emergency in the forest - ciponline.org

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CONTENTS Presentation 2 I. ECONOMICAND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE FOREST EMERGENCY 3 . Background: Half a century of ravaging the forest 4 2. The government of Arnoldo Alemán: The time of the “fat cows” 8 3. The forestry sector’s legal and institutional framework: INAFOR’s role 2 4. Forestry activity and foreign demand: The mahogany market 5 5. Bolaños’ emergency, closed season and exports at discretion 2 II.CASE ANALYSES: THE LUMBER COMPANIES’ MODUS OPERANDI 25 . The disaster in the Río Kung Kung 26 2. A questioned concession in Karawala: The case of the Ubeda Brothers 29 3. MAPRONIC (Santo Domingo) company in the RAAN: Favoritism by INAFOR? 32 4. PRADA, S.A.: Certified company with a dubious record 35 5. Pine in Nueva Segovia: Abuse by regents, lumber dealers and INAFOR officials 38 III CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 . Conclusions 42 2. Recommendations 45 Bibliographic References 47 Emergency in the forest REPORT ON THE ILLEGAL FELLING OF LUMBER IN NICARAGUA An investigation by the Center for Communication Research (CINCO) in association with the Center for International Policy (CIP) Design and layout: Roberto Zúñiga L. Photography: Roberto Fonseca L. English translation: Judy Butler

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CONTENTS

Presentation 2

I. ECONOMICANDENVIRONMENTALIMPACTOFTHEFORESTEMERGENCY 3

�. Background:Halfacenturyofravagingtheforest 4

2. ThegovernmentofArnoldoAlemán:Thetimeofthe“fatcows” 8

3. Theforestrysector’slegalandinstitutionalframework:INAFOR’srole �2

4. Forestryactivityandforeigndemand:Themahoganymarket �5

5. Bolaños’emergency,closedseasonandexportsatdiscretion 2�

II.CASEANALYSES:THELUMBERCOMPANIES’MODUSOPERANDI 25

�. ThedisasterintheRíoKungKung 26

2. AquestionedconcessioninKarawala:ThecaseoftheUbedaBrothers 29

3. MAPRONIC(SantoDomingo)companyintheRAAN:FavoritismbyINAFOR? 32

4. PRADA,S.A.:Certifiedcompanywithadubiousrecord 35

5. PineinNuevaSegovia:Abusebyregents,lumberdealersandINAFORofficials 38

IIICONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS 4�

�. Conclusions 42

2. Recommendations 45

BibliographicReferences 47

Emergency in the forest REPORT ON THE ILLEGAL FELLING OF LUMBER IN NICARAGUA

An investigation by the Center for Communication Research (CINCO) in association with the Center for International Policy (CIP)

Design and layout: Roberto Zúñiga L.Photography: Roberto Fonseca L.English translation: Judy Butler

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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This report contains the principalfindingsofthejournalistic inves-tigation “Emergency in the For-est,”conductedoverfivemonthsby a team of professionals fromthe Center for Communication

Research(CINCO),inassociationwiththeCen-terforInternationalPolicy(CIP),basedinWash-ingtonDC.

The research, coor-dinated by Carlos F.Chamorro, presidentof CINCO, was con-ducted by a team madeupofRobertoFonseca,Camilo de Castro andother journalists andresearchers. It coveredthe territories of theMiningTriangle,PuertoCabezas, Waspám andthe Río Coco in theNorth Atlantic Autono-mous Region (RAAN),themunicipalitiesoftheDesembocadura de RíoGrandeandLaCruzdeRíoGrandeandtheRíoKungKungintheSouthAtlantic AutonomousRegion(RAAS),aswellas the department ofNuevaSegovia.

Italsoinvolvedanintensesearchforandgather-ingofdataanddocumentsrelatedtotheforestissuefromthemaingovernmentalandnongov-ernmentalinstitutionsandespeciallyinterviewswiththemostnotablerepresentativesoftheNi-

caraguanlumber industry,whointhemajorityofcasesgrantedajournalisticinterviewforthefirsttime.

Thereportisdividedintothreepartstofacilitatereadingandtoexplorethefindingsmoredeeply.Inthefirstpart,youwillfindeverythingrelatedtotheissueoftheeconomicandenvironmentalim-

pactoftheforestemer-gency, starting with thehistorical backgroundand coming up to theForestryStateofEmer-gency declared in May2006.

The second part pres-ents, case by case, thediversemodusoperandiof a very representativegroup of lumber com-panies that exploit theforest resource throughGeneral ManagementPlans, Minimum Plansor concessions by in-digenous communities.MostofthemoperateinNicaragua’s Caribbeanregion and are the ob-ject of major suspicionandaccusations.

Finally, in the thirdpart, the reader will find a summarized set ofconclusions and recommendations, the lat-terofwhichareespeciallydirectedtothenewauthorities elected this past November 5, whomust make key decisions on the forestry issueinthenextfiveyears.

Presentation

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IEconomic and environmental

impact of the forest emergency

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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In �950, a Technical Mission from theUnited Nations Food and AgricultureOrganization (FAO) produced the firstimportant report on Nicaragua’s forestresources. The document stated thatthis Central American country had 6.5

millionhectaresofforestcover,whichrepresent-ed47%ofthenationalterritory,estimatedatthattimeat�37,000squarekilometers.

ThatFAOTechnicalReport,preparedbyexpertsR.D.GarverandH.Recartof theUSForestryServiceandtheFAO,respectively,estimatedthatthecultivatedsurfaceamounted toonly958,000hectares,equivalent to7%of thenational terri-toryatthetime.

Ahalfcenturylater,theofficialNicaraguandocu-menttitled“ValoraciónForestalNicaragua2000”(ForestryAppraisalNicaragua2000)estimatedthatNicaragua’sforestedareahadshrunkto3.2millionhectares (32,000 square kilometers in the �950-2000period,anareamuchgreaterthanthetotalextensionoftheUSstateofMassachusetts(20,306squarekilometers),orofNicaragua’sneighbor,ElSalvador(2�,040squarekilometers).

Thisoveralldeforestationfigureequalsanaver-agelossof64,000hectaresperyear.Atthisrate,47.35%ofNicaragua’sforestshavedisappeared.

Inturn,thesurfacecultivatedforagriculturalpur-poses increasedto46,935.4squarekilometers inthatsamehalfcentury,afigurenowequaltoover36%of thenational territory, compared toonly7%fiftyyearsearlier.

Agrarian reformVariousfactorsarerelatedtothisfreneticadvanceoftheagriculturalfrontierinthepasthalfcentury.Amongthemarepeasantmigration,theagrarianreformprocessesof�960-�978and�979-�990,theend of the armed conflict and social reinsertionofthecontraandarmyveterans,andthelackofterritorialdemarcationand titlingof indigenouslandsinthecountry’sCaribbeancoast.

Bytheendofthefifties,accordingtotheofficialAgricultural and Forestry Ministry (MAGFOR)documenttitled“MarcodePolíticasdeTierras”(LandPoliciesFramework),amovementofland-less peasants was noted, which engaged in land

Background: Half a century of ravaging the forest

“Lands in forested zones belonging to the sta-te were given out to former contras and for-mer army soldiers, and all they did was cut

down all the trees to plant rice, beans and maize. You can see that the whole strip where those property titles began to be given out was clear-cut and what we have now is a subsistence agricultural frontier.” Jader Guzmán, head of MAGFOR’s Forest Policies Dept.

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EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

“Each time I would see in the media that property titles were being given to those who had formerly taken up arms, it trigge-

red a dual sentiment in me, in that I knew it would help pacify the country, but I could also see that it would provoke an environmental disaster, a genuine tragedy, in that they would destroy the forest to plant in lands not apt for agriculture.” Jaime Guillén, National Rainforest Coordinator

invasionsas amethodof struggle. In response,thethengovernmentapprovedthefirstAgrarianReformLawin�963.

The agrarian reform process intensified in the�979-�990 period, with the Sandinista govern-ment.ItwasinitiatedinJuly�979,withthecon-fiscationofruralpropertiesthathadbelongedtothe Somoza family and its close associates. By�990,54.4%ofthelandswasinthepoweroftheprivatesectorand39.8%inthehandsoftheso-calledreformedsector(cooperatives, statecom-panies,etc.)asaresultofthislandredistributionprocess.

It is officially estimated thatthe agrarian reform duringthe Sandinista period (�979-�990) benefited over ��0,000peasantfamilies,whichrepre-sented around 80% of thosedemandinglands.

PacificationWith the end of the armedconflictin�990resultingfromtheelectoralvictoryofVioletaBarrios de Chamorro, a newlanddistributionprocesscon-tinued,nowtothetwobandsinvolvedinthecivilwar—the

formermembersoftheArmyandtheResistance(contras), to guarantee their social and produc-tivereinsertion.

According to MAGFOR’s official document,“Marco de Políticas de Tierras,” the Chamorrogovernmentprovided23,069property titlesdur-ingheradministration,whichrepresented837,947manzanas(�manzana=.7hectares)and37,690peasantfamilybeneficiaries.

“Each timeIwouldsee in themedia thatprop-erty titles were being givento those who had formerlytakenuparms,ittriggeredadualsentimentinme”com-ments Jaime Guillén, Na-tional Rainforest Coordina-tor,“inthatIknewitwouldhelppacifythecountry,butIcouldalso see that itwouldprovoke an environmentaldisaster, a genuine tragedy,in that they would destroythe forest to plant in landsnotaptforagriculture.”

Thebook,Dinámicadelsec-tor forestal en Nicaragua:�986-�996, shows the nega-tive impactonthecountry’sforests of the agrarian re-

Jaime Guillén

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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formprocesspromotedbytheSandini-stagovernmentfollowedbytheprovi-sionof landtothesectors involvedinthearmedconflictof theeightiesandtothetraditionalseekersoflandinthepost-conflictperiod(�990-200�).

That book, says Jader Guzmán, headof MAGFOR’s Forest Policies Dept,“shows an increase in the deforesta-tionratefrom35,000to�00,000hect-aresayear….Landsinforestedzonesbelonging to the state were given outto former contras and former armysoldiers,andalltheydidwascutdownall the trees to plant rice, beans andmaize.Youcanseethatthewholestripwherethosepropertytitlesbegantobegiven out was clear-cut and what wehavenow isa subsistenceagriculturalfrontier.”

According to the latest agriculturalcensus, taken in 200�, there are ap-proximately 200,000 agricultural ex-ploitationsinthecountry,coveringanareaof6.2millionhectares.Inthisre-gard,itshouldberecalledthattheFAOTechnicalMission’sreportfromthefiftiesindicatedthattheareacultivatedtotaledonly958,000hectares.

Illegal cuttingTogether with the advance of the agriculturalfrontier is the illegal fellingof trees for lumber,especiallyinNicaragua’sCaribbeanareas,wheretheforestswiththegreatestcommercialpotentialarefound.Thoseinvolvedjustifytheiractivitiesonthegroundsthattheindigenousterritoriesareneitherdemarcatednortitledofficially.

“Thelackofdemarcationandtitlingoftheindig-enousterritorieshasmadewayforthereformedsectorbeneficiariesanddemobilizedgroupstobeputthereoftenbystateinterventionandthey,likethe private owners and colonizers, have pushed

theagriculturalfrontierfurtheranddisplacedthecommunitiesfromthelandsoccupiedbytheiran-cestors,”statestheofficialMAGFORdocument,“MarcodePolíticasdetierras.”

Itgoesontosaythat“aproductofthisweaknesshasbeenobservedon thepartof thecolonizersandemigrantpeasants,which isa significant in-crease in the cuttingdownof the forests, illegalexploitation of lumber, establishment of subsis-tenceagriculturalplotsandextensivecattlerais-ing.”

According to the same document, “the agricul-turalfrontierisstillexpandingrapidlyandthees-timated deforestation rate in the Atlantic Coastis80,000hectaresayear,closeto2.�%ofthere-mainingforestcover.”Thisfigure,whichitcalls“alarming,”isbasedonaWorldBankdocument.

Yader Guzmán

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Moreover,anAssessmentoftheForestry-LumberCluster, promoted by the Ministry of Develop-ment, Industry and Commerce (MIFIC), claimsthatthe“illegalcuttingoflumbercouldbearound60%ofthecuttingvolumesregisteredbyIN-AFOR.”

ThisassessmentcitesanotherrecentstudybytheWorldBank,whichestimatesthattheille-galcuttingoflumberrangesbetween30,000and 35,000 cubic meters of broadleaf treesandaround�35,000cubicmetersofconifers.

Based on these calculations it is estimated thatNicaraguasufferslosesbetweenUS$4and8mil-lioninduetofiscallossesduetoproducedbytheillegalfellingoftheforests.

Summary of relevant data

n In �950, the forest cover totaled 6.4millionhectares.

n The cultivated surface was 958,600hectares.

n Theappraisalofthe2000ForestMapconfirmed that the forest cover hadshrunkto3.2millionhectares.

n Incontrast,thelanddedicatedtoagri-culture increasedfrom7%to36%ofthenationalterritory.

n Between �986 and �996, the annualdeforestationraterosefrom35,000to�00,000hectares.

n WorldBank studiesestimate that theillegalfellingoftreesreaches�70,000cubic meters a year in broadleaf andconifertrees.

n Basedonthesecalculations, it isesti-mated that Nicaragua loses betweenUS$4and8millionduetofiscallossesproduced by the illegal felling of theforests.

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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On January �0, �997, ArnoldoAlemán assumed the presi-dency of the republic for afive-yearperiodafterwinningthe elections the previousyear. He came from having

servedasmayorofManagua(�990-�996),wherehewaspursuedby recurrentaccusationsofcor-ruption,favoritismandpersonalenrichment.

Monthsaftertakingoffice,PresidentAlemánis-suedanExecutiveDecree(25-97)settingaFor-estryMoratoriumontheexploitationoftwolum-ber species of high commercial value: AtlanticMahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) and RoyalCedar(Cedrelaodorata).

Nonetheless,representativesofNicaraguanlum-ber businesses consulted during this researchprocess insist that behind this decision was an-other:thatoffavoringagroupofnationallumbercompanybusinessowners,whowereatthattimelinked to President Alemán himself and to the

The government of Arnoldo Alemán: The time of the “fat cows”

“…the objective of the forestry moratorium set by President Alemán was to push the lum-ber dealers out of the market and create their

own company in the North Atlantic. I’m not going to give the company’s name but it is known that figures linked to President Alemán were involved, and the ships left from Puerto Cabezas (RAAN) without CITES permits or customs permits. How did they get [the lumber] into the country of destination? I have no idea.” Oscar Sobalvarro, former leader of the Nicaraguan Resistance and now owner of the company called Maderas Preciosas de Nicaragua (Maprenic)

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oppositionSandinistaNationalLiberationFront(FSLN),withwhichtheNicaraguanPresidentwasengagedindiscussionsaroundcommonpoliticalandeconomicinterests.

The closed season in the Alemán periodAccordingtoOscarSobalvarro,formerleaderoftheNicaraguanResistanceandnowownerofthecompanycalledMaderasPreciosasdeNicaragua(Maprenic)“…theobjectiveoftheforestrymora-toriumsetbyPresidentAlemánwastopushthelumberdealersoutofthemarketandcreatetheirowncompanyintheNorthAtlantic.I’mnotgoingtogivethecompany’snamebutit isknownthatfigureslinkedtoPresidentAlemánwereinvolved,andtheshipsleftfromPuertoCabezas(RAAN)withoutCITESpermitsorcustomspermits.Howdidtheyget[thelumber]intothecountryofdes-tination?Ihavenoidea.”

“During Alemán’s closed season, around fivetimes more was cut than was cut generally; inotherwordstherewasmoredepredationoftheforests,”saidPedroBlandónMoreno,Manager

andlegalrepresentativeoftheforestrycompanyPRADA,SA.

AttheendofOctober�998,whilethesupposedmoratorium was still in effect, the country wasdevastated by Hurricane Mitch, which affectedalargepartofthenationalterritorywithtorren-tialrainsandmudslides,especiallynorthernandCaribbeanNicaragua,wherethecountry’smostimportant forested areas are. Months later,thePresident issuedanewpresidential accord,couched in the interest of helping the autono-mous regions affected by Hurricane Mitch, tocommercially exploit the trees downed by thenaturalphenomenon.

