eisen's critique

8/8/2019 Eisen's Critique

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On Authority, Freedom and Society:A Rejoinder to the Criticisms Raised in the First Paper

My paper is divided into three parts or essays. The first part tackles and answers the

problems and issues raised by the writer of the first paper [note: I will refer to the author of thefirst paper as simply ‘the writer’, for brevity’s sake]. This part is my refutation of the arguments

advanced by the writer regarding authority, freedom and society. I think the writer has failed to

make necessary distinctions and is guilty of several misconceptions in his disquisition of theaforementioned subjects. The second part or essay is where I will substantiate the claim, made in

the first part, that freedom and society: social institutions and the principle governing them,

norms and standards are not necessarily and absolutely contradictory, or put another way,social institutions and its principles, social norms and standards, especially those formulated

based on the principles of practical reason, are not necessarily and absolutely ‘anti-freedom’,

contrary to what the writer claims. The second part therefore is the substance my paper since this

is where I will present alternative conceptions regarding authority, freedom and society that can

rescind the claims made by the writer. However, I cannot present the second part here in thisinstallment because, for one, I feel that this particular series, which is consist of the first and the

third part, is long enough to have in it another lengthy thesis paper. Also, given such importanceof the second part, I think it would be best to present it on its own. The third part, which is about

Aristotle’s metaphysics, is my answer to the claims made by the writer about being, form,

essence and actuality, and matter, change and potentiality.I have two aims in writing this paper. First is to clear several issues that were raised by

the writer and second to start a discourse.

Before I begin, I would like to say that what we are going to do here is to examine ideas

and principles. The question therefore of whether these ideas or principles can be carried out or not in reality i.e. whether they are doable or not, is not our concern. We are just entertaining the

ideas of the writer and their implications and follow where they would lead us.Let me begin the first part by citing this passage which represents, more or less, the stand

of the writer regarding ‘authority’. According to the writer:

However, the credibility of our thoughts mostly recognized especially when it adheres to the

minds of those people we may consider authorities or say professionals. In adherin g to the minds of these professionals, one must be able to communicate his

thoughts in a way the professionals could understand, for it is in that way that he would likely

have the chance to be part of that elitism [my emphases].

I disagree. This statement runs counter to the reality of modern democratic society.

Allow me to explain.One of the distinctive features of modern democratic society is the existence of diverse

pluralism i.e., the existence of many doctrines, beliefs, philosophical as well as religious views,

world-views, hobbies, interests etc., each of which has its own followers. This pluralism is possible precisely because in modern democratic society there is enough social space that allows



us to pursue our own personal good and interests. More often than not, this personal good is

expressed through one of the many doctrines that we find in society. While it is true that our

perception of the world is influenced by the particular world view we adhere to, such world viewnevertheless is something that is freely chosen given the existence of democratic space and the

diverse choices that is available in modern society (later I will consider the writer’s concept of

‘freedom’ which I find to be a case of an old misconception of the term). Again, since there isenough social space, the freedom that the people enjoy is not limited to merely choosing which

among the many available doctrines one would want to have, but it extends to, if one so wishes,

the creation of one’s own belief system.The fact that there is pluralism in modern society obviously means that different people

engage in different activities. There are chemists, physicists, artists, athletes, scientists, computer

programmers, priests, teachers, dancers, and so on. Apparently, each group has its own jargons

thus, for example, the words of computer programmers or simply those who are interested incomputer and study it formally (that is, in an institution) or otherwise, would sound strange to,

say, a dancer or even to a physicist and vice versa. The idea here is that there is peculiarity in

each of this field and this is reflected by, first and foremost, the words which the practitioners of

each field use. The fact that I cannot understand the words uttered by a computer enthusiast(which really is the case) does not mean, however, that she is a member of some unreachable

elite group. Rather it only means that she is into something which obviously is not in myimmediate interest to pursue. Likewise, I may have a particular preoccupation which does not

interest her. Again this does not make me superior over her. We can say then that it is simply a

case of personal differences. Now the question is if someone else wishes to understand the

knitty-gritty of a computer system, to whom would she run to? Would she ask the help of adancer or someone who has knowledge of computer? Likewise, if I have a query about physics

would it be rational for me to seek the help of a programmer than a physicist? The prudent

choice, obviously, in both cases and in all other similar cases would be the one who has studiedthe field in question, in other words the ‘authority’ of a particular field.

Now before I proceed, let me first clear the apparent error which the writer has

committed in his presentation of the idea of ‘authority’. First and foremost, the writer has presented it as if the word ‘authority’ necessarily means something detrimental to human or

personal growth. Indeed the word has acquired a derisive connotation but mind you this is not

the only meaning of the word (in fact, in this case, its derisive character is merely aconnotation). It is not analytical to the concept of ‘authority’ that it is a negation of human

development and thus to limit its use to that meaning is fallacious. Put another way, the idea of

‘authority’ per se is not something that is against human flourishing. How can I prove this point?

Let me use the principle of non-contradiction. Briefly, this principle states that ‘if astatement/something cannot be denied without contradiction, then it is necessarily true and if it

can, then it is not necessarily true’. Let us have then an example. A triangle is a figure that has

three sides or angles. Following the principle, once we deny this statement we will necessarilycommit a contradiction for the essence of a triangle is that of its three angles. Hence we cannot

deny the statement without running into a contradiction. The idea of three sides or angles

therefore is analytical to the concept of a triangle i.e., it is necessary to the concept of a triangle.Let us now have the concept of ‘authority’. The writer has presented the concept with only one

meaning or application in mind: authority is against personal growth. Can we deny this statement

without committing a contradiction? Of course we can for the idea of ‘against personal growth’

is not analytical or necessary to the concept of ‘authority’, though we cannot deny that it can be



one of its effects. But to say that ‘it can be one of its effects’ is to point to only one of the

several applications of the word ‘authority’, which is ‘power or influence over others in virtue

of one’s status and prestige’. The other application of the term is ‘one’s respectability andreliability’ which can be gained through one’s honest hard work and humble demeanor. I

personally admire Professor Randy David not because he or somebody else has commanded me

to do so. I admire him because of his humility and integrity despite of his many achievements. Itis only in virtue of this that I do recognize his authority over me though not his ‘superiority’ as a

person. Thus his authority over me is based on principles I have come to believe as worthy to

possess, and these principles are exhibited by the Professor. In addition, he is an authority insociology because he has gone a long way in the field of sociology. It would be the height of

hypocrisy if one would claim that what one knows about society is all there is to know about it

and that what Professor David does is to merely cloth with technical jargons what are essentially

trivial things.This, incidentally, connects us with the other idea which the writer has used as a ground

to rail against ‘authorities’ or ‘professionals’.

According to the writer,

If you are just new and happened to encounter these groups of authorities, you will find

yourself ignorant because you don’t know what they were talking about even if you have sameexperiences with theirs due to the simple law of group jargons [my emphasis].

Again I disagree. As I have stated earlier, what is peculiar to modern society is the

existence of diverse pluralism and that the different groups in such a pluralist society have

developed their own languages or jargons. If the ‘law of jargons’ is a sign of elitism, then all thegroupings that we can find in society are elitist i.e., the priests are elites, computer programmers

are elites, dancers are elites, artists are elites, physicists are elites, religious congregations are

elites, activists are elites. In its extreme form we can also say that fishermen are elites, smugglersare elites, commercial sex workers are elites, psychopaths are elites, magicians are elites, fortune

tellers are elites, slaughterers are elites, teachers are elites, people who play sophisticated

computer games are elites and so on. If you ask me why this is so, the simple answer is becausewhen I approach, say, those who play sophisticated computer games, I will definitely be finding

myself “ignorant because you do not know ( in this case I do not know) what they were talking

about…” But the writer might rejoin that what he is talking about here are the experiences

common to both the philosophers and the laymen, which, because of the jargons of the philosophers, become incomprehensible to the latter. But that exactly is the point! If the ‘law of

jargons’, if there is such a thing, complicates an otherwise simple things, then regardless of the

nature of the group in question, that group must be, following the argument of the writer, anelitist group. But the truth is that in modern democratic society characterized by diverse

pluralism, the groups that we can find in it have their own jargons as much as, say, the

philosophers and the academe do. But more than this, a more fundamental question can be raisedthat is, does the existence of jargons necessarily equate to, or produce elitism? To answer,

we must investigate the role of jargons.

As I have stated earlier, in a pluralist society there exists different groups each of which

has its own set of jargons peculiar to its nature. These jargons are not created whimsically and



simply at will by any member belonging to any particular group. The jargons are not created to

serve as simply a tool, with the sole purpose of merely determining who can qualify to join a

particular group based on whether one can parrot and ‘memorize’ the jargons well enough. Intruth, a group of jargons does not merely reflect the peculiarity of an organization but also plays

an essential role. This is because jargons are derived from the very nature of a group and its

activity. Take for instance the case of computer enthusiasts. Terms such as megahertz,gigabytes, processor, motherboard, CPU, software, hardware, hard disk drive, chipset, IRI,

CMOS, IDE devices, base memory, extended memory, total memory, BIOS etc. are not invented

just to alienate and preclude others from engaging on, and learning matters about computers.That is, these terms are not meant to create an elite group. Moreover, as I have said earlier, these

terms are not arbitrarily invented by any one and thus these cannot be changed arbitrarily as if,

for example, the term CMOS can be changed anytime to, say, KULANGOT. These terms exist

because they are essential terms to computers. Now the reason why philosophy has so manytechnical terms is simply, and obviously, because it is one of the oldest vocations of man. Had

computers been available thousands of years earlier, it would have also created a mammoth

number of technical terms. Having said this, the insinuation of the writer about the academic

world being governed by jargons is partly true. What is untrue however is his claim that:

In schools, the terms and jargons was totally formalized. Academic worlds practice it

by asking the students to memorize their concepts and meanings. Understanding is tantamount

to use of their jargons (my emphasis).

I strongly disagree. Again, different ‘worlds’ have different languages. Since, as I haveshown above, these terms or jargons are essential to the conduct of a particular vocation these

jargons therefore are inseparable from the very practice of a vocation. Academic world is indeed

governed by its own set of jargons (but this is true of any other ‘world’) but never does theAcademic world confuse ‘understanding’ from mere ‘memorizing’ or ‘parroting’. If there is a

world that appreciates better the meaning and virtue of genuine understanding, that should be the

world whose aim is to seek understanding. I have a professor in the University of the Philippineswho does not tell openly whether a student’s understanding of a particular concept is right or not.

The only way we can say that we got a concept right is during the presentation of our reports; the

professor nods and occasionally smiles when a student hits the idea correctly. But there arestudents who are apparently confuse with the lesson. But never does this professor criticize

and/or correct the students openly and formally i.e., authoritatively. Instead he goes around it by

explaining anew, with different examples, the ideas missed by the students. The reason behind

this strategy of the professor is apparent. More than having us ‘memorize’ the meaning of theideas and concepts, he wants us to understand the lesson and its significance to us and to society

as a whole-the subject is social and political philosophy. I have already attended six different

classes under six different professors in the University of the Philippines. All of them havedisplayed commitment to academic excellence but not one of them had asked us, their students,

to merely ‘memorize’ and ‘parrot’ the jargons of the lesson. That is, academic excellence cannot

be equated to memorization as what the writer wants to show.Again, the writer may ask, why do we have to use jargons? By this time I hope that it is

already apparent that a group of jargons of a particular filed is essentially connected to it. Of

course it is possible that the terms we associate now to, say, computer e.g., motherboard could

have been something else. But just the same, what ever those terms are, that would still define



the manner of how we speak of computer. For example, if the thing we call motherboard is not

known as motherboard but as something else, say pencil, still we will definitely be using the term

pencil when we refer to ‘that thing’ and that it would be a term which we will essentially regardas a computer part, which consequently defines the manner of how we look at and speak of

computer. The point is jargons play a huge and an essential role in whatever specialized

field. It is not a case of simple tripping, thus it cannot be changed without producing confusion.How can I tell? Let us have an example. Suppose that I, being a deviant (deviancy for

deviancy’s sake is worthless and senseless. One must know when it is reasonable to be deviant

and when it is not. I will discuss more about this issue later) , decided to change arbitrarily thenames of computer features. Instead of motherboard I changed it to synthetic-a priori, quiddity

for BIOS, privation for CMOS , haciete for IDE, overlapping consensus for IRI. Now, suppose

that I went to a computer expo and ask a personnel what are the functions of these computer

features: synthetic-a priori, quiddity, privation, haciete and overlapping consensus. Do you think the personnel can answer my question? Now let us switch the situation. Suppose that there is a

computer enthusiast who changed these philosophical terms into those computer features and

approach a philosopher. Surely, if the computer enthusiast will ask the philosopher about the

meaning of these philosophical terms: motherboard, BIOS, CMOS, IDE and IRI, the latter woulddefinitely find himself dumfounded. The point is, these terms have their own proper niche

within their own respective fields and that one cannot simply disregard them if one wishes to

study and understand a particular field. Again, if one would ask a computer enthusiast, who

has no interest in philosophy and therefore does not engage in it, about philosophy, surely one

cannot expect an answer. The same is true to a philosopher who has no interest in computer. The

point here is that just as a computer enthusiast is ‘ignorant’ in matters pertaining to philosophy,so too a philosopher is equally ‘ignorant’ in matters that pertain to computer unless both are also

interested and therefore engage in that other field.

The writer has insinuated that the norm or rule that governs the academe is that of parody, parroting and, at worst, pretense. This he made by pointing that what is important in the

academe is to memorize and therefore parrot (since this is its purpose) meaning of ideas and

concepts and that understanding is measure by how well one carries this pathetic task. Genuineunderstanding therefore is not the aim and concern of the academe. What is necessary is that

one must be able to speak the tongue of the ‘authorities’ even without really understanding the

concepts and ideas, thus the pretension. According to the writer:

Understanding is tantamount to use of their jargons sometimes without even asking if the student understands the use of a particular word.

Furthermore, according to the writer, in the academe and in the world of ‘authorities’ and

professionals, the one rule that has to be observed is that of conforming and ‘adhering to their

minds’. Therefore contrary to what the academe claims that it is committed to be the center of discourse of different and diverse ideas, what it really does, following the argument of the writer,

is to just create fakers and pretenders and destroy freedom of thought. Apparently the reason the

writer offers for this claim is that in this world of ‘authorities’ one is coerced, to the abrogationof one’s freedom and well-being, to use the jargons of ‘authorities’. Are these claims true? Let us

examine.

If one is aware of the very long history of thought, particularly of philosophy, certainly

one would not miss that it is filled with debates. That is, one particular idea or belief system is



being challenged by another. A challenge can take several forms. At its sharpest and ambitious

form, a challenge would try to nullify altogether and replace a particular belief system. Now,

while a challenger, which aims to replace an existing belief system, is itself a belief system, it

does not recognize nor adhere to the jargons already established by the system it aims to

replace. In the first place that is the very reason why it dares to throw a challenge. Our concern

here though is not to determine which among these competing ideas or systems is more likelytrue. The point here is that, contrary to what the writer is saying, the world of academe is, as

shown in its history filled with debates, and never was, a world of conformist. The rule here is

not ‘conform’ and ‘adhere’. The rule here is to think, decide and express. I once became aMarxist amidst the existence of so many other schools of thoughts. I became a Marxist though

not because I wanted to conform and ‘adhere’ and eventually be accepted in the elite circle (in

fact, Marxism is probably one of the very few school of thoughts, whose members are belittled)

nor was I coerced by anyone. I became a Marxist because I recognized some of its principles assound.

Let me at the moment engage in a digression.

While it is true that Marxism has drawn heavily, for its materials necessary to the

formation and completion of its whole thesis, from the ‘common experiences’ shared by theworkers, it nevertheless presented them in a new light. That is, Marxism has offered a theory

behind the ‘common experience’. With this theory the workers were able to see the systematicand systemic oppression committed against them. But workers, prior to the formulation of this

theory, particularly those belonging to the protestant sect, believed that labor, and a hard and

unjust labor at that, is just a natural way to go to heaven. True, it is possible that some or maybe

even many had noticed that there is something wrong with their condition. But that suspicion is

nothing against an elaborate religious system that promises eternal bliss after a lifetime of hell

on earth. Why am I saying this? I am saying this because according to the writer one of the

errors of the ‘authorities’ is their wont of making an elaborate, sophisticated and technicaltheories out of ‘common experience’ that is open to all. Well, how common is ‘common’!?

As I have shown, it took a highly technical and sophisticated theory before workers as a

class took actions to alleviate their plight. In fact, even the idea of ‘working class’ is aninnovation of Marxism, before that what we have are only isolated personal grudges of

individual workers. It took a challenge from one academic system against another academic

system (remember that religious churches with an elaborate set of doctrines are born inside thewalls of universities during Medieval Europe. In fact, during this time, religious thoughts

dominate the academe. This is also true as to the origin of capital system). If the academe is

merely a story of conform and ‘adhere’, this will never happen.

The point I want to emphasize is this, ‘common experience’ is common only if one islooking at it through the same lens. But philosophy as well as the other social sciences knows the

folly of such a practice, that is, of looking at things through one solitary perspective. There is a

need to invent and reinvent ourselves and this can be done by using different metaphors bywhich we can look at things. This incidentally is what you will see in the long history of thought,

particularly of philosophy. There is a constant clash of metaphors, of ideas, of systems, of

jargons. This is so since the role of philosophy is not only to describe ‘common experience’ butmore importantly, to create perspectives by which we can see things and experiences in a new

light. The reason behind is to discover solutions to our problems which previous perspectives

failed to offer. This does not mean however that problems can be resolved only by making

elaborate theories, not at all. The idea is that, the more profound our existential and human



problems are, the more they necessitate a much deeper and thorough thinking and abstraction to

solve. Had Marx not painstakingly examined the mechanism and structure of the capital system,

its evil would not have been exposed. Again, if the academe is indeed a world of mediocrity, asthe writer would want us to believe, then all academicians of the 21st century should only be

‘Thalesists’ i.e., those who ‘adhere’ to the jargons of Thales. But at that very early age of

Thales, debate had already ensued. He was challenged by Anaximander. The debates anddiscourses obviously continue up to this time.

The point here is that, again, the academic world, as shown in its history, is in fact an

avenue where different and diverse ideas can be presented and debated freely. Even Nietzsche,who scorns, and loathes, and curses practically all philosophers and their language, has earned

for himself the respect of the academic world. Marxism, which professes its belief of the need to

abolish the state and religion, is taught at government universities and colleges and even in

private religious universities like Ateneo and even in the seminaries. We have heard of stories inwhich seminarians (and even priests) committed apostasy and turned to Marxism all because of

what they have learned about it inside the seminaries. Truth is, in places where there is academic

spirit or at least a semblance of academic environment, ideas, even those that are contrary to the

official and/or personal beliefs of the people overseeing an institution are freely discussed. Now let us examine very briefly how debates and/or discourses are done or how, in the

first place, debates become possible at all. There can only be a debate when the contending parties have a common or the same conception of an idea which is the subject of debate. For

instance, in a debate about whether an act of war can ever be justified or not, the contending

parties must have first a common understanding of what war is. This will serve as their starting

point and will also give the necessary consistency for their arguments. However, when one of the parties claims that war is justifiable because it takes war to mean peace while the other takes war

as the opposite of peace, then the debate cannot proceed much less produce a meaningful

discourse (which by the way is the purpose of debate). What I am saying is this, before you canaffirm or reject something you must, first and foremost, know what it is that you affirm or reject,

otherwise, a claim pro or against a side, is worthless and empty. Applying this to philosophy, one

cannot affirm or reject, say, the existence of a metaphysical reality if one does not know whatmetaphysics is in the first place. I, for instance, am personally more inclined, given my present

state of mind, to reject the reality of a metaphysical world, or to put it in the language of the

writer, I refuse to ‘adhere’ to the jargons of metaphysicians. But I can only make sense of myrejection if I know what I am rejecting. Thus when I critique the ideas of metaphysics, it is

inevitable for me to use the very jargons of the metaphysicians but only to show their seeming

inconsistencies. But I can only use them if indeed I understand them and not merely because I

memorize them verbatim. Note the very obvious difference here, just because I use the jargonsor the language of the metaphysicians does not mean that I ‘adhere’ to them. I only use them to

expose what I believe are the inherent inconsistencies of the arguments espoused by

metaphysicians. In the history of philosophy we have so many examples of such cases. Kant, for instance, is one of the first modern philosophers who murdered metaphysics. But if you will read

his books, they are flooded with the jargons of metaphysics. Nevertheless, he discussed and

included them in his books not because he ‘adheres’ to them and certainly not because he justwants to be ‘in’, on the contrary, he wants to be ‘out’. He included them because he sees their

flaws and he can only expose them if he can and will present them. Nietzsche which probably is

the sharpest critic of metaphysicians has also used their jargons but he does not (and very much

not!) ‘adhere’ to them. Now the thing about Nietzsche is that he is rather straightforward in



soundness of its arguments. Though I must admit that at present I have misgivings about that

system and I often find myself criticizing it. But that is the luxury that the academe has given to

its people that is, the luxury to criticize and also to adopt, revise, reject, affirm and even formone’s own world view. That is why we have Marx, Hayek, Descartes, Sarte, Nietzsche, Fichte

etc. If the academe restricts and destroys freedom of thought, as what the writer suggests, then

these hundreds and hundreds (and counting) of thinkers would not have existed. When Kant, for instance, entered the academe, he does not only reject, meaning he does not ‘adhere’, to the

language of metaphysics, he also created his own technical terms. The same is true to almost

every thinker i.e. they created their own technical terms. And this is precisely the reason why wehave equally hundreds and hundreds (and again, counting) of technical terms or jargons in the

social sciences. In short in the academe you have the luxury to create your own concepts and

technical jargons. I am saying this because the writer seems to be obsessed to the idea that to be

‘really’ free, one alone, and he means ALONE, must create his own ‘words’ absolutely devoid of any ‘influence’ from anybody, since any influence according to the writer, if one will read

carefully his arguments, is necessarily ‘anti-freedom’.

Let me proceed further on the issue raised by the writer regarding jargons. The major

reason why the writer has so much loathing against the ‘authorities’ and the academic world andtheir jargons is his view that these are necessarily and hence absolutely against personal

freedom. The writer believes and claims that to adopt and use a particular jargon of a particular ‘authority’ is to lose one’s freedom. Or put it another way, to be influenced by anybody

particularly by an ‘authority’ is to be enslaved. For the writer, one of the major reasons, if not the

major reason, of the enslavement of humanity (yes the writer believes that we are enslaved) is

these ‘authorities’ who feign greatness and conceal their vicious intentions through the ‘greatnessof their craftsmanship’. According to the writer:

The greatness of their craftsmanship led us to believe that their outside intentions were

true.

In short, we are being fooled by these ‘authorities’. Thus, Marx, for example, who practically devoted the productive years of his life fighting for social justice and equality and

wrote voluminous articles to expose the evils of the capital system, following the arguments of

the writer, is really a vicious ignoramus who conceal his malicious intentions through his works.Therefore, contrary to what Marx claims that he dreams of a day where humanity is free from the

shackles of capital oppression, he is really dreaming of a day where humanity is enslaved by him

and his jargons. Following further still the arguments of the writer, the ‘authorities’, the

feminists, the environmentalists, human rights advocates (who are obviously armed withfundamental principles of human right…are, well, following the writer, actually armed only with

‘jargons’ and therefore they are actually human rights violators for they only want to ‘impose’

their jargons), philosophers, sociologists, scientists, etc. are actually bestial creatures whotrampled on the freedom of humanity and one of the paramount causes of humanity’s

enslavement. Well, I wonder how the Law of Inertia, presented by Galileo, can enslave

humanity and destroy freedom of thought.

The reason advanced by the writer why he thinks the ‘authorities’ and the academic

world are the negation of freedom is because they, according to the writer, compelled hapless

and innocent people to use their jargons, hence the suppression of freedom. But is the concept



used appropriate? Does the academic world really compel and therefore coerce people to adopt

its jargons? To answer, let us first study what the academic world is.

The academe is very much different from ordinary schools, universities or colleges. Togo and study in a school does not necessarily mean that one is in the academic world otherwise,

if this were the case, even grade school pupils and even kindergarten pupils shall be considered

students or people of the academe. Likewise, the presence of teachers in schools does notnecessarily make schools academe. In the almost five years that I spent in the Polytechnic

University of the Philippines, I have not met a teacher who can be considered, more or less, a

scholar [note: I did not say there is none, I only said I have not met one]. In contrast, in the oneand a half year that I have spent in the University of the Philippines, I have met relatively many

professors (and counting) who are indeed academicians. Who then are these academicians? For

one, the academicians or scholars are the hands-on practitioners of a field which they have

actually pursued and studied. For example, Professor Randy David of the Department of Sociology is not a graduate of Business Accountancy teaching sociology. Rather Prof. David is

in fact a sociologist. The same is true to his other colleagues in the department. Prof. Walden

Bello and Prof. Bonifacio, for instance, are also practicing sociologists. In the Department of

Philosophy of the University of the Philippines, we have, for instance, Prof. Lee, Sayson andDavid. This can be said to all the other academic departments of the University of the

Philippines. In the Department of History, for instance, we have Filipino historians; in theDepartment of Anthropology, Filipino anthropologists; in the School of Economics we have

Filipino economists, etc. These people, being the hands-on practitioners of their own respective

fields, are the ones who actually do their own research and study, read voluminous books,

papers, articles, essays, reports, analyze and interpret data and other researches, write, presentand publish their own papers, attend seminars and lectures, make local and international

correspondence, emerge in different communities, and of course teach. Their profession is not

one that we can actually consider easy and certainly not one free from, among others, pressure.In some circumstances, their profession is not one we can consider safe. I just learned that Prof.

David had to change his phone number because of the death threats he has been receiving

through his old number.Now in the Philippine setting, and possibly in many other countries as well, one can only

have a real taste of the academe when one enters the graduate level. The question I want to throw

now is this: is there an academic law, backed and heavily supported by a State law, which saysthat when one finishes undergraduate studies, he or she is compelled and therefore coerced to

enroll in higher studies so as to be enslaved by the jargons of ‘authorities’? I matriculated in the

Graduate Program of the Department of Philosophy in the University of the Philippines out of

the so many available Graduate studies not only in the University of the Philippines but in manyother universities as well because of my personal interest and preference. As I have stated a

couple of times now, we will find in modern democratic society diverse and different fields

being pursued out of personal interests and inclinations. While it is true that philosophy hasexisted long before the advent of modernity and hence before the advent of specialization, still

we can trace its inception from the simple interest of the early Greek thinkers on their

surroundings. No one is coerced and compelled to enter the academe or read philosophical works, in as

much as no one is coerced and compelled to study computer and its parts. The key and crucial

word here is ‘personal preference’ but the more important word here is ‘respect’ to others’



preferences. What is interesting here is that the writer seems to know this idea. According to the

writer:

[I]t is not necessary to live with the acceptance of professionals to live a happy life. It

was just an option to enter their world… [My emphasis]

Precisely! And since it is just ‘an option to enter their world’ does not it follow that it is

also just an option to use their jargons? Meaning, that no one is coerced to use their jargons?

In the above quoted passage we can clearly see the personal bias and loathing of thewriter against the ‘authorities’ and the academe which, as evident in his work, make his paper

based not really on accurate and informed observation but more on his personal grudges and

cynicism.

The first sentence of the above quoted passage is so bias, misleading and malicious. Whatit suggests is that when one enters the academe, and therefore meets ‘professionals’ and

‘authorities’, one is only after their approval and acceptance. It seems that it has not occurred to

the writer that it is very much possible that those who enter the academe are not after the

approval of the ‘authorities’. In one of my papers in a class in the University of the Philippines, Icriticized one of the favorite philosophers of my professor, not because I just want to be a

‘deviant’ and hence becomes ‘totally free’, but because I find the arguments of that philosopher unsound (as I have said earlier, deviancy for deviancy’s sake is worthless and senseless. One

must know when it is reasonable to resist and when it is not).

Another reason suggested by the writer why he has so much loathing against the

academe and the ‘authorities’ is his views that what the authorities know, we can, even byourselves alone, also know. But this idea, again, runs counter against how the social world, with

its creations and innovations, actually work. It is not possible, for instance, for a single man to

know and discover within his lifetime the principles of quantum physics if no one before himactually presented the elementary principles of physics. Likewise, the computer, as we have it

today, with its very complex applications and processes is not the single idea and creation of a

single man within his lifetime. It undergoes so many phases of change and innovations and passes on different hands before it becomes what it is today. That is, in the social world one

actually builds on what the others before had already established. Like what the writer says, one

should not ‘begin from the scratch’.But who are they to whom we actually build our works on? Are they not the

‘authorities’? Here, I think it is significant to discuss again the idea of ‘authority’.

As I have stated earlier, there are several applications of the term ‘authority’ and not

merely, as the writer wants us to believe and accept, those people with vicious and maliciousintentions and who feign greatness so as to enslave us through their jargons. Another application

of the term ‘authority’ is those who have pioneered or started the study of a particular field, again

out of personal interest. Also, ‘authority’ can mean those who have immersed and studied a particular subject matter longer than somebody else and thus have gained experiences and

valuable knowledge about a subject matter. Thus Professor Randy David is an ‘authority’ in

sociology not because he is a vicious and malicious person with an evil intention of coercing,enslaving and destroying the freedom of other people. Rather, he is an ‘authority’ because he has

studied and practiced sociology long enough.

Given this ‘other’ application and appreciation of the term ‘authority’, when a student,

for instance, approaches the Professor and asks the Professor to teach her a thing or two about



sociology, she is doing so not because she only wants to be accepted nor is it because she has

already been brainwashed or coerced. Rather, she is doing it because the Professor, having been

in the field of sociology long enough, and being a practicing sociologist, has with him valuablelessons and knowledge that an aspiring sociologist like her can use. This is a very common

understanding of what ‘authority’ in a specialized field means. But because the writer has

personal bias against ‘authorities’ the writer therefore misses entirely this acceptable applicationof the term.

Also, given this ‘other’ application and appreciation of the term ‘authority’, it will not be

a rejection of our freedom when we use, adopt, cite or even merely quote a particular idea of a particular ‘authority’, contrary to what the writer claims. When we do use, adopt, cite or quote

ideas of a particular thinker, we are just recognizing that not only that other people have studied

a particular subject matter longer than some of us did, we are also not being stupid to pretend

that we can gain knowledge absolutely and solely by ourselves alone. Indeed, the writer’s claimruns contrary, again, against how the social world really works. The truth is that our knowledge

whatever its nature: philosophical, sociological, scientific and even personal; and concepts like

‘freedom’, ‘reason’, and even ‘self’ are ‘social’ knowledge i.e., social in nature. There is no such

thing as knowledge as absolutely based on one’s own mind alone. Later I will consider how our knowledge, even of ourselves, is essentially connected to society that is, from ‘influences’

(which by the way for the writer only means ‘against freedom’) we gain from it.But more than that, the writer’s claim essentially rejects the virtue and value of social

cooperation. It also entirely dismisses society. If we will read carefully the arguments the writer

presents in his paper, what he is rejecting is not only the vicious and malicious ‘authorities’ but

also the idea of society itself. This is so since the writer did not bother to make necessarydistinctions and hence his claims become encompassing and universal. Later, I will also consider

the idea that when a man is isolated entirely from society, he will cease to be a man and will

become a mere beast.The academe being a field of interest, like any other field, is being pursued out of

personal inclination and preference. Thus the academe is not a demonic institution deceiving the

people so it can enslave them.Here I want to pursue another issue raised by the writer. According to him, what these

‘authorities’, who feign greatness, really do is to merely cloth with technical jargons what are

essentially ‘simple and easy’ things. That is, they only complicate and obscure things which areindeed ‘simple and easy’, again because of their malicious desire to enslave others. Is this true?

Let us see.

As I have stated awhile ago, the more profound our existential and human problems are,

the more they necessitate an equally profound thinking and abstraction so as to meet their challenges and eventually solve them. Now it is true that one of the things the philosophers or

social scientists try to solve are experiences that are open to all. But because of our tendency to

take things for granted or to take them as ‘given’ or even ‘natural’, the social scientists thereforehave to rise above and examine whether what we see and claim as apparent is all there is in it or

whether there is much more behind to what seems real. Let me give an example. When we look

at a tree, are we ‘really’ seeing a thing which is essentially a tree?Ordinary people would answer ‘yes’, more likely with sarcastic comments on the side.

But this is not really as simple as it looks like. The issue here actually is whether there is such a

thing as a thing-in-itself i.e. thing which is itself and exist of itself independent from the human

mind, or not. The answer is not easy. If we will take Kant he would say yes there are such things



that exist by themselves independent from the human mind, it just so happen that we can never

have knowledge of them because our capacity to know is limited in time and space. That is, we

can only know things and events as they happen in time and space, the phenomena, and notthings that ‘are’ outside phenomena (or what he calls the ‘noumena’). Given this, according to

Kant, we can never know, for instance, whether the universe as a whole has a beginning in time

or not because such question is beyond the capacity of the human mind to grasp, which is boundonly to things accessible to experience (which happens in phenomena).

But if we will take his younger contemporary Fichte, he will say that there is no such

thing that has an existence and essence outside the human mind. According to him, when weopen our eyes what we actually see are “X’s” i.e. meaningless sensations that have no meaning,

essence, and existence on their own. These meaningless sensations become a ‘thing’ only

because we posit them to be a ‘tree’, ‘animal’, etc. But on their own, they are nothing.

It is not our intention here to determine which of these two competing ideas is true (justto calm the writer, it is obvious that these two ‘authorities’ do not ‘adhere’ nor conform to each

other’s jargons. In fact, as we have seen, they reject each other’s theory. This is just one of the

many proofs we can adduce to prove that in the academe, contrary to what the writer claims, the

rule that has to be followed is not ‘adherence’). My point here in citing this example is to showthat things which we regard as ‘common sense’, ‘simple’ ‘easy’, ‘given’ or even ‘natural’ are,

most often than not, not what they seem to be.Also it must be obvious why these two thinkers have to use technical terms. They do so

because ordinary language is not sufficient to express and present ideas which are complex and

difficult in nature. This is so since, for one, ordinary language is open to many misconceptions

and ambiguities. Thus the need arises to use or present idea, which are essentially complex, indifferent tone (though not necessarily ‘superior’ over ordinary language as to create elitism).

This need often translates to creations and/or innovations by the thinkers of their own technical

terms so as to present their arguments as clear and as free from any misconceptions andambiguities as possible. If these two thinkers, and this is also true to all other ‘authorities’,

merely talk about ordinary things, then surely they would not use highly technical and difficult

terms. But since the subject they discuss cannot be considered at all as ordinary, simple and easy,then the use of technical terms and sophisticated explanation are warranted. Now if the writer

would question the significance of the topic discussed by, in our example, Kant and Fichte, we

can answer him this way. It is significant precisely because it involves the very state of our being. That is, what is being discussed by these two ‘authorities’ is not just whether there is such

a thing as a ‘tree’ or not, but more importantly how we come to know reality. It involves the idea

of how we perceive things which we take as reality, what is the basis of our knowledge, what is

the limit of human reason and what is its power and to what extent can we control and determinereality.

As I have said, the more profound our existential and human problems are, the more they

necessitate higher abstraction. Again, if Marx had not studied painstakingly the structure of thecapital system, its evil would not have been exposed. In other fields, for instance science, I

wonder how we can talk of quantum physics using ordinary language.

I have mentioned our tendency to take things which are essentially problematic andcomplex as merely simple and easy. Sadly, the writer has somewhat displayed this uncritical

tendency. This is evident in the many claims he has made in his paper, the contents of which are

very much highly debatable and are still the subject of debates within and outside the academe or

the ‘world of authorities’. For instance, the writer claims that:



It is true that history repeats itself … [My emphasis]

This view is in fact just one of the many views regarding history. There are also other

views like ‘history moves in a spiral direction’, ‘history is the progression of spirit’, ‘history is

organized around episteme’ and so on. What makes the writer claims that out of the many viewsregarding history, ‘history repeats itself’ is the true view? What is funny is that, in the paper, the

writer takes that view as the ‘true view’ while at the same time rejecting an equally plausible

view and therefore equally debatable view that:

History is moving towards perfection is misleading [My emphasis]

Just because we have two ‘Edsa Revolutions’ do not mean that ‘history repeats itself’ is

true. In fact, the view that ‘history is determined by the strongest discourse’ is a more plausible

view to apply in the two Edsas.Another example which exhibits the tendency of the writer to take things as ‘simple’ is

his claim that culture and government must be fused so as to avoid ‘inefficacy’ and ‘unwantedupheavals’. What this statement means is that upheavals in a certain nation are due to the

disparity between culture and the law or government. While this statement is true in some cases,

it does not apply to all cases. There is a country in West Asia (forgive me for forgetting the

name) where the government indeed reflects the culture of its people, which is Muslim culture.But very recently an upheaval has erupted in that country. This only shows that the cause of

social disorder is not only disparity between culture and government. Social order cannot be

achieved by simply making the government reflects culture. The social world does not move based on some very elementary formula. And it becomes a little more complicated when we

consider modern nations that have diverse pluralism i.e. that have diverse and different cultures

(present in just one nation).It is this problem regarding modern democratic society and its diversity that Rawls tries

to answer. And since the problem is much more complex, he therefore abstracted a little deeper

and invented new ‘technical’ terms because the problems faced by modern societies cannot beresolved anymore by simply applying the simple idea of making the ‘government reflects the

culture’. Following Rorty, we have to have new metaphors so we can look and consequently

approach things with new perspective and solution

Here I would like to pursue an issue that might be raised especially by the writer. Giventhat the academe, like any other, is a field of interest and that one enters into it out of personal

interest and preference, still why does one have to use the language or jargons of the academe?

Now if one has read closely the arguments I presented above, one would realize that I havealready answered the question. But for the sake of being explicit let me pursue this issue using

the concept of necessity.

There are basically two kinds of necessity, one is called simple necessity which is derivedfrom a thing’s nature and the other one is conditional necessity which is shaped by the condition

affixed to it. For our case, we will be dealing with the idea of conditional necessity. To explain

what conditional necessity is, let me cite this example.



There is nothing that coerces us to walk. That is, walking is an activity done out of our

own free decision. Now when one finally decides to walk, although there is nothing that coerces

one to move forward, one will nevertheless have to move forward. This is because the condition

we append to walking is that of moving forward. Thus although nothing coerces us to walk,

when we freely decide to walk, it is necessary for us to move forward. Let us apply the logic of

this idea to the academe. Although no one is coerced to enter the academe, when one freelydecides to enter the academe one would have to eventually use its language. Likewise, although

no one is coerced to, say, study the computer system, when one finally decides to study it, one

would necessarily have to know the names and jargons of the computer system. Now if in spite of this explanation the writer would still claim that those who enter the

academe are not free because they will have to use its jargons, then the same will be true to all

fields being pursued even out of one’s preference and inclination. And since the modern world is

characterized by diverse plurality, what we actually do therefore, if we will follow the argumentof the writer, is to merely choose which field we want to be enslaved with. This is so since each

field has its own set of jargons.

This brings me to expose the danger of the writer’s position, which is essentially

connected to an erroneous conception of freedom.What the writer is actually espousing is solipsism. The belief that says that ‘I am my own

world’ and that I alone should be the sole and absolute determiner of my freedom and that

everything and anything which is not created by me is the negation and the anti-thesis of my

freedom. Let me for a moment quote some passages from the paper of the writer that actually

points to his dangerous solipsistic impulses brought about by a misconceived notion of freedom.

According to the writer:

1- Freedom is a condition free from anything (a universal concept)

2- There were still many ideas to share but this tasks bores me so much because of the

‘ethics in writing, standards of research and etc’ since I want to be free

3- I want to write anything that I wanted without any (a universal concept) connection

from another topic because I am free to do it

The writer believes that he is not free when he has written his paper for he has to

follow certain guidelines. Aside from that, according to the writer, the reason why

he only follows guidelines is the fear of stigma and the punishment of non-

acceptance. Thus in effect what the writer is claiming is that human civilization andthe entire social world and its order are founded only on the fear of people to

be isolated. But sociologists can prove that the history of mankind and that the

socialworld are not formed merely out of cowardice.

4- Being great is having the privilege to play by naming things and make it forma… we

have no choice [and therefore not free-Eisen]



5- Why do they apply the word orange to a single crayon… why not apply the nameeggplant to a violet crayon or call the eggplant violet…well, we have no choice...

6- Their acts [deviants] were signs to achieve their freedom. Where in fact it would

lead to anarchy, it is still free

7- We were talking here about freedom and not about the system of government, where

freedom has been defined as doing things in accordance with the law

[Note: the blackened phrases are my emphases]

The first quoted passage is the telling one. For the writer ‘freedom’ means total

detachments from anything. Anything that binds one to something is against the idea of ‘realfreedom’. Although the writer claims that this kind of freedom is somewhat suicidal, he

nevertheless regards this as its ‘real’ conception. This made the writer claim that ‘abnormal’

people are free for they are detached from ‘the binds he agreed to be with’. According to the

writer, since ‘abnormal’ people… can no longer go back to his normal condition and therefore abnormal yet free [my emphasis]

What are these ‘binds’ that the writer talks about? These binds are, first and foremost, the

norms of society, which for him is absolutely and necessarily against ‘real freedom’. Hence,

since abnormal people no longer recognized such norms, they are therefore, according to thewriter, ‘free’.

Because the writer’s conception of freedom is ‘total detachment’ even matters like

naming things are raised by him as a case of our enslavement. Thus the writer believes that he is

not free because the things we call, say, ‘kulangot’ is a term given not by him but by some one

else. But if the term ‘kulangot’ is a term which he alone has created, then he is, according to his

argument, ‘free’.We can classify the things which the writer has adduced to serve as a proof of our

enslavement as political, social and even structural and cultural. The last quoted passage is the

writer’s view of freedom in the domain of politics. The sixth is his conception of what socialfreedom is; the second and third passages I regard as his view of freedom in what I personally

classify as those that has an essential connection to structure and culture.

Let me first discuss the issue regarding naming things.

The fact that things have already been named points to, according to the writer, the realitythat ‘authorities’ have dominated the world. What he means by this is that it is the ‘authorities’

who give names to things. But is this accusation true or another case of personal bias getting the

better of the writer? Let us see.There are several things the writer’s claim means. First, the writer’s claim also means that

when one has successfully given a particular thing a name, then one is automatically an

‘authority’. But the question is what if the ones that give a name to a particular thing are basically nothing in terms of status and have nothing in terms of material wealth and properties?

Can we or should we still consider them as ‘authorities’?

The ‘food’ we called ‘pagpag’, a mix of spoiled foods dumped as garbage and scavenged

by poor people, is a name given by these poor people. Although ‘pagpag’ is a ‘food’ which is



available only within their circle (which by the way is a very large circle given the mammoth

number of urban poor people in the Philippines), the ‘food’ is known as ‘pagpag’ and people

who do not and would not want to eat this ‘food’ refer to it as ‘pagpag’. The question now is arethese people then ‘authorities’ who, because they have successfully given a name to a thing,

enslave us because we have “no choice” but to call that thing ‘pagpag’?

Now if the writer would claim that this is a different case, then I would say that that isexactly the point. That is, the etymology of a particular name or word or the reason why we

associate to a particular thing a particular name is not necessarily and absolutely and simply

because of some ‘authorities’, as what the writer wants us to believe. The name ‘Lucy’ given byJohansson to an archeological discovery is in fact not his creation. He merely adopted the name

for the obvious and practical purpose of reference. True, it can be given other name but what is

the point? The more important thing here is the discovery and not what name should be given to

it. The fact that Johansson adopted the name Lucy from just a popular song points to the almostinsignificant matter of naming the discovery. What is obvious though is the need to have a word

that will signify it. The truth is the name Lucy has long existed prior to its adoption by

Johansson. The name is in fact a name of a person. Thus, if we will follow the argument of the

writer, the parent who first introduced that name in the world must be the ‘authority’, even if that parent has nothing and is nothing.

There are many reasons why particular things are given their particular names. For example, some things derived their names from their activity e.g. the spider called ‘black

widow’. It is called ‘black widow’ because it kills its partner after mating with it. Some derived

their names from their history, for instance the White House which was so-called after it was

painted white to hide the damage it sustained when the British forces attacked Washington.Another example is the ‘knot’ which is the unit use to measure the speed of a ship. It is called

knot because in the old days the speed of ships were measured by tying a rope full of knots

(‘buhol’) to a log while a sailor in the ship would hold the rope and would count the number of knots that passes through his hand as the ship sails. The speed of the ship therefore is the total

number of knots that passed in a sailor’s hand within a given time.

Still, some things are named after the manner of their creation like hollow blocks whichare blocks made with hollow or empty spaces inside. Some are named after someone like teddy

bear which is named after Theodore Roosevelt or Leningrad after Lenin. Some are named

because of their location, for example, we call the United States of America and Europe as the‘West’ while they in turn call us the ‘East’. Some are named after their shape like the pyramid of

Egypt or the Quezon City circle. Some are named after the manner of their movements like the

animal ‘sloth’ which is so-called because the word ‘sloth’ means ‘slow’ and the animal is slow-

moving. Some are named after the manner of how they were created like my example earlier ‘pagpag’ because this ‘food’ is given a ‘pagpag’ to rid it of its dirt since it is scavenged from

garbage. Still, some are just customary like “looban’, ‘niyog’, ‘kulisap’, ‘dahon’, etc.

It is very much possible that there are hundreds of millions of names or terms that are being used today by different people with different culture, language, ethnicity, race and social

milieu. And it is equally possible that out of that hundreds of millions of words, so very many of

them are introduced or given by ordinary people who lead ordinary lives. Or to put it another way, it is very much impossible that all these hundreds of millions of words are introduced or

given by ‘authorities’ alone. In fact, ‘authorities’ will only give names to things which have

something to do with their study. Does the writer really think that common names such as

orange, water, leaves, roots, hammer, dog, family, fur, claws, thread, needle, sap, logs, earth or



mud, waste, garbage, pathways, sidewalks, pavements, coins, strap, stones, tears, paddle,

eggplant, fruits, balcony, column, pins, cowl, