and local-currency offshore bonds.
Source: J.P. Morgan and AllianceBernstein
EM Bond Stock: Sovereigns vs.
Corporates* USD Billions
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Emerging Corporates: Less Debt, More Attractive Spreads
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Net Leverage to EBITDA* Multiples
Spread per Turn of Net Leverage** Basis Points/Multiples
US Corporates EM Corporates Historical analysis and current estimates do not guarantee future results.
*As of December 31, 2011
**As of April 9, 2012
Leverage refers to the last 12 months (LTM) ratio of debt capital (bank loans, bonds, etc.) to EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax depreciation and amortization).
Source: Bank of America and AllianceBernstein
3.9
2.7
1.8
1.4
3.5
2.0
1.4
1.2
B
BB
BBB
A
161
164
140
125
286
301
230
176
B
BB
BBB
A
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Emerging Corporates: Healthier Cash Reserves than US Peers
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0
10
20
30
40
50
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011C
ash a
s a
Pe
rcent
of Tota
l D
ebt
US IG Corporates EM IG Corporates
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10
15
20
25
30
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cash a
s a
Pe
rcent
of Tota
l D
ebt
US HY Corporates EM HY Corporates
High-Yield Corporates Investment-Grade Corporates
Historical analysis and current estimates do not guarantee future results.
As of December 31, 2011
Source: Bank of America and AllianceBernstein
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Ba
sis
Po
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EM Corporates: Potential for Additional Yield and Carry
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EM Corporates vs. EM Sovereigns** EM Corporate Spread Premium vs.
EM Sovereigns*
Historical analysis and current estimates do not guarantee future results. As of 31 March 2012 *Bank of America Merrill Lynch Emerging Markets Corporate Plus Index minus Emerging Markets External Debt Sovereign Index **J.P. Morgan CEMBI Broad Diversified vs. J.P. Morgan EMBIG Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, and AllianceBernstein
Average
Credit Crisis
Corporates Sovereigns
Percentage from
Investment-Grade
Issuers
70 62
Percentage from
Investment-Grade
Countries
91 62
Number of Countries 36 45
Number of Issuers 325 75
Yield (%) 5.6 5.6
Spread (Basis Points) 385 342
Average Quality BBB BBB–
Average Duration
(Years) 5.2 7.3
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BP
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EM Corporates: Attractive Yield Pickup over US Corporates
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Investment-Grade: EM Corporate Spread Premium vs. US
High-Yield: EM Corporate Spread Premium vs. US
Historical analysis and current estimates do not guarantee future results As of 31 March 2012 Investment-grade —JPMorgan CEMBI IG index minus JPMorgan JULI BBB index; high yield—JPMorgan CEMBI Sub-IG Index minus JPMorgan US High Yield BB Index Sources: JPMorgan and AllianceBernstein
Six-Year Average
Six-Year Average
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EM Corporates: Default Rates Comparable to Developed Corporates
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Historical analysis and current estimates do not guarantee future results.
Through January 31, 2012
Last 12 months (LTM) issuer-weighted default rate
Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch and AllianceBernstein
7
High-Yield Default Rates
LT
M Issuer
Defa
ult R
ate
(P
erc
ent)
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Why emerging-market corporates?
Sovereign fundamentals strong
Corporate fundamentals strong
Valuations attractive
What’s the best way to assess the opportunity? Some key analytical tools
Making the World’s Fastest-Growing Economies Work for You
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Key Analytical Tools: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Analysis
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Bottom-Up
Top-Down
Investment Opportunity
Issuer Industry Capital Structure
Market Cycle Country
Fundamentals Currency Macro/Economic
Outlook
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Evaluating Quasi-Sovereigns: Combination of Macro and Credit Analysis
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Source: AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
More macro intensive
More credit intensive
Chile Israel
Strong Sovereign
Weak Quasi
ENAP Israel Electric
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Evaluating Quasi-Sovereigns: Combination of Macro and Credit Analysis
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Source: AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
More macro intensive
More credit intensive
Chile Israel
Chile Mexico
Codelco Pemex
Strong Sovereign
Weak Quasi Strong Quasi
Strong Sovereign
ENAP Israel Electric
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Evaluating Quasi-Sovereigns: Combination of Macro and Credit Analysis
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Source: AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
More macro intensive
More credit intensive
Chile Israel
Chile Mexico
Codelco Pemex
Strong Sovereign
Weak Quasi Strong Quasi Weak Quasi
Strong Sovereign Weak Sovereign
Venezuela Ukraine
ENAP Israel Electric
PDVSA Naftogaz
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Evaluating Quasi-Sovereigns: Combination of Macro and Credit Analysis
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More macro intensive
More credit intensive
Chile Israel
Chile Mexico
Codelco Pemex
Strong Sovereign
Weak Quasi Strong Quasi
Weak Sovereign
Weak Quasi Strong Quasi
Dubai
Strong Sovereign Weak Sovereign
Venezuela Ukraine
ENAP Israel Electric
DEWA PDVSA
Naftogaz
Source: AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
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Historical example only. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
As of February 21, 2012
Indonesia refers to 5⅞% 2020; PLN refers to 5½% 2021.
Source: Bloomberg and AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information.
