electronic records and signatures: warning letters and observations including proposed solutions
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Electronic Records and Signatures: Warning Letters and Observations including proposed solutions. 8Linweld (8/2/99) , X 9Purepac (11/26/97), 10 Schein (3/2/00), X 11 Synthes (10/15/99), 12 Willis Eye Associates (7/7/98), 13 Ganes Chemicals (12/22/99) - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Electronic Records and Signatures:Warning Letters and Observations including proposed solutions
8 Linweld (8/2/99) , X
9 Purepac (11/26/97),
10 Schein (3/2/00), X
11 Synthes (10/15/99),
12 Willis Eye Associates (7/7/98),
13 Ganes Chemicals (12/22/99)
14 Associated Regional University Pathologists (3/18/99). Red = Warning Letter
Warning Letters and 483-Observations 1 Ansell International
(6/8/98),
2 Cypress Bioscience (6/7/99),
3 Fairbanks Memorial Hospital (4/28/99),
4 Gensia Sicor (7/21/99), X
5 Glenwood (5/20/99),
6 Hydro Med Sciences (2/12/99),
7 Johnson Matthey (3/7/00), X
Classification of 36 FDA-Observations from 14 Warning Letters and 483
27%
17%
17%
11%
11%
11%3%3%
Procedures
Authorisation
System
Audit Trail Issues
Backup
Password
Change Control
Data handling
Goldsheet, October 2000
Recent Problems Observed in FDA-Inspections
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 1/12 Data edit rights available to all users
– Restrict user authorizations to the necessary. Protect files wherever possible.
Functions that "modify" or "delete" whole or partial data files available to all analysts – Restrict authorizations of people who can delete and modify
All QC network users can edit permissions for fields, commands, and system menu functions; analysts can submit edited data
All users can delete data, modify files, & overwrite raw data – Restrict authorizations
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 2/12 Original reports sent via email differed significantly
from QA Manager's official reports – Do not send reports by email, without checksum or hash
No evidence of system's ability to discern invalid or altered records – Evaluate the usage of checksums or other protection tools
Inadequate HPLC controls; analysts can delete results
– Check all Lab-Equipment that there are no “Delete” functions
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 3/12 Software does not secure data from
alterations, loss, or erasure– Have Backup procedure in place. Evaluate new
Software No written procedures for use of passwords,
access levels, or data backup – Check if procedures are available
User ID & password publicly posted for other employees' use – Keep the passwords secret, no group password
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 4/12 Employees terminated years earlier still had
access privileges – Check list of authorized personnel and have a
procedure in place that system administration is notified about changes in personnel
No security procedures for lab computer systems; no security access levels established – Have different appropriate access levels defined in
procedures and implemented in the lab No data file backup procedures
– Check Backup Procedure
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 5/12 No password security on computer used for data
entry and data transfer via the internet – Do not transfer the data via Internet except you are
using encryption and have the corresponding procedures.
No physical or password access controls on PLC to prevent unauthorized changes – Difficult one. PLCs should not be used to enter data or
recipes. Lock PLCs in. PLCs – at least the old ones do not have any possibility to work with User access rights, passwords and the like. Needs to be solved procedurally if recipes are entered in PLC.
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 6/12 Primary CAD engineering drawings stored on
unprotected computer – Define which drafts are relevant to GMP and need
to be stored. Do not store GMP-relevant Data on unprotected computers
No procedures to verify electronic SOPs against approved hardcopy prior to posting on company network – Verify formally all the documents that are
distributed electronically. Validate the system.
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 7/12 Password protection can be bypassed Windows O/S security can be bypassed
– Use Windows 95, 98 as operating system only if you know using TWEAK.UI. Windows 3.1, DOS...Do not use these Systems
Password system does not ensure password expiration; passwords can be as short as 4 characters – There are no regulatory requirements behind this. In save
systems such as ATM (automated teller machine) cards (e.g. Bankomat) the password does not age and is therefore never changed. These cards sometimes have also as short codes as 4 digits.
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 8/12 Audit Trail Issues
• System does not generate an audit trail • No audit trail for changes to clinical data in e-records• No audit trail
– There are no immediate remedies. Show in plans when you are going to replace the Equipment.
TurboChrom audit trail switch was intentionally disabled– Be sure to have an existing audit trail switched on.
No SOPs or records for changes made to critical data– Have an SOP for the change of critical data in place.
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 9/12Record Retention Issues No assurance that e-records could be
stored/retrieved for entire retention period – Have details in a procedure
Electronic files from lab instruments not properly maintained – Have clear maintenance procedures including
maintenance of electronic files Software allows overwriting of original data
– Difficult. Software needs to be replaced.
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 10/12 Failure to assure retention & security of PLC
data captured by computer – Validate and test system
No procedure to control secure retention of master PLC programs, or to identify & retain all versions – Establish Change Control
Data files automatically deleted after printing
– Difficult. Software needs to be replaced.
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 11/12 Backup tapes were never restored & verified;
tapes stored at employee's home – Test Backup procedure regularly
E-Signature Control Issues No written accountability procedures for actions
taken under E-signatures – Establish procedure to make personnel accountable for
their signatures. No safeguards to prevent unauthorized use of E-
signatures when employee leaves the workstation – Screensaver and Lock the screen procedure
Findings and Proposed Corrective Actions 12/12 E-signature certification not sent to FDA prior
to using E-signatures– Roche has sent out such a certification in 1998
Other Issues Could not generate copies of e-records
– Verify that copies can be generated. In Windows: Provide Screenshot (Press Print-Screen Button, open an empty Word Document, and press CTRL+V)