“Thepressure regarding thedowned lumber in-creased, so [the government] created a mecha-nismcalledProgramoftheAutonomousRegions(PRA),tobeabletogetthelumberout.Butwiththatcameanotherstratagemofthelumberdeal-ers;theycommittedabuses,ascanbeobservedinthetableofexports[ofmilledlumber]from2000-200�,aboom,whichwaslinkedtoover-exploita-tion of the forestry resources,” said MAGFORexpertJaderGuzmán.

WHO’S WHO IN THE ALEMÁN ERAName Representatives Export markets Departure

pointsProducts

CONSORCIO MADERERO INTERNACIONAL, S.A.

Luis E. Figueroa A. Cuba and Spain. El Bluff, El Rama, Las Manos and Peñas Blancas.

Milled pine, cedar, mahogany and other lumber.

MADERAS Y DERIVADOS DE NICARAGUA, S.A. (MADENSA)

Francisco Lemuz Lanuza

Dominican Republic and United States.

Peñas Blancas and Puerto Cabezas.

PRADA, S.A. Pedro Blandón Moreno

Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Spain, United States, Guate-mala and Panama.

Guasaule, Peñas Blancas and Puerto Cabezas.Products: Plywood, milled lumber.

CARMEN ADRIÁN UBEDA RIVERA

Carmen Adrián Ubeda Rivera.

Costa Rica (milled lumber and doors), Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Spain, United States and Mexico.

Corinto, El Rama, Guasaule, Las Ma-nos, Peñas Blancas and Puerto Corinto.

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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Forestry aberration disgui-sed as legality

OnSeptember27,thenAgriculturalandForestryMinisterJoséMarencoCardenal,apoliticalcol-leagueofPresidentArnoldoAlemán,issuedMin-isterialAccordNo.33-2000, titled“Legalizationofintegrallycutlumber.”Behindthiseuphemism,however,lurkedthewillto“legalizetheillegal,”inotherwordstoexemptthedownedtreesfromthepresumedmoratoriumwithoutanyauthoriza-tionwhatever.

“A maximum period of up to April 30, 200�, isauthorized to transport the legalized lumber,”

statestheMinisterialAccord. Itsarticle5adds:“Theunextendableperiodofninety(90)calendardaysisestablishedfromthetimeofpublicationofthisAccordinanynationallycirculatingmediumtoinventorytheillegallycutlumber.”

In effect, extraordinary exports of milled lumber,above all of broadleaf trees, were recorded in theyears2000-200�byasmallnumberofnationallum-bercompanieslinkedtosectorsveryclosetoPresi-dentAlemánandtohisopposition,theFSLN.

In2000,accordingtoofficialfiguresoftheGeneralCustomsDivision(DGA),fourlumberdealerslinkedtothegoverningPLCandtheoppositionFSLNreg-istered record exports of 23.4 million kilograms oflumber,withatotalFOBvalueofUS$�55.7million.

“During Alemán’s clo-sed season, around five times more was cut

than was cut generally; in other words there was more depreda-tion of the forests.” Pedro Blandón Moreno, Manager and legal representative of the forestry company PRADA, SA.

Lizandro D’León, Oscar Sobalvarro and Indalecio Rodríguez

Pedro Blandón

— �� —

ThatistentimestheFOBvalueofNicaragua’saver-ageannuallumberexports.

In200�,ayearofgeneralelections,thesamelumbercompaniesregisteredmuchlowerexports,althoughstillhigherthanthenationalaverage.AccordingtoDGAdata,thesefourexportersregisteredatotalvol-umeof9.2millionkilos,valuedatUS$23.5millionFOB.

Whencomparingthe200�figureswiththeofficialfig-uresgeneratedbyMIFICbasedontheDGAvalues,however,anofficialunder-recordingcanbeobservedinCustoms,sinceitrecordedexportsofonlyatotalFOBvalueofUS$�3.0million.

Companies with “good connections”Thebreakdownofexportsforthosecompaniesinbothextraordinaryyearsisthefollowing:

ComPAny nAmE VAlor FoB

�.PRADA,S.A. US$70.704,85�.6�2.MaderasyDeriva-dosdeNicaragua(MADENSA) US$49.7�9,925.733.ConsorcioMadereroInternacional,S.A. US$30,�94,3�7.584.CarmenAdriánUbedaRivera US$25.248,40�.03

PRADA,S.A. is the company thatexported themostinbothyears.ItsrepresentativesarePedroBlandón Moreno, Edgar Gómez Casco, IleanaSalgadoandLesbiaBlandónMoreno. Thefirstof these,PedroBlandónMoreno,was thealter-nateofSandinistabenchlegislatorTomásBorgeMartínezinthe2002-2006legislativeperiod.

In second place for the 2000-200� exportswas Maderas y Derivados de Nicaragua, S.A.(MADENSA), whose representatives are Fran-cisco Lemuz Lanuza, Leyla Martínez MartínezandMarthaLorenaPérezRamos.Sourcesfrom

thelumberindustryalsolinkthepowerfulByronJerez,PresidentAlemán’sformerGeneralDirec-tor of Income (DGI), who also held the diplo-maticpostofHonoraryConsultotheDominicanRepublic.TheinternationalclientsofthislumbercompanyarepreciselyintheDominicanRepublicandtheUnitedStates.

ThethirdcompanythatstoodoutinthatperiodisConsorcioMaderero Internacional, S.A., rep-resentedbyLuisE.FigueroaA,adistinguishedpoliticalFSLNcadreinRegionV(Boaco-Chon-tales)duringtheSandinistagovernmentandfor-merFSLNlegislativerepresentative.

In fourth place in the export ranking of thoseyearsistheHermanosUbedacompany,whosele-galrepresentativeisCarmenAdriánUbedaRive-ra,registeredasanindividualexporter.Heworkstogetherwithhisyoungerbrother,JoséMaximinoUbedaRivera.BothsaytheyareoriginallyfromSanRafaeldelNorte,fromafamilytraditionallydedicatedtotheforestrysectorandhadreturnedfromCostaRicawheretheylivedformanyyearsand relaunched the family lumber businesses athigherlevels.

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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In June �998, then-President Ar-noldo Alemán Lacayo ratified Law290, “Law of Organization, Compe-tence and Procedures of the Execu-tive Branch,” in which is recordedthecreationoftheNationalForestry

Institute (INAFOR) as a Decentralized En-tity under MAGFOR’s sectoral guidance. Inpractice, this represents a severe limitationoninfluencingthecountry’sforestpoliciesas,accordingtothislaw,therequiredplans,pro-grams, investments and budgets must be pre-sentedviaMAGFORordirectly tothePresi-dentoftheRepublic.

“[INAFOR]isanewinstitution,whichappearedwiththefamousLaw290.Thisisasectorthatisnotgiven the importance it reallyhas. It isaninstitutionthatwasperhapscreatedbecauseMARENA wanted to get rid of the responsi-bilities it had in this area,” comments currentINAFOR Executive Director Indalecio Rodrí-guez.

The nascent INAFOR was not assigned fundsthroughtheGeneralBudgetoftheRepublic.Itsinstitutional income to coverpayroll andopera-tionalexpensescamefromtheincomebroughtinthroughtherateschargedforanyforestryexploi-tationandservicesitmightprovideforanyregis-teredindividualororganizationdedicatedtofor-estactivity.Thisdistortedtheforestmonitoringand inspection function that INAFOR was sup-posedtoperform.

“From �998 to 2002, INAFOR financed itselfwithminimum[budgetary]resourcesthatcamefrom approving forestry permits, but a distor-tionappeared,inthatthemorepermitsitgavethe faster it could cover payroll; living off the

grantingofpermitsmeantitsforestryadminis-trationwasn’tefficient. Itwasa totally incon-ceivable phenomenon,” explains MAGFOR’sJaderGuzmán.

The system of taxes on lumber exploitation wasestablishedthroughDecreeNo.75-99,approvedby President Alemán in June �999. To protectthe Atlantic mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla)androyalcedar(Cederlaodorate),thislawestab-lisheda7.5%incometaxretentionrateoneachcubicmeteroflogsofthesetwospecies.ThebaseonwhichtheretentionwouldbeappliedwastheaverageinternationalFOBpriceforacubicmeterofmilled lumber in tropical countriespublishedby the International Tropical Timber Organiza-tion(ITTO).

The amount of the retentions, according to thesameExecutiveDecree,wouldbedepositedintheMinistryofTreasuryandPublicCredit(MHCP),“remainingavailable to INAFOR, followingap-provalbythePresidentoftheRepublic.”

Two years later, the National Assembly ap-provedLawNo.402,“LawofRatesforForest-ryExploitationandServices,”whichabolishedExecutive Decree 75-99. This law establishedthat the beneficiary of a Forestry Use Permitgranted by INAFOR must pay that institutionarateofC$250(córdobas)percubicmeteroffelledlog(US$�8.50)ifitcorrespondedtospe-ciesfromCategoryA,amongthemroyalcedar,Atlanticmahogany,pochote,lignumvitae,WestIndian red ebony, walnut or Jamaican rose-wood,amongothers.

By 2006, when the Economic Emergency De-creewent intoeffect, followedbytheForestryClosedSeasonLaw,INAFORhadalreadyreg-

The forestry sector’s legal and institutional framework: InAFor’s role

— �3 —

istered �0� sawmills, a record number. Theyweredistributedasfollows:NuevaSegovia33,RAAN�6,RíoSanJuan8,Estelí6,Madriz2,amongothers.

The forest exploitation volume that INAFORapproved also increased in the 200�-2005 pe-riod.Inthefourdepartmentsandautonomousregionswith thegreatest lumberactivity,a fre-netic and growing extraction was observed. In200�,INAFORapprovedavolumeof53,295cu-bicmetersinNuevaSegovia,RAAN,RAASandRíoSanJuan.In2005thatincreasedto�45,500cubicmetersinthosesamelocales:almostthreetimesmore.

Environmental Ombudsman Lisandro D’Leónstrongly criticizes INAFOR’s institutional inca-pacitytocontrolcompliancewithandimplemen-tationoftheUsePlans.“Itisanactofirrespon-sibilitytobegrantingforestryuseplanswhenyoudon’thavethecapacitytogosupervise.It’slikegivingthelumberdealersortheforestownersablankcheck.Ifyou’regoingtogivethempermis-siontoexploit,youhavetoprovidefollow-uptoconfirmwhetherornotthebeneficiaryiscomply-ingwithwhatwasestablished.Ifyoudon’t,you’recontributingtotheirreversiblelossoftheforest,”heinsists.

Law 462 created the posts of Forestry RegentandForestryTechnicianto“ensureimplementa-tionoftheForestryManagementPlanapprovedby the correspondingauthority inaproductionunit. This person, however, would be directlycontracted by the person or company respon-sible for themanagement. Inotherwords, theforestry company that this regentor technicianwassupposedtomonitorbecamehisorherboss.By 2005, INAFOR had registered and autho-rized more than 300 Forestry Regents and �30ForestryTechnicians.

“Accordingtomycriteria,”saystheenvironmen-tal ombudsman, “these forestry regents endedupbeingaworsemedicinethanthedisease.Itis

assumedthattheyareobligedtofilloutexploita-tionguidesinthefield,alsomarkingwhichtreesaretobecutandhowit’stobedone,respectingthetechnicalnorms. We,however,haveseizedblank guide forms from the lumbermen, andthey’ve told us that the regent gave it to themlikethat,toavoidtheresponsibilityofgoingouttothefield.”

More responsibilities, fewer resources

InSeptember2003,afterseveralyearsofdebate,negotiation and consensus, Law No. 462, “LawofConservation,PromotionandSustainableDe-velopmentoftheForestrySector”wasapproved,assigning INAFOR—still under MAGFOR’ssectoral guidance—a total of �6 vital functions,among them surveillance of the sustainable ex-ploitation of the forestry resources, approval oftheUsePermitsandaccreditationoftheForestryRegentsandTechnicians,whobecamekeyactorsinthenewrulesoftheforestrygame.

Toexercisethesefunctionsatanationallevel,IN-AFORwasstructuredinto�0ForestryDistricts,whichinadecentralizedwayareresponsibleforthe application of the forestry policy’s technicalnorms and those of the inter-institutional coor-dination. Themost importantof theseForestryDistricts are: District I (Puerto Cabezas), Dis-trictII(Rosita),DistrictIII(Ocotal),DistrictIX(Bluefields)andDistrictX(SanCarlos,RíoSanJuan).

In appraising the institution’s weaknesses, IN-AFOR executive director Indalecio Rodríguezinsists that “the greatest weakness is still thebudgetaryissue.”IntheGeneralBudgetoftheRepublic for 2003, the National Assembly ear-marked C$3�.8 million for INAFOR, of whichC$23.4 million was for current expenses (par-ticularly salaries) and C$8.3 million for capitalexpenses.Attheofficialexchangerateforthatyear—C$�5.�0 per dollar—this was equivalenttoUS$2.�million.

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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INAFOR appears as a “Cinderella” comparedtootherdecentralizedentitiessuchasINATEC,which was allocated C$ 2�9.� million, or INTA,which was allocated C$96.7, respectively sevenand three times more than the line assigned toINAFOR.

“Everybody wants to blame INAFOR and itsofficials[forthelackofforestsurveillance]butyou have to be fair in this,” insists Guzmán.“One person can’t cover �5-20,000 square ki-lometerswithoutabudgetandoperationalex-penses.NotevenyouorIcoulddoit.It’sim-possibleforamunicipaldelegate[ofINAFOR],forexample,tocoverawoodedareathesizeofEl Salvador with operational spending of onlyC$�,000ayear.”

AccordingtoINAFOR’sexecutivedirector,theseannual budget lines are less than half (47%) ofwhattheinstitutionrequestedtobeabletooper-ateefficiently.

FélixHernández,INAFORdelegateinthemu-nicipalityofRosita(RAAN),confirmstheweak-nessoftheinstitutionalcontrolduetobudget-arylimitations.“HereinRositatheproblemwehave as INAFOR is the illegality; the controlpostsintheregionofLasMinasandPrinzapol-ka aren’t functioning… There should be onepoliceofficer,onefromthearmyandonefromINAFOR, [but] INAFORcurrentlyhasa verylowbudgetanditprovidesvirtuallynothingtohiremorepersonnel.”

CasEs aIRED IN COURT (2003-2006)

Total cases: 38

Resolved in INAFOR´s favor: 5

Pending resolution in Supreme Court: 33

sawmills registered in INaFOR

2000 85

2001 70

2002 N.D.

2003 70

2004 59

2005 19

2006 101

Source: Registro Nacional Forestal, INAFOR

Increase in lumber felling (cubic meters)

2000 92,768,710

2001 53,295,413

2002 73,291,160

2003 65,655,814

2004 98,406,895

2005 145,500,872

Data corresponding to Nueva Segovia, RAAN, RAAS and Río San Juan, the areas with the greatest forest potential.

Lumber seized by INaFOR (cubic meters)

2003 862.02004 44.352005 462.4

Fines imposed by INaFOR (in C$)

2003 254,160.002004 341,165.002005 28,060.00Fines amounting toC$264,915.00 are being appealed.

Fines imposed by INaFOR (in Us$)

2003 3,138.402004 58,500.02005 39,206.6Fines amounting to US$73,000.00 are being appealed.

INaFOR officials sanctioned

2003 32004 162005 16

— �5 —

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

Forestry activity and foreign demand: The mahogany market

LWhatiscalledAtlanticmahogany(Swietenia macrophylla) is thespecies of precious wood thatheads the Nicaraguan lumbertradewiththegreatestforeignde-mand,provokinggreaterpressure

onthisspecies.

In themid-eighties,according to theApril2005study titled Diagnóstico del estado actual de laCaobaenNicaragua [Assessmentof thecurrentstate of Mahogany in Nicaragua], mahogany isfound in seven departments of the country, butafter 2000 no more use permits for this specieswereregisteredinthedepartmentsofMatagalpa,JinotegaorRíoSanJuan,given that“theavail-ableresourceisalmostextinguished.”

ExploitablevolumesofmahoganyarestillfoundinClosedBroadleafForests(BLC),whichrepre-sent44%ofthecountry’stotalwoodedarea,in-cludingtheprotectedareas.

In the Atlantic region, the 2000 Forestry Mapcharacterizedthreegreatblocsofbroadleaf for-est,withcanopycoverageexceeding70%.Thesethreeblocs,whichincludeareasinconservation,amounttoaround2.3millionhectares.

The municipalities with the most extensive pro-ductive forests in which mahogany is found arethose of Waspám, Rosita, Prinzapolka, BonanzaandLaDesembocaduradeRíoGrande,allmu-nicipalities located in the North and South Au-tonomousRegions.Theabove-mentionedstudyestimatesthat77%oftheclosedproductivefor-estsareintheselocalitiesandthattherecouldbecloseto950,000hectaresoftheclosedforesttype

containingpotentiallyusablemahogany forpro-ductivepurposes.

Nonetheless, this area would be reduced to833,90� hectares, since the technical norms es-tablish that the Minimum Cutting Diameter formahogany isover40centimetersDAPandonlythosetreesthatmeetthisgrowthcycleshouldbeextracted.

Thearmedconflictof theeighties tookplace inareascontainingthemostcommerciallyvaluableforestresource,thustherewasnoaccesstoit in

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

— �6 —

largevolumes.Thevolumeformahoganyextrac-tion authorized in that period thus ranged be-tween2,869and6,243cubicmetersperyear.In2003,incontrast,thevolumeofmahoganyautho-rizedreached24,339cubicmetersinthecountryasawhole.

Furthermore,ananalysisoftheGeneralForestryManagementPlans(PGMF)andMinimalMan-agementPlans(PM)ineffectfrom2000to2003concludes that mahogany exploitation reached46,3�� cubic meters, a bit over 50% of which isfrom 2003, precisely when Law 462 on ForestryExploitationwasapproved.

CITES prohibition spiked foreign demand

In 2000, Nicaragua and Guatemala started pro-posingthatmahoganybeincludedinAppendixIIofCITES,onendangeredspecies,topreventtheexhaustionof this valuablewood. Internationalpricesformahoganybegantodrop,affectingtheLatin American exporting countries, but as thisspeciesbecamehardertoacquireinthewakeofits incorporationintotheCITESAppendixII in2003,theystartedrisingagain.

AccordingtotheJuly2006TropicalTimberMar-ketreportgeneratedbytheInternationalTropicalTimber Organization (ITTO), the average pricein the US market of Peruvian mahogany, whichserves as a reference in the world market, rose

fromUS$879 toUS$�,�43a cubicmeterby theendof2005.

By September 2006, the same milled PeruvianmahoganycouldbefoundatanaveragepriceofUS$�,800-�,850 per cubic meter. And BolivianmahoganyhadrisenfromUS$�,300toUS$�,680percubicmeter.

“Wood is one of the most stable commoditiesin theworldmarket,”explainsHéctorRamos,president of the Forestry Chamber of Nicara-gua and of the Forestry Consortium of NuevaSegovia. “Woodisn’t likecoffee,whichbringsonepriceoneyearandanother,eithergreateror smaller one, the next. As you can see, thepriceofwood,whetherpineorbroadleaf,usu-allyhasatendencyjusttorise,moderatelybutalwaysupward.”

Nicaragua stands out among regional exporters

Byexportinganaverageof9,�72cubicmetersayearbetween�996and2002,Nicaraguatookfourth place among the mahogany exportingnationsofLatinAmerica,accordingtothere-port “Racionalizando el comercio de caoba”(Rationalizingthemahoganytrade),publishedbyITTOenOctober2004. Paradoxically,thatperiod covers the “closed season on exports”that President Arnoldo Alemán imposed onmahogany.

“Wood is one of the most stable commodities in the world market. It isn’t like coffee, which brings one price one year and another, either

greater or smaller one, the next. As you can see, the price of wood, whether pine or broadleaf, usually has a tendency just to rise, moderately but always upward.” Héctor Ramos, president of the Forestry Chamber of Nicaragua and of the Forestry Consortium of Nueva Segovia.

— �7 —

Brazilwasthenumberonemahoganyex-porter in Latin America up to October2004, with an annual average of 59,438cubicmeters.ItisfollowedbyPeru,with30,346cubicmetersannually.

The world’s main mahogany importersaretheUnitedStates,whichimportedanannualaverageof73,828cubicmetersbe-tween�996and2002.ItisfollowedbytheDominican Republic, with �2,068 cubicmetersofmilledmahogany.InthirdplaceistheUnitedKingdom,withanannualav-erage of 5,029 cubic meters of importedmahogany.

The foreign markets for Nicaraguan lumber

Nicaragua,accordingtothegovernmen-tal Export Transactions Center (CE-TREX),exportsmilledandotherlumbertoagroupofnearly30countries in theworld,butonlyadozenofthemarefinalmarkets,withpurchaseordersexceedinghalfamilliondollars.Theranking,how-ever,hasbeenexperiencingsomesubtlevariants.

In200�,accordingtotheexportordersauthorizedbyCETREX,theforestrycompanieshadintheirpower permits to export 67.� million kilogramsofmilledlumber,withanFOBvalueofUS$2�.3million.

TheprimarymarketthatyearwasElSalvador,to which 22.2 million kilos was exported, atan FOB value of US$6.� million. In secondplace was the United States, with 3.6 millionkilograms,atanFOBvalueofUS$3.7million.Forcomparativepurposes, it shouldbenotedthatonlymilledpine is exported toElSalva-dor while mahogany and processed productsofgreatercommercialvaluegoto theUnitedStates.

Fouryears later, in2005,CETREXwasalreadyreflectingachangeinthefinalmarketsformilledNicaraguan lumber. TheUnitedStatesbecamethenumberoneforeignmarketbyrecordingex-portpermitsfor3.4millionkilogramsatanFOBvalueofUS$3.4million.ElSalvadorfelltosec-ondplace,with�5.6millionkilogramsatanFOBvalueofUS$2.9million.

According to the General Customs Division(DGA),apublic institution that recordsexportsper se (not only the permits), the trend in theforeignmarketsissimilartothatreportedbyCE-TREX,althoughtheFOBvaluesdeclaredbytheexportersvariednotably.TheamountsassignedbytheDGAarelower,especiallywhenthemer-chandise is to be exported to Central Americancountries, where customs controls are not reli-

Carmen Adrián Ubeda

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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ablecomparedtodestinationssuchastheUnitedStates, which exercises stricter controls on themerchandise.

IncontrasttotheCETREXfiguresbasedonex-portorders,theDGArankingoftheforeignmar-kets for milled Nicaraguan lumber in 200� wasasfollows:ElSalvador(US$4.5million),UnitedStates (US$3.9million),Honduras (US$�.2mil-lion),Spain(US$834,000),DominicanRepublic(US$786,000),Cuba(US$584,000)andCostaRica(US$555,000).Fouryearslater,thefinalmarkethadbeenreconfigured,withSpainorCubamov-inguptothefirstpositions.

They pay a rock-bottom price

Despitethebenefitsfromtheinternationalmar-ketdue to theprice rise, the lumbercompaniesoperatinginNicaraguadon’ttransfertheseben-efitstotheforestowners,betheyfarmersorin-digenouscommunities.Thelatter,inparticular,continuetobevictimsofatransactionthatisun-justbyalldefinitions.

In the case of Atlantic mahogany, the woodwiththegreatestinternationalcommercialval-ue, the Ubeda Rivera brothers, for example,placethecubicmeteroffirst-classmilledwood(FAST-Select)withFSCcertificationatanav-erage price of US$�,500. Nonetheless, theypayUS$30.00pertreeofprecious(red)woodtotheindigenouscommunitieswheretheyex-tractthetrees.

They defend this purchase price tooth and nail,despite it being obscenely low, and wouldn’tdreamofcallingit“unfair”totheindigenouscom-munities. “Onecouldn’t say that it’s fairornotfair; we’d have to go into details,” says CarmenAdriánUbedaRivera,oneofthelargestexport-ersofmilledmahoganyandother commerciallyvaluablespecies.“Manypeoplebelievethatthisactivityisnothingmorethangoinginandbring-ingthetreesout;theydon’tunderstandthepro-

cess involved,or thecosts incurred toextract it,processitandsenditthere.”

The overseas mahogany purchasers

The main purchasers of Nicaraguan mahoganyareintheUnitedStatesandtheDominicanRe-public.Accordingtothelumberdealers,thepre-miumqualitylumber,calledFASTandSELECT,goes to the former. The second quality lumberisboughtbytheCaribbeancountrytosupplyanindustrythatthirstsforrawmaterialtotransformitintoplywood,furniture,etc.

Lumber dealer Hernando Escobar Waldán, ofMiskituoriginandoneofthetenmostoutstand-ingin2005,explainsthemodusoperandiofthiseconomicactivity,whichrequires strong injec-tionsofcapital.“Ifwe’retalkingaboutmiddle-men,almostallofusare. I’mreferringtotheexporters, the machinery owners, the sawmillowners. Theonlyoneswhoaren’tmiddlemenin this casewouldbe the landownersand thedirect buyer, who would be the North Ameri-can, Puerto Rican or European who comeshere looking for lumber. But in thisbusiness,youhavetowinalotofcredibility ifyouwantsomeone to finance your operation each year.Because if youeverendupon thewrong sideofaninternationalist[buyer]they’llnevergiveyousomuchasanotherdirtypenny.Infact,tostartupabusinessyouhavetobeginwithlocalcapital,andonce it’s sure thatyou’regoing tobringouttheproduct,youcanstartlookingforeconomic aid from your client, but that’s onlyafteryou’vegottenthebusinessrunning,drawnup the minimum plans, gotten all the permitsand other stuff that INAFOR requires withLaw462.Onlythenmaybethey’llfacilitatethemoneyyouneed.”

Amongtheseclients,whicharealsotheonesthatfinancetheforestexploitation,extractionandex-portoperations,arethefollowingimportingandmarketingbusinesses:

— �9 —

UnITEd STATES�. MedleyHardwoodInc.*2. MackCookSpecialtyWoods3. BeetyLumberCo.Inc.4. B.T.P.5. GreatAtlanticInternationalInc.6. JamesLewis/IrwinBrownCo.Broker7. CapitalTimberGroup8. PatriotTimber9. MarvinWindows&Doors�0. SITCOLumberCompany��. NobleHoldingInc.�2. MaderasDecorativas(MADECO)�3. RexLumbert�4. ILSCargoMiami�5. Panalpina�6. SouthFloridaLumber�7. LumberAmericasLLC�8. SpecialtyLumberServiceInc.

*Thiscompanyhasbeenmentionedinvariousre-portsofworldenvironmentalorganizations,amongthemGreenpeace, as involved in the import andcommercializationoflumberofillegalorigin.

domInICAn rEPUBlIC�. MaderasDecorativas(MADECO)2. FuenteCigarLtd.3. FerreteríaOchoa4. INDOCAMA5. MaderasFernández6. BraulioFernández

Source:CITESPermits,PIERSReports,U.S.

The market in Honduras and El Salvador

ThedepartmentsofMadrizandNuevaSegovia,whichbordertheneighboringcountryofHondu-ras,liealmost200kilometersnorthofManagua.According to the Forestry Map, around 7�,745hectares of pine trees exist in the northern andcentralpartofNicaragua,ofwhichthevastma-jority(88%)isfoundinthedepartmentofNuevaSegovia. These are the species Pinus oocarpaSchiedeexSchltdl.

In the 200�-200� period, however, this depart-ment’s pine forests suffered a severe plague ofweevils(Dendroctonusfrontalis),whichaffectedover half of the woodlands, causing losses esti-matedatUS$95million.

Nueva Segovia’s forest industry, like that of therestofthecountry,workstosatisfytheneedsofSalvadoran and Honduran import companies,someofwhichhavebeensubjectedtoinvestiga-tionsintotaxevasionorillegalfellingoftreesintheirowncountries.

According to official DGA figures for 2005, Ni-caraguaexported�8.6millionboardfeetofpine,valuedatUS$3.3millionFOB.Ofthatamount,theSalvadoranmarket importedUS$�.7millionandHondurasUS$�.5millions—over95%.

“If we’re talking about middlemen, almost all of us are. I’m referring to the exporters, the machinery owners, the sawmill owners. The

only ones who aren’t middlemen in this case would be the land owners and the direct buyer, who would be the North American, Puerto Rican or European who comes here looking for lumber. But in this business, you have to win a lot of credibility if you want someone to finance your operation each year.” Lumber dealer Hernando Escobar Waldán, of Miskitu origin

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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“InthecaseofElSalvador,there’sdemandforNicaraguan pine in the construction and fur-niture industries, while in Honduras, it’s usedtomake the fences that separatehouses in theUnitedStates,whatwecall‘catears,’”explainsHéctorRamos,presidentoftheForestryCham-ber and of the Forestry Consortium of NuevaSegovia. “We make them here then send themto Honduras, where they are passed through adryerandthenexportedtotheUnitedStatesandCanada.”

According to our database of export permitsgranted by CETREX, the largest exporters tothose Central American markets between �999and2006were:

a) MaderasSegovianas,S.A.(US$7.9million)

b) Industria Maderera San Martín (US$2.�million),

c) Empresa Maderera Nicaragüenses, S.A.(US$2.0million)

d) AgenciadeTrámitesdeExportaciónCáceresSánchez(US$2.0million)

e) FabioJoséGarcíaLanuza(US$�.5million)

f) AracelyCalixtraLópez(US$980,749.57)

g) Norma Esperanza Bautista Vargas(US$407,�66).

The ranking of the major Honduran importers

In that 200�-2006 period, the following compa-niesrankamongthemajorHonduranimportersthatbuylumberfromNicaragua:

Company FOB Value US$

1. José Lamas S.R.L. 1,350.,864.20

2. Yodeco de Honduras S.A. 1,083.788.85*

3. Maderas y Equipos de R.L. de CV 876,969.45

4. Mimbres de Honduras S.A. 316,143.66*

5. Zinma Exports de R.L. 240,528.67*

6. Serv Especializados en Maderas 194,202.49*

7. Industrias de Madera S.A. de C.V. 188,922.72 *

8. Canahuati Mitra, Jamal 57,613.53

9. Tracoma S.A. de CV 36,353.29*

10. Derivados de Maderas S.A. de C.V. 16,216.17*

*These Honduran companies record no payment of taxes for the import of Nicaraguan lumber, revealing the possibility of tax evasion in the neighboring country.

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EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

Bolaños’ emergency, closed season and exports at discretion

On May 3, 2006, in a plenarysession of the Council ofMinisters, President Bola-ños found himself obliged toturntomoreefficientcontrolmeasures than those already

adoptedbyvariousinstitutionsto“controltheil-legalcuttingandextractionofforestresourcesinvariouszonesofthecountry.”

Asaconsequence,heissuedDecreeNo.32-2006onMay7,declaringaStateofEconomicEmer-gencyforaperiodof�80daysasofthatdateintheNorthAtlanticAutonomousRegion(RAAN),theSouthAtlanticAutonomousRegion(RAAS),andthedepartmentsofNuevaSegoviaandRíoSanJuan,thefourforestedzoneswiththegreatestpo-tentialinthecountry,“duetotheillegalcutting,transporting, handling, processing, warehousing,possession,exportationandcommercializationofforestresources.”

ThedecreeorderedtheArmyofNicaraguaandtheNationalPolicetoimmediatelyreinforcethepresence and ongoing surveillance in the statedzones so that, in thedecree’s terms, theywouldproceed to retain and safeguard the forest re-sources being subtracted from those areas andthemeansusedforcutting,transportingandstor-ingthem,aswellascapturinganddetainingthepeopleinvolvedintheseactivities.

ThismeasurewouldremaininforceuntilINAFOR’stopmanagementsuspendedtheretentionandsafe-guardinginaccordwiththeresultsofaninter-insti-tutionalinvestigationtobeconductedintothelum-bercompaniesoperatingintheselocales.

The President’s legal and political initiative trig-geredresponsesbothproandcon.Ontheonesideitreceivedbackingandsupportgiventheimagesof

destructionanddeforestationofthetreesintheRíoKungKungareaintheSouthAtlanticAutonomousRegion (RAAS) that would become public with-indays. Ontheotherside,however, itawakenedstrong criticisms and suggestions, including fromsectorsthatdefendtheenvironmentandnaturalre-sources,giventhatitsuspendedrightsandguaran-teesestablishedintheConstitution.

Four days after the decree was issued, Nicara-guans were horrified by the national televisionimagescomingfromtheRíoKungKung.Thou-sandsoflogsofpreciouswoodwerefloatingovera50-kilometerlengthofthisriver,formingavir-tualaquaticcarpet.Theimagesofthatecological,environmental disaster shook the conscience ofpublicauthoritiesandofNicaraguansingeneral.

“ThisisthefirsttimeintheeightyearsI’vebeenworkingfortheEnvironmentalOmbudsman’sof-fice that I’ve seen a situation like this one. It istruly alarming, a situation I could catalogue inall sincerityasanenvironmental crime. All thebiodiversity laws, forestry laws and the GeneralLawoftheEnvironmenthavebeenviolatedhere,consideringthatindiscriminatecuttingtookplacelessthan20metersfromtheriver,”saidEnviron-mentalOmbudsmanLisandroD’León.

“In addition, everybody could now see theamountofwood thoseravagershad irresponsi-bly cut, justifying their actions by the minimalmanagementplans,whichhaveno legalunder-pinning…,” adds the Environmental Ombuds-man during a visit to the site of the disaster.“What those irresponsible people do is go toINAFOR, request �5, 20 minimum plans andINAFOR, also irresponsibly, approves the 20minimummanagementplansanddoesn’tcometosupervise,sonowwecomealong,andrealizethegenuinelarcenybeingcommitted.”

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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RAAS: A very attractive zoneThe fact that the lumber dealers involved in theKung kung tragedy chose the forest area of theRAAS is no accident. According to the ForestryMapofNicaragua,madebyMARENAin�995andupdatedwith theNicaraguaForestryAppraisalof2000, the South Atlantic Autonomous Region isthecountry’srichestareainforestmass,estimatedat679,445hectaresofOpenBroadleafForestand92�,78�hectaresofClosedBroadleafForest.TheyaremoreextensiveandmoreproductiveareasthantheRAANinthattheproductivevolumes(treesperhectare) of mahogany and other precious speciesaregreater.

DecreeNo.50-200�, issuedby then-PresidentAr-noldoAlemánLacayo,establishedtheForestryDe-velopmentPolicyofNicaragua,whichofficiallylaysoutforthefirsttimethat“theexploitationofnaturalforestswillbeconductedunderapprovedanddulyimplementedforestrymanagementplans.”

The database constructed for this journalisticinvestigation,whichusestheINAFORNationalForestryRegistry’sofficialreportsasoneoftheinputs,confirmsthatanexcessivenumberoffor-est use permits was granted in the RAAS, andfavoredagroupofnomorethantwentylumberdealers. Between 2003 and May 2006, munici-pal and district INAFOR delegations gave outnearlyahundredforestryusepermitstocutandextract9�,925.05cubicmetersofpreciouswood,

especially mahogany, for an annual average of�8,385cubicmeters.

These permits were in the following six munici-palitiesoftheRAAS:�. La Cruz de Río Grande (56,852.3 cubic

meters)2. DesembocaduradeRíoGrande(�5,698.5cu-

bicmeters)3. ElTortuguero(�3,277.�cubicmeters)4. PearlLagoon(3,760.8cubicmeters)5. KukraHill(�,84�.9cubicmeters)6. BocanadePaiwas(394.25cubicmeters).

Our database, prepared with official INAFORdata,alsoreveals that thevolumeof lumberex-tractedwas increasingyearbyyear (2000-2006),inthatwhile5,824.7cubicmeterswereextractedin 2000, by 2005—the peak year—it reached atotal volume of 33,087.9 cubic meters, six timesmorethanfiveyearsearlier.

Analyzing the forest use permits in La Cruz deRíoGrande,oneof thetwomostexploitedmu-nicipalities in the RAAS, we see that INAFORauthorities provided a total of 88 permits, ofwhichalmost35%wenttoasmallgroupoffor-estrycompaniesorinthenameofstrawmen,withthefollowingdistribution:

• �8inthenameofCándidoMirandaordum-mynames(8,228.3cubicmeters)

“Our database, prepared with official INAFOR data, also reveals that the volume of lumber

extracted was increasing year by year (2000-2006), in that while 5,824.7 cubic meters were extracted in 2000, by 2005—the peak year—it reached a total volume of 33,087.9 cubic meters, six times more than five years earlier.

— 23 —

• �4inthenameofDomingoAntenorAlvarezAngulo(�0,��0cubicmeters)and:

• 2inthenameofMaximinoUbeda(�,0�5cu-bicmeters).

Thethreeaddupto�9,353.7cubicmeters,whichis34%ofthemunicipaltotal.

Intheothermostexploitedmunicipalitystudied,theDesembocaduradelRíoGrande,35forestryusepermitsweregrantedbetween2000andMay2006,especiallybenefitingthreepeopleaswell:

• NicolásBáez,with�8permitsand8,369.4cu-bicmeters

• Domingo Antenor Alvarez Angulo, with �8permitsand3,726.7cubicmeters,and

• XiomaraPeralta,with3permitsand�,566.2cubicmeters.

HéctorRamos,presidentoftheForestryCham-berandtheForestryConsortiumofNuevaSego-via, recognizes thatabusesmayhavebeencom-mittedinadjudicatingforestryusepermitsbasedonMinimumPlans(under500hectares)butindi-catesthatLaw462includessanctions,sothattheyshouldhavebeenapplied rather thandecreeingtheStateofEconomicEmergencyandfollowingthatwiththeForestryClosedSeasonLaw.

“Iunderstandtherehavebeenirregularitiesandthemediahaveprobablyusedthetermmafiatorefertotheseirregularitiesandtothepeoplewho’vecom-mittedtheminthesector. We’vebeentellingthegovernmentforseveralyearstoapplyLaw462,butforusastheNationalForestryChamber,approvaloftheStateofEmergencyandtheForestryClosedSeasonLawwasadisappointment,”saidRamos.

“IttookusmanyyearstogetconsensusonLaw462,”headded,“andit’soneofthemostmodernforestrylawsinLatinAmerica,butitwastossedasidedue to thegovernment’s ineptitude,whichcouldn’tordidn’twanttogivemoreresourcestoINAFORortheNationalPolicesotheycouldap-ply it. We believe that the [emergency] decree,immediately followed by the moratorium law,wereextrememeasuresandthatwhenagovern-mentfeelsincapableofcontrollingaresourceorasituation,itgoesforthehardestline.”

Application of the Emergency

Weeks after the State of Emergency was de-creedinthecountry’sforestedterritories,theInter-institutionalCommissioncreated toen-sure application and monitoring of this mea-sure presented a Compliance Report to theexecutivebranchrevealingseriousnewirregu-laritiesbylumbercompanieswithusepermitspreparedbytheForestRegentsandapprovedbyINAFOR.

“…inwhichthemainevidencefoundirregularitiesthat,accordingtotheexistinglaws(462,2�7andad-ministrativetechnicalnorms),areconsideredmild,seriousorveryseriousinfractions.”Theseare:

• MisuseoftheMinimumPlanofForestUsetoevadetheenvironmentalimpactevaluation.

• Inappropriateuseofthelumberguides.• Incompleterecordsthatthecompaniesmust

keep.• Excesslumbercutwithoutauthorization.• Utilization of the rivers as a means to

transportlumber,causingcontamination.

EcOnOmIc and EnvIrOnmEnTal ImpacT OF THE FOrEST EmErgEncY

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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• Moretreescutperhectarethanwereauthorized.• Theslopelevelsforthecuttingoftreeswere

notrespected.• TheForestryRegent’sfailuretofulfillhis/her

functions.• Incapacity by INAFOR and MARENA to

conduct periodic controls of the authorizedpermitsandcompanies.

• InvolvementofINAFORandtoalesserdegreeofMARENAofficialsincorruptactivities.

Of the 63 companies and plans reviewed, accord-ing toLaw462,2�7andTechnicalAdministrativeNorms, �2 had mild infractions, �5 serious ones,25veryseriousonesand��remaintobetypified.Over�00administrativeandpenalsuitspromotedby INAFOR, MARENA and the EnvironmentalOmbudsman’sOfficearecurrentlybeingprocessedagainst violators of the natural resources and en-vironment. Somemid-level INAFORofficials in-volvedintheirregularitieswerefiredbutnottried.

Inaddition,betweenMay3andJune6,incompliancewithDecree32-2006,�6,�62logs,944piecesofmilledlumberand59�,687boardfeetwereseized,whilethedocumentationpresentedbythelumbercompaniesownersorrepresentativeswerechecked.Ifinorder,permissionwasgivenfortheircommercialization.

On May 20, 2006, the Special Law on CrimesagainsttheEnvironmentandNaturalResourceswent into effect. “The expectation was createdthat environmental crimes would be punishedwiththislaw.Sofarthere’snoknowledgeofin-dividualsorcompanieshavingbeensanctionedbyeffectofthislaw,”chargestheCentroHumboldt.

Impact of the Economic Emergency

FromMay�0to28,2006,accordingtoCentroHum-boldt,Decree32-2006hadapositiveeffect,paralyz-ingthelumbertrafficinthefourregionsmentionedabove. Later, however, the INAFOR executivedirector’sofficebegantoreleasedetainedlumber,

permit the movement of milled lumber and evenauthorizetheexportoflumbershipmentsthatsup-posedlyhadeverythinginorder.

“At thebeginning [of theemergency]wewereabitdrastic,butlaterwerationalizedthedecisionsalittleanddecidedthatthosecaseswherealltheirmanagement plans had been duly implementedandtheyhadtheirlumberattheport,incustoms,andhadobtainedallthevariouspermitswouldbeallowedtofollowtheircourse,butonlythosethatwerealready incustoms,”saidINAFORExecu-tiveDirectorIndalecioRodríguez.

FromJanuary toJuneof thisyear, theDGAoffi-ciallyreportedthatNicaraguaexportedUS$790,278ofmilledlumber,afigurewellbelowwhattheUScustomsauthoritiesrecorded.TheirreportsrevealthatlumbershipmentsamountingtoUS$2.2millionwereimportedfromNicaragua,overthreetimestheFOBvaluedeclared inour country. ThisUS$�.5milliondifferenceisanindicationofboththeillegalcuttinginNicaraguaandthetaxevasionbylumbercompaniesinvolvedintheexportofmilledlumber.

Inthefirsthalfofthisyear,reportsfromtheUSPortService(PIERS)confirmedthat85shipmentsoflumbercameintoUSseaportsfromNicaragua,withatotalvolumeof�,794tonsandatotalvalueestimatedatUS$2.2million.

Of this total, 34 shipments entered the UnitedStatesinMay,JuneandJuly,despitethefactthatthe State of Emergency Decree was in effect inNicaraguaatthattime,havingbeenappliedforaperiodof�80daysstartingonMay3.

Barely25ofallthelumbershipmentsfromNicaraguawereclearlyidentifiedasmahogany,thespeciesmostdemandedintheUnitedStatesandwiththehighestcommercialvalue.Thisisconsidered“normalprac-tice”bysomelumberprocessingcompanies,toavoidahighertaxrateandalsotheCITEScertificationthattheCITES-Nicaraguaofficemustextendtobeabletoexportthisendangeredspeciesofwood.

— 25 —

IICase analyses:

The lumber companies’ modus operandi

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

— 26 —

The disaster in the río Kung Kung

DomingoAntenorAlvarezAn-gulowasoneofahandfulofmajorbeneficiariesofforest-ryusepermitsgrantedinthepastfiveyears,and isoneofthe lumber dealers involved

intheKungKungtragedy.Accordingtoourdata-basehehasregistrynumber2943,underthecate-goryofexporter.HisRUCnumberis�0454�275,accrediting him as a natural company with theGeneralCustomsDivision(DGA).HeownstheElGuapinolSawmill,locatedatkilometer�44ofthehighwaybetweenJuigalpaandElRama.

CETREXhasgrantedhimpermitstoexportlum-ber and derivatives between 200� and 2006 val-uedatUS$�.9millionFOB,accordingtoourda-tabase.HeexportstoCostaRica,theDominicanRepublic and the United States. The most fre-quently used departure ports are Guasaule, LasManos,PeñasBlancasandElRama,dependingonthemarketexportedto.

According to the procedureestablishedinLaw462(Lawof Conservation, Promotionand Sustainable Develop-mentoftheForestrySector),in force since November2003, and in its Regulations(Decree No. 73-2003), theregentsareinchargeofdraw-ingupeachforestryexploita-tionpermitandthenguaran-teeingitsimplementation.InthecaseofDomingoAntenorAlvarez Angulo, the regent,who signs off as H. Gámez,regent of Río Grande, No.�704,authorizedhispermitsfromNo.06430to06437, toexploit the forest located in

the sitesofWankarlayaandBratara, in themu-nicipalityoftheDesembocaduradelRíoGrande,RAAS.

The ironic aspect of these official documents,however,liesinonecuriousdetail:allweresignedbytheregentinthecityofBluefields,onDecem-ber�4,2005,yetparadoxicallyallwerepaidoffonDecember5,2005,nearlytendaysearlier,inthetaxofficesofJuigalpa,Chontales.Inotherwords,hepaidthecorrespondingtaxesonanamountoflumberthattheregenthadyettoapprove.

InMay2006,anInter-institutionalCommitteetoMonitor and Evaluate Lumber Companies andManagementPlansvisitedtheRAAStofollowupontheEconomicEmergencyDecree.Amongthesites was Kung Kungcito, under the administra-tionofAntenorAlvarez.Accordingtothereport,aseriesofirregularities,anomaliesandviolationsoftheforestrylawsandregulationsweredetected,someofwhicharecitedbelow:

a) The majority of the ma-hogany was below the Mini-mum Cutting Diameter (50cm,NTON2004).

b)Clear-cutting in an areaofapproximately�0hectaresinfrontofthecamp,whereitispresumedthatbasicgrainswouldbeplanted,insoilnotaptforagriculture.

c) Thecuttingof349treesofdifferentspeciesnotincludedintheexploitationplanswasdetected.

d)Logs with other marks,belonging to Mr. RigobertoDomingo Alvarez

— 27 —

Calero, were also found in the lumberyard,whichheallegedlyusedtopayfortherentalof transportation services. This lumber, inturn, was only registered with the initials ofotherpeople.

A report titled “Cumplimiento Medidas-Emer-genciaEconómica”(ComplianceMeasures-Eco-nomic Emergency) refers to Antenor AlvarezAngulo’spermits06430,0643�,06432,06433and06434asviolatingarticle53ofLaw462,whichisinthechapteronInfractionsandSanctions.Theirregularitiesareidentifiedas“grave”infractions,forwhichfinesofbetweenUS$500andUS$5,000mustbepaid.

INAFOR seizes illegal lumber

Nonetheless, the top INAFOR authority optedto seize the logs located at the site called KungKungcito,accordingtoAdministrativeResolutionNo. DF IX 04-2006, which establishes the sanc-tionofconfiscating�,6�4mahogany logs,withavolumeof�,368.9cubicmeters,and79cedarlogs,withavolumeof�29.6cubicmeters,allfoundintheKungKungcitolumberyard.

Inaddition,INAFORcanceledeightexploitationplanscorrespondingtonumbers06430to06437,ostensiblybecausetheycoveredanareaincludedin a General Management Plan granted to theGalloPintoTradingCo.belongingtoBruceEu-geneLong,fromtheUnitedStates.

Nonetheless, no approved PGMF in the nameofMr.BruceEugeneLongappears in theoffi-cial INAFOR records under the title “ForestryAuthorization: General Forestry ManagementPlan” (PGMF) between January �, 2004, andMay �5, 2006. The only thing registered for2004, but in the chapter on sawmills, is an au-thorizationbyINAFORallowingBruceEugeneLong’sGalloPintoTradingCorp.tooperate intheindigenouscommunityofLaEsperanza,un-dercodeno.0�89.

DomingoAntenorAlvarezAngulorejectedbothdecisionsofINAFORExecutiveDirectorIndale-cioRodríguez,who,inhisopinion,isbiasedinfa-voroftheUSbusinessman,BruceEugeneLong.

“The law says that when a person cuts morethan five unauthorized trees [in his case 349weredetected] it is treatedasaseriousfailingandthecorrespondingresponseisfines,butinmycase,theychoseseizurefromtheoutset,”hesaidinaninterviewgrantedduringtheforestryinvestigation.

caSE analYSES: THE lumbEr cOmpanIES’ modus operandi

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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“They have to value it, they’re shared responsi-bilitiesofINAFORandmyforestryengineer;I’mnot responsible for whether they cut one, two,threeorfivetreesillegally.…SoIsoughtprotec-tion in the court, to get out of INAFOR’s grip,becauseINAFORisactingverydevilishlyagainstthelumberdealers.”

A judicial appeal and a suspended auction

DomingoAntenorAlvarezAngulodidindeedfileaWritofProtectionwiththeAppealsCourt,Ma-naguaDistrict,CivilHallNo.One,demandingsus-pensionoftheconfiscationofthe�,6�4mahoganyand 79 cedar logs found inthe lumberyard known asKung Kungcito. He filedit on September 25, 2006,at ��:59 a.m. (one minutebefore the Appeals Courtclosed) and it was upheldbythemembersofHallNo.Onefourhourslater,forcingcancellation of the auctionoftheseizedlumber,whichwastobeheldthefollowingdayintheElCorintillosec-torofElRama,intheareaofthePortAuthorityofNi-caragua. The president ofthis hall is Judge RobertoBorgeTapia.

Thetotalvolumeofthelumbertobeauctioned,distributed into�7 lots,was�,687,592cubicme-tersofmahoganyand�,852,483cubicmetersofcedar. The totalbaseprice for theauctionwasUS$770,759.96. Around �3 people interestedinparticipatinghadgone to theauction,amongthemsomerepresentativesoflumbercompaniesregisteredinINAFOR.

Finally,onOctober3�,2006,INAFORreportedinanofficialnotethatMrs.XiomaraPeralta,anotherlumberdealerinvolvedintheKungKungdisaster,

showedupattheNimasaSawmillinElRamathatday,togetherwithJudgeCarlosGaitán,toforciblyremove�78mahoganylogsandpartofthemilledlumberfoundstoredinthatlocale.

Judge Gaitán, with the legal figure of “JudicialSequester or Embargo,” transferred the lumberfrom where it had been safeguarded to the Al-mendro Sawmill, which is the property of Mr.RógerHerrera,yetanotherof those involved intheKungKungdisaster. Paradoxically,theFor-estryClosedSeasonLawprohibited the judicialsystem’s use of this judicial measure to recovertheseizedlumber.

These events, argued IN-AFORin itspress release,violatedtheForestryClosedSeason Law (Law 585),whose article 9, paragraph2 states: “The judicial au-thoritiesofthecountrymaynot make use of sequesterorembargoorothersimilarjudicialfiguresforthepur-poseofliberatingthesanc-tionsimposedontheviola-tor.Failurebythejudiciaryto comply will be consid-ered a prevarication andsanctioned in conformitywith what is established inthePenalCode.”

Inaddition,art.�4oftheEnvironmentalCrimesLaw(Law559)condemnsthoseacts,sanctioningtheofficialsandbarringthemfromanypublicof-ficefortwoyears.

INAFORcalledontheSupremeCourtofJusticeto respond belligerently to the writs of protec-tion holding up the forestry processes, and alsotoavoidanycontinuationofthesereprehensibleacts.Itisstillwaitingforanofficialpositionfromthe justices of the Supreme Court, the highestcourtintheland.

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caSE analYSES: THE lumbEr cOmpanIES’ modus operandi

On May 23, 2006, in the Sec-ond Ordinary Session of thenew Autonomous RegionalCouncil of the South Atlan-tic (CRAAS), which took of-fice on the 4th of that same

month,theplenaryvotedunanimouslytosuspendandannulthepresumed�0-yearforestryconces-sionof22hectaresinthesectorofKarawala, inthe Desembocadura del Río Grande, RAAS infavorofMaximinoUbedaRivera(whopreferstobecalled“Max”). Withthis,aconcession lacedwithsignsofirregularitiesandinfluencepeddlingwasrevoked.

The beginning: they request permission for a sawmill

Chronologically,thehistoryofthiscasestartedonMarch�9,2005,withthemin-utesofaCouncilofEldersses-sionintheDesembocaduradeRío Grande. The document,signed by six people, amongthemtheFSLNmayorofthatmunicipality, Lesly CarlinDowns, gives Mr. MaximinoUbeda Rivera authorizationfor “the installation of a sta-tionarysawmillina6-hectarearea to process broadleaf andconifer lumber for a ten-yearperiod.” Four people signedfortheindigenousauthorities.

The document includes the“commitments” assumed by the company in ex-change for this authorization. “…the lumbercompanypledgestosubmit�0,000(tenthousand)feetofprocessedlumbertothemunicipalmayor’soffice.”Themunicipalgovernmentinthisremote

region of the RAAS was won by the SandinistaNational Liberation Front (FSLN) in the mu-nicipalelectionsofNovember7,2004.Thispartycontrols municipal power there, as not only themayorbutalsothedeputymayorandtwoCoun-cilmembers(withtheiralternates)belongtothatpoliticalgrouping.Itslocaloppositionisthein-digenousregionalparty,whichalsohastwoCoun-cilmembers(withtheiralternates).

Dayslater,onApril�,themunicipalgovernmentof theDesembocaduradeRíoGrandegrantedMr.UbedaRiveraaMunicipalRegistrational-lowing him to install and operate the Station-ary/MobileSawmill(nowwithbothcharacteris-tics) foraone-yearperiod,whichwouldexpireonMarch3�,2006.Thedocumentstatesthatitwouldhaveaproductioncapacityof�0,000feetadayforconifersand5,000feetadayforbroad-

leaftrees.

An irregular fo-restry conces-sionMonthslater,onAugust�7,2005,withMessrs.RendellHebbert and Lesly CarlinDowns, respectively repre-sentingregionalandmunic-ipal authorities, serving aswitnesses, Document No.�58,aforestryconcessionof22,000hectaresforaspaceof ten years renewable inthe zoneofKarawala,De-

sembocaduradeRíoGrande,wassignedbeforethelawyerBernardBrownMedina,inBluefields.Alsofortheinstallationofthesawmill.ThebeneficiariesareJoséMaximinoUbedaRiveraandhisbrother,CarmenAdrián.Thedecisionsupposedlyobeysthe

A questioned concession in Karawala: the case of the Ubeda Brothers

Carmen and Maximino Ubeda.

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

— 30 —

mandateoftheCommunalAssembly,heldonJune�3ofthesameyear.

Finally,onDecember22,2005,twodays before Christmas, with thecentralgovernmentandthestateonvacation, CRAAS President Ray-field Hodgson and First SecretaryRendellHebbertissuedaresolutiongranting Maximino Ubeda “Envi-ronmentalPermissionfor theProj-ectcalledAserraderoSanRoque.”

Nonetheless, the investigations con-ducted in INAFOR’s National For-estryRegistryrevealthatatotalof�9sawmillswereregistered,withoperatingpermits,alloverthecoun-tryin2005.NoneofthemwereintheRAASun-derthenameofSanRoque,orwiththesurnamesUbedaRivera.NordoestheSanRoquemillingop-eration,operatinginKarawalabythatdate,appearregistered among the 65 sawmills operating withpermitsin2006.TheonlyoneregisteredistheLasBanderassawmill,undercodeno.�0070006,inthenameofCarmenAdriánUbedaRivera, theolderbrother.TheregistrationdateisJanuary�7,2006.

Furthermore, no PGMF is registered with IN-AFORauthorizationamongtherecordsofGen-eral Forest Management Plans (PGMF) regis-teredinINAFORbetween2004and2006(May�5),eventhoughLaw462clearlyestablishesthataPGMFmustbeformulatedinareasofover500hectaresand itmustcontainanEnvironmentalImpactStudy.NotuntilFebruary28,2006,didaninformalinvitation,signedbyColmanGómezLópez, INAFOR Municipal Delegate for theDesembocadura de Río Grande, RAAS, begintobedistributedforanyinterestedpersontoat-tendaPublicHearingon theGeneralForestryManagement Plan for the concession to Máxi-mino Ubeda and Adrián Ubeda Rivera. Theirregent, Damaris Oporta, would make the pre-sentation. The date of the hearing was March2, 2006, and the place was the Aserradero SanRoque,Karawala.

OnFebruary5,2006,FranciscoAbelCenteno,aYata-mamemberanduntilthatdaymemberandsecretaryoftheMunicipalCouncilorofRíoGrande,issuedaMunicipal Certification stating that “the MunicipalCouncilhasnotENDORSEDtheconcessiongrant-edtotheHermanosUbedalumbercompanyinourindigenousterritory;wehaveonlyheldoneworkses-sion,anduptonowwehavenottakenanyresolution.”Followingthatletter,Mr.CentenostatesthatMayorDownsfiredhimasMunicipalCouncilsecretary.

Inaninterviewgrantedtotheinvestigativeteam,Mr.Centenoreaffirmedhisrefusal,togetherwiththatoftheMunicipalCouncilandtheindigenouscommunityofKarawala.“…thecommunitymem-bersarenotinagreementinapprovingthosecon-cessions,soIwasonehundredpercentopposedinthataspect.AtthattimeIwassecretary[oftheMunicipalCouncil]andneededtosignthecertifi-cate,sotheytook[thedocument]toManaguaandfalsifiedthatsignature….Theyexpelledmeandputanother,”saidtheCouncilmember,electedinthe2004municipalelections.

RAAS Regional Council revokes authorization

Forherpart, theSouthAtlanticAutonomousRe-gional Council president, Mrs. Lourdes Aguilar,confirmedthatinthesecondordinarysessionofthatbodyoflocalpower,itvotedunanimously(47votes)

Lesly DownsLourdes Aguilar

— 3� —

againstthesupposed�0-yearforestryconcessiontotheUbedaRiverabrothersfor22,000hectares.

“Abnormalitieswerefound,itwasseenthat[thepro-cess]wascorrupted, that itdidn’tmeet theenviron-mentalrequirementsforaconcessionofthatmagni-tudeforpreciouswoodintheregion,”shestated ina televised interview. “…the decision was made torevoke the resolution, because it was damaging theregion’s imageandharming thecustomary rightsofthepeopleoftheDesembocaduradeRíoGrande,andbecausetherewerealreadymanydemandsbycommu-nitymembers,leaders,síndicos[communityleaderinchargeofenvironmentalissues]andcommunityjudgesthattheconcessionwasdoingalotofdamagetothecommunityandshouldn’tcontinueirrationallyexploit-ingtheresource,inthatcasepreciouswood.”

TheCRAASpresidentstressesthedeception.“Reso-lution��822-2005,whichwasapprovedonlybyvotesoftheBoardofDirectors, isn’taresolutiontograntlumberexploitation;it’saresolutionthatapprovesanenvironmentalpermittoinstallasawmill,preciselytheSanRoquesawmill….Mr.MaxUbedabasedhimselfonandused that resolution to install a sawmill andpresentittothecommunityasifitwereapermitforalumberconcession.Sohe’sverywily;hetrickedthecommunity.Thesawmillwassetup,butalongsidethathebeganexploitinglumberirrationallywithoutaper-mit.Thelawstatesthatanyconcessionhastobeap-provedbytheRegionCouncilplenary,notbyaboard,sotherewerealsoproblemswithintheRegionalCoun-cil,becauseitwasadecisionofonly7people,not47,whichistheRegionalCouncilplenary.”

Aguilaracknowledgestheexistenceofunsubstan-tiated versions that there were under-the-table“negotiations”(payments)withregionalauthori-ties who finished their term last May 4, but shesaidaninvestigationunderwaystillhasnoproba-toryelementsonthataspect.

The lumber owner’s version

Mr. José Maximino Ubeda, the lumber dealer,roundlydeniedanyanomaliesorirregularitiesinthe

concessionprocess,andassured that theyhad thesupport of the indigenous communities and theirauthorities. “It was the community that gave metheconcession,nottheRegionalCouncil;itdoesn’thaveauthoritytograntsuchaconcession….WhattheRegionalCouncilapprovedformeistheGen-eralManagementPlan’senvironmentalimpact.Wepaidourtaxesandthentheystartwiththeproblem.IcanshowyouthatIhaveoverathousandsigna-turesfromthecommunities.”Accordingtohiscal-culations,80%ofthecommunitiesagreethattheyshouldstayinKarawalaandcontinueoperating.

Ubeda also rejected the accusations of Karawa-la’s former Municipal Council secretary. “…Iwasatthatmeeting[onMay28,2005],whentheyall said yes, andall signed; later they convincedtwo[Councilmembers]andtheybegantosayno[amongthemAbelCenteno].Theyareonlytwoandtheothersarefour.”

Inhisopinion,theRAASRegionalCouncilmustreverseitsdecisiontorevoketheKarawalacon-cession,sincehiscompanyhascompliedwiththelawsandisworkingtheforestryresourceinasus-tainedmanner,basedontheStewardshipCouncil(FSC)certification,whichitpossessesasalumbercompanythatcomplieswiththenormsandstan-dards.

“The Karawala lumber is certified, because it issustainable and is demonstrated,” says CarmenAdriánUbedaRiveraforhispart.Theircompa-ny,HermanosUbeda,hasChainofCustodycer-tificationCSS-COC-004�5,issuedbytheFSConApril�9,2002.ItexpiresonApril�9,2007.

Finally, Karawala Mayor Lesly Carlin DownscameoutinfavoroftheRAASRegionalCouncilreversingitselfandrenewingtheforestryconces-sion to Maximino Ubeda Rivera, given that theforestsarecertified,thesawmillgeneratesjobsaswellasincomeforthemunicipalgovernmentviaitstaxesandthecommunityistherealowneroftheforestresourceandthemajorityisinfavoroftheUbedabrothersstaying.

caSE analYSES: THE lumbEr cOmpanIES’ modus operandi

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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mAPrEnIC (Santo domingo) company in the rAAn: favoritism by InAFor?

On May �5-23, following up onthe State of Economic Emer-gency, an Inter-institutionalCommissiondidanon-sitein-spectionandevaluationoftheLakia Tara development pole

and of the community of Wisconsin, in the mu-nicipality of Waspám Río Coco, RAAN, whereminimumforestryplansofindigenouscollectiveswerebeingimplementedandalsowheretheSan-toDomingocompanywasoperating. Thiscom-panybelongstolumberdealerOscarSobalvarro,knownalsoas“ComandanteRubén,”whichwashisnomdeguerreintheranksoftheNicaraguanResistance.

After finishing its work, the Inter-InstitutionalCommission,whichhaddividedintotwoworkinggroups, issueda�5-pageTechnicalFieldInspec-tion Report, which contained serious commentsabouttheoperationoftheSantoDomingolum-bercompany,whichwasworkinginthecommu-nityofWisconsin.

Among the principal irregularities and viola-tionsofthejudicialframeworkineffectandofthe Technical Norms (NTON) that govern theSustainableManagementoftheBroadleafandConifer Rainforests and Forestry Plantations,werethat:

a) Santo Domingo did not have an operatingpermitissuedbytheNorthAtlanticAutono-mousRegionalCouncil.

b) Themountainencampmentlackedbasicsani-taryconditionsandwas found inbadcondi-tion.

c) TheManagementPlanforSolid,LiquidandToxicWastesprovidedbyMARENAwasnotbeingfollowed.

d) No occupational security measures were be-ingimplementedwithitsworkers.

e) Thelogsfoundinthepermanentlumberyarddid not have the corresponding codificationestablishedintheadministrativedispositions.

f) Mahogany logs with dimensions below thepermissible cutting diameter (50 cm DPA)were found,whichwerenot recorded in thecompany’sincomebook.

In the official document titled “InformeCumplimiento Medidas Emergencia Económi-ca,”theInter-InstitutionalCommissionmembers,whoincludedINAFORExecutiveDirectorInda-lecio Rodríguez, state that the Santo DomingocompanyandtheGeneralForestryManagementPlancommitted“grave”infractionsoftheforestrylegislationand“verygrave”onesofNicaragua’senvironmentallegislation.Forthefirstgroupofviolations, the judicial framework contemplatesfinesofbetweenUS$500andUS$5,000.

OscarSobalvarro,ownerof theSantoDomingosawmill and implementer of an indigenous con-cession of �2,000 hectares, rejects the report’sresults,questioning thecompositionandprofes-sionalcapacityoftheTechnicalMissionandargu-ing that there was a misunderstanding and con-fusion about the logs they measured below thetechnicalcuttingnorm.“…thereweretechniciansthere who weren’t from the area; they grabbedanyoldtechnician,”hesaid,adding,“whatdoesasoldierfromthearmyknowaboutforestryissues,whatdoestheEnvironmentalOmbudsmanknowaboutlumberquestions?”

Regardingthetrees,thiswashisdefense:“Along-sideSantoDomingowasanothercompanycalledMaderas Girón, and it was the one that movedlumberandcommittedviolations.”

— 33 —

HesaidthatasecondTechnicalMissioncamebackto Wisconsin, Waspám, RAAN, to inspect SantoDomingo’swork,butthistimeitwasmadeuponlyofINAFORprofessionalsandtechnicians,whoseidentitieswecouldnotcorroboratewithINAFORorwithSobalvarrohimself,asnoneof themsub-mittedacopyofthatsecondreport.

“It was another commission and the only thingit could find there was that some 20 trees with asmaller diameter had been cut, but they didn’t

have anything to do with Santo Domingo. Theybelongedtotheowneroftheplot,oftheforest.Sothingswere clearedupand they clearedusof allresponsibility,”saidSobalvarro.

INAFOR denies favoritism

INAFORExecutiveDirectorIndalecioRodríguezconfirmed both that a second technical missionhadbeensentandthecompletelydifferentconclu-sion, exempting Santo Domingo of any violation.Heassuredthat itwasn’tan issueof“favoritism”towardhisex-colleagueinarmsintheNicaraguan

ResistanceandarguedinfavorofathirdTechnicalMission.

“We’regoingtohavetomakeathirdvisit,becausetherearetworeportsthatcontradicteachother….I know him from the time when he was a Resis-tance commando, when he joined the civil insur-rection that occurred in the eighties…. I’ve hadtosignsanctionsthatwereappliedtoSobalvarro,sohecanseethatfriendshipdoesn’tmattertomewhenyouhavetoapplyasanction,independentof

whoitis,”saidtheINAFORexecutivedirector.

“OscarSobalvarrohasbeensanctionedlike three times; there are the fines,”heinsisted.“Hehasaboutthreefinesif I remember rightly. I haven’t fa-voredhim;he’shadthesameoptionsthat the others did; you can rest as-suredthatIhaven’tfavoredhiminanyway,absolutelynotinanything.Infacthis lumber has been auctioned; therearethefiles.”

Inthisregard,itshouldbenotedthattheINAFORrecordscontainadocu-ment titled “Resoluciones, multas ydecomisos de vehículos en apelacióna la fecha” (Resolutions, fines andconfiscationsofvehiclesunderappealto date), which states that 9,984 cu-

bicmetersofcedarwereseizedfromOscarSo-balvarro,according to INAFORAdministrativeResolution No. 48-2005. This is the only sanc-tiondetected.

DespitehavingreviewedtherecordsofINAFOR’sNational Forestry Registry from 2000 to 2006,Santo Domingo curiously does not appear to beregisteredinthemunicipalityofWaspám,RAANwithanoperatingpermit. Nor isaGeneralFor-estryManagementPlan(PGMF)registered,eventhough Law 462 requires that one be formulatedandsubjectedtoconsultationwhentheareastobeexploitedexceed500hectares.

Oscar Sobalvarro

caSE analYSES: THE lumbEr cOmpanIES’ modus operandi

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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There are �2,000 hectares in Sobalvarro’scase, granted by old combatants of Yatama,an armed indigenous organization fightingagainst the Sandinistas in the eighties. Ac-cording to our database, what are registeredare eight forest exploitation permits to cutand extract �,947.9 cubic meters in Waspámbetween2004and2005.

“We’rewithanoperation in theWisconsinareaundera�2,000-hectareconcessionwehavewithacommunityofformerYatamacombatantswhogave it to us. I’m a former Resistance combat-antandnoonewantedtocomeintothatzonetoinvestinlumber,buttherewasafriendlyrelation-shipsincetheywereYatamafightersandweweretheonlyoneswhodecided togo invest there….We’vedoneeverythingaccordingtothelaw,ful-fillingallthelegalrequisites.”

Thatsenseofasociallyandenvironmentallyre-sponsible business is not, however, shared byWaspám’scurrentmayor,CornelioAlfonsoTebas,whoalsocomesfromtheYatamaranks. “…theSanto Domingo company has now been operat-ingforyears,takingoutlumberfromthesmallesttrees to the biggest ones. This man [Oscar So-balvarro]hasbeensetupheresincethepreviousgovernment [of President Alemán, �997-200�).WhenIcamein,Ianalyzed,Isawtheplace,Isawhow he’s destroying everything, and there’s nobenefitforthepeople;thepeopledon’thaveany-thing,”hesaid.

Inaddition to themayorofWaspám, thepro-fessionals and technicians of the communityofSantaFé,RíoCoco,RAAN,havealsobeenwatchingSantoDomingo’sbehavior.“Afterwewonourpenalsuitagainst theMaderasGiróncompany(ofGuatemalanorigins),we’regoingto proceed against the Santo Domingocompa-nies.It’sapending[judicial]fight,becausethestate [of Nicaragua] granted lands and com-munallandtitlestoagroupofformerYatama

fighters,”preciselywhereMAPRENIChastheconcession.

Sobalvarro says he has been working almost �2yearsasalumberdealer,firstattheheadofacor-poration,Nicamadera,S.A., togetherwithotherpartners,andnowasMaderasPreciosasdeNica-ragua(MAPRENIC).

Inadditiontooperatingwiththeindigenouscon-cession in the Wisconsin sector of the RAAN,SobalvarrosayshehassimultaneousonesintheSouth Atlantic, with a sawmill in El Rama andforests in the sector of la Cruz de Río Grande.“Mahogany is the most desired species in theinternationalmarket; it’s theonewhoseprice isconstantlymoving, growing,because it’s becom-ingincreasinglyscarce.”

According toourdatabase,MAPRENICorOs-car Sobalvarro have negotiated and obtainedmorethan40CITESpermitsbetween2004and2006,foratotalvolumeof�,32�.6cubicmetersofmahogany.Foritspart,CETREXregistersitasa“largeexporter”—amongthe20strongestinthecountry—withatotalvolumeof�.9millionkilosof lumber exported and declared values of US$2.9million.

IntheelectionsheldonNovember5,2006,So-balvarrowaselectedalternateNationalAssem-blyrepresentativefortheNationalistLiberalAl-liance(ALN),whichranEduardoMontealegreasitspresidentialcandidate.TheINAFOREx-ecutiveDirectorpreviouslycommentedthatSo-balvarro should resignhis lumberactivitynowthathe’sanalternatelegislator.“Ibelievethat[Sobalvarro]shouldnowseparatehimselffromthat activity if he’s going to run for legislativeoffice,” said the INAFOR executive director,whowasalsoelectedasalegislativerepresenta-tivefortheALN,thesamepoliticalallianceasSobalvarro.

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caSE analYSES: THE lumbEr cOmpanIES’ modus operandi

PrAdA, S.A.: a certified company with a dubious record

Mr.PedroBlandónMoreno,ownerofthelumbercom-panycalledPRADA,S.A.isapowerfullumberdeal-er who did not renounceany privileges for the five

years(2002-2006)heservedasalternatetoSan-dinistalegislatorTomásBorgeMartínez,founderandvicepresidentoftheSandinistaNationalLib-erationFront.Hedidnotdosoeventhough,ac-cordingtoBlandón,itresultedinmoreproblemsthanbenefits,amongwhich,hesaid,wasbeinginthesitesoftheINAFORexecutivedirector.

“I belong to the Sandinista Front and Indalecio[Rodríguez]isfromtheradicalRight,sohe’shadproblemswithus;he’striedtomakelifeimpossible,butwe’vegottenthem[thesanctionsandfines]allthrownoutbecausetheyhavenolegalbasis.We’venever paid any fines, right up to today,” he saidwith a certain arrogant air.In this regard, it should benotedthatthelegislativerep-resentatives as well as theiralternatesenjoy immunity intheexerciseofthispopularlyelectedpost.

The latest incident betweenPRADA and INAFOR,whichwellreflectsthisbusi-ness attitude of “rebellion”and refusal to respect IN-AFOR dispositions despiteit being the regulating bodyfor lumber activity in Nica-ragua,wasrecordedonMay2�,2005,whenPRADA,S.A.was moving 87 bundles oflumber from the municipal-

ityofRositatoPuertoCabezas(Bilwi),toexportthemfromtheretoCuba.The officials in an INAFOR control post askedthedriversforthedocumentsneededforthecart-ageandlaterexport,buttheywereonlycarryingremittances from PRADA in favor of its clientMATCO. Given this anomaly, the regional IN-AFORauthoritiesallowed the trucks togo intothe city so they couldappearbefore INAFOR’sDelegationI,butthedrivers,wentstraightthroughtotheportareagroundsoftheENAPwharf.

Theauthoritiesopted to inspect thecargo there,and given the lack of documentation decided onthecautionarymeasureofretainingtheshipmentandfilinganadministrativeprocess.ThisdecisionwascommunicatedtothePRADAowners,whointurn proceeded to file a particular penal accusa-tionagainst the INAFORMunicipalDelegate intheRAAN,MiriamRojas,fortheallegedcrimesof

ABUSEOFAUTHORITY,DAMAGES AND GRIEV-ANCES and ILLICIT AS-SOCIATIONTOCOMMITACRIME.Attherequestofthe INAFOR director, twotop-level officials of the At-torneyGeneral’sOfficewenttoPuertoCabezastoanalyzethe accusation against theINAFORofficial.

TheofficialsoftheAttorneyGeneral’sOfficedeterminedthat “… the attempted pe-nalactionsdenotenjoy le-gal pretext and instead aretranslatedintobaselessandmal-intentioned actions,sincetheINAFORdelegate

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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has acted in accord withthe law in theexerciseofherpost,byretainingeighttrucksoflumberthatwereexported to the Republicof Cuba, defending thetransferandloadingoftheproduct aboard the shipwith spurious and illegaldocuments.”Theyaddedthattheyhad“strongpre-sumptions” that the IN-AFORdelegateinRositacooperatedwithPRADA,S.A.togetthelumberoutofthecountry.

On May 26, 2005, in acompletelydifferent,non-belligerent attitude, theMunicipal INAFOR del-egation issued Administrative Resolution No.�3-2005-DDFI,whichresolvesthatPRADA’sin-fractionis“mild”andthusmeritsonlyanadmoni-tion.Italsoordersthereleaseofthelumberforexport.

Whoorderedthedetainedlumberreleasedforshipment? “We don’t discard that with these[judicial]actions,there’sadesiretoinfuseter-ror, fear and uncertainty in the officials whoarefightingillegality.Nonetheless,it’sanab-surdandrashjudgment[againstMiriamRojas,ex-INAFOR delegate of Puerto Cabezas]; nocourtor judge isgoing to findagainst theof-ficial, because she simply fulfilled her duty,”commented Environmental OmbudsmanLisandroD’León.

Meanwhile, the lumber shipment destined forCubainthenameofaclientofPRADA,S.A.,sailed ina shipwithaPanamanianflag,whichstayed a few days docked in Puerto Cabezas.For the Environmental Ombudsman, the 87bundles of lumber should never have left thecountry.

“The lumber was illegal,as demonstrated in theadministrative process, sothefactthattheyreleasedit,letitgo,wasaviolationofthelaw,”addedtheEn-vironmental Ombudsman.“Theportauthoritiessaidthey received orders. I’dreally like to know whogavethatorder.”

Weeks later, on June 20,2005,theINAFORexecu-tive director, basing him-selfonwhatisestablishedinLaw462,issuedastate-mentonanappealfiledbythe legal representativeof PRADA, S.A. againstAdministrativeResolution

�3-2005DDFI,which“admonishedit”forthein-cidentofthelumbersenttoHavana.

In INAFOR’s new Administrative Resolution(DE35-2005),theINAFORdirectorenumeratesa largenumberof failingsandviolations—graveand very grave—committed by PRADA in thiscaseandordersthelumbercompanysanctionedwithaUS$�0,000fine“forIllegalTrafficofFor-estryResources.”

PRADA rejects the fine and turns to the Supreme Court

PRADA’s executive director, businessman-legis-latorPedroBlandónMoreno,firmlyrejectedthefine, however. He refused to pay it and filed aWritofProtectionagainstAdministrativeResolu-tionDE35-2005withtheSupremeCourtofJus-ticeitself,whichiscontrolledbyjusticesfromhisparty,theFSLN,andfromthePLC.

Convincedthathewasgoingto“win”legally,hewouldthen“suethestate”fortheextraexpensesincurredbythepermanenceoftheship“Daniel

Pedro Blandón Moreno

— 37 —

Atar”inPuertoCabezasforaweek.“We’renotgoingtopaytenthousanddollars.We’regoingtothecourthere,we’reinthe[Supreme]Courtandit’sgoingtoissueadecisionatthepropertime.Ifit’sfavorable,aswebelieve,we’regoingtosuethestate for the losses we’ve incurred,” threatenedBlandónMoreno.

“…[INAFOR] is a political and also criminalinstitute. You can’t work, so we’ve stoppedworkingthisyear,we’veworkedverylittle,justlikelastyear,andthepartnershaveleftNica-ragua.I’malmostalone,becausethey’veseenthecriminalwaytheywork,”insistedBlandónMoreno.

Nonetheless,officialfiguresoftheGeneralCus-tomsDivision(DGA)confirmthatthis“businessinactivity”isn’tquiteright,sinceitregisteredto-talexportsofUS$385,000in2005(althoughitisindeedlessthaninpreviousyears)andthisyear,2006, it had shipments worth US$72,097—thelastoftheminJune,whentheStateofEconomicEmergencywasineffect.

For their part, the environmental ombudsmanandtheINAFORexecutivedirectorhaveanega-tiveimageofPRADA,S.A.,acompanythatpara-doxicallydisplaysanFSCcertification(codeSW-FM/COC-27�), extended for the 9,232-hectareforestryconcessionstartingonJune�5,2003andgooduntilJune�4,2008.

“PRADA has been sanctioned several times,threeorfourtimes;someevenbytheSupremeCourt,whichruledagainstthem,”saidIndalecioRodríguez. “Idon’t consider it satisfactory forsuchan importantbusiness tocommit somany

irregularitiesagainstthenormsit’sobligedtore-spect.”

A very lucrative business

PRADA,S.A.(ElCascal-Layasiksa)hasinstalledaplywoodprocessingcompanyinthemunicipal-ityofRosita,inwhatiscalledtheRAAN’s“Min-ingTriangle.”BlandónMorenosaysitproducesanaverageof4,000cubicmetersofsoftplywood,i.e. of Ceibo, Guanacaste, Cedar, Palo de agua,Jiñocuago. He denies working with mahogany.He also claims that his main market is national(50%oftheproduction)andthattherestisdis-tributed in El Salvador, Costa Rica, GuatemalaandMexico.

Intheexportcategory,accordingtothedatabaseconstructed for this investigation,CETREXhasgranted him export permits for milled lumberand derivatives between 200� and 2005 totaling2.7millionkilosandUS$2.4million. Italsore-cords furniture and other exports between �999and 2003 at 2.0 million kilos and US$85�,009.Among the markets that Blandón Moreno didnotmention,butthatappearinthedatabaseareCuba,DominicanRepublic,SpainandtheUnitedStates.

TheseCETREXfigures,however,arewellbelowthe record exported by PRADA, in that officialfiguresfromtheDGAshowthatin2000alone,itexported6.4millionkilos, totalingUS$5�.9mil-lion. A year later, PRADA registered US$�8.7million,bringingthetwo-yeartotaltooverUS$70million. These were the his electoral campaignyearandthefirstyearofhiselectionasalternatenationallegislatorontheFSLNbench.

caSE analYSES: THE lumbEr cOmpanIES’ modus operandi

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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Around 7�,745 hectares ofpine forestsexist in thecen-tral and north part of Nica-ragua, according to the For-estryMap,ofwhich thevastmajority (88%) are located

in the department of Nueva Segovia, whichbordersHonduras.

NuevaSegovia isoneof thecountry’s regions inwhich the pine forests are suffering the greatestpressure fromanaggressive,backward,first-gen-erationlumberindustrydedicatedabovealltoex-tractingtheresourcetosellittothesawmills.Thesawmillsinturnexportittoneighboringcountriessuch as Honduras and El Salvador, which havetechnified industries of second and third leveltransformation,providingitgreatervalueadded.In 2005, according to official DGA figures, �8.6millionboardfeetofpinewereexportedwithanFOB value of US$3.3 million. The number onemarketisElSalvador,whichimported�0.3millionboardfeetofNicaraguanpine,followedbyHon-duraswith8.2millionboardfeet.

In2000,forexample,85sawmillswereregisteredinNicaragua as operating with INAFOR permits, ofwhich�8werelocatedinNuevaSegovia,inthemu-nicipalities of Ciudad Antigua, Jalapa, Macuelizo,Mozonte,OcotalandSanFernando.Sixyearslater,in2006,33ofthetotalof65sawmillsoperatingwithINAFORpermitswerelocatedinNuevaSegovia.

Withrespecttotheforestryexploitationpermitsforcuttingpines,ourdatabaseindicatesthatpermitsweregrantedfor theextractionof40,530cubicmeters in2000,afigurethatfellwellshortofthe70,�62cubicmetersextractedin2005.Thisrepresentsatremen-douspressure,ifwerecallthattheareawasreducedbyoverhalfduetotheweevilplagueandforestfires.

“IntheendtheweevildestroyedhalfofNuevaSego-via’sforests,”saysRamos.“Themedicinewashard[thecompletefellingofthetreesaffected],butifthatwoodhadn’tbeenfelled,itprobablywouldhaveaf-fectedmuchmorethanhalf,sothatwasthecostofsavingtherestoftheforest.Thatwastheperiodinwhichtherulesoftheforestrygamewereliberalized,but since then, forestry management has returnedthrough the General Forestry Management Plans(PGMF),whichdictatehowmuchonecancuteachyear,accordingtothegrowthoftheforestitself.”

The case of the regents

WithrespecttothePGMFs,INAFORhasinven-toried20�authorizationsinitsNationalForestryRegistry, corresponding toa totalareaof�2,084hectares.Ofthoseauthorizations,�70arelocatedin thedepartmentofNuevaSegovia,which indi-catesthepressureontheresourceandtheforestryaptitudeof its soils. AllPGMFsare formulatedbyforestryregents,peopletrainedbyINAFORintheuseandmanagementoftheforestryresources,and their annual operational plans must be ap-provedandmonitoredbythemunicipalINAFORdelegates. Nonetheless,thischainofcontrolhasnotfunctionedeffectively.

“It was thought that the [illegal felling] wasgoingtobesolvedbycreatingtheregents,butsave honorable exceptions, the regents havebeenadisaster,” says INAFORExecutiveDi-rectorIndalecioRodríguez.“Theyweregiventheresponsibilityofanotary;theyhadtosweartowhat theyreceived, toguardall theofficialdocuments of the forestry sector, the securityguides;butthatdidn’thappen.Theyacquiredmoremanagementplansthantheycouldsuper-

Pine in nueva Segovia: abuse by regents, lumber dealers and InAFor officials

— 39 —

vise; some didn’t even go tothe field. That isoneofourgreatest weaknesses, the fig-ure of the regent didn’t liveuptotheexpectationswehadabout their professional be-havior.”

TheopinionofEnvironmentalOmbudsmanLisandroD’Leónisverysimilar.“Theforestre-gents,accordingtomycriteria,endedupbeingamedicinethatwasworsethantheillness.Oneassumes that they’e obliged tofill out the exploitation guideon the ground, also pointingout which trees are to be cutandhowtodoitrespectingthetechnical norms. But we’veseizedguideblanks fromthe lumbermen,whichtheytellustheregentgavethemlikethattoavoidtheresponsibilityofgoingtothefield.”A surprising operation

FromSeptember5to7ofthisyear,threemonthsafterLaw585(LawofClosedSeasononCutting,Exploiting and Commercializing the Forest Re-source)wentintoforce,theEnvironmentalOm-budsman’s Office, MARENA and the NationalArmy,undertookasurpriseoperationinvariouspointsofNuevaSegoviaandMadriztoprovethedegreeof compliancewitharticleNo.�,partofwhich states: “A restricted zone of fifteen (�5)kilometers will be established from the nationalbordertowardtheinteriorofthecountryinwhichforestexploitationofallspecieswillbeprohibit-edandwhichwillremainundersurveillanceandcontrolbytheArmyofNicaraguaincoordinationwiththecompetentauthorities.”

Various irregularities and violations of the laws,aboveallofLaw585,weredetected inthe jointoperation,withvariousflatbedsloadedwithpinelogs being hauled without legal documentation,and with completely blank Forestry Guides No.

0586�3 and 0586�4,issued by regent Te-odoroRamos,codeno.RFT 0�92, of Dipilto,Madriz.

AlsoseizedwasaFor-estryUsePermitinthename of Mr. RógerLópezMidence,ofthemunicipality of SanFernando.Itwasgooduntil June2, 2006,butwas extended to Sep-tember30ofthissameyear by the INAFORdelegateofthatmunic-ipality.Law462estab-lishesthepossibilityofrenewing unexecuted

usepermitsforthespaceofayear.

The forestryactivity inNuevaSegovia is largelyconducted in municipalities and communitieslocated within what is called the Dipilto-JalapaNaturalReserve,underprotection.

“The protected area in Nueva Segovia cov-ers 4�,200 hectares and encompasses the mu-nicipalitiesofDipilto,Mozonte, JalapaandSanFernando,”explainsMarthaVirginiaRubio, theMARENAdelegateinthatdepartment.“We,astheMinistryof theEnvironment,havetwoparkguardsandthreetechnicianstocovertheReserve;wedowhatwecanandwillcontinuedoingit.

“In the operation, they found different trucks(aroundsix),comingoutoftheReserve,whichiswithin the �5 kilometers of the Forestry ClosedSeasonLaw.Sowehavetoreviewwhatpermitstheyhave,thelegalityofthelumber,toseewheth-eritsconfiscationismeritedornot.”

HéctorRamos,oftheNuevaSegoviaForestryCon-sortium,estimatesthattheforestryindustryofthatdepartmentgeneratesaround3,000directjobsand

Róger López Midence

caSE analYSES: THE lumbEr cOmpanIES’ modus operandi

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

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some�5,000to�8,000indirectonesthroughouttheforestrychain,fromthosewhofellandextracttheresourcetotheloadersandshippers.

“Whatwewantfromthemisthattheyhonorthenorms,”saysMARENA’sdepartmentaldelegate.“We’renotsayingtheyshouldn’tworktheforest,butthattheyhavetocomplywiththenormsanddo so responsibly to reduce thenegative impactonourmainsourcesofwater.InNuevaSegovia,letmetellyou,wealreadyhave80communitiesinthemunicipalityofJalapathatlackwater,withoutmentioningthemunicipaldepartmentalcapitalofOcotal, which is beginning to suffer serious wa-ter problems, because the Río Dipilto, its mainsourceofsupply,isgettingincreasinglyshallow.”

On the border with Honduras

RógerLópezMidence,ownerofthewoodedsiteknownas “ElEncanto,” locatedat least twoki-lometers from the borderline, feels that he’s upagainstthewallwiththenewForestryClosedSea-sonLaw.Hehasaforestryusepermit(No.�6�2)toextract�,464trees(�,620.5cubicmeters)andclaimsthathehasonlybeenabletotakeout�,200cubicmeters, a shortfallof 400 cubicmetersonwhichhepaidtaxeslastyear.

“We’vebeenworkingthispropertyfor40years,ex-ceptforthewaryears,whenwehadtoleavebecauseitwasallmined,”saysMr.LópezMidence.“Inourpropertywehavesome400manzanas[�manzana=.7hectares]ofpineforestandsome45hectaresun-derconservation.Weworkwithmanagementplans,contract a regent, pay our taxes and comply withwhattheyorderustodo.This[closedseason]lawisdoingusalotofharm;itwaspassedwithoutanytechnicalconsultationinareaslikethese,wherethedepartment’sforestrysectorisclosetotheborder.Therearesome40,000-50,000hectaresofforests,sowhatarewegoingtodo,howarewegoingtolive?”

Another lumberman affected during the for-estry operation is José Andrés Castillo Urbina,

whoidentifieshimselfasaforestownerandalsoa lumber transporter. Oneofhis trucks,ablueMacktruck,wasdetainedwithaloadofpineandputattheorderofMARENA.

“We’ve made five trips with this truck and all theloadscome—withtheirbilloflading,theirpermit,their transfer sheet—from a place authorized byMARENA and INAFOR, which are the forestrysector’sregulatorybodies.ButnowtheycomefromManaguaandgoovertheheadofthedepartmentalauthorities.They’vegiventhepermitshere,soifthelawhasbeenviolated,thefirsttohavedonesoarethe officials from the authorizing bodies,” he saysangrily,waitingforthemtoreleasehistruck.

“I’mtheowneroftheSanAndrésforest,locatedinthemunicipalityofSanFernando,andIhaveauthorizationtocut629cubicmeters,butaftertheEmergencyDecreecameoutandthentheClosedSeason law, they suspended it, and still haven’tgivenusanyanswer.Ihaven’tbroughtoutevenhalfofthelumber,mypermitisfrozen,theyhaveusagainstawall,andwehavecommitmentswiththecompaniesandwiththebanksthemselves.Ifthey’regoingtoletuswork,thenletusgetonwithit;andifthey’regoingtostopus,thendoitdefini-tively,”hesays,hisangerrising.

ForRamos,oftheForestryConsortiumofNuevaSegovia,aSalomonicsolutionwouldbetorevieweachcaseofthebeneficiariesofforestusepermitsone by one, and reward those who have shownthemselves to be responsible and punish thosewhohavedemonstratedirresponsibility.

“We’veanalyzed the legal framework—both theEmergencyDecreeandtheForestryClosedSea-sonLaw—withourteamofadvisersandourpro-posals are aimed at getting them to free up themanagement plans that have been proven suc-cessfulbecauseofthewaythey’vebeenhandled.We’realsoproposingthatmoreresourcesbeas-signedtoINAFORandthatthestatepaythere-gents,sothattheirbossisthegovernmentandnotthelumberdealers.”

— 4� —

IIIConclusions

and recommendations

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

— 42 —

Conclusions

� Nicaragua has lost around 3.2 million hect-aresofforest inhalfacentury(�950-2000)asaresultofanarrayoffactors,amongthemthestrongadvanceoftheagriculturalfrontier, in-discriminateandillegalcutting,agrarianreformprocesses,thepostwarreinsertionprocessandthelackofdemarcationandtitlingoftheindig-enouslands.

2 WorldBankorLumber-FurnitureClusterstud-iescalculatedthatbetween50%and60%ofthemilledlumberexportedfromNicaraguacomesfromillegalfelling.ItisalsoestimatedthatthecountrylosesaroundUS$8millionannuallyintaxes due to the fiscal evasion accompanyingthisillegalfelling.

3 TheforestrymoratoriumdecreedbyPresidentArnoldoAlemánduringhis term(�997-200�)notonly failedcompletelybutalso fosteredajudicial-forestry aberration: the legalization ofallillegallyfelledandcutlumberbetween�997and 2000, following the payment of low finesandsanctions.

4 Asaresultofthisaberration,theDGAshowsrecordfiguresfortheexportofmilledlumberbya smallgroupof lumbercompanies linkedtothethengoverningparty(PLC)andtheop-positionFSLN.ThoseexportsexceedUS$�00million,afigure that represents ten times theaverageannualexports.Intheinterestoftrans-parencyandtruth,itisimportantforthecountrytoreviewtheforestryusepermitsofthatperiod(�997-2000) more intensively, particularly theFOBvaluetheydeclaredintheirexportsandinthetaxesthesecompaniespaid.Inourinvesti-gation,multipleeffortsweremadetouncoverthesepointsforthatperiod,buttheinstitutionslinkedtocustomsandtaxes(DGAandDGI)refused to provide the pertinent information,claimingthatitviolatedthecurrentlegalframe-work. That period thus remains shrouded insecrecy.

5 Itisalsoimportanttolookdeeperintothelinkbetween the lumber companies that exportedfromNicaragua in that�997-2000periodandtheir foreign buyers, especially in the UnitedStates,DominicanRepublic,Honduras,ElSal-vadorandCostaRica.Thereareindicationsofinfluencepeddling,corruption,etc.

6 The legislative branch has provided thecountry a modern legal framework in theforestry sphere, according to the experts,especially with the approval and puttingintoforceofLaw462,theForestryExploi-tationLaw,but ironically itdidnotassignanoperationalbudgettoINAFORbetween�998and2003,leavingtheleadforestryin-stitutiontoothlessandobligingittogener-ateitsincomefromservicesprovidedtothelumber companies and lumbermen, whichlends itself to irregularities, violations ofethics,complicity,etc.

7 INAFORwasassigned�6 functions linkedtothe forestry sector, but ironically it continuestobeathird-levelinstitution,inthatitretainsitscategoryasadecentralizedentityunderthesectoralsupervisionofMAGFOR.Thatinsti-tutionaldisparagement isalsoreflectedintheannualallocationofresourcesviathenationalbudget,whichislessthanhalfofwhatitrequeststobeabletooperateasaguidinginstitutionoftheforestrysector.

8 In contrast with the inoperativeness of thestate’sregulatoryentities,thelumbercompa-nieshavemammothbudgetsthatallowthemtoexercisestronginfluenceonlocalauthori-ties,indigenouscommunitiesandgovernmentofficials.Thelumbercompaniesimposetheirrulesofthegameatanadvantage,whilethestate entities—INAFOR and MARENA—donotexerciseadequatesurveillanceoftheforests.

— 43 —

9 INAFORisobligedtoreviewindetailandwithacriticalsensetheweaknessesrevealedineachlinkofthechainrelatedtotheforestrysector,from the registration process of the lumbercompaniestotheexportationoftheproduct.ItmusttakeafirmstandregardingtheauthorizedMinimum Plans, the registered regents, theGeneralManagementPlans,etc.

�0 The export activity is thus generating evengreaterearningsandprofits,butitdoesnotbenefiteitherthecommunitiesortheforestowners, since the lumber dealers only paythem between $30 and $50 per tree whilethey receive US$�,500 per cubic meter ofcertifiedmahogany.

�� AmongthecompaniesthatbuymilledNica-raguanlumberintheUnitedStates,Domini-canRepublicandHondurasarethoseidenti-fiedashavingbeeninvolvedintheimportofillegallycutwoodonotheroccasions,orelsehavearecordoftaxevasionintheircountriesoforigin.

�2 The forestry regent endorse theillegalityAccordingtoLaw462,thefunctionoftheregents istoensurethattheforestrymanagementfulfillsallthetechnicalnorms.Buttheregentsarealmostalwaysmorecom-mittedtothebusinessesthatpaytheirsala-riesthantothesustainabledevelopmentoftheforests.Thereisthusconsensusthattheregentsendedupbeingmuchmoreharmfulthanthedisease,soanexhaustivereviewofthe behavior of each of them is proposed,withsuspensionofthoseinvolvedinirregu-larities,areformofthelawsothatthecom-paniesdonotcontinuepayingthem,andthedevelopmentofadiplomacourseintechni-calandprofessionaltraining.

�3 Theextractionoflumberisoftenauthorizedbytheindigenouscommunitieswhich,giventheirconditionsofpoverty,findthemselvesforcedtoselltheirforests.Butaccordingtowhatcouldbedocumentedinthecommuni-tiesof theDesembocaduradeRíoGrande(RAAS), as well as in the communities ofWisconsinandLaEsperanzaintheRAAN,

theagreementswiththelumberdetailshaveleft little or no benefit for the communitymembers.

�4 TheEconomicEmergencyDecreeissuedbyPresidentEnriqueBolañosGeyeronMay3,2006,hadaverypositiveimpactintheensu-ingtwoorthreeweeks,bycompletelyhaltingallactivitylinkedtotheforestrysector.Butafterward,duetopressures,claims,criticisms,lobbyingandtherest,theINAFORauthori-ties permitted the hauling, embarking andeven exportation of lumber that had beenheld.AccordingtomonitoringbytheCen-tro Humboldt, the lumber traffic doubledbetweenJune,JulyandAugust2006infourlumbercontrolposts intheNorthAtlantic,eventhoughtheStateofEmergencywasineffect.

�5 Notall lumbercompaniesoperate illegally,butaninspectionmadeaftertheEmergencyindozensofforestcompaniesinNuevaSe-govia,RíoSanJuanandtheSouthandNorthAtlantic Autonomous Regions producedalarmingresults.Of63companiesandman-agement plans reviewed in May 2006, 52hadnotcompliedwiththeNationalForestryInstitute’stechnicalnormsand40%ofthemhadcommitted“verygrave”infractions.

�6 INAFORhasnotbeenabletoauctionoffthelumberconfiscatedinRíoKungKung—atotalof3,540cubicmetersofmahoganyandcedarbecausethelumberdealersinvolvedinthat environmental tragedy have turned tothejudicialbranch,controlledbytheFSLN-PLCpoliticalparties,andtheAppealsCourtshaveupheldthem.Inaddition,therearelo-caljudgeswhohaveactedinfavorofthelum-bermenandevenrecoveredseized lumber.Ironically,theSupremeCourtofJustice,thecountry’smaximumtribunal,hasnot takenany stand regarding these events that havemeritedsuchstrongcriticismbythemedia.

�7 The authorities initiated over �00 adminis-trativeandcriminalprocessesagainstviola-torsofthelaws,amongthempublicofficials,lumberdealersandforestryregentsortech-

cOncluSIOnS and rEcOmmEndaTIOnS

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

— 44 —

nicians,butnoimportantprogresshasbeenmadeinthissphereduetothelackofcoordi-nationandofpoliticalwillbytherelatedin-stitutions(AttorneyGeneral’sOffice,PGR,INAFOR).

�8 Independent audits in Nueva Segovia con-ducted by the international organizationGlobal Witness confirm that in this regionof the country—supposedly the most or-deredandwiththegreatestforestryexperi-ence—thereisalsoalackofproperfollow-up,monitoring, surveillanceand inspectionoftheExploitationPlansbylocalINAFORauthoritiesandtheregentsincharge.

�9 The individuals and registered companiesin the forestry sector that have committedirregularities and been fined by INAFORcontinuetoignorethepaymentofthousandsofcórdobasanddollarsinfinesbecausetheyareprotectedbytheappealscourtsorbytheSupremeCourt itself. Thismeansthatthecountrycannotevenrecoverpartoftheloss-escausedbytheillegalfelling.

20 ThenextNationalAssembly,whichwillbeginitsworkinJanuary2007,willhavetoresolvethenationaldilemmarelatedtotheforestrysector.WillitkeeptheForestryClosedSea-sonLawineffectdespiteitsgaps,loopholesandinconsistencies?OrwillitreformLaw462, of Forestry Exploitation? The latterseems tohavemore supportersamong thesectorsinvolvedinthiseconomicsector,in-cludingpublicofficialsofMAGFOR,lumberdealersandexpertsfrominternationalinsti-tutions. In their judgment, the law is veryyounganddeservestobereviewed,identify-ingtheweaknessesandholes,thenreformed,strengthenedandputintopractice.

2� The lumber companies that prepaid theirtaxesrelatedtolumberexploitationfor2006and were affected first by the EmergencyDecreethenbytheForestryClosedSeasonLawaredemandingthatthestatereturnthatmoney so theycan recapitalize,as in somecasestheypaidthousandsofdollarsonlum-berthattheycouldnotextract,marketorex-port.

22 Thelumbercompanyrepresentativesbelievethatvery fewwillmanage to survive in thenewrulesofthegameimposedbytheEco-nomicEmergencyDecreeandtheForestryClosedSeasonLaw;themajoritywilldisap-pearduetolackofenoughcapitaltooper-ateasacompanyofsecondtransformation.Theyarguethatthepurchaseofequipmentandmachineryforindustrialprocessingde-mands major investments, thousands uponthousands of dollars, and very few will beable to redefine their operations now thattheyaredecapitalizedandnotcreditworthytothebankingentities.

23 Withtheendoftherainyseason,thelumberdealersarepreparingtoreturntotheforestandrepeatthenewcuttingcycle.Despitetheemergency,theforestryissuewasabsentfromtheelectoralcampaign.InJanuary2007thenewPresidentandlegislativeauthoritieswhowillrulethedestinyofthecountrywilltakeoffice.Theadoptionofcorrectivemeasuresandanationalstrategytogivevaluetotheforestandstimulatesustainableforestryde-velopmentwilldependonthem.Butwith-outpoliticalwill,thecycleofenvironmentaldestructionwillberepeatedyetagain.

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� Openabroadpublicdebate inwhichall sectorsinvolved in the forestry situation participate tocontinue analyzing the emergency the forestryresources are experiencing and reach nationalconsensus regarding the present and future oftheForestryClosedSeasonLawandForestryEx-ploitationLaw.Thenewexecutiveandlegislativeauthoritiesshouldpromoteandparticipateinthisdebate,asshouldauthoritiesoftheEnvironmen-talOmbudsman’sOffice,thePublicProsecutor’sEnvironmentalOffice,theAutonomousRegionalGovernments, the forestry industry, indigenouscommunitiesandcivilsocietyorganizations.

2 Reformor suspend theForestryClosedSeasonLaw,consideringthatsuchpromulgatedmorato-riumshavehistoricallynotfunctioned,andtothecontraryhavesubjectedtheforestryresourcestogreaterpressures.

3 Review and reform the Forestry ExploitationLaw,Law462,aroundthefollowingpoints:

a) RegulationoftheMinimumPlansb) Paymentoftheregentsbythelumberdealersc) Greatercontroloverthesawmillstoprevent

illegaltraffickingandavoidfiscalfraudd) Periodic audits, preferably independent

ones, of the forestry concessions, GeneralManagement plans, INAFOR Delegations,etc.

e) Exhaustive review of the criteria and thefunctionsandresponsibilitiesoftheForestryRegentsandForestryTechnicians.

f) Misconductandsanctionsg) RoleofINAFORh) Administrative procedures regarding the

forestryindustry

4 ReviewandreformLaw290,onOrganizationofthe State, and the role of the National ForestryInstitute’ssubordinationandautonomousentity.

Raiseitsrank,provideitaminimumbudgetwithconstitutionalrankandreturnitsdecision-makingcapacityonforestryissues,cutoffinthewakeoftheEmergencyDecree.

5 OrganizeanInter-institutionalCommissionhead-ed by the Environmental Ombudsmen’s OfficeandthePublicProsecutor’sOfficetoinvestigateindepththe“boom”ofexportedmilledlumberdur-ingthe�999-200�periodtocorroboratewhetherornotthereareindicationsorevidenceofpossiblefraudortaxevasionbythelumbercompanies.Ifirregularitiesareproven,applythelawsandpub-liclyreportonthecommission’sfindings.

6 Exhaustively review the weaknesses of INAFOR’sNationalForestryRegistrySystemandadoptinter-nal institutions thatensurethegatheringandhan-dling of complete, exhaustive, recent informationregarding the lumber companies, concessions, ap-provedexploitationplans,sanctionsimposed,fines,etc.

7 Speed up the titling process for the communalindigenous territories,which iswhere thegreatmajority of forests of high commercial poten-tialarelocated.Alsocreatetheframeworkthatregulatestheexploitationoftheforestsoftheag-ricultural frontierunderschemesofcommunityforestryormixedschemeswithcertifiedcompa-nies.

8 Confirm a temporary specific closed season formahoganyandalmond,whileatechnicalevalua-tionoftheirstatusisbeingmade.

9 EnsurethatanewForestryInventoryisconduct-ed, tohelpdetermine the statusof the forestryresourcesinNicaragua.

�0 Promoteaframeworkofincentivesandsub-sidiesthatcanhelpexportersofmilledlum-

recommendations

cOncluSIOnS and rEcOmmEndaTIOnS

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

— 46 —

ber make the leap to the export of lumberorsub-productswithvalueadded,seeingtotheirtechnologicalconversionandthesearchfornewforeignmarkets.

�� Ensure that the judicialbranch immedi-atelyissuesanopinion,honoringthelaw,aboutthesuitsfiledbythelumberdealerswhose lumber was seized and is waitingto be auctioned, to set a precedent andallowthecountrytorecoverasmallpor-tionoftheenvironmentaldisastercausedinthezoneofKungKungandKungcito.

�2 Also ensure that the judicial branch ruleson all writs of protection filed by the lum-bercompaniesagainstthesanctionsorfinesimposed by the executive direction of IN-AFOR.

�3 ThattheEnvironmentalOfficeofboththeAt-torneyGeneral’sandPublicProsecutor’sOffic-esreviewthecasesandthechargesofviolationoftheforestryandenvironmentallawsthatareintheirpower,andproceedtoworktogetherinfavoroftheapplicationofthelaws.

�4 StudytheFinalReportonthefulfillmentandresults of the Emergency Decree imposedlastMay,whichwastobeineffectforape-riodof�80days.Inthatlapseanexhaustiveon-site investigation was to be done of theconcessionsandhowtheforestrycompanieswereoperating.

�5 Ensure that INAFOR officials and regentsinvolveddirectlyor indirectly in the irregu-larconcessionsandexploitationofminimumplans are not relocated in either the IN-AFORdelegationsoritscentraloffices.

�6 Transparentlyexplain topublicopinion thewhereaboutsofall logsseizedbytheInter-institutionalCommissionatthebeginningoftheEconomicEmergencyinMay2006.Re-leaseanupdated inventory, comparedwith

theinitialfigure,andincaseoflossordisap-pearance,openanofficialinvestigationintotheissue.

�7 CreateaprogramwithinthesameInstitutethat fosters the sustainable forest exploita-tionoftheAtlanticCoastandotherwoodedareasoftheagriculturalfrontierundercom-munityforestryschemes.

�8 ActivateaplaninLasSegoviasthatensuresgood management practices and promotestherecoveryofareasdegradedbyfire,wee-vilsandbadforestrypractices.

�9 Finishestablishingthemechanismstomakeaccesstodiscountsystemsforexistingenvi-ronmentalservices.

20 AnalyzetheparticularsituationofLasSego-vias, a department with a forestry traditionon which the Forestry Closed Season Lawimposednewrulesofthegamewithoutpre-viouslyconsultingthestakeholders.Reopentheissueandseekconsensualsolutions.

2� Review and strengthen the system of per-mits, control and surveillance granted bythe CITES authority in Nicaragua. It isin charge of granting export permits formahogany, among other precious species,without having either enough mechanisms

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Studies, Documents and Government Sources

�. “Valoración Forestal Nicaragua 2000,” MAG-FOR-PROFOR Collection, Volume �, May2005.

2. MarcodePolíticadeTierras,MAGFOR,LandPolicyOffice.

3. DiagnósticoClusterForestal-Madera,Presiden-tialCompetitivenessCommission(CPC).

4. ArchiveofLaGaceta,DiarioOficial,ExecutiveDecrees�997-200�.

5. Laúltimafronteraforestal:Diagnósticodeles-tadoactualde laCaobaenNicaragua,GabrielTravisany,Consultant,April2005.

6. TropicalTimberMarketReport,ITTOMarketInformationService,JulyandSeptember2006is-sues.

7. “Racionalizando el comercio de caoba,” Inter-nationalTropicalTimberOrganization(ITTO),October2004.

8. Historial de exportaciones nicaragüenses demaderaaserrada,CETREX,�999-2006.

9. DimensionesyPerspectivasdelaTalaIlegalenNicaragua,CentroAlexanderVonHumboldt.

�0. ReportsbytheUSPortAuthorityServiceoftheUnitedStates(PIERS),fromMaytoJuly2006.

��. Primer Reporte Proyecto Piloto de MonitoreoForestal Independiente en Nicaragua, GlobalWitness,October2006

�2. Informe de Inspección Técnica de Campo aPlanesMínimosde losColectivosdeExCom-batientesdeYátama�3y�4ylaIndustriaFor-estalSantoDomingo,May2006,PuertoCabe-zas,RAAN.

�3. Law290,“LawofOrganization,CompetenciesandProceduresoftheExecutiveBranch.”

�4. Law402,“LawofRatesforForestryExploitationandServices.”

�5. Law462,LawofConservation,PromotionandSustainableDevelopmentoftheForestrySector,November2003.

�6. Law559,LawofEnvironmentalCrimes.

�7. DecreeNo.32-2006,DecreeofEmergency,Pres-idencyoftheRepublic,May2006.

�8. AdministrativeResolutionNo.DFIX04-2006,INAFOR,May2006.

�9. Report on Lumber Seized and Confiscated byINAFOR,2003-2005.

20. Report on Fines and Sanctions by INAFOR,2003-2005.

2�. Registry of Sawmills authorized by INAFOR,200�-2006, National Forestry Registry, IN-AFOR.

22. RegistryofForestryUsePermits,200�-2006,Na-tionalForestryRegistry,INAFOR.

23. RegistryofauthorizedRegents,2005-2006,Na-tionalForestryRegistry,INAFOR.

Bibliographic references

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

EmErgEncY In THE FOrEST

— 48 —

24. General Budget of the Republic 2003, WebpageoftheMinistryoftheTreasuryandPub-licCredit.

25. DraftofReportofMeasuresFulfillment-Eco-nomic Emergency, of the Inter-InstitutionalCommittee, organized following the DecreeofEconomicEmergency,July2006.

26. WritofProtectiontotheAppealsCourt,Ma-nagua District, Civil Issues Hall No. One,filedbyDomingoAntenorAlvarez,Septem-ber2006.

27. AuctionNotice,INAFOR,September2006.

28. INAFORPressRelease,October3�,2006.

29. Copy of the minutes of the Session of theCouncilofEldersof theDesembocaduradeRíoGrande,March�9,2005.

30. CopyofDocumentNo.�58,ofthelawyerBer-nardBrownMedina,prepared inBluefields,August2005.

3�.Copyof theMunicipalCertificationof theDesembocadura del Río Grande by theMayor’s Office, issued by then MunicipalSecretary, Municipal Councilor FranciscoAbel Centeno for Yatama, dated February5,2006.

Governmental sources

�. GeneralCustomsDivision(DGA).

2. ExportTransactionsCenter(CETREX).

Interviews

�. Jaime Guillén, Coordinator National Rain-forestAlliance,October2006.

2. JaderGuzmán,headoftheForestryPoliciesDepartmentofMAGFOR,October2006.

3. Oscar Sobalvarro, Comandante “Rubén,”lumberbusinessman,September2006.

4. Pedro Blandón Moreno, owner of PRADA,S.A.,September2006.

5. IndalecioRodríguez,ExecutiveDirectorIN-AFOR,September2006.

6. Lisandro D’León, Environmental Ombuds-man,September2006.

7. AdriánUbedaRiveraandMaximinoUbedaRivera, lumber businessmen, September2006.

8. HernaldoEscobarWaldán,lumberman,Sep-tember2006.

9. Róger López Midence, owner of the forest“ElEncanto,”ofthemunicipalityofSanFer-nando,NuevaSegovia,September2006.

�0. Martha VirginiaRubio, MARENA delegateinNuevaSegovia.

��. Héctor Ramos, president of the ForestryChamber of Nicaragua and of the ForestryConsortiumofNuevaSegovia,July2006.

�2. Lesly Downs, mayor of the DesembocaduradeRíoGrande.

�3. LourdesAguilar,presidentof theSouthAt-lantic Autonomous Regional Council, Sep-tember2006.

�4. JoséAndrésCastilloUrbina,lumbermanandtransporter in Nueva Segovia, September2006.

�5. Working tour to the Río Kung Kung, orga-nized by the Environmental Ombudsman’sOfficeandtheArmyofNicaragua,May2006.

�6. Forestry Operation of the EnvironmentalOmbudsman’s Office, MARENA and theArmyofNicaragua, inNuevaSegovia,Mac-uelizo, San Fernando, Mozonte, September2006.