Indonesia: strong country fundamentals
PLN: strong company fundamentals
Investment implications: use PLN to express positive view on Indonesia
When Both Country and Company Fundamentals Matter
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Best-case investment scenario: Indonesia and PLN in late 2011
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Indonesian Government Bonds:
Spread vs. US Treasuries PLN:
Spread vs. Indonesian Government Bonds
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.7
Dec 11 Jan 12 Feb 12
Pe
rce
nt
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
Dec 11 Jan 12 Feb 12
Perc
ent
Awarded Investment-Grade Status
When Both Country and Company Fundamentals Matter
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Best-case scenario: Sovereigns outperform treasuries, quasi-sovereigns outperform
sovereigns
Historical example only. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
As of February 21, 2012
Indonesia refers to 5⅞% 2020; PLN refers to 5½% 2021.
Source: Bloomberg and AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
Fitch Moody’s
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Relative Value: Don’t Invest Unless You’re Paid Enough to Do So
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Banco do Brasil’s “nifty perpetual bond” (Financial Times)
Yields are as of January 12, 2012. Banco do Brasil new bond is 9¼% perpetual issued January 12, 2012; Banco do Brasil existing bond is 8½% perpetual issued in 2009.
Source: Bloomberg and AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
Banco do Brasil
New Bond
Banco do Brasil
Existing Bond
Yield 9.25% 7.90%
Bank Rating Baa1/BBB Baa1/BBB
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Relative Value: Don’t Invest Unless You’re Paid Enough to Do So
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Banco do Brasil’s “nifty perpetual bond” (Financial Times)
Yields are as of January 12, 2012. Banco do Brasil new bond is 9¼% perpetual issued January 12, 2012; Banco do Brasil existing bond is 8½% perpetual issued in 2009.
Source: Bloomberg and AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
Banco do Brasil
New Bond
Banco do Brasil
Existing Bond
Yield 9.25% 7.90%
Bank Rating Baa1/BBB Baa1/BBB
Structure Bondholders less
protected (Basel III)
Bondholders more
protected
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Relative Value: Don’t Invest Unless You’re Paid Enough to Do So
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Banco do Brasil’s “nifty perpetual bond” (Financial Times)
Banco do Brasil
New Bond
Banco do Brasil
Existing Bond
Credit Suisse
Comparable Bond
Yield 9.25% 7.90% 10%
Bank Rating Baa1/BBB Baa1/BBB AA1/A
Structure Bondholders less
protected (Basel III)
Bondholders more
protected
Bondholders more
protected
Yields are as of January 12, 2012. Banco do Brasil new bond is 9¼% perpetual issued January 12, 2012; Banco do Brasil existing bond is 8½% perpetual issued in 2009; Credit Suisse
comparable bond is 7⅞% 2041 issued in 2011.
Source: Bloomberg and AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information
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2008 2009 2010 2011
US
D
Avoiding Worst-Case Scenarios: Watch for Warning Signs
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Arantes Alimentos
As of February 21, 2012
*Refers to senior unsecured notes, 10½%, 2012.
Source: Bloomberg and AllianceBernstein; see Disclosures and Important Information.
Arantes Alimentos Bond: Price*
Jun 2008: Bond issued
Dec 2008: Missed first coupon payment
Feb 2012: Still pending resolution
Jan 2009: Filed for bankruptcy protection
“Flavor of the month”: Arantes was the last of six Brazilian beef companies to issue bonds
Risk-insensitive market: investors were desperate for yield
Lack of track record: short operating history
Inconsistencies: management gave changing account of expansion strategy
Signs of desperation: first road show had failed; brokers pushed the bond at any price buyers would accept
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Case Study: Pemex (Issued September 2011)
New peso-denominated issue looked less attractive than comparable existing US dollar bond…
…the yield was lower, it was less liquid, and the bond language offered slightly less protection under local law compared with US law
One option: Don’t buy peso bond; buy dollar bond and swap into Mexican pesos to achieve a higher yield than the new issue
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Explore all the Options, Consider Simple Derivative Strategies
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[insert document identifier] AllianceBernstein.com 21
Making the World’s Fastest-Growing Economies Work for You
Why emerging-market corporates?
Sovereign fundamentals strong
Corporate fundamentals strong
Valuations attractive
What’s the best way to assess the opportunity? Some key analytical tools
Both top-down and bottom-up analysis matter
View relative value in global industry context
Pay close attention to corporate governance
Where Can Emerging-Market Corporates Fit in Your Asset Allocation?
Dedicated mandate
Incorporated into your emerging-market portfolio
Incorporated into your credit portfolio
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Disclosures and Important Information
Disclosure on Security Examples References to specific securities are presented to illustrate the application of our investment philosophy only and are not to be considered recommendations by AllianceBernstein. The specific securities identified and described in this presentation do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold or recommended for the portfolio, and it should not be assumed that investments in the securities identified were or will be profitable. Upon request, we will furnish a listing of all investments made during the prior one-year period. Past performance is not a guide to future performance. Additional Information The value of investments and the income from them can fall as well as rise and you may not get back the original amount invested. The value of non-domestic securities may be subject to exchange-rate fluctuations. The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are based on AllianceBernstein’s internal forecasts and should not be relied upon as an indication of future market performance or any guarantee of return from an investment in any AllianceBernstein services. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data contained herein. The MSCI data may not be further redistributed or used as a basis for other indices or any securities or financial products. This report is not approved, reviewed or produced by MSCI.
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A Word About Risk
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