electoral rules and the transformation of bolivian politics: the rise of evo morales

ELECTORAL RULES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS


THE RISE OF EVO MORALES

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian


Copyright © Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, 2008.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2008 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN®in the US—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Muñoz-Pogossian, Betilde. Electoral rules and the transformation of Bolivian politics : the rise of

Evo Morales / Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Bolivia—Politics and government—1982– 2. Morales Ayma, Evo, 1959– 3. Movimiento al Socialismo (Bolivia) 4. Bolivia—Politics and government—21st century. I. Title.

JL2231.M86 2008324.6�30984—dc22 2008012344

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

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First edition: October 2008

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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2008 978-0-230-60819-1

This is dedicated to my family—thanks for your support,

love and the joy you bring to my life.

CONTENTS

List of Tables ix

List of Figures xi

List of Acronyms xiii

1 The Rise of Evo Morales through an Electoral Lens:

An Introduction 1

2 Bolivia’s Founding Pacts: The Pact for Democracy

and the Patriotic Accord through an Electoral Lens 31

3 Paving the Way for the Transformation of Bolivian

Politics: Electoral Reforms and Coalition Building 81

4 Crumbling Coalitions? Assessing the Transformation

of Bolivian Politics 143

5 Explaining Evo Morales’s Rise to Power:

The Unintended [or Intended?] Political

Consequences of Electoral Laws 187

Notes 209

Bibliography 223

Index 237

LIST OF TABLES

2.1 The Pact for Democracy: Incentives for Coalition Building 39

2.2 Legislative Leadership, 1985–1989 49

2.3 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 1 51



2.6 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinets 4 and 5 54

2.7 Composition of the Political Council of the Patriotic

Accord or COPAP 68

2.8 Paz Zamora Administration: Cabinet 1 73

3.1 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 1 103

3.2 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 2 104

3.3 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinets 3 and 4 106

3.4 Uninominal and Plurinominal Deputies in the 1997–2002

Chamber of Deputies 115

4.1 Uninominal and Plurinominal Deputies in the Chamber

of Deputies, 2002–2005 152

4.2 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 2 161

4.3 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 3 163

4.4 Mesa Administration: Cabinet 1 169



5.1 Electoral Reforms in Bolivia, 1986–2004 195

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Results of the 1985 Elections 35

2.2 Composition of the 1985–1989 Chamber of Deputies 37





4.3 Composition of the 2002–2005 Senate 154

5.1 Party Representation in Paz Estenssoro’s Cabinet,

1985–1989 199

5.2 Party Representation in Paz Zamora’s Cabinet,

1989–1993 199

5.3 Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet,

1993–1997 200

5.4 Party Representation in Banzer’s Cabinet, 1997–2001 200

5.5 Party Representation in Quiroga’s Cabinet, 2001–2002 201

5.6 Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet,

2002–2005 201

5.7 Party Representation in Mesa’s Cabinet, 2003–2005 202

5.8 Party Representation in Evo Morales’s Cabinet,

2005–Present 202

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADN Acción Democrática Nacionalista

AP Acuerdo Patriótico

ASP Asamblea Soberana del Pueblo

CEPB Confederación de Empresarios de Bolivia

CIPC Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado

CNE Corte Nacional Electoral

COB Central Obrera Boliviana

COMIBOL Corporación de Mineros de Bolivia

CONDEPA Conciencia de Patria

CONEPLAN Consejo Nacional de Economía y Planificación

CSUTCB Conderación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos

de Bolivia

CPE Constitución Politica du Estado

ENDE Empresa Nacional de Electricidad

ENFE Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles

FEJUVE Federación de Juntas Vecinales

FRI Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda

FSB Falange Socialista Boliviana

FTAA Free Trade Agreement of the America

IU Izquierda Unida

LAB Lloyd Aérea Boliviana

LPP Ley de Participación Popular

MAS Movimiento al Socialismo

MBL Movimiento Bolivia Libre

MIP Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti

MIR Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario

MNR Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario

MNR-I Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario de Izquierda

MRTKL Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari L

NFR Nueva Fuerza Republicana

xiv LIST OF ACRON YMS

NPE Nueva Política Económica

OTBs Organizaciones Territoriales de Base

PCB Partido Comunista Boliviano

PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano

POR Partido Obrero Revolucionario

PS Partido Socialista

SMD Single Member District

UCS Unión Cívica Solidaridad

UDP Unión Democrática Popular

UMSA Universidad Mayor de San Andrés

VC Vigilance Committees

YPFB Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos

CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF EVO MORALESTHROUGH AN ELECTORAL LENS: AN INTRODUCTION

In recent times, no other region in Latin America has received so much

attention as the Andean region. A brief look at the region reveals that

the weaknesses of these burgeoning democratic systems have had a tangible

impact upon their political stability. In the last decade, there have been at

least six political crises that have each resulted in a presidential change.1

Along with Ecuador, Bolivia has been the most unstable country in the

region. In 2003, after what became known as Black October, the president

resigned and went into exile in the United States. The succeeding presi-

dent, Carlos Mesa, resigned 20 months later and, in the midst of political

uncertainty, the president of the Supreme Court assumed power. After

three presidents in as many years, a highly contested political campaign in

2005 ended with the election of Evo Morales, the Aymara union and

political leader, as the nation’s new president.

Bolivia continues to hold the eye of the international community. The

growing interest springs from the fact that, domestically, it is embarking

on a process of major national reforms. Not only do those behind the

process promise to revamp the nation’s social contract, but also the move-

ment is being led by one of the indigenous leaders whom sectors of the

political class have historically despised. Moreover, the international

community sees Bolivia as a political laboratory where, although new

and interesting projects may emerge, things can go wrong very easily.

Regionally, with the 2005 election of Evo Morales, and his manifested

sympathy toward left-leaning Latin American leaders, Bolivia joined

what some analysts are now calling “the Latin American new left.”

2 ELECTOR A L RU LES A N D BOLI V I A N POLITICS

International donors, journalists, analysts, political scientists, and the

general public alike are watching this national exercise closely.

In the case of Bolivia, the choice of political institutions—electoral

systems, specifically—has mattered greatly. Indeed, electoral reforms

have been a key part of Bolivia’s institutional development. Between

1958 and 2007, the country had about thirteen electoral reforms—an

average of a new electoral law every 3.4 years. Although the process of

reforms was not always informed by political engineering, it has facilitated

the emergence of more than 400 parties in 20 years and of more than 500

indigenous movements and civic associations as political vehicles to con-

test power. At the same time, however, the reforms have also produced a

complex and politically volatile environment.

In the past, political leaders managed to maintain stability, in spite of

system fragmentation, through coalition building, as promoted by the

electoral system, constitutional design, and, ultimately, Bolivia’s political

culture. Yet recently, a disconnect between the political class and the

demands of the population has created a breeding ground for turbulent

politics. This has been complicated by the emergence of new opportuni-

ties within the political sphere for groups that had been relegated before.

This book examines the variations of electoral arrangements across

time in Bolivia, highlighting the two most recent electoral reforms that

introduced the election of half of the members of the Chamber of Deputies

using the Single Member District (SMD) system (in 1997) and allowed

for indigenous movements and civic groups (in 2004) to contest elections

along with political parties. The book contends that the political out-

comes of recent times in Bolivia—such as the events of October 2003 and

the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada, the political instability of

2004 and 2005, with the election of President Morales in December 2005,

and the emergence of the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al

Socialismo-MAS) as the new hegemonic party in the country—are all

consequences of the electoral system. In light of the various electoral

reforms, the book analyzes the impact of the electoral rules on the con-

figuration of Congress, executive-legislative relations, and effective

coalition building and traces the impact of the reforms on the formation

and strengthening of the MAS as a new hegemonic political force. In

doing this, the book offers a key contribution to the study of the Bolivian

electoral system and recent political events in the country.

Why use an electoral lens? Because electoral systems have political

consequences. Indeed, electoral design generally affects the behaviors and

attitudes of voters, with regards to the formation of party systems

(Duverger 1954; Rae 1967) as well as to loyalty and cohesiveness.

3TH E R ISE OF EVO MOR A LES

Similarly, electoral rules affect attitudes and behavior, as well as citizen

participation in elections (Powell 2000). There are also further incentives

for conducting a study on electoral systems.

First, research on electoral systems represents an important wealth of

literature in the field of comparative politics and has immense heuristic

value in assessing the nature and qualities of democratic regimes, institu-

tions, and procedures. Second, electoral systems are worth evaluating

because in recent years they have become “politically interesting” (Farrell

1997: 2). Both political scientists and practitioners are rediscovering a

theoretical and practical interest in examining the crucial part that

electoral systems play in strengthening or debilitating democracy. Third,

a study of electoral systems is significant because a comparative analysis

on electoral systems can shed light on how political systems function in

relation to their institutions. Finally, this study is methodologically sig-

nificant not only because it expands on existing theoretical knowledge

about electoral systems (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Scully

1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), but also because it aims to contrib-

ute to the literature by attempting to uncover new variables that may help

explain variations in already accepted hypotheses.

Beyond the current interest in Bolivia, it is also pertinent to study this

country for theoretical reasons. First, a broad overview of Latin American

politics suggests that, relative to other countries in the hemisphere,

Bolivia has performed comparatively better in terms of forming electoral

and governing coalitions. The Bolivian case suggests an important

message to scientists and practitioners in the comparative politics field—

that the existence of electoral mechanisms giving incentives for interparty

coalitions can generate effective policymaking in difficult environments

(Shugart and Carey 1992: 85). However, it also shows that interparty

coalitions are not enough to guarantee political stability. This essential

point requires further analysis.

Second, the capacity of the Bolivian political class to enter into long-

term pacts shows an important degree of political maturity (Gamarra 1997a:

134). This, in turn, afforded the Bolivian political system an important

attribute, that of a relatively stable democratic regime—especially during

the first 20 years following the democratic transition. The present study

finds these institutionalized mechanisms for coalition building theoreti-

cally and empirically interesting. Finally, since Bolivia’s constitutional

structure exhibits features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism, the

nation’s political system can be considered a variation within a recurrent

constitutional structure in Latin America. It is compelling for comparativists

to assess its seemingly apparent uniqueness.


Electoral Dynamics: A Review of the Literature

The systematic analysis of Latin American electoral systems and their

impact on executive-legislative interaction remains an unexplored aspect

in the field of comparative politics. While U.S. executive-legislative rela-

tions have been much studied (Thurber 1991; Mayhew 1991; Davidson

1991; Peterson and Greene 1994), little research has been done on the

severe difficulties faced by divided governments of Latin American coun-

tries (Hughes and Mijeski 1973; Suarez 1982). Other comparativists

focused, albeit subtly, on electoral systems and divided government in the

context of three major scholarly discussions: (i) the debate between pres-

identialism and parliamentarism, (ii) the debate on the effect of electoral

laws on the party system and ultimately on democratic stability; and

(iii) the discussion about political institutions and democratic stability in

the context of country-specific analyses. Herein lies the literature on

Bolivian politics, which places great emphasis on political institutions and

structures as the major determinants of interinstitutional dynamics at the

national level.

Discussions of Executive-Legislative Relations in

the Context of the Presidentialism versus

Parliamentarism Debate

In the last 20 years, comparativists delved into the study of the features of

presidential and parliamentary systems (Lijphart 1984 and 1994; Valenzuela

1990 and 1993; Shugart and Carey 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Jones

1995; Mainwaring 1997). As a result, a major debate on the advantages

and disadvantages of these two ideal types took prominence in the field

of comparative politics. This debate includes those scholars who criticize

presidentialism and support parliamentarism as the ideal form of govern-

ment, especially for deeply divided societies (Lijphart 1984 and 1994;

Valenzuela 1990 and 1993; Linz and Valenzuela 1994), and those who

favor presidentialism and highlight the potential advantages of these sys-

tems, especially for Latin American countries (Shugart and Carey 1992;

Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1997; Mustapic 2002).

The major critiques to presidentialism (Lijphart 1984 and 1994;

Valenzuela 1990 and 1993; Linz and Valenzuela 1994) relate to its tempo-

ral rigidity, its tendency toward majoritarianism, and the existence of

dual democratic legitimacy. A substantial aspect of these criticisms deals

with examining the sources and consequences of the gridlock caused by

divided government in presidential democracies. Lijphart (1984 and 1994),


Valenzuela (1990 and 1993), and Linz and Valenzuela (1994) identified

this gridlock as one of the primary reasons why presidentialism should

not be the preferred form of government for deeply divided democracies,

such as those in Latin America.

In their analysis, executive-legislative gridlock results from the lack of

presidential support in the legislature, imminently induced by the inabil-

ity of presidential regimes to function effectively with multipartism. In

his 1982 study of the power of the executive in Latin American presiden-

tial regimes, Suarez identified not only the tendency of presidential

governments in Latin America to experience gridlock but also the

inability of minority governments to govern effectively.

A commonality found in the assertions offered by critics and advocates

of presidentialism is their standpoint on the role of executive-legislative

confrontation on presidential systems. Scholars who emphasize the

potential benefits of the presidential form of government (Shugart and

Carey 1992; Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1997; Mustapic 2002) also acknowl-

edge the negative consequences of the lack of presidential support in

the legislature.

Shugart and Carey (1992: 42) examined the performance of demo-

cratic systems from various points of view and in turn refuted Linz and

other scholars’ claim that, as opposed to parliamentarism, presidentialism

is by nature more prone to crises that lead to democratic breakdown.

Their study suggested that this negative relationship cited by critics of

presidentialism needed to be studied more systematically.

Mainwaring also favors presidentialism, but he recognizes the poten-

tial negative consequences of the combination of presidentialism and

multipartism to democratic stability. He states that “the combination of

presidentialism and a fractionalized multiparty system seems especially

inimical to stable democracy” (Mainwaring 1990: 168). According to the

author, these two elements produce “a difficult combination,” especially

when the president lacks congressional support.

Like Shugart and Carey (1992), Mainwaring (1993: 215) asserts that

legislative support of the president is indispensable for enacting laws and

for democratic governance. He also argues that this negative relationship

may be not only due to the number of parties in a system, but also due to

the interaction between the level of multipartism in a system and the

form of constitutional government employed.2

The notions about presidentialism and parliamentarism proposed by

these scholars are different. However, both sides of the debate agree that

the difficulty of building and sustaining support for the president’s legisla-

tive agenda poses a serious problem for effective government; and they


both agree that multipartism is inimical to democratic stability. This study

throws a challenge to these claims as it attempts to show that presidential-

ism and multipartism can work and that they have, in fact, worked in the

Bolivian case. This study is able to prove this by taking the electoral sys-

tem for the election of the president and legislature into consideration.

Particularly, the project proposes that presidentialism and multipartism

can work if the electoral system for executive and legislative elections is

designed to engender conditions for effective coalition building.

Discussions of Executive-Legislative Relations Utilizing

Electoral Rules as one of the Independent Variables

Using different comparative approaches, scholars such as Suarez (1982),

Mainwaring (1990), Shugart and Carey (1992), Linz and Valenzuela

(1994), and Jones (1995) suggest that the degree of executive-legislative

confrontation in Latin American presidential systems is a by-product of

the electoral rules employed by these nations.

These authors focused on two main negative consequences of divided

government for Latin American democracies. On one hand, they empha-

sized the impact of electoral rules on the performance of presidential

systems, that is, their capacity to foster ineffective governments and dem-

ocratic instability. On the other hand, these authors pointed to the risk of

democratic breakdown produced by executive-legislative confrontation.

Shugart and Carey (1992) focus on constitutional design and electoral

rules and cycles as having an effect on the interaction between presidents

and assemblies. They assert that the processes of election of the president

and legislature have profound effects on the functioning of democracy,

especially in light of the separate origins and survivals of these two

branches of government.

Similarly, Jones (1995: 158) also considers electoral arrangements as

one of the main sources of divided government in Latin American presi-

dential systems. In his view, it is not the legislative formula, but the

executive electoral formula that has the most inf luence on executive-

legislative relations. He agrees with scholars who argue that multipartism

and presidential governments are incompatible in most cases ( Jones 1995:

160). But instead of offering parliamentarism as the preferred alternative

for these regimes, he proposes the adoption of electoral systems designed

to ameliorate multipartism. Although his analysis recognizes that elec-

toral laws alone do not make or break a democratic system, it does posit

that they have a significant impact on its effective functioning ( Jones

1995: 3–5). He finds this is specially the case when a president is deprived


of a legislative majority (or near majority) forcing her/him to utilize

extraconstitutional methods to implement government policies.

While acknowledging Jones’s claims that electoral systems can be

designed to reduce or produce multipartism, this study further proposes

that presidentialism can work with an electoral system that produces

incentives for coalition formation. It also proposes that the legislative

formula for the translations of votes into seats has as much inf luence as

the executive formula, if not more.

Similarly, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) examine the impact of

electoral laws, party systems, and the internal organization of legislatures

in facilitating or hindering the capacity of presidents to obtain legislative

approval for their bills. Confirming the already established premise that

electoral arrangements matter, their study suggests that executive-legislative

relations in presidential systems can be improved by redesigning electoral

laws to reduce party fragmentation. In analyzing the legislative powers of

the president, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), like many other com-

parativists, suggest that keeping the legislative powers of presidents

restricted, especially if their partisan powers are weak, can enhance

democratic stability.

In an attempt to provide a theoretical and empirical balance in the

study of democratic institutions, and with the goal of overcoming the

stereotype imposed on legislatures3 by Latin Americanists, Morgenstern

and Nacif (2002) also consider electoral arrangements as one of the vari-

ables having an impact on legislative politics, legislative behavior, and the

actual role legislatures have in the policy process. Yet electoral rules are

not the focus of the study since they believe that although electoral rules

may have an independent impact, the party and constitutional systems

mediate their impact.

In sum, these comparativists conclude that electoral rules and electoral

systems matter. Moreover, they assert that democratic stability is inf lu-

enced by the degree of confrontation between the executive and the

legislature and that unless the president has a majority or near majority in

the legislature, s/he is likely to experience serious confrontation—thus

making governance ineffective. However, they fail to propose alternatives

in designing electoral systems that can facilitate coalition building.

Country-Specific Analysis of Political Institutions

and Democratic Stability: The Case of Bolivia

A group of comparativists examined the interaction between the execu-

tive and legislative branches of governments in their country-oriented


analyses (Hughes and Mijeski 1973; Lehoucq 1992; D’Agostino 1992;

Gonzales and Gillespie 1994; Deheza 1997 and 1998).

However, a small number of scholars consider the case of Bolivia as

part of a larger comparative project (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1995;

Von Mettenheim 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Grindle 2000 and

2002; Deheza 1997 and 1998), and very few scholars systematically exam-

ined the Bolivian political and institutional context as their major case

(Whitehead 1986; Gamarra 1987, 1997a and 1997b; Mayorga 1999;

Deheza 2000; Whitehead and Crabtree 2001).

Within the first group of scholars who considered the Bolivian case as

part of a larger comparative project (Shugart and Carey 1992; Jones 1995;

Von Mettenheim 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Grindle 2000 and

2002; Deheza 1997 and 1998), some noted the uniqueness of the Bolivian

system in terms of the coalition-inducing effect of its method of presiden-

tial election.

These scholars, besides acknowledging other politicohistorical factors

that also inf luence the behavior of political actors, propose that the election

of the president via the legislature engenders an interdependent and coop-

erative presidential-legislative relationship. According to Jones (1995: 48),

this in turn allowed Bolivia to avoid much of the interinstitutional con-

frontation that is associated with other multiparty presidential systems.

Jones (1995) provides a compelling analysis of the impact of Bolivia’s

electoral arrangements on the relationship between the executive and the

legislature. The findings of his analysis support the claim that the unique

attributes of the Bolivian system reduced executive-legislative confronta-

tion. His study neither provides an analysis of why executive-legislative

confrontation is well managed in Bolivia nor does it consider the particu-

lar attributes of the Bolivian electoral system that produce conditions for

coalition building. The purpose of this book is to uncover those particular

features of the Bolivian political system that reduced executive-legislative

confrontation during the 1980s and 1990s until today.

A potential answer may be found in what Valenzuela (1993) and

Gamarra (1997a and 1997b) suggested, namely, its method of presidential

election, recent electoral reforms, and the impact they have on coalition

building. Nonetheless, this book recognizes potential changes in this

trend as the events of February and October 2003 suggest. These political

developments in the country seem to have foreshadowed a reordering of

the Bolivian political system. This study also aims to address the factors

that may contribute to this trend.

Other authors such as Chasquetti (2001) highlight Bolivia’s ability to

ameliorate “the difficult combination” of presidentialism with multiparty


systems. He evaluates the difficult combination proposed by Mainwaring

and attempts to demonstrate that multiparty presidential systems with

majority coalitions are effective politicoinstitutional formats able to guar-

antee democratic stability. Analogously, the author asserts that multiparty

presidential systems without government coalitions are, without a doubt,

problematic (Chasquetti 2001: 321).

Chasquetti (2001: 342) attributes the tendency of the Bolivian politi-

cal class to form coalitions to the congressional election of the president

when no candidate achieves an absolute majority as the key to coalition

building in the country. Along with Chasquetti’s arguments, the present

study attempts to prove that since 1985 this institutional provision stimu-

lated party coalitions with the purpose of supporting governments.

Besides the institutional arrangements that promote coalition building,

minority presidents also have a political motivation to negotiate coali-

tions vis-à-vis their need to approve legislation in the legislature.

Deheza (1997 and 1998: 151–169) also focuses on coalition building

and democracy in South American nations, including Bolivia. Her

quantitative study investigates the existence of coalitions in countries

such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,

Uruguay, and Venezuela since 1958 until 1994. The author puts forward

the notion that coalition governments occur more frequently in South

American presidential democracies than do one-party governments

(Deheza 1998: 136).

Within the debates of this second group of authors who dealt with the

case of Bolivia directly, one of the most salient issues in the various anal-

yses is the debate regarding Bolivia’s constitutional structure. No real

consensus exists as to how the attributes of the Bolivian system work to

the benefit or detriment of its democratic stability, and much less as to

what label to give it.4

Mayorga (1999: 36) asserts that “parliamentarized presidencialism”

(presidencialismo parlamentarizado) relies on interparty coalitions. Moreover,

he asserts that it has generated a different “parliamentary logic” and has

established a necessary and essential nexus between presidents and legis-

latures through the forging of congressional majorities/near-majorities.

Mayorga is more optimistic than other comparativists working on Bolivia

since he argues that Bolivia experienced a process that resulted in an

effective moderate multiparty system in which no party exercises a heg-

emonic role—a system qualitatively opposed to the highly fragmented

and polarized multiparty system in existence during the Bolivian transition

to democracy (Mayorga 1999: 24). This study contends with this premise

and attempts to show that the electoral system not only helped generate


working coalitions but eventually also engendered a hegemonic role for

the MAS party.

Furthermore, Mayorga also points to a significant political transfor-

mation in Bolivia’s political class that originated not only from what he

identifies as a gradual disappearance of corrupt politicians but also from

the progressive development of a logic of pacts and agreements that, in his

view, has eradicated the traditional logic of “war” between political

adversaries (Mayorga 1999: 25). Although he does not directly deal with

the electoral arrangements in Bolivia, Mayorga contends that the decisive

factor for this increasing democratization of the Bolivian regime lies in its

institutions, namely, the interaction between this different government

logic and the nation’s constitutional design, which has opened an optimal

scenario for government coalitions and for the congressional support of

presidents.

Conversely, Gamarra (1997a and 1997b) asserts that Bolivia’s hybrid

presidential system is inherently incongruous with presidentialism. In his

view, under the constitutional provision granting authority to the legis-

lature to elect the president, Bolivian politics has functioned many times

as a parliamentary system. He asserts then that to maintain democratic

governance, parties have had to build pacts and create multiparty govern-

ments just as parliamentary systems do. However, although Congress

elects the president, the executive branch is not dependent on parliamen-

tary confidence and s/he remains in office for a fixed term. Thus, Bolivia’s

system is a hybrid that combines features of both presidentialism and par-

liamentarism (Gamarra 1997a and 1997b).

Moreover, Gamarra (1997a: 109–135) argues that separate executive

and legislative powers permitted Bolivian presidents to build their popu-

larity and form new party coalitions throughout the nation’s democrati-

zation process but that external constraints and domestic austerity

programs consistently hampered democratic politics during the 1980s. In

his view, the Bolivian executive electoral formula forced presidential

candidates to balance the “plesbicitarian appeals needed to get votes in

the first round with subsequent realities,” namely, the need to forge inter-

party coalitions in the legislature to get elected and to also renegotiate

these coalitions to be able to govern.

Building on the work of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and also focus-

ing on the case of Bolivia, a later work by Deheza (2000) studies the

effects of electoral laws on the stability and/or instability of the Bolivian

political party system and its characteristic multipartism. The author pro-

vides a statistical analysis to examine the volatility of political parties in

Bolivia. In her study, she argues that although volatility exists in terms of


the parties elected to Congress, relative stability is also present due to

the permanence across time of the three major political parties in

Bolivia, namely, the National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento

Nacional Revolucionario-MNR), the National Democratic Action party

(Acción Democrática Nacional-ADN), and the Revolutionary Left

Movement (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria-MIR). Deheza

(2000) also asserts that electoral laws in Bolivia have the tendency to pro-

mote the proliferation of minor parties and produce system fragmenta-

tion. The author argues that the Bolivian political system is highly

volatile, mainly due to the electoral reforms that modified the translation

of votes into seats.

Whitehead et al (2001) also offer an analysis of a wide range of themes

to assess Bolivia’s achievements in constructing democracy that, in their

view, are considerable. They examine Bolivia’s major political changes

to determine how they contributed to resolving the country’s long-

standing problems. Their work stresses the need to consider historical

conditions to understand “democratic viability” in Bolivia. They refer

to various issues that must be taken into consideration to explain demo-

cratic viability in Bolivia, namely, the ability of the state to maintain

effective control and jurisdiction over the territory, regime legitimacy,

and democratic institutionalism, a strong and effective link between

state and civil society, effective citizenship, and economic performance,

among other factors.

Taking into account the hypothesis proposed by these groups of

scholars, especially those by Jones (1995), Deheza (1998), and Chasquetti

(2001), this study proposes that the Bolivian democratic system has gen-

erally produced the necessary mechanisms to resolve the “difficult com-

bination” of presidentialism, multiparty systems, and proportional

representation systems that are generally a source of permanent political

confrontation and government instability in many other presidential

systems.

However, the study also recognizes the political challenges present in

the country since 2000, and more clearly in 2003, including the increas-

ing weakening of the state and the social mobilization going untangled,

besides the economic crisis and international pressures that may challenge

these assumptions considerably.

Consensus in the Literature

The preceding review of the literature on divided government and

the impact of electoral arrangements on executive-legislative dynamics


suggests that albeit their differences, these authors agree on the

following:

a. Presidentialism—or hybrid presidentialism—and multipartism are

“a difficult combination.” Scholars overwhelmingly assert that

when the president’s party lacks a majority or near majority of the

seats in the legislature, the system is more prone to democratic

instability.

b. These authors conclusively posit that presidential systems and

hybrid presidential systems, as in the case of Bolivia, that consis-

tently fail to provide the president with adequate legislative support

are inherently unstable and ineffective. But some also suggested

that some electoral systems can ameliorate multipartism and induce

coalition building.

c. The electoral arrangements tend to be one of the principal causes of

divided government in Latin America, as well as of presidential

systems in other regions of the world. Some also suggested that

constitutional structures as well as legislators’s goals and strategies,

among others, also have a role.

d. Most scholars in the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate

argue that the stronger the executive and the weaker the legislature,

the more unstable the democratic system will be. Other analyses

suggest that it might be more beneficial to center decision making

in the executive.

This study considers electoral arrangements as a basic factor facilitating

or undermining divided government. It considers both the legislative

and executive electoral formulas as crucial determinants of executive-

legislative relations and further proposes, contrary to the above- mentioned

propositions, that multipartism and presidential governments can be

compatible. The key to enabling presidentialism to work with multipar-

tism lies in an electoral system’s ability to produce incentives for coalition

formation.

Resolving the Electoral Dilemma

Over the past two decades, scholars—including many of those just

reviewed—extensively addressed the dilemma that electoral engineers

face between the degree of correspondence between the choices of

voters and who gets elected (representativeness), on the one hand, and

government eff iciency (governance), on the other, when designing


electoral systems. In their 1992 seminal study, Shugart and Carey (1992: 8)

asserted that a tradeoff always occurs between “representativeness” and

“efficiency” when designing electoral systems. In their line of analysis,

whereas a representative system is one in which elections allow for the

articulation and provision of a space and voice for diverse interests in the

assembly, an efficient system is one in which elections turn less on the

provision of particularistic services and more on constituents focusing on

policymaking.

Moreover, electoral systems that are proportional tend to facilitate

the representation of minority interests, but they also hinder the ability

of political leaders to govern, especially because they facilitate the pro-

liferation of numerous minor parties and promote the fragmentation of

the political system. Based on this, when there is a high level of repre-

sentativeness, there should be a low level of government efficiency.

These are situations in which government coalitions are diff icult to

achieve and sustain, causing governments to be unstable and to sometimes

collapse.

On the contrary, according to the authors, an electoral system that is

nonproportional avoids the unmitigated explosion of minor parties,

thereby increasing the cohesiveness of the political system. Majoritarian

systems have the ability of guaranteeing the possibility that the executive

can articulate national policy goals, transcending parochial partisan inter-

ests. Consequently, although they undermine the representation of par-

ticular and regional interests, they facilitate policymaking and promote

government efficiency. This produces a government that is much more

stable.

Coalitions can be understood as any group of political parties that agree

to (a) follow common programmatic goals, (b) mobilize resources to attain

those goals, and (c) distribute the benefits of achieving those goals. To

secure them, governments can recur to different kinds of payoffs, namely,

particularistic payoffs (pork and patronage), positional payoffs (ministerial

portfolios), policy concessions, and agenda setting (Cox and Morgenstern

2002: 453–454), among other bargaining strategies. While recognizing

the existence of empirical evidence suggesting that electoral systems that

favor two-party systems are more capable of avoiding immobilism and

intense legislative-executive confrontation because they facilitate the for-

mation of coalition governments (Mainwaring 1990 and 1993: 207;

Shugart and Carey 1992), this analysis of the Bolivian case may prove a

different reality. The book attempts to show whether electoral systems

that favor multipartism can moderate the likelihood of confrontation

amongst political actors by producing the necessary conditions for coalition


building in the legislature and guaranteeing inclusiveness in the political

realm.

In the particular case of Bolivia, the book confirms that because the

electoral system determines the allocation of power, especially in terms of

governmental policymaking, the relations among political actors and the

political outcomes themselves are profoundly inf luenced by it. At the

same time, the book shows that the Bolivian electoral system had impor-

tant political consequences for the emergence of new actors, and these

factors can explain the rise of a new dominant political force in the country.

It is an electoral system that allowed a high level of representation of

minority interests. Indeed, the relationship between representation and

efficiency remained in tension, but representation of minority interests

was guaranteed.

In attempting to trace the emergence of Evo Morales as a prominent

political leader, and the MAS as the new hegemony, the book evaluates

seven key moments in Bolivian political history from 1985 to the present.

These key moments are also linked to important legal instruments in

Bolivia that dealt with major reforms to the political and/or economic

systems, and citizen participation in the political process. Thus, the anal-

ysis is done in the context of seven legal instruments:

● Supreme Decree 21060 or New Economic Policy (NEP). Enacted by

President Paz Estenssoro in 1985, this is one of the most important

presidential decrees in Bolivian history because it introduced an eco-

nomic package aimed at implementing economic stabilization and

structural adjustment programs. Indeed, a 1999 survey of 17 of the

most important Bolivian politicians, researchers, and journalists on

the most relevant laws in the country since the transition to democ-

racy reveals that Decree 21060 is the most cited one, the one cited by

all surveyed people, and the one always cited first (Romero Ballivián

1999: 73–86).● Law 1330 or Privatization Law. This law was sent to the legislature

by President Paz Zamora and approved by Congress with the sup-

port of the ADN-MIR alliance. It followed Supreme Decree

22836, also a policy on privatization, enacted by Paz Zamora before

the law was designed. The “privatization law” enabled legislation

for the privatization of state-owned enterprises. This law comple-

mented the neoliberal measures that were started with the NPE.● Law 1544 or Capitalization Law. Approved by Congress during the

Sánchez de Lozada administration, it is one of the most controver-

sial laws in Bolivia. The Capitalization Law covered various


aspects of the privatization initiative started in the previous

administration, and it structured the implementation of a program

of partial privatization of state enterprises with the investment of

private capital. It also included a program to capitalize a pension

plan.● Law 1551 or Popular Participation Law. This law was also ground-

breaking because it restructured local politics in Bolivia. The law

established new municipalities throughout the country as the basic

level of public authority. It also implemented the direct election of

municipal councils and mayors as well as the assignment of 20 percent

of government revenues to the new municipalities.● Law 2029 or Law for Drinking Water and Sanitary Sewer Systems. This

law was passed during the Banzer-Quiroga administration (1997–

2002) in its second governing year (1999) to privatize the distribu-

tion of water in Cochabamba. It was so controversial that it resulted

in the so-called Water War (Guerra del Agua) in 2000.● Dignity Plan (Plan Dignidad). This was one of the results of the

National Dialogue process also started during the Banzer-Quiroga

administration. This presidential plan committed the government to

eliminating all illicit coca production in Bolivia within five years

through coca eradication, alternative development, controlling

chemical precursors, and interdiction.● Law 3058 or the Hydrocarbons Law. In 2003, as the world closely

watched the Iraq invasion, the existing Law of Hydrocarbons was

being adamantly rejected by most popular sectors in Bolivia on the

grounds that it meant the exploitation of a very important natural

resource in the country by the multinationals, with very small rev-

enues accruing from it for the country. Moreover, the situation was

complicated by the proposal by Sánchez de Lozada to export gas

through Chile. The Law of Hydrocarbons provoked the Gas War,

the resignation of the president in 2003, and the tense relationship of

the succeeding president with Congress in 2004 and 2005. It served

as the legal instrument for President Morales to nationalize gas

resources in May 2006.

The book traces the process behind the establishment of these legal

instruments, the discussions leading to them, and the consequences of

their enactment in the context of the impact of the electoral system on

the configuration of Congress. The process of building coalitions is also

traced, and emphasis is placed on how these events provided the space for

the MAS to emerge as a new and leading political force.


Bolivian Political History Revisited:

From MNR to MAS

Albeit the existence of power-driven leaders, and periods of extreme

political instability, which are indubitably two key factors that may

undermine institutional development, Bolivian leaders, military and civil

alike, have always considered institution building as important and have

been able to move forward in this regard. Electoral reforms in Bolivia

have generally not been deliberative but responsive to political pressures

and events. Also, there has always been a marked trend toward guarantee-

ing greater political participation and representativeness in the political

system. Indeed as Whitehead (2001: 25) asserts, “Successive efforts to widen

participation are central to the story of the emergence of democracy in

Bolivia,” as well as to later political developments. Politicohistorical

events in this country and society’s transformation have generally shaped

the building and strengthening of institutions. In this sense, the analysis

shows that in the case of Bolivia, electoral systems can inf luence political

outcomes but are also inf luenced and shaped by external political factors

and decisions made by the political class.

Bolivia endured similar patterns of political instability in three basic

historical periods, namely, during the independence process, during the

1960s and 1970s with frequent military de facto governments, and during

the period following the year 2000. During these periods, however, elec-

toral reforms were advanced and changes were implemented while other

kinds of political and societal changes were also taking place.

One of the key reforms of the republican years is that enacted on

October 14, 1834, which introduced the congressional election of the

president among the three most voted candidates in case none of them

achieved two-thirds of the popular vote. This electoral stipulation became

a permanent feature of the electoral system.

The years after two harsh wars, namely, the War of the Pacif ic against

Chile and the Chaco War against Paraguay, were characterized by the

formation of one of the main Bolivian political parties. By January

1941, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Hernan Siles Suazo, Walter Guevara Arce,

Lidia Gueiler, Juan Lechín, and another group of young intellectuals

from the professional middle class established the MNR. The most

striking reforms came about in the 1950s when the MNR was able to

consolidate an important group of followers who were against existing

electoral arrangements, especially those dealing with restrictive

citizenship and voting requirements. The party presented itself as a plu-

ralist movement trying to group all social classes. It originally emerged


as a force opposing the oligarchic regime that, until then, had dominated

all political life.

On April 9, 1952, the MNR mobilized the support of tin miners,

peasant unionists, and former participants of the Chaco War into what

became known as the 1952 Revolution. The reforms previously attempted

through a constitutional reform could now be furthered. The 1952

Revolution nationalized tin mines previously controlled by the three tin

barons and ended the accumulation of land ownership. The revolution

was successful also in shifting government resources into social welfare

programs, including the provision of primary education in the rural areas,

and, more importantly, in establishing an emerging hegemonic political

force in Bolivia—that of the MNR.

Indeed, from a politicoelectoral point of view, the revolution trans-

formed the power structure and gave way to the emergence of new actors;

it opened the political space with the incorporation of those political

actors that, until then, had been excluded or marginalized from the

“oligarchic” institutional politics (Garcia Montero 2001: 67; Gamarra

and Malloy 1988). The Decree 03128 of July 21, 1952 institutionalized

the universal vote. Through this law, all inhabitants of the country—men

and women, the indigenous and the mestizos, the literate and the illiterate—

had the right to elect their leaders and authorities and to be elected, with

only minor requirements—being 21 years of age or older and having

Bolivian citizenship. This new disposition was the opposite of what had

been utilized in the past, that is, the use of the “qualified vote” through

which the vote was reserved only for property-owning men who read

and wrote Spanish. As the 1952 electoral decree states, the goal was to

impose a democratic regime in which “the people were the source of all

power and authority.”

With a new electoral law in 1956, the election of the president and

vice president was conducted through a system of absolute majority.

Another development this law introduced was the possibility for women

to assume all popular electoral positions. Senators were elected through a

mixed system of majority and deputies through a proportional represen-

tation system of double quotient,5 with voting in closed lists6 for both

chambers. In other words, senators were elected (two for each depart-

ment) by a majority system using lists decided by the party chiefs and

undisclosed to the voters. However, deputies were elected through

proportional representation with a double quotient system according to

the system of simple quota and largest remainders.7

Electoral reforms were used by the new dominant political force to

also shape political outcomes. This electoral formula (the closed list, and


double-quotient system) allowed MNR leaders to choose their most

preferred candidates, centralizing the selection process of the members of

Congress in La Paz. The complete list, introduced by the MNR, also

linked the candidates for deputies and senators to the presidential candi-

date. In this sense, there was no mechanism for the voter to distinguish

between the presidential candidate and those that composed the list for

Congress. Also, voters could not split their vote but had to cast a single

vote for one party in both presidential and congressional races. In this

sense, small parties could not endorse a major party presidential candidate

and still keep their own identity in the congressional election. Smaller

parties had to run a presidential candidate and assume all costs related to

their participation in order to have a chance to reach Congress.

Under this system, the MNR candidate as well as the principal lead-

ers of each party named their closest followers for positions within the

complete list, so there was no chance for leaders who were not part of the

core group of the party to run in an electoral race. Another effect was

the dependence of party discipline in the legislature upon patron-client

networks.

The MNR sustained its hegemonic stance with the assistance of the

Bolivian Worker’s Union (Central Obrera Boliviana-COB). These two

had dominated Bolivian politics under the figure of a cogovernment, but

the MNR sought to institutionalize a hegemonic dominance of the party

in the political realm (Gamarra and Malloy 1988: 34).

In 1964, as a result of tensions within this alliance between the MNR

and the COB, the stability based in this cogovernment was broken, giv-

ing way to a crisis in the party and across the country. A period of politi-

cal instability ensued with the predominance of military regimes. This

tension reached its breaking point with the coup d’état by General Hugo

Banzer Suarez in 1971. As the military was assuming power, the MNR

started losing its hegemonic stance and the Bolivian Revolution was left

uncompleted.

The principal objectives of the new de facto government were to

resolve the democratic governance problems of the previous years and

to guarantee the nation’s political stability, considered as an essential

condition for economic development. The MNR supported the coup

d’état and participated in the Banzer government until 1974 when the

military ignored the support of political parties. Its participation con-

sisted of collaborating in the decomposition of its former partner, the

union movement.

Parallel to the strengthening of this authoritarian regime, the

Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) was also founded. In 1971,


Jaime Paz Zamora, Oscar Eid Franco, and Antonio Araníbar Quiroga

established the MIR. These militants principally came from the radical

currents of Christian and Marxist ideology and were joined by their

common opposition to the Banzer regime. Later on, the MIR would

come to abandon its initial revolutionary Marxist thesis for more moder-

ate principles. Through various internal reforms, though, the party also

became one of the key actors in the politics of pacts characteristic of

Bolivian politics.

The Banzer regime was very repressive in nature and politically pros-

ecuted many of the members of the MIR. By November 1977, however,

after a hunger strike organized by mining women, General Banzer was

compelled to suspend prohibitions on political participation and call for

general elections. These took place in 1978.

The Electoral Law of 1965 was applied to the 1979 elections. Around

this time, the political party Nationalist Democratic Action (Acción

Democrática Nacionalista-ADN) was also founded. In March 1979,

Hugo Banzer Suarez and a group of his followers decided to create this

new political party with the purpose of participating in the election tak-

ing place that same year. Another purpose of creating the ADN was to

create in Congress a support group for the former dictator, who was fac-

ing a series of investigations and the possibility of a trial on charges of

corruption and human rights violations.

The ADN party was formed basically as a conservative party. The

“Doctrine and Ideology of ADN” proposed a commitment to a conser-

vative and liberal program in the economic realm. Since its beginning,

the ADN represented the interests of the private business sector and the

upper middle class. In the social realm, the party promoted the defense of

the family as the basis of society and defended the right of the Bolivian

people to have access to the sea (Garcia Montero 2001: 42). The ADN ran

a campaign for the first time in the 1979 elections.

The 1979 electoral process was later annulled by the level of verif ied

fraud. The fraud was generally attributed to errors existing in the elec-

toral registry as well as to “ballot stuff ing,” a practice in which political

parties made their voters deposit into the ballot boxes more than the

one colored ballot allowed per voter. The ambiguity and chaos caused

by this fraud paved the way for new de facto military takeovers.8 The

existing 1956 Electoral Law was reformed in January 1979, establishing

“the representation of majorities and minorities” as one of the principles

of suffrage.

In terms of the election of political leaders, the electoral arrangements

were much more structured. This time, the law stipulated that the president


and vice president were elected directly by the people with an absolute

majority of votes for a four-year mandate.9 For congressional elections,

this reform allowed for the nine departments to elect three senators by

the system of incomplete lists and absolute majority of votes, that is, “two

by majority and one by minority for a six-year mandate,”10 whereas the

departments could elect five deputies for every department and one for

every 50,000 inhabitants.

This 1979 electoral reform was aimed at preventing the proliferation

of small parties. Under the terms of these reforms, parties that did not

achieve a 50,000-vote minimum were forced to pay their share of print-

ing the ballot. However, to guarantee minority representation, the

electoral law allowed alliances and coalitions. In the elections of 1979,

Hernan Siles Zuazo won the first majority. Victor Paz Estenssoro was

very close behind, obtaining only about 1,500 less votes. As it was stip-

ulated in the Constitution, Congress had the responsibility of determin-

ing who would become president. After the 1979 stalemate

(empantanamiento), in other words, after various fruitless voting rounds

in Congress in which no consensus was achieved, the legislature decided

to designate Walter Guevara Arze, the then president of Congress, as

interim constitutional president.

Various de facto governments ruled the country starting in 1979 until

1982 when the electoral results of the 1979 elections were finally recog-

nized. In 1982, Hernan Siles Zuazo took power as constitutional presi-

dent of Bolivia, giving way to the Bolivian transition to democracy.

However, the early 1980s in Bolivia were characterized by a severe eco-

nomic crisis that undermined the political stability of the country. Hernan

Siles Zuazo voluntarily resigned from the presidency in December 1984

to facilitate the resolution of the country’s economic and political crisis,

and new elections were held on July 14, 1985.

General Hugo Banzer, who had formed the ADN in 1979, partici-

pated in this electoral process—this time with renewed enthusiasm for

democracy. He came first in the election. However, because Banzer did

not achieve an absolute majority, Congress was left to decide who would

become president. Following these arrangements, Victor Paz Estenssoro,

second in the popular election, was elected president by Congress and

assumed power in August 1985.11

In 1986, a new electoral law was enacted that highlighted the impor-

tance of the democratic regime. It stated that the effectiveness of the

suffrage was fully guaranteed by law and constituted the basis of the rep-

resentative, democratic, participatory, and unitary regime. The law also

assigned the responsibility of the adequate development and vigilance of


the electoral process to “the branches of government, to political parties,

and citizens in general.”

New elections were called at the end of 1988. The 1989 electoral pro-

cess was paired with other important political and societal developments,

including the establishment of new political parties. In 1988, the closing

of a very popular radio and TV channel in La Paz caused a great multi-

tude of people to protest in the town squares.12 The protests were followed

by the establishment of a nationalist political party—Conscience of the

Motherland (Conciencia de Patria-CONDEPA)—by its owner and

announcer Carlos Palenque, also known as “El Compadre.” Although

small, CONDEPA quickly became an important contender in the nation’s

electoral scenario, and for the 1989 elections, Palenque became the can-

didate with the highest intention of votes in La Paz and El Alto, two

important political focal points in Bolivia. If it won at least in these two

cities, CONDEPA could clearly become a key partner in a political pact.

However, votes were not enough to make CONDEPA the main political

force.

In the 1989 elections, MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada

obtained a relative majority of the votes; General Hugo Banzer with the

ADN won the second place, and Jaime Paz Zamora with the MIR

achieved the third place. Following the stipulations introduced in 1834

for the congressional election of the president when no candidate achieves

a majority, this time Congress elected the third running candidate, Jaime d

Paz Zamora, as the new president of Bolivia. His victory was due to the

support given to him by General Banzer and the ADN party by forming

one of the least expected coalitions in Bolivian history.

After the 1989 elections, the Solidarity Civic Union (UCS), another

political party of a populist nature, was founded on August 15, 1989, after

diverging from the National Civic Union party (Unión Cívica Nacional-

UCN). The UCN later allied with Sánchez de Lozada in exchange for

some deputy positions and then disappeared (Garcia Montero 2001: 121).

The commercial structure of the brewing company owned by the party

leader Max Fernández Rojas was also the party structure. Indeed, there

was a strong link between the commercialization and beer distribution

functions and the directive positions within the political movement, which

was mainly composed of the dissidents of other political parties. Thus, it

was difficult to distinguish between the party structure and the manage-

ment structure of the company (Garcia Montero 2001: 120–121).

Following the death of Max Fernández in an accident, the leadership

of the company, and of the party, was assumed by his son Johnny

Fernández who also ran for elections in 1997 and 2002. Building on his


father’s success, he had forged a political career at the local level and had

also become a key person in the family business.

The UCS ideologically supported “work, honesty, and social justice.”

It promoted the defense of democracy and respect for the Constitution.

The party valued market economy and opposed both interventionism

and protectionism in the economy. By 1989, the UCS had become the

fifth most important political force in Bolivian politics (Archondo 1999:

22). Advocating for the strengthening of security forces in Bolivia and for

decentralization, the core of its appeal to the masses rested on the popu-

larity of its leader, Max Fernández.

The results of the 1989 general elections in Bolivia provoked serious

controversy for various reasons. On one hand, an electoral coalition was

formed with two very unlikely parties bringing into power the third

most voted candidate. This later made way for a major electoral modifi-

cation through which Congress would elect the president only from the

top two formulas. On the other hand, the general public and the media

questioned the behavior adopted by the departmental electoral courts and

the National Electoral Court (CNE).13

There were alleged reports of manipulations of the vote counting pro-

cedures, and an alleged bias in the allocation of Senate and deputy seats.

These reports created an environment filled with suspicion and led the

general population to ask for more credibility and legitimacy in electoral

procedures and institutions.

In July 1989, the Catholic Church called the leaders of the three

most voted parties to meet behind closed doors. After two days, the

political parties announced to the public that they had identif ied a

series of “legal def iciencies” that had to be amended in order to

strengthen democratic institutionalism in the country. The parties

agreed on the need to provide all people in society, especially those in

rural sectors, with identif ication documents. Similarly, the parties

agreed on the need to establish one electoral registry, permanent and

computerized, as well as to guarantee impartiality and transparency by

the Electoral Courts. The representatives at this meeting also agreed

on the need to make constitutional reforms in order to improve the

existing electoral system.

After almost 18 months, the leaders took on the task of taking concrete

measures to implement what they had agreed upon. Their work culmi-

nated with what was known as the “Agreements of February 5, 1991,”

subscribed by the leaders of each of the three most voted parties plus

CONDEPA, and the Free Bolivia Movement party (Movimiento Bolivia

Libre-MBL) that broke away from the MIR. That same year, an interparty


commission proposed a project for an electoral law, which was approved

by Congress and enacted on July 5, 1991.

Although it did not directly deal with the proportional representation

system prevalent at the time, nor with other features of the electoral sys-

tem, the 1991 constitutional reform further institutionalized the CNE.

The reform guaranteed the CNE’s autonomy and stated that it would be

composed of five members not associated with any political party who

would be elected by a two-thirds vote in the National Congress, plus one

member appointed by the president.

The 1991 reform also proposed the adoption of a validation mecha-

nism for the votes in the ballot boxes based on the “principle of preclu-

sion” (Art. 171), by which election results recorded at the voting table

were considered final, stipulating very specific causes for annulment,

thereby eliminating existing mechanisms that made possible the manipu-

lation and distortion of the results by the department electoral courts and

the CNE.14

For instance, previous electoral arrangements granted the electoral

courts the authority to review the voting procedures and results, as well

as to annul votes if they thought that electoral laws had been violated in

any way, or if political party representatives claimed any wrongdoing.

These duties assigned to the electoral courts were always questioned, but

they became more controversial after the 1989 elections.

Similarly, and with the purpose of guaranteeing minority representa-

tion, the procedure to calculate the translation of votes into parliamen-

tary seats was changed substituting the double quotient system, established

with the 1956 electoral reform, with the D’Hondt formula using the odd

divisors variant.15

Using the 1991 electoral arrangements, general elections were held

again in June 1993 through which Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was

elected president. Although there was a new electoral reform in 1993 by

Jaime Paz Zamora, electoral reforms well into the 1990s did not signifi-

cantly alter the proportional representation system and the use of closed

lists. The electoral reforms focusing on the proportional representation

system, for instance, were limited in principle to determining the appli-

cation of different formulas of proportional representation used in the

1985, 1989, and 1993 elections with the purpose of avoiding the entrance

of small parties into Congress.

In 1991, however, the intention was to not marginalize smaller politi-

cal parties. Unlike the double quotient formula, the 1991 electoral reform

introduced the Saint-Lägue formula,16 which was used for the 1993

presidential and parliamentary elections with the purpose of stimulating


the representation of small parties. Under this proportional representation

system, small parties could easily access the legislature by winning a seat

with only 1 to 1.5 percent of the votes.

For the municipal elections of 1995, a new political force of high

electoral caliber at the time was born in the department of Cochabamba.

The center-right political party New Republican Force (Nueva Fuerza

Republicana-NFR) was a faction of the ADN. It was led by the then

mayor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa, and coca-leaf peasants

from the Chapare, who joined to contain governmental repression of

their crop production. The locals formed a political party that was started

from their unions, and the NFR started to build a mass support in the

late 1990s. In 2002, the NFR became one of the strongest political con-

tenders in the elections and even today enjoys some popular appeal at the

local level.

Evo Morales’s Emerging Hegemonic Political Force:

The 1994 Constitutional Reform

During the 1993–1997 presidential period, and as a result of the National

Agreement for the Modernization of the State, the Constitution was

modified, recognizing, at least in theory, the multiethnic character of

Bolivia. The educational reform was developed to promote the intercul-

tural and bilingual character of the country, and the Law of Popular

Participation was enacted to strengthen the rural municipalities and to

create a space for indigenous people to take part in local government

functions. In the early 1990s, one of the sectors that benefited the most

from these reforms was a new emerging but critical mass, a party that was

initially called the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (Asamblea

por la Soberanía del Pueblo-ASP). The ASP and the Political Instrument

for the Sovereignty of the People (Instrumento Político por la Soberanía

de los Pueblos-IPSP) were established in March 1995, grouping peasant,

indigenous, and coca grower organizations to contest political power.

This group wanted to run a campaign for the municipal elections held

in 1995. Since the ASP-IPSP was unable to secure recognition from the

CNE, the group was forced to find a party that would want to sponsor

them. Thus, the ASP-IPSP pacted with the United Left party (Izquierda

Unida-IU), a coalition of leftist parties led by the Bolivian Communist

Party (Partido Comunista Boliviano-PCB). In this first electoral experi-

ment, the group obtained 10 mayor posts and 49 council posts, all in the

Department of Cochabamba.17 For the 1999 municipal elections, the coca-

leaf (cocalero) leader, Evo Morales, negotiated with the chief of the


Movement Toward Socialist party (Movimiento al Socialismo-MAS-U),

David Añez Pedraza, for the ASP-IPSP to assume the MAS nomencla-

ture. In January 1999, the IPSP-MAS was established with Morales as

president. In the 1999 municipal elections, the MAS, under the leader-

ship of Evo Morales, obtained 3.2 percent of the votes amongst the group

of 8 parties. However, it was still a small group with only a regional reach

limited to Cochabamba and La Paz (especially in the Yungas, largely a

coca-leaf-producing region).

Motivated by their municipal success, the party also launched its cam-

paign for the 1997 national elections and eventually won six seats in the

Chamber of Deputies, including one seat for their leader, Evo Morales.

Benefiting from the electoral system features that allowed for greater

inclusion of these smaller parties, the MAS and its leader Evo Morales

continued building on these little but meaningful steps. In 2002, they

became the second largest force in Congress and thus the main opposition

party, both in Congress and in the streets. In 2005, the MAS started the

process of consolidation as the new hegemonic political force in the

country.

The 1994 constitutional reform had produced an important change in

the electoral system. With minor adjustments, a system similar to the

German personalized proportional representation system was adopted for

the lower chamber. At the time, there was increasing skepticism regard-

ing the overall political process and the real representativeness of the

political parties. This was caused by the predominance of a selected group

of people in the closed lists of candidates, generally defined by the party

leadership, and was seriously debilitating the nexus between parliamen-

tary representatives and their voters.

Bolivians were also disenchanted with political parties for their lack of

accountability to the electorate. The reform served to reverse the per-

ceived disconnect between parties and society and attempted to strengthen

the connection between representatives and their constituents.

Due to the limitations of the 1994 reform, Congress agreed to enact

the so-called Law for the Application of Article 60 of the Political

Constitution of the State to reduce its defects and contradictions. This

law reestablished the D’Hondt formula of proportional representation

and introduced, for the first time, an electoral threshold of 3 percent for

legislative seats that corresponded to the plurinominal circumscriptions

in the Chamber of Deputies. According to the new mixed system imple-

mented in 1997, 68 deputies out of the 130 constitutionally ascribed

members would be elected by plurality, or by absolute majority in pluri-

nominal districts, while the remaining 62 would be elected in nine


departmental uninominal districts on the basis of a complete and closed

list according to the D’Hondt proportional representation formula.

Uninominal circumscriptions were created taking into consideration

various factors, namely, the percentage of population, geographic conti-

nuity, and affinity, as well as existing departmental divisions. Plurinominal

circumscriptions, on the other hand, were defined according to existing

arrangements as per the nine departments in which the country was

administratively divided. The increase in population required a redistri-

bution of the seats, but the number of deputies was maintained at 130. La

Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, however, were assigned more seats.18

Under this mixed system of elections, the seats would be directly

assigned to the candidates who won in the uninominal districts even if

the candidate’s party won in only one district. Moreover, under this sys-

tem, voters were allowed the split vote (voto cruzado), that is, one vote for

the candidates to the uninominal circumscription and another vote for

the candidates to plurinominal deputies by a list that was linked to the

presidential and vice presidential candidates as well as to the senators of

each party. The split vote allowed voters to vote for candidates of two

different parties and allowed smaller parties to run congressional candi-

dates without necessarily running a presidential campaign.

The supporters of this reform believed that the mixed system would (a)

help create direct linkages between parties, constituencies, and legislators

promoting a strong personalization of politics; (b) lead to a stronger geo-

graphic representation by creating 68 single-seat districts, thereby support-

ing the ensuing process of regional decentralization and the development

of local governments; and (c) improve the choices of voters in democratic

elections by allowing the split vote (Mayorga 2001: 205–208).

For the election of senators, however, the electoral system did not

endure any modifications with the application of this law. The members

of the Senate continued to be elected under a plurality system. Like the

plurinominal candidates, candidates to the Senate are part of a complete

list attached to the candidates for the presidency and vice presidency.

However, two of the senators for each department must correspond to the

majority party, and one to the first minority party.

Using the March 19, 1997 Electoral Law, elections took place on June 1,

1997. In this process, General Hugo Banzer obtained the first place in r

the elections and a coalition of parties confirmed his position as presi-

dent but with a fundamental modification this time: the president, vice

president, senators, and deputies, according to the reforms introduced in

the Constitution, would function in their positions for five years, instead

of four.


Two years later, on June 25, 1999, the Electoral Code was enacted

with the purpose of giving more coherence, structure, and clarity to the

arrangements relating to the registration of citizens in the electoral regis-

try, the presentation of candidates, the functioning of the electoral tables,

the vote-counting procedures, and other aspects of the electoral process.19

More importantly, on June 25, 1999, the first Law of Political Parties was

also enacted to regulate the functioning of political parties and to push

for greater internal democratization. This Political Parties Law was the

first ever in the history of the country.

In 2002, new elections took place. Uninominal and plurinominal

deputies were elected for a second time under the mixed system of legis-

lative elections. Article 90 of the Constitution still dictated the congres-

sional election of the president and thus the MNR’s Gonzalo Sánchez de

Lozada came to power once more. After the events of February and

October 2003 and his resignation, Vice President Mesa assumed the pres-

idency. In February 2004, Mesa approved a constitutional reform that

incorporated changes to the electoral regime, including the possibility of

holding referenda and the opening of the electoral scenario to indigenous

movements and civic associations to run electoral campaigns. The first

attempt at an electoral process with these arrangements was in the 2004

municipal elections, and the arrangements were used for the 2005 general

election as well. Two referenda, one on the gas issue (2004) and another

on regional autonomies (2006) were also held.

After the resignation of President Mesa in June 2005 and in a chaotic

scenario in which both the president of the Senate and the president of

the Chamber of Deputies—namely, MIR’s Hormando Vaca Diez and

MNR’s Mario Cossio—declined their right of succession, the then presi-

dent of the Supreme Court, Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé, became presi-

dent. The process of political and social transformations started in 2005

with the election of Evo Morales promised to bring new electoral

reforms.

Electoral Reforms and the Move toward a

New Hegemonic Political Force

The preceding review of Bolivian electoral developments suggests that

important electoral transformations were generally paired with sociopo-

litical changes. Although the republican years did not really bring struc-

tured electoral arrangements, by the end of the 1830s, the direct election

of the president and her/his election among the top three most voted

candidates was introduced.


The first 20 years of the twentieth century maintained most of the

previous electoral arrangements, but more systematic regulations for

political parties, for instance, were beginning to be implemented. Key

electoral reforms took place as one of the major sociopolitical events in

Bolivia was unfolding—the 1952 Revolution. From 1952 to 1956, funda-

mental electoral developments occurred, including the adoption of the

universal vote, and the right of women to elect and be elected. These years

also experienced the institutionalization of political parties. They were

defined within these electoral reforms as the sole channels of the inter-

relation between people and the political system.

Similarly, more refinements occurred in terms of the electoral regis-

try, the mandate periods, and the institutionalization of the CNE as the

only electoral authority in the country. In terms of electoral arrange-

ments for the translation of votes into seats, the president continued to

be elected by an absolute majority, but a mixed system of proportional

representation and majoritarianism was implemented for legislative

elections.

The last constitutional reform took place in 1967, in which the current

division of powers between the executive and legislature was instituted

and the congressional election of the president was institutionalized

through Article 90. The 1970s were marked by a period of repressive

dictatorships, which gave way to the transition to democracy in the 1980s.

The 1990s saw greater democratic stability, as well as important electoral

reforms including the latest two in 1997 and 2004.

Institution building has been important for both civil and military

Bolivian political leaders. The assessment of the various electoral devel-

opments documented in this volume suggests that politicohistorical

events and society’s transformation have generally inf luenced institution

building in Bolivia, as the case of 1952 Revolution and the major reforms

of the 1990s reveal. However, the reforms have also inf luenced the polit-

ical reality of the nation. The cumulative effects of these reforms are

analyzed in the following chapters.

Indeed, the project seeks to demonstrate that political outcomes in

Bolivia are profoundly inf luenced by electoral systems, particularly

because these determine the allocation of power. In this manner, the

study attempts to reveal how electoral systems inf luence the relationship

among political actors, and political outcomes themselves, depending on

whether they produce conditions for (a) effective and functioning coali-

tions and for (b) new political forces to emerge and assert power within

the political system.


Chapter 2, “Bolivia’s Founding Pacts: The Pact for Democracy and

the Patriotic Accord through an Electoral Lens,” focuses on the period

covering 1985 to 1993. It presents an analysis of the impact of Article

90 and the mixed system for legislative elections on the two founding

pacts of Bolivian democracy—the Pact for Democracy and the Patriotic

Accord. The section also studies the impact of the electoral system and

coalition building around key economic and privatization legal instru-

ments for this period, including the NPE—an emblematic economic

policy that followed the Washington Consensus. This chapter assesses

the potential implications of the Bolivian electoral system in terms of

Bolivian presidents’ ability to govern and to avoid immobilism, and

the conditions for legislators to form coalitions from 1985 through

1993.

Chapter 3, “Paving the Way for the Transformation of Bolivian

Politics: Electoral Reforms and Coalition Building,” provides an analysis

of Sánchez de Lozada’s Pact for Governance and Pact for Change (1993–

1997), and Hugo Banzer and Jorge Quiroga’s Megacoalition (1997–2002).

It reviews the electoral reforms that took place in this period and the

impact they had on the formation of Evo Morales as a leader, and the

MAS as the new hegemonic political party in Bolivia. The chapter traces

the formation of the aforementioned political pacts and how the electoral

system and the composition of the congress and cabinets inf luenced the

relationship between presidents and congresses.

Chapter 4, “Crumbling Coalitions? Assessing the Transformation of

Bolivian Politics,” provides an analysis of recent events. It analyzes polit-

ical events in Bolivia and their impact on executive-legislative relations

since the June 2002 elections until December 2005 when Evo Morales

was elected president. It attempts to explain the impact of the 1997 elec-

toral reform that allowed for the election of uninominal deputies and

assesses the 2004 reform as it was first used in the 2004 municipal elec-

tions. It also analyzes the July 2 election of members of the Constituent

Assembly and the prospects that existed for an environment conducive to

a broad-based and consensus-based constituent process.

Chapter 5, “Explaining Evo Morales’s Rise to Power: The Unintended

(or Intended?) Political Consequences of Electoral Laws,” provides a

summation of the most important findings of the project, emphasizing

the impact of electoral systems on the interaction amongst political actors

in Bolivia. The chapter unveils the lessons learned from the Bolivian

experience in a comparative perspective highlighting the implications of

the Bolivian process for the region and for the rest of the world. It


addresses how the Bolivian case compares to other cases in the hemisphere,

especially in the Andean region. Ultimately, the chapter highlights the

contributions of the book to the study of electoral systems and political

institutions in general and provides this analysis in the context of the

political events in the Americas and the rest of the world.

CHAPTER 2

BOLIVIA’S FOUNDING PACTS:THE PACT FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE PATRIOTIC ACCORD THROUGH ANELECTORAL LENS

Institutional design in Bolivia, mainly through electoral reforms, has

had a dramatic impact on the capacity of Bolivian governments to forge

and maintain ruling coalitions even since the transition to democracy. To

move toward democracy, elections were held in July 1979 with the Popular

Democratic Unity’s (UDP) Hernan Siles Zuazo emerging as the most

voted candidate with 38.74 percent. MNR’s Paz Estenssoro obtained

20.15 percent of the vote and ADN’s Hugo Banzer came in third with

16.83 percent. The 1979 stalemate ensued when no agreement was reached

among parliamentarians as to who should become president.

After voting the number of times stipulated in the Constitution,

instead of electing a president among the top three electoral formulas, the

parliamentarians arbitrarily decided to appoint the president of the Senate,

Walter Guevara Arze, as the interim president of the republic—an extra-

constitutional resolution to the stalemate. This decision was not widely

accepted by the electorate. Indeed, Bedegral (2001) asserts that this was

an unconstitutional arrangement.1 Besides popular opposition, opposing

candidate Hernan Siles Zuazo and his running mate, Jaime Paz Zamora,

went on a hunger strike at the Bolivian Library of Congress to protest the

congressional decision that they thought to be unconstitutional (Baptista

Gumucio 1996: 320). This stalemate left a considerable mark on the

Bolivian political class. As most Bolivian political leaders indicate,2 the


fear of another stalemate was one of the crucial determinants for coalitional

politics in this country’s democratic history.

The new president’s commitment was to call new elections the next

year (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 33). Starting in 1980 through 1982, how-

ever, a series of de facto military governments prevented Guevara Arze

from governing. The political forces and civil society groups that had

started to push for a democratic transition demanded that the 1979

election results be recognized. It was only in 1982 that General Guido

Vildoso decided to ask the 1979 Congress-elect to retry electing the

new president.

The parliamentarians met and a coalition of leftist parties elected Siles

Zuazo, the most voted candidate in the 1979 election, as the new president.

The Bolivian Communist Party, the MNR-I, the MIR, and the Christian

Democratic Party (PDC) put together the Popular Democratic Unity

(Unidad Democrática Popular-UDP) coalition to support Siles Zuazo in

government.

Siles Zuazo’s political basis was heterogeneous and conf lictive. The

Siles Zuazo administration lacked a congressional majority. Congress

became controlled by an opposition alliance between the ADN and the

MNR (Gamarra and Malloy 1988: 163). Thus, a chronic situation of

executive-legislative confrontation and lack of legitimacy of the execu-

tive power emerged (Carvajal Donoso 2000: 65; Rojas-Ortuste 2004). In

this situation, Congress emerged as an institution highly independent of

the executive but simultaneously caused great political instability.

The opposition blocked all governmental initiatives, rejected draft

laws, and requested oral reports and the interpellation of ministers

(Fernández Saavedra 2004: 58). For example, on April 1983, Deputy

Carlos Valverde Barbery requested an interpellation by the lower cham-

ber against the interior ministers and ministers for foreign relations and

aeronautics for having sent former Nazi refugee Klaus Altmann-Barbi,

accused of having committed war crimes, to be tried in France (Abecia

Valdivieso 1999: 346–347). Also, Senators Oscar Zamora and Luis Añez

requested, in November 1984, another interpellation to the economic

cabinet for the inability of the government to manage the economic

crisis. Because of these actions and the weaknesses of the executive, there

were frequent ministerial crises,3 contradictory positions, and an impasse

in the government administration.

The president faced a chaotic situation. He was kidnapped by police

forces and a coup d‘etat was attempted with no success. The opposition

deputies accused Siles Zuazo of having links to narco-trafficking and

threatened him with starting a Malfeasance Trial against him. To defend

33BOLI V I A’S FOU N DING PACTS

his and his family’s honor, Siles Zuazo returned $300,000 he received

for travel expenses, and other expenses related to his tenure as presi-

dent, to the treasury and declared a hunger strike (Baptista Gumucio

1996: 343). The collapse was imminent. The economic crisis became

the aggravating factor for the institutional crisis of the 1982–1985

period. The Siles Zuazo administration had to resolve critical aspects of

an inf lationary and depressive economic period. While Bolivians‘ pur-

chasing power decreased, the government responded with monetary

emissions that simultaneously worsened the inf lation (Carvajal Donoso

2000: 65).

Two other factors triggered the inf lationary crisis, namely, the need to

service the foreign debt and the effect of the drop in the prices of basic

raw materials. The president promised to resolve the crisis within 100

days of assuming power by implementing austerity measures. In response,

strong antagonism emerged between labor and private sector interests

regarding the implementation of the measures. The Bolivian Worker’s

Union (COB) pressured the government. The pressure was such that Siles

Zuazo even offered a new system of cogovernment to the COB emu-

lating the model of the revolutionary period, but confrontations continued.

The Communist Party (PC) had been part of the UDP government but was

also part of the COB. Interestingly, the COB pressured the government in

parallel spaces: in Congress and in the streets. The April 24, 1983 edition of

El Diario, a major Bolivian newspaper, describes the clash between Siles

Zuazo and the COB’s Lechín, whom the former called an “an anarchic-

unionist, ultraleftist, destabilizing factor” who occupied the premises of

the Bolivian Mining Corporation (Corporación Minera de Bolivia). The

crisis between the UDP and the COB suffered a definitive rupture in

November 1983.

Two hundred and four strikes occurred during the first three months

of the Siles Zuazo administration—October–December 1982 (Gamarra

and Malloy 1988: 165). By May 1985, 865 strikes were accounted for—

strikes that led to the loss of 4,191 man-days in the three-year period.4 By

1984—in the middle of an intransigent deadlock between the opposition

forces and Siles Zuazo’s minority in the legislature, with growing rumors

of a coup d‘etat and social mobilizations—shortening Siles Zuazo’s

mandate emerged as the only viable option to relegitimate the executive

mandate.

Demands for his resignation emerged from all sectors. The most visible

one was by MNR’s Senator Jaime Arellano Castañeda who, in an address

to the Senate, indicated that according to the Constitution, the August

1980 Congress had concluded its four-year mandate in August 6, 1984.


New elections thus needed to be called for in May 1985, according to

Arellano Castañeda (Abecia Valdivieso 1999: 350).

In the middle of the economic and institutional crisis, Siles Zuazo

accepted to shorten his mandate and, on November 24, 1984, the

parliament agreed to call new elections. A majority of the Congress

members (from the MNR, MNR-I, ADN, FRI, PCB, PDC, BPO,

and BPI) approved the law that set the election date for July 1985.5 Paz

Zamora, who was vice president in this period, wanted to run for

president in the 1985 elections. By signing a law with no stipulations

about the candidacy of former heads of government for the post of

president or vice president, Paz Zamora could lose his chance at the

candidacy. The MIR refused to approve the law. The elections were

called for in July 1985. Through this experience, Bolivians concluded

that the key and f irst condition for governance was securing a parlia-

mentary majority; otherwise, a government would have enormous

diff iculty governing.6

The Paz Estenssoro Administration: 1985 Elections

and the Composition of Congress

The sequels of the taxi-partidos still existed in 1985.7 The National Electoral

Court (CNE) recognized 18 political parties for the 1985 elections. Paz

Estenssoro’s MNR regrouped many of its dissidents, former supporters of

military regimes, and even convinced Walter Guevara Arze, who had

defected, to go back to the MNR (Abecia Valdivieso 1999: 344).

Hugo Banzer emerged as the most challenging contender and made

successful efforts at projecting his image of a converted democrat who

would privilege the popular vote. Paz Zamora launched his candidacy

with the MIR after arranging for a constitutional provision that would

allow him to participate in the elections regardless of his tenure as vice

president in the previous administration. The MIR used to their advan-

tage the fact that the party abandoned the UDP coalition in 1982, and

that Paz Zamora later resigned from the vice presidency.

For these elections, the MIR suffered a division. The radical sector of

the MIR that still adhered to the Marxist orthodox ideology formed a

new party, the Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre-MBL),8

and launched Antonio Araníbar Quiroga and Oscar Salas Moya as

presidential and vice presidential candidates respectively. Former UDP

partners MNR-I, MNR-V, and PS-1 also launched candidacies led by

Roberto Jordán Pacheco, Carlos Serrate Reich, and Ramiro Velasco

Romero respectively.


The 1985 electoral campaign issues centered around economic matters.

Political parties and their teams of technocrats made an effort to propose

practical solutions to the economic crisis during the campaign. The MNR

as well as the ADN devised similar proposals to stabilize the Bolivian

economy, once elected (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 189–193).

Elections took place on July 14, 1985. The results showed that, after

the experience with the UDP, voters decided to reject the leftist options

and to support the moderate right. Banzer and Paz Estenssoro won more

than 60 percent of the votes. Banzer obtained the highest plurality of

votes with 32.83 percent and Paz Estenssoro followed with 30.36 percent.

The UDP parties lost a significant number of votes. Jaime Paz Zamora’s

MIR obtained a mere 10.18 percent, 20.18 percentage points less than the

second place candidate. The remaining 26.63 percent was divided

amongst the other 15 parties; most of them of the radical left. Former

UDP parties, PDC, and PS-1 were punished by voters receiving only 1

to 4 percent of the votes, as figure 2.1 shows.

In terms of the mechanism for translating popular vote into seats in the

lower chamber, the proportional representation (PR) system in Bolivia was

relatively similar to the PR systems prevalent in Latin America at the time.

In the first democratic elections, in 1979, the method utilized to distribute

seats was the Hare quotient method of the highest remainders, one of

Figure 2.1 Results of the 1985 Elections (Prepared by the author

using National Electoral Court [CNE] data)

32.83%

30.36%

10.18%

5.48%

4.80%

2.58%

2.53%2.11% 1.60%

1.33%1.08% 5.12%

A.D.N.

MNR

MIR

MNR-I

MNRV

PS-1

FPU

MRTKL

PDC

FSB


the most proportional formulas (Deheza 2000: 141). For the 1985 elections,

the D’Hondt proportional representation system and the system of closed

lists were used. With these arrangements, the 130 seats in the Chamber of

Deputies were divided into nine plurinominal circumscriptions according

to the nine departments in which the country was administratively

divided.

Although there was some controversy in terms of the effects of this

law, the D‘Hondt formula allowed the allocation of parliamentary seats to

10 of the 18 parties participating in the election. The MNR and the

ADN, the two most voted parties, obtained 43 and 41 deputy seats

respectively. The law also contained a provision that permitted parties

that failed to meet the participation quota to nonetheless obtain a seat, if

their total vote was not less than the lowest remainder that earned a seat

in the district. This provision allowed parties with less than 5 percent of

the vote to enter Congress.

The smaller Tupac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement

(Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación-MRTKL),

with only 2.11 percent of the popular vote, obtained 2 seats, the Christian

Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano-PDC), with only 1.60

percent, obtained 3 seats and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange

Socialista Boliviana-FSB), with only 1.33 percent of the vote, obtained 3

seats in the lower chamber. Geographically, the MRTKL votes were con-

centrated in La Paz, thereby limiting its seats to 2; whereas the PDC and

the FSB won in more departments allowing them each to obtain one

more seat than the MRTKL. The MNR, however, seemed to remain the

hegemonic political force in Congress. The party, and its divisions

(MNR-I, MRN-V), obtained 58 deputy posts as figure 2.2 illustrates.

In terms of the election of senators, Article 162 stated that each of the

nine departments could elect three senators by the system of incomplete

lists and a simple majority of votes, in other words, “two by majority, and

one by minority for a six-year mandate.” In the Senate, composed of

27 members (each department elects 3 senators), seats were distributed

using the plurality system and closed lists.

According to Article 63 of the Constitution, the party that won the

relative (first) majority in a department obtained two senators, and the party

that received the second highest number of votes (second majority) obtained

the remaining senator. The distribution of Senate seats mirrored the popular

vote for the presidential ticket. Only three parties entered the Senate: the

MNR, the ADN, and the MIR—the three most voted parties.

Because the concentration of parties and the distribution of seats

according to votes varied throughout the country, there was a minor

(but determinant) difference between the popular vote and the votes


assigned to parties in Congress. Although the ADN had won the popular

vote over the MNR, albeit by a small number (2.47 percent), the MNR

obtained two more deputies and six more senators than the ADN.

The explanation lied in the geographical nature of the electoral system.

The MNR won in more departments than the ADN, whose votes were

concentrated in only two departments.

Governing Coalition: Pact for Democracy

The ADN obtained 41 seats in the lower chamber and 10 Senate posts for

a total of 51 parliamentarians. The MNR controlled 43 seats and 16 Senate

posts respectively, for a total of 59 parliamentarians. Without a two-thirds

representation in parliament, Banzer and Paz Estenssoro, the first and

second most voted candidates, needed to forge a winning coalition.

The MNR had been one of the opposition parties to the UDP, a

coalition in which the MIR had been one of the key partners. However,

by 1983, the MIR left the governing coalition and joined the MNR in

the opposition group in Congress. The MIR was still on the radical side

of the left but was starting to moderate its discourse and move toward the

center of the political spectrum. The MIR and the rest of the political

forces represented in parliament, except for the ADN, decided to support

Paz Estenssoro in his bid for the presidency (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 170).

For the first time in Bolivian history, Congress elected the second most

Figure 2.2 Composition of the 1985–1989 Chamber of Deputies

(Prepared by the author using National Electoral Court data)

33456

8

15

4143

MNR

A.D.N M

IRM

NRI

MNRV

PS-1FPU

FSBPFC

MRTKL

2


voted candidate with 94 congressional votes for Paz Estenssoro against 51

for Banzer.9

An implicit pact of support was formed between the MNR and the

MIR to elect Paz Estenssoro. Under the agreement, the MIR partici-

pated marginally in the Paz Estenssoro government. It received some vice

ministries, but the majority of the payoffs were given through embassy

posts in the foreign service.10

Although the congressional support of the MIR was useful, it was not

sufficient to guarantee Paz Estenssoro a majority government. Another

alliance was in the horizon. Paz Estenssoro decided to implement a

package of structural adjustment reforms called the New Economic

Policy (NPE) to control the economic crisis. The MNR-MIR alliance

did not have the sufficient vitality to confront what needed to be done. A

new and strongly programmatic alliance between the MNR and the

ADN was forged within one month after the congressional election. The

Pact for Democracy became Paz Estenssoro’s governing coalition.

The immediate antecedent of the Pact for Democracy had been the

UDP government. The MNR and ADN parties had formed a center-left

alliance that was opposed to Siles Zuazo’s political line and his leftist coali-

tion that was more oriented toward the protection of the internal market.

To understand this alliance, it is important to take into account the failure

of the left (the UDP), which was indeed showing signs of exhaustion from

the 1952 state model. With the dramatic decline of the left in Bolivia, the

1985 political scenario was the ideal space for an alliance between the

MNR (the rightist wing of the MNR movement) and the ADN.

The MNR and Banzer had also been partners in the past. In fact, Banzer

had started to govern in 1971 with the support of the MNR.

President Paz Estenssoro was facing great street opposition in his

efforts to stabilize the Bolivian economy through the NPE decreed on

August 29, 1985. In the midst of an inevitable crisis, Paz Estenssoro

declared a state of siege under Article 111 of the Constitution. However,

the constitutional stipulation also required him to secure congressional

approval to continue the stage of siege.

Paz Estenssoro entered negotiations with Hugo Banzer for ADN con-

gressional support to ratify the state of siege and, on October 16, 1985, they

signed the Pact for Democracy. Initially, the ADN and MNR were joined

by the need to maintain the state of siege and control public opposition.

Later, however, the pact served to support the implementation of the NPE.

The nature of the pact became highly ideological with some elements of

pragmatism. In the ideological realm, there was convergence as to the

appropriateness of the structural adjustment program encapsulated in the


NPE. Both parties were planning to make the NPE their economic policy

plan. With the agreement on the need for the NPE, the Paz Estenssoro

administration was able to move its monetary stabilization policies forward

with the support of the ADN.

On the pragmatic side, although there was no real model of cogovern-

ment under this pact, the ADN guaranteed Paz Estenssoro legislative

support in exchange for a limited share of state patronage.11 Through this

alliance, the MNR controlled all cabinet positions, vice ministries, for-

eign service appointments, and most prefect’s offices. The ADN acceded

to state patronage only through the leadership of a number of state enter-

prises such as the Railroad National Company (Empresa Nacional de

Ferrocarriles-ENFE), Lloyd Bolivian Airlines (Lloyd Aérea Boliviana-

LAB), the Customs Autonomous Administration (Administración

Autónoma de Almacenes Aduaneros-AADAA), the Airport and Auxiliary

Services to Air Travel Administration (Administración de Aeropuertos y

Servicios Auxiliares a la Navegación Aérea-AASANA), and some super-

intendent offices. Congressional leadership positions were also shared but

the exchange of positional payoffs was limited.

Various strategic reasons for both the MNR and Paz Estenssoro and

for the ADN and Banzer served as incentives for the forging of this

coalition. Table 2.1 summarizes them.

Table 2.1 The Pact for Democracy: Incentives for Coalition Building

ADN-Banzer MNR-Paz Estenssoro

1. Electorally, the system concentrated the number of congressional posts

into a few parties. The ADN and the MNR were able to maintain the

majority in the legislature and thus advance their programmatic goals.

With the alliance, they had the two-thirds congressional majority needed

to pass legislation.

2. Banzer confronted an untenable

situation. The MNR and ADN

economic plans aimed at the same

objective and used the same

strategies to stabilize the economy.

In this scenario, he had two

choices: either to oppose the NPE

for purely political reasons or to

support a program that had also

been designed by his own

economic team (Gamarra 1997b).

Paz Estenssoro wanted to implement

an economic package of reforms

similar to the one discussed within

the ADN during the electoral

campaign.* Newspaper coverage

indicates that both candidates and

their parties were advised by the

same Harvard Economist, Jeffrey

Sachs. The ADN would thus be

the ideal partner to implement

the NPE.

Continued

Table 2.1 Continued


3. The political class still resisted

Hugo Banzer for his military past.

Banzer wanted to find a

mechanism to make himself

legitimate again in the political

arena. By facilitating a viable

solution to the national economic

crisis through the provision of

political support to the president,

he saw an opportunity to show

himself as a committed democrat

(Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 192;

Jaime Aparicio 2004).

Paz Estenssoro also had important

personal reasons to join the Pact: he

only had 43 deputies in the lower

chamber, and 16 senators in the

Senate. Although the most important

policy in his administration was

passed unilaterally through decree,

he needed the coalition to guarantee

some degree of legitimacy for the

new economic plan. This legitimacy

could be guaranteed through the

legislative support of the ADN, the

most voted party in the election.

4. The period preceding this administration featured intense ideological

polarization. An incipient trend became obvious, that is, that of

moving political tendencies toward the center of the political

spectrum. Moreover, although the experience of the UDP weakened

the Bolivian left as the 1985 electoral results showed, both ADN and

the MNR realized that whoever implemented the policies would face

protests and opposition from the left that remained in Bolivia. A

strong center coalition could confront opposition to the measures

emanating from these sectors.

5. Banzer was willing to give

support in exchange for policy

concessions. The ADN saw in the

Pact a mechanism to further the

structural adjustment policies the

party favored. Sharing the success

of the policy could serve as

beneficial to the following

electoral campaign. Indeed, the

policy was continued by Banzer

in the next administration.

The Pact also allowed Paz

Estenssoro to control both

congressional houses to pass

complementary policies to the NPE.

The series of laws passed in relation

to the NPE relied on the support of

a partner with similar policy

orientations. By forging the alliance,

he was closer to guaranteeing the

continuity of the economic plan.

6. The ADN also saw an

opportunity to receive positional

concessions. Although not in very

politically visible positions, with

the pact the ADN received

control of some development

Paz Estenssoro’s MNR, a highly

institutionalized political party,

would receive the majority of the

posts within the state apparatus.

However, Paz Estenssoro was

willing and had the authority to

Continued


Table 2.1 Continued


state corporations, superintendence

offices, and the leadership of key

state enterprises.

grant limited state patronage to the

ADN in exchange for legislative

support.

7. The Pact for Democracy somehow

emulated the Venezuelan Punto

Fijo Pact (Pacto de Punto Fijo) and

the Colombian National Front

(Frente Nacional). Banzer saw this

as an opportunity to alternate

power with the MNR in future

years** (Conaghan and Malloy

1994: 192).

By adhering to the Pact, the MNR

could share the management of the

country with the ADN for the next

few decades. Paz Estenssoro saw this

as an opportunity to extend the

MNR’s political hegemony well

beyond his presidency.

* Paz Ballivián, Ricardo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.** The Historical Ratification of the Pact for Democracy would be signed later by Paz

Estenssoro and Banzer to facilitate the election of the candidate who obtained the first

majority in future elections, and thus alternation of power between the ADN and the

MNR.

The Pact for Democracy marked the beginning of a structural change

in Bolivian politics. It allowed the president to have a majority in

Congress, to move his policy proposals forward, and it served as the basis

of the model of “pacted democracy” in Bolivia. Two factors made the

pact a point of structural transformation in this country’s national politics.

First, the pact not only gave political legitimacy to the implementation of

executive policies but also marked the beginning of a process of ideological

convergence in political and economic policies amongst the majority par-

ties. Second, political parties adopted a new style of political interaction,

one based on consensus building and coalition building and on the

exchange of payoffs to achieve policy objectives.

Supreme Decree 21060: The NPE

The serious economic crisis confronted by Siles Zuazo was the result of

the extensive and mismanaged state intervention that followed the 1952

revolution, the collapse of the international tin market, the effects of an

international recession, and the country’s extensive corruption and political

instability that drove away foreign investors (Grindle 2002: 2). The UDP

altered its monetary policies but was unable to stop inf lation; discontent

emerged from unions, private and urban sectors, and political parties.12


When Paz Estenssoro assumed power the crisis had worsened. In one

of the most memorable speeches by any Bolivian president, President Paz

Estenssoro stated that by 1985 Bolivians had two options: to implement a

radical economic adjustment plan or to let the country collapse. In his

inauguration speech on August 6, 1985, Paz Estenssoro stated that he had

a “moral obligation to radically implement, with sacrifices, a new eco-

nomic policy, or [else] simply and with great pain for all of us, Bolivia

will die on us” (Bolivia se nos muere). Inf lation went from 296 percent in e

1982 to 8,170.52 percent in 1985 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística-INE).

By 1985, the economic crisis led to a fall in the GNP (11.7 percent in

1985) and uncontrolled hyperinf lation. The external debt was almost

5 billion dollars and GNP per capita had declined from $610 to $450 per

year (Grindle 2002: 2).

To combat this, his package of reforms sought three primary objectives:

(a) the liberalization of the economy, (b) the ascendance of the private

sector as the central actor in economic development, and (c) the recupera-

tion of state control over key state enterprises (Gamarra 1996: 98). Following

the tenets of the Washington Consensus, the Supreme Decree proposed the

following mechanisms to achieve these objectives:

● Reduce the fiscal deficit.● Establish a fixed exchange rate, as a result of direct f loating and

mini-devaluations of the currency.● Freeze prices and salaries.● Reduce taxes (by 10–20 percent).● Restructure/downsize public enterprises.

This formula was also similar to the model used by other Latin

American countries. The origin, in the case of Bolivia, was disputed

between the ADN and MIR. Interestingly, even the government of

Siles Zuazo had similar policy proposals although it was never able to

secure enough political support or the congressional majority to

implement them. Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard Economist seemingly

responsible for advising the design of the NPE, was invited to Bolivia

on two occasions. On one occasion, Sachs was invited by David Blanco,

an economics professor at the Catholic University in La Paz and later

MNR minister of f inance, and on another occasion he was invited by

Ronald McClean, one of the key economists of the ADN and later part

of the Patriotic Accord (Acuerdo Patriótico-AP) cabinet. They both

had been Sachs’s students. Later visits by Sachs to Bolivia as well as by

ADN militants to Boston, including a seminar on the policy held at


Harvard University, allowed the ADN team to formulate their version

of the NPE.13

The MNR was not precisely associated with the ideological tenden-

cies related to the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s. In the

collective understanding, the MNR was still associated with nationalism,

statism, and the 1952 revolution. However, Sachs also advised the MNR

on options for stabilizing the economy. In his March 29, 1985 speech at

the MNR National Convention,14 Paz Estenssoro already enunciated

what would become the main tenets of the New Economic Policy. He

identified the need to reduce the fiscal deficit, organize state enterprises,

and rationalize private credit. Asserting that negotiating with the

international financial agencies “was a taboo that the infantile left had

created,” Paz Estenssoro even proposed to renegotiate the foreign debt

and establish a dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

He reminisced of Lenin and the application of his own version of the

New Economic Policy, in which “certain capitalist measures were imple-

mented to confront the economic crisis that the Soviet Union faced

following the October Revolution.”

On the part of the MNR, the main tenets of the NPE were formu-

lated by Juan Cariaga and Guillermo Bedegral, ministers of finance and

planning respectively, while in Congress the political maneuvering was

done by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada who had been elected senator from

Cochabamba. In a cabinet shift in January 22, 1986, Sánchez de Lozada

became minister of planning, and Bedegral moved to the Ministry of

Foreign Relations. Sánchez de Lozada led the implementation of the

NPE from then on, but the original key designers of the policy were

Bedegral and Cariaga.15

An existing characteristic of policymaking in Bolivia became obvious.

To design policy on the given areas, Paz Estenssoro put together teams of

experts. He appointed small design teams that deliberated and drafted

legislation related to the NPE and did so in isolation from public discus-

sion or debate (Grindle 2002: 9; Conaghan and Abhugattas 1990).

Controversy emerged as to the origins of the NPE. During the next

presidential campaign in 1989, Sánchez de Lozada asserted that ADN had

nothing to do with the NPE. He affirmed that Supreme Decree 21060

was “of exclusive responsibility of an MNR cabinet,”16 although later he

stated that the MNR did not dispute the paternity of the NPE, he indi-

cated, “we just implemented it because that is what was needed to save

the country.”17 Members of the ADN also contended it was formulated

by their party. Although the MNR and the ADN disputed the origins of

the NPE, they facilitated the implementation of the policy together.


Collaboration was such that the ADN and the MNR are still thought to

be the authors of deregulation, new economic policies, and the application

of the Washington Consensus in Bolivia.

The structural adjustment policies controlled hyperinf lation, reducing

it from 8,168 percent in 1985 to 16.56 percent by the end of Estenssoro’s

administration in 1989, according to the National Statistics Institute

(Instituto Nacional de Estadística-INE). The liberalization of the econ-

omy to international goods and capital was also successful. A large amount

of aid and some investment came into Bolivia, ameliorating the balance

of payment discrepancies. Internationally, Bolivia and its application of

the NPE was praised as a success case.

Political Actors and Outcomes Assessed:

The Paz Estenssoro Administration

During his tenure (1982–1985), Siles Zuazo tried to impose policy

proposals on the legislature and to unilaterally govern by decree. The

legislature, however, was exerting harsh confrontation that provoked

the resignation of the president. In his tenure, the legislature functioned

as a political obstacle launching assaults on the executive and other

political actors.18 The Pact for Democracy provoked a change in the

institutional interaction between political actors based on common

programmatic goals.

The Pact for Democracy resolved the state of confrontation that had

characterized executive-legislative relations in the transition period. By

forming a legislative majority, the government developed and consistently

implemented policies that provided the nation with relative economic

stability and effective governance.

Along with the presidential power of decree, Bolivian presidents are

also permitted to exercise discretionary powers in declaring a state of

emergency. The Constitution states in its Article 111 that in times of

crisis due to internal commotion or international war, the president, with

the support of his Council of Ministers, can declare a state of siege in

areas of national territory that s/he may deem necessary. However, the

president and legislature have to agree on the maintenance of the state of

siege and its duration.

The complementary policies associated with the NPE generally enjoyed

the support of a majority in Congress, and Paz Estenssoro was able to main-

tain two states of siege with congressional support—one in September 1985

to control a massive hunger strike declared in protest against Decree 21060,

and another in August 1986 to stop the March for Life mobilization by


displaced miners.19 Those who protested against the dismissal of more than

20,000 workers from the state mining company, the Bolivian Mining

Corporation, were captured under the state of siege and sent to internal

exile until they were willing to have a dialogue with the government.20

Paz Estenssoro’s political maneuvering was aided by constitutional

provisions that granted him an ample array of legal powers to enact and

implement policies, including economic policy. Besides the urgency of

the crisis, the legal powers allowed Paz Estenssoro and his economic team

to design the NPE independent of the legislature.

Yet to implement the NPE, Paz Estenssoro’s constitutional powers

were challenged by those conferred to Congress. According to Article 59

of the Bolivian constitution, Congress is allowed to exert, through the

various commissions of both chambers, an oversight role on economic

matters. Censure and interpellation were used as opposition tactics.

Using the Power of Interpellation

By having implemented policies ending the state-led economy, the presi-

dent faced opposition from the left not only in the streets but also in

Congress. After the NPE was decreed, opposition from the leftist bloc in

Congress that had supported his election exacerbated. Congress was able

to question cabinet ministers through a process known as interpellation.

Soon after the Supreme Decree 21060, the Chamber of Deputies resolved

to interpellate the whole cabinet of the NPE through a parliamentary

resolution dated September 3, 1985. The chamber was declared in per-

manent session and disposed that the interpellation be transmitted “live

and in its entirety” through state television and Illimani Radio (Abecia

Valdivieso 1999: 370).

In 1986, there was another interpellation that was derived into a cabinet

censure by Congress, supported even by the ADN, the coalition partner.

The opposition parties in Congress, in other words, the MBL, FSB, PS-1,

the MRTK, and MRTKL, proposed the interpellation of the minister of

planning, chief of the economic cabinet, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who

was in conf lict with the regional civic committees. Sánchez de Lozada

(2004) recounts that the civic committees of the gas and petroleum-

producing departments of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija presented

their demands for financial reimbursements for the production of these

resources from the central government, but there was no mechanism to

distribute these funds. Without a decentralization structure in place,

the government had to use regular channels to distribute funds. To protest,

the deputies from the three regions proposed to interpellate him.


Opposition parties understood that the interpellation would not

advance but found hope when the ADN showed interest in participating

in it. Interestingly, coalition partners also found in the interpellation

processes a way to either neutralize the opposition or to renegotiate the

terms of the agreement. Opposition deputies would present a request for

an oral report or an interpellation, and 30 parliamentarians from the

governing coalition would adhere to the measure. The parliamentarians

from the governing coalition would usually join with the purpose of

initiating the interpellatory action to not only demand more payoffs, but

to also extend it as long as possible as a way to protect the decisions of the

coalition. In this case, the ADN wanted to take advantage of the interpel-

lation procedure to readjust support and payoffs. It sought a concession,

so the ADN party caucus decided to support the interpellation, even to

censure the minister.

With 67 deputies present, the minister of planning as well as the whole

cabinet was censured with 66 votes for censure and 1 against. At the time,

the whole cabinet was censured since a “solidarity” mechanism existed by

which if one minister was censured, the whole cabinet considered itself

censured; the idea was that they all were co-responsible for the policies

implemented.21 At the end, however, no cabinet or political crisis occurred

because hours later the party leaders, Paz Estenssoro and Banzer, resolved

their differences. In the negotiation, the ADN received two new payoffs:

(a) positional payoffs through the granting of two prefect’s offices and

(b) a policy concession by bringing into the legislative agenda a law that

mandated a one-time reimbursement to the departments that needed to

be compensated (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 192).

After this interpellation, Sánchez de Lozada did not want to go back

to the Ministry of Planning and even offered his resignation to Paz

Estenssoro, who refused it, indicating that, if he accepted it, he “would be

resigning too because I will not accept it if they are going to start ques-

tioning my ministers.” Sánchez de Lozada asserts that it was obviously

acceptable for Paz Estenssoro to say this because he was “a sort of walking

voice” (voz caminante), and he was precisely such a voice in the heat of

the controversy.22

Other cases of oppositional tactics by the congressional opposition

included,

● MRTKL deputy Victor Hugo Cardenas attempted to interpellate

Minister of Defense Alfonso Revollo in relation to the case of

Vicente Nina, a peasant who was found dead in the Achacachi bar-

racks.23 In this opportunity, 54 ADN and MNR deputies voted to


close the order of the day, and 30 to censure Revollo. The MNR-

ADN deputies were able to avoid the censure of the minister. The

lower chamber declared a recess for seven days to avoid the discus-

sion of the request, and the matter remained unresolved.24

● The interpellations to the ministers of the Interior Ministry, the

National Defense Ministry, and the Education Ministry as a result of

the events that occurred in Huatajata, Sucre, and Parotani.● Opposition through the media on the increase of parliamentary

diets.25

● The interpellation of the interior minister as a result of the clash

between coca growers and the military that occurred in the

Chapare.26

● The Chamber of Deputies interpellated the information and plan-

ning ministers to clarify whether supplementary salaries, paid through

a parallel budget, indeed existed in the public administration.27

● Alfonso Ferrufino of the MBL and seven other deputies requested an

oral report from the minister of communications on the arrest of

Antonio Peredo, director of the AQUI weekly newspaper.28

● The Senate requested oral and written reports by the minister of

energy and the minister of transportation to ascertain the govern-

ment’s plans for the exploration of hydrocarbons in the Altiplano.● Senator Jaime Villegas requested a written report from the minister

of labor and the minister of mining on the labor policy applied to the

COMIBOL.29

However, interpellations were not frequent. Apart from these instances,

the congressional opposition was neutralized by the Pact for Democracy

majority.30 More interestingly, censure became a mechanism to not only

question the government policy but to also pressure and obtain benefits

and payoffs.

In May 1986, the MIR announced that it would carry out “con-

structive opposition” in Congress. The MIR’s votes were not necessary

to impose the state of siege; however, it is important to note that the

MIR did not join any interpellation maneuvers that could have threat-

ened the government’s attempt to defeat organized labor’s strikes

(Gamarra 1994: 109–124). It was even granted some positional payoffs.

Indeed, under this pact, the MIR occupied the leadership of the

Chamber of Deputies during the f irst year of the mandate. MIR deputy

Gaston Encinas became the president of the Chamber of Deputies.

They also had some prefect off ices, minor posts, and some second- and

third-tier diplomatic positions. They were not part of the pact but


served as the “wild card.” Among the three (ADN, MNR, and MIR),

they had a strong congressional majority.

Neutralizing Pockets of Congressional Opposition

Paz Estenssoro used payoffs to secure deals but, by and large, political

affinity took precedence leaving this bargaining technique as a last

recourse. Instead, Paz Estenssoro used three available bargaining

techniques that more intimately involved the assembly in actual policy

decision making: (1) agenda setting, in other words, the ADN supported

and had input in terms of the implementation of the NPE; (2) policy

concessions, that is, the ADN was allowed to propose policy reforms,

including the 1986 electoral reform; and (3) positional payoffs, namely,

the ADN was granted access to state patronage, albeit in very limited

numbers.

Agenda setting: Implementing the NPE.1. Allowing the ADN to have a

say in setting the legislative agenda was also utilized as a strategy by

Paz Estenssoro to secure their support for his policies. Similarly,

having political affinity and a commitment on the part of ADN,

and the MIR in many instances, to further the NPE, made easier

these parties‘ incorporation in setting the legislative agenda and in

implementing policy.

Policy concessions.2. Policy decisions were negotiated directly by Paz

Estenssoro and Banzer, who then instructed their caucuses on how

to vote in Congress. By 1986, the MNR had proposed a tax-code

reform to complement the NPE measures. ADN, already part of the

pact, conceded to these reforms in exchange for continued access to

policy decisions. The understanding behind the pact was ADN’s

promise to support the government’s economic efforts in exchange

for the MNR’s support on electoral law reforms. This proposal was

also backed by the MIR, which also offered to give support to the

tax-code reform in exchange for the electoral reform. Both parties,

and even the MNR, were interested in moving forward with elec-

toral reform. Although it would maintain previous electoral

arrangements, an important change would take place in terms of

districting and the formula utilized for the distribution of seats to

members of Congress. The D‘Hondt formula established in 1956

and favoring smaller parties was replaced in this 1986 electoral

reform by the “double-quotient” formula of participation and

assignment of seats. With this proportional representation formula,


the intention was to avoid the entrance of small parties into the

chambers of Congress. By doing this, Paz Estenssoro, Banzer and Paz

Zamora saw an opportunity to concentrate parliamentary representation

in their parties.

Positional Payoffs.3. An option available to Paz Estenssoro to secure

the pact was to make use of the patronage network to give posi-

tional payoffs. However, the ADN support to Paz Estenssoro

through the Pact of Democracy was not necessarily conditional to

ADN’s participation in state patronage.31 State patronage had a

secondary role in facilitating this agreement. Indeed, the pact did

not off icially bring the ADN into the cabinet, although it allowed

the party to head the legislative chambers. Except for the f irst year

when leadership was shared with the MIR, the two parties

monopolized the leadership of the legislative chambers. Table 2.2

shows how legislative leadership posts were distributed among the

parties.

The pact also gave the ADN a number of appointments in key state

enterprises. According to Fortún, the ADN national adjunct chief from

1985 to 1989, during the Pact for Democracy the ADN administered the

Railroad National Company, the Customs Autonomous Administration,

the Airport and Auxiliary Services to Air Travel Administration, Lloyd

Bolivian Airlines, the Insurance Superintendence, the Agriculture Bank

of Bolivia, and the Development Corporations in Chuquisaca, Oruro,

and Cochabamba. An ADN militant, Luis del Rio, was appointed as

superintendent of banks.

Table 2.2 Legislative Leadership, 1985–1989

Legislature President of the

Senate

Party President of the

Chamber of Deputies

Party

Paz

Est

enss

oro

1985–1986 Gonzalo Sanchez

de Lozada

MNR Gastón Encinas

Valverde

MIR

1986–1987 Ciro Humbolt

Barrero

MNR Willy Vargas

Vacaf lor

ADN


Barrero

MNR Willy Vargas

Vacaf lor

ADN


Barrero

MNR Walter Soriano

Lea Plaza

ADN


With the pact, the ADN also received control over some of the municipal

governments and regional development corporations. The condition for

the coalition was, however, mainly contextual and structural as the pact

was not an alliance for cogovernment. A greater positional payoff was

settled in May 1988. Paz Estenssoro and Banzer signed a secret addendum

to the original pact by which the MNR committed itself to supporting

Banzer in the 1989 elections.

Exerting his political dominance, Paz Estenssoro’s cabinet was com-

posed of MNR party people as well as technocrats associated with the

party. A number of senior MNR members joined this first cabinet in

strategic positions, including the Ministry of Planning that was supposed

to implement the economic structural adjustment package. The ADN did

not receive any positions, as table 2.3 indicates.

To guarantee the success of the application of Supreme Decree 21060,

Paz Estenssoro dispensed his first cabinet, formed by MNR militants, and

sought the collaboration of private entrepreneurs, who were close to the

leadership of the MNR. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was then president

of the Senate. In Paz Estenssoro’s first cabinet shift, Sánchez de Lozada left

the Senate and moved to the Ministry of Planning to coordinate the appli-

cation of the new economic model (Baptista Gumucio 1996: 348).

Guillermo Bedegral, who was originally in charge of the implementation

of the model, was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. MNR’s more

technical militants, Juan Cariaga and Juan Carlos Duran, also joined the

second cabinet, which was composed as table 2.4 illustrates.

Paz Estenssoro’s third cabinet was composed of ministers who had

served with him before. The third shift also involved the departure from

the cabinet of Juan Cariaga, minister of finance and one of the key

implementers of the NPE. Cariaga resigned from his position in the

cabinet stating that his cycle of participation in the government had

concluded.32

There was also pressure by the MNR for the “movimientization of the

cabinet,” in other words, for the inclusion of more MNR party militants.

Carlos Ponce Sanjinés, leader of the MNR executive committee, publicly

indicated that although it was a prerogative of the president, a higher rep-

resentation of the party in the cabinet was desirable.33 With the departure

of Cariaga, Paz Estenssoro joined the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry

of Tax and Ramiro Cabezas, an independent economist, was designated

as the new head. Table 2.5 shows the composition of Paz Estenssoro’s third

cabinet.

On September 20, 1988, eight months before the election, the whole

cabinet presented its resignation on the grounds that with the coming of

Table

2.3

Paz E

stenss

oro

A

dm

inis

trati

on:

Cabin

et

1 (P

repare

d by th

e auth

or

usi

ng data

fr

om

th

e G

aceta

Ofi

cia

l, inte

rvie

ws,

and n

ew

spapers

)

Nam

eP

PM

inis

try

Sta

rtin

g D

ate

End

Dat

e

Gas

ton L

evy A

raoz

MN

R

Min

iste

r of Fore

ign

Rel

atio

ns

August

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Feder

ico K

aune

Art

eag

a M

NR

M

inis

ter

of In

teri

or/

Just

ice

August

6, 1985

August

25, 1985

Fern

ando V

alle

Quevedo

MN

R

Min

iste

r of D

efe

nse

August

6, 1985

Apri

l 04, 1987

Robert

o G

isbert

Berm

udez

MN

R

Min

iste

r of Fin

ance

A

ugust

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Guil

lerm

o B

edegra

lM

NR

M

inis

ter

of P

lan

nin

g

August

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

En

rique

Ipin

a M

elgar

M

NR

M

inis

ter

of E

duca

tion

August

6, 1985

August

06, 1989

Nest

or

Dal

enz

Mejia

MN

R

Min

iste

r of T

ransp

ort

atio

n

August

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Eduar

do D

ougla

s A

scar

runz

MN

R

Min

iste

r of In

dust

ryA

ugust

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Wal

ter

Cost

as B

adan

i M

NR

M

inis

ter

of L

abor

August

6, 1985

Januar

y 0

2, 1986

Hugo S

err

ano R

odri

guez

MN

R

Min

iste

r of th

e P

resi

dency

August

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1987

Sin

foro

so C

abre

ra R

om

ero

M

NR

M

inis

ter

of M

inin

g

August

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Mau

ricio

Mam

ani Poco

ata

MN

R

Min

iste

r of Peas

ant

Aff

airs

A

ugust

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Orl

ando D

onoso

Torr

ez

MN

R

Min

iste

r of E

nerg

yA

ugust

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Car

los

Ali

aga

Ayoro

aM

NR

M

inis

ter

of U

rban

Aff

airs

A

ugust

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Gu

ille

rmo R

ivero

s T

eja

da

MN

R

Secre

tary

August

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Rein

aldo P

eters

Arz

abe

MN

R

Min

iste

r of In

form

atio

nA

ugust

6, 1985

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Fern

ando C

acere

s R

om

ero

M

NR

M

inis

ter

of In

tegra

tion

August

6, 1985

Feb

ruar

y 2

6, 1987

Anto

nio

Tovar

Pie

rola

M

NR

M

inis

ter

of A

ero

nau

tics

A

ugust

6, 1985

Feb

ruar

y 2

6, 1987

Fer

nan

do B

arth

elem

y M

arti

ne

MN

R

Min

iste

r of In

teri

or/

Just

ice

August

27,

1985

Feb

ruar

y 2

6, 1987

Table

2.4

Paz E

stenss

oro

A

dm

inis

trati

on:

Cabin

et

2 (P

repare

d by th

e auth

or

usi

ng data

fr

om

th

e G

aceta

Ofi

cia

l and n

ew

spapers

)

Nam

e P

P

Min

istr

ySta

rtin

g D

ate

End

Dat

e

Gu

ille

rmo B

edegra

l M

NR

M

inis

ter

of Fore

ign

Rel

atio

ns

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Mar

ch 0

3, 1989

Juan

Car

iaga

Oso

rio

MN

R

Min

iste

r of Fin

ance

Ja

nuar

y 2

2, 1986

August

10, 1988

Gonza

lo S

anch

ez

de

Loza

da

MN

R

Min

iste

r of P

lan

nin

g

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Septe

mber

20, 1988

Andre

s Pet

rice

vic

Ras

tanovic

M

NR

M

inis

ter

of T

ran

sport

atio

n

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Mar

ch 0

3, 1989

Robert

o G

isbert

Berm

udez

MN

R

Min

iste

r of In

dust

ry

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

May

30, 1987

Wal

ter

Rio

s G

amboa

MN

R

Min

iste

r of L

abor

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Feb

ruar

y 2

6, 1987

Car

los

Per

ez

Guzm

an

MN

R

Min

iste

r of th

e P

resi

den

cy

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Septe

mber

20, 1988

Jaim

e V

illa

lobos

San

jines

MN

R

Min

iste

r of M

inin

g

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

August

06, 1989

Edil S

andoval

Moro

n

MN

R

Min

iste

r of Peas

ant

Aff

airs

Ja

nuar

y 2

2, 1986

Feb

ruar

y 2

6, 1987

Car

los

Mora

les

Lan

div

ar

MN

R

Min

iste

r of E

ner

gy

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Oct

ober

07,

1997

Fra

nkin

Anay

a V

asquez

MN

R

Min

iste

r of U

rban

Aff

airs

Ja

nuar

y 2

2, 1986

Mar

ch 0

3, 1989

Juan

Car

los

Dura

nM

NR

M

inis

ter

of E

ner

gy

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

Feb

ruar

y 2

6, 1987

Herm

an A

nte

lo L

augh

lin

MN

R

Min

iste

r of In

form

atio

n

Januar

y 2

2, 1986

August

06, 1989

Fern

ando M

osc

oso

Sal

mon

MN

R

Min

iste

r of In

dust

ryD

ece

mber

26, 1986

Septe

mber

20, 1988

Ram

iro C

abeza

s M

asse

s M

NR

M

inis

ter

of T

ax

Collecti

ons

Januar

y 0

5, 1987

August

10, 1988


an electoral campaigning period, they thought the president should have

more liberty to compose his cabinet. President Paz Estenssoro indicated

that the change in cabinet did not mean a change in government policies

but accepted their resignation nonetheless. Four new ministers were

sworn in: Fernando Romero Moreno for the Ministry of Planning, Luis

Palenque Cordero for Industry, Alfonso Peña Rueda for Labor, and

Joaquin Arce Lema for Social Security and Health. They were all MNR

affiliated. The rest of the cabinet members were ratified as ministers.34

This cabinet lasted for eleven more months, from September 1988 until

August 1989, as table 2.6 indicates.

While the NPE was the most notable policy innovation of the

Paz Estenssoro government, other important changes were also intro-

duced. In 1985, the same year that the economic package was introduced,

another decree tackled the problem of state reform by introducing public

sector downsizing, including severe reductions in the state enterprise

sector, and a series of austerity measures.35 Two years later, banking,

foreign trade, and debt policies were greatly improved (Grindle 2002: 3).

Table 2.5 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinet 3 (Prepared by the

author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and newspapers)

Name PP Ministry Starting Date End Date

Juan Carlos

Duran

MNR Minister of the

Interior

February 26,

1987

March 03,

1989

Aifredo Franco

Guachalla

MNR Minister of

Labor

February 26,

1987

September 20,

1988

Jose Guillermo

Justiniano

MNR Minister of

Peasant Affairs

February 26,

1987

August 06,

1989

Walter Zuleta

Roncal

MNR Secretary February 26,

1987

August 06,

1989

Jaime Zegada

Hurtado

MNR Minister of

Aeronautics

February 26,

1987

August 06,

1989

Alfonso Thenier

Revollo

MNR Minister of

Defense

April 08,

1987

August 06,

1989

Fernando

Illanes de Ia

Riva

MNR Minister of

Energy

October 07,

1987

August 06,

1989

Ramiro

Cabezas Masses

MNR Minister of

Finance

August 10,

1988

August 06,

1989


The successful passage of the national budget, a new tax code, and a new

electoral law that would allow the MNR, the ADN, and the MIR to

control political power were some of the elements of the ADN-MIR Pact

(Gamarra 1987: 411). Finally, the controversial Law 1008 on Controlled

Substances, and with specific mandates for coca eradication, was also

approved during this administration.

However, Bolivians‘ faith in the legislature as a reliable democratic

institution eroded. For example, with the approval of Law 1008,

Congress was critiqued for having approved it in merely two sessions

and for having accepted the terms imposed by the U.S. embassy. In fact,

the law became known by some sectors as the Sheraton Project because

it was drafted at the Sheraton Hotel in La Paz by Bolivian and U.S.

off icials.36 Until this point since 1985, Evo Morales had been general

secretary of his coca growers union in San Francisco. When the Law

1008 was being approved by Congress on July 19, 1989, Morales was

Table 2.6 Paz Estenssoro Administration: Cabinets 4 and 5 (Prepared

by the author using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, and

newspapers)

Name PP Ministry Starting

Date

End Date

Fernando

Romero

Moreno

MNR Minister of

Planning

September 20,

1988

August 6, 1989

Luis Fernando

Palenque

MNR Minister of

Industry

September 20,

1988

August 6, 1989

Alfonso Peña

Rueda

MNR Minister of

Labor

September 20,

1988

August 6, 1989

Joaquien Arce

Lema

MNR Minister of the

Presidency

September 20,

1988

August 6, 1989

Valentin Abecia

Baldivieso

MNR Minister of

Foreign

Relations

March 3,

1989

August 6, 1989

Eduardo Perez

Beltran

MNR Minister of

Interior

March 3,

1989

August 6, 1989

Alfonso

Balderrama

Maldona

MNR Minister of

Transportation

March 3,

1989

August 6, 1989

Roberto Roca MNR Minister of

Urban Affairs

March 3, 1989 August 6, 1989


being elected executive secretary of the coca growers’ Tropic Federation

(Federación del Trópico).

The Paz Zamora Administration: A Heated Electoral

Campaign and the 1989 Election Results

In May 1988, after signif icant pressure from the ADN, the MNR and

the ADN secretly outlined mechanisms for the institutionalization of

the Pact for Democracy. The so-called Historic Ratif ication of the

Pact for Democracy (Ratif icación Histórica del Pacto por la

Democracia), signed on May 25, 1988, called for a stronger commit-

ment by both parties to democratic rule, as well as to the NPE, the

elimination of illegal drug trade, and toward a transparent electoral

process. The key aspect of this addendum was a pledge by both parties

to vote in Congress in the May 1989 elections for the candidate with

the highest plurality of the votes.37 Under the terms of the addendum,

the ADN and the MNR were assured of control over Bolivian politics

for at least the next four years.

Also by May 1988, internal strife within the MNR made it impossible

to predict who would be the presidential candidate. Minister of Planning

Sánchez de Lozada was said to be “the president’s man.” He was covered

by the press as the “one that implemented more coherently Paz Estenssoro’s

economic policy and one of the few ministers that has told people the

truth, no matter how hard it was.”38 Besides Sánchez de Lozada, other

MNR militants, including the MNR veteran Ñuf lo Chávez Ortiz and

Guillermo Bedegral, also showed their interest in participating in the

1989 elections.39

By July 1988, Guillermo Bedegral started a discrediting campaign

against his MNR opponent, Sánchez de Lozada, and tried to organize

the electoral machinery for the September 1988 primaries.40 Also by July,

Sánchez de Lozada presented his 1989 government plan for consideration

during the MNR convention. He proposed to guarantee “the continuity

of a modern development policy.”41 In the end, based on the belief that

the NPE had popular support and this would drive the MNR to victory,

the party named Sánchez de Lozada its presidential candidate at the

September 1988 MNR National Convention.42

The other parties had less internal battles to appoint their candidates

for the presidential–vice presidential tickets. In May of 1988, Antonio

Araníbar Quiroga started a campaign through the leftist mass communi-

cation media and participated, with labor groups from the left, in all the

social conf licts that were taking place in the country.43 There was no


dispute over the designation of Paz Zamora and Hugo Banzer as

presidential candidates representing the MIR and the ADN respectively.

The time for the 1989 electoral campaign was approaching, and due to

fears of a breach of the pact, the ADN requested to make the secret

addendum document public. The secret addendum was unveiled. It

caused great commotion among the other political parties. MIR’s Oscar

Eid Franco indicated that the addendum was just “a political barter that

belittled democracy”44 because it basically guaranteed alternation between

the ADN and the MNR. In January 25, 1989, the adjunct chiefs of the

parties, Guillermo Bedregal and Guillermo Fortún, on behalf of their

parties, MNR and ADN, ratified the agreements of the pact and agreed,

once more, to run separate presidential tickets but only to support the

candidate of either party that achieved the highest plurality.45 This

renewed agreement lasted less than a month.

An insufficient number of voters had registered in the electoral registry

by February 1989, and a fierce debate arose amongst the parties in

Congress on whether to extend the registration period and postpone the

elections. On February 9, 1989, the MNR officially broke the Pact for

Democracy with the ADN. In a public document published in national

newspapers signed by Paz Estenssoro, Sánchez de Lozada, Bedegral,

Chávez Ortiz, and other MNR party leaders, the party affirmed that the

Pact for Democracy had been broken because of the ADN refusal to

extend the period for Bolivians to register in the electoral registry for 45

extra days—something that, in the MNR’s view, violated the rights of

Bolivians to the universal vote.46

If the MNR was a pragmatic party, Sánchez de Lozada was doubly

pragmatic because of his MNR and business background. In reality,

Sánchez de Lozada (2004) still asserts that due to the secret clause on alter-

nation, the real key to the pact was that the MNR made a commitment to

support Banzer even if the MNR achieved more votes than the ADN.47

Sánchez de Lozada (2004) was not comfortable with the stipulation that

under the pact “when people voted for me, they were automatically voting

for Banzer.”

The Pact for Democracy thus lasted three years, three months, and

24 days. Six hours after breaking the Pact for Democracy, Sánchez de

Lozada, as minister of planning and as MNR presidential candidate,

asked ADN militants who held public positions to resign.48 He indicated

in his declarations that the ADN held “60 percent of public positions in

LAB, the National Railroad Company, etcetera.” The breaking of the

pact profoundly offended the ADN. Banzer felt betrayed by the MNR,

especially by Sánchez de Lozada.


As May 1989 approached, the issues of the campaign centered around

four elements: (a) the competency of the candidates; (b) the political

economy: attacks and defenses to the NPE; (c) social policies: including

the lack of attention to social issues and offers for new and more effective

socioeconomic policies; and (d) local demands: in this case, all parties

made an attempt to address the diverse and contradictory local and

regional demands for economic and social development (Müller &

Asociados 1989: 72–73).

Employment became an important issue during the campaign (Lazarte

1993: 29). Other campaign issues included the negotiation of the external

debt as well as Bolivia’s access to the sea through Chile, and more

importantly, the search for mechanisms to achieve the administrative

decentralization of the country.49

In the 1989 presidential campaign, the MNR, ADN, and MIR can-

didates presented a political platform continuing, in varying degrees, the

implementation of the NPE policies started by the Paz Estenssoro

administration. The traditional method of electoral campaigning—that

is, popular concentrations, ideological debates, and direct contact of the

candidates with the electorate—was complemented by the use of new

advertising mechanisms in which form was privileged over substance.

Foreign political marketing companies advised the candidates in terms

of the (a) elaboration and processing of data from public opinion polls;

(b) the definition of the campaign objectives; and (c) the determination

of the mechanisms to be used to reach the electorate.50 The MNR was

advised by Sawyer and Miller, a company long known to Sánchez de

Lozada; ADN relied on a Spanish consulting firm; and the MIR was

coached by a Venezuelan firm.51

The 1989 campaign became a personal battle. Through mass media,

conf licts amongst candidates were taken to the urban centers, especially

the axis cities of La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. They all used TV

more systematically and conducted harsh negative TV ads, thereby

increasing the amount of money spent on the campaigns. In the end,

political parties’ total campaign budget exceeded $37 million.52

At the beginning of the campaign, Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada did

not attack each other. Instead Banzer attacked the MIR in its most vul-

nerable aspects. Banzer constantly sent public reminders of the MIR’s

participation in the UDP and attributed to the party’s policies the

hyperinf lation that took place in the early 1980s.53

Sánchez de Lozada’s campaign tactics were of a mixed tone. On the

positive side, he ran on his record as minister of planning for the Paz

Estenssoro government. On the negative side, he attacked the records of


his two main adversaries, Banzer and Paz Zamora. With regard to Banzer,

it was speculated that the MNR and Sánchez de Lozada manufactured a

press debate on Banzer’s human rights record. The media kept associating

his name with the term “dictator” for several weeks during the cam-

paign. In addition, emphasis was placed on Jaime Paz Zamora’s record as

Siles Zuazo’s vice president, with the implication that he would “restore

the policies which created hyperinf lation” (Henderson 1989: 7–9).

The left, represented by the United Left (IU) and the MIR, continued

to stress a strong interventionist and redistributionist role for the state.

Paz Zamora was criticized by leftist sectors for being “too much in tune

with the forces of capitalism” and branded him a traitor.54 Throughout

the campaign, Paz Zamora announced that, if elected, he would maintain

the NPE policies but would discard its “insensible aspects.”

In 1989, the new political party, CONDEPA, was starting to take up

public space. In his presidential campaign, Palenque used the populist

themes of ethnic unity and a persistent emphasis on “traditional values”

and social responsibility to win a vast following in La Paz, the broadcast

radius of his stations. Yet concrete policies and programs supported by

Palenque remained vague throughout the campaign. By February 1989,

the parties started to accuse each other of intent to commit fraud.

Newspaper coverage for that period shows the MIR denouncing the

MNR and the ADN; the ADN accusing the MNR; the MNR accusing

the MIR and the ADN, etcetera.

In this election, the media played a greater role than in previous years

as television, radio ownership, and Bolivia’s overall electrification

expanded. The attacks between candidates offended many in the

electorate. Even the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights (Asamblea

Permanente de Derechos Humanos) rejected the campaign strategies used

by candidates in this campaign, describing the television spots as “deceiving

as well as offensive and insulting.”55 At some point, Banzer himself called

for a campaign with no insults.56

The most effective and sustained television effort belonged to

Carlos Palenque before the campaign had actually begun. Although

his station was off the air for the year prior to the election, Palenque

used El Compadre, a friendly character created for his highlight talk

show to stress his compassion for the working class neighborhoods of

the capital.

Under this scenario, the 1989 elections took place on May 7, 1989. As

results came in, they showed that MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de

Lozada had won a relative majority of the votes, with 363,113 votes cast

in his favor. The second place belonged to General Hugo Banzer with


357,298 votes while Jaime Paz Zamora with the MIR achieved the third

place with 309,033 votes (CNE data).

The MNR and MIR together accumulated 72.72 percent of the vote.

The results brought widespread surprise. First, there was a decline in

support to Banzer who went from 32.83 percent of support in the 1985

elections to 25.24 percent. Second, the MNR also lost vote percentage,

but this election was the only one in Bolivian history in which an incum-

bent party won the new election. The emergence of Sánchez de Lozada

as the new MNR leader was confirmed through the presidential vote.

Finally, for the MIR, the 1989 elections represented the best voting

record for the party ever. With 21.83 percent of the votes, the MIR was

never able to recreate results similar to these elections. CONDEPA

emerged as the fourth political force with 12.25 percent. The remaining

15.03 percent was divided amongst the other six political parties running,

namely, the United Left (IU), the Socialist Party-1 (PS-1), the MRTKL,

Front of Katarista Unity (FULKA), the Falange Socialista Boliviana, and

the National Independent Movement (MIN).

These electoral results show the fragmentation of the vote among ten

political parties, a situation that forced political parties to seek a broad elec-

toral coalition. The most important trend that can be observed, however,

is the growth in racial and ethnic tensions as shown in the massive voting

for El Compadre, especially in the Department of La Paz. El Compadre’s

appeal showed the inability of the traditional political parties to connect

with the lower and lower-middle classes in the urban areas as well as the

increase in the use of racial and ethnic overtones in the political debate.

This is a trend that the MAS later capitalized on. For the first time in the

country’s history, an indigenous woman from the CONDEPA party wear-

ing traditional native attire served as deputy to the Bolivian Congress.

An Electoral Scandal: The 1989 Composition

of Congress and the Presidential Election

of Paz Zamora

The D‘Hondt formula, established in 1956, was replaced in 1986 by the

double quotient of participation and seat distribution for the lower cham-

ber. Used for the first time in the 1989 elections, Article 156 of the law in

its Section A indicated that the first quotient, the participation quotient,

would be obtained by dividing the total valid votes in a department by

the number of seats to be distributed.

Under this formula, those parties that obtained at least the same number

of votes as the participation quotient would participate in the seat


assignment (Art. 156, Section B). Once the participation quotient was

calculated, the votes of all parties that participated in the distribution of

seats were added, and this total was divided by the number of seats to be

distributed in a department. With this quotient, seats were distributed

only amongst the parties that qualified for the distribution.

The double quotient method had a tendency to restrict the participation

of smaller parties because it eliminated those that did not obtain the

minimum to enter into the distribution of seats (Deheza 2000: 141–143).

Even if the minority parties made it, their representation was restricted by

the second quotient of seat distribution that favored the majority parties.

All electoral laws in use from 1979 through 1985 contained a provision

that permitted parties that failed to meet the participation quota to none-

theless obtain a seat, provided that their vote total was not less than the

lowest remainder that earned a seat in the district. In 1986, this provision

was changed through the introduction of what was known as the excep-

tion clause, giving the CNE the discretion to permit small parties which

fell below the participation quota to earn a seat (Mayorga 2001: 195).

Granting such discretionary powers to the CNE proved ominous to the

democratic process.

The MNR had been for many years the symbol of fraud in the Bolivian

collective understanding.57 In the two elections of the 1950s, the MNR

used far-fetched tactics to win votes. In those elections, it is argued that

dead people and even animals voted! In small towns with 400 voters,

2,000 votes were counted. When Bolivian adults, not younger people

necessarily, talked about fraud, they associated it with the MNR.58 Now

in the 1989 elections, the MNR became the victim of fraud.

The CNE was composed of seven members, three of which were

appointed with the support of the MNR, three were appointed with

MIR support and one with the ADN’s. A quorum (four members pres-

ent) was needed to make most decisions, and it was impeccably formed

with the MIR and ADN members. In 1989, and with the Pact of

Democracy broken, the MIR and ADN members found it convenient to

join forces at the CNE to exclude the MNR. The MIR-ADN formed an

alliance that became known as the Band of the Four (La Banda de los

Cuatro) within the CNE. The MNR was left out of the incipient ADN-

MIR alliance in the CNE. This marked the first great distancing between

the MIR and the MNR. On the other hand, the Band of the Four was

probably the immediate antecedent of the Patriotic Accord between the

ADN and the MIR.

All the last resolutions by the Band of the Four were approved without

the MNR members present, they abandoned the meetings of the Court


in protest of the decision-making procedure. Although results were

questioned, MIR’s Eid Franco asserts that there was indeed a “triple tie”

(triple empate) in these elections. According to Eid Franco, the parties

“had similar votes, one had 49, another 46, and we [the MIR] had 41. We

called it the triple tie, and it was constitutional that any of the three could

be elected president.”

The CNE members forced the so-called triple tie (Mesa Gisbert 2003a:

173), which in reality was not so since the MIR popular vote was slightly

lower than the other two. The main controversy arose over the transla-

tion of the popular vote into seats in the Chamber of Deputies, then

composed of only plurinominal deputies, and over one position in the

Senate.

The electoral system allowed the manipulation of votes. The system

allowed three instances of decision making in legitimating votes: at the

voting table during the vote count, in which the party delegates could

question anomalies of the voting procedures or the recording of votes,

and at the intermediate and central level. The Departmental Electoral

Courts and the CNE in Bolivia could, in 1989, review the results and

annul votes coming from the voting table.

There were always simple mistakes of the voting records that parties

could use to their advantage. With this in mind, the MIR and ADN

members of the CNE shortened the differences between the parties by

annulling records, modifying jurisdictions, and ignoring the resolutions

by departmental courts.

The alleged fraud was mainly done in the departments of Oruro, La Paz,

and Potosí. In polling stations in the Department of Oruro, results from

voting tables were strategically annulled to take votes away from the MNR.

The MIR legitimately won the first two Senate positions from Oruro, but

the third position was in dispute. It is alleged that votes were manipulated

to grant the Senate post to the ADN when the MNR should have been the

party to receive it.59 If the MNR lost a senator, naturally it would also lose

one or two deputies in Oruro; the manipulation of votes for the distribu-

tion of seats affected the MNR in both chambers. The same was done in

the departments of La Paz and Potosí. Thus, even though it won the popu-

lar vote, the MNR lost at least six or seven congressional seats in this man-

ner, which impeded the party from winning the congressional election.

Julio Garret Ayllón who had been vice president with Victor Paz Estenssoro

in the previous administration was the candidate who ran for the Senate

seat with the MNR in Oruro. He lost his seat.

In that election, in a majority of the departments, the ADN, MNR,

and MIR votes were very close. Thus by annulling 350 votes in one


department, a senator could be decided. The changes were not in great

numbers but enough to alter the composition of Congress. Similarly, the

purpose of the ADN and MIR members of the CNE was not to take the

victory away from the MNR but to produce a correlation of forces in the

parliament more favorable to them.

Besides taking parliamentarians away from the MNR, the Band of the

Four left two very small parties out of Congress when they should have

had one deputy each: the Socialist Party of Roger Cortez, and the

MRTKL of Victor Hugo Cardenas. The two of them were supposed to

receive one deputy position. The CNE members misinterpreted Section

E of the electoral law to deny seats to the MNR, PS-1, and the MRTKL.

They could have received a deputy seat by residuals, but the CNE chose

not to grant the positions to them.

Based on the popular vote, the ADN had 43 and the MIR had 35

parliamentarians, which did not give them the needed two-thirds major-

ity (87 representatives). With the changes, they received exactly the 87

(or two-thirds) votes they needed. Indeed, the MNR made a public

announcement stating that according to the results, the MNR had won

in Cochabamba, Potosí, Tarija, Santa Cruz, and Beni. Thus, the parlia-

ment should have been organized in the following manner:

MNR ADN MIR IU CONDEPA PS-1 MRTKL Total

50 43 35 14 11 3 1 157

The MNR contended that by annulling 150,000 votes, the CNE

limited the MNR success to the departments of Tarija, Cochabamba, and

Santa Cruz and granted Beni to the ADN, and Pando and Chuquisaca to

the MIR. With the vote manipulation, the PS-1 and the MRTKL had no

parliamentarians and the IU parliamentary seats were reduced by 4 seats.

According to the MNR leaders, the CNE organized the parliament in

the following manner with the sole purpose of reducing differences

between the top three 60:

MNR ADN MIR IU CONDEPA PS-1 MRTKL Total

49 46 41 10 11 0 0 157

With this, the MNR lost one parliamentarian, the ADN gained three

more than it had achieved, and the MIR obtained six more than it should

have received. Coincidentally, the ADN and MIR parties were the only


ones that benefited from the vote manipulation. Besides the MNR, the

IU lost four parliamentarians, and whereas CONDEPA maintained the

same number of parliamentarians, the PS-1 and the MRTKL were left

with none.

The double quotient system made the calculation two times. Smaller

parties were eliminated, and in the process, there was a manipulation of

the votes to the detriment of specific parties. There was no time to prove

the existence of fraud, and the final electoral results were confirmed for

the Chamber of Deputies.

Although the law favored small parties, the CNE members interpreted

the law so that the least number of minorities would be elected. Víctor

Hugo Cárdenas was unable to be deputy in 1989 because of this intentional

misinterpretation of the law. These parties and the MNR complained.

Presidential candidates for the MRTKL and the PS-1, Roger Cortez and

Victor Hugo Cardenas, went on a hunger strike to protest the decision of

the CNE to annul votes to their detriment. According to the strikers,

14 parliamentary seats had been stolen from them.61 In the Senate, the

MNR, ADN, MIR and CONDEPA entered in relatively similar levels,

especially the first three.

The MNR called it a scandal and demanded the annulment of the

elections before the Supreme Court.62 This was done to no avail. FULKA,

MRTKL, IU also requested the annulment of the 1989 election results

and the resignation of the members of the CNE.63 The ADN and MIR

were now prepared to cross the “rivers of blood,” namely, to forge an

alliance after a past of persecution, while the MNR, the winner of the

elections, was positioned as the outsider and head of the political

opposition. As the results of the composition of Congress were confirmed,

negotiations for a governing coalition began.

Crossing the Rivers of Blood:

The Patriotic Accord (AP)

With or without the electoral scandal, in 1989 no formula achieved the

absolute majority of votes. Thus, Congress assumed the responsibility of

electing the president once again. By the late 1980s, the trauma of the

1979 stalemate persisted. Throughout the first months of 1989, the word

stalemate is mentioned by political leaders in public declarations numer-

ous times (newspaper articles, TV, etcetera). In March 1989, Bedegral

appeared speaking on behalf of the MNR asserting that the party “would

not provoke another stalemate.” He also asserted in those declarations to

the press, “that word should be forgotten because it is a bad word.”64


From May 7 through August 6, 1989, intense negotiations took place

between the ADN, the MIR, CONDEPA and the MNR to forge a

winning alliance. Guillermo Fortún, Carlos Iturralde and Willy Vargas

Vacaf lor composed the ADN-PDC convergence negotiating team.65 Juan

Carlos Duran, Edil Sandoval, Oscar Bonifaz negotiated on behalf of the

MNR, Palenque on behalf of his own party, and Oscar Eid Franco,

Gonzalo Valda, and Luis Gonzales Quintanilla for the MIR. During

these three months the leaders held many informal meetings in an effort

to achieve an alliance.

Through the media, the leaders would make proposals for the other

parties to consider. In the process, there were proposals by the ADN to

the MIR and CONDEPA, by the MNR to the ADN, MIR and

CONDEPA, but there was no proposal by the ADN or MIR to forge an

alliance with the MNR, neither party wanted to form a government

with the MNR. In this climate, the MIR especially, saw that it had the

possibility of obtaining the presidency.

By June 1989, Kieffer, one of ADN’s chiefs proposed a tripartite agree-

ment to govern with the MIR and CONDEPA.66 With no success, a

month later the ADN asked the MIR, separately, for the congressional

votes to elect Banzer.67 The MIR responded to Banzer that this was not

possible because of their previous history of persecution. The MIR

parliamentarians would not vote for Banzer (Baptista Gumucio 1996:

357) as he had persecuted them during his military dictatorship. With the

pragmatism that characterizes the MIR leaders, Paz Zamora and Eid

Franco, asked Banzer to support the MIR instead.68

Neither the ADN nor the MIR asked the MNR for support or a gov-

erning alliance, but the MNR returned to desperate measures to achieve

the presidency. Sánchez de Lozada attempted discussions with Banzer

and Paz Zamora separately to try to put together a government.69 The

dislike for Sánchez de Lozada was such that the ADN only wanted to

discuss with the MNR organic structure but not with Sánchez

de Lozada.

For a few weeks, Eid Franco asserted that the MIR did not trust the

MNR,70 but there was a faction of the party that wanted to make a pact

with the MNR rather than ADN. At the end of July, days before the

congressional election of August 6, the MNR proposed a cogovernment

plan to the MIR that would last until 2000 and in which they would

share the cabinet, the development corporations, the prefect’s offices,

alliances in municipal elections, and leadership positions in the judicial

branch.71


However, on the night of August 1, Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada

met to discuss a possible alliance. After receiving no response from the

MIR, on August 2, four days before the vote in Congress, in desperation

the MNR sent a letter proposing a cogovernment this time with the

ADN. The MNR proposal offered shared leadership of the executive

branch, organization of the cabinet by consensus, as well as the equal

management of the regional development corporations. The presidency

of the Senate would be for the ADN and the Chamber of Deputies for the

MNR.72

CONDEPA appeared in the news distancing itself from the MNR, as

well as from the ADN and MIR. At some point, Palenque stated that the

party would give the votes to the MIR in Congress but would not form

a governing alliance. However, some meetings between the MIR and the

ADN took place in Palenque’s residency, and it is even argued that the

agreement between Banzer and Paz Zamora was sealed at Palenque’s

house (Paz Ballivián and Cevallos 2001: 163). In the end, CONDEPA

joined the 1989 coalition, and received minor posts within the

Development Corporation of La Paz.73 The core of the coalition,

however, remained with the ADN and MIR.

After almost three months of negotiations, and after exhausting a

series of scenarios that never materialized, the Patriotic Accord was

forged.74 The ADN surprisingly decided to give the votes to the MIR.

Under the agreement, the President was elected from one of the formulas

(MIR), and the vice president was elected from the other formula (ADN-

PDC). That is how the Jaime Paz Zamora-Luis Ossio Sanjinés formula

came into being. The agreement included the sharing of the executive

posts, as well as leadership of the legislative chambers. It also included

dividing the management posts of the state enterprises, and the regional

development corporations. In the end, a clear model of cogovernment

was put in place.

The MIR decision to accept the ADN support was made by Paz

Zamora, and the MIR negotiating team. However, the whole of the

party was not involved in deciding to forge the Patriotic Accord. That is

why the AP was such a surprise for everyone.75 By “crossing the rivers of

blood,” as Paz Zamora put it, the ADN and MIR agreed to share the

government in equal parts (Carvajal Donoso 2000: 43). It is important to

mention that this was not the first alliance between the MIR and the

ADN. The antecedent that preceded the Patriotic Accord in 1989, and

the Commitment for Bolivia in 1997 for that matter, were the political

agreements that the MIR made with General Banzer in 1978, and later


with his party ADN in 1981. The MIR reached an agreement in 1978

with General Banzer to make democracy viable in Bolivia, and in 1981

another agreement was forged to overthrow the dictator Luis Garcia

Meza. This time the two leaders decided not to sign any agreement and

indicated that their “word” was enough, a direct message to Sánchez de

Lozada who had breached a written agreement.

A day before the congressional election, General Banzer publicly

announced to Paz Zamora that “the Patriotic Convergence would give

support to the MIR-New Majority with no conditions.” He also stated

that his party would assume the line of constructive opposition in

Congress. This was a curious misunderstanding since the negotiating

teams of both parties had advanced in detail an agreement for cogovern-

ment that none of the chiefs publicly mentioned. The misunderstanding

was corrected in the morning hours of the next day (Fernández Saavedra

2004: 71). What this misunderstanding also shows is the disconnect

between party leaders and party militants. The Patriotic Accord, just as

the Pact for Democracy, was forged by negotiating teams with no

involvement from the party militants, or at least some basic input. In this

case, the different scenarios considered were discussed by the ADN and

MIR negotiating teams in social settings, and at people’s houses, with no

real participation of the party, much less the parliamentarians elected

with the party.

The main protagonists of this “marriage of convenience,” the MIR

and ADN, had vital interests in brokering the pact. A series of facilitating

factors in the forging of this alliance also existed. First, the electoral

arrangements and its effects on the composition of Congress were crucial.

The fraud perpetrated by the Band of the Four facilitated the election of

the third most voted candidate. By minimizing the differences between

the first three candidates and taking the Senate and deputy seats from the

MNR and other smaller parties, the possibility of an ADN-MIR alliance

became real (Mesa Gisbert 2003a: 34).

Second, the decision by Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR to break the

Pact for Democracy with the ADN repositioned the MNR away from

the other two. Although Sánchez de Lozada won a slight plurality

(23.07 percent) to Banzer (22.7 percent) and Jaime Paz Zamora’s (19.6

percent), neither the ADN nor the MIR would contemplate supporting

the MNR’s claim. If Sánchez de Lozada maintained the pact, Banzer

would have become president, and Sánchez de Lozada would have had to

wait for another opportunity.76

Third, the campaign style adopted by Sánchez de Lozada was also

ill-fated. The breaking of the pact and the negative campaigning adopted

by the MNR fomented a strong personal dislike for Sánchez de Lozada


by Banzer.77 Even a newspaper headline appeared stating that “personal

problems between Banzer and Sánchez de Lozada impeded an MNR-

ADN agreement.”78 The bitterness between the MNR and ADN opened

the possibility for the third candidate to play on the rivalry.

Fourth, its formation and sustainability rested on their willingness to

concede to the proposals of the other. Payoffs and concessions also had a

role in the ADN’s decision to support Paz Zamora. In this sense, a fifth

factor, ideological convergence, also had a role. The MIR had moved

from a leftist position: radical and Marxist during the 1970s, to a social-

democratic left in the moderate center. It was the same for Banzer who

went from a fascist right during the dictatorship to a moderate center-

right. So, most parties were converging to the center.

Banzer knew he would not be elected president, so he decided to

support the least dislikable option. The reason behind this decision was

the strong rejection that various political sectors and important societal

sectors continued to feel about constitutionally electing someone who

had been one of the worst dictators of Bolivian history (Mesa Gisbert

2003a: 33). Thus Banzer was motivated to support the Patriotic Accord

to reemphasize, once more, his conversion to democracy. Finally, policy

continuity had an important role. The Patriotic Accord was brokered as

a mechanism for Congress to pass legislation that would further the

implementation of the NPE economic reforms. Paz Zamora assured the

banking and financial markets that the NPE would be maintained.79

One of the more pragmatic reasons for the AP was the sharing of state

patronage. The Accord was attractive to the ADN because it facilitated

the party’s access to agenda setting and policymaking. Indeed, the ADN

and MIR shared half of the government. ADN-PDC would be in charge

of 10 of the 17 ministries 80 while the MIR had 7. In addition, also in

August 1989, the Political Council of the Patriotic Accord or COPAP

(Consejo Político Suprapartidario) was established under the leadership of

Hugo Banzer.81 With this, the idea of a cogovernment between Banzer

and Paz Zamora was materialized.

The COPAP was composed of five members of the MIR and five of

the ADN-PDC alliance. The Council was established for consultation

and coordination purposes to sustain the national unity government

(Soria Saravia 2002: 176–177). By chairing this political committee,

ADN had direct access to policy formation as well as direct oversight and

an advisory role over the legislative and executive branches of government.

The COPAP was useful for promoting better relations between the ruling

parties and it was praised as the instrument necessary for the consolidation

of Bolivian democracy and the modernization of the Bolivian state

(Gamarra 1994: 111). Table 2.7 shows the composition of the COPAP.


Like his uncle, in an August 24 speech from 1989, in the event of the

establishment of the Council, Jaime Paz Zamora asserted that the

Patriotic Accord “responded to more profound tendencies.” Paz Zamora

continued to distance the MIR from its leftist origins. He asserted that

it was time for “political consensus-building and coalition govern-

ments . . . Because now the pragmatic component is the most important

one in which no ideology is able to become viable. Seeking solutions to

concrete problems does not require for one to renounce to one’s

principles” (Paz Zamora, Jaime. La Bolivia de Hoy, Tres Discursos del

Presidente. La Paz, 1989–1990). Also on behalf of the MIR, Eid Franco

appeared in the media indicating that ideological differences would not

be a reason not to make good government.82

Furthering the NPE: The Privatization Law

The Bolivian electorate voted for the continuation of the economic

adjustment model. The three parties that bowed to support the NPE—

the MNR, ADN, and the MIR—obtained 72.72 percent of the popular

vote in the 1989 elections. It was thus logical that further implementation

of the NPE would take place.

By 1989, inf lation had dropped to 16.56 percent (National Statistical

Institute data), but various NPE policy initiatives did not get to be

implemented during the Paz Estenssoro administration. For one, the

decentralization of the administration of health and education was not

carried out due to massive protests which prevented it from happening.

The program to reactivate the economy by extending fresh credit to the

private sector lagged. Some short-term macroeconomic problems

reappeared. And finally, the privatization of public enterprises was not

significantly implemented (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 186). The

Table 2.7 Composition of the Political

Council of the Patriotic Accord or COPAP

MIR* ADN

Gastón Encinas Valverde Marion Rolon Anaya

Guillermo Capobianco Antonio Ormachea

Samuel Doria Medina Ronald McClean

Mario Rueda Peña Franz Ondarza

Gonzalo Valda Jorge Agreda

* Presencia, 8/10/1989.


antecedent to the Privatization Law by Paz Zamora was Supreme Decree

22407 of January 1990, which focused on differentiating his policies from

the previous administration’s, though they were different at a minimal

level, and on furthering some of the measures.

Through Decree 22407, the Paz Zamora government established four

objectives: stability, growth, human development and the modernization

of the state. In terms of stability and economic growth, the decree ratified

the policy of price liberty, and proposed to elaborate and approve legisla-

tion for the financial sector and to establish the rules of the game for

national and foreign private investors. It also proposed the further privati-

zation of state enterprises, and the opening up of the economy to foreign

investment, especially in mining and hydrocarbons.

In terms of human development, the administration sought to promote

programs to link more actively the private sector with labor organizations

and thus promote employment, education and social services, and reduce

poverty. In terms of the modernization of the state, Paz Zamora proposed

to reduce the size of the state coining another famous phrase regarding

this: “To reduce the state is to aggrandize the nation.” At the beginning

of its tenure, the government dissolved 20 subsecretaries of the 57 that

existed. The Minister of Finance indicated that this would allow the saving

of Bs. 140,000 millions that would be destined for public investment and

the payment of the foreign debt.83

The adoption of this decree also allowed the government to propose

an increase in revenues from taxes and the control of public spending. By

doing this, the Paz Zamora administration expected to receive an average

of $265 million per year from direct investment, a portion of which could

be used toward the mining industry.84

Whereas President Paz Zamora saw acceptance on the part of society

toward the Supreme Decree 22407 stating that he was “optimistic because

I see that people have no prejudices against the government, and accepted

the new administration with good faith,” the Supreme Decree 22407 was

qualified by the opposition as a continuation of the 21060. For instance,

Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that he has always thought that, as the

Bolivian saying goes, the Supreme Decree 22407 was “the same chola

(indigenous woman) with another pollera (skirt).” Government representa-

tives denied this by indicating that whereas the Paz Estenssoro’s decree

sought stability, the Supreme Decree 22407 sought economic growth with

social development,85 two elements the Supreme Decree 21060 supposedly

lacked.

Ongoing public protests started as the Supreme Decree 22407 was

decreed. To control opposition, Paz Zamora also had to resort to

repression, through a state of siege declared on November 15, 1989.


However, he guaranteed the political rights of the citizens and parties

participating in the 1989 electoral municipal process to take place the

following month.86

Law 1330 or Privatization Law served to further the NPE. This piece

of legislation was sanctioned by Congress on April 24, 1992 and followed

Paz Zamora’s unilateral attempts to pass privatization reforms. However,

it was only with the approval of Congress that the privatization of the

majority of the state-owned enterprises would take place.

The proposal of a privatization law emerged from two different realms,

one international and one internal to the AP. On one hand, privatization

measures accompanied the package of structural adjustment reforms

proposed by the Washington Consensus. In that sense, Paz Zamora and

his party did not propose the privatization measures but responded to

outside dynamics.87 The government itself indicated that it promised to

launch the privatization decree as a commitment made with the World

Bank.88 On the other hand, the privatization decree and later the law

were also a product of the impetus of two of the AP ministers: the

Minister of Planning, Samuel Doria Medina (MIR), and the Minister of

Finance, Jorge Quiroga (ADN), later political rivals in the 2005 presi-

dential campaign. Doria Medina and Quiroga had previously worked

together in the Ministry of Planning when Quiroga was Minister and

Doria Medina was undersecretary for Public Investment and International

Cooperation. They were both interested in advancing privatization, and

were the technical designers of the law.

The reforms that took place in Paz Estenssoro’s administration

mainly focused on restoring macroeconomic activity, liberalizing trade

and the market, and correcting price relativity to bring them into line

with those of the market. The Privatization Law also sought to refine

the relationship between the state and the private sector and between

central government and local government. What later became known

as the “capitalization” of former state companies entered a f irst stage of

implementation with this law.

The law also proposed the establishment of the National Economic

and Planning Council (Consejo Nacional de Economía y Planificación-

CONEPLAN). This body would be in charge of regulating and

monitoring the privatization process and defining the appropriate strate-

gies to implement the law. It was designated as the sole representative of

the interest of the Bolivian state. Through the sale of state enterprises, in

other words, actives, assets, values and properties, Article 7 of the law

aimed the net earnings toward investment projects and the building of

economic and social infrastructure of the department in which the


enterprises were located—a form of decentralization. While the income

generated from the sale of public enterprises had to stay with the central

government and be incorporated into the public investment budget, the

law stipulated that investment had to be directed, as a priority, in favor of

extreme poverty groups.

Article 9 of the Privatization Law regulated its approval by the

executive. It indicated that the executive had to make the law valid no

later than 30 days after its enactment by Congress. Given that the law had

been accepted by the legislature as sent by the president, no major con-

f licts took place in terms of its approval. The ADN-MIR stranglehold on

the legislature facilitated a quick, although dubious, approval of the law.

In a controversial legislative procedure, the law was approved by the

lower chamber with no quorum (Morales 1994: 141). For these reasons,

from April to December 1992, a threat of an annulment of the law by the

MNR-controlled Supreme Court existed (Gamarra 1994b: 57; Morales

1994: 141).

The law contained the list of state enterprises that would be trans-

ferred to the private sector. According to the government, the national

airline, Lloyd Bolivian Airlines (LAB), would be privatized first. The

regional development corporations would follow although there were

some “unnecessary ideological debates in terms of their privatization,” as

former Minister of Finance, David Blanco asserted.89

Privatization increased somewhat after the sale of the cooking oil

factory. But the process was plagued by problems ranging from incompe-

tence to an overwhelming emphasis on details to sell off factories which

in one case went for only $500 (Morales 1992). By December 1992, the

government had failed to privatize the companies proposed in the law.

Gamarra (1997a: 126) asserts that “as of December 31, 1992, the govern-

ment had [only] sold off a trout farm for $28,750, three ceramic factories

for approximately $1.4 million, and a chicken farm for $16,300.”

Moreover, privatization was not done in a timely manner. There was

no time to privatize the important state-run enterprises such as the

Bolivian Oil company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Bolivianos-YPB), or the

National Telephone Company (Empresa Nacional de Telefonos-ENTEL).

There was little advancement in terms of the joint venture contracts signed

by the State Mining Corporation or COMIBOL with private companies.

The case of the Lithco Corporation from the United States is also illustra-

tive. Lithco wanted to extract lithium reserves in the Uyuni area. An

agreement had been negotiated by the government but found opposition

by the Potosí Civic Committee. After major protests and strikes in Potosí,

Lithco left to seek similar reserves in Argentina. The privatization plan of


this administration then was limited to the privatization of two hotels

confiscated from the owners due to debt, an oil manufacturing company

and other smaller factories (Baptista Gumucio 1996: 359).

Sustaining the Patriotic Accord

The Patriotic Accord was mainly dependent on two factors. On one

hand, political affinity supported and sustained the political alliance—

both the ADN and MIR had shown an explicit commitment to the

structural adjustment measures initiated with the NPE. On the other,

state patronage motivated the ADN and even members of Paz Zamora’s

own party to guarantee him a legislative majority.

The Bolivian electoral arrangements for the election of the president,

and the constitutional powers ascribed to the Bolivian executive and leg-

islature necessarily forced Paz Zamora and the 1989–1993 legislature to

coexist as well as utilize interinstitutional negotiation to be able to move

policy proposals or legislation forward. Outside challenges were resolved

through the adoption of the Patriotic Accord in the sense that the ADN-

MIR majority neutralized the MNR opposition. However, this Accord

was also based on political clientelism. Payoffs were necessary to sustain

the governing coalition:

Positional Payoffs

Through the Accord, the ADN received the vice presidency and nine

key governmental posts, while the MIR received the presidency and the

other half of the governmental posts. The Political Council had five

representatives of each party, and served as a supranational institution

with control over all government affairs. The leader of the Council was

Banzer (ADN). The distribution of posts was almost symmetrical.

Indeed, the MIR had to concede power, otherwise, it would not have

been able to govern. In his cabinet, positional payoffs were also distributed

as table 2.8 shows.

Indeed, the exchange of positions for political support became more

explicit. Although the AP was criticized for dividing power so bluntly, its

leaders found the sharing of state patronage completely appropriate. Oscar

Eid Franco (2004) asserted that the positional payoffs were distributed in

normal levels: “Distributing positional payoffs is normal and should

continue, why is that bad?” In Paz Zamora’s second and third cabinets,

the ADN and MIR also shared posts on relatively equal terms.

Table

2.8

Paz Z

am

ora

A

dm

inis

trati

on:

Cabin

et

1 (P

repare

d by th

e auth

or

usi

ng data

fr

om

th

e G

aceta

Ofi

cia

l, inte

rvie

ws,

and n

ew

spapers

)

Nam

e P

P

Min

istr

ySta

rtin

g D

ate

End

Dat

e

Car

los

Iturr

alde

Bal

livia

n

AD

N

Min

iste

r of Fore

ign

Rel

atio

ns

August

6, 1989

Mar

ch 1

7, 1

992

Guil

lerm

o C

apobia

nco

Riv

era

AD

NM

inis

ter

of In

teri

or

August

6, 1989

Mar

ch 1

5, 1991

Hect

or

Orm

achea

Pen

aran

da

AD

NM

inis

ter

of D

efe

nse

A

ugust

6, 1989

August

9, 1991

En

rique

Gar

cia

Rodri

guez

AD

NM

inis

ter

of P

lan

nin

g

August

6, 1989

August

9, 1991

Dav

id B

lanco

Zav

ala

AD

NM

inis

ter

of Fin

ance

A

ugust

6, 1989

Mar

ch 1

7, 1

992

Mar

iano B

apti

sta

Gum

ucio

M

IRM

inis

ter

of E

duca

tion

August

6, 1989

August

9, 1991

Wil

ly V

argas

Vac

aflo

r A

DN

Min

iste

r of T

ransp

ort

atio

nA

ugust

6, 1989

Mar

ch 1

7, 1

992

Gu

ido C

esp

edes

Arg

andona

MIR

Min

iste

r of In

dust

ryA

ugust

6, 1989

August

9, 1991

Osc

ar Z

amora

Medin

acel

li

MIR

Min

iste

r of L

abor

August

6, 1989

Novem

ber

12, 1992

Mar

io P

az Z

amora

MIR

Min

iste

r of Socia

l Securi

tyA

ugust

6, 1989

Mar

ch 1

7, 1

992

Wal

ter

Sori

ano L

ea

Pla

za

AD

NM

inis

ter

of M

inin

gA

ugust

6, 1989

August

9, 1991

Angel

Zan

nie

r C

laro

s M

IRM

inis

ter

of E

ner

gy

August

6, 1989

August

9, 1991

Mau

ro B

erte

ro G

uti

erre

z A

DN

Min

iste

r of Peas

ant

Aff

airs

August

6, 1989

Mar

ch 1

7, 1

992

Gust

avo F

ern

andez

Saa

vedra

MIR

Min

iste

r of th

e P

resi

den

cy

August

6, 1989

August

6, 1993

Man

fredo K

em

pff

Suar

ez

AD

NM

inis

ter

of In

form

atio

nA

ugust

6, 1989

July

3, 1990

En

rique

Pra

da

Abas

to

AD

NM

inis

ter

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Paz Zamora’s last cabinet was composed of members of both parties.

This time the majority of them were from his party, but it lasted less than

a year, until the end of his presidency in August 1989.

In the legislature, the AP also divided the legislative commissions: the

constitution and justice commission, international affairs, economic

policy, education, communications, etcetera, in the lower chamber,

excluding minority and opposition groups from the commissions. The

posts were distributed to MIR and ADN militants: 11 under the leader-

ship of the MIR, and 10 under the leadership of the ADN.90 The leader-

ship of the chambers was also divided between the two parties.

Agenda-Setting

Naturally, with the distribution of posts also came the division of responsi-

bilities in terms of the design of public policy. Much more than in the case

of the Paz Estenssoro administration, policy concessions were another

incentive for the maintenance of functioning executive-legislative relations

in Paz Zamora’s government. Indeed, through its leadership of the Political

Committee, and of the Chamber of Deputies, the ADN was given direct

access to the setting of the legislative agenda, which still focused on the

commitment to the continuity of the NPE.91

Congressional Opposition: How effective was it?

The MNR, less than a month since the inauguration, presented a request

for an oral report to the whole cabinet to appear before the lower cham-

ber and inform the legislature of the plans of the new government.92 In

January of the following year (1990), the cabinet presented the oral report

to the lower chamber. The MNR was unsatisfied with the report and the

party caucus walked out of the chambers.93

Constitutional provisions allowed Paz Zamora to govern without

the consent of the assembly in certain situations. As with the case of

Paz Estenssoro, Article 96 gave Paz Zamora the authority to imple-

ment policies by decree, but his legal powers were not unfettered since

Article 59, and more strongly, Article 70 of the CPE, allowed the

Bolivian Congress to exert an oversight role by questioning cabinet

ministers.

Within the MIR, as would be expected, his acceptance of liberal eco-

nomic policies caused resistance amongst the most radical groups. Outside

his party, Paz Zamora faced popular opposition by the labor sectors, and

he was forced to deal with the MNR as the leader of the opposition


within the legislature. The intraparty challenges were resolved through

political clientelism and the practice of co-opting intraparty dissenters

with public appointments (Morales 1994: 132). The president had a harder

time dealing with the MNR.

Although the fiscalization role of Congress was limited by the force of

the AP majority, opposition parties managed to exert opposition tactics

to disrupt the Paz Zamora administration. Some of these included:

● In the second year of the administration, opposition deputy Edwin

Rodriguez attempted a Malfeasance Trial against President Paz

Zamora, Congress denied the motion. The reason for the request for

a trial was Paz Zamora’s decision to deliver former Minister of the

Interior, Luis Arce Gomez, to the US to be tried there on

narco-trafficking charges.94 In the legislative session, of 114 parlia-

mentarians, 24 voted for the trial, 87 rejected it, and 3 voted

blank.95

● The MNR deputy Juan Pereira Florillo requested the interpellation

of Minister of Foreign Relations Carlos Iturralde, Minister of

Finance David Blanco, Minister of Energy Angel Zanier, due to the

commercialization of hydrocarbon subproducts and the allocation of

$600,000 to the National Electricity Company (Empresa Nacional

de Electricidad—ENDE), without consulting Congress.96

● Eudoro Galindo, an opposition senator, established a record in the

Senate by speaking without interruptions for 9.30 hours to delay, and

possibly avoid, the approval of the hydrocarbons and mining laws.97

● Minister of Planning, Enrique Garcia, and of Finance, David Blanco

presented an oral report to the Commission of Regional Development

of the lower chamber on the situation of the regional development

corporations and decentralization in Bolivia.98

Although the requests for oral reports by the MNR were initiated in

the chamber of deputies, they were not completed in the 990 congres-

sional sessions of the 1989–1990 legislative period.99 Paz Zamora also

faced confrontation in the declaration of the state of siege. Immediately

after being declared, CONDEPA, the Socialist Party (PS-1) and the

MNR rejected the declaration of state of siege and demanded the respect

for civil liberties.100

To demand the end of the state of siege, six deputies also declared a

hunger strike.101 In this state of siege, leaders of various sectors were

arrested, mainly those on the hunger strike. While some were taken to

different locations in the eastern part of the country, other professors


and students were exiled to Argentina. One hundred and sixty-eight

people were relocated from La Paz to Ibibobo in the Department of

Tarija, to Ramon Dario Gutierrez in Beni and to Apolo in the

Department of La Paz.102

The Paz Estenssoro and Paz Zamora

Administrations: Street and Strike Politics

With the state of siege declared on September 1985, Paz Estenssoro was

able to arrest and send to internal exile in the departments of Beni and

Pando, over two hundred COB leaders, including Juan Lechin Oquendo,

the legendary COB leader. Without legal recourse, these people were

kept in exile until October 1985 when the COB called off the strike and

showed a willingness to engage in dialogue with the government

(Gamarra 1987: 410).

In 1986, mining workers went on strikes again and peasants, the COB,

teachers, coca leaf growers, etcetera, started various protests against the

government. In March 1988, The March for Life saw 50,000 people

march to La Paz to protest against Paz Estenssoro’s administration. The

March went from the mining camps in Oruro to the capital to protest a

government proposal to decentralize the health and educational systems.

The marchers were dispersed when they reached the Altiplano under

another state of siege declared by Paz Estenssoro.103

In April 1988, the COB continued promoting social unrest. In late

April the government faced widespread social unrest and harsh opposi-

tion from labor unions and attempted to reach a truce so that Pope John

Paul II could start his 9-day visit to Bolivia. Street and strike politics were

characteristic of this period.

During the Paz Zamora administration, the effects of the NPE were

also felt mostly by the lower classes, including unionized teachers. In

November 1989, hundreds of people throughout the country went on

hunger strikes to protest the continued economic measures and to demand

benefits from the state.

The teacher’s union leaders Miguel Lora and Telmo Roman held a

three-week hunger strike to demand a bonus of 300 Bolivians for

teachers who had been negatively affected by the NPE and privatiza-

tion policies. Militants of the Revolutionary Worker’s Party (Partido

Obrero Revolucionario) were accused of altering order, promoting

violence, and attempting suicide. Other teachers such as Wilma Plata,

Eliodoro Tiniti, Oscar Vega, and Eduardo Flores were involved in the

hundreds of hunger strikes (or “piquetes”) throughout the country.


Vega and Flores tried to crucify themselves at the Universidad Mayor

de San Andrés (UMSA).104

Law 1330 also had opposition both in Congress and in the streets.

Although the ADN-MIR alliance was careful to put forth the argument

that privatization would end state corruption, the MNR opposed the

privatization law approved by the AP in Congress, and did not endorse

any of the attempts at selling off state property, especially the largest state

enterprises which it then believed should remain in state hands. MNR

spokespersons were also vociferous critics of the sale of the former La Paz

Hotel. Populist and leftist political parties, especially CONDEPA and the

MBL also opposed privatization from the outset (Gamarra 1997a: 103).

There were less protests during the Paz Zamora administration as

compared to that of Paz Estenssoro, however. The number of strikes

dropped from 945 between 1983 and 1985 (13 were by the COB), to 506

between 1986 and 1989 (19 by the COB). The Paz Zamora government

only had 109 strikes from 1990 to 1993 (8 by the COB) (Romero Ballivián

1999: 39).

In sum, forging these political agreements allowed these two presi-

dents to ignore popular opposition and move forward with economic

stabilization measures; but popular resistance to the measures was present.

With a legislature brought into policymaking vis-à-vis state patronage

and access to legislative agenda setting, trade unions and organizations

opposing the measures were left without representation inside the insti-

tutional apparatus of the state. Their only available mechanism to protest

were “street and strike” politics—a tactic that became more popular as

time went on.

The Pact for Democracy and the Patriotic

Accord: General Ref lections

Various factors were crucial to the sustainability of these political pacts

from 1985 to 1993.

● Ideological affinity, in terms of the adoption of the economic

stabilization measures to stabilize the national economy, had a direct

impact on the parties‘ interest to build the coalitions. Also, the

economic situation, and the pressure from international and bilateral

donors forced a political affinity around the NPE that probably could

not have been possible in other circumstances.● Political negotiation and bargaining were also crucial to the sustain-

ability of pacted democracy. It was needed both at the electoral and


governing levels. Paz Estenssoro was able to secure legitimacy and

democratic support for the NPE through a decree, but its sustain-

ability depended on the pact. Political negotiation took even more

precedence in the Patriotic Accord, in which two historically

opposed parties formed and sustained a governing coalition.● Paz Estenssoro, Banzer, and Paz Zamora’s political savvy also facili-

tated the emergence and sustainability of these political agreements.

By exerting their political leadership, they were able to reach relative

interparty consensus on economic policy, which at the same time

produced functioning institutional relations needed to implement

the NPE. The three leaders used their personal control over their

respective parties to stabilize the party system and ensure that it

would not emerge as an obstacle to the maintenance of the NPE

(Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 193).● There was further exclusion of the minority parties and civil society

sectors. The application of the NPE was through the practice of

regulating the economy via presidential decrees that circumvented

Congress. In the few cases in which the executive opened discus-

sions in the national legislature, the congressional majorities were

quickly utilized to approve the measures before the emergence of

widespread public debate. This practice was taken to extremes by

Paz Zamora.105

● Finally, the electoral system, especially the congressional election of

the president when no candidate had reached a majority, also

prompted these political leaders to negotiate and reach political deals.

The election of the president by Congress forced the political parties

to form coalitions at the electoral level. But to govern, presidents

also needed to forge coalitions. Also, in this period, the electoral

system for the election of legislators tended to favor bigger parties to

the detriment of smaller ones. The 1986 electoral reform had the

principal objective of concentrating parliamentary representation in

a few parties (ADN, MNR, MIR) through the revision of a propor-

tional coefficient that had favored minority parties. Moreover, the

electoral system allowed the parties to manipulate the voting count-

ing procedures. With this, the majority parties had the best scenario

to monopolize congressional seats. Giving the ADN, MNR and

MIR predominance in the party system, and the legislature, the

electoral system facilitated coalition building.

Gamarra (1994: 123) proposes that the creation and sustainability of

these two coalitions from 1985 through 1993 reveal various trends about


the nature of politics in Bolivia. On one hand, they reveal that long term

pacts can allow executives to overcome recalcitrant congressional opposi-

tion. Similarly, it shows that by 1993, Bolivia’s political class was showing

a great degree of political maturity. Finally, we see that coalition building

can contribute toward the stability of the Bolivian political system.

In the same way, these early Bolivian experiences with coalition build-

ing also revealed the early signs of what later became a major f law of the

Bolivian political system, the emerging formal dependence of political

groups on state patronage. This tendency toward job factionalism gener-

ally drove the logic of political party competition and became crucial to

the survival of presidents in Bolivia in the years ahead.

The greatest limitation of these pacts, as it was observed toward the

end of the Paz Zamora administration, was the beginning of a move away

from programmatic goals toward clientelism and job factionalism.

Starting with the AP, the concept of a governing coalition with direct

proportions of participation in the state apparatus also became open, and

accepted. In 1989, a stronger connection between parliamentary support

and the responsibilities of the executive existed. This period also saw the

beginning of generalized corruption.106

As later events reveal, for these pacts to continue to have an impact,

programmatic content could not be discarded for the substitution of

political patronage. Moreover, the pacts needed to take into account the

demands emerging from society to connect the programmatic goals to

the needs and demands of the citizens. This could have been done by

creating spaces for dialogue between government and civil society, among

other strategies that favored inclusion and citizen participation.

CHAPTER 3

PAVING THE WAY FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOLIVIAN POLITICS:ELECTORAL REFORMSAND COALITION BUILDING

After serious allegations of partisanship and a major fraud scandal in

the 1989 elections, by 1993, the National Electoral Court (CNE)

had recovered its credibility and was considered by all parties a legitimate

institution to oversee the electoral process. Political parties had agreed

to strengthen the Electoral Court by incorporating highly qualified

individuals as members.

The 1993 elections took place after a campaign with three basic

characteristics: (a) the marriage between the right and the left contin-

ued; this time the ADN and the MIR launched a joint ticket for the

presidency and vice presidency through the AP electoral coalition;

(b) the MNR assertively sought the presidency, building on the image

of the “victim” whose victory had been stolen in the 1989 electoral

process 1 and capitalizing on the indigenousness of the vice presidential

candidate; and (c) neopopulism emerged; new parties CONDEPA and

UCS used their populist and indigenous extractions to amass political

support. The outcome was an interesting one.

Before 1993, the greatest concentration of votes had occurred in the

1982 election when the UDP won 38 percent of the vote. In this election,

votes concentrated in relatively similar levels. The MNR had its best vot-

ing record in history with 35.56 percent going to Sánchez de Lozada, who

won in eight of the nine departments. This time, mistakenly thinking


they could build on the results of the AP alliance, the ADN and MIR

launched a joint ticket. Hugo Banzer tried to become a democratically

elected president for the third time. This time, former MIR president

Jaime Paz Zamora’s half brother, Oscar Zamora Medinacelli, ran with

Banzer for the vice presidency. Together, they achieved 21.05 percent of

the vote.

Two parties disputed the third place: CONDEPA received 14.29 percent

of the votes, and Max Fernández’ UCS 13.77 percent, as f igure 3.1

illustrates. These parties captured the vote of the marginalized and

popular sectors of society that were disenchanted with the political and

economic models designed and implemented by the majority parties.

Although small, the MBL had the best voting record in any election.

Receiving 5.36 percent of the votes, the MBL became the f ifth politi-

cal force in Congress. Nine other parties received a small plurality of

the votes.

Although he was not elected by Congress, Sánchez de Lozada received

the highest plurality of the votes in the 1989 elections. The main reason

was the electoral system. Four basic factors can be attributed to Sánchez

de Lozada’s success this time. First, to get votes the MNR capitalized on

its image of a victim of CNE fraud. Second, the MNR put together an

electoral campaign with modern political marketing tools. Sawyer and

Miller, the U.S. polling firm that had advised Sánchez de Lozada in the



35.56%

21.05%

14.29%

13.77%

5.36%1.87%

1.84%

1.27% 1.10% 1.28% 0.98% 0.77% 0.38% 0.48%

MNR-MRTKL

AP

CONDEPA

UCS

MBL

ARBOL

ASD

FSB

EJE

VR-9

83TR A NSFOR M ATION OF BOLI V I A N POLITICS

1989 electoral campaign, advised him again in 1993 and partly directed

the campaign using innovative ads and mass media elements. The MNR’s

other strategy was the so-called New Plan (Plan Nuevo), that is, visiting

from door to door as many households as possible throughout the territory

to present Sánchez de Lozada’s candidacy and his government plan.2

Third, Sánchez de Lozada chose an indigenous person as his running

mate—the leader of a fraction of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj

Katari L.3 An internal decision-making process was undertaken to

decide who would be Sánchez de Lozada’s running mate. The process

was greatly inf luenced by Sánchez de Lozada. As Oscar Arrien Sandoval,

a MNR Deputy, recounts, there were two possible candidates to run

for the vice presidency on the MNR ticket in 1993: Cardenas, the well-

educated Aymara who was the leader of the MRTKL party, and Percy

Fernández, an MNR strong man from Santa Cruz. Arrien Sandoval

recounts that the majority of the National Command of the party was

leaning toward Percy Fernández because he was from Santa Cruz, an

economically important region of the country, and had a powerful

political demeanor. However, “Goni imposed his view; he imposed

Victor Hugo Cardenas, creating a risk for an internal confrontation of

the party.”

According to him, Sánchez de Lozada proposed Cardenas at the be-

ginning of the National Command Meeting; the vote was 2 to 1 in

favor of Percy Fernández. To avoid getting to a vote, Sánchez de

Lozada arbitrarily decided to suspend the meeting. He then held indi-

vidual meetings with about 100 delegates to explain the reasons why

his running mate had to be Víctor Hugo Cárdenas. Sánchez de Lozada

got their votes, and the MNR party launched the 1993 electoral cam-

paign with Cardenas as the running mate for the vice presidency. The

MNR thus built the electoral campaign on two things: (i) the image of

Victor Hugo Cardenas as “a son of the Revolution,” an attribute

Sánchez de Lozada did not have, and as an effort to appeal to indige-

nous voters and (ii) a brutal attack on corruption. He also capitalized

on his success as a businessman. Without a well-developed discourse

and using a memorable phrase (very common for Bolivian political

leaders to do)—“Victor Hugo doesn’t know how to steal, and I don’t

need to”4—Sánchez de Lozada tried to differentiate his party from its

contenders. This phrase granted him credibility but also two of the

attributes Bolivians were looking for in the next administration:

honesty and eff icacy (Müller & Asociados 1993: 7). Surely his relaxed

demeanor, wittiness, and directness when communicating with the

populace also helped.


The fourth factor had to do with the configuration of forces in

Congress, including the entrance of populist parties as potential

coalition partners, and the very ambitious government plan proposed

by the MNR during the campaign: the Plan for All (Plan de Todos).

This electoral platform proposed reforms as profound as those of the

1952 Revolution in the economic, political, educational, and electoral

realms.

In the economic realm, the plan proposed the innovative “capitaliza-

tion” law that would allow for the sale of 50 percent of the shares of certain

government enterprises in exchange for infusions of capital into these

firms. Shares for the remaining 50 percent would be distributed to Bolivians

and vested in a pension program. Under these reforms, dividends emanating

from the pension accounts were channeled to the BonoSol, a program of

annual payments to Bolivians over the age of 65.

In the political realm, the Plan for All proposed the design and

implementation of a Popular Participation program that would create

municipalities throughout the country; it would give them funds and

significant autonomy to administer them and invest in health, education,

and infrastructure development. It would also enable local citizens to

vote for local officials and hold them accountable for their actions.

In the educational realm, the Plan for All proposed a broad educa-

tional reform that would provide for a bilingual system of education such

that Spanish and indigenous languages could be taught in schools. The

Plan also included improvements in teacher training and compensation

based on performance, changes in teacher qualifications, a strengthened

ministry of education, merit hiring of school supervisors, special atten-

tion to girls’ education, national testing of students and teachers, and local

school councils, among other measures.

Although the MNR had the highest number of votes, Article 90 of

the Constitution still forced parties to agree on a congressionally elected

president given that no candidate received 51 percent of the votes. As

opposed to the uncertainty in 1989, in 1993, all political parties recog-

nized the MNR’s victory the day of the vote (Romero Ballivián 1999: 42).

The coalition-building process began.

Bolivian political leaders 5 relate that putting together these coalitions

is usually done over dinner or drinks, and the most pragmatic of them

usually conduct parallel negotiations with different parties. In this case,

forming an alliance with the ADN or MIR was not an option. Instead,

Sánchez de Lozada and his aides started negotiations principally with

CONDEPA and the UCS, but also with the MBL.


The Impact of the Electoral System

on the Composition of Congress

The experience of the 1989 elections showed that an important transfor-

mation of the electoral system needed to be made. Thus, for the June 6,

1993 elections, the electoral arrangements were modified according to the

terms agreed by political party leaders at a “political summit” held in

1991.

At this summit, the leaders of the MNR, ADN, and MIR as well as

CONDEPA and the MBL met and signed the “Agreements of February 5,

1991.” The document contemplated a series of reforms to the electoral

system to be implemented through Congress. Party leaders then instructed

their party caucuses in Congress on the results of the summit and an

interparty commission proposed a Draft Law on an Electoral Reform.

The law was approved and enacted on July 5, 1991.

Four important characteristics of this agreement need to be mentioned.

First, the agreement was done outside of the legislature with no inclusion

of political party militants or societal sectors. Second, the representatives

of the parties present at the “summit” were not the chiefs of the party

caucuses in Congress; they were the party chiefs who had not been able

to enter Congress. Since the agreement was made outside of Congress,

parliamentarians had no input in the decision-making process and were

limited to following instructions on how to vote in Congress. This cre-

ated a huge disconnect between the chief, the parliamentarians, and the

people. MIR parliamentarian Hugo Carvajal Donoso (2004: 67) defines

this as the jefaturismo phenomenon. The jefaturas (chiefs) of the parties

monopolized the decision-making process on issues related to the party

and to the country in general. Through the so-called political summits,

the chiefs agreed on changes on specific issues and instructed the rest of

the party on the decisions made and on the next steps. In his view, the

effects of this phenomenon were devastating for the party system because

(i) the organic and deliberative culture within political organizations was

annihilated, (ii) the possibility of the emergence of new leadership

was annulled, and (iii) the historic visibility of democracy in the country

was obscured.

The third factor relates to the strength of the chiefs present relative to

the votes received in the election. The political summit was not a meeting

of equals. Each chief participated and negotiated the 1991 agreements

knowing the weight each had in Congress.6 This inf luenced the out-

comes. Finally, the agreement did not include all the parties. It was made

by five of the ten parties elected to Congress in 1989.


The greatest achievement of the 1991 reform, however, was the

institutionalization of the CNE. This effectively disassociated party

politics from the electoral process. The parties agreed that the CNE

needed autonomy. Thus, they agreed that it would be composed of five

members not associated with any political party who would be elected by

two-thirds of the votes in the National Congress, plus one member

appointed by the president. The reform also included the “principle of

preclusion” (Art. 171, 1991 Electoral Law), which eliminated the mecha-

nisms that allowed the departmental and national electoral courts to

review the voting procedures and annul votes if they thought them

invalid.

The party leaders also thought it would be important to guarantee

minority representation. They eliminated the quotient (simple or double

of the D’Hondt formula) and proposed the “odd divisor” on the grounds

that it was more accurate. The problem became political rather than

technical. In the end, there was consensus, and the procedure to calculate

the translation of votes into parliamentary seats was changed substituting

the double quotient system, established in 1956, with the D’Hondt for-

mula using the odd divisors variant.7 No legal threshold for entrance in

the legislature was established.

The 1993 Electoral Law also conferred, in a more systematic manner,

rights and obligations to political parties. With this reform, electoral

legislation also became more systematic with regards to presidential and

congressional elections. Article 130 stated that to be elected president and

vice president, the party ticket had to obtain the absolute majority (half

plus one) of the valid votes. This prohibited parties from granting the

presidency and vice presidency to candidates of different tickets, a practice

that occurred in the previous administration.

For the election of senators, the same arrangements were maintained.

Previous electoral reforms in Bolivia generally had the intention of

limiting the entrance of small parties into the chambers of Congress and

concentrating the vote in the majority parties. However, the intention of

the 1991 reform was not to marginalize smaller political parties but to

open a space for them to enter Congress.

With this electoral arrangement, eight parties obtained seats in

Congress. In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, three small parties

obtained one seat each while the bigger parties together obtained more

than 107. The 36 percent of the popular vote guaranteed the MNR about

53 percent of the seats in the lower chamber, because the seats distribu-

tion system was not perfectly proportional. The composition of the

Chamber of Deputies was as figure 3.2 indicates.


Two important elements of analysis regarding the electoral system and

its impact on the composition of Congress need to be mentioned. First,

although the UCS and CONDEPA received a relatively equal share of

the votes, the difference in the lower chamber was seven seats. How can

a 0.52 percent voting difference represent seven seats in Congress? The

explanation resides in the regional orientation of the electoral system.

Because of the region-wise parliamentary seat distribution system, the

CONDEPA votes were concentrated fundamentally in the highlands

(Altiplano), and so were the parliamentary seats. UCS received a more

uniform national voting and thus obtained seven parliamentarians more

than CONDEPA, which had votes in only one region (Paz Ballivián and

Cevallos Rueda 2001: 166).

Second, the nature of the electoral reforms suggests a trend toward

granting more opportunities for smaller parties to enter into the legisla-

ture. The numeric difference has been small (one to two seats) from one

formula to the next, but the political implications of a small numeric

difference are great. This is especially true when the composition of

Congress is finalized and the presidential election follows. This time,

more representation was guaranteed.

Because the election of presidents and senators was done on the same

ballot, the distribution of seats in the Senate ref lected the presidential

popular vote percentages. The simple majority elements of the electoral

system concentrated the seats in the four most voted parties, excluding



MNR AP

UCS

CONDEPAM

BLASD

EJE

ARBOL

1117

13

20

35

52


minority parties from the Senate. The MNR won the Senate race in

eight of the nine departments, and in the ninth one the MNR obtained

the second place. Thus the party obtained 17 Senate seats out of the 18 for

the two-thirds majority needed in the Senate for certain laws, including

constitutional reforms. The MBL, with 5 percent of the popular vote,

obtained no seats in the Senate.

In this election, however, it became obvious that Sánchez de Lozada

would be able to form a congressional majority. With 36 percent of the

vote, Sánchez de Lozada had a commanding force in the parliament, to

the point that there was not much the opposition could do in the legislature.8

He needed a very small margin of seats in Congress to secure a majority.

Negotiations started to consolidate a governing coalition.

Governing Coalitions: The Pact for

Governance and the Pact for Change

The newcomers, CONDEPA and UCS, challenged the dominance of the

MNR, ADN, and MIR in the 1993 elections. CONDEPA, led by “El

Compadre” Carlos Palenque, had participated for the first time in the

1989 municipal elections, achieving important results—especially in the

Department of La Paz. In the 1989 presidential elections, it achieved

12 percent of the votes and gave its seats in Congress to support the

election of Paz Zamora.

The other newcomer, Max Fernández with the UCS, followed a sim-

ilar patrimonial logic to attract followers. Beginning in 1989, Fernández

converted the UCS into a mechanism to deliver promises and favors to

vast and remote sectors of Bolivian society, thus establishing the slogan

“Max obras” (Max Works)(Gamarra 1996: 75).

The MBL obtained a very small margin of votes (seven in the lower

chamber and none in the Senate), but it enjoyed widespread respect

among Bolivians because of a track record of honesty and intellectual

capacity. The respect was such that they became known as the “clean

wheat” (trigo limpio). Alfonso Ferrufino, an important leader of the

MBL, recounts that by 1989, the MBL adopted the motto “we are clean

wheat,” doing so was, in his view, a monumental mistake because it was

aggressive and exclusionary to tie all other parties to corruption. The

motto was proposed by a group of MBL militants and quickly taken on

by the media. With 33.32 percent of the vote and 44 parliamentarians

altogether, Sánchez de Lozada sought to put together a coalition with

these parties.


Parallel negotiations were thus started with CONDEPA and UCS,

which had the votes to guarantee Sánchez de Lozada a majority. Sánchez

de Lozada (2004) recounts that it was not that hard to negotiate with Max

Fernández and the UCS because “Max was a populist and did not really

have a strong party.” In other words, the UCS was not going to request

many payoffs, such as government quotas. At the outset, the main conces-

sion Max Fernández requested from the MNR candidate to guarantee

him a majority in Congress was f lexibility in the payment of taxes.9 With

the UCS, Sánchez de Lozada would get exactly two-thirds of the Senate,

and four deputies over and above the two-thirds majority needed in the

Chamber of Deputies to pass legislation. He still tried negotiating with

CONDEPA.

Some polls by the Catholic University in La Paz, and other reliable

polling companies, indicated that by early 1993, Fernández enjoyed great

popularity and the highest percentage of vote intention for the presiden-

tial election. The success in the 1991 municipal elections results also

showed that UCS could become a strong national political force. During

the 1993 electoral campaign, UCS realized that its strongest challenger in

getting the votes from the same electorate was CONDEPA; thus Palenque

started an aggressive campaign against Fernández alleging that the beer

baron had ties with narco-trafficking and accusing the Fernández family

of tax evasion (Paz Ballivián and Cevallos Rueda 2001: 165). Thus, in its

negotiations with Sánchez de Lozada, CONDEPA conditioned its

participation in the coalition to the exclusion of the UCS.

CONDEPA’s Palenque and Paz Ballivián then forced Sánchez de Lozada

to make a decision between the two: “whether to make an alliance with a

strong party that would probably want to be involved in the policymaking

process and had less parliamentarians, or with a party that had no real

interest in policymaking but in receiving tax deferments, but had more

parliamentarians.”10 With the pragmatism that was characteristic of him,

Sánchez de Lozada chose UCS as the coalition partner. Paz Ballivián relates

that at a dinner hosted by Sánchez de Lozada for the CONDEPA leaders,

the would-be president asserted “You know, this is arithmetic, they have

more [parliamentarians] and you have less, I insist Mr. Palenque, I want to

‘make government’ with you, but I will not give up the UCS.”

It is important to mention, however, that MNR militants were not

involved even in the decision of choosing which party to make the alli-

ance with. Some sectors within the party considered Carlos Palenque’s

CONDEPA as a more suitable and strategic partner. CONDEPA was

seen by these MNR sectors basically as a stronghold in the western part


of the country. Although Carlos Palenque had no Aymara or indigenous

origin, “El Compadre” Palenque reached all the popular classes and the

ethnic majority and appealed to both urban and rural sectors. Both

CONDEPA and UCS were populists, but Palenque had what the MNR

was never able to obtain, the indigenous vote. These MNR sectors

thought they could have reached the indigenous sectors even more with

an ally such as CONDEPA.11

The agreement was then made with the UCS. What became known

as the Pact for Governance (Pacto por la Gobernabilidad) served as the

coalition vehicle for the alliance of the MNR with Max Fernández.

Under the terms of the MNR-UCS pact, Fernández followers secured,

among other tradeoffs, one ministry, two undersecretary posts, two

ambassadorships, and the first vice presidency of both the Chamber of

Deputies and the Senate (Gamarra 1997a: 384).

The MNR also forged a pact—the Pact for Change (Pacto por el

Cambio)—with the MBL. With 5 percent of the votes and seven parlia-

mentarians, the MBL was not a strong coalition partner but the MNR

sought to capitalize on their image of honesty and political integrity.

With the offer of one ministry, some congressional and diplomatic posts,

and a genuine interest in the Plan for All, the MBL decided to ally with

the MNR. Although viable, some of its members say that the alliance was

not strategic because the number of parliamentarians gave the MBL no

real power in the coalition to inf luence policy decisions, or at least not

enough to attempt to inf luence the policy formulation process.

The offer to form the Pact for Change was made to Antonio Araníbar

Quiroga, head and presidential candidate of the MBL, but was collec-

tively decided by the party’s National Board. Only three members of the

party opposed the decision: Alfonso Ferrufino, Luis Fernández Fagalde

(Mesa’s first minister of labor), and Maria Mercedes Boiti (who later

retired from the party). Ferrufino asserts that forming the Pact for Change

was a democratic decision, but a strategic error as the 1997 and 2002

election results for the party would later reveal.12

The Sánchez de Lozada Administration:

Popular Participation and Capitalization

With the Plan for All, the MNR entered the electoral game and won.

Political reforms characterized this coalition government. Initially, it

appeared that the demands of the people had finally reached the ears of

their representatives and a series of reforms were implemented in various

realms. According to Sánchez de Lozada (2004), the political reforms


were profound and produced results as important as those of the 1952

National Revolution. Most of the proposals made during the electoral

campaign were delivered, albeit slowly. Two of the most important pieces

of legislation during this period are evaluated below: the Law of Popular

Participation, and the Capitalization Law.

Law 1551 of Popular Participation (LPP)

The discussion and formulation of the Law of Popular Participation,

emblematic of the period from 1993 to 1997, were done without the

MNR’s participation. The MBL claims the origin of the law, or at

least the basic elements of what became known as the Law of Popular

Participation. Apparently, Miguel Urioste Fernández, who became

the 1997 MBL presidential candidate, led a working group that pro-

duced a draft law, designed mainly for the rural area, with elements

that were later used for the LPP.13 However, the most credible account

attributes the content of the law to Carlos Hugo Molina, a lawyer

from Santa Cruz. Molina, had strong connections with a progressive

sector of the Catholic Church and worked at one of the oldest NGOs

in Bolivia, the Jesuit’s Center for Peasant Research and Promotion

(Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado-CIPCA).

Other sources indicate that some of the technical elements of the LPP

were a product of the World Bank project EMSO that between 1988

and 1994 prepared various decentralization proposals for the country

(Galindo Soza 1998: 228).

At the end of the 1980s, the CIPCA put together a publication—“For

a Different Bolivia” (Por una Bolivia Diferente)—that proposed a revision

of the administrative organization of the country, taking indigenous

people’s rights into account. CIPCA organized a conference and invited

Carlos Hugo Molina to present a proposal on how to politically

operationalize the main tenets of the book. His proposal was to work this

revision of the country by strengthening the municipalities.

“The only municipalistas 14 in Bolivia before the LPP were Carlos

Hugo Molina and Ruben Ardaya . . . Their proposals were never received

very enthusiastically because most thought that in a country with a weak

state, it made no sense to create mini-states.”15 In 1994, Carlos Hugo

Molina and others put together a proposal for the constitutional reform

on behalf of Millennium Foundation (Fundación Milenio), one of

Bolivia’s think thanks. Their proposal strengthened the municipal regime,

the municipal councils in particular, and even included the figure of the

Vigilance Committees (VCs) that later became part of the LPP. Sánchez


de Lozada’s logic for the VC was that if more responsibility was given to

municipalities, they also had to have more control.16

The proposal was well received and Carlos Hugo Molina was later

selected to head the popular participation team that prepared the draft

law to be approved by Congress and then worked in what became the

National Secretariat for Popular Participation within the Ministry for

Sustainable Development. He put together a team of specialists with no

real political party affiliation and gave them freedom to work toward a

draft, but not without a close monitoring of the process by Sánchez de

Lozada, who got involved in all aspects of the formulation of the policy

proposal and its implementation.

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and his team of specialists put together

the proposal that was sent to Congress. The Capitalization Law, and the

education reform were identified in the media as the “damned laws.” The

LPP was added to this group of laws. The claim of those that did not sup-

port it was that the law was deceiving. They argued that the law was not

really aimed at decentralization, a long-standing demand from civic

movements in Bolivia, but rather at resolving conf licts in the interior of

the country.

Neither members of the MNR nor members of the coalition parties

participated in the design of the law, thus the law became a reality

without broad political party support. It stayed in the hands of a select

group of well-educated and independent professionals. As a result of

this disconnect, there was constant tension. Parliamentarians, govern-

ment representatives, and political party militants did not really respect

the work of the National Secretariat for Popular Participation. In the

words of a secretariat staff in charge of the political monitoring of the

law, politicians saw them as “crazy intellectuals” who were taking

advantage of the political momentum to assume administrative tasks

that were assigned to parliamentarians and ministers. Headed f irst by

the minister of sustainable development and later by Sánchez de Lozada

himself, this group of people devoted more than 300 hours of work to

facilitate the implementation of the Popular Participation Law (Galindo

Soza 1998: 234).

The Law 1551 was sent by the executive to Congress, which approved

it on April 20, 1994. In its four sections, the law radically changed the

territorial, economic, and democratic conditions of local government in

Bolivia. In its Article 1, the law recognized, promoted, and consolidated

the process of popular participation of indigenous communities, both

urban and rural. The stated purpose of the law was to strengthen the

economic and political instruments to improve representative democracy,


facilitate citizen participation, and guarantee equal opportunities and

representation for both men and women (Art. 2).

In its f irst section, the law recognized the legal existence of all

communities by establishing them as Base Territorial Organizations

(Organizaciones Territoriales de Base-OTBs). The second section

introduced districtization, a mechanism to define municipal jurisdic-

tional territory within sectional provinces, widening their effective

scope, and adding more and newer resources. In its third and fourth

sections, the law established the equal distribution of resources through-

out the country and reordered the power structure of public bodies to

implement the law.

The law granted legal recognition to the OTBs and created the prov-

ince as a geographical territory within departments. Indeed, Article 3

recognized the authority of neighborhood associations and indigenous

communities, thus giving legitimacy to “captains, jilacatas, mallcus, and

curacas”17 according to their native customs and laws.

After the recognition process, the OTB was given the right to have

access to resources assigned to the community through the law. In

addition, the OTB could propose, request, control, and supervise public

services and works according to the needs of the community (health,

basic necessities, sports etc.); modify actions contrary to community

interest; propose justified changes or ratifications to their education and

health systems; and ask the municipal government about financial

resources available to them from the LPP. The organizations were also

given the responsibility to oversee the use of the funds, take care of the

public works, and inform and be accountable to the communities that

they represented.

Article 18 created a new level of government through the districting

process 18: municipalities within provincial sections. These municipalities

would have a minimum of five councilors or a maximum of eleven

depending on the number of inhabitants. Districting then served as the

convergence of political administrative divisions and established social

structures and public services within the territory of sectional provinces.

A third section of the law distributed resources equally among

inhabitants of a department, thus closing the gap between resources being

assigned more to urban than to rural areas. Before the LPP, most municipal

government expenditures were concentrated in urban areas, particularly

in the nine department capitals. The law assigned resources according to

the number of people who lived in each area. Article 20 assigned 20 percent

of the national revenue to the municipalities instead of the 10 percent

previously given to localities. To receive the 20 percent, a municipality


had to have a minimum population of 5,000 inhabitants. Of the resources

assigned to the municipality, the municipality had to assign 90 percent to

the Popular Participation Plan. Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that giv-

ing municipalities 20 percent of the resources was “a revolution” because

these regions had never received funds from the central government,

instead funds were taken from the regions to the cities. Until 1994 when

the law was enacted, 62 percent of public investment was concentrated in

the “central axis” of the country, that is, La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa

Cruz (Galindo Soza 1998: 233). This law alleviated that.

The last component of the law reorganized the power structure of the

local bodies. Article 28 created the Development Corporations,

responsible for administering resources in the municipality. Representatives

from each OTB were elected in each municipality, and they were given

the right to form VCs. The VCs were responsible for informing the

community about municipal affairs and for acting as a liaison between

municipal structures and the community. In the area of social control, the

committees had the responsibility of ensuring that communal plans were

carried out correctly and that they were coordinated with all civil society

organizations as well as with local governments and community actors.

They also were given the responsibility of overseeing resource distribu-

tion, earnings, and expenditures. The VCs were created to give oversight

to the transfer and distribution of funds. In case of alleged misuse of funds

from a VC, the executive could stop the disbursement of funds to the

accused municipality (Art. 11).

The LPP had both critics and followers. Gamarra (1996: 85) asserts

that the OTBs and VCs were the most criticized elements of the law

because they were perceived more as instruments of the MNR to control

local government than as instruments of government “accountability.”

Criticism also came from civic movements from Santa Cruz, Tarija, and

other regions that were patiently waiting for a decentralization law, but

to no avail. Political unrest went to the streets as massive protests by these

sectors in April 1995 forced a discussion on decentralization again.19 The

Decentralization Law, or Law 1654, was approved on July 28, 1995.

The objectives of the LPP were widely praised throughout the world,

especially for incorporating indigenous, peasant, and urban communities

into the judicial, political, and economic life of the country. Praise was

also given for improving the quality of life of Bolivians through fairer

distribution and better administration of public resources, and for

improving representative democracy by facilitating citizen participation

and guaranteeing equal opportunities for men and women in their local

governments. The approval of this law had an effect on the incorporation


of new political movements into the electoral realm. The MAS, one of

the beneficiaries, became the most voted political organization in 2005.

Law 1544: Capitalization Law

Also proposed by Sánchez de Lozada in the first six months of his admin-

istration was the Capitalization Law. The purpose of the law was to

privatize public enterprises through what some thought was an interest-

ing and innovative mechanism. It was, indubitably, a process led by

technocrats—a process that included neither MNR-elected members of

Congress nor other parliamentary members of the coalition.

The draft law was developed by a series of interdisciplinary working

groups that were organized within the then established Ministry of

Capitalization (Salinas, Lema, and Espinoza 2002: 19). Political parties in

Congress had an accompaniment role and the responsibility of dealing

with the citizens in critical moments, but they had no real involvement

in the policy-formulation process.20

The positive effects of the New Economic Policy had slowed down.

Thus Sánchez de Lozada looked at the privatization system in England 21

as a model for securing resources and promoting investment, an important

determinant of economic growth. Realizing that privatization measures

were never popular, Sánchez de Lozada decided to propose a plan where

50 percent of the privatized industries would stay in Bolivian hands.22

The reasoning was that state enterprises lacked capital and, accord-

ing to Sánchez de Lozada (2004), administration and technology too.

Therefore, instead of selling the enterprises to investors, the state

would regulate the sale of half the shares in a public bid and would

grant the investor the administration of the enterprise giving her/him

the responsibility of also investing capital into the company. Sánchez

de Lozada proposed that those shares that belonged to the state be put

in a collective capitalization fund that would pay the BonoSol, a pen-

sion given to Bolivians at the age of 65—something that a majority of

Bolivians do not have access to. Although $250 was not much, accord-

ing to him, it was a lot for the more than 90 percent of Bolivians who

lived in poverty then.

The president sent the project of law to the Bolivian Congress on

January 31, 1994. The Bolivian Congress approved the Capitalization

Law, thus establishing the framework to carry out the government’s

program in February 1994; a month later, President Sánchez de Lozada

signed the bill into law. The law allowed (Art. 3) the executive to decree

a series of laws regulating its implementation.


Promulgated on March 21, 1994, the law provided a program in which

outside investors would match the value of six of the largest state-owned

enterprises in return for 50 percent of their equity with full management

control. In its Article 1, Congress allowed the president to “contribute

the assets and/or rights of the public enterprises to the capital paid in the

constitution of new companies of a mixed economy.” Both national and

international investors could buy into the company (Art. 4) through an

international public bid. Unlike privatization, the funds from the sale of

half the state enterprise would be invested in the company instead of

being transferred to the government.

Shares equal to the other half of the companies would be given to all

Bolivians 21 and older in the form of individual pension funds. Upon reach-

ing retirement at 65, citizens would receive a pension payable annually for

life earnings. Through this law, Bolivian Fiscal Oilfields, National Electricity

Company, National Railroad Company, and Vinto Metallurgical Company

(Empresa Metalúrgica Vinto) would be capitalized (Art. 2). Article 4 of the

law guaranteed that no investor (national or international) could own more

than 50 percent of the stock of the company, even if that investor bought it

from a third party. An anticorruption component was also included through

Article 8 that prohibited representatives from the government (executive,

legislative etc.) or their family members from participating in the bid for the

privatization of these companies.23

In summary, through the attraction of massive private investments,

the law sought to promote an economic transformation to stimulate the

creation of new jobs and improve the income of Bolivians; guarantee

efficiency and the modernization of the productive and service sectors;

create a long-term savings system (the government proposed the goal of

saving 20 percent of the GDP); restructure the energy, telecommunica-

tions, mining, and transportation sectors; capitalize the six most impor-

tant public enterprises; and establish a regulating entity for the privatized

sectors.

The government claimed that this program would result in the creation

of half a million new jobs. In mid-February 1994, Ramiro Ortega Landa,

national secretary for capitalization and investment in the Ministry of

Finance, published paid advertisements in the Wall Street Journal (Eastern l

Edition, 2/15/94) and The Economist (No. 7851, 2/19–25/94) promoting t

the capitalization program and recruiting firms with experience in

privatization and the administration of pension funds.

By 2005, four public enterprises were capitalized via international bids

on the basis of market prices of share packages, using the recommenda-

tions and conditions of an international team of privatization advisors.


There were 10 new mixed enterprises: ENTEL in the telecommunica-

tions sector; Chaco Oil Company (Petrolera Chaco), Andina Oil

Company (Petrolera Andina), and hydrocarbons conveyor company

(Transportadora de Hidrocarburos) in the hydrocarbons sector; Corani

Electric Company (Eléctrica Corani), Guaracachi Electric Company

(Eléctrica Guaracachi), and Valle Hermoso Electric Company (Eléctrica

Valle Hermoso) in the energy sector; and Oriental Railroad (Ferroviaria

Oriental), Andina Railroad (Ferroviaria Andina), and Lloyd Bolivian

Airlines in the transportation sector (Napoleon Pacheco 2004: 50).

Politics of Pacts

Like his predecessors, Sánchez de Lozada also had to take recourse to his

constitutional authority to declare a state of siege to control some instances

of massive protests against his policies, especially protests against the

so-called damned laws. Like the others, he depended on the legislature to

continue the state of emergency.

Throughout its history, the MNR had shown great political capacity

in forming coalitions both at the level of Congress and with different sec-

tors in society. To implement the proposals of the Plan for All, Sánchez

de Lozada, needed to act quickly. Through the two pacts, Pact for

Governance and Pact for Change, he was able to corral the necessary

congressional votes to pass these laws. How was he able to do this? The

MNR and its coalition allies were essential to the approval and sustain-

ability of the reforms, even though, they were largely excluded from the

policy-formulation process.

In early 1993, amidst the electoral campaign, the Senate approved the

Decentralization Law and sent it to the lower chamber for consideration.

Time constraints impeded the bill from being signed into law. In addi-

tion, new elections took place. The MNR was elected and Sánchez de

Lozada, soon after assuming office, gave priority not to the Decentralization

Law but to a reform of the executive branch. He sent to Congress a

draft law that became known as the Law of the Executive Power or LOPE

Law (Ley del Poder Ejecutivo).The law stipulated that the number of

ministries would be reduced from 18 to 10, keeping some of the political

ministries, such as foreign relations and the presidency, and making some

of them “super” ministries. The “super” ministries of Bolivia were not func-

tional or specific anymore but became sectoral. These were the Ministry

of Social Development, the Ministry of Sustainable Development, and

the Ministry of Economic Development. A series of subspecialties,

national secretariats, and subsecretaries were grouped under each of these


three ministries to address particular issues. Until then Bolivia had a

hybrid model of cabinet structure emulating the French and American

systems.

During the first six months, congressional sessions were devoted to

cabinet reform. During this time, civic movements decided to postpone

their demands for decentralization to give the new administration some

time to organize. The next two tasks were the popular participation and

capitalization laws. The popular participation law was introduced in

January 1994. On its heels came the Decentralization Law. However, as

Congress was considering it, Sánchez de Lozada realized that in order to

move his project, his vision, and convictions forward, he first needed to

reform the Constitution to eliminate departmental governments.

Otherwise the Decentralization Law would have strengthened them and

not the municipalities he wanted to create.24

Thus the coalition faced its first real test in trying to get the constitu-

tional reform approved. The electoral system had an impact on the

configuration of forces in Congress, which the MNR managed to articu-

late in a congressional majority. Sánchez de Lozada needed to approve the

reforms stipulated in the Law of Necessity for Constitutional Reform

sanctioned by the 1989–1993 legislature.25 The Bolivian Constitution

stipulates that for the Constitution to be reformed, it has to be approved

by two subsequent legislatures. In other words, one legislature approves a

law on the need for the reform of the Constitution, and the following

legislature approves the measure. The coalition was effective and the

reform was approved. There was opposition from noncoalition parties,

but the implicit agreement in terms of the needs of the country and the

demands of its citizens took precedence. The reform allowed for

decentralization via the municipalities.

Other reforms to the constitution included a recognition of the

multiethnic character of the country, the increase in the number of legis-

lators voted into office through a simple plurality system, a modification

to Article 90 limiting the congressional election of the president when no

candidate achieves the majority to the top two electoral tickets. The

reform aligned the timing of the election of executives and legislators and

lengthened the term of office of presidents, legislators, and mayors to five

years. The most significant reform was the creation of uninominal

deputies, elected independent of their parties and in a specific circum-

scription, in an effort to strengthen the link between the representative

and her/his electorate.

Thus, almost simultaneously, the executive sent to Congress both

the popular participation and capitalization laws. The law of popular


participation came first. Political inertia dictated that the f irst reaction

of the opposition parties (MIR, ADN, and CONDEPA) was to oppose

the law. However, they soon realized that the law was very progressive.

As some parliamentarians from the opposition suggested, “Who could

oppose such a law?”26—a law that facilitated citizen participation and

guaranteed citizens’ input into the distribution of local resources.

In the approval of these laws, and generally throughout the adminis-

tration, the CONDEPA opposition was the most recalcitrant. To slow

down the approval of the laws in Congress, parliamentarians used, among

other means, interpellating ministers and requesting them for oral and

written reports. The channeling of the requests for oral or written reports

was discretional and rather authoritative. Congressional records show

that from the date of an oral/written request by a parliamentarian to the

date that the report was submitted the average wait was three months

long. Often the delays made the requests for reports inconsequential upon

arrival. Indeed, the 1993 Debate Rules had no stipulations regarding

promptness in response. In the 1997 reform of the congressional debate

rules, Article 152 established that a request for an oral/written report or

interpellation had to be addressed, discussed, and concluded in the same

session it was requested. Regardless, the tactic of requesting reports was

primarily meant to slow down the reform process.27

Congressional opposition was also exerted by the ADN and MIR. In

November 1993, three months after Sánchez de Lozada assumed office, a

request for his impeachment and/or the calling of new elections was

made in Congress by some ADN and MIR parliamentarians. A month

later, in December 1993, when the MNR-controlled Congress amended

the electoral law, the opposition parties charged Sánchez de Lozada with

attempting to rig the rules of the game to favor his party (Gamarra 1996:

90). However, in the case of the MIR, during this administration, this

party was both the persecutor and the persecuted.

While Sánchez de Lozada publicized allegations of MIR ties to narco-

trafficking, MIR exerted opposition in the legislature rejecting his policy

proposals.28 Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that MIR, with Jaime Paz

Zamora and Oscar Eid Franco as the leaders, financed their campaigns

with illicit money. He relates that the U.S. embassy wanted him to force

a responsibility trial against Paz Zamora. He replied telling them to

request his extradition if they had information but refused to try him.

According to Sánchez de Lozada, the information he had was not same as

the information the U.S. embassy had. He refused to do it also because he

was president then and feared that if he did it to Paz Zamora, they would

probably do it to him later. He battled the U.S. embassy but they did not


have sufficient evidence to get Paz Zamora tried in a U.S. prison, so they

wanted, as Sánchez de Lozada recounts, him to do the “dirty work.”

Instead of Paz Zamora, the second in command would take the heat. In

December 1994, Oscar Eid Franco, the party’s principal strategist, was

arrested, tried, and sentenced to four years in prison, the duration of

Sánchez de Lozada’s government.

The two laws, capitalization and popular participation, were

sanctioned by Congress and promulgated by the president. The law of

popular participation was somewhat accepted by the public—and by the

parties in Congress, who could in no way oppose a law that promoted

citizen participation.29 It would have been “political suicide,” as many of

them assert. Even CONDEPA approved the law, although, of course,

with minor modifications. Yet the law enjoyed widespread national

consensus.

The capitalization law had been designed by technocrats, not

parliamentarians, though the elected leaders would be the ones to

ultimately approve it. To facilitate the approval of the law by the coalition

members, the government put together a “crash course” for the coalition

parliamentarians. The parliamentarians who were members of the

coalition attended workshops every morning over four days where they

listened to presentations on the main elements of the law. As some

participants of the workshops suggested, these lectures helped them

understand only 15–20 percent of the proposal because it was so complex.30

The members of the coalition voted the proposal into law in Congress

with a very low level of information. The decisions about the law then

were not made by the parliamentarians. Rather, they received instructions

from the party leadership.

The capitalization law caused an all-out war in the legislature. Both

the capitalization law and the Hydrocarbons Law were strongly fought by

the opposition, especially CONDEPA, on the basis that they meant the

denationalization of state enterprises or a deferred privatization. In the

congressional debate on the law, Ricardo Paz Ballivián, a CONDEPA

deputy and executive secretary of the party, talked nonstop for 48 hours

to delay its approval.31 ADN and MIR also joined the anticapitalization

bandwagon on the grounds of nationalist sentiments. Differentiating its

own privatization attempts in 1992–1993 from capitalization, the MIR

argued that capitalization was equivalent to selling the country’s jewels to

the highest bidder (Gamarra 1997a: 115).

MIR and ADN parliamentarians, who belonged to the group that

favored structural adjustment measures, tried to exert opposition but found

themselves, as well as CONDEPA, unable to do anything against the


strength of the congressional majority. They exerted opposition through

activities such as public declarations and interpellations, but the MNR

and its coalition partners had the necessary seats in the legislature to

approve these two and any other laws. On the day of the approval of the

capitalization law, the parliamentarians from the opposition chose to

leave the chamber, to delegitimize the law and the subsequent legislation.

At the end they had no choice but to accept its passage.

Parallel Opposition from the Streets

and the State of Siege

The year 1995 began with an accumulation of unattended demands, and

no tangible results from the capitalization policy adopted the year before.

The administration started facing opposition from the streets. Demands

were put forward by four main social groups: those protesting against the

educational reform, those protesting against coca eradication measures,

COB members protesting against low salaries, and finally those protest-

ing against the government’s neglect of the final passage of the

Decentralization Law.

By early 1995, a group of protestors were demanding that the

government suspend the implementation of the educational reform that,

according to them, would leave teachers unemployed. Roadblocks and

confrontations with the police paralyzed life in the capital city. The

unionized coca growers from the Chapare organized protests against

what they thought was an imposed coca eradication program. Coca union

leaders rejected Sánchez de Lozada’s coca eradication measures and joined

forces with the teachers’ unions to stage massive uprisings around

La Paz.

The COB, in turn, was in its thirteenth day of a general strike to

protest low salaries, the government’s refusal to give in to demands for

higher levels of social spending, and the education reform that in their

view would affect teachers’ salaries. Simultaneously, civic leaders from

Tarija threatened to secede from the country if the central government

refused to implement the Decentralization Law that would establish local

governments (Gamarra 1996: 96). A march of 20,000 supporters further

complicated the scenario.

With three weeks of protests, some of them violent, Sánchez de Lozada

made the decision to declare a state of siege on April 18, 1995, for a

90-day period, as established in the Constitution. More than 100 people

were detained, according to official records. Evo Morales and a group of

coca unionists were arrested in Copacabana in the Department of La Paz


while attending the V Meeting of the Permanent Council in Defense of

Coca Growers in the Andean countries. A group of Peruvians were also

arrested. On April 19, 1995, the day after the state of siege was declared,

public opinion generally favored President Sánchez de Lozada’s decision

to mobilize the armed forces and arrest labor leaders (Gamarra 1996: 96).

Through the media, Carlos Sánchez Berzain, Sánchez de Lozada’s minis-

ter of government, stated that the measure was inevitable since dialogue

with the unionists became impossible.

In July 1995, the state of siege was extended for another 90 days. When

it was finally lifted, social unrest continued, with students, coca growers,

members of opposition parties, and others still on the march (Gamarra

1997a: 391). The government coalition gave Sánchez de Lozada the

authority to establish and maintain the state of siege. Neutralized by the

two-thirds majority of the governing coalition, again, the opposition had

no other choice but to accept the will of the coalition.

Overreliance on the Cabinet

For the passage of these two pieces of legislation to be successful, Sánchez

de Lozada knew that they had to have a minimum of societal support and

legitimating congressional approval. However, privatization experiences

in other countries showed that opening up the discussion of the law had

the potential of delaying the process indefinitely. Thus, Sánchez de

Lozada favored keeping the discussions limited and relied on a team of

specialists to design and implement the proposals for these two laws.

Sánchez de Lozada’s first cabinet was comprised of technocrats and busi-

nessmen. Most leadership positions in Congress were headed by the MNR.

As table 3.1 indicates, during the August 1993–March 1994 period, the

MNR retained much control of the cabinet, ceding only two ministries to

its coalition partners, UCS and MBL, as the following chart shows.

The alliance with the private sector guaranteed two Bolivian Chamber of

Commerce members (Central de Empresarios Bolivianos-CEPB) with

connections to the MNR and Sánchez de Lozada the leadership of two of the

“super” ministries. The ministries of Economic Development, where the

National Secretariat for Popular Participation was housed, and the Ministry

of Human Development were occupied by independents associated with the

CEPB, while the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

two of the political ministries, were given to the UCS and MBL respectively.

The complaints coming from the MNR called for more positional payoffs

for the militants of the party (San Martin Arzabe 1998: 524).

Having a team of specialists follow up on the implementation of this

legislation would have been the ideal scenario for Sánchez de Lozada.


However, problems with its allies in the private sector, tensions with the

UCS, but more importantly, within the MNR, especially its members in

the party caucus who had been left out of the policy process, produced a

cabinet shift in March 1994. There had been tensions also as a result of the

internal battles of movimientistas who did not want Sánchez de Lozada to

be the head of the party. It produced the separation and, sometimes, expul-

sion of old MNR militants such as Edwin Rodriguez, Jorge Alderete,

Ciro Humboldt Barrero, Alvaro Perez del Castillo, Ñuf lo Chavez, and

some others (San Martin Arzabe 1998: 518). Factions of the MNR, includ-

ing Guillermo Bedegral (1996: 27), rejected the work of the technocrats

on the grounds that there was a “lack of commitment of the technocrats

Table 3.1 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 1 (Prepared


newspapers)


Date

End Date

Fernando Illanes

De Ia Riva

MNR Minister of

Finance

August 6,

1993

March 24,

1994

Fernando

Romero

Moreno

MNR Minister of

Human

Development

August 6,

1993

March 24,

1994

Antonio

Cespedes Toro

UCS Minister of

Defense

August 6,

1993

March 24,

1994

Herman Antelo

Laughlin

MNR Minister of

Social

Communication

August 6,

1993

March 24,

1994

German Quiroga

Gomez

MNR Minister of

Government

August 6,

1993

December

16, 1994

Jose Justiniano

Sandoval

MNR Minister of

Sustainable

Development

August 6,

1993

January 6,

1995

Carlos Morales

Guillen

MNR Minister of

Justice

August 6,

1993

March 24,

1994

Carlos Sanchez

Berzain

MNR Minister of the

Presidency

August 6,

1993

January 6,

1995

Antonio Aranibar

Quiroga

MBL Minister of

Foreign Affairs/

Culture

August 6,

1993

August 6,

1997

Reynaldo Peters

Arzabe

MNR Minister of

Labor

August 6,

1993

June 9, 1994


who held political power, and very little political responsibility.” In the

view of these MNR militants, power without responsibility produced a

threat to governance and politics. As a result of their pressure, the cabinet

was reconfigured taking the two “super” ministries from the CEPB

members and granting them to strongmen within the party. By early 1994,

the cabinet became MNR-controlled, as table 3.2 shows.

Table 3.2 Sanchez de Lozada Administration: Cabinet 2 (Prepared


newspapers)


Alfonso Revollo

Thenier

MNR Minister of

Capitalizacion

March 26,

1994

August 6,

1997

Alvaro Fernando

Cossio

MNR Minister of

Finance

March 26,

1994

August 6,

1997

Enrique

Ipinha Melgar

MNR Ministry of

Human

Development

March 26,

1994

August 31,

1995

Raul Tovar

Pierola

MNR Minister of

Defense

March 26,

1994

August 31,

1995

Ernesto Machicao

Argiro

MNR Minister of Social

Communication

March 26,

1994

August 31,

1995

Rene Blattmann

Bauer

MNR Minister of Justice March 26,

1994

December 1,

1996

Marchcelo

Cespedes G.

MNR Minister of Labor June 9,

1994

August 9,

1994

Reynaldo Peters

Arzabe

MNR Minister of Labor August 9,

1994

December 1,

1996

Jaime Villalobos

Sanjines

MNR Minister of

Economic

Development

November 24,

1994

August 6,

1997

Carlos Sanchez

Berzain

MNR Minister of

Government

December 16,

1994

December 1,

1996

Luis Lema Molina MNR Minister of

Sustainable

Development

December 16,

1994

August 31,

1995

Alfonso Kreidler

Guillaux

MNR Minister of

Sustainable

Development

January 6,

1995

January 16,

1995

Jose Justiniano

Sandoval

MNR Minister of the

Presidency

January 6,

1995

August 6,

1997


There were constant doubts about the sustainability of the ruling coa-

lition. Although the MBL support seemed stable, Fernández’ support for

the coalition varied with his mood. He felt excluded from the decision-

making and policy-formulation process. He had originally been granted

the Ministry of Defense, but he later requested the Ministry of Sustainable

Development to be able to inf luence the implementation of the popular

participation law. He was offered this ministry, but Sánchez de Lozada

decided to move the National Secretariat for Popular Participation to the

Ministry of Human Development to retain control of this portfolio. After

serious confrontations and constant requests for more political presence

in the state apparatus (Romero Ballivián 1999: 112), the UCS leader left

the coalition in late 1994; later he came back and left again in 1995 (in

November that year, Fernández died in an airplane accident).

There were no threats of a broken alliance with the MBL. Antonio

Araníbar Quiroga, the MBL foreign minister, was one of the most pop-

ular members of the cabinet, according to opinion polls, and was the only

minister who completed the five-year mandate. The rest of the cabinet

remained in MNR hands for the duration of the administration. Table 3.3

shows how the cabinet was reconfigured two more times. With every

change, however, the MNR never rescinded control.

In his first two years in office, Sánchez de Lozada relied mainly on his

cabinet to design and implement policy and used Congress merely as a

rubber stamp mechanism. Later his party was incorporated into the

cabinet to facilitate the party’s participation in the policy-implementation

process. Congress continued to amend, veto, or—as in this case— approve

executive proposals. During the 1993–1997 legislature, parliamentary

work was subjected to the initiatives and calendar fixed by the executive

(Grebe Lopez 1998: 41).

However, because of the weak parliamentary force and the scant ideo-

logical strength of the UCS, Sánchez de Lozada many times threatened

their identity with policy actions that did not correspond to their party

line. On several occasions and in getting approval for these laws, the MNR

made the UCS parliamentarians act as an appendix to the MNR without

Max Fernández’ knowledge (San Martin Arzabe 1998: 523). Legislative

support was secured using the following payoffs.

Positional Payoffs

The UCS had the deputies and the senators Sánchez de Lozada needed to

pass these controversial laws, but since there was no strong party structure,

payoffs were mostly limited to prebendas (or payments made from public

Table

3.3

Sanchez d

e L

ozada A

dm

inis

trati

on:

Cabin

ets

3 a

nd 4

(P

repare

d b

y t

he a

uth

or

usi

ng d

ata

fro

m t

he

Gaceta

Ofi

cia

l, inte

rvie

ws,

and n

ew

spapers

)

Nam

e P

P

Min

istr

ySta

rtin

g D

ate

End

Dat

e

Juan

F. C

andia

Cas

tillo

Fre

ddy T

eodovic

h O

rtiz

Jorg

e O

tace

vic

h

Irvin

g A

lcar

az d

el C

asti

llo

Mois

es

Jarm

usz

Levy

Gu

ille

rmo R

ichte

r A

scim

ani

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

Min

i ste

r of Fin

ance

Min

iste

r of H

um

an D

evel

opm

ent

Min

iste

r of D

efe

nse

Min

iste

r of Socia

l C

om

mun

icat

ion

Min

iste

r of E

nvir

on

men

t

Min

iste

r of Socia

l C

om

mun

icat

ion

August

31, 1995

August

31, 1995

August

31, 1995

August

31, 1995

August

31, 1995

Apri

l 19, 1996

August

6, 1997

Januar

y 1

4, 1997

Dece

mber

1, 1996

Apri

l 19, 1996

July

10, 1997

Dece

mber

1, 1996

Alfonso

Kre

idle

r G

uil

lau

x

Mau

ricio

Bal

caza

r G

uti

err

ez

Fra

nkli

n A

nay

a V

asquez

Rau

l E

span

a Sm

ith

Hugo S

an M

arti

n A

rzab

e

Fra

nkli

n A

nay

a V

asquez

Car

los

San

chez

Berz

ain

Ren

e B

latt

man

n B

auer

Mau

ricio

Ante

zana

Vic

tor

Hugo C

anel

as

Alb

ert

o V

argas

Jose

G. Ju

stin

iano S

andoval

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

MN

R

Min

iste

r of D

efe

nse

Min

iste

r of Socia

l C

om

mun

icat

ion

Min

iste

r of G

overn

men

t

Min

iste

r of Ju

stic

e

Min

iste

r of L

abor

Min

iste

r of H

um

an D

evel

opm

ent

Min

iste

r of G

overn

men

t

Min

iste

r of Ju

stic

e

Min

iste

r of Socia

l C

om

mun

icat

ion

Min

iste

r of G

overn

men

t

Min

iste

r of L

abor

Min

iste

r of E

conom

ic D

evel

opm

ent

Dece

mber

1, 1996

Dece

mber

1, 1996

Dece

mber

1, 1996

Dece

mber

1, 1996

Dece

mber

1, 1996

Januar

y 1

4, 1997

Januar

y 1

4, 1997

Feb

ruar

y 1

4, 1997

Apri

l 2, 1997

Apri

l 2, 1997

Apri

l 2, 1997

July

10, 1997

August

6, 1997

Apri

l 2, 1997

Januar

y 1

4, 1997

Januar

y 1

4, 1997

Apri

l 2, 1997

August

6, 1997

Apri

l 2, 1997

August

6, 1997

August

6, 1997

August

6, 1997

August

6, 1997

August

6, 1997


sources; parliamentarians were given payments in the form of “extra”

resources, bonus, and the like in exchange for their vote in Congress) and

some quotas of power. Through the coalition, the UCS was given one

ministry, two undersecretary posts, two embassies, the presidency of one

regional development corporation, and the first vice presidency of both

the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Gamarra 1997a: 384). The five

votes of the MBL parliamentarians did not really make a difference; how-

ever, Sánchez de Lozada gave them the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

other minor positions in government. As Sánchez de Lozada recounts,

fortunately the ministries contained general secretariats, secretaries, and

general directors within the ministries to distribute amongst the coalition

partners, so “it worked fine.”32

Other Types of Concessions

Other concessions were generally demanded by the UCS. After tensions

with the U.S. embassy because of allegations of ties to narco-trafficking,

Sánchez de Lozada facilitated the first meeting of Max Fernández with

the U.S. ambassador. In addition, Max Fernández constantly requested

more f lexibility in the payments of taxes to the Internal Revenue Office

on the profits of his beer industry.

Sánchez de Lozada distributed positional payoffs with political audac-

ity. The objective was to control the portfolios without the immersion of

the coalition partners. He wanted to limit the MNR’s participation too.

Throughout the administration, the MNR neither supported nor opposed

these two laws, but it never took ownership of them. Probably because of

the lack of involvement of the party in the formulation of the policy, the

MNR just voted for the law through the party caucus in Congress, but it

had no role in its implementation.

In this analysis, two important observations come to light. The first is

the permanence of an implicit agreement among political parties on a

politicoeconomic agenda for the country, that is, democratic consolida-

tion and neoliberal economic policies. The ADN supported privatization

because its constituency included large numbers of entrepreneurs who

would benefit from the policy. MIR agreed with these proposals in 1989.

The MNR was its most outspoken advocate.

Second, the design and implementation of the popular participation

and capitalization laws did not involve the parliamentarians, who were

supposed to represent the interests of the citizens. Instead, they only

followed the instructions on how to vote from the party leadership. This

great disconnect between Congress and the party leadership became


characteristic of Bolivian politics. By not incorporating into Congress the

national party leaders (presidential candidates) who received relative

electoral support, the electoral system directly inf luenced the interaction

between Congress and the president, Congress and the party leadership,

and, more importantly, the party and the electorate. A situation where

the political party leader is in no manner accountable to the electorate

and only instructs parliamentarians of the agreements that are made

outside of Congress has had pernicious effects on the Bolivian political

system. The next presidential period substantiates these claims.

The Banzer-Quiroga Administration: 1997–2002

The tacit agreement amongst political parties on the neoliberal and

democratizing agenda continued in this administration. Similarly, the

growing disconnect between Congress, the party leadership, and the

people, prepared the terrain for serious social confrontations. An

aggravating factor inf luenced the challenges the executive and legis-

lature faced in this period: the Banzer-Quiroga administration con-

fronted a dramatic economic slowdown emerging from domestic and

international factors and was unable to f ind adequate and timely mea-

sures to address it. Napoleon Pacheco (2004), Bolivian economist and

executive director of the think tank Millennium Foundation, asserts

that the Banzer-Quiroga administration ignored the economic crisis

early on. He narrates a joke circulating amongst Bolivians around

1997 saying that “the crisis is passing by sea level, therefore, the crisis

is not going to arrive in Bolivia”—most Bolivians live 3,000 meters

above sea level. This was a way for Bolivians to mock the perceived

inaction of the Banzer administration. The majority of Bolivians

believed that when measures were taken by the administration, they

were adopted late and executed with poor policy designs that ulti-

mately contributed to deepening the economic problem. An opinion

poll by the newspaper La Prensa in 2001 (Pg. 1, 10/5/2001) reveals

that 44 percent of those polled thought Banzer’s performance was

poor, 50 percent thought it was not as good, while only 5 percent

thought the performance was good.

At the domestic level, the coca leaf eradication measures of this and

previous administrations caused high levels of unemployment, a reduc-

tion of the national income, and unmanageable sociopolitical conf lict as

social sectors demanded alternative modes of sustainable development. At

the international level, the Asian and Russian crises shocked Latin

American economies. In particular, the Asian crisis affected the Brazilian,


Argentinean, and Chilean economies that had direct links with the

Bolivian economy (Fernández Saavedra 2004: 117).

In a spillover effect, the Brazilian and Argentinean economies suffered

severe slowdowns that had two main impacts on the Bolivian economy

from 1997 to 2001. On one hand, as other nations devalued their cur-

rency, the Bolivian government also enacted a devaluation. In a country

with so many Brazilian, Chilean, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan products

on the market, people chose to buy cheaper imported products than

Bolivian-made products. Thus, both national production and employ-

ment decreased. On the other hand, the crisis in Argentina and Brazil

brought Bolivian migrants back to the country,33 producing a dramatic

decrease in remittances from abroad and a greater number of unemployed

people in Bolivia.

Attributing the economic crisis merely to financial factors—in a

country with an incipient financial market—the Banzer administration

seriously underestimated the effects of the crisis on the Bolivian economy.

A recession ensued as the government was unable to effectively respond

to the challenges. Some economic corrective measures were pursued but

not early enough to avoid the economic decline. The Banzer administra-

tion devised, on its third governing year (2000), the so-called Economic

Recovery and Social Development Plan—a plan that proposed tax, public

investment, and public procurement initiatives.34

The country was also suffering a severe democratic deficit that was

aggravated by the economic recession. Popular mobilizations became the

mechanism for Bolivians to gain political space and demand tangible

results as elections became ineffective in channeling citizen demands.

Politics went, once more, to the streets.

The 1994 Constitutional Reform and

Its 1997 Application

During the Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993–1997), a constitu-

tional reform brought important changes to the Bolivian Constitution.

The reform was a result of the July 1992 agreements on the moderniza-

tion of the state and the strengthening of democracy among political

party representatives. Interestingly enough, the driving cause behind the

reforms did not have to do with the economic or social crisis developing

in Bolivia, but with relatively serious representativeness and legitimacy

problems of Congress and the party system.

Again, it was left to parliamentarians to give practical application to the

agreements reached by their chiefs. The 1993–1997 governing coalition in


Congress had the lead, but the international community also had a role.

The system to be implemented emulated those of Germany and Great

Britain. Proposing the mixed-system as a useful mechanism to address the

growing disenchantment of Bolivians with the party representation sys-

tem, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation invited a Bolivian multiparty

committee to visit these two countries to see how the models worked.

Carlos Börth, Alfonso Ferrufino, Luis Ossio, and a group of five more

parliamentarians visited two electoral districts in Germany to observe

first-hand the relationship between the representative and her/his circum-

scription. Another visit to England was arranged with the same purpose.

The multiparty committee obtained ideas on how to organize the work of

the uninominal deputies and posited that this could be a useful device for

developing a representative and effective legislature with a greater degree

of autonomy vis-à-vis the executive power and more responsive to the

interests and demands of citizens.

The multiparty committee proposed that the system had the potential

effect of positively impacting the ability of historically marginalized sec-

tors of society to occupy political spaces by linking them to their local

constituencies. However, some of the parliamentarians saw the reform as

another mechanism to concentrate power in a few majority parties. For

them, the SMD reform would allow them to connect the representative

with her/his constituency but on the basis of the party since there were

few parties that had the possibility of achieving a relative majority in

every circumscription. The first results confirm this hypothesis. In the

1997 elections, the SMD system favored the majority parties (ADN,

MIR, MNR, CONDEPA, UCS) except in Cochabamba where Evo

Morales’s first electoral platform, the United Left (IU), obtained the first

important quota of power. This was an isolated case then. If, in fact, the

underlying intention was to concentrate power and strengthen the major-

ity political parties, history will later radically alter the purpose of the

measure.

The previous PR electoral system utilized closed and blocked lists and

the D’Hondt formula to assign seats. With the closed and blocked lists,

the voter had no knowledge of who was getting elected for the Chamber

of Deputies. They just voted for the parties. The decision on who would

become a deputy on behalf of the party was made by the party chiefs. The

electorate in nine plurinominal districts (according to the nine departments

in the country) elected 130 deputies using the closed lists belonging to

the candidates for president and senators.

Besides uninominal and plurinominal deputies, the reform incorpo-

rated a 3 percent threshold for multiseat districts in the Chamber of


Deputies. The threshold, however, did not affect uninominal candidates

who would occupy the seat in Congress even if their party did not achieve

the 3 percent of votes required to participate in list allocation. The split

vote—in other words, one vote for the uninominal circumscription and

another for the plurinominal candidates to deputies attached to the party

list—permitted voters to vote for two different parties, if they so chose.

The mixed system of elections was generally regarded as a good mech-

anism to force representatives to develop specific ties with the districts

that they represented. Bolivians liked the idea of creating mechanisms to

guarantee more accountability since the plurinominal system of elections

with closed lists had not strengthened the relationship between the rep-

resentative and the locality he or she was supposed to represent. This had

caused great discontent since people voted without really knowing who

was representing them.35

Results of the 1997 Election: Growing Multipartism

Although it is often characterized as a three-party dominant system,

Bolivia has many features of a multiparty system. Since 1958, there have

been approximately 418 political parties contesting power. The average

number of parties participating in presidential elections since 1985 is

12.6 per election. The 1997 presidential elections were contested by

10 different political parties.36 This time, the electoral campaign had both

political veterans and novices. Political veterans Jaime Paz Zamora and

Hugo Banzer had left their political parties but came back to the political

game on time for the elections. On the other hand, although not new to

politics, René Blattman with the MNR and Ivo Kuljis with the UCS, for

instance, were beginners in electoral campaigning.

The MNR started the campaign with René Blattman as the presidential

candidate, but he decided to resign from the ticket four months before the

election. Newcomer Juan Carlos Duran assumed the candidacy. Duran had

the MNR support but was not a favorite of the president and MNR chief—

Sánchez de Lozada (Romero Ballivián 2003b: 42). In fact, Duran and

Sánchez de Lozada had been rivals in the race for the MNR leadership and

candidacy for the 1993 elections. Sánchez de Lozada won the race for the

MNR leadership and ultimately the presidency, but their rivalry continued.

The new MNR candidate decided to distance himself from the Sánchez de

Lozada administration overlooking the continuity of the Plan for All.37

Interestingly, the only party that tried to build on the Plan for All and

defended the reforms during the campaign was the MBL, the more leftist

political party in the election, which only received 3 percent of the votes.


High levels of political bickering characterized the climate of the

campaign. The political parties and candidates took issue with each other

and traded insults throughout the campaign. At the proposal of the CNE,

the CNE and the political parties participating in the elections signed a

so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement in which, with a view to guaranteeing

and strengthening democracy in Bolivia, they proclaimed their commit-

ment to avoid a “dirty war” in their electoral campaigns and to ensure

mutual respect vis-à-vis all the participants in the process. The meeting

was attended by all leading political forces, except for the MNR and the

MBL that indicated their intention to support the proposed agreement

but refused to sign it.38

Banzer built on the opposition to capitalization as a strategy against

Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR and was first in the polls leading up to

the June 1, 1997 election (Gamarra 1997a: 115). In this process, the

Banzer-Quiroga ticket obtained the first place in the elections with

22.26 percent of the vote.

Reminiscent of old practices, there were serious allegations of elec-

toral fraud in the 1997 elections. The MIR was accused of fraud in cir-

cumscription No. 41 of the localities of Colquechaca, Ocurí, and Maragua

in the Department of Potosí, where the voting records of the polling sta-

tions had been replaced favoring MIR candidate Edgar Lazcano. Potosí

senator Edgar Lazo, senator and Potosí department chief Gonzalo Valda,

the Potosí adjunct chief Marco Antonio Villa, and the ex-mayor of

Colquechaca Edgar Lazcano were accused of the fraud. Later in 2000,

Valda, Villa, and Lazcano were suspended from their party functions by

the MIR National Executive Command.39

The election results, however, were generally accepted and they

brought another shift in power between two competing party blocks.

The results also show great fragmentation within the core of major par-

ties. While the MNR lost 17.36 percentage points from the previous

election, almost half the votes; the ADN improved by only 1.21 percentage

points. Three parties—CONDEPA, MIR, and UCS—received relatively

comparable levels of votes (around 16 percent), however, the MIR

obtained fewer votes than CONDEPA, and the UCS was only 0.66 percent

below the MIR. Five other parties received very small pluralities. Evo

Morales ran as a uninominal candidate with the United Left (IU), which

obtained only 3.71 percent of the votes but concentrated most of its votes

in Cochabamba, allowing for the entrance of Morales into Congress for

the first time.

The electoral campaigns for uninominal deputy posts had a different

orientation than those of the presidential, senatorial, and plurinominal


candidates. The majority of uninominal deputies ran campaigns with

plans for municipal development and improvement of such infrastructure

as water services, sewer systems, and street maintenance—all tasks

assigned to municipal governments. As one uninominal deputy asserted,

“I had clearly understood the reform, as a candidate, I refused to enter

into a municipal bid but later did, to secure my election; I had no other

choice but to do what other candidates were doing and I started to make

‘offers’ as if my election was for mayor” (Ardaya Salinas 2003: 37). Some

deputies knew the difference between a legislative and a municipal bid,

others reached the Chamber of Deputies without really knowing what

was their role as parliamentarians.

The objective of the reform was to have open lists that would include

candidates more closely connected to their circumscriptions. However,

following previous party customs, the five most voted parties, ADN,

MNR, UCS, MIR, and CONDEPA, nominated strong party people as

candidates for uninominal deputies. The case of the MIR is illustrative.

The uninominal lists for the 1997 election were determined by the MIR

departmental leaders. This meant that in the uninominal lists, the “deter-

mination of the consequences and the electoral projection corresponded

to the party elites” (Carvajal Donoso 2002: 50). The MNR also operated

this way. To win an election, the uninominal deputy first had to win the

space within the party, and to achieve this, s/he had to be confirmed by

the territorial section as a candidate.40 It seemed that the intention of

majority parties was to have deputies whose first loyalty was to the

political party and not necessarily to her/his circumscription.41

Translating Votes into Seats: The Uninominal

Deputy and Its Impact on Congress

The popular vote was divided amongst ten political parties in the 1997

election, seven of which won representation in the legislature; in 1985, ten

parties had achieved representation in Congress. In 1989, five parties reached

Congress, and in 1993, seven parties secured parliamentary posts. The incor-

poration of the uninominal deputies, the 3 percent threshold, and the

D’Hondt formula did not produce the expected result of increasing the num-

ber of parties represented in 1997. Only seven parties reached Congress.

In the Senate, seats were allocated through closed lists linked to the

candidates for the presidency, vice presidency, and plurinominal deputies.

Using a simple majority formula for the distribution of seats in the Senate,

votes were dispersed and five parties reached the Senate: ADN, MIR,

UCS, CONDEPA, and the MNR.


The Chamber of Deputies was divided amongst seven political parties.

The ADN, MIR, MNR, and CONDEPA achieved more than 25 deputies

each. ADN obtained the highest number of deputies (32), of which

18 were uninominal deputies. It was also the only party that achieved

uninominal deputies in all departments of the country, especially in

Pando where it obtained the totality of the uninominal seats. The MIR

obtained 12 uninominal deputies out of a 23-seat party caucus. It had

uninominal deputies in the three regions of the country, except in the

departments of Beni and Pando. This time these two parties were more

able to exert their representation and effectiveness as an electoral force

and secured a significant representation in Congress.

The MNR also obtained 12 uninominal deputies in the three regions of

the country except for Tarija, Pando, and Cochabamba. UCS deputies

were mostly plurinominal (16 out of 21), and uninominal deputies were

concentrated in Santa Cruz. CONDEPA concentrated its uninominal dep-

uties in La Paz and Oruro. The MBL and one of the newcomers, United

Left (Izquierda Unida-IU), obtained few parliamentarians, but they all

were uninominal deputies. The former obtained five parliamentarians, all

uninominal deputies, in Chuquisaca, Potosí, and La Paz while the latter

had only four uninominal deputies all in the department of Cochambamba.

In this case, Morales assumed the first democratically elected post in his

political career. Morales was one of the IU candidates who obtained a con-

gressional seat for the circumscription of the provinces of Chapare and

Carrasco. He obtained an overwhelming 70 percent of the vote, the high-

est percentage vote obtained by any of the 68 elected candidates through

this new uninominal system, and the highest voting ever received by a

Bolivian parliamentarian. He asserts that “in 1997, it was very difficult for

me to believe, I became the deputy that received the most votes in Bolivia.”42

The reform bolstered two prevailing features of the Bolivian party system:

the personalization and the territorialization of the votes.

As the 1997 results show, the uninominal distribution did not

necessarily mean the consolidation of the majority parties. Instead,

national electoral tendencies were exacerbated. Moreover, it allowed the

election of electoral minorities (e.g., IU and MBL), but not necessarily

social minorities. Indigenous peoples and women were, in fact, excluded

since parties were interested in occupying those seats and restricted the

access to other actors (Ardaya Salinas 2003: 29). For example, women

obtained only 3.1 percent of representation through uninominal deputies

(only 2 out of the 68 uninominal deputies elected were women—one was

reelected). The uninominal and plurinominal seats in the 1997–2002

lower chamber were distributed as shown in table 3.4.


As shown in the composition of Congress, the new system benefited

majority and minority parties differently. On one hand, majority parties

with national constituencies—ADN, MIR, MNR, UCS—obtained

more than 20 parliamentarians each under both formulas. The MNR and

UCS votes also showed the continued personalization of politics since

they achieved more plurinominal than uninominal deputies. Second, the

reform benefited small and/or medium-size parties with local and regional

strongholds, such as CONDEPA and IU, which could benefit from the

support of voters in single-seat districts (Mayorga 2001: 434).

Coalition Building in the Late 1990s: The Megacoalition

With only 22.26 percent of the votes, Banzer leaned on the support of a

congressional coalition to be elected president. The ADN was seven sen-

ators short of achieving the two-thirds majority in the Senate and needed

87 out of the 130 seats to achieve the two-thirds majority needed for most

legislation to get approved in the Chamber of Deputies. Only 32 ADN

candidates won seats in the lower chamber. Thus, Banzer needed to

secure 54 more deputies to support him and his party in government.

Intense negotiations amongst political parties started. Positional

payoffs were a determining factor to secure this 1997 alliance. Banzer and

Table 3.4 Uninominal and Plurinominal

Deputies in the 1997–2002 Chamber of

Deputies (Prepared by the author using

National Electoral Court [CNE] data)

Uninominal

Deputies

Plurinominal

Deputies

Total

ADN 18 14 32

MIR 12 11 23

MNR 12 14 26

CONDEPA 12 7 19

UCS 5 16 21

MBL 5 0 5

IU 4 0 4

Total 68* 62 130

* Of the 68 uninominal deputies elected, only 17 had

been deputies before and won the election. The remaining

51 were political newcomers.


his negotiation team relied on the distribution of positions at the executive

and legislative levels, including ministries, secretaries, prefect’s offices,

and the leadership of the legislative chambers, commissions, and parlia-

mentary regional brigades. Indeed, the payoffs to put together this

coalition were quotas of power in the executive branch—including

departmental prefect’s offices—and in the legislature.

Walter Guiteras Denis, ADN deputy-elect, was responsible for the

negotiation of the coalition with the MIR, CONDEPA, and UCS on

behalf of the ADN. Paz Zamora, Fernández Saavedra, and Eid Franco

were among the MIR negotiating team. For the MIR, positional payoffs

were crucial as congressional support would be conditioned by represen-

tation within the cabinet. Oscar Eid Franco (2004) asserts that in 1997,

the MIR “joined the alliance because it allowed for the continuity of

democracy, but the alliance started to erode . . . the moment came when

the alliance was not enough.” It was enough, however, for Hugo Banzer

to be elected president.

The UCS also had pragmatic interests in joining the alliance. The

UCS always pursued positional payoffs as well as other types of “favors,”

that is, tax deferment benefits or the elimination of tax payments alto-

gether. Obtaining the leadership of the lower chamber, a historic demand

of the UCS even in the previous administration, became the goal in join-

ing the coalition. The widespread democratic and economic deficits were

being expressed through the CONDEPA votes. CONDEPA’s interest in

joining the coalition was being able to have greater inf luence on how to

provide tangible results to the people.

No party, including the ADN, launched a proposal for a government

plan to implement once elected. Gustavo Fernández Saavedra (2004)

asserts that “the basis of the Megacoalition was purely utilitarian . . . There

was a clear distribution of quotas of power, and of the so-called ‘reserved

expenses’ (gastos reservados).” The Megacoalition thus became more an

agreement amongst the political party operators over state patronage than

amongst political party representatives in search of access to the policy

agenda, or the policy formulation process.

The Commitment for Bolivia (Compromiso por Bolivia) was consoli-

dated through the Megacoalition composed of five political parties:

ADN, MIR, NFR, UCS, and CONDEPA. Together these parties jointly

represented 71 percent of the popular vote, and 118 parliamentarians

between senators (23) and deputies (95), enough seats to guarantee a

legislative majority for the president.

This was the broadest coalition created in the country until then, but

at the same time the most heterogeneous. Two consequences of the


grouping of such a widespread collage of political parties are clear. First,

parties suffered a progressive loss of radicalism in the ideology. Their

positions accommodated to the objectives and interests of the rest of the

members of the coalition. Second, there was great structural and cultural

heterogeneity amongst those who supported the coalition. Its broadness

also represented a great threat to its cohesion. By 2000, serious problems

within the coalition became obvious.

Water and Coca: Legislation and Policies Enacted

Banzer’s electoral campaign was initiated without a government plan,

which obstructed the expeditious formulation of public policies once in

government. In October 1997, two months into the administration, the

Banzer-Quiroga administration initiated National Dialogue I, a dialogue

process amongst social organizations, political parties, public institutions,

economic actors, and other key actors, to formulate a plan based on long-

term strategic policies for the economic and social development of the

country. Through this dialogue process, the administration organized its

work around the Plan of the Four Pillars (Plan de los Cuatro Pilares):

Institutionality Plan, Integrity Plan, Opportunity Plan, and Dignity Plan

(Plan Institucionalidad, Plan Integridad, Plan Oportunidad, Plan

Dignidad).

Based on these four broad priority areas, the Banzer administration

and the Megacoalition, among other actions, outlined a national plan to

fight poverty; developed community projects on production develop-

ment, microenterprise, and a system of microcredit favoring deprived

zones; and proposed the creation of a national indigenous confederation

run by traditional authorities.

The economic crisis starting in 1998 reduced the maneuverability of

Banzer. Also, at almost the same time, the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon

started a criminal process against former Chilean dictator Augusto

Pinochet. The news affected Banzer’s spirits, and he sought refuge in the

ADN’s old guard. His fears were confirmed, and his family’s paranoia

increased when an Argentinean judge, Rodolfo Canicoba Corral,

requested his extradition in a criminal trial for the disappearance of an

Argentinean refugee during his military regime in the 1970s.43 Although

he was never extradited, the fear of a trial was latent.

By 2000, there were allegations of political rivalry between Banzer

and Quiroga.44 For instance, in 2000, Otto Ritter, an FSB militant,

publicly accused Quiroga of organizing a “plot” to remove Banzer from

power. President Banzer, however, responded that he “never doubted


Tuto Quiroga because I have no reasons to do it. Those are speculative

comments and mere judgments . . . I cannot believe them.”45 Later, NFR’s

Manfred Reyes Villa also made similar accusations. Banzer’s family, es-

pecially his wife, Yolanda Prada, and daughters, also had a role in spread-

ing this perception. Bolivians remember the instance when Quiroga was

not allowed to work from Banzer’s desk in the Palacio Quemado

(Presidential Palace), when substituting Banzer in one of his institutional

absences. As Bolivians recount, Banzer, on his daughter’s demand,

accused Quiroga of wanting to take over; after that, Quiroga never went

back to the government palace. This produced a perception in the col-

lective imaginary that there was a rupture between the two political

authorities.

In general, Bolivian vice presidents do not generally have an agenda

independent of the president. Baptista Gumucio et al. (2003) refer to two

responsibilities of vice presidents in Bolivia: to support the functions of

the president in the executive branch and to coordinate the functions in

the legislative branch as president of Congress.46 Quiroga, however,

appeared to be the power behind the throne as he took on a series of

important responsibilities, including the implementation of the Plan

Dignidad.

Unfortunately for the wife and daughters, who wanted to continue

inf luencing politics, Banzer was diagnosed with cancer in 2000 and on

August 6, 2001, he resigned from the presidency leaving Quiroga as the

constitutional president of the country for one year. The manner in which

Quiroga’s presidency was accepted was an interesting phenomenon in the

sense that people did not question his legitimacy and accepted him as

someone completely disconnected from the Banzer administration. The

continuous perception of a break between these two political authorities

might have helped.

One piece of legislation and a government policy need to be analyzed

in this section. The lack of a coherent government program at the start of

the administration and the slow process for the formulation of a plan

showed the predominance of the political logic of patronage and distribu-

tion of posts when it came to responding to the demands of voters who

initially allowed them to accede to public positions.

Law 2029: The Law for Drinking Water

and Sanitary Sewer Systems

Although consensus was never reached, the parliamentary discussion of a

law dealing with water resources dates back to the 1970s. To address this


unresolved matter, the Banzer administration decided to advance a public

policy on water issues through the SEMAPA concession and the

implementation of the Misicuni Project.

For this project, Banzer decided to incorporate the private sector.

Banzer’s Supreme Decree 24841 of September 1997 authorized the par-

ticipation of the private sector in the provision of the public services of

drinking water and the sewer system, specifically in Cochabamba and in

the Misicuni Project. Supreme Resolution 218144 designated the presi-

dent of the directory of the Misicuni Company as the official responsible

for promoting the project and engaging private investors.

A series of decrees and agreements were signed from November 1997 to

August 1998, ending on an international bid to select the company to build

the water tunnels in Cochabamba. The international bid was opened, grant-

ing the winner not only a concession for the extraction of water resources

and the building of the sewer system but also the business of distributing and

selling the water to the public for 40 years. The bidding process did not have

the success that was expected and so, through Decree 25351, in April 1999,

the government cancelled the international public bidding and authorized

direct and exclusive negotiations with the Tunari Waters (Aguas del

Tunari-AT) consortium (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 33).

The proposal given by Tunari Waters to the government had serious

deficiencies, especially in terms of the proposed increment of 34 percent

in consumer rates for drinking water and sewer system services. However,

following a brief negotiation, the administration accepted the proposal

and Tunari Waters was granted rights to (a) provide water and sewer sys-

tems, (b) generate energy, and (c) rent the SEMAPA and Misicuni prop-

erties (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 39).

As part of the concession process of the SEMAPA-Misicuni project,

President Banzer sent to the legislature in 1999 the draft of the General

Law on Water. The basis of the law provided for a change in the logic for

the provision of services, namely, moving the monopoly for the provision

of basic services from the state to the market.

The law established as a basic principle that water was a “social and

ecological good with economic value.” Resistance to the law started

when a series of NGOs, the peasant sector, indigenous sector, and other

social groups made a counterproposal in which they stated that water was

not simply “a good with economic value,” but “a social and ecological

good for the benefit of people and families’ socio-economic develop-

ment” (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 42). This counterproposal was

not considered by the legislature as discussions for the approval of the law

were underway.


Then, Law 2029, containing four basic components, was approved

by the legislature on October 1999. First, it regulated the concession,

licenses, and provision of drinking water and sewer services by estab-

lishing the Superintendence of Basic Cleaning, which substituted the

Superintendence of Water, as the regulating body of the concession.

This superintendence had the responsibility of granting concessions

and licenses, approving the prices and maximum tariffs for the services,

as well as the sanctions and obligations of both service providers and

users.

Second, the law defined the characteristics of the concessions by limit-

ing concessions and licenses only to Drinking Water and Sewer System

Providers constituted as public municipal companies, mixed anonymous

companies, private companies, and cooperatives or civil associations.

Third, the law restricted the areas included in the concession based on the

concentration of population and prohibited the illegal perforation of wells

and other forms of water extraction, that is, acting without the appropri-

ate concession or license given by the corresponding superintendence.

Finally, the law established the rights and obligations of users benefiting

from the service.47 When users were forced to pay higher prices for the

same service, a new social struggle was in the making. In April 2000, the

Water War erupted.

Dignity Plan

Coca eradication measures were government rather thant state policy. e

Previous administrations had implemented their own versions of the

policy. Sánchez de Lozada sought an option zero program 48 that called

for industrial projects and mass training programs for coca growers in

exchange for the complete eradication of illegal coca leaf crops. He also

concentrated efforts on extradition measures. In his administration, the

United States and Bolivia signed an extradition treaty. Under this agree-

ment, a group of Bolivians were tried in U.S. courts and sent to U.S. jails,

something that caused great controversy. In 1994, Sánchez de Lozada

faced an all-out confrontation with Chapare coca growers who clashed

violently with eradication workers. Evo Morales, as leader of the Tropic

Federation of coca growers, was arrested.

The Banzer-Quiroga administration also put together a plan with

specific goals and mechanisms to achieve the eradication of illegal coca.

The Dignity Plan and accompanying legislation were designed without

the participation of political parties. ADN’s Osvaldo Antezana, a techno-

crat and an agricultural engineer who specialized in these issues, was the


brain behind the policy.49 Antezana belonged to Jorge Quiroga’s team of

experts and was at the time vice minister of Alternative Development.

Antezana and Quiroga designed the plan and managed to secure interna-

tional support, especially by the United States. The fact remained that

coca eradication programs in Bolivia were usually not enforced without

the support of the U.S. embassy in La Paz. The mechanism to show

approval was through “cooperation.” In other words, should the embassy

not agree with a proposed coca eradication plan, it did not provide finan-

cial support for it. This was also linked to the U.S. policy of certification,

a very delicate area of U.S.-Bolivian relations. It was a difficult issue to

deal with in Bolivia that required an adept combination of technical,

political, and diplomatic skills.

Although most key sectors and political parties in Bolivia participated

in the National Dialogue process, very few had an opportunity to pro-

vide inputs on the technical components of the plan. The National

Dialogue served to sanction only the technical content of the coca eradi-

cation plan. But it was enforced and the Banzer-Quiroga administration

unilaterally entered into a coca eradication program based on the use of

force with weak signs of a viable alternative program for economic and

social development.

For this, the Banzer administration constantly faced confrontation

from social sectors, and Quiroga and his team were often the target of

angry coca growers from the Chapare. By 2000, President Banzer

announced that “in the Chapare, the Dignity Plan, started in 1998, was

completed with the elimination of 38,000 hectares of coca leaves, thus

only 600 hectares are left to be eradicated.”50 By February 2001, how-

ever, other numbers suggested that the Dignity Plan had not been as

effective as initially planned. In February 2001, military authorities

admitted that there were still between 3,000 and 4,000 hectares of coca

leaves left to be eradicated. By March 2001, President Banzer denied hav-

ing referred to the achievement of “zero coca” and insisted that he had

used the phrase “zero drugs.”

Once he assumed the presidency in 2001, Quiroga was forced to make

some critical decisions regarding the continuity of the Dignity Plan.

First, he was forced to admit publicly that zero coca had not been attained

and that a satellite error was responsible for the premature declaration of

success (Gamarra 2002: 7). In September 2001, the new minister of gov-

ernment admitted the existence of 6,000 hectares of surplus coca, which

confirmed the inability of the administration to attain the goals of the

Dignity Plan.51 He also had to admit that the social and economic impact

of the plan in the coca-producing zones was negative.52


Second, to reverse the negative results, Quiroga’s immediate decision

was the militarization of the illegal coca-producing areas,53 namely, the

Yungas of La Paz and the Chapare. Quiroga secretly ordered the entry of

4,000 military and police troops into the Chapare to control an inevitable

mobilization of the coca growers’ federation. This decision was signifi-

cant in the sense that control of the Chapare region became dependent on

the long-term presence of security forces there (Gamarra 2002: 7). This

militarization provoked a new escalation of violence and a disregarding

of the agreements made between the government and the coca union

movement in the past.

Because of a lack of internal coherence within the Megacoalition, in

the final analysis, the Banzer administration was characterized by (a) a

significant decrease in authority in terms of the decision-making process,

and (b) the inability of the administration to deliver on the proposals of

the Four Pillars. There was also excessive patrimonialism and nepotism

in the government administration, a deficient level of coordination and

lack of leadership that produced more inefficiency in the institutional and

political management of the executive. According to accusations by

various newspapers, a significant number of relatives or people close to

the president, and his wife Yolanda Prada, served as officials and high-

level executives in the national administration. For example, there were

a significant number of Banzer’s relatives in the Foreign Service, and his

son-in-law, Luis Alberto Valle, was appointed prefect of La Paz. Similarly,

numerous cases were denounced regarding corruption in his administra-

tion, including the case charged by General Jose Ernesto Ayoroa

Argandoña on the irregularities in the use of the resources destined to

help the victims of an earthquake in Aíquile 54; the case of Minister of

Health Tonchy Marinkovich and the anomalies committed by the sale

units of the National Health Bank through the overpricing of some food

items, and the embezzlement of a million dollars in the transfer of equip-

ment; the so-called Chito Casos referring to the corruption committed

by the ex-prefect of La Paz, Luis Alberto Valle (Banzer’s son-in-law); the

connections of Italian mafia’s Marino Diodato with the government and

the president’s family; the irregularities of the mass communication unit

of the Cochabamba Customs Office; and the loss of $160 million of the

FONVIS invested in supposed housing “mega” projects (Costa Benavides

et al. 2000: 8; Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton 2003: 26). The increase in

corruption, the effects of Law 2029 and the Dignity Plan, and the scant

results of the economic reactivation policies put Banzer in a delicate state

of democratic governance.


The ADN as a party weakened considerably in this period as did

Banzer’s image as party chief and articulator of the Megacoalition,

especially as a result of the April 2000 events in Cochabamba.55 Within

the party, there were serious risks of disintegration. By mid-July 2000,

there were three well-defined currents within the ADN party: “the

Dinosaurs,” who grouped around Minister Guillermo Fortun, “the

Snurfs,” who grouped around Vice President Quiroga, and “the Pitosaurs,”

who grouped around National Deputy Fernando Kieffer. This resulted in

serious challenges in keeping the Megacoalition coherent.

Two types of payoffs allowed Banzer to secure his fragile support.

First, the use of “reserved expenses,” more common in this administra-

tion than in previous ones,56 that allowed controversial laws to be passed

by parliamentarians once they received an extra remuneration. The

reserved expenses did not go to all parliamentarians approving the law,

however. It only went to parliamentarians belonging to the coalition.

Second, positional payoffs were also strategic. Electing the presidency

of the Chambers of Deputies and the Senate was a space to grant posi-

tional payoffs in exchange for support. The election of local governments

was also a space to negotiate positions. For instance, in the 1999 elections,

the election of mayors by the elected councilors also ref lected the

composition of the Megacoalition; however, there were serious confron-

tations in Oruro, between the ADN and the MIR, and in Santa Cruz

between ADN and the UCS. But the most important space for this type

of payoffs continued to be the cabinet.

The MIR had an important presence in the ministerial cabinet.

Throughout the administration, however, the party adopted an ambiva-

lent strategy of disconnection and critique as well as support to the

administration.

On some occasions, the MIR functioned more as opposition than as

an ally of the ADN and the government. During the 2000 events in

Cochabamba, the MIR attempted to capitalize on the situation of a gov-

ernance crisis to promote a restructuring of the ministerial cabinet to

resolve the crisis, but with an aim of occupying more spaces of power

(Costa Benavides et al. 2000: 23).

In the case of the legislature too, payoffs were used. Through the

Megacoalition, the UCS was finally able to lead the Chamber of Deputies.

On July 29, 2000, ADN, MIR, and UCS made it official that the president

of the Chamber of Deputies would be a UCS militant. The UCS’s Deputy

Jaalil Melgar Mustafa was named president then. In 2000, the ADN

obtained the leadership of the Senate when ADN’s Senator Leopoldo


Fernández Ferreira was elected president. In exchange for giving up this

post, the MIR received one ministry in the executive branch. Cabinet

composition continued to be a strategic space to distribute positional

payoffs.

The MIR was also experiencing internal conf licts. The Supreme

Court ratified Oscar Eid Franco’s sentence on narco-corruption charges

on June 6, 2000. He had to leave his position as coordinator of the coali-

tion. To replace him, the party’s National Executive Committee (CEN)—

Samuel Doria Medina, Carlos Saavedra, Jorge Torres, and Marco Antonio

Oviedo—assumed Eid’s work 57 while Eid stayed as the internal articula-

tor. The Supreme Court also allowed the trial of Tonchy Marinkovic for

the irregular purchase of vaccines in 1988 when he was minister of health.

The MIR party caucus requested his voluntary retirement.58

As part of the Megacoalition, the UCS’s support to the Banzer-

Quiroga administration was strategic on two fronts. On one hand, the

UCS gave the coalition the support needed to pass government policies.

On the other, its regional strength in the department of Santa Cruz guar-

anteed relative governance in the municipal administration. An ally in

the municipality was helpful in furthering regional support to the gov-

ernment. The UCS showed, however, greater interest in quotas of power

than in intervening in the setting up of the policy agenda.

The Megacoalition weakened with the departure of the NFR. The

NFR quotas of power were distributed between the MIR and the UCS;

the MIR obtained the Ministry of Sustainable Development and the

UCS obtained the Vice-Ministry of Popular Participation. The ADN

had to accept only minor quotas of power (Orozco et al. 2000: 1) such as

the leadership of the Fund for Peasant Development, the direction of

the Petroleum Bank in the executive branch, and the presidency of the

Finance Commission in the Chamber of Deputies, previously held by the

NFR. After the April 2000 events, President Banzer decided to make a

political change with very few novelties. He decided to govern with the

same group of men: Claudio Mansilla, a businessman from Santa Cruz;

Hugo Carvajal Donoso, the well-known leader and parliamentarian from

MIR; and Jorge Pacheco, from the UCS, all came back to the cabinet this

time as minister of labor.

The cabinet shift had no changes in members, but rotations did occur

in the remaining ministries; four ministries changed positions: Ronald

McLean (ADN), who was minister of finance, moved to the Ministry of

Sustainable Development; Jose Luis Lupo moved from Economic

Development to Finance; Minister of Labor Luis Vasquez (MIR) went on

to become the minister of justice; Carlos Saavedra (MIR) went to occupy


the Ministry of Economic Development.59 The cabinet was reconfigured

with limited posts for the UCS.

Quiroga assumed power in 2001 and immediately showed his inten-

tion to avoid the distribution of positional payoffs. The MIR and UCS

decided to relinquish the ministries they had occupied but guaranteed

Quiroga the 50 parliamentarians in Congress. In the legislature, however,

there was great controversy in electing the leadership of the two cham-

bers. Luis Vasquez (MIR) was elected president of the Chamber of

Deputies, and Enrique Toro (ADN) was elected president of the Senate.

Regardless of the MNR opposition to these appointments, the ADN,

MIR, UCS, NFR, CONDEPA, and IU with 94 votes imposed the

decision to elect the 2001–2002 congressional leadership.

The MNR abandoned the chambers in protest and announced that it

would start a process before the Constitutional Tribunal for the illegal

election of Vasquez (who was accused of violating the Debate Rules) as

president of the lower chamber. The leadership of the chambers was thus

in the hands of the Quiroga administration’s governing coalition.60

Quiroga organized his cabinet in three working teams: an economic

team led by Jorge Torres, a second team in charge of managing external

relations led by Jose Luis Lupo, and a third team in charge of the political

agenda and the coordination with coalition political parties, led by Walter

Guiteras.

He also appointed Javier Nogales and Jacques Trigo as minister of

housing and minister of finance respectively; both had close ties to

MNR’s Sánchez de Lozada. This was seen as a sign that he wanted to

build strategic alliances with opposition parties. Sánchez de Lozada had

no choice but to confirm his support for these changes.61 A La Razón

article (7/28/2001) read “President Quiroga wants to successfully address

two issues: the economic crisis and a secure transition process. To do that,

he will bet on a new cabinet that would balance the technical with the

political.” Other newspapers such as La Prensa and Los Tiempos had similar

headlines.

During 2001, Banzer was accused of nepotism. The prefects’ offices of

La Paz and Santa Cruz were occupied by family members Luis Alberto

Valle and Ramón Prada respectively. In the Bolivian Foreign Ministry,

there were 13 cases of nepotism. The situation was such that 13 Banzer

family members were suspended from their responsibilities by Quiroga in

2001 (Costa Benavides, De la Riva et al. 2001: 58). Quiroga did not

resort to positional payoffs at the levels Banzer did. However, the

parliamentary majority, facilitated through payoffs in exchange for

support, was the mechanism that allowed the passing of Law 2029 and the


implementation of coca eradication measures in the Dignity Plan. In the

case of the Law of Water, regional newspaper coverage in Cochabamba

suggested that the president exerted pressure on the parliamentary coali-

tion to approve Law 2029.62 For example, an article in a local newspaper

said, “The government pressures the parliamentarians. Bolivia will lose

80 million dollars if the Law of Water is not approved, according to

information provided by the president of the Commission on Sustainable

Development of the Chamber of Deputies, Edgar Zagarra.”

Various political parties and key sectors in Bolivian society exerted

opposition to the administration through demands for Banzer’s resigna-

tion. After the conf lict in Cochabamba, Sánchez de Lozada lobbied for a

constitutional mechanism that would allow the legal removal of the pres-

ident: “the idea is for people to have the option of changing the leaders

that are bad, and demand that the good ones remain in power longer.”63

The MBL’s Antonio Aranibar also demanded Banzer’s resignation after

the failure of the state of siege declared by the president. Aranibar stated that

the state of siege “served to show the impotence of the government . . . General

Banzer must resign allowing for a constitutional succession.”64 Later, in light

of Banzer’s illness, private businessmen from Cochabamba also demanded

his resignation and the appointment of Quiroga to end the power vacuum.65

Sánchez de Lozada also requested Banzer’s resignation when the president

was attending the Summit of the Americas Meeting in Quebec, Canada, in

January 2001.

Parallel Opposition: The Water War and

Confrontations with the Cocalero Movement

The popular mobilization movements that started in 2000 were a byproduct

of the inability of the political class to guarantee concrete socioeconomic

results for the population through effective executive-legislative policy-

making. Additionally, the 2000 events clearly show the divorce between

representatives and their constituencies. Demands emerging from society

in terms of the conditions for the provision of such a basic service as water

did not find institutional channels of expression.

The Law of Water affected peasant and agricultural organizations in

the sense that the main traditional source for consumption and irrigation

in Cochabamba was the water found under the soil. The peasants extracted

this water through wells without a license or paying fees; this was deemed

illegal by the government. In October 1999, as the law was approved,

various social and indigenous groups started a process of political pressure

in the streets to defend the “uses and customs” of water by the peasant


organizations and to protest the privatization of such a basic social service.

Things became complicated when the general director of the Tunari

Waters, Geoffrey Torpe, announced that there would be an increase in

the tariffs starting on January 1, 2000.66

The response was marked by massive popular protests against the

increase of water bills (tarifazo) in the city of Cochabamba without an

equivalent improvement in water services. Conf licts started as people

protested against the tarifazo. In response, the popular opposition uti-

lized three basic protest mechanisms: (a) road blocks in January 2000; (b)

the pacific occupation of the city in February 2000, and finally (c) a gen-

eral strike that paralyzed Cochabamba in April 2000. The two key social

groups exerting pressure were the Committee for the Defense of the

Water and the Popular Economy (Comité de Defensa del Agua y la

Economia Popular-CODAEP) and the Departmental Coordinating

Group for Water and Life (Coordinadora Departamental del Agua y la

Vida). The CODAEP had been created in July 1999 led by the Uninominal

Deputy Gonzalo Maldonado. The Coordinating Group was created in an

ad hoc manner specifically to demand the annulment of the concession

contract of the SEMAPA project to Tunari Waters and the modification

of Law 2029.

To initiate opposition, the Regional Civic Committee organized a

one-day strike for January 13, 2000, while the Coordinating Group

organized three days of massive roadblocks with the support of the peas-

ant sector. Unable to control social unrest, the government, through four

of its ministers—Carlos Saavedra Bruno, the minister of external

commerce, Herbert Müller, minister of economic development, Erick

Reyes Villa, minister of sustainable development, and Jose Luis Lupo,

minister of housing—decided to sign the first agreement to contain con-

frontations. The Civic Committee also signed. Maclovio Zapara signed

on behalf of the transportation sector, and Nestor Guzman on behalf of

the Cochabamba Parliamentary Brigade (Garcia, Garcia, and Quiton

2003: 57).

The agreement did not stop the Tunari Waters Consortium’s measures.

The Coordinating Group announced the pacific occupation of the city to

pressure for the freezing of the tariffs on drinking water, the annulment

of the contract with the AT company and the abolishment of Law 2029.

With mobilizations and social pressure and being unable to provide a

state subsidy to water services, the government accepted for a second time

to revise the tariff structure, revise the contract with AT, and modify Law

2029 (De la Fuente 2000: 3). It proposed to reduce the increase in tariffs

from 35 percent to 20 percent.


The Megacoalition supported the proposal, and in March 2000, all

political parties in the governing coalition, except for the New Republican

Force (NFR), signed a public document stating their support. But in

reaction to this, Manfred Reyes Villa, mayor of Cochabamba and chief of

the NFR, rejected the presidential proposal and distanced himself and

the NFR from the governing coalition. In a press conference, Reyes

Villa stated that “we [the NFR] are not in agreement with the govern-

ment decision. Although we [the NFR] made an effort to reduce the

increase, we decided not to sign the document presented to the public by

the governing parties.” 67 With this, the coalition weakened and lost its

main ally in the city of Cochabamba.

Following the pacific takeover of the city, President Banzer decided to

send from La Paz his minister of the presidency, Walter Guiteras (ADN),

accompanied by 700 police officials, the Special Security Group (GES),

and various army officials to support the government actions in

Cochabamba. Minister Guiteras was supported by Vice Minister of

Government Jose Orias.

By February 4, 2000, the city became a battleground. The Civic

Committee divided from the Coordinating Group. The Catholic Church

exerted its moral inf luence and tried to persuade the government to

withdraw its forces and negotiate. The Ombudsman Office also inter-

vened. Under extreme social pressure, the government signed a second

agreement, the Agreement for Cochabamba, with the Civic Committee

and the Coordinating Group. The agreement signed on the night of

February 5, 2000 contained nine points that intended to freeze tariffs,

continue negotiations to establish a tariff structure based on consensus,

revise Law 2029 and the contract with Tunari Waters (Garcia, Garcia,

and Quiton 2003: 50–59).

By March 2000, positions were radicalized. On March 25, 2000, the

Coordinating Group called for a popular consultation process at the

margins of the State.68 The results of the popular consultation showed a

clear opposition to the government measures: 99 percent of the votes

were against the increase in tariffs, 96 percent in favor of annulling the

concession contract for SEMAPA-Misicuni, and 97 percent rejected Law

2029. Later, on April 4, 2000, the Coordinating Group organized a gen-

eral strike joined by the municipal mayor, the president of the Civic

Committee, regional deputies, and members of the municipal council.69

Representatives from the private sector and the Coordinating Group

attempted to start a dialogue but that same night, the representatives from

the Coordinating Group were arrested by the police.


The president declared a state of siege, ordered the arrest of regional

leaders, and suspended constitutional guarantees (civil rights)70 (Whitehead

2001: 12). Constitutionally, Banzer was entitled to this discretionary

presidential power. Banzer opted to do this although he himself was

criticized for using similar measures when he was a dictator.

However, in order to maintain this state of siege, the president needed

the legislature’s support.71 On April 12, 2000, the coalition in Congress

approved the state of siege.72 Immediately, opposition parties, MNR,

CONDEPA, MBL, IU, and NFR resolved to request the Constitutional

Tribunal to declare unconstitutional the congressional resolution that

ratified the state of siege.73

Even with the April 8 declaration of a state of siege, the government

was unable to stop the mobilizations and street protests that became even

more violent, leaving dozens of people hurt and one dead. Two days after

declaring the state of siege, the situation had become unsustainable for

the government. The government lost control of the city and of the

country in general. The Cochabamba demonstrations were also joined by

road blockades and protests in other areas of the country, including in the

traditionally conf lictive Altiplano peasant settlement of Achacachi

(Whitehead 2001: 12). Armed officials deployed in the city were not able

to counterrespond to the street barricades. Banzer was forced to cut the

state of emergency short. Cornered by social pressure, the government

decided to accept citizen demands.

There was still uncertainty on April 9, but Tunari Waters announced

in the afternoon that it would leave Cochabamba. Almost immediately,

the superintendent informed the public of the end of the contract. Vice

Minister Orios made an agreement with the Coordinating Group. The

state of siege was suspended on April 20,74 but the renegotiation of Law

2029 was still pending. On April 10, the last march took place and an

agreement was signed to confirm what Orios had promised verbally. On

April 11, Banzer promulgated a new law, Law 2026, that ended the

Water War.

One of the key factors in the Water War was that uninominal depu-

ties, and the Regional Parliamentary Brigade for the department of

Cochabamba, were unable to channel citizens’ demands regarding both

water and coca eradication measures adopted by the Banzer administra-

tion. This parliamentary group had no coherent line of thought. On the

contrary, it was divided because of the divergent positions between

opposition sectors and the party line and interests defended by the

uninominal and plurinominal deputies. This caused fragmentation and


thus its participation had a very limited impact (Garcia, Garcia, and

Quiton 2003: 80).

Within the Regional Parliamentary Brigade there were two divergent

currents. Evo Morales, elected for the first time as a uninominal deputy

for the IU party stated that “the Brigade is divided between those who

support the Government and the opposition against the tarifazo.”75 He

was in the group opposing the government measure. The other group

within the Brigade maintained a supporting position toward the measures

adopted by the administration regarding the issue of water in Cochabamba.

The president of the Brigade, Deputy Nestor Guzman, stated that “the

Brigade is not in agreement with the annulment of the contract and the

fight will focus on negotiating a subsidy to reduce the tariff increase.” 76

Similar declarations were made by Deputy Eloy Lujan.77

The Brigade appeared at the scene of conf lict only when Law 2029

was questioned by the people. Law 2029 was a law that the Brigade itself

had approved earlier in the legislature without really discussing it, much

less consulting with the beneficiaries or affected population. Censured by

its role and because of its representatives, the Brigade took a proactive

attitude and was willing to revise and modify Law 2029. In January 2000,

the parliamentary group signed the first agreement to present before

Congress within 45 days a modified and complementary draft of Law

2029 that would be the product of joint work with the Coordinating

Group and the Civic Committee. This did not happen.

On February 5, 2000, the Brigade signed the second agreement with

the same commitment but did not act on it. Regional newspaper cover-

age stated that “the Brigade continues divorced from the Coordinating

Group. It was supposed to meet on Saturday and Monday with the

Coordinating Group to analyze Law 2029, however, its members did not

show up.”78 There were very slow negotiations to modify the law. The

first modifications to Law 2029 were made only on April 5 in the lower

chamber.

Two issues became clear to the political class and to the rest of the

population during the Water War. On one hand, the water crisis made it

obvious how disconnected both the government and political parties

were from popular sentiment. On the other, it revealed the growing

inefficiency of political institutions, such as the Congress, to address

legitimate grievances coming from society. The uninominal deputies

from that district were indeed unable to bring and resolve the longstand-

ing local dispute to the formal institutions of power and promote a serious

discussion in parliament. The weak institutions were overwhelmed by

the local nongovernmental organizations such as the Pro-Water Committee


and the Coordinating Group, which were able to amass the popular

discontent and use it to demand action from the government.

A similar situation occurred with the cocalero movement and their

opposition on the streets against the Dignity Plan measures. The social

conf lict that took place in September 2000 was the result of the accumu-

lation of multiple particular and small conf licts that eventually coincided

(Laserna 2001) and took advantage of the vulnerability of the national

government. The protests mainly consisted of the blocking of the main

roads of the country, and a violent response by the military sent by the

national government to regain the roads. The two main issues of protest

in September 2000 were voiced in the Chapare, Cochabamba, and

Achacachi, La Paz. In the Chapare, coca producers demanded for the end

of the forced eradication of coca plantations that had been part of the state

policy, Dignity Plan, in the framework of the plan to fight narco-

trafficking. The people of Achacachi, mainly peasants of Aymara origins,

initially supported the Chapare movement, but their discourse later

changed toward a questioning of the ethnic inequities of Bolivian society

(Ames, Pérez, and Seligson 2004: 5).

September and October 2000, June 2001, and the second half of 2001

saw an increasing number of popular demonstrations as a result of the

accumulation of unattended demands of coca-leaf peasants and indige-

nous groups in the Altiplano, including Evo Morales’s coca sector and

Felipe Quispe’s Union Confederation of Peasant Workers in Bolivia

(Conderación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia-

CSUTCB). Social demands for better prices for peasant producers, higher

wages for school teachers, and the withdrawal of military presence in the

coca zones, among other issues, were expressed through massive road

blockades. By the end of 2001, Bolivia was rife with social conf lict.

The discontent of the cocaleros and peasant groups emerged also from

their perception that the opening up of the political system had not been

paired with solutions to their problems, and that the generation of liberal-

izing reforms had failed to deliver tangible benefits to the majority of the

people. The gap between the numerous reform objectives and the results

the reforms produced was exceedingly wide.79

Political parties had become self-serving groups pursuing only their

party and personal interests, and not national problems, so people used

confrontation as a mechanism to bring about changes to their situation.

By the end of 2000, Bolivia’s Permanent Assembly on Human Rights

estimated that the protests against the Dignity Plan had resulted in

20 deaths (15 civilians and 5 soldiers), 335 injuries, 152 arrests, 26 cases of

torture, and 1 disappearance 80 (Whitehead 2001: 13). Indeed, newspaper


coverage documents the violent confrontation between the cocalero

movement and the government. By 2001, one year before the electoral

process, there was a military apprehension of peasants. Felipe Quispe led

a 29-day blocking of the city of La Paz. A truce was negotiated between

the government and the CSUTCB and signed into an agreement by the

Quiroga ministers and peasant sector representatives. Marches and

demonstrations, however, became the order of the day.

By January 2002, when Jorge Quiroga was already president,

another big conf lict escalated in Cochabamba in opposition to Decree

1008 that prohibited the sale of coca leaves from the Chapare in the

local market. Other confrontations and passive manifestations of con-

f lict regarding the coca issue ensued. Throughout the last two years of

Quiroga’s presidency, there were numerous confrontations between

cocaleros and the military in the Chapare as well as roadblocks,

marches, and other protests in La Paz.

Unfortunately, the encounters between the police and the cocaleros

ended with many dead on both sides. The government accused Evo

Morales, already a legislator in the lower chamber with the IU, for the

death of a policeman in the Chapare and managed his expulsion from the

legislature. The decision to expulse him from the parliament was made

on January 2002.81 The expulsion took place following a vote where both

the official and opposition sectors agreed to expel him from the legisla-

ture: 104 deputies voted to expel him, 14 to allow him to stay, and there

was 1 blank vote.82 The Banzer administration, counting on the govern-

ing coalition, was able to expel Evo Morales without even presenting

evidence for the accusation.

Opposition in the Legislature

For the approval of Law 2029 and the Dignity Plan-related measures,

Banzer and Quiroga relied on the traditional mechanism of the parlia-

mentary majority. By then, the Megacoalition had 23 of the 27 senators

in the Senate, and 95 of the 130 in the lower chamber. This allowed

them to surpass both (a) the weaknesses of the governing coalition and

internal confrontations within it and (b) the confrontation on the part of

opposition parties.

Within the coalition, the MIR showed great apprehensiveness toward

the ADN and many of the government measures. In various opportuni-

ties, Paz Zamora attacked the ADN and asserted on some occasions that

he “was not a politician of the Megacoalition.” However, the MIR sup-

ported the agenda proposed by Banzer through 2002.83 Ericka Brockman,


chief of the MIR’s party caucus (1997–2002), asserts that the MIR coor-

dinated the legislative agenda with the executive. She asserts that “before

they were sent to Congress by the executive, the MIR party caucus had

an input on the items that were important, and on deciding which ones

to consider in the legislature. This was done through a political commis-

sion for the coalition with members of the legislative and executive

branches.”84

Banzer also faced confrontation from the UCS, which constantly

threatened him with abandoning the Megacoalition. This would leave

the government coalition with only 53 of the 74 votes needed to main-

tain a parliamentary majority, that is, 21 seats short. Fernández’ threats

came as a result of Banzer’s unwillingness to absolve the Fernández

family of accusations of tax evasion. The demand by the Internal

Revenue Service dates back to 1990, when the Santa Cruz IRS off ice

produced two rulings that established debts with respect to the added

valued tax as well as consumption taxes owed by the Fernández

Distribution Company, which is linked to the National Beer Company

(Cervecería Nacional Boliviana-CNB). By June 1999, the CNB refused

to pay the initial debt amount of 32 million Bolivians (Orozco et al.

2000: 7). By mid-2000, the Bolivian Internal Revenue Service pres-

sured the Fernández family to pay a debt of Bs 60 million, owed to the

institution by the Fernández (Beer) distribution company, a Fernández

family property.

Faced with the accusation, Johnny Fernández threatened his allies

with leaving the coalition if they did not help them with the IRS situa-

tion.85 Fernández later retreated from his proposition, but demanded

more quotas of power, including the Ministry of Housing and the

Ministry of Labor in exchange for staying in the coalition (Costa

Benavides et al. 2000: 25). As a result of the IRS scandal, covered widely

by the news media, the UCS unilaterally broke political relations with

the Megacoalition in the middle of a series of MIR accusations of alleged

corruption in the payment of taxes.86

The NFR also behaved erratically both within the coalition and as

part of the opposition. The NFR joined the ADN ticket for the presiden-

tial elections and was since the beginning an ally to the administration.

With Reyes Villa as the mayor of Cochabamba and chief of the party,

support was supposedly guaranteed. In the case of Law 2029, the NFR

shifted positions. At the beginning of the SEMAPA concession, the NFR

adopted an official stance. Later, the NFR adopted a confrontational

position, broke with ADN, and moved to exert opposition in Congress.

Reyes Villa publicly declared that “at the moment of signing the contract,


[he] trusted the good faith of the government, but the interest in making

the Misicuni Project a reality was stronger. We were all deceived.”87

Just as the MNR had done earlier, in July 2000, the NFR attempted

to put together its own opposition block—a “mega-opposition.” By July

2000, newspaper coverage announced that Johnny Fernández, German

Gutierrez, Manfred Reyes Villa, and Evo Morales had advanced negotia-

tions to put together a political party alliance, what they called a center-

left alliance, to confront the MNR, MIR, and ADN in the 2002 elections.

This opposition alliance never consolidated.

Opposition was exerted more efficiently by the MNR. This party

caucus exerted opposition using two key strategies. On one hand, the

MNR through its deputies, senators, and other leaders used the media to

continuously criticize the government on various issues, such as gas sub-

sidies, suspension of the payment of the pension plan “BonoSol,”

the National Dialogue, the monopoly of the district attorney’s offices by

the official parties. They also questioned key legislation advanced by the

Megacoalition on the f loors of the Senate and lower chamber.

On the other hand, MNR parliamentarians also used a series of mech-

anisms through the party caucus to exert pressure on Congress, some of

which are:

● A request for the interpellation of Foreign Minister Javier Murillo

and the destitution of Ambassador Bedoya Ballivián, Bolivian

ambassador to Argentina, made on July 18, 2000, for rejecting a

special event organized by the autonomous legislature of Buenos

Aires to honor the disappeared Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz.88

● Requests for the interpellation of the ministers in the economic

realm. For example, an August 8, 2000, La Prensa headline states

that the “MNR Deputy Carlos Sánchez Berzain, jointly with other

opposition deputies Evo Morales and Andres Soliz, announced in

the legislature an interpellation of three ministers in the economic

realm because of their inability to provide solutions to the economic

crisis.”● The demand of the transfer of the National ID Registry (Registro

de Identificacion Nacional-RIN) to the CNE in an effort to guar-

antee transparent elections.● As president of the Commission on Human Rights in Congress,

former MNR plurinominal deputy Manuel Suarez (2004) recounts

that the party caucus requested the questioning of military authori-

ties. Having the military questioned was really uncomfortable for

any government, and this was especially uncomfortable to former


military leader Hugo Banzer. Requests for oral and written reports

from the minister of defense, minister of government, and other

military authorities generally with regard to the management of the

conf lict with the cocalero movement were made.89 In July 2001,

after serious confrontations with the cocalero movement, the minis-

ter of defense, General Oscar Vargas, and the police chief, Walter

Osinada, presented an oral report to the Human Rights Commission

in the Chamber of Deputies in relation to the deaths of a group of

peasants in the Altiplano. Minister of Government Leopoldo

Fernández also presented an oral report.90

● Accusations on La Paz ex-prefect Luis Alberto Valle of administrative

irregularities.● A rejection of the declaration of the state of siege in April 2000, as

well as the measures adopted to control social protests in

Cochabamba.● The condemnation of the distribution of quotas of power within the

district attorney’s offices amongst the three majority parties within

the coalition on the grounds that it affected the transparency of the

Judicial branch (Orozco et al. 2001: 24).● The request for the censuring of President Banzer for trying to

resolve the September 2000 crisis with the armed forces first before

resolving the crisis with its political counterparts.

In an attempt to move away from confrontation, the MNR attempted

to get close to the administration by calling for another summit of polit-

ical party chiefs to find measures to address the economic crisis.91 By

August 2000, the Banzer administration recognized unanimously that

the economic crisis deserved to be addressed urgently and indicated its

willingness to sit in a consensus roundtable with the opposition, the

private sector, and civil society.92

At the same time, the MNR advanced its interpellation procedures.

The government considered the requests for interpellation on the part of

the opposition, especially the MNR, as a “double discourse” and rejected

any possibilities for consensus building.93 In declarations to the media,

Quiroga asserted that “the president was going to convene the consensus

roundtable via an invitation letter to the opposition; [the government]

prepared statements to the private sector, and the political leadership, and

agreed on [new] instructions to the economic cabinet. However, we

wanted this to take place in a calm and relaxed environment.” Although

Sánchez de Lozada apologized and recognized that the interpellation

request altered the consensus-building process, he still asserted that the


interpellation needed to be done because that was one of the censuring

functions of the legislature.94

With other opposition parties, the MNR had a relatively amicable

relation. In August 2000, the MNR took advantage of a weak moment

of the Megacoalition that had only 61 votes in the lower chamber (ADN

with 16 votes, UCS 21, FRI 2, the MIR 21, and the PDC 1) as compared

to 60 votes of the opposition parties (MNR with 26 votes, NFR 13,

CONDEPA 10, MBL 5, IU 4, KND 1, and FSB 1). With a slim differ-

ence of only one parliamentarian to be able to crush the administration,

the MNR tried to put together a parallel opposite alliance, but without

success. Only nine votes were to be defined, and these were the votes of

the rebellious deputies from CONDEPA. The MNR was unable to put

together a majority opposition in Congress.

The Banzer administration faced opposition from the MNR as well

when the state of siege was declared. The national command of the MNR

demanded, during the most violent moments in April 2000, the immedi-

ate convening of the national Congress to discuss the end of the state of

siege. However, the governing coalition finally secured support for the

state of siege.95 As Sánchez de Lozada (2004) recounts, the MNR caucus

tried to block the state of siege, but the Megacoalition had the majority

and neutralized any kind of opposition. The opposition parties could do

nothing to lift the state of siege in Congress, while at the same time social

confrontation limited the administration’s maneuver.

By the end of 2001, the Megacoalition decided to appoint the mem-

bers of the CNE without the required consensus that included the

MNR.96 The administration once again faced opposition by the MNR.

This time the MNR was successful and, by the end of 2001, the Quiroga

administration called for a summit of chiefs and political representatives

with the support of the Catholic Church 97 to resolve the impasse. On

June 21, 2001, an agreement was signed by the Catholic Church, CEPB,

MNR, ADN, UCS, MIR, MBL, MSM, CONDEPA, PDC, FSB, KND,

and FRI with a commitment based on a four-point agenda, namely,

(a) the composition of the new CNE with independent authorities; (b) the

approval of the Law of Necessity for a Constitutional Reform; (c) the

approval of an anticorruption law; and (d) the establishment of a poverty-

reduction mechanism. In this context, the agreement would facilitate the

approval of the Dialogue Law, the Fiscal Code, an anticorruption strategy,

and the institutionalization of the Roads Service (Costa Benavides et al.

2001: 28). In the end, the members of the CNE were impartially and

transparently appointed within the framework of this agreement between

the government sector and the opposition.


An extraordinary congressional session was required for the vote, as

both chambers, especially the chamber of deputies, were very slow in

addressing the issue (Orozco et al. 2001: 12). Executive-legislative rela-

tions were stagnant. As the La Razón headline (3/19/2001) read, “not

only the designation of the electoral authorities is at risk. The political

consensus has weakened, 35 laws are stuck in Congress.”

The Free Bolivia Movement (MBL) did not join this coalition and

instead chose an oppositional position to defend democratic institutions

by requesting the removal of the CNE member Alcira Espinoza as the

controversy over the 1999 municipal elections emerged. The MBL

decided to request her removal from the CNE following her decision not

to annul the irregular lists of the “cross-dressing” council member

candidates 98 from Colquechaca, Maragua, and Ocurí in the 1999 munic-

ipal elections, and following her voting contrary to the CNE resolutions

regarding these cases and in favor of the MIR (Benavides et al. 2000: 33).

With only five parliamentarians and incapable of making a difference,

the MBL was marginalized.

Designating independent people to these posts required two-thirds of

the parliamentary votes. In this case, the official and opposition sector

had to form sobrepactos, that is, agreements that went beyond the gov-

erning coalition and included the opposition. In these designations by

two-thirds majorities, the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and the

U.S. embassy—all sectors in Bolivia—made recommendations.

A Different Bolivia: Concluding Remarks

The paradox of Bolivia’s electoral reforms was the unintended consequence

of having strengthened emerging political parties, such as the MAS, as well

as the ranks of local organizations in the country. The unintended effects

of these reforms facilitated the ability of the population to mobilize and

protest for local demands and openly question the status quo. The Water

War in the year 2000 marked a critical juncture for the country.

Throughout the period, the Megacoalition lacked serious cohesive-

ness. The analysis suggests eight main features of this alliance. First,

confrontation and apprehensiveness were characteristic of executive-

legislative relations especially because the Megacoalition lacked internal

hegemony. Its members behaved contradictorily and sometimes acted as

the opposition.

Second, the assembly, unlike the opposition, lacked internal articula-

tion. This made the decision-making process and the implementation of

public policies dependent on the ability of coalition partners to resolve


internal confrontation through negotiation. This also harmed the image

of the government before society and diminished the efficacy and

efficiency of the administration. Third, the precarious majority in the

National Congress—with the departure of CONDEPA in 1998 and the

NFR in 2000—also impeded the administration from making decisions

by consensus in order to resolve conf lictive situations or to maintain

authority.

Fourth, social movements exerted an increased level of social pressure.

Indeed, the Banzer administration lacked the authority to impose policy

decisions and generally ceded to the demands and impositions of social

movements. Moreover, Evo Morales acquired popularity after having

been arrested in 1995, having won a deputy post in 1997, and having

been arbitrarily expelled by his colleagues from Congress in 2002. The

image of a leader questioning the political system and being victimized

by the political class worked in his favor.

Finally, the ADN, once in government, gave excessive attention to the

behavior of the opposition instead of addressing social demands. However,

both the coalition parties and the opposition were unable to bring the

debate on social demands to the f loor of Congress (Costa Benavides et al.

2000: 11). The reform incorporating the Single Member District (SMD)

system gave deputies another opportunity to inf luence policymaking on

behalf of their districts, but the Cochabamba conf lict revealed the inad-

equacy of parliamentarians to push for citizen demands and to inf luence

parliamentary activity.

Unfortunately, uninominal deputies suffered even an identity crisis as

some did not even know what they were and what they represented.99

Indeed, when the reform was applied in 1997, it was not easy for the can-

didates for uninominal deputies to make explicit the distinction between

themselves and the plurinominal deputies.

As the events in Cochabamba revealed, when it came to voting in

Congress, uninominal deputies did not vote in response to the local

demands but in response to the demands of the party.100 Bedegral (2001)

asserts that the first experience with the SMD system suggests that uni-

nominal deputies maintained loyalty to their parties and not to their con-

stituencies.101

To be fair, uninominal deputies faced significant limitations on their

performance. First, uninominal deputies suffered the great institutional

limitations of the Congress, both institutionally and economically, espe-

cially the Chamber of Deputies. Uninominal deputies did not have any

infrastructure such as office space, computers, or phones in the lower

chamber premises,102 unless they held the presidency of the chambers or


the leadership of the Regional Parliamentary Brigades or specific

commissions. Former minister Sánchez Berzaín asserted that each party

caucus was assigned an office. For instance, his 23-party caucus shared an

18-square meters office.103 Also, these deputies did not have personal

funds or mechanisms to visit their regions, or for an office to meet with

their constituencies in their districts.104

Another limitation of the reforms relates to the configuration of the

circumscriptions to elect the uninominal deputies. Some circumscrip-

tions, especially in the rural areas, were vast; the circumscription in the

north of La Paz, for instance, was extensive in territory. Only one deputy

was elected for a population that was small and dispersed. Thus, the

deputy very rarely went back because the costs of going back to these

territories were too great for a deputy to assume. This happened to many

other deputies.

The relationship between representatives and districts that the reform

intended to strengthen was then affected by these kinds of institutional

obstacles. Some were able to connect to their constituencies, but not

many of them, as the 2002 election results show. Very few of the uni-

nominal deputies were reelected. The majority of uninominal deputies

were not able to find a mechanism to connect to their electorate.

However, the 1997 reform did have its benefits, especially in terms of

the mechanisms that the uninominal deputies did find to connect to their

constituencies, namely, the Public Audiences, the so-called Concurrent

Decisions Encounters, and the sessions of the Regional Parliamentary

Brigades in the regions and in the uninominal circumscriptions (Rodriguez

Calvo 2002: 12; Luna 2004). Thus, the results of this election and the

performance of the administration and the 1997–2002 legislature suggest

three basic effects of the implementation of the SMD system.

Stronger personalization of politics:1. By abolishing the closed party lists

for more than a half of the Chamber of Deputies, the mixed-

member proportional system helped create direct linkages between

parties, constituencies, and legislators. Although a more direct

connection between parties, their legislators, and constituencies

would bring more legitimacy and representativeness in the legisla-

ture, there were still many instances of disconnection between

representatives and constituencies in the 1997–2002 period.

Increased regional decentralization:2. By creating 68 single-seat districts,

the mixed-member PR system strengthened local representation;

more importantly, it encouraged stronger geographical representa-

tion by the different parties that reached Congress via the SMDs.


The split vote enhanced the choices of voters:3. The possibility of vote-splitting ff

by giving two votes to voters was considered as an adequate mecha-

nism to broaden their choices (Mayorga 2001: 205). As electors

themselves indicated, they now could both “vote and elect.” This

was not uniform throughout the country, but two chief examples

where this occurred are those of circumscription No. 10 in La Paz

(including Sopocachi, San Padre, and part of the west of the Ladera)

where Banzer’s success was parallel to the MBL’s Juan del Granado,

or circumscription No. 8 where Banzer’s success was equivalent to

the MNR’s Guido Capra (Romero Ballivián 2003b: 44).

Uninominal deputies attempted to find ways to show that they were

connecting to their constituencies, proposing to fix roads and provide basic

social services; however, they had no competency to do this. The electorate

was also expecting uninominal deputies to resolve larger problems that

affected them. However, these functions were the responsibilities of the

municipal authorities. This was disenchanting for both parliamentarians

and Bolivians in general. Those parliamentarians who thought they could

resolve these kinds of issues from Congress, two months into the election,

realized that they were unable to do it. As Sucre uninominal deputy

Fernando Rodriguez Calvo (2002: 12) simply put it: “We have to recog-

nize that the uninominal deputies created great expectations that in the

majority of the cases became great frustrations.”

All in all, the effects of the reform were not uniform. In some circum-

scriptions, uninominal deputies were successful, in others, not as much.

For instance, Rodriguez Calvo (2002) asserts that, besides playing his

traditional roles of legislating and censuring, he was able to do a lot in

terms of education, housing, pensions, departmental budgets, as well as a

series of censuring initiatives including requests for oral reports and was

able to pass 24 pieces of legislation related to his region. The Regional

Parliamentary Brigade was able to meet in each of the uninominal

circumscriptions (Rodriguez Calvo 2002: 14–24). Some other interest-

ing success stories are those of Juan del Granado in circumscription No. 10

in La Paz, Jose Luis Paredes in circumscription No. 14 in El Alto, and that

by Evo Morales in circumscription No. 27 in Cochabamba. These three

former deputies reached broad political notoriety after having served as

uninominal deputies from 1997 to 2002.

In the first exercise very few deputies stayed in Congress. No representa-

tive from previous administrations was able to get reelected and few were

reelected as uninominal deputies.105 Indeed, out of the 157 parliamentarians


probably only 20 had been in Congress before, and out of those 20, only

3 or 4 were elected this time as uninominal deputies.

The militarization of the Chapare continued. In early 2001, President

Quiroga decided to send three of his ministers to Achacachi to establish

a dialogue with Felipe Quispe and coca union leaders. Regional demands

from La Paz and Potosí joined the demands of the cocaleros and the

teacher unions to create massive protests.106 The government, however,

was not willing to negotiate centimeters of coca per family, or what

Morales later called “un cato de coca por familia” (an area of coca per

family)107—an area of 40 square meters. Road blocks ensued, and

confrontations with the military increased as the 2002 electoral process

came about.108

CHAPTER 4

CRUMBLING COALITIONS? ASSESSING THE TRANSFORMATION OFBOLIVIAN POLITICS

Whereas the period from 1985 through 2002 was characterized by

relative democratic stability and the existence of “pacted democ-

racy” in Bolivia, recent events have signaled a process of reordering of

coalitional politics in this country. Starting in the year 2000, Bolivia

underwent a process leading to a critical juncture, or what Calderon

(2002) calls “a moment of inf lection”—a historical moment in which

political patterns start to change.

With the electoral reforms that created spaces for greater representa-

tion, new patterns in citizen-state relations positioned the general

population, especially those historically marginalized, as key players in

the political game. The cumulative process that composes this historic

moment started in 2000 with the Water War, as well as with other major

mobilizations on the part of popular sectors to voice socioeconomic

demands, and culminated in 2003 with the Gas War and the forced

resignation of Sánchez de Lozada from the presidency.

Its legacies were seen in 2003, when major changes in the way of

doing politics in Bolivia occurred, including, among other reforms, a

major reform in the following year of 16 articles of the Constitution that

allowed for referenda in 2004 and 2006, the direct election of members

of civic organizations and indigenous movements without links to

political parties in the 2004 municipal elections and the election of

prefects in 2006, and the call for a Constituent Assembly for 2006. The


most important outcome was the election of Evo Morales with more than

50 percent of the popular vote in 2005.

The 2002 Elections and the Increasing Force

of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS)

The 2002 electoral process confronted some early challenges. The

CNE faced delays in dividing circumscriptions throughout the country.

Although the electoral norms required the CNE to distribute the

circumscriptions according to population data from the 2001 National

Population and Housing Census, there was no time for this. To avoid a

postponement of the election, the parties in Congress decided that, since

the National Statistics Institute had not finished processing 100 percent

of the data in some localities, and those were not official results, they

could postpone the redistribution of circumscriptions for the 2007

elections. Similarly, controversy also arose around the CNE members

who apparently did not get along. Eventually, all members resigned or

were asked to leave.

For this election, deciding on presidential nominees was not a compli-

cated matter. The MNR once more nominated Sánchez de Lozada for

the presidency, accompanied by the independent Carlos Mesa; Jaime Paz

Zamora was nominated as the candidate for the MIR; and the NFR

launched the regional leader Manfred Reyes Villa as its presidential

candidate. Of the two other parties, the MAS nominated its leader and

former deputy, Evo Morales, for president, and the Pachacuti Indigenous

Movement (Movimiento Indígena Pachacuti-MIP) proclaimed Felipe

Quispe as its candidate.1

Political marketing was again at the heart of electoral campaigning.

This time, the MNR hired the services of an international consortium of

political strategists of the firms Shrum-Devine-Donilon, GCS-UK, and

Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research. This team of specialists worked

as campaign advisors to Bill Clinton (United States) and Tony Blair

(United Kingdom). Sánchez de Lozada’s electoral campaign focused on

the fight against corruption (as evidenced by his choice of vice presiden-

tial candidate, the independent Carlos Mesa), unemployment, and social

exclusion. In the 1993 campaign, Sánchez de Lozada had promised

500,000 new jobs. The 2002 campaign promised double that number. By

2000, politics became the politics of employment. All parties worked the

same way, but especially the MNR. The issue with jobs was such that at

the end of the campaign, all the activists who participated in the MNR

campaign received a certificate of participation so that they could take

145CRUM BLING COA LITIONS?

part in the public distribution of jobs.2 The patrimonial logic was exacer-

bated in this election.

Using modern marketing tools, the MNR campaign also focused on

negatively attacking Manfred Reyes Villa, the NFR presidential

candidate. In comparison to the young Reyes Villa, the issue of public

image also became important. Sánchez de Lozada started preparing a year

before the election. He went on a special diet for weight control and for

improving his appearance and youthfulness. The MNR also made

alliances with smaller parties, the MBL, the PS-1, and the Pachacuti Axis

and utilized a very positive slogan for the campaign: “It can be done”

(Sí Se puede) (Costa Benavides et al. 2002: 31–34).

The MIR electoral campaign used the slogan “Bolivia is not for sale”

(Bolivia no se vende) as the core of its message. Paz Zamora was initially

advised by a Brazilian team of campaign advisors but later on in the cam-

paign, advice came solely from members of his family and friends as well

as from party colleagues.3 His campaign focused on three issues: generat-

ing employment, the call for a Constituent Assembly, and the issue of gas

and the need to derogate capitalization. A lot of the MIR energy during

the electoral campaign also included attacks against Sánchez de Lozada,

the MNR candidate. The MIR labeled Sánchez de Lozada as a “seller

of the country” (vende-patria), referring to the capitalization process of

the 1993–1997 administration.

The NFR sought the campaign advice of Ralph Murphine, a very

well-known political strategist in Latin America who had advised

President Chavez in Venezuela. Former CONDEPA executive secretary

Ricardo Paz Ballivián also advised Reyes Villa in his campaign. Reyes

Villa capitalized on his experience as the mayor of Cochabamba and used

his personal appearance to his benefit. His good looks were often a topic

of conversation amongst voters. He even became known as the bombon

(chocolate truff le)—an expression used in some Latin American countries

to refer to a man who is handsome or a woman who is beautiful. As

expected from the type of advisor he had, Reyes Villa’s campaign

contained important media elements but he also emphasized direct con-

tact with people. Unfortunately, public TV debates did not work in his

favor. In the debates, he often contradicted himself and seemed unable to

answer technical questions.

The NFR did not propose a government plan but presented itself as a

break from the traditional parties. Reyes Villa urged voters to support “a

positive change” without clearly defining the policies he would pursue in

office. His message seemed to tap into the widespread political and eco-

nomic discontent. The May 2002 polls in 10 cities showed that he had


about 40 percent of the vote intention.4 Some political analysts even

suggested a strong possibility that he would achieve an electoral majority

and avoid the congressional vote to become president.

However, the negative attacks on Reyes Villa appeared to benefit

Morales more than the attackers. Indeed, the main recipient of the NFR’s

losses was Morales who, polling at 6 percent only six weeks before the

election, became the fourth contender in the final three weeks of the cam-

paign, reached the third and second places the week prior to the election,

and ended up obtaining the second place in the election.

A group of students from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés

(UMSA) and Catholic University participated in his campaign as

volunteers. He also relied on a group of advisors including political ana-

lysts Filemón Escobar and Alvaro García Linera, later his vice president,

to plan his electoral strategies. It was even speculated that Venezuelan

president Hugo Chávez, as well as left-wing U.S. and European NGOs,

helped finance the campaign. The fact remains that by November 6,

2002, Evo Morales returned half of the subsidy for the campaign given to

his party by the CNE.5

The MAS slogan became “We are more each day” (Cada día somos

MAS; más is Spanish for more) to convey the idea that the party was

progressively capturing more militants as people became discontent with

the traditional parties. One of the biggest banners of Evo Morales was the

challenge to U.S. policies in Bolivia, specifically the U.S.-imposed

measures for coca eradication. His message was also an attack on the

neoliberal and pacted democracy models. He proposed a Constituent

Assembly, the derogation of Supreme Decree 21060 or New Economic

Policy, and the nationalization of the capitalized companies. The fact that

he was expelled from the parliament also helped him gain popularity

through the campaign.

The UCS began the electoral campaign at the end of 2001. Johnny

Fernández, who was mayor of Santa Cruz, refused to leave the leadership

of the party to start a process of internal democratization. That year, he

requested permission from the municipal government of Santa Cruz to

start the electoral campaign and improve his deteriorated image, a product

of the tax evasion scandals. Johnny Fernández’ image was so deteriorated

that the UCS leadership even thought of proposing the UCS candidacy

to ex-minister of justice (and ex-MNR) René Blattman or to former

judge Alberto Costa Obregón.6 Although at some point the CNE ruled

the leader out of the presidential race, by May 31, 2002, a month before

the elections, he was back in the game.7


He ran his campaign with Marlene Fernández as his running mate.

His brother Roberto Fernández assumed Johnny’s position in the munic-

ipal government in Santa Cruz while the UCS chief started his national

tour. He moved to La Paz to advance his preelectoral campaign using the

UCS’s traditional populist style. For instance, on July 20, 2001, Johnny

Fernández gave the locality of El Alto a campaign house (casa de campaña)

and informed La Razón that he had 10 million notebooks made with his

picture on it and 5 million party f lags to distribute around the country.8

The 2002 elections had a (party) newcomer: the Freedom and Justice

Movement (Movimiento Libertad y Justicia-MLyJ). The MLyJ responded

to popular demands and the highly affective Bolivian political culture:

the movement was organized around and based on the figure of former

judge Alberto Costa Obregón. MLyJ had no real party structure.

However, the authoritarian and arrogant image of the leader had a high

impact on collective emotions. Costa Obregón was seen as being antisys-

tem. He relied on a strong support base in La Paz and El Alto and on some

level of support in Oruro.

The 2002 electoral campaign amongst these parties had many negative

overtones. The attacks against Sánchez de Lozada and especially on

Manfred Reyes Villa were such that the La Paz Electoral Departmental

Court ordered the MNR to stop running TV spots that attacked the

image and trajectory of Manfred Reyes Villa. In the ads, the MNR

accused the leader of having transferred millions of dollars to six of his

relatives to conceal funds from the CNE.9

The preelection climate was somewhat perturbed by two key issues

mere weeks before the elections: a massive march composed of various

indigenous organizations moving from many parts of the country to the

city of La Paz, and the remarks made by the U.S. ambassador about the

electoral process.

On one hand, the massive demonstration was being organized with

the support of the nontraditional parties and some sectors of the tradi-

tional parties.10 The demands were for constitutional reforms that many

indigenous sectors considered essential for increasing their participation

in the decision-making process, in other words, the establishment of a

Constituent Assembly to review all constitutional and electoral arrange-

ments and incorporate more access to representation and participation by

all sectors of society.

Faced with the possibility that these marches could contribute to

destabilizing the elections, the Quiroga government negotiated a truce.

In exchange for peace and the dissolution of the marches, the government


agreed to hold a special session of Congress to review the issue of a

constitutional reform after the elections. Two days before Quiroga

stepped down from the presidency, Congress approved the bill to allow

the reform of the Constitution that would in turn allow the holding of a

Constituent Assembly in 2006.

The second issue that had an impact on the dynamics of the electoral

campaign shortly before the elections was a statement made by the U.S.

ambassador, Manuel Rocha, during the inauguration of the El Chapare

airport. In his speech, he said that “if Bolivians elected those who want

Bolivia to become a major cocaine exporter again, the future of U.S.

assistance to the country will be put in jeopardy.” This referred specifi-

cally to technical cooperation with the United States and to Bolivian

access to the U.S. petroleum and textile markets. The ambassador’s com-

ments were widely interpreted in relation to Evo Morales, the leader of

the coca farmers and MAS presidential candidate.11 This gave Morales a

big boost in the polls and proved significant because it allowed Morales

to quickly amass wider support at this essential moment. As it furthered

the view that the Untied States wanted to control the political choices in

Bolivia, Rocha’s comments enraged not only those supporting Morales’s

anti-U.S. stance but also those who were undecided. The effects could be

observed years later. Sánchez de Lozada himself still asserts that his “gov-

ernment was a disaster,” especially because of the “the really tragic inter-

vention of the U.S. Ambassador” who attacked Evo Morales. With this,

among other facilitating factors, the ambassador helped Morales reach

second place in the election. Indeed, had there been more time before the

election, Morales probably would have won the presidency in 2002.

Moreover, some sectors considered that the comments made by the

U.S. ambassador constituted interference in Bolivia’s internal affairs, and

strong reactions came from both the political sector and the CNE. The

CNE made a public statement requesting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

to summon the ambassador to prevent a recurrence of the situation since

it considered that the statement affected the normal evolution of the elec-

toral process. This comment by the U.S. ambassador made Evo Morales

gain more exposure to the electorate and the electoral process took place

as planned.

On June 30, 2002, the World Cup game between Brazil and France

was not the only thing that captured the attention of most Bolivians.

That day Bolivians were also exercising their right to vote for their pres-

idential and legislative representatives. The Bolivian elections were held

in a scenario characterized by a difficult economic and social situation, as

well as by the existence of growing voter dissatisfaction with the political


parties and political leaders. This dissatisfaction facilitated the emergence

of a series of new parties, some of them perceived by some sectors as

antisystem.

The electoral registry used on June 30 comprised 4,164,909 voters

distributed across Bolivia’s nine departments. Eleven political parties and

their presidential candidates took part in the elections. At the end of

election day, the media began to broadcast a series of projections about

the results. Even though they ref lected differences as to the winner of the

election, they all projected very close results among the top candidates.

This trend was confirmed in the following hours, as the partial official

results were announced and it was confirmed, once again, that none of

the candidates obtained an absolute majority of the votes for president.

Even though former presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Jaime

Paz Zamora from the traditional parties ended up in the forefront of voter

preference, the presidential candidates of the emerging parties—Evo

Morales of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), Manfred Reyes

Villa of the New Republican Force (NFR), and Felipe Quispe of the

Pachacuti Indigenous Movement (MIP)—obtained a substantial number

of votes.

By July 9, the CNE finalized the count of all the polling stations,

placing the MNR of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in first place with

22.46 percent of the valid votes, followed by the MAS of Evo Morales

Ayma with 20.94 percent. As figure 4.1 shows, the NFR ended third

with 20.91 percent, whereas the MIR obtained 16.32 percent. This elec-

tion saw the clear decline of the ADN as a major political party: the ADN

got only 3.4 percent of the votes and a group of other six smaller parties

received the remaining 19.38 percent.

The election results showed three clear trends. First, the ADN disap-

peared as a strong party within the party system. Second, the neopopulist

front parties emerged as strong contenders. Finally, the MAS emerged as

the second electoral force and as the main opposition to the block of

traditional parties, thus paving the way for it to become a hegemonic

political force in the country. The difference between the first and the

second most voted parties, MNR and MAS, was a mere 1.52 percent.

The vote also followed clear geographic patterns. Both Morales and

Reyes Villa received most of their support in the indigenous western

highlands (La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro), while Sánchez de Lozada

and Paz Zamora received most of their support in the economic center of

Santa Cruz and the Amazonian lowland provinces of Beni and Pando.

Besides ref lecting cultural and economic differences across regions, this

geographic pattern also demonstrated the stronghold that traditional


parties still had in the east of the country, and the growing dominance of

peasant and labor organizations, especially the MAS and the cocalero

sector in the west.

The CNE had to address the consequences of the not-so-rigorously

conducted opinion polls. Opinion polls before the election had indicated

that NFR’s Manfred Reyes Villa would be the winner of the election

with a large margin, even with an absolute majority, but that was not

the case as Sánchez de Lozada achieved the highest plurality and Morales

the second place. The inaccuracy of the prediction was due mainly to

the use of data from opinion polls that ref lected electoral tendencies

only in very specif ic areas of the country. The polls were conducted

mostly in urban areas, and the NFR did very well in the cities but

poorly in the rural areas as opposed to the MAS that had a strong rural

appeal. This distinction was enough for the MNR to beat the NFR,

overall. Although the polls taken f ive days before the election confirmed

that Morales’s support was rising and Reyes Villa’s falling, the popular

consensus was that the NFR candidate would still gain a narrow victory

over Sánchez de Lozada.12



MNR22%

MAS21%

NFR21%

MIR-NM16%

MIP6%

UCS6%

ADN3%

LYJ3%

MCC1%

PS1% CONDEPA

0%


Another problem the CNE faced was its webpage. The CNE failed to

report the accurate results of the voting tables when results were

downloaded. When they were published for the first time, the results for

president and deputy seats were inverted. When the page was refreshed

the accurate results would come up. However, this caused great

controversy, and the NFR accused the CNE of fraud.

These elections ref lected what had been occurring in the Bolivian

party system since at least 2000, a process of reordering of the political

system. CONDEPA disappeared, the UCS subsided, and the ADN deeply

weakened; only two parties of the 20-year-old model stayed in the game:

the MNR and the MIR, this time accompanied by the neopopulist NFR.

The MAS emerged as a strong contender.

Translating Votes into Seats: The Composition

of the 2002–2007 Congress

In 2002, the SMD system was used for a second time. By this time,

there was more plurality and local interests represented in Congress, but

also more dependence on positional and pork-and-barrel payoffs to sus-

tain coalitions. Thus a more difficult situation for the president and

Congress to advance policy proposals and sustain democratic governance

ensued.

For the election of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, the 1996

law was maintained: the D’Hondt formula of proportional representation

for the translation of votes into seats and the electoral threshold of 3 percent

for legislative seats that corresponded to the plurinominal circumscrip-

tions in the Chamber of Deputies. According to the mixed system used

for a second time in 2002, 68 deputies out of the 130 constitutionally

ascribed members were elected by plurality, or absolute majority, in

plurinominal districts while the other 62 were elected in nine depart-

mental uninominal districts on the basis of a complete and closed list

according to the D’Hondt proportional representation formula.

The MNR obtained 36 deputies in the lower chamber, including 24

uninominal and 12 plurinominal deputies. The party with the second

highest number of deputy seats was the MAS that obtained 14 uninominal

and 13 plurinominal deputies, mostly in the departments of Cochabamba,

La Paz, and Oruro. Its performance greatly improved as compared to the

1997 election in which the IU, the electoral platform then, obtained only

four uninominal deputy seats and no plurinominal seats. The MIR and

the NFR obtained 26 and 25 seats respectively; however, the majority of

MIR’s deputy seats were uninominal, that is, linked to regional figures


rather than to Jaime Paz Zamora while the NFR obtained 20 plurinom-

inal seats linked to the vote for Manfred Reyes Villa, against only five in

uninominal districts. The smaller parties MIP, UCS, and ADN obtained

less than six deputy seats and the PS-1 came back with only seat. The

composition of the lower chamber and the distribution of uninominal

and plurinominal seats are shown in table 4.1.

The Aymara and coca leaf leader Evo Morales became the main leader

of the opposition in Congress. Building on an appeal at the local level, the

majority of MAS deputies were uninominal. Morales built his image

around the opposition to coca eradication measures in the country and

used the indigenous identity to appeal to people in the struggle. The

proposal for a Constituent Assembly also became a winning strategy for

the MAS, as public opinion was strongly demanding a Constituent

Assembly to revamp the national Constitution.

On this occasion, and for the first time in Bolivian history, 21 titular

deputies and three Senate posts were occupied by indigenous people. For

the first time in the history of Bolivia and America, the first session of the

parliament in August 2002 had a system of simultaneous translation of

three indigenous languages plus Spanish. The composition of the

Chamber of Deputies is illustrated in figure 4.2.

CONDEPA and UCS lost all the circumscriptions the parties had won

in 1997, and the ADN party caucus was greatly reduced from 18 to only

Table 4.1 Uninominal and Plurinominal

Deputies in the Chamber of Deputies,

2002–2005 (Prepared by the author using

National Electoral Court [CNE] data)

Uninominal

Deputies

Plurinominal

Deputies

Total

MNR 24 12 36

MAS 14 13 27

MIR 15 11 26

NFR 5 20 25

MIP 5 1 6

UCS 0 5 5

ADN 4 0 4

PS 1 0 1

Total 68 62 130


4 uninominal deputies. The results also show the ascendance of the MAS,

which obtained 27 deputy seats. Seven of the eight parties with parlia-

mentary representation obtained more uninominal deputies than pluri-

nominal. This meant that the majority of these parties were dominant

locally and had mass movements that were regional. The results also

showed there was a significant shift of representation in the chambers as

123 of the 157 deputies were new. Of them, seven were women deputies

and nine were women deputy substitutes. The MAS main contender then

was not the MNR but the NFR. This party was strong in regions domi-

nated by the MAS. It captured only five single-member seats and two

senators, but it obtained 20 other plurinominal deputies.

For the Senate, only five of the twelve parties that ran for election

obtained seats. Of those, the MNR obtained the highest number of

Senate seats, as expected from the presidential vote. Interestingly, the

MAS obtained seven Senate seats. In the department of Potosí, however,

the MAS won the plurality of the votes but had nominated only one

candidate for senator. The seat stayed empty. The MIR obtained more

senators than the NFR and the ADN, even though it achieved fourth

place in the presidential votes, as figure 4.3 indicates.

This was due to the regional orientation of the electoral system and

the hold of each of the parties on different regions of the country, with

greater concentration of votes in some areas than in others. Whereas the

MAS and NFR concentrated votes in the western areas of the country,

1456

252627

36

MNR MAS MIR MIP UCS ADN PSNFR




the MIR votes were more evenly distributed throughout the country and

in some cases disputed the Senate seats. The ADN weakened consider-

ably but it was still able to obtain a Senate seat in the department of Beni,

a traditionally ADN locality.

Plan Bolivia 2002: “How Hard It Is to Love Bolivia”

In the 2002 election, 78 percent of the electorate had not voted for

Sánchez de Lozada, and various surveys showed that he had about

60 percent negative-perception ratings. It seemed, though, that the most

likely outcome was having him as president of Bolivia. While waiting

for the last few precincts to report, Sánchez de Lozada and Reyes Villa

opened negotiations with the MIR for support in the congressional

election of the president. Morales had previously declared that his party

would not negotiate with any party over government formation, even if

it f inished among the top two.13 As it increasingly seemed that his strong

showing would result in only a moral victory, Morales announced his

intention to form a “government in the streets,” suggesting he would use

social mobilization to achieve the party’s goals.14

The UCS soon declared that it would support Sánchez de Lozada both

in the congressional election and in the government, whereas the ADN

later joined the group but limited its support to the congressional

Figure 4.3 Composition of the 2002–2005 Senate (Prepared by the

author using National Electoral Court data)

MNR MAS MIR NFR ADN

11

7

5

2

1


election.15 In fact, by the end of July, the ADN confirmed that after the

vote in Congress for Sánchez de Lozada, the party would exert opposition

to the government in Congress.16

The UCS and the ADN votes were not enough to guarantee Sánchez

de Lozada a legislative majority. Hence, Sánchez de Lozada entered into

negotiations with both the NFR and MIR. However, Reyes Villa soon

confirmed that he and his party would not vote to make Sánchez de

Lozada president. So did the MIR. After a meeting of its Directive

Council that took place in Tarija, the MIR party decided not to support

Sánchez de Lozada but to govern through the parliament. This so-called

Tarija decision defined the position of the MIR right after the election.

Given the direct refusal of the NFR to support Sánchez de Lozada, the

MNR thus decided to concentrate energy in negotiating for MIR sup-

port. However, on July 11, the MIR announced its intention to void their

congressional votes, thus forcing the MNR to negotiate with the NFR.17

The MNR advanced some negotiations with the NFR, but they broke

down on July 21, 2002, when the MNR and UCS announced they would

not support the NFR’s proposal for a Constituent Assembly. Morales

maintained his position of not negotiating with the other parties but

invited other parties to support the MAS. However, he refused to com-

promise on policies with other parties or to promise cabinet positions in

exchange for support.18 This probably prevented him from gaining sup-

port from the NFR, which had previously stated it would support Morales

over Sánchez de Lozada.19

Negotiations were started again between the two adversaries, the

MNR and the MIR. Sánchez de Lozada asserts that the MNR had no

other choice but to negotiate with the MIR: “I had no other choice but

to forge the alliance with the MIR, they were the only ones that gave me

a majority, the MIR plus UCS gave us majority. The other option was

Manfred Reyes but the NFR did not give me the majority.” Oscar Eid

Franco, the MIR party strongman, was involved in the negotiations and

suggests that the party was in a difficult situation because if the MIR did

not participate in the agreement, “there would be no president and no

democracy for anybody.”

Besides preventing Morales from becoming president, factors external

to the parties also facilitated or, better yet, inf luenced the forging of a coali-

tion. The international community pressured the MIR as there were risks

of more hyperinf lation. The MNR-MIR pact emerged after pressure from

the U.S. embassy, the private sector, the Catholic Church, and the middle

classes 20 that feared an economic breakdown of the country if a coalition

that could guarantee a parliamentary majority was not formed.


By July 2002, and as the August 6 election day in Congress approached,

uncertainty was growing; the banking system almost collapsed; savings

dropped. All sectors in Bolivian society were asking for an agreement.

This is the main reason MIR militants decided to forge the agreement

with the MNR. Faced with increasing pressure, the MIR decided to

reverse the Tarija decision. Jaime Paz Zamora declared that support would

be given to Sánchez de Lozada. In light of their past as political enemies,

Paz Zamora coined another phrase to describe the situation, he stated that

in situations such as this one, it was “very difficult to love Bolivia!”

(Que difícil es amar a Bolivia!).

Although for politicians it was understandable to forge the pact,

Bolivians had a hard time understanding its nature. In their view, the

parties were putting together alliances only for pragmatism, prebendal-

ism, and quotas of power. However, the pact was necessary to prevent a

crisis; had it not been forged, the October 2003 crisis would probably

have occurred in July 2002.21

On July 25, nearly four weeks after the election, the MNR, MIR, and

UCS agreed to form a “Government of National Responsibility”22 (ADN

initially offered support but in the end it did not join due to disagree-

ments with the MNR’s decision not to call a Constituent Assembly). The

pact was forged through the so-called Plan Bolivia 2002. This coalition

was not an ideological formation but an arrangement to deal with the

critical phase the country was going through. Plan Bolivia included the

revision of the Hydrocarbons Law and of capitalization, among other

things, but not the call for a Constituent Assembly.23

With Plan Bolivia, “pacted democracy” and coalitional politics as

Bolivians knew it had survived, but the fact remained that the transfor-

mation of Bolivian politics was more palpable. Unlike all previous pacts,

Plan Bolivia assured Sánchez de Lozada a slim majority in the legislature

and virtually no control over the rest of the country. Morales and his

party were strong in Congress with 34 seats but they were also strong in

“the streets.” This scenario had repercussions in terms of the political

costs to construct and maintain the coalition.

The coalition partners agreed to support Sánchez de Lozada and he

was officially elected president by Congress on August 4, 2002, receiving

84 of the 127 congressional votes against 43 that were given to Evo

Morales—the coca leader and MAS candidate. As expected, the alliance

formed by the MNR, the MIR, and other parties facilitated the advantage

that Sánchez de Lozada had over the cocalero leader.24 The legislative

session that confirmed Sánchez de Lozada as president was prolonged for


more than 23 consecutive hours and was transmitted live by the state

television station.

In exchange for support, the MIR received 7 of the 18 ministries, and

the leadership of the Chamber of Deputies. Other minority parties joined

this congressional coalition. The official legislative majority that sup-

ported Sánchez de Lozada was composed of the MNR (47), MIR (31),

UCS (5), and ADN (5). The opposition, which did not necessarily behave

as a coherent opposition, was composed of the MAS (34), NFR (27), and

the remaining parties (7).

Sánchez de Lozada and Evo Morales:

The Road to Black October

Sánchez de Lozada began his second period as president in a very

precarious way. More than 70 percent of the voters had not supported

him in the electoral vote, and in the end it was Congress once again that

elected the president. As they had been stating since at least 1989, Bolivians

felt that though they voted they never actually elected their presidents.

During the first six months of his administration, Sánchez de Lozada

faced great opposition from the second political force, the MAS, and

attempted various unsuccessful negotiations with Evo Morales on the

coca issue. Starting in 2002 and until the end of the year, pressure from

the streets intensified around the issue of coca. However, soon the MAS

realized that the coca issue was not enough to win followers and the

opposition was broadened to include issues of land, rejection of the

FTAA, and, finally, gas. Sánchez de Lozada met five times with Morales

to discuss the possibility of a social truce, but with no success. One of the

initial points of contention was over which points needed to be addressed.

While Sánchez de Lozada wanted to address the coca issue independently,

Morales said that the government had to deal with all issues at once and

not only with those related to coca eradication. Peasant and cocalero

sectors attacked the government while the United States pushed for

eradication measures. Domestic and international pressures complicated

the scenario for the new administration.

In the institutions of democracy, Congress was also blocking and

censuring executive proposals. Sánchez de Lozada had a slim majority;

Morales, Quispe, and their parties managed to confront the coalition

partners. An extreme case of this opposition occurred on January 23,

2003, when the MAS representatives joined with MIP representatives

and attended a congressional session with wood sticks in their hands.


They threatened and attempted to use physical violence in the chamber if

the session was not stopped.25

By June 6, 2003, Sánchez de Lozada threatened to govern by decree.26

He also made use of the relative majority he obtained through the coali-

tion. But confrontation occurred not only in the interaction with the

opposition in Congress but also within the cabinet itself. In particular,

the cabinet sessions were filled with tension as the presence of so many

parties prevented the president and his ministers from reaching consensus

on government policies.

What cost the coalition the most was its need to frequently resort to

the distribution of posts to sustain itself. Perhaps more than any pact since

1985, Plan Bolivia was fundamentally patronage-driven, with the MIR

extorting a high price in cabinet posts, embassies, and other government

posts.

While the weakened traditional parties retained control of the legisla-

ture and the executive branch, Evo Morales and the opposition forces

retained effective control over the rest of the country, especially the

streets, and provided the space to build party identity among the public.

Plan Bolivia allowed the parties in the governing coalition to systemati-

cally apply their congressional majority to prevent any measures proposed

by the MAS or MIP from getting approved. The coalition parties also

continued moving forward the unpopular measures to export gas. In light

of this, after five months of truces, failed dialogues, and confrontation, the

struggle moved to the streets.

Challenging Coalition Governments and Coalitional

Politics in Bolivia: February–October 2003

In 2000, it was the Water War; in 2003, it was the Gas War. Gas exporta-

tion became the key item on the domestic agenda. The most important

result of the capitalization law of 1994, also designed and implemented by

Sánchez de Lozada, was that the oil multinationals that had obtained

access to explore the Bolivian land found great reserves of natural gas.

Since then, the number of proven reserves had multiplied enormously.27

An opportunity to secure a contract to export natural gas to the United

States emerged. Although this was presented as the immediate answer to

the economic crisis the country was suffering, more time was needed to

have Bolivians accept the terms of the exportation, especially in light of

the conditions imposed by the multinationals.

Indeed, to address the economic crisis, in August 2002, Sánchez de

Lozada offered to develop a package of economic measures to resolve the


economic crisis within 90 days of assuming power.28 But he generated

too many expectations about the measures and later approved a very scant

and not-so-timely group of measures. The model proposed by the 2002

administration advocated an opening of the national economy to foreign

commerce and international capital f low, a government reduced in its

functions and participation in the economy—although with the capacity

to maintain price stability—and a structure of incentives favorable to

private economic activity (Morales 1994: 143).

However, the core principles of Sánchez de Lozada’s economic strategy

and his rather arbitrary moves to implement them explain the crisis that

unfolded in 2003. The reforms of the 1990s represented important steps

forward in granting more inclusiveness to different sectors of society. The

law of popular participation gave localities a voice in the decision making

for the distribution of resources. The electoral reforms promised to better

connect the representatives with their constituencies, thereby reducing

representation deficit. However, these measures to guarantee Bolivians

more inclusive social policies proved short-lived. They did not really

establish a consensual framework for policymaking (Whitehead 2001:

14), nor did they really bring concrete improvements to the lives of

Bolivians. Confrontation was inevitable as discontented sectors demanded

real representation and tangible benefits from policy decisions. The year

2003 arrived in a political atmosphere of “wars” and “truces,” a time

when Bolivians felt a serious lack of government attention to their basic

necessities.

By early 2003, however, peasants put roadblocks in protest, thus stop-

ping traffic in various parts of the country for almost two weeks. There

was confrontation between peasant groups and the military sent by

Sánchez de Lozada, resulting in the death of several peasants. The Catholic

Church called for a dialogue process through which the government

agreed to comply with a series of agreements to improve their interaction

with peasant and indigenous groups (Albó 2003: 6).

On February 9, 2003, the government announced work on a new law

that would increase the income tax on the salaries of the majority of the

population, without a proportional increase in the salaries of people who

earned the most. This tax increase was one of the mechanisms proposed

by the IMF to raise funds and to reduce the country’s staggering fiscal

deficit of almost 8.5 percent of GDP (Gamarra et al. 2003).

The purpose was to improve state revenues in the middle of the crisis.

It was imposed although the government knew that social protest and

tensions would emerge, especially from the middle class—the sector most

affected by the economic crisis. Rejection of the government measure


was not voiced through formal political institutions and so on February

12 and 13, 2003, a severe political crisis took place.

In light of the impact of the tax (impuestazo) to their daily lives, the

police, supported by some other civil society groups, revolted and almost

took over the Government Palace.29 The situation became complicated

when Sánchez de Lozada decided to send in the military, a longstanding

“rival” of the police, to control the mobilization.

The military stopped the confrontation on February 12 with an

exchange of fire in front of the palace, but the hostilities continued.

Sánchez de Lozada and a few of his ministers had to be escorted by

the military out of the palace. Sánchez de Lozada (2004) asserts that the

events of February 2003 were also an attempted coup d’état. In the

process, the headquarters of the governing political parties were attacked,

some of them were burned, as were some of the stores, mainly in the

cities of La Paz and El Alto.

As a result of this confrontation, the Sánchez de Lozada administration

retracted the tax proposal. It was not even sent to Congress for consider-

ation. In turn, Sánchez de Lozada was forced to restructure his whole

cabinet eliminating some ministries to reduce the deficit. Reminiscent of

the political instability and violent confrontation characteristic of the

predemocratic era, the February crisis was felt by Bolivians as the worst

crisis they had suffered since 1982 when the democratic transition started.

However, the worst crisis was yet to come.

Starting in February 2003, the MAS opposition in Congress con-

fronted the Sánchez de Lozada administration with the same passion they

expressed in the streets. They started by demanding malfeasance trials

against the president and his ministers for the February events, requesting

to change the cabinet, calling for the expulsion of Minister of the

Presidency Carlos Sánchez Berzaín, and using other pressure tactics

including threats of hunger strikes. Later, a hunger strike was started by

the MAS and the MIP to call for social support against Sánchez de Lozada.

The request for the resignation of the president was the banner of the

MAS since February until the end of Sánchez de Lozada’s term.

Carlos Mesa was responsible for maintaining working relations with

the parliament. However, he was ineffective at the task as he openly

showed his contempt for the parties and the politicians. The parliamen-

tarians did not like him either. For example, the leader of the MIR and

former president Jaime Paz Zamora once walked out of the Congress

chambers while Carlos Mesa was addressing Congress as vice president

and president of Congress. Confrontation between the executive and

legislature started with Mesa himself. The vice president denounced


slowness on the part of the parliament to move legislation forward and

the parliament in turn accused the government of being slow.30

Following the February events, Sánchez de Lozada was forced to expel

Sánchez Berzaín from the cabinet, giving in to the pressure exerted by

popular sectors, the media, and his own vice president.31 The second

cabinet was reorganized as table 4.2 shows.

The months following the events of February 2003 were filled with

confrontations, roadblocks, and numerous popular demonstrations.

Instead of attempting to engage the opposition to strengthen his position,

the Sánchez de Lozada administration relied on the military to maintain

order. People perceived that human rights violations were taking place

and that Sánchez de Lozada was not really paying attention to their

demands. Sánchez de Lozada continued to try securing support from

both legislators and the general public to control the violent demonstrations

but to no avail. A decision to bring Sánchez Berzaín to his cabinet once

Table 4.2 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 2 (Prepared by the author

using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, the National Electoral

Court, and newspapers)


Date

End Date

Jose Justiniano

Sandoval

MNR Minister of

Presidency

Februray 19,

2003

October 18,

2003

Yerko Kukoc del

Carpio

MNR Minister of

Government

Februray 19,

2003

October 18,

2003

Moira Paz

Estenssoro

Cortez

MNR Minister of

Sustainable

Dev.

Februray 19,

2003

August 4,

2003

Juan Walter

Subirana Suarez

NFR Minister of

Labor

Februray 19,

2003

August 4,

2003

Hugo Arturo

Carvajal Donoso

MIR Minister of

Education

Februray 19,

2003

October 18,

2003

Jorge Torres

Obleas

MNR Minister of

Economic Dev.

Februray 19,

2003

October 18,

2003

Carlos Morales

Landivar

NFR Minister of

Mining

Februray 19,

2003

October 18,

2003

Jorge Berindoague

Alcocer

MNR Minister of

Hydrocarbons

March 21,

2003

October 18,

2003


more, as minister of defense, proved fateful. To complicate matters

further, at around the same time, Sánchez de Lozada also removed

Ana Maria Campero, the ombudswoman and a very well-respected nota-

ble in Bolivia, and appointed an MNR loyal with no real expertise.

Only one year after his election, it was obvious that the Sánchez de

Lozada administration had lost control. The opposition in Congress and

on the streets made him powerless, unable to move any of his policy pro-

posals forward, especially those concerning the export of gas. By August

2003, the MNR, and the MIR allowed a new member into the coalition:

the third most voted party in the elections—the NFR.

The MNR, MIR, and now the NFR consolidated a governing coali-

tion that could be defined using a phrase of the famous Argentinean writer

Jorge Luis Borges: “It’s not love but fear that unites us” (no nos une el amor

sino el espanto), that is, the fear of the emergence of new parties, such as the

MAS, the fear of having more indigenous people sit with them legislating,

the fear of the collapse of Bolivian politics as its citizens knew it.

The entrance of the NFR gave Sánchez de Lozada a more comfortable

majority in Congress and allowed the government coalition to face some

decisions in which a qualified majority was needed, especially in terms of the

designation of public positions. It also had an unintended effect: internal strife

within the coalition. The entrance of the NFR provoked disputes within the

coalition because of the distribution of posts and changes in the positions of

power. The MIR resisted the entrance of this new party on the grounds that

they had not been involved in the decision to allow the NFR to enter the

coalition, and on the grounds that it meant losing posts for their party.

Whereas the 2002 coalition between the MNR and the MIR was

supported by a distribution of positions, 60 percent and 40 percent repre-

sentations by MNR and MIR respectively, with the entrance of the NFR

this changed. Disputes between the government partners emerged.

The worst encounter was due to the distribution of nine vice ministries

to the NFR, of which four had previously been in the hands of the MIR.

The MIR refused to give them over, claiming they were not involved in

the decision.32 Thus, while the MNR and the MIR had two-thirds

majority in Congress, they could not run the cabinet.

In this cabinet shift, the NFR received three ministries: the Ministry

of Labor, the Ministry of Sustainable Development, and the Ministry of

Financial Services. Nine vice ministries and fifteen general director

offices were also granted to the party. In exchange, the NFR guaranteed

the MNR a two-thirds majority in Congress. As table 4.3 shows, four

new ministers were appointed.33


Table 4.3 Sanchez de Lozada: Cabinet 3 (Prepared by the author

using data from the Gaceta Oficial, interviews, the National

Electoral Court and newspapers)


Erick Reyes

Villa

NFR Minister of

Sustainable

Development

August 4,

2003

October 18,

2003

Adalberto

Kuajara

NFR Minister of

Labor

August 4,

2003

October 18,

2003

Dante

Napoleon

Pinto

NFR Minister of

Financial

Services

August 4,

2003

October 18,

2003

Mirta

Quevedo

MNR Minister of

Popular

Participation

August 4,

2003

October 18,

2003

Although it was a new player in the political game and a novice in form-

ing governing coalitions, the NFR behaved in the same patronage-driven

manner as traditional parties. In its August 5, 2003 issue, La Razón reported n

the entrance of the NFR into the government coalition, however, it also

reported that blatant positional payoffs were being distributed.

Meanwhile, and in contrast to the new force that this alliance was

giving to the parliamentary majority, the opposition and other popular

sectors, led by Evo Morales and the MAS, were taking to the streets and

the roads, with a growing number of claims from different fronts. Although

there was no real articulation of the demands of the various opposition

fronts to the Sánchez de Lozada administration, the cumulative effect of

their protests both in parliament and in the streets was causing commotion

across the country. Open confrontation was imminent.

During this period, there was constant political conflict and disagreements

with no real possibilities for a dialogue in the parliament and/or on the

streets. There was no legislation moving in a functional manner through

the legislative process, and those executive policy decisions, such as the

tax increase to reduce the fiscal deficit, had to be reversed. An additional

factor complicated this further, namely, the ability of the opposition to

exert tension both in the parliament and in the streets. Political impasse

and immobilism eventually foretold the demise of the Sánchez de Lozada

administration.


Street Politics: The Gas War

In early September 2003, demonstrations started against the export of

gas, especially against Sánchez de Lozada’s proposal to transport it through

Chile. Sánchez de Lozada convened the MAS to discuss a proposal to

resolve the impasse over the sale of gas. The MAS rejected the invitation

and a possible agreement because the proposal did not provide for more

oil revenues for the state and did not stipulate the holding of a Constituent

Assembly, or a change in the economic model. Although the Catholic

Church attempted to facilitate a dialogue between the government and

their civil society counterparts, including Morales and his followers,

Morales refused to comply, much less to sign the document for the

so-called Reencuentro (Reencounter).34 The majority of the Bolivian

population shared his position.

Besides the conditions imposed by the multinationals in terms of

the very limited benefits from gas extraction and exportation to the

country, one of the conditions most resisted, psychologically, by Bolivians

was the idea that the best way to resolve the economic crisis was to

export gas through Chile. In 1879, Chile and Bolivia had disputed access

to the Pacific coast through an area with vast reserves of mineral

resources. Bolivia lost access to the sea, and as a consequence, diplomatic

relations with Chile were suspended. To this day, the issue of recovering

the access to the sea is in every Bolivian’s mind and heart, it is a central

theme in primary and secondary education, it is present in the doctrine

documents of most of the political parties, and it is even one of the top

issues in every political campaign.

Besides Morales, “El Malku” Felipe Quispe also opposed Sánchez de

Lozada’s measures on the streets. Apart from being the leader of the MIP

and a member of Congress, “El Malku” was also the leader of the

Conderación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia

(Union Confederation of Peasant Workers in Bolivia). Similarly, the

COB emerged as a strong opposition force. Their requests included the

call for a Constituent Assembly, the elimination of the Hydrocarbons

Law and a referendum to decide the issue of the export of gas.35

On September 19, 2003, the MAS called for new demonstrations in var-

ious cities in the country against the sale of gas. The mobilized population

demanded changes to the Hydrocarbons Law and the elimination of Decree

24806 signed by Sánchez de Lozada two days before concluding his 1993–

1997 mandate, which provided favorable conditions for oil transnational

companies. These protests demanded not only a cessation of the sale of gas

through Chile but also the resignation of the president.36


By September 30, the so-called Gas War had started. By early October,

the Gas War threw the country into confusion. Some students were

wounded and others were detained during the protests in front of the

government headquarters. From August to October, instead of becoming

strong, the government coalition weakened. Coalition partners MIR and

NFR asked to modify the Hydrocarbons Law and its Article 55, to change

profit margins and/or royalty payments by the transnational companies

from 18 to 50 percent.37

By the end of 2003, the Gas War and the Iraq War were being fought

at the same time. Throughout the fall, the marches, demonstrations,

hunger strikes, and roadblocks continued all over the country. An aggra-

vating factor was the kidnapping of foreign tourists by Quispe loyals in

Achacachi and Sorata. The death of peasants as a result of the confrontation

with the military sent by Sánchez de Lozada triggered even more protests

and demonstrations, including a march to La Paz.

By October 2, 2003, MAS deputy Dionisio Nuñez indicated that his

party block had presented a draft bill to the plenary of the Lower Chamber.

The draft bill for the modification of Article 55 would require multina-

tionals to increase the royalties to the Bolivian government from 18 to 50

percent for the exploitation of the mineral resource.38

The opposition to the government was being conducted in parallel

fashion, in Congress and on the streets. On October 8, 2003, promoted

by the local COB and the neighborhood associations, a new civic strike

against the sale of gas started in El Alto. Major protests in La Paz stopped

traffic. By the second week of October, stores were closed, there were

fires on many street corners, and there were demonstrations by several

neighborhood associations. La Paz and El Alto were in chaos.

Strikes and demonstrations continued during the following days, and

on October 11, 2003, the conf lict escalated. Given how easy it is to block

the entrance to the city of La Paz through El Alto, the protest was

successful and after a few days, residents experienced shortage in gas,

food, and other basic necessities. To address the shortage, the government

sent a convoy of military men to El Alto to open the way for distributor

trucks to enter the city to deliver these items. A confrontation ensued

between the military and El Alto residents coordinating the blockade

when the military opened fire to push people away from the truck.39

In the midst of violence all over the city, Sánchez de Lozada approved

a Supreme Decree establishing that natural gas would not be sold to for-

eign countries until the population and its social sectors were consulted

on it.40 The situation prompted Sánchez de Lozada to consider the idea of

a consultative referendum.


This was not enough for Bolivians. By mid-October, the situation

became radicalized with demonstrations and other forms of violence as

well as a transportation strike that paralyzed the city of La Paz. Whereas

most ministers still stayed in the cabinet, Minister of Economic

Development Jorge Torres Obleas—from the ally party MIR—presented

his resignation. Sánchez de Lozada, however, declined the resignation

and accused the union movement and social sectors of “trying to end the

democratic regime and institutionalize a dictatorship.”41

On October 13, 2003, after unsuccessfully having urged the president

to find a solution to the matters, Mesa distanced himself from the

government. Four more ministers distanced themselves from the admin-

istration when the demonstrations had escalated into violence. New

protests erupted in the Department of Potosí and in the central city of

Cochabamba, this time asking for Sánchez de Lozada’s “head.”42

By October 15, 2003, the slogans chanted by those demonstrating

were not about gas anymore but about Goni “the assassin.” Protesters

were sending a clear message asking him to resign.43 There were also

mobilizations in Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí, Sucre, and Santa Cruz; the

demand for the president’s resignation was heard everywhere.

Another event took place on October 15, 2003, when ex-ombudswoman

Ana Maria Campero started a hunger strike with a select group of intel-

lectuals and professionals in a parish close to the central headquarters of

the police and the Ministry of Defense. The motive for the hunger strike

was to ask Sánchez de Lozada to resign because he had lost political

support. Many other hunger strikes followed. By this time, the middle

class and intellectuals had joined the opposition to the government.

Also on October 15, Sánchez de Lozada appeared at a national press

conference with his MIR and NFR allies and said he would defend

democracy against the “plotting” and “sedition” organized against his

government and confirmed that he was not going to resign. As part of his

commitment to resolve the crisis, Sánchez de Lozada promised to hold a

consultative referendum on the issue of gas, to revise the Hydrocarbons

Law, and to call for a Constituent Assembly. In his press conference, he

never once referred to those people who died in the confrontation. People

resented this omission.

The situation became more complex when Sánchez de Lozada’s closest

allies, who had publicly expressed their solidarity with the president days

earlier, started to withdraw their support from the coalition. First the

NFR’s Manfred Reyes Villa announced his party’s exit from the coalition,

then Jaime Paz Zamora met with Sánchez de Lozada to discuss his resig-

nation. The MIR also left the coalition at a critical moment: two days


before the fall of the government. MIR leader Oscar Eid Franco stated

that the party left the coalition for a purely strategic reason: preparing its

future. The MIR “ran the risk of collapsing with the government, and

that needed to be avoided.”44

“Goni, become gas!” (Goni, házte gas!) or disappear was the slogan

chanted by the masses and written with spray-paint on the walls of La Paz.

On October 16, Sánchez de Lozada prepared his helicopter to leave from

Santa Cruz on the Lloyd Bolivian Airlines f light to Miami, FL, and he

sent a letter to Congress with his resignation. All members of Congress

voted to accept his resignation except for those of the MNR who still sup-

ported him. Only one MNR parliamentarian voted for his resignation.

Sánchez de Lozada (2004) vehemently asserts that the problem of that

coalition was that force started to emerge from the streets. Additionally,

close election results and the participation of the MIR as coalition partner

were two other aggravating factors according to him. He asserts that “the

irony was that I decided to resign when Manfred left the coalition. Since

I think as a parliamentarian, I realized that I had lost the majority; I could

not impose a state of siege. What I should have done earlier is to stay on,

and retire to Santa Cruz and start a civil war, at least I wouldn’t be accused

of what they are accusing me today.”45

October 2003 saw the first open demonstration of the strength of the

popular actors after the events of February 2003 and since the Bolivian

transition to democracy. The Gas War showed an enormous weakness—

almost decomposition—of the state apparatus, and the crumbling of

coalitional politics in Bolivia.

Mesa’s Critical Juncture: 2003–2005

The collapse of coalition governments and coalitional politics in Bolivia

occurred parallel to the collapse of Sánchez de Lozada’s government. Just

as Sánchez de Lozada was f lying to Miami in October 2003, in a relatively

smooth constitutional transition, Vice President Mesa was sworn in as

interim president by Congress. As soon as he took over, Mesa took the

first steps toward restructuring the political system.

In his first address to Congress as president, Mesa presented his

government program. He distanced himself from political parties and

asked them to reconsider their performance and role in politics. To

address the people’s rejection of state patronage and discontent with the

“pacted democracy” model, Mesa established a cabinet mainly composed

of independents with technical expertise in the various subject matters,46

as table 4.4 shows.


Table 4.4 Mesa Administration: Cabinet 1 (Prepared by the author

using data from the Gaceta Oficial, the National Electoral Court, and

newspapers)


Juan Siles del

Valle

None Minister of

Foreign

Relations

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Jose Galindo

Neder

MNR Minister of the

Presidency

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Alfonso Ferrufino None Minister of

Government

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Gonzalo Arredondo

Millan

None Minister of

Defense

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Javier Cuevas None Minister of

Finance

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Xavier Nogales

Iturri

None Minister of

Economic

Development

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Luis Fernandez

Fagalde

None Minister of

Labor

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Diego Montenegro

Ernst

None Minister of

Peasant Affairs

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Jorge Cortes

Rodriguez

None Minister of

Sustainable

Development

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Jorge Urquidi

Barrau

MNR Minister of

Public Services

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Justo Seoane

Parapaino

None Minister of

Peasant Affairs

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Roberto Barbery

Anaya

ADN Minister of

Popular

Participation

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Guadalupe Cajias ADN Presidential

Delegate

November 2,

2003

November 20,

2003

Mesa also promised to hold a referendum on the issue of natural gas and

to promote a draft law to modify the old Hydrocarbons Law. However, he

said nothing about the rest of the capitalization enterprises. He also pledged

to promote the holding of a Constituent Assembly.47 Since the beginning,

he insistently declared himself to be leading a government of transition.


In developing this agenda, the Mesa administration faced various

challenges. First, popular movements gave him a deadline, a 90-day grace

period, to comply with the proposals of the October Agenda. The

accumulated popular discontent and impatience forced him to provide

the population tangible results in a timely manner.

This was aggravated by the need to foster immediate economic growth

that could have a visible impact in the lives of Bolivians. Second, by

excluding political parties from the game and choosing not to form a coa-

lition with them, Mesa would face the reprisals of the political parties

represented in Congress.48

The fact remained that despite their ineffective governing capacity,

political parties still controlled the bureaucratic and political structures

of the state. Finally, he faced the pressure from local elitist groups who

wanted to inf luence the decision making in terms of governing poli-

cies and turn them in their favor, especially when it came to economic

policies.

A survey taken a few weeks after Mesa took office showed that an

average of 77 percent of the population supported him (85 percent in La

Paz and El Alto, 83 percent in Cochabamba, and 73 percent and 68 percent

support in Santa Cruz and Tarija respectively). A reorganization of the

cabinet took place in November, days after he had appointed his first cab-

inet. Table 4.5 shows how, without major modifications, the cabinet was

formed with technocrats and specialists on particular issues for the

remainder of 2003, 2004 and 2005.

By December 2003, newspaper coverage highlighted how the parties

blamed each other because the discussion of the crucial items in the political

agenda (that is, the issue of the Constituent Assembly, the Hydrocarbons

Law, etc.) was being postponed for 2004.49

The new combination of forces made consensus building difficult.

Congress and the mobilized sectors that had opposed Sánchez de Lozada

wanted tangible results in terms of the principal themes of the new

national agenda. The president of the Chamber of Deputies, MNR’s

Oscar Arrien, even suggested that President Mesa should temporarily

govern through decrees so that the functioning of different powers would

not stop.

A similar position was taken by Arrien later when he suggested that

President Mesa should reduce the BonoSol 50 through a decree and not

through a congressional law. MIR representative Rafael Oviedo and

NFR representative Johnny Antezana were not in agreement with

Arrien’s vision, since, as they suggested, “It would be a bad sign that the

Executive should assume the tasks of the Legislature.”51



newspapers)


Diego

Montenegro

None Minister of

Agriculture

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005

Gonzalo Aredondo

Millan

None Minister of

National

Defense

November 10,

2003

February 3,

2005

Donato Ayma None Minister of

Education

November 20,

2003

June 11,

2004

Alfonso Ferrufino

Valderrama

None Interior

Minister

November 20,

2003

June 11,

2004

Javier Cuevas None Minister of

Finance

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005

Jorge Espinoza None Minister of

Mines and

Metallurgy

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005

Juan lgnacio

Siles

None Minister of

Foreign Affairs

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005

Fernando

Antezana Aranibar

None Minister of

Health

November 20,

2003

June 11,

2004

Luis Fernandez

Fajalde

None Minister of

Labor

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005

Jorge Urquidi

Barrau

MNR Minister of

Public Services

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005

Guillermo Torrez

Orias

MNR Minister of

Hydrocarbons

November 17,

2003

February 3,

2005

Ricardo Calla

Ortega

None Minister of

Indigenous

Affairs

November 17,

2003

February 3,

2005

Guadalupe Cajias ADN Presidential

Delegate

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005

Jose Antonio

Galindo Neder

None Minister of the

Presidency

November 20,

2003

February 3,

2005


With the postponement of these issues until the following year, the

“grace period” given to President Mesa by the social movements was

expiring. The COB threatened to take over the National Congress and

indicated that “things would be stirred up starting in January, when

people could start to demand again” because the people had “lost

confidence in the president.”52

With respect to this, Morales, now with a more moderate discourse,

asserted that “closing the Parliament was an attack on democracy” and

qualified this measure as “an imposition of a dictatorship.” Moreover, Morales

indicated in a press conference that “not because the parliamentarians are

bad should we have to close Congress. One thing is the person and another

one is the institution, and here we need to defend the institutions.”53

Morales seemed so eager to protect democratic institutions, mainly

because Mesa allowed him to have inputs in major political decisions. By

now, Morales had broadened MAS’s support and transformed the party

from a cocalero movement to a national movement with a middle-class

constituency, especially in some urban centers in western Bolivia. His

international projection also inf luenced his attitude. In November 2003,

Mesa gave Morales a platform to address the participants at the

Development Summit of heads of state held in Santa Cruz, and his

international popularity was growing.

With relative support from political parties and the key social forces,

what Mesa started to lead was a “moment of inf lection” that presumed

the need for changes and the creation of new opportunities for develop-

ment. Starting on October 20, 2003, Mesa asked for congressional

support to govern, stipulating that it had to be based on national interest

and not on payoffs. He heartily asked the presidents of the Senate and

Chamber of Deputies to give him political backing (un espaldarazo).

Admitting the risk of making a government without political parties,

the president also admitted that “we should make a Government with

the Parliament if we want to have possibilities of success.”54 The problem

continued to be that Mesa considered political parties, and Congress

also, corrupt institutions. This made functioning executive-legislative

dynamics diff icult.

President Mesa met with the leaders of the legislative chambers. He

also met with the chiefs of the political party blocks in Congress. They all

agreed to start working on revising the Hydrocarbons Law and on draft-

ing a bill to call for a referendum and a Constituent Assembly.55 According

to Johnny Antezana, the leader of the NFR in Congress, the participants

of the meeting agreed that the executive in power should be the one to

manage directly, in coordination with the legislature, the revision to the


Hydrocarbons Law and the binding referendum on the sale of the gas.

Calling for a Constituent Assembly would be the legislature’s responsibility,

in coordination with representatives from the regions, their civic

committees, and civil society.56

At the beginning of Mesa’s administration, it seemed impossible to

modify the Constitution.57 Indeed, Article 230 of the Constitution makes

it extremely complex to carry out reforms. In order to partially amend

the Constitution, the proposed reform has to be initiated by Congress

and then approved by the following Congress. The law must enumerate

the changes to be made. Only those changes included in the law can be

subsequently approved. It is the subsequent legislative session, also with

two-thirds of the votes, that approves the reform. The logic was to avoid

too many changes, especially those tied to the interests of a particular set

of leaders.

The discussion of the Law of Necessity of Constitutional Reform was

approved on August 5, 2002, on the last day of the mandate of President

Quiroga. Its approval was to be discussed during the next session, but it was

postponed during the 14-month Sánchez de Lozada administration.58

By February 2004, at 78 percent of popularity 59 in La Paz, Cochabamba,

El Alto, and Santa Cruz, Mesa was showing levels of support never

achieved by any president in Bolivia since the transition to democracy.60

Unlike Sánchez de Lozada, Mesa was able to promote the constitutional

reform. However, he approved more measures than were originally listed

and approved by the previous legislature.

With such high levels of popularity, the party caucuses in both legis-

lative chambers had no choice but to support it. By February 2004,

Bolivia had initiated a new phase in their democratic history by approv-

ing the constitutional reform. In an act celebrated at the Government

Palace in La Paz, President Carlos Mesa promulgated the law that modi-

fied 16 of the 235 articles of the current Constitution.61 The law was

passed with the support of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Mesa

said that the reform signaled a “process of historic transition” and that it

was “a step ahead” in the construction of a “new social pact amongst

Bolivians.”

Besides the stipulations for the referendum and the call for the

Constituent Assembly, the reform allowed citizens to present candidates

through indigenous movements and civic associations, without having to

belong to a political party, and they were now also able to complement

Congress by initiating legislation.

On February 1, President Mesa also presented his economic plan and

gave no role to Congress to implement it since he moved it forward by


promulgating 23 Supreme Decrees. In the end, a limited number of laws

were actually sent to the legislature for their approval.62

Agreeing on a Hydrocarbons Law

After October 2003, there was a complete change in the attitudes of the

parliamentarians. They now wanted to respond to citizen demands but in

terms of the agenda set in October 2003. Starting in October 2003, how-

ever, and given that Mesa had distanced himself from Congress and polit-

ical parties, Congress was “revitalized” in the sense that it assumed

positions independent of the executive.

Along with the transition to democracy (1982–1985), this is the time

in Bolivian history when Congress became a proactive institution. In

terms of the Hydrocarbons Law, there was no homogenous position in

the parliament, but all parties were proposing their own elements to the

law. By assuming their own institutional position, some governance

problems emerged but at the same time, Congress revitalized its role.

In the Mesa government, all the problems went to the extreme. A ref-

erendum was held in July 18, 2004, as part of the October commitments

to let Bolivians decide on the basic terms of a new Hydrocarbons Law

and, most importantly, on the relationship with the transnational corpo-

rations that would extract the resources.

The fact remained that President Mesa needed to build a working rela-

tionship and synchrony with political parties to prevent them from inter-

rupting his initiatives. Indeed, it would have been impossible for Mesa to

work through the remainder of his mandate in 2007 if Congress had not

been an essential protagonist in making the changes that the country was

demanding.

By November 2004, there were rumors of a coup d’état against

President Mesa. A bombing in front of the Ministry of Defense in

Sopocachi, La Paz, caused commotion and speculation on whether it was

part of a plot to oust President Mesa. Most argued that the alleged coup

was being crafted inside the walls of the U.S. embassy by opponents to

the governments while others argued that it was part of a strategy by the

MIP and MAS to destabilize the regime.

As tensions resumed after the Christmas holiday, Mesa made the deci-

sion to reorganize his whole cabinet. He faced a lot of confrontation from

the same mobilized sectors that pressured Sánchez de Lozada; Mesa

resorted to this traditional method in an attempt to reorganize politics in

the country. As table 4.6 indicates, this time some MNR militants, or

those who had belonged to the party, were invited to the cabinet. This



newspapers)


Juan Siles

del Valle

No party Minister of

Foreign

Relations

February 3,

2005

June 2005

José Antonio

Galindo

MNR Minister of the

Presidency

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Saúl Lara T. No party Minister of

Govermment

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Gonzalo Arredondo

Millan


Defense

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Luis Jemio M. No party Minister of

Finance

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Erwin Aguilera No party Minister of

Sustainable

Develop.

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Walter Kreidler No party Minister of

Economic

Develop.

February 3,

2005

June 2005

René Gomez

Garcia


Public Works

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Guillermo

Torres O.

MNR Minister of

Hydrocarbons

February 3,

2005

June 2005

M. Soledad Quiroga No party Minister of

Education

February 3,

2005

June 2005

María Teresa Paz MNR Minister of

Health

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Audalia Zurita MNR Minister of

Labor

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Victor Barrios A. No party Minister of

Peasant Affairs

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Jorge Espinoza M No party Minister of

Mining

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Gloria Ardaya M. No party Minister of

Popular

Participation

February 3,

2005

June 2005

Rosario Quiroga No party Minister of

Health

February 9,

2005

June 2005


was the third cabinet shift in an administration that had lasted less than

two years.

In March 2005, however, President Mesa almost forced Congress to

approve a law that would grant the country 50 percent in benefits from gas

extraction—18 percent royalties and 32 percent taxes to the transnational

companies. Evo Morales and a group of like-minded individuals contin-

ued supporting the 50 percent (and not just 18 percent) royalties proposal.

A congressional vote initially favorable to the proposal of the president

provoked a campaign of mobilizations and roadblocks led by Evo Morales

to force Congress to approve the law that he defended. Under these condi-

tions, the president sent a message to the country on the night of March 6

and presented his resignation.63 Confusion prevailed the following day,

during which Congress refused to accept his resignation and pacted a leg-

islative program with the president that would include the approval of the

Hydrocarbons Law, the call for the Constituent Assembly, the election of

prefects, and the referendum on regional autonomies, all in 2005. As time

passed, President Mesa became more dependent on Congress to push these

commitments forward, but the pressure continued.

In June 2005, Carlos Mesa resigned, and in an unprecedented turn of

events, all succeeding authorities waived their constitutional succession at

the presidency, and Eduardo Rodriguez Veltzé, chief justice of the

Supreme Court of Justice, took over as president. He promised to lead a

government of transition with new presidential elections as the only issue

in the agenda. New elections were called for December 2005.

The Election of Evo Morales: A New Hegemonic

Political Force in Bolivia

The new president, Rodriguez Veltzé, called for early general elections to

be held in December 4, 2005. This election would also include the vote

for departmental prefects, a promise that had been made by Mesa. A

controversy emerged again over the application of the latest (2001)

National Population and Housing Census to the distribution of

departmental circumscriptions. When the decision was left to Congress,

no consensus could be achieved. In the interest of facilitating an early

election, President Rodriguez Veltzé, by way of Supreme Decree 28429

of November 1, 2005, redistributed the seats to ensure an equitable allo-

cation in terms of population and economic development. In the new

distribution, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba both received three and two

more seats respectively, whereas La Paz’ seats were reduced by two, Oruro

and Potosi by one each. Considering the delays in the electoral calendar,


the decree also changed the date of elections from December 4 to

December 18, 2005.

There were eight political parties participating in the elections that

took place December 18, 2005. The top three contenders included Evo

Morales for the MAS, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, who abandoned his old

party ADN and ran with the civic association Democratic and Social

Power (Poder Democrático y Social-Podemos), and Samuel Doria

Medina, who abandoned the MIR and created the party National Unity

(Unidad Nacional-UN). Other contenders included Felipe Quispe for

the MIP, the newcomer Michiaki Nagatani for the MNR, Gildo Angulo

for the NFR, Eliseo Rodríguez for the Agricultural Patriotic Front of

Bolivia (Frente Patriótico Agropecuario de Bolivia-FREPAB), and

Néstor García Rojas for the Social Union of Workers of Bolivia (Unión

Social de los Trabajadores de Bolivia-USTB).

The general trends in political party decay and the emergence of the

MAS as the new hegemonic political actor could be observed at the

beginning of the campaign. The campaign was thus characterized by the

following. First, there was an increase in the participation of new political

groups, especially civic associations, in light of the 2004 constitutional

reform that allowed indigenous movements and civic associations to

contest power along with political parties. This was especially true for the

election of prefects—18 different groups participated in the elections.

The MAS was in a special situation since it was the only political group

that remained unhurt by the events of 2003 and that managed to success-

fully participate in the 2004 municipal elections. Conversely, a majority

of the so-called traditional parties did not run candidates with their own

party nomenclatures, except for the MNR.

Second, the campaign showed a greater trend toward the polarization

of the political debate. The presentation of highly differentiated proposals

or “visions of the country,” as it was often referred to by the media,

became clear. In this sense, although the themes of the campaign were

generally the same for the top three parties, their approaches were

significantly different. First of all, the exploitation of petroleum reserves

and natural gas deposits continued to be the key issue in the campaign.

Seen as a strategy to increase foreign trade and investment, the only dif-

ference of how the issue was addressed related to the MAS proposal to

completely nationalize the industry, whereas Podemos and UN proposed

a negotiated resolution of the matter with the investment companies.

A second theme in the debate was related to coca growth and produc-

tion, and the implicit challenge to U.S. policies toward the country.

Morales pledged throughout the campaign not to accept the terms of the


U.S. government’s policy on coca eradication. Instead, he advocated for

the legalization of the coca leaf and for the right of families to produce it

and consume it. On the other hand, Quiroga, who had been a key imple-

menter of the 1997–2002 administration Dignity Plan, proposed to con-

tinue an alternative development approach in which coca cultivation

would be replaced by other crops. A last theme in the political debate was

the Constituent Assembly, a project that all parties supported. As part of

the campaign strategy, Podemos even presented a proposal for a new

Constitution that included political reforms such as the runoff election,

the direct election of council members, departmental autonomies, among

others. Morales’s commitment to a Constituent Assembly process was

also clear although no proposal was presented during the campaign.

These two visions of the country remained unresolved throughout the

electoral process and the Constituent Assembly later became the place to

discuss and resolve them.

Through the media, Morales positioned the MAS as the vehicle for

marginalized and underrepresented sectors to voice their opinions. By

then, the middle class and most other sectors in Bolivia were fed up with

the constant mobilizations that had paralyzed the country previously.

Thus, the MAS also promoted the idea that the party was the only one

that, once elected, could control social mobilization. They were helped

by Quiroga’s strategy of generating fear of a Morales election, since peo-

ple were given the idea that if Quiroga were to become president, he

would not be able to withstand the mobilizations initiated by the MAS;

thus stability could be guaranteed with a Morales election. This kind of

“dirty war” or personal attacks between contenders became common, as

in previous electoral processes. Throughout the campaign, Morales asso-

ciated Quiroga with the traditional parties and pacted democracy in

Bolivia as well as with continuing the policies of previous regimes. On

the other hand, Podemos depicted the MAS, including Evo Morales him-

self, as a group of extremist and undemocratic followers of “the Venezuelan

model.” Podemos lost this “dirty war” when it was discovered that the

“textile worker” who had declared in a Podemos TV spot that he was

scared he would lose his job if Morales was elected was in fact just an

actor and not a textile worker.

The marketing strategies of the three were different. Whereas Podemos

focused on securing mass media spots and announcements and also relied

on an Argentinean firm for political marketing advice, Morales took

advantage of his visits to indigenous localities and other mass events to

get media coverage and designed a campaign with his own group, includ-

ing Juan Ramon Quintana, his campaign chief and later minister of the


presidency. By having obtained the second place in the previous election,

his party received resources from the state to run the campaign. As

opposed to the 2002 elections when mass media campaigning was scant,

the MAS was able to run TV and radio propaganda. In the rural areas,

mass media campaigning became almost irrelevant as the campaigns took

on more traditional mechanisms. For this, the parties had to rely on their

party structures. The MAS overpowered Podemos throughout the

country, but especially in the western part and even in the agricultural

colonies in Santa Cruz where the highest amount of registered voters

were found.

The 2005 Election Results

On December 18, 2005, Bolivians turned out in massive numbers to elect

the president, the vice president, 27 Senators, 130 Congress members,

and 9 prefects. The main problem of the entire process was caused by the

high number of people who were unable to vote because they had been

purged from the voter registration rolls because they had not voted in the

previous elections and had not re-registered. On election day, this matter

was the permanent target of comments by the media, political groups,

candidates, and the population in general. At some point, it generated

confusion and certain social unrest. Some political parties interpreted the

purging as an effort to reduce or hamper their victory. The MAS asserted

that a large number of the purged persons belonged to lower middle-class

and low-income social strata and that, therefore, the purging affected

MAS’s natural voter base. This situation was mentioned by Evo Morales

in his acceptance speech in which he said that instead of citizens, “it was

the CNE that needed to be purged.”

Regardless of this problem, on January 6, 2006, the National Electoral

Court (CNE) presented the official count of the votes in the framework

of a plenary session attended by four CNE members and the delegates of

the political parties. Evo Morales obtained 53.7 percent of the popular

vote, the absolute majority needed to avoid a vote in Congress, whereas

Quiroga was 25 percentage points below Morales with 28.6 percent of

the votes, below even the best ADN electoral performance in 1985 when

it won 32.8 percent of the votes. Doria Medina obtained 7.8 percent and

the MNR obtained 6.5 percent. The other four parties captured the

remaining 3.5 percent.

No poll was able to predict the great success of the MAS in the elec-

tion. In most polls, Morales was nowhere near the 30 percent popularity

that Quiroga enjoyed. Other analysts predicted a close election with an


electoral difference of small percentage points. This became known as

the “catastrophic tie” in the last months of the campaign. The biggest fear

was the possibility that one of the formulas would not accept the results.

If Morales won, most analysts predicted that he would not get the needed

50+1 percent of the popular vote and would be forced to establish an

electoral alliance and governing coalition with Tuto Quiroga, his neme-

sis in the contest. However, that was not the case, and for the first time in

Bolivian history a candidate captured more than 50 percent of the vote in

the general election.

This election was unprecedented for Bolivia for various reasons. For

one, there was an extraordinarily high voter turnout. The CNE data

shows that for these elections, there were 3,671,152 citizens eligible to

vote. Of these, 3,102,417 Bolivians voted, that is, 84.508 percent of those

eligible. According to the CNE, this was the highest participation in gen-

eral elections since the return to democracy in 1985. The case of women

is interesting too as they participated in greater numbers (86.8 percent)

than men (86.1 percent), an uncommon occurrence in Latin American

elections. Second, there was a clear and easily identifiable choice by the

voters for one of the candidates. This choice gave the MAS the absolute

majority of the votes with no need for a congressional election of the pres-

ident. Third, a trend toward vote concentration was observed. Whereas

the historical trend in Bolivian elections had been toward dispersion, in

these elections the two candidates with the highest number of ballots

accounted for 82.2 percent of the votes.

Finally, the figure of the vice president also became very relevant in

these elections. In almost all of the formulas, the VP figure carried a

strong symbolism not seen in previous electoral processes, except for

previous MNR choices. In the case of Podemos’s VP candidate, Maria

René Duchen, the civic association sought to tap into her popularity as a

journalist and to even demonstrate their commitment to the inclusion of

one of Bolivia’s underrepresented groups—women. In the case of UN’s

VP candidate, the party sought to incorporate a geographical balance. In

other words, by including Carlos Dabdoub from Santa Cruz, Doria

Medina attempted to secure the vote from the eastern region of the

country, especially given that he was from the west. The idea was to give

equal importance to the eastern and western votes. Finally, in the case of

the MAS’s VP candidate, the MAS sought to guarantee a socioeconomic

balance in the voting. By including Alvaro García Linera, a leftist intel-

lectual who had started in the radical Tupac Katari Guerilla Group

(Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari-EGTK) but later moderated his

discourse, it was clear that the MAS was seeking to project its image as a


moderate actor and thus secure the votes of the intellectuals and the mid-

dle class of the country, both in the west and in the east. García Linera

had become popular through TV programs on which he often appeared

as a political analyst.

Without the need to refer to Article 90 of the Constitution that

requires the congressional election of the president when no candidate

achieves an absolute majority, the Proclamation Act was unanimously

adopted on January 20, 2006, once President Morales had returned from

his famous first trip abroad as president-elect. His election to the

presidency marks the first time an indigenous politician has reached the

presidency in Bolivia. His victory thus marks a socioeconomic and

political moment of inf lection, perhaps a continuation, or conclusion, of

the uncompleted revolution of 1952. It also served as the basis for the

strengthening of a new political hegemonic force in Bolivia.

The 2005–2010 Congress: Dominance of the MAS

As results came in, it seemed that the MAS would have a comfortable con-

gressional majority with 72 out of 130 deputies, and 12 members of the

Senate. Only four parties reached Congress this time, namely, the MAS,

Podemos, UN, and the MNR, confirming that vote concentration was

possible.

In terms of representation in the Chamber of Deputies, the SMD

reform greatly benefited the MAS, which obtained 45 uninominal seats,

23 seats more than the second party. From 2002 to 2005, the MAS

managed to capture 31 more uninominal seats. No other party showed

such improvement.

In the case of Senate, the majority went to Podemos, which obtained

13 posts, with a Senate post each for the UN and the MNR. The suc-

cess of the MAS in the Chamber of Deputies and a less successful per-

formance in the Senate as compared to Podemos can be explained by

the geographical nature of the electoral system. Although Podemos was

a new nomenclature, in practice it included the most popular ADN

politicians from the Amazon region, Beni and the Chiquitanía in the

Santa Cruz region, who had been active in the recent electoral process.

The Senate posts went to Podemos from these Amazonian provinces of

Beni and Pando, former ADN strongholds, and in which the MAS was

not yet strong. Moreover, Podemos managed to be second or third in all

nine departments, guaranteeing the party at least one senator per

department.


While the electoral bases of the rest of the parties decreased, the results

showed a significant improvement in electoral performance for the MAS.

This was expected in the western departments, but it was surprising to

see that it was also the case for the departments in the eastern part of the

country, where competing parties had more support. In the case of the

departments in the west, whereas in the 2002 election the MAS had

achieved 22.5 percent of the vote in the province of La Paz, the party

support base increased by 44.1 percentage points obtaining 66.6 percent

of the vote in that province in 2005. In his own department, Cochabamba,

Morales had obtained 37.6 percent of the vote in 2002, but in the 2005

election it reached 64.8 percent. The same can be said for Oruro and

Potosí, where his support base increased from 20.2 percent to an amazing

62.6 percent and from 27 percent to 57.8 percent, respectively.

In the east, the increase in the popular vote was remarkable. In the

department of Tarija, his vote share went from 6.2 percent in 2002 to

31.6 percent in 2005, whereas in Chuquisaca, it increased by 37.1 percent.

Although Morales was still unable to obtain the majority of the votes

here, he showed similar improvements in Beni and Pando where his vot-

ing went from 3.2 percent to 16.5 percent and from 2.9 percent to

20.9 percent respectively. The most unexpected results were those in

Santa Cruz, where Quiroga won over Morales only by 8.5 percent. His

support increased from 10.2 percent in 2002 to 33.2 percent in the last

election.

After results were confirmed and Morales assumed power with

ceremonial events in Tihuanaco and La Paz, the next task was compos-

ing the cabinet. There were demands from social movements and labor

unions for ministerial positions. In the end, President Morales put

together a cabinet made up of party militants with backgrounds in the

social and union movements. They were sworn in on January 23, 2006.

He governed his first year in power still with the majority of these

members, except for a change in the Ministry of Mining due to an

incident in Huanuni, Potosí, in which 16 people died, and another change

due to the resignation, in September 2006, of Hydrocarbons Minister

Andres Soliz. At the completion of his first year of government, the MAS

opened the space for social movements and unions to evaluate the group

of ministers. More than 400 people, including MAS leaders and militants

as well as leaders of union organizations participated in this meeting.

Following this consultation process, on January 24, 2007, President

Morales changed seven of his ministers with militants with strong leftist

backgrounds.


The 2006 Election of Members of the Constituent Assembly

The first commitment that Morales sought to comply with was the call

for a Constituent Assembly process that would allow for the revamping

of the political Constitution. In coordination with the opposition,

Congress approved the Special Law for the Call of a Constituent

Assembly through which it was established that Bolivians would elect its

members on July 2, 2006. A referendum on regional autonomies was

also set for the same day.

The campaign made evident a relative imbalance in terms of electoral

propaganda. The broadest political movements or parties had a consider-

able volume of electoral propaganda, both qualitatively and quantitatively,

as compared to smaller and more local forces that had very limited expo-

sure. In the western part of the country, the presence of the MAS was

very evident, especially in rural areas, where the presence of political

propaganda from other parties was almost inexistent.

The electorate was generally uninformed, at times misinformed, about

the process. The majority of the population had no real knowledge of the

main issues that were being decided on election day as well as the meaning

of the Constituent Assembly or the consequences of an autonomic process.

Aside from the four political parties with parliamentary representation—

MAS, Podemos, UN, and MNR—the following political forces obtained

seats in the Constituent Assembly:

1. A3MNR (an MNR division in Santa Cruz)

2. Camino al Cambio (CC, an MNR division in Tarija)

3. National Concertation (Concertación Nacional-CN)

4. Autonomy for Bolivia (Autonomía para Bolivia-APB)

5. The MIR and the MBL

6. Social Alliance (Alianza Social-AS)

7. AYRA

8. Andrés Ibáñez Group (Agrupación Andrés Ibáñez-AAI)

9. San Felipe de Austria Citizen Movement (Movimiento Ciudadano

San Felipe de Austria-MCSFA)

10. Social-Patriotic Alliance (Alianza Social Patriótica-ASP)

11. The Popular Native Movement (Movimiento Originario Popular-

MOP)

The electoral campaign for this election was done without major prob-

lems, and Bolivians voted in greater numbers than in the 2005 election. In

fact, 3,138,324 citizens voted—35,907 more than the highest record of


2005 in which 3,102,417 voted. In the end, the MAS again obtained the

absolute majority. However, this time there was a greater dispersion of the

national vote as compared to the December 2005 elections as there were

many local political groups contesting the election. Based on the results,

the new Constituent Assembly was composed.

The Special Law for the Call of a Constituent Assembly established

not only the nature, duration, and objectives of the Constituent

Assembly but also the rules to adopt the new articles in session. Article

25 of the Special Law states that “the Constituent Assembly will approve

the text of the new Constitution with two-thirds of the votes of

the members present in the Assembly.” This article was very important

in the sense that it forced the establishment of consensus, given that,

considering the mechanisms for the distribution of assembly seats, no

party achieved the two-thirds needed to approve matters in the

Constituent Assembly.

The Constituent Assembly faced many problems since its inception.

Along with the issue of deciding where to place the capital of the country, or

how regional autonomies will be integrated into the Constitution, the most

difficult challenge was agreeing on the procedure to approve articles of the

new Constitution. The MAS, in alliance with other smaller parties, con-

trolled about 155 votes. With support from other groups, it could reach the

two-thirds majority needed to approve proposals. Moreover, opposition

groups, including Podemos, UN, and the MNR, interpreted Article 25 of

the Special Law as suggesting that not only the whole text of the Constitution

but also every article must be approved with a two-thirds majority. After

weeks of this issue remaining unresolved, the MAS proposed that only the

final document should require a two-thirds majority and that all other deci-

sions should be taken by simple majority. A September 2006 vote on this

proposal by the MAS was invalidated when opposition members left the

chamber. The discussions stalled because of strong opposition to the MAS

proposals to redistribute property and wealth and to incorporate the indef-

inite election of the president, as was proposed in Venezuela.

The year 2007 passed and the Constituent Assembly was not able to

initiate the more important discussion on the contents of the new

Constitution. In November 2007, in an unorthodox turn of events,

Morales’s followers decided to vote on a constitutional draft at a meeting

that excluded the opposition. As a result, marches and demonstrations

took place in which three people died.

On December 9, 2007, in Oruro, the draft document was approved in

another 16-hour marathon ad hoc session of 164 members out of the 255


and of 10 out of the 16 political groups that composed the Constituent

Assembly. The opposition did not participate in the session on the grounds

that the document was illegal and ignored the legal requirement that called

for a two-thirds majority of the Constituent Assembly votes in favor. The

411 clauses of the new Constitution include provisions that recognize even

more the rights of indigenous Bolivians and it further recognizes more

than 30 official languages. It incorporates, among other things, provisions

for both regional as well as indigenous community autonomies.

Controversy continued in Bolivia as the leaders of four of the six

departments questioned the draft Constitution to be approved in a refer-

endum and threatened with a plan to declare regional autonomy. President

Morales responded to this opposition by calling on a recall referendum on

his own tenure and those of the departmental prefects. The debate on the

content of the draft Constitution continued since it seems that far from

“refounding” Bolivia, as President Morales proposed during his cam-

paign, the constitutional reforms seemed to have exacerbated the political

confrontation that divided the country and forced the resignation of two

presidents since 2003.

General Reflections

Analyzing coalitional politics since 1985, it is obvious that political

pacts were slowly degraded and became less programmatic and more

oriented toward the distribution of positional payoffs to sustain weak

government plans. Whereas at the beginning of Bolivia’s democracy

pacts were key to the sustainability of those who governed and their

parties, the governing powers were discredited as a result of “pacts of

governance” between elite members seeking to satisfy only their per-

sonal and party interests. As former president Quiroga recently stated,

“the model of alliances has been exhausted because it was only used to

distribute spaces for power,” instead of being used as “an instrument

that responds to the people.”64

The Bolivian case until the late 1990s showed that multipartism could

effectively work with presidential systems to bring democratic stability.

Although Bolivia’s hybrid presidentialism with a mixed system for the

election of the legislature had the effect of creating ideological polariza-

tion and system fragmentation, and thus executive-legislative deadlock,

Bolivian political leaders throughout most of the country’s democratic

history were able to form effective coalitions and coalition governments.

Similarly, the hybrid presidential system and the greater opening of the

system to new actors through electoral reforms such as the 1997 SMD


election also had a countereffect in the sense that they opened spaces for

social groups to enter into Congress and to challenge the government

both from the parliament and from the streets.

Thus, Bolivia’s electoral system has important political consequences.

By 2000, the Bolivian electoral system was one that allowed a high level

of representation of minority interests in Congress, but this time it

threatened the stability of the government. Starting in the late 1990s,

by providing spaces for participation without concrete benefits to peo-

ple, political leaders failed to manage system fragmentation and demo-

cratic instability. The concerns of the political parties were remote from

the concerns of the masses, who suffered the effects of the economic

measures adopted in the previous twenty years but who, at the same

time, also benefited from the creation of spaces to contest political

power.

The analysis suggests that the problem of representativeness, which has

been a major source of tension since 2000, cannot be addressed only

through electoral engineering. This representation deficit requires an

integral treatment that would include the renovation and internal democ-

ratization of the political parties, the promotion of a democratic political

culture, the strengthening of legislative functions, and the promotion of

effective economic growth, especially in terms of concrete benefits to the

masses.

Political parties have been unsuccessful in fulfilling their functions of

creating political identities, representing social plurality, seeking

individual interest aggregation, and defining and managing a political

agenda. They have not been capable of turning the votes garnered in

elections into stable broad-based coalitions, including social coalitions, to

support or oppose important policies. Nor have they been successful in

performing a programmatic function, that is, in generating policy agendas

for governments to put into practice after elections.

The analysis suggests that nowadays, for pacts to have an impact, they

need to bring back that which is programmatic, that is, to reinvent or

create new public policies that bring tangible benefits to citizens. Political

leaders need to connect these agreements to the streets, perhaps by creat-

ing spaces for dialogue and public deliberation of key public policies

between government and civil society and making the decision making

inclusive of these sectors.

The 2003 experience showed that in Bolivia, pacted democracy is not

enough. Political parties and political leaders failed to see that parliamen-

tary majorities are not enough to deal with the real problems at hand.

Guaranteeing democracy governance goes beyond avoiding a deadlock


and executive-legislative immobilism. The 2002 and, more clearly, the

2005 results show an increased political dominance on the part of the

MAS. Morales narrowly missed a victory in the 2002 presidential elec-

tions by 42,000 votes. However, it is obvious that this does not resolve

the longstanding issues dividing the country’s disparate populations along

ethnic, economic, and political lines.

In sum, the fundamental problem in Bolivia today is the disconnec-

tion between a civil society that has exerted power on the streets and has

questioned the political system, and a political class that does not priori-

tize the agenda demanded by the society that they claim to represent. In

the 2003 conf lict, the MAS deliberately left the parliament as the second-

ary space to engage, and it did that because its roots were in the union and

not in a party structure. As power has shifted to the streets, power has also

shifted toward the MAS. The essential challenge for this new hegemonic

political force remains how to give an institutional form to the street

demands and reform the institutionality that gives them form. President

Morales faces a difficult but fascinating scenario.

CHAPTER 5

EXPLAINING EVO MORALES’SRISE TO POWER: THEUNINTENDED [OR INTENDED?]POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS

Although the socioeconomic climate in the country was starting to

deteriorate by 1997, important reforms to further representation

mechanisms were yet to be implemented in Bolivia. The establishment of

the mixed-member electoral system for the election of the members of

the Chamber of Deputies was seen as a major effort to connect citizens

with their representatives. As a result of a long process of electoral reforms,

there were more plurality and local interests represented in Congress, but

there was also a greater dependence on positional and pork-and-barrel

payoffs to sustain coalitions.

The creation of new opportunities within the political sphere through

various electoral reforms helps explain the emergence of Evo Morales as

the new predominant leader. Although President Morales was expected

to receive a majority of the votes, no analyst was able to predict that he

would do it with over 50 percent of the votes—a historic majority. Besides

producing the first indigenous president in the country and in the

Americas, his election has important implications for the country as well

as for the region in a comparative perspective.

The Political Consequences of Electoral Systems

The Bolivian electoral system has important political consequences. For

the last 20 years, it effectively dealt with the challenge of guaranteeing


representation without threatening the stability of the government. The

electoral system certainly facilitated the emergence of more than 400

parties in 20 years, but political leaders managed system fragmentation

and democratic instability through coalition building.

In the context of Bolivian politics, the arguments for majoritarian

systems (two-party systems) and against PR and Mixed systems (multipartism)

do not stand. In other words, the Bolivian case shows that multipartism

can effectively work with presidential systems to bring democratic

stability.

In terms of coalition building, the country’s political history shows that

although the Bolivia’s mixed system for legislative elections and its executive

formula favor multipartism, these electoral systems do not necessarily engender

executive-legislative confrontation in Bolivia. Indeed, the aforementioned

electoral arrangements may not create executive-legislative confrontation

because in promoting political representation, they have increased the likeli-

hood of coalition formation and government efficiency.

This is so because the Bolivian electoral system was capable of amelio-

rating system fragmentation and ideological polarization among the political

class, especially from 1985 through 2002. However, events since 2000

suggest that political institutions are not ameliorating system fragmenta-

tion and ideological polarization in the streets, beyond the political class.

The electoral system also produced an environment conducive to the

exercise of politics outside of democratic institutions, and to the emer-

gence of political forces such as the MAS that effectively practice politics

within the institutions of democracy and at its base—the people.

The Bolivian electoral system inf luenced the performance of Congress,

as the legitimate actor in charge of channeling citizen demands, and that

of the president. It also had effects on the political system as a whole, that

is, on the way politics is done. With regards to the effects of the electoral

system on the performance of Congress and the president, the following

consequences of the Bolivian electoral system can be identified.

Effect No. 1: Subordination of Congress to the President

Electoral systems that foster multipartism produce the need for government

coalitions. By doing this, they can also produce, in fact, a weakening of

parliamentary activity and a subordination of the assembly to the executive

and to the government coalition.

Pacted democracy in Bolivia had as a consequence the subordination

of the legislature to the executive. Except for the 2005 election, since

1979, all presidents have been elected by Congress. The result was that

189EX PLA INING MOR A LES’S R ISE TO POW ER

Congress never achieved the expected level of preeminence, and the system

was generally executive-led. The legislative branch became the center of

consensus and political negotiation, but at the same time, the legislative

power became completely incapable of exerting its functions of represen-

tation, oversight, and legislation (Calderon 2002: 113).

Bolivian political leaders assert that the checks and balances mecha-

nisms between these two branches worked in Bolivia “from August 3rd

when the parliamentarians are given their credentials, are sworn in as

parliamentarians, and the congressional session is installed, until August

6 at 5pm when the president is elected by Congress. The moment the

president starts his mandate, the legislative control functions end.”1 The

analysis shows that in every administration from 1985 to 2003, the presi-

dent generally decided the government agenda and how to carry it out.

Indeed, it is only in such a subordination framework of the legislature to

the president, that the Bolivian recent experience, with political conf lict

starting in 2000, can be understood.

Thus, the study concludes that an effect of the electoral system and

coalitional politics in general is that government and policy decisions

tend to be executive-led. Congress did not play a major legislative or

debating function but joined the agenda agreed through the govern-

ment coalition. There was always, however, a part of Congress that

usually exerted great independence of the executive—the opposition.

Throughout democratic history, every coalition had a congressional

opposition with varying degrees of strength. The strength of the con-

gressional opposition varied with the choice of electoral systems. The

more inclusive the system, the greater the opportunities for the

entrance of political parties and the greater the opposition exerted in

Congress.

Effect No. 2: Duality in the Origin of Congressional Powers

The control function of Congress is affected by the fact that many of the

decision-making processes and discussions on important issues usually take

place outside of Congress, particularly during meetings between the leaders

of the parties of the government coalition who actually are not members of

Congress.

This analysis of the interaction of presidents and congresses in Bolivia

demonstrates that the design and implementation of the most important

laws in the country—the NPE, popular participation, privatization and

capitalization laws, the water law, and more recently, the constitutional

reform—did not involve the parliamentarians, who were supposed to


represent the interests of the citizens. Instead, these leaders only followed

instructions their party chiefs gave on how to vote in Congress.

The electoral system was instrumental in furthering this great

disconnect between Congress and the party leadership by not allowing

the national party leaders (usually presidential candidates), who received

relative electoral support in Congress, into Congress. A situation where

the political party leader was not accountable to the electorate and

instructed parliamentarians to support and act on agreements that were

made outside of Congress had pernicious effects for the Bolivian political

system.

Effect No. 3: Duality of Worlds—Parliamentarism in Congress and in the

Streets

The electoral systems and various reforms of the Bolivian political system

have had a dual effect on the formal institutions and on the informal sectors.

The reforms gave marginalized actors an opportunity to occupy political

spaces. Also, a situation where political action is taken both in Congress and

in the streets was exacerbated.

Laurence Whitehead (2001) underscored the importance of taking

into consideration two traditions in Bolivian political history when it

comes to interpreting the democratization process in that country: the

“constitutionalist” tradition and the “mobilization” tradition. In a

similar line of analysis, this present study recognizes that there has

generally been a duality of political worlds in this country. Political

pressure has been exerted both from the institution of Congress,

following the “constitutionalist” tradition, in Whitehead’s terms, as

well as from the streets, following the “mobilization” tradition. In

many cases, instead of functioning as a pendulum, as suggested by the

author, the study shows that in many instances these two traditions

have simultaneously existed.

Effect No. 4: Neutralization of the Opposition and the Oversight Role of

the Congress by the Congressional Majority

An instinctive reaction to the formation of a strong parliamentary majority

through coalitions was always for the opposition to become radicalized in

order to balance the system.

The strength of the congressional majority usually tended to neutralize

effective legislative decision making in the sense that most decisions on

particular issues have been taken by the governing coalition. The study


does not find the use of congressional majority as a feature that is

necessarily negative. On the contrary, this feature has served to guarantee

government efficiency and ultimately democratic governance. Moreover,

parliamentarians voting with congressional majority usually represent

(at least in theory) more than 60 to 70 percent of the popular vote. The

political class failed because it completely distanced the opposition and

social sectors from a serious dialogue on the legislation and policies under

discussion, especially those that directly affected the well-being of the

population, such as the water law and the Hydrocarbons Law. This

produced a situation in which congressional opposition, to balance the

force of the government coalition, engaged in a battle to control, inter-

pellate, and sometimes censure government actions.

The Electoral System: Explaining Bolivia

Today and Evo Morales’s Rise to Power

The electoral system had important effects on the political system as a whole.

The following political effects of the electoral system can be identified.

Effect No. 1: Regionalization of Politics

The electoral system encouraged the regionalization of party representa-

tion that benefited both major and minor parties with local and regional

strongholds.

The electoral system, especially the inclusion of the single-member

district system for the election of 68 deputies of the lower chamber ben-

efited smaller parties with regional strength. Minor local parties such as

the New Republican Force (NFR) and the Front of the Revolutionary

Left (FRI) have also been able to take part in alliances with major parties

because of their inf luence in single-seat districts (Mayorga 2001: 434). By

promoting the regionalization of party representation, the electoral sys-

tem also strengthened the representation of corporate and ethnic inter-

ests, especially in the case of the Quechua peasants of the Chapare. The

system greatly favored the formation and strengthening of the MAS party.

The ability of Morales to get elected in Cochabamba as a uninominal

deputy represented the first move toward political dominance of the party.

It was facilitated through the reform. Morales’s inf luence in the western

part of the country and in the regionalization of the MAS vote helped

him get elected in 2005 and will further guarantee the party’s promi-

nence in the future.


The regionalization of votes also had an effect on the composition of

Congress. Because the concentration of parties and the distribution of

seats according to votes varied throughout the country, there have always

been minor but crucial differences between the popular vote and the

votes assigned to parties in Congress. In 1985, for instance, although the

ADN had won the popular vote over the MNR, the MNR obtained two

more deputies and six more senators than the ADN. In this particular

case, the ADN won the popular vote but its voting was concentrated in

two departments, whereas the MNR won in more departments. The case

of the additional Senate post won by Podemos as opposed to the MAS,

the party that won the popular vote, in 2005 can also be explained by the

regional nature of the electoral system.

Effect No. 2: Important Changes to the Party System

The reforms to the electoral system have helped reduce the number of par-

ties, as well as the unproportionality of previous electoral systems. The

MNR, MIR, and the ADN monopolized votes for most of the first 20

years of Bolivian democracy, but the party system as we know it was com-

pletely overhauled. Although it remains to be seen, there is a strong possi-

bility that Bolivia will consolidate a dominant one-party system headed by

the MAS.

The electoral system has not had a dramatic effect on the interparty

dimension since its PR nature has been maintained (only formulas have

been modified). The D’Hondt formula and the legal threshold of 3 percent

have brought about the disappearance of three very small parties

(CONDEPA, UCS, MBL), while it has weakened the representation of a

majority party, the ADN. This decline can be attributed not just to the

electoral system but to a combination of factors, including past perfor-

mance while in government and the absence of legitimate leadership.

However, reforms such as the SMD system helped spearhead the develop-

ment of parties such as the MAS.

Effect No. 3: Stronger Personalization of Politics

The most recent electoral reforms have sought to link the constituent with

the representative. Specifically in the circumscriptions with uninominal

candidates, the force of the party was combined with the personalization of

the vote.

By abolishing the closed party lists for more than a half of the

Chamber of Deputies, the mixed-member proportional system helped

create direct linkages between parties, constituencies, and legislators.


There were still degrees of disconnection between representatives and

constituencies in the 1997–2002 period, but the reform ultimately

strengthened their interaction. The 2004 reform promised to do the

same. Votes were cast in support of the party but ultimately it was the

appeal of the candidate to the constituents in her/his circumscription

that determined the voter’s preference. That was the case in the Chapare,

where Morales set the highest voting record for any parliamentarian in

Bolivia.

Effect No. 4: The Split Vote

The split vote enhanced the choices of voters. The possibility of vote-splitting

by giving two votes to voters was considered as an adequate mechanism to

broaden the choices offered to electors.

As electors themselves indicated, with the reform they now could both

“vote and elect.” This was not uniform throughout the country, but two

examples where this occurred the first time the system was used are those of

circumscription No. 10 in La Paz where Banzer’s success was similar to the

MBL’s Juan del Granado, and circumscription No. 8 where Banzer’s success

was equivalent to the MNR’s Guido Capra (Romero Ballivián 2003a: 44).

Other examples include those of circumscription No. 51 where UCS’s Ivo

Kuljis had almost equal voting as ADN’s Stelzer, No. 52 where Banzer had

as much as MIR’s Añez, and circumscription No. 54 where Kuljis had as

much as MIR’s Añez.

Effect No. 5. Municipalization of the Legislature

Legislative politics became “municipalized.” The most distinctive effect of

the SMD system was the municipalization of legislative politics as

uninominal deputies ran campaigns similar to (local) mayoral campaigns.

In running uninominal campaigns, however, the experience of

legislators shows that there was confusion regarding the parliamentary

role of uninominal deputies. Thus, with the reform, a trend toward

locality-centered politics was strengthened at the expense of national

politics. Most uninominal deputies have had “identity crises” as they

did not clearly understand their role and responsibility toward their

constituents.

Effect No. 6: Patronage and Political Pacts

Patronage became the privileged way to seal political pacts. In Bolivia,

coalitional politics rested not only on an ideological or programmatic basis

but also, and mainly, on patronage.


The primary political motivation to forge and maintain coalitions has

been office seeking and patronage-based distribution of power resources

rather than policy-seeking motivations. Political parties have attributed

their survival and strengthening to the control over the state apparatus

they have been able to exercise (Mayorga 2001: 442–443). However,

through such a control, the opportunities for corruption have increased,

and parties have distanced themselves from engaging with societal sectors

to address their demands and needs.

Effect No. 7: Representativeness versus Efficiency

The electoral system reconciled the dilemma between representativeness

and government efficiency. The personalized proportional representation

system attempted to enhance the representativeness of the system. At the

same time, the election of a large share of the legislature through single-

member (or small) districts by plurality fostered a stronger link between

representatives and voters. The system to elect senators and plurinominal

deputies guarantees a two- or three-party majority. The combined elements

meant a reconciliation of the two goals.

In terms of the dilemma between representativeness and government

efficiency, the project contends that the challenge should not be about

choosing efficiency over representativeness, or representativeness over

efficiency, but about finding a reasonable and efficient equilibrium between

the two goals. Whereas a high degree of representation could hamper the

ability of a government to implement its plans, a relatively smaller degree

of representativeness would generally (although not always) allow for an

easier execution of a government plan, regardless of how severe it is and

regardless of the negative weight that it represents for society. Such was

the case of the Paz Estenssoro administration (1985–1989) and its anti-

inf lationary plan. However, representativeness without efficiency would

bring about crises of governance (as in the case of the UDP government).

Finally, pure government efficiency without representativeness would

make governments illegitimate and would create conditions for political

crises (Banzer-Quiroga 2000; Sánchez de Lozada 2002).

Latin American electoral systems for the lower house tend to serve the

function of representativeness to the detriment of effectiveness and

participation. In Bolivia, for the Senate, citizens elect senators by plural-

ity with a representative of the minority. It favors more efficiency with a

low degree of representativeness.

The election of the members of the lower chamber reconciles this gap

of representativeness by incorporating uninominal deputies. A compari-

son of these reforms suggests that more representation usually meant less


government efficiency but not for the expected reasons. The limited

government efficiency and political instability in this country were due to

the decay of the model of pacted democracy and due to the ability of mar-

ginalized sectors to occupy spaces not only in formal political institutions

but also in the streets. In Bolivia, as opposed to what the argument suggests,

the periods in which efficiency was privileged over representativeness

brought unmanageable political crises, such as the Water War and the Gas

War. Table 5.1 summarizes the reforms that have taken place in Bolivia

and how they have favored representation or efficiency.

Effect No. 8: Duality of Coalitions—Congressional Coalitions and

Ministerial Coalitions

One of the most important points of analysis emerging from this study

relates to the practicality in Bolivia of not only forging coalitions in the

legislature, a common practice of both parliamentary and presidential

democracies, but also doing so at the executive level.

Following similar practices of parliamentary democracies, Bolivian

presidents have incorporated members of the coalition partner into the

cabinet. In many cases, the party composition of the governing coalition

Table 5.1 Electoral Reforms in Bolivia, 1986–2004

1986 Seat allocation formula changed from D’

Hondt to double quotient

Representation −

Efficiency: +

1991 Seat allocation formula changed from double

quotient to Saint-Lägue divisor system (the

double quotient requires that parties receive at

least one quota (total valid votes/seats

contested) before they can receive any seats

through remainders.

Representation +

Efficiency −

1994 Changed system from proportional

representation list to personalized

proportional representation (about half of

deputies elected through plurality in single

member districts); plurality vote separate from

vote for president, vice president and senate;

threshold of three percent introduced at the

national level.

Representation +

Efficiency −

2004 Opened the electoral scenario for indigenous

movements and civic groups to launch

candidates.

Representation +

Efficiency −


usually ref lected the party composition of the cabinet in almost

proportional ways. This attempts to shed some light on the question

posed by scholars such as Amorin Neto (2002: 48–78) who assert that

cabinets with proportional correspondence between cabinet shares and

the coalition parties’ legislative weights can generally be considered a

coalition executive.

Coalition Building and Hegemonic Political Parties

A basic ref lection on the analysis suggests that the Bolivian system gave

the political class institutional incentives to forge and maintain function-

ing coalitions. The fact that the winning party does not have an absolute

majority in Congress seems to be an incentive powerful enough to make

the president negotiate with other parties. This is, of course, a structural

factor that works as an incentive both in presidential and parliamentary

systems.

The Bolivian political system functioned in such a way so as to sustain

democratic stability. Bolivian leaders have had to rely on coalitions in

order to govern and maintain democratic stability. As a result and as

Gamarra (1997: 392) asserts, the recurrent need to form coalitions para-

doxically became both the strength and the weakness of the system.

Coalitions allowed executives to manage congressional opposition so that

national policies could be moved forward.

Various factors that favor and undermine coalition building can be

identified. On one hand, four factors have facilitated coalition building

in Bolivia from 1985 to 2003: Article 90 in the constitutional structure

that provides for the congressional election of the president, the formulas

that translate popular votes into congressional seats, the emergence of an

implicit consensus on the economic and political models for the nation,

and finally, the access to positional payoffs and state patronage to secure

congressional support. On the other hand, the duality of opposition in

the streets and in Congress, the use of the parliament as an instrument of

sectors to push particular political agendas, and the inability of the polit-

ical class to provide viable solutions to the economic situation have

undermined pacted democracy in Bolivia.

Facilitating Factors

● Article 90 of the CPE. Article 90 of the Bolivian Constitution

requires the president to be elected by Congress in case no presiden-

tial candidate achieves an absolute majority. This selection is done


by a Congress elected in the same elections by constituents with a

corrective mixed electoral system combining both majoritarian

and proportional representation features. The corrective nature of

the mixed system for legislative seats favors the representation of a

wide variety of interests while also promoting the proliferation of

minority parties with the aim of contesting power. With this

mixed system that is corrective of the f laws of the majoritarian

aspect of the electoral system, Bolivia has had throughout its

history more than 400 different political parties. However, the

election of the president via the legislature in Bolivia forced an

interdependent and cooperative presidential-legislative relationship.

Although it made the congressional opposition, but harsh, some-

what ineffective, Congress and presidents have managed to main-

tain functioning relations. It has historically been imperative and

feasible for Bolivian political leaders to form coalitions in order to

be selected as president, to obtain executive power, and to

govern.● The Composition of Congress. The Mixed PR and Majoritarian Electoral

System for the Translation of Votes into Seats. Under the Saint-Lägue

formula, and even under the D’Hondt formula, and given the

magnitude of the plurinominal districts, the proportional representa-

tion system facilitated the survival of minority parties, but this ten-

dency toward fragmentation was offset by the centripetal logic

inherent in Article 90 of the Constitution that advanced a process of

party concentration with effective presence and parliamentary

inf luence and a process of pacts of minor parties with major ones.

The electoral system reasonably resolved the dilemma between

representativeness and governance—two aspects that a democratic

regime must reconcile. In other words, it allowed the efficient

translation of votes into seats that guarantee a wide representation of

interests, and at the same time, it made possible the building of parlia-

mentary majorities that could guarantee government action.● The Existence of an Implicit Consensus on the Economic and Political

Models and the Move away from Ideologies. Starting in 1985, there has

been a progressive ideological convergence and a move by all parties

toward the center of the political spectrum. There was no strong

discussion of the government agenda because of the implicit consen-

sus that existed amongst the political parties on the need for neolib-

eral reforms and on the need to further the democratization process

in the country. The consensus on basic issues—namely, monetary

policy, economic liberalization, democratization, and the opening of


the system to indigenous communities and other marginalized

groups—has consolidated over the years since 1985.

An important characteristic of the democratic process of the years under

study in this project is that the incumbent government never won an elec-

tion and the opposition always won. However, they all maintained fiscal

and economic discipline and the logic of agreements. The support for the

1985 economic measures to halt hyperinf lation ref lected not just a political

accord on the need to take action, but a broader social consensus forged by

the way in which the trauma of economic instability had affected all sectors

of the population. As parties entered government coalitions, their ideo-

logical identity tended to take a backseat because of the acceptance of the

economic model and the attractions of state patronage.2

● Access to positional payoffs and state patronage to secure congressional support.

The UNDP Human Development Index for Bolivia (2002: 110)

asserts that political parties have always depended more on the state

for their resources than the class groups or interest groups that sustain

them, or worse, on people in general. In fact, the dependence has

been so great that in a way, parties have been extensions of the state

and thus a political society that is linked to the state has existed, just

as the other sectors are linked to the economy or the civil society.

The analysis suggests that presidents have increasingly depended on

cabinet formation and the distribution of posts within the state apparatus

to secure congressional support; however, this tendency to distribute

positional payoffs was determined by the strength of the political party

and the increasing inability of the government sector to control opposi-

tion both in Congress and in the streets.

Figures 5.1 through 5.8 graphically present the percentages of political

parties occupying ministries in each administration from 1985 to the

present. The figures show that the distribution of cabinet posts varied

depending on two factors:

1. The strength of the party vis-à-vis its structure and clientelistic

traditions and commitments

2. The impact of the electoral system and the erosion of pacted democracy

on the fragmentation of the political system

The analysis shows that the greater the fragmentation, the more depen-

dent presidents became on coalition partners and on patronage to secure


continued support. Figures 5.1 to 5.8, seen together, reveal how cabinet

distribution varied throughout time and as coalitions evolved.

The changes in percentages are clearly observed. The MNR, a party

with a strong infrastructure of prebendalism, generally monopolized the

distribution of posts to the party, thus limiting the participation of coali-

tion partners in government positions. This was especially the case in

1985 and 1993. In 2002, however, as the MNR was unable to control

opposition demonstrated in the streets, the party became more dependent

on legislative support and decided to cede more positions of power to

coalition partners. The MIR and ADN, the only other parties that

reached government before 2005, however, have generally divided all

Figure 5.1 Party Representation in Paz Estenssoro’s Cabinet, 1985–1989

0%

100%

ADN

MNR

Figure 5.2 Party Representation in Paz Zamora’s Cabinet, 1989–1993

45.45%

54.54%

MIR

ADN

Party Representation in Paz Zamora's Cabinet, 1989-1993


2.12% 2.12%

ADN

MIR

UCS

NFR

CONDEPA

Party Representation in Banzer's Cabinet, 1997-2001

19.14%

63.82%

12.76%

Figure 5.4 Party Representation in Banzer’s Cabinet, 1997–2001

government positions with coalition partners, sometimes in an almost

symmetrical way.

This is the case of the AP (1989–1993) and more intensively in the

1997–2002 period when Bolivia had the most heterogeneous government

coalition (five parties). In the 2002–2003 period, however, Sánchez de

Lozada was not able to hold cabinet power for the MNR and had to

divide it between the MIR and the NFR. Another pattern that can be

Figure 5.3 Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet,

1993–1997

95.12%

2.43%2.43%

MNR

UCS

MBL

Party Representation in S.de Lozada's Cabinet, 1993-1997


22.22%

11.11%

81%

ADN

MIR

UCS

Party Representation in Quiroga's Cabinet, 2001-2002

66.66%

Figure 5.5 Party Representation in Quiroga’s Cabinet, 2001–2002

observed is that in 1985 when Paz Estenssoro was president, there was an

extreme hegemony of cabinet posts by the governing party. The other

similar case was that of the 2003–2005 period when Mesa formed a cab-

inet completely dominated by his group of nonideological independents.

The progression in 2005, as compared to the fragmented scenario of the

1990s, shows a near return to a hegemonic political force—that of

President Morales. Morales’s cabinets have been formed only with party

Figure 5.6 Party Representation in Sanchez de Lozada’s Cabinet,

2002–2005

60%13.33%

26.66%MNR

MIR

NFR

Party Representation in S.de Lozada's Cabinet, 2002-2005


Figure 5.7 Party Representation in Mesa’s Cabinet, 2003–2005

9.21%3.70%

87.09%

MNR

AND

Independents

Party Representation in Mesa's Cabinet, 2002-2005

100%

0%

MAS

Others

Figure 5.8 Party Representation in Evo Morales’s Cabinet, 2005–Present

militants or representatives from sectors supportive of the MAS. It is

expected that in every cabinet shift—which usually takes place in the

anniversary of his presidency ( January)—President Morales will continue

to appoint MAS militants. Indeed, the pendulum of hegemony went

from the MNR to the MAS.

The study demonstrates that postelectoral alliances in a democracy

of relative majorities had, as an intrinsic consequence, the use of


political quotas and the distribution of state entities amongst the member

parties.

Undermining Factors

A series of factors have undermined coalition building and, ultimately,

pacted democracy in Bolivia. Three factors are identified below.

● Duality of opposition: Politics in the streets and in the Parliament: The

eruption of social movements and political parties with radical pro-

posals and a double strategy not only within the system but also

outside of it confirmed the problem of double political legitimacy in

Bolivia. Two understandings of political representation have begun

to coexist: (1) that which is sustained in the citizenship and individ-

ual political rights of a representative democracy and (2) the corpo-

rativist logic that is part of Bolivian tradition that promotes the

defense of sectoral interests. This was produced by the crisis of rep-

resentativeness that the country has been going through over the

past few years. In other words, neither individuals nor sectors saw

their demands addressed by the political class, and so the search for

new alternatives to voice these demands began. This duality in

opposition allowed the MAS to secure a support base in the rural

areas, in urban streets and neighborhoods, as well as in the union and

social movements while also being in parliament. By effectively

dominating these dual spheres, the MAS achieved control of most of

political activity in the country, including the presidency.● Congress as an political instrument: Moreover, some sectors have

found parliament to be an instrument to push their political agendas.

As that has not worked, they have resorted to pushing their agenda

through force. Pressuring the government through roadblocks, pro-

tests, and marches became common in Bolivia. Alongside this, the

same groups use the parliament too to exert pressure and demand

legislation that is favorable to their views. The best example are the

hydrocarbons law that provoked the Gas War in 2003, the tense

relationship of the president with Congress in 2004, and his resigna-

tion in 2005. All political parties have pushed for their positions, but

parties such as the MAS and associated groups have radicalized their

proposals in Congress and in the streets. ● Inability of governing coalitions to deliver tangible benefits to society:

Finally, the inability of the political class to resolve the economic


situation put a heavy toll on the perceived usefulness of coalitional

politics. The political crisis is connected to the economic crisis.

Calderon (2002: 45) states that the effects of the economic crisis, exclu-

sion factors, and the political management of the economy increased

the levels of institutional trust and decreased the political credibility in

Bolivia, thereby increasing the intensity of social protests.

Bolivia in Comparative Perspective:

The Andean Region

In Latin America, governments have used electoral mechanisms in different

ways to guarantee democratic stability. Most of them have been unsuccess-

ful as crises of governance continue to occur throughout the hemisphere.

Indeed, a commonality between all Latin America countries, especially

those in the Andean region, is the political crisis they have faced with vary-

ing degrees. By 2003, Bolivia joined the Andean nations in this state of

political crisis. The near elimination of the traditional political parties is

another common and most visible element, which is accompanied by the

emergence of political informality and other forms of neocorporativism.

With the 2006 election of Hugo Chavez as president of Venezuela for

another six years, Latin America closed an unprecedented and intense

electoral cycle, marked by relatively free and fair elections and with results

that were accepted by all candidates, winners and losers, as well as inter-

national observers. Eighteen presidential and parliamentary elections in

2005–2006 configured a new political map in the region, and what some

analysts are calling the “Latin American new left.”

Except for the close and indeed controversial election of the PAN

candidate in Mexico, Felipe Calderon, and the clear reelection of President

Uribe in Colombia, whose government faces serious charges of alleged

ties to the paramilitaries, the right in Latin America does not seem to be

the viable option in the region for now.

The emergence of new figures such as Michelle Bachelet in Chile,

Rafael Correa in Ecuador, even Inacio Lula da Silva in Brasil, the reelec-

tion of President Chavez, the emergence of the MAS as the new hege-

monic political force in Bolivia, and the election of President Morales, all

can be understood in light of the discredit and decay of the neoliberal

model and the crisis of traditional political parties that were unable to

offer viable solutions to people.

This “turn to the left” that is now occurring in Latin America, far

from being homogeneous, is plural and diverse and forces a particular

effort to understand its nuances and specificities. In the case of Bolivia,


Evo Morales reached power with over 50 percent of the votes following

the political tendencies critical of economic liberalism, against the insti-

tutions of representative democracy, and amidst the discrediting of the

governing or “traditional” parties. Emulating his counterpart in

Venezuela, Morales also favors the celebration of recall referendums to

relegitimate his position as president. His electoral base, as that of other

Andean leaders, was strengthened in July 2006 when Bolivians elected

Constituent Assembly members, and the MAS once again obtained an

absolute majority of the votes. As other Latin American nations have

recently done, Bolivia underwent a process to draft a new Constitution.

The Constituent Assembly Process

President Morales faces great challenges to move the country toward greater

development, economic growth, and tangible benefits to his followers.

Previous electoral reforms and the MAS’s ability to strengthen its presence

throughout the territory have left an impoverished but politically empow-

ered indigenous population. Moreover, organized indigenous and social

movements have a great capacity to pressure him and can easily mobilize

masses against him. Pressure comes also from the people of Bolivia to benefit

from the exploitation of the natural gas reserves. Balancing between a domes-

tic demand for the nationalization of the gas sector and the international

demand to satisfy international investors continues to be difficult. This is

complicated by the demands of the eastern and wealthier part of the country

for regional autonomy, and the need to use the results of the Constituent

Assembly process to generate a more unified vision of a country.

The Constituent Assembly was the ideal space for President Morales to

further the reforms needed to restructure from the grassroots level the

whole Bolivian political structure. Given the plethora of unresolved dif-

ferences evidenced by the polarization of the 2005 campaign, it was also

a space for confrontation, struggle between powers, stalemate, and social

conf lict. At the same time, it was also an ideal place to amend the elements

of the system that were not so efficient before. As various electoral pro-

cesses filled the political agenda in Bolivia in 2008, the need for consen-

sus building to obtain support for the new “social pact” became a priority

for President Morales.

The Unintended Consequences of Electoral Laws

Political events throughout history have generally inf luenced institution

building in Bolivia, as the case of the 1952 Revolution and the major


reforms of the 1990s reveal. However, reforms did not typically provide

tangible benefits to the population, paving the way for the events of 2000

and 2003. The lack of concrete results in the socioeconomic sphere, a

better articulation of constituent-representative ties, and a growing

dependence on positional payoffs to guarantee working executive-legislative

relations became the characteristics of the pacted democracy model in

existence in Bolivia since 1985. The electoral system served as a mecha-

nism to ameliorate the situation and, more recently, to exacerbate it.

Two basic unintended consequences of electoral reforms in Bolivia are

identified through this study:

1. By guaranteeing more representation, the electoral system created

spaces for nontraditional forces to emerge and challenge democratic

constitutionality, and for the MAS to emerge as the new hegemonic

political actor

2. The “difficult combination” between presidentialism and multipartism

was ameliorated, arguably unintentionally

1. An unintended consequence of electoral reforms that progressively

attempted to guarantee representativeness was the emergence of power-

ful forces questioning the political system. A possible explanation for this

is that the reforms attempted to strengthen the representative capability

of the political system while preserving the patrimonial privileges of

political society. One of the central problems facing Bolivian political

society was that of strengthening reforms that challenge the system of

“trading favors” that traditionally existed in Bolivian politics. This sys-

tem of patronage-based relationships blocked both party representation

and the exercise of democratic citizenship—in other words, political

modernization (Calderon 2002: 7).

Finally, by guaranteeing more representation, it created spaces for new

political forces to emerge and challenge the status quo. The MAS is the

case in point that permeates all political structures. While it appears

highly unlikely that democracy will collapse, the rules of the political

game have changed and the MAS is consolidating broad support among

people. Surveys indicate that Evo Morales enjoyed high levels of popularity

among people in 2007.3

2. Government coalitions that are promoted by the system of

congressional election of the president resolved one of the typical problems


of presidential systems in Latin America: the presence of a minority

government that is blocked in its capacity to govern (Barreda and

Costafreda 2004: 169).

The electoral system also contributed to the strengthening of a

government system of hybrid presidentialism, which facilitated a sustained

policy of pacts and interparty coalitions and in this sense guaranteed one

of the essential conditions for democratic governance. Government capacity,

in other words, being able to make decisions and implement them is inti-

mately connected to the formation of majority governments that would

have been impossible in Bolivia without the electoral pacts formed to

elect the president. In this sense, the electoral system gave a strong stimu-

lus to parties that did not obtain majority support from the voters to

participate in coalition governments.

The academic debate concerning executive-assembly relations in Latin

America has focused mainly on the issue of the distinction between pres-

identialism and parliamentarism (Mainwaring 1990, Linz and Valenzuela:

1994; Lijphart 1994). However, there is a gap in the literature on the

institutional configuration of executive-assembly relations as an impor-

tant variable affecting the prospects for democratic longevity. This study

calls for more theoretical and empirical work on executive-legislative

bargaining models in order to understand how institutional reforms can

have an impact on the incentives that presidents and legislators have in

forming coherent coalitions.

Similarly, further studies can address more contextual factors that

work to inf luence the behavior of individuals in the political system. A

fascinating question is why coalitions worked in Bolivia until 2000 and

not as well in other nations in Latin America. Perhaps Bolivia’s culture of

coalitions matured much more as compared to neighboring presidential

democracies.

This study has shown that the constitutional structure in a democ-

racy, encompassing the governmental and electoral design, provides the

basic framework within which the nation’s political life functions.

Comparative studies on electoral systems can also shed light on the degree

to which the political system functions as well as on the importance of

institutions in the consolidation of democracy. Therefore, in order to

fully comprehend the political dynamics of any democratic regime, it is

imperative to understand the constitutional and electoral components in

different contexts. This is the task that awaits both comparativists and

democratization scholars.

NOTES

1 The Rise of Evo Morales through an

Electoral Lens: An Introduction

1. Venezuela 1993 (Carlos Andrés Perez), 2002 (Hugo Chávez), Ecuador

1997 (Abdalá Bucaram), 2000 ( Jamil Mahuad), 2004 (Lucio Gutiérrez),

Bolivia 2003 (Sánchez de Lozada), 2005 (Carlos Mesa).

2. This claim is relevant to the Bolivian case since a group of scholars,

following Gamarra (1997a), have pointed to the hybrid nature of its

presidential system, contained in Article 90 of the Constitution, as the

major determinant of its relative success.

3. Comparativists have consistently affirmed that the primary role of leg-

islatures has been either “neglect and acquiescence or obstructionism”

(Morgenstern and Nacif 2002: 7). Moreover, according to the latest

Latinobarómetro (2007), the general population in Latin America

regards legislatures as one of the most ineffective and one of the least

trusted institutions.

4. In light of Article 90 of the Political Constitution of the State, which

grants authority to Congress to elect the president in case no candidate

receives a majority, Gamarra (1997a; 1997b) called the system “hybrid

presidentialism.” Shugart and Carey (1992) followed Gamarra’s concep-

tualization while Jones (1995) identified it as a “majority congressional

system.” Mayorga (1999) called it “presidencialismo parlamentarizado”

(parliamentarized presidentialism). Regardless of the variations in the

labels assigned to the Bolivian political system, these scholars agree that

it exhibits features of both presidential and parliamentary systems.

5. The double quotient formula was calculated in the following manner:

the first quotient, the participation quotient, would be obtained by

dividing the total valid votes in a department by the number of seats to

be distributed. Then, the votes of all parties that participated in the dis-

tribution of seats were added, and this total was divided by the number

of seats to be distributed in a department. With this quotient, seats were

distributed only amongst the parties that qualified for the distribution.

210 NOTES

6. In a closed-list system, the political party leaders decide on the list of

candidates before the election, and the voter, rather than voting for a

particular candidate, just exercises his or her vote for the party. The

main criticism associated with this system is that it tends to concentrate

power in the hands of party leaders and not its members who may be

directly linked to the constituencies.

7. Article 134.

8. General Juan Pereda Asbun ( July–November 1978); General David

Padilla Arancibia (November 1978–August 1979).

9. Article 161.

10. Article 162.

11. In 1985, municipal elections were also held for the first time since the

1952 Revolution. These municipal elections took place jointly with the

general elections, according to the Organic Law of Municipalities

enacted by Hernan Siles Zuazo on February 13, 1952. Elections for

mayors and municipal councils were institutionalized then. Two years

later, in December 6, 1987, with the Law of 1980 and the amendments

of May 20, 1986, new municipal elections were held, but now indepen-

dent of the presidential electoral process. This is still the case for

Bolivia.

12. In June 1988, after the TV and radio owner Carlos Palenque allowed

one of the most wanted narcotraffickers to speak to the nation through

his radio network, Paz Estenssoro forced a congressional session to close

down Palenque’s radio and TV network (Paz Ballivián and Cevallos

2001: 183). The MNR became Palenque’s greatest enemy for many

years until UCS’ Max Fernández, CONDEPA’s nemesis, entered the

political game.

13. Romero Ballivián, Salvador. Interview by author. November 2004. La

Paz, Bolivia.

14. Regarding this, Article 163 of the current Electoral Code states: “The

results of the ballot, i.e., the counting of vote by vote, and the counting

at the suffrage table, or addition of results, are exclusively done by the

electoral jury [at the voting table] when they are elaborating and signing

the final electoral record, by this no electoral organism can repeat or

review the act.”

15. In Bolivia, under the D’Hondt formula, the cumulative votes obtained by

each party, front, or alliance are divided by natural divisor series (1, 2, 3,

4, 5, 6, 7, etc.) in a correlative, continuous and obliged manner accord-

ing to what is needed in each department.

16. With the Saint-Laguë formula, once all votes are counted, quotients are

calculated for each party. The quotients are calculated by dividing the

total number of votes that the party received by the number of seats the

party is allocated starting with 0. The list with the highest quotient gets

the next seat allocated, and their quotient is recalculated with their new

seat total. The process is repeated until all seats have been allocated.

211NOTES

17. Evo Morales webpage (http://www.evomorales.net/).

18. Article 4, Law for the Electoral Reform: Application of Article 60 of the

Political Constitution of the State.

19. That code suffered its f irst modification on September 7, 1999, to clar-

ify some articles for the next municipal elections. Later, other changes

were approved through Law 2232 on July 25, 2001; Law 2282 on

December 4, 2001; and Law 2346 on April 30, 2002, among others.

2 Bolivia’s Founding Pacts: The Pact

for Democracy and the Patriotic Accord

through an Electoral Lens

1. Carey, John. “Interview with Guillermo Bedegral,” MNR deputy. La

Paz, Bolivia, May 2001.

2. Leaders such as Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Gustavo Fernández

Saavedra, Carlos Börth, Guillermo Bedegral, Hugo Carvajal Donoso,

Ricardo Paz Ballivián, among others.

3. Siles Zuazo shifted ministers more times than any other democratically

elected president in Bolivia, i.e., about 143 times.

4. Presencia, 1/1/1989.

5. El Diario, 11/27/1984.

6. Fernández Saavedra, Gustavo. Interview by author. November 2004.

La Paz, Bolivia.

7. This term was coined by Siles Zuazo to refer to political parties composed

of a small group of people, friends, and families that could actually fit into

a taxi cab. The normative framework for the registration of political par-

ties before 1985 was rather f lexible, the CNE recognized parties by a

nominal declaration. In other words, by appearing in the CNE and

declaring their existence and their interest in participating in the election,

the CNE granted them juridical recognition to participate. Currently

there are more requirements for parties to receive recognition: parties are

recognized if their membership is equal to 2 percent or more of the total

valid votes in the immediately preceding presidential elections (Political

Parties Code, Art. 6), or if they can secure a minimum amount of citi-

zens’ signatures in case they have never run in an election.

8. Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

9. Presencia, 7/16/1989.

10. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.


La Paz, Bolivia.

12. For an analysis of the economic crisis faced by the UDP, see Machicado

1995: 69–99.


212 NOTES

14. An MNR National Convention was called on March 29, 1985 with the

purpose of electing a new party candidate for the July 14, 1985 elections.

15. Soon after the launching of the NPE, Guillermo Bedegral participated

and won the Central Bank 1986 Annual Contest on Economic Essays

with an essay entitled “New Economic Policy,” where he explained the

reasons for the policy, its philosophy and ideology.

16. Presencia, 9/8/1989.

17. Presencia, 9/15/1988.

18. For an analysis of the role of Congress in this period, see Gamarra

1987.

19. Presencia, 8/28/1986. The march started in Oruro and was supposed to

arrive to La Paz. Through the state of siege, the military was instructed

to stop the mobilization and was able to dissolve it before reaching

La Paz.

20. On the state of siege and deportation of union leaders, see Morales, Juan

A. 1991. “Democracia y Política Económica en Bolivia.” In Síntesis,

vol. 14, May–August 1991.

21. The existing constitutional disposition then did not force the censured

minister to present his resignation. Nowadays, a censured minister must

present his resignation and the president has the last word on whether to

accept it or deny it.

22. Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004.

Washington, DC.

23. Presencia, 10/25/1988.

24. Presencia, 10/28/1988.

25. Presencia, 1988.

26. Presencia, 8/5/1988.

27. Presencia, 8/14/1988.

28. Presencia, 8/16/1988.

29. Presencia, 10/20/1988.

30. Paz Ballivián, Ricardo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

31. For a thorough assessment of this aspect of Bolivian politics, see

Gamarra, Eduardo A. and James M. Malloy. 1995. “The Patrimonial

Dynamics of Party Politics in Bolivia.” In Scott Mainwaring and

Timothy Scully. 1995. Eds. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems

in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

32. Presencia, 8/10/1988.

33. Presencia, 8/11/1988.

34. Presencia, 9/21/1988.

35. Grindle (2000) documents that between 1985 and 1986, public sector

employment dropped by 24,600 people; by 1987, a further 8,550 people

had been dismissed, and by 1988, public sector employment had dropped

by 17 percent.

36. Presencia, AQUI, 7/9/1988; 2.

213NOTES

37. Última Hora, 1/26/1989.

38. Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 5/24/1988.

39. Presencia, 8/15/1988; Agencia de Noticias FIDES, 5/24/1988.



42. Presencia, 9/5/1988.


44. Presencia, 1/28/1989.

45. Presencia, 1/26/1989.

46. Political Declaration of the MNR. La Paz, February 9, 1989 (Presencia).


Washington, DC.

48. Presencia, 9/8/1988, October, November, December 1988.

49. Presencia, 9/8/1988, October, November, December 1988; 1989.

50. For more information on this, see Müller & Asociados 1989.

51. Presencia, 4/16/1989.

52. Presencia, 5/7/1989.


54. Presencia, 8/28/1988.

55. Presencia, 4/20/1989.

56. Presencia, 4/7/1989.



Bolivia; Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.


60. Presencia, 6/1/1989.

61. Presencia, 7/12/1989.

62. Presencia, 5/29/1989.

63. Presencia, 6/1/1989.

64. Presencia, 3/28/1989.

65. Presencia, 8/13/1989.

66. Presencia, 6/14/1989.

67. Presencia, 7/13/1989.

68. Presencia, 7/13/1989.

69. Presencia, 6/10/1989.

70. Presencia, 6/10/1989.

71. Presencia, 7/27/1989.

72. Presencia, 8/2/1989.

73. Rojas, Gonzalo. November 2004. La Paz. Bolivia.

74. Interview with Ossio Sanjinés in Baptista Gumucio, Cordero Carraffa,

Mesa Gisbert 2003: 227–229.



Washington, DC.

NOTES214

77. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

78. Presencia, 6/17/1989.

79. Presencia, 8/4/1989.

80. Presencia, 8/3/1989.

81. Presencia, 8/1989.

82. Presencia, 8/11/1989.

83. Presencia, 1/10/1991.

84. “1989–2000 Economic Development Strategy Defined,” Foreign

Broadcast Information Service-LAT, June 19, 1989, pp. 51–53.

85. Presencia, 1/16/1990.

86. Presencia, 12/3/1989.


Bolivia.

88. Presencia, 4/5/1989.

89. Presencia, 4/5/1989.

90. Presencia, 8/17/1988.


La Paz, Bolivia.

92. Presencia, 8/30/1989.

93. Presencia, 1/16/1990.

94. Presencia, 11/23/1990.

95. Presencia, 11/24/1990.

96. Presencia, 10/21/1990.

97. Nuevo Herald, 10/28/1990.

98. Presencia, 9/13/1990.

99. Presencia, 4/20/1991.

100. Presencia, 11/16/1989.

101. Presencia, 11/23/1989.

102. Presencia, 11/22/1989.

103. Presencia, 9/21/1988.

104. Presencia, 11/29/1989.

105. For more on this, see Morales 1994: 131.

106. Arrien Sandoval, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

3 Paving the Way for the Transformation of

Bolivian Politics: Electoral Reforms and

Coalition Building


Bolivia.


Bolivia.

215NOTES

3. The Aymara movement called Katarismo emerged in the 1960s seeking

the promotion and restoration of Inca culture and communal social

organization among the Andean peasantry following the abuses and

discrimination suffered throughout history, and especially during the

Banzer and Garcia Meza dictatorships (Soria Saravia 2002: 76). After a

series of splits and name changing, the MRTKL (Movimiento

Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación) led by Victor Hugo

Cardenas came ahead and won a seat in the 1985–1989 legislature.

Cardenas was then chosen as Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s running

mate in the 1993 elections.

4. The phrase read in Spanish: “Victor Hugo no sabe robar y yo no neces-

ito robar.”

5. Some of them included Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Börth, Alfonso

Ferrufino, Ricardo Paz Ballivián, among others.

6. Laserna, Roberto. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

7. Currently, the Electoral Code establishes that seats in the Chamber of

Deputies are assigned by the proportional representation system using

the system of natural divisors.


9. Sánchez de Lozada. Interview by author. Washington, DC, November

2004.


Bolivia.


Bolivia.


Bolivia.


Bolivia.

14. A term used to describe those that favor strengthening municipalities as

a viable option for the decentralization of a country.

15. Rojas-Ortuste, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.


Washington, DC.

17. Indigenous social and political authorities.

18. This was deepened through the subsequent Administrative Decentrali-

zation Law of July 28, 1995.

19. Laserna, Roberto. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

20. Ferrufino, Alfonso; Börth, Carlos; Suarez, Manuel; Arrien Sandoval;

Oscar. Interviews by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.

21. For more on this, see Gamarra (1997a: 107), and Baldivia Urdininea

(1998: 85).

216 NOTES


Washington, DC.

23. Later that year, on October 1994, associated legislation was passed, i.e.,

the Sectoral Regulation System (SIRESE) Law, establishing a regula-

tory and oversight framework for each sector that was to be capitalized.

The basic objective of the SIRESE Law was to establish a new arbiter

for the Bolivian economy.


Washington, DC.

25. This occurred twice in Bolivia’s democratic history, a constitutional

amendment was initially approved by the 1989–1993 legislature and

confirmed by the 1993–1997 legislature; another was approved by the

1997–2002 legislature and confirmed by the 2002–2005 legislature.

The president and Congress called for a Constituent Assembly to

revamp the Bolivian Constitution in its entirety in 2006.

26. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.


Bolivia.


Bolivia.

29. Roberto Laserna (Interview by author. La Paz, Bolivia, November

2004) asserted that without popular participation, the 1998–1999 eco-

nomic crisis would have been worse. The deterioration of basic social

services would have been felt stronger and the incapacity of the govern-

ment to provide them would have been more obvious.


Bolivia.

31. Article 82 of the 1997 Debate Rules changed this limiting the discus-

sion by a deputy in a congressional session to 15 minutes.


Washington, DC.

33. Aparicio, Jaime. Interview by author. February 2004. Washington, DC.

34. La Prensa. La Paz, 2000.

35. Aparicio, Jaime. Interview by author. November 2004. Washington, DC.

36. Based on National Electoral Court data.

37. Rojas-Ortuste, Gonzalo. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

38. El Diario, 5/6/1197; Hoy, 5/5/1997; Última Hora, 5/6/1997; Presencia

(ERBOL Agency), 4/25/1997.

39. La Razón, 8/15/2000.

40. Carey, John. “Interview with Carlos Sánchez Berzaín,” MNR deputy.

La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001.

41. Luna, Luis. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.

42. Evo Morales webpage (http://www.evomorales.net/).

217NOTES

43. La Prensa, 7/27/2001.

44. La Prensa, 4/18/2000.

45. Pulso, 1/27/2000.

46. For a more detailed analysis on the roles of the vice president and inter-

views to all vice presidents since the democratic transition in Bolivia,

see Baptista Gumucio et al. (2003).

47. La Razón, 29/10/1999.

48. For more information, see Gamarra 2002: 7.


50. La Prensa, 9/8/2001.

51. La Prensa, September 2001.

52. La Prensa, 9/9/2001.

53. La Razón, 10/20/2001.

54. La Prensa, 7/25/2000.

55. These events will be analyzed in detail in the following sections.


57. La Prensa, 7/27/2000.

58. La Prensa, 9/9/2001.

59. La Razón, 10/20/2000.

60. La Prensa, 8/3/2001.

61. La Razón, 8/17/2001.

62. Los Tiempos, 6/10/1999.

63. La Razón, 11/30/2000.

64. La Prensa, 4/11/2000.

65. Los Tiempos de Cochabamba, 7/14/2001.

66. Opinión, 2/11/1999.

67. Los Tiempos, 3/2/2000.

68. Opinión, 28/3/2000.

69. Los Tiempos, 4/5/2000.

70. La Razón, April 2000.

71. Section 2, Article 111. Also, Article 62 and Article 66, Section 9 grant

the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate respectively, the responsibility

of considering a declaration of a state of siege made by the president,

having the option to either approve it or question it.

72. La Razón, 4/12/2000.

73. La Razón, 4/13/2000.

74. La Razón, 4/20/2000.

75. Los Tiempos, 11/1/1999.

76. El Deber, 18/1/2000.

77. El Deber, 11/1/2000.

78. Rafael Puente, El Deber, 9/2/2000.


80. La Razón, 7/21/2001.

81. La Razón, 1/23/2002.

82. La Razón, 1/24/2002.

218 NOTES

83. Carey, John. “Interview with Ericka Brockman,” Chief of the MIR’s

party caucus. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001.

84. Carey, John. “Interview with Ericka Brockman,” Chief of the MIR’s

party caucus. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001.

85. La Prensa, 11/8/2000.

86. La Prensa, 7/3/2001.

87. La Razón, 13/1/2000.

88. La Razón, 7/18/2000.

89. La Razón, 7/5/2001.

90. Los Tiempos, 10/4/2001.

91. La Razón, 6/13/2000.

92. La Prensa, 8/20/2000.

93. La Razón, 8/24/2000.

94. La Razón, 8/25/2000.

95. An article on the newspaper Los Tiempos covered declarations made by

the minister of information stating “The Government ratifies the

State of Siege as a result of a parliamentary session. Military officials

were mobilized to respond to the mandate for a state of siege. Also, a

commission to analyze the situation with Tunari Waters was created,

but the Coordinating Group was not allowed to participate because of

its intransigent position “ (Los Tiempos 8/4/2000).

96. La Razón, 2/20/2001; Carey, John. “Interview with Ericka Brockman,”

Chief of the MIR’s party caucus. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001.

97. La Razón, 8/20/2001.

98. The law requires a minimum amount of women to be included in

the party lists. In this area of the country, the MIR registered men

under female names. Thus, they were called the “cross-dresser”

candidates.

99. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia;

John Carey. “Interview with Victor Hugo Cardenas,” former vice

president of Bolivia.

100. Carey, John. “Interview with Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada,” ex-president

of Bolivia. May 15, 2001. La Paz, Bolivia.

101. Carey, John. “Interview with Guillermo Bedegral,” MNR deputy.


102. Carey, John. “Interview with Hugo Carvajal Donoso,” MIR minister

of agriculture. La Paz, Bolivia, May 2001.

103. Carey, John. “Interview with Carlos Sánchez Berzaín,” MNR deputy.




106. La Razón, 10/25/2001.

107. La Razón, 10/27/2001.

108. La Razón, 11/16/2001; 11/19/2001.

219NOTES

4 Crumbling Coalitions? Assessing the

Transformation of Bolivian Politics

1. La Razón, 3/16/2002.

2. Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by the author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

3. A headline in El Nuevo Día (3/31/2002) read “Jaime Paz Zamora and a

small group of people prepare the MIR strategies” ( Jaime Paz Zamora

y un reducido grupo hacen las estrategias del MIR).

4. La Razón, 5/4/2002 Recta Final Poll.

5. La Razón, 11/7/2002.

6. La Razón, 11/16/2001.

7. La Razón, 6/1/2002.

8. La Razón, 7/22/2001.

9. Los Tiempos de Cochabamba, 4/23/2002.

10. El Diario, La Razón, BBC News, June 2002.


Washington, DC.

12. La Razón, 6/26/2002.

13. BBC, 6/27/2002.

14. La Razón, 7/5/2002.

15. La Razón, 7/8/2002.

16. La Razón, 7/30/2002.

17. La Razón, 7/11/2002.

18. La Razón, 7/6/2002.

19. “Manfred would even support Evo before supporting Goni,” La Razón,

7/6/2002.

20. Pressure: La Razón, 7/10/2002: MNR negotiates with the MIR and the

pressure for a pact grows. La Razón, 7/11/2002: Jaime asks the MNR

and the MAS to join and offers to be the mediator. La Razón, 7/23/2002:

the private sector asks for a political pact, the Catholic Church raises its

hands.


Bolivia.

22. “The MNR and MIR have the pact ready to govern,” (La Razón,

7/25/2002). “Sánchez de Lozada and Paz Zamora signed an agreement

with 12 points that will be the basis of the so-called ‘Government of

Social Responsibility’—Gobierno de Responsabilidad Nacional” (La

Razón, 7/26/2002).


Bolivia.

24. LA TERCERA: CL, 2002 Election.

25. La Razón, 1/24/2003—“Chicote en mano, la oposición impide una

sesión en el congreso.”

220 NOTES

26. “Goni threatened with governing through decrees,” La Prensa,

6/6/2003.

27. Bolivia is now the second largest country in the region, after Venezuela,

in terms of available gas reserves.

28. “Sánchez de Lozada announced a trust shock (un shock de confianza)

and asks for 3 months to resolve the economic crisis: Five projects will

be produced in 90 days” (La Razón, 8/5/2002).

29. La Razón, 2/12/2003; 2/13/2003 and 2/14/2003.

30. El Deber, 4/6/2003; La Prensa, 4/8/2003.

31. Sánchez de Lozada reorganized his cabinet—anticonf lict ministers

were nominated, Sánchez Berzain left, and nine new ministers were

sworn in (La Razón, 2/20/2003).

32. La Razón, 8/18–25/2003.

33. La Razón, 8/6/2003.

34. La Razón, September 2003.

35. Pliego Único Nacional 2004. Central Obrera Boliviana (COB).

November 2004.

36. Juarez, Jesus-Monsignor. Interview by author. March 2004. Lima, Peru.

37. El Diario, 10/2/2003.

38. El Diario, 10/2/ 2003.

39. La Razón, 10/12/2003, Interview with El Alto residents.

40. La Prensa, 10/13/2003.

41. EFE. La Paz, 10/14/2003.

42. El Tiempo, 10/14/2003.

43. Juarez, Jesus-Monsignor. Interview by author. March 2004. Lima, Peru.

44. Eid Franco, Oscar. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia.


Washington, DC.

46. La Razón, 10/20/2003, the president puts together a cabinet according

to the political crisis.

47. La Razón, 10/17/2003.

48. La Razón, 11/3/2003.

49. La Razón, 12/18/2003.

50. The Bolivian pension plan or Bonosol was a popular yearly payment of

1,800 Bolivians (about $250) to senior citizens over the age of 65. It was

approved via the legislature during the 1993–1997 Sánchez de Lozada

administration and repealed by the Banzer government.

51. La Razón, 12/18/2003.

52. EFE. La Paz, 1/5/2004.

53. La Razón, 6/26/2002.

54. La Razón, 10/20/2003.

55. Johnny Antezana, leader of the NFR block in Congress.

56. La Prensa, 11/3/2003.

57. On May 9, 2002, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Law of

Necessity of Constitutional Reform (La Razón, 5/10/2002: A7).

221NOTES

58. La Prensa, 11/3/2003.

59. La Razón, 2/29/2004.


61. Parties approved the reform to comply with demands of citizens who

had voiced for the need of the reforms through politics from the streets

in October 2003. Eid Franco (2004) asserts that the MIR supported the

reform “to end the phenomenon once in for all and so that the system

would turn to political parties again.”

62. La Prensa, 2/29/2004.

63. “MNR, NFR and MIR parliamentarians asked the executive to jointly

design an agenda for the country” (La Razón, 3/7/2005).

64. Jorge Quiroga in EFE. La Paz, 11/5/2003.

5 Explaining Evo Morales’s Rise to Power:

The Unintended [or Intended?] Political

Consequences of Electoral Laws

1. Börth, Carlos. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz, Bolivia;

Ferrufino, Alfonso. Interview by author. November 2004. La Paz,

Bolivia.

2. It is important to mention, though, that beyond the stability of government

coalitions, there have been important inconsistencies and cohesion

problems within them, precisely due to the political frictions between

the member parties and because the coalitions are not established based

on a common project for the country.

3. La Razón, survey by Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado, March 2007. The

highest percentage of popularity for Morales was in May 2006, after he

nationalized the hydrocarbons industry.

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Börth, Carlos—researcher, and former senator and deputy (MIR/ADN).

Eid Franco, Oscar—political strategist of the MIR.

Fernández Saavedra, Gustavo—former minister of foreign affairs.

Ferrufino, Alfonso—MBL militant, and former plurinominal deputy, former

director of FUNDAPACC.

Laserna, Roberto—professor, and director of the Conf lict Research Institute,

Cochabamba.

Lazarte, Jorge—professor and former member of the National Electoral Court.

Loayza, Rafael—advisor to former president Jorge Quiroga, November.

Luna, Luis—director SUNY Bolivia.

Müller, Herbert—former minister of finance.

Pacheco, Napoleon—executive director of Fundación Milenio.

Paz Ballivián, Ricardo—advisor to President Mesa for constitutional affairs, and

former executive director of CONDEPA.

Rojas-Ortuste, Gonzalo—professor and former member of the Secretariat for

Popular Participation, 1993–1997.

Romero Ballivian, Salvador—member of the National Electoral Court.

Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo—former president of Bolivia, Washington, DC.


Suarez, Manuel—advisor to former president Sánchez de Lozada, and plurinominal

deputy 1997–2002.

Toranzo, Carlos—professor, and director of the Latin American Institution for

Social Research (ILDIS), November 2004, February 2005.

Torrez, Andres—professor, Universidad Catolica de Bolivia.

Speech

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. “Bolivia: Turning Point for Democracy?” October 17,

2003, Kay Spiritual Life Center. Event sponsored by the Office of International

Affairs, the Center for Democracy and Election Management, and the School

of International Service, American University.

INDEX

1985 elections, 35–37

1989 elections, 55–63

and the Chamber of Deputies, 37

campaign, 55–56

main issues, 57

political marketing, 57

1993 elections, 81

characteristics of, 81

composition of Congress, 87

participating parties, 111

results of, 82, 114

1994 constitutional reform, 24–25,

109

2002 elections

and Plan Bolivia, 154

and the campaign, 144

and the composition of Congress,

151–154

electoral results, 149–150

2005 elections

characteristics of, 176–177

Congress, 180

parties participating, 176

results of, 178–181

Agreements of February 5,

1991, 22

characteristics of, 85

Antonio Araníbar Quiroga, 19,

55, 90

Article 90 of the Constitution, 27, 28,

84, 180, 196

Asamblea Permanente de Derechos

Humanos, 58

Assembly for the Sovereignty of the

People (ASP), 24

Ballot stuffing, 19

Banzer-Quiroga administration, 15,

108, 109, 117, 120–121

and the Plan of the Four Pillars,

117

Black October, 1, 157

Bolivian Communist Party, 24, 33

Bolivian Mining Corporation, 33,

45, 77

Bolivian Revolution, 17–18, 28

Bolivian Worker’s Union (Central

Obrera Boliviana-COB),

18, 33

and the Gas War, 171

and street and strike politics, 76,

101

BonoSol, 95, 169

Capitalization Law, 14

description of, 95–97

Carlos Mesa, 1, 167, 168, 171, 172

cabinets, 168, 170

resignation of, 175

Carlos Palenque “El Compadre,” 21,

89, 90

and the 1989 elections, 58

Catholic Church, 22, 128

238 IN DEX

Center for Peasant Research and

Promotion (CIPCA), 91

Central de Empresarios Bolivianos

(CEPB), 102, 104

Chaco War, 16, 17

Chapare, 101, 121–122, 141

Coalitions, 13

Conscience of the Motherland

(Consciencia de Patria-

CONDEPA), 89, 90, 99, 100

formation of, 21


and the 1993 elections, 81–82

and coalition building, 87

and the Patriotic Accord, 65, 75

Constituent Assembly, 182, 205

approval of, 184

and the Special Law for the Call of a

Constituent Assembly, 182–183

parties elected to, 182

“Damned laws,” 92

Decentralization Law, 97, 98, 101

D’Hondt formula, 23, 25, 36, 48, 59,

86, 110, 151, 195, 197

and the odd divisor formula, 86

Dignity Plan, 15, 117, 120–126

Double-quotient formula, 48, 63

Electoral dilemma (representativeness

vs. efficiency), 12–13, 194–195


and the Bolivian electoral system,

187–188

and the Patriotic Accord, 75

Evo Morales, 1, 101, 120

election as president, 175

election to Congress, 25

and the Tropic Federation,

54–55

as uninominal deputy, 191

Executive-legislative relations, 4, 6–7

Falange Socialista Boliviana, 36

Free Bolivia Movement party (MBL),

22, 88–89

formation of, 34

Gas War, 15, 158, 164–167, 203

Hernan Siles Zuazo, 16, 20, 31, 33

Historic Ratification of the Pact for

Democracy, 55

breaking of, 56

Hugo Banzer Suarez, 18, 20, 21, 31,

34, 82


election of, 26

and the Pact for Democracy, 38

and the Patriotic Accord, 66

Hybrid presidentialism, 10

Hydrocarbons Law, 15, 100, 171–173,

203

Jaime Paz Zamora, 19, 21, 31, 99


Jefaturismo, 85

Juan Lechín, 16, 33, 76

Law 1008 on Controlled Substances, 54

Law for drinking water and sanitary

systems, 15, 118

formulation of, 119

Tunari Waters, 119

and the Water War, 126–132

Law for the Application of Article 60,

25

Lidia Gueiler, 16

Majoritarianism, 4, 13

March for Life, 44, 76

Max Fernández Rojas, 21, 22, 88, 90,

105, 107

and Max obras, 88

Megacoalition, 115, 121–126

characteristics, 122

and the Commitment for Bolivia, 116

negotiations for, 116

239IN DEX

opposition to, 132–137

payoffs, 123

Movement Toward Socialist

(Movimiento al Socialismo-

MAS), 2

and the 2002 elections, 144,

146

and the 2005 campaign, 176–177

and the Constituent Assembly,

182–183

election to Congress, 25

formation of, 24–25

National Agreement for the

Modernization of the State, 24,

109

National Civic Union (UCN), 21

National Democratic Action party

(Acción Democrática

Nacional-ADN), 11

formation of, 19

National Electoral Court

(CNE), 22




and the Band of the Four,

60–63

institutionalization of, 23,

28, 86

National Revolutionary Movement

(Movimiento Nacional

Revolucionario-MNR), 11

formation of, 16–17

New Economic Policy (Nueva

Política Económica-NPE), 14,

38, 41, 95

formulation of, 41–44

main objectives, 42

New Republican Force (Nueva

Fuerza Republicana-NFR), 24,

191


and the Megacoalition, 124

Organizaciones Territoriales de Base

(OTBs), 93

Oscar Eid Franco, 19, 56, 72, 99

Pact for Change, 88–90

Pact for Democracy, 37–44

bargaining strategies, 48–49

formation of, 38

incentives for, 39–40

interpellation to, 45

legislative leadership, 49

Pact for Governance, 88–90

Parliamentarized presidentialism, 9

Partido Demócrata Cristiano

(PDC), 36

Partido Obrero Revolucionario, 76

Patriotic Accord, 63

and the CONEPLAN (Consejo

Nacional de Economía y

Planificación), 70

government sharing, 67

negotiations for, 64–65

and the Political Council of the

Patriotic Accord, 67–68, 72

positional payoffs, 72

Paz Estenssoro administration, 34

cabinet formation, 50–54

main outcomes, 44

Paz Zamora administration, 55

cabinets, 73

congressional results, 62

opposition to, 75

Plan for All (Plan de Todos),

111

Plan Nuevo (New Plan), 83

Popular Democratic Unity

government (UDP), 31, 33, 38,

41, 81

Popular Participation Law, 15

description of, 91–95

purpose of, 24

Presidentialism vs. parliamentarism,

4–6, 12

and “the difficult combination,” 8

240 IN DEX

Privatization Law, 14

main tenets, 70–72

and the state of siege, 69–70

and Supreme Decree 22407, 69

and the Paz Zamora administration,

68

Revolutionary Left Movement, 11


formation of, 18

and the Megacoalition, 124

Saint Lague formula, 23, 192, 195,

197

Sánchez de Lozada, 2, 15, 21, 27, 82,

99, 101



cabinets, 103–106

and the Pact for Democracy, 45

and the Plan for All, 84

Single Member District (SMD), 2



description of, 26

experience of uninominal deputies,

140

uninominal circumscriptions, 26

Solidarity Civic Union (UCS), 82,

89, 90, 105, 107


and coalition building, 87

doctrine of, 22

formation of, 21

Split vote (voto cruzado), 26, 140, 193

Tupac Katari Revolutionary

Liberation Movement, 36,

46, 83

United Left (Izquierda Unida), 24, 58

Victor Hugo Cárdenas, 46, 83

Victor Paz Estenssoro, 16, 20, 31, 33

Vigilance Committees (VCs), 91

Walter Guevara Arce, 16, 20, 31, 33

War of the Pacific, 16

Washington Consensus, 44, 70

Water War, 126

electoral rules and the transformation of bolivian politics: the rise of evo morales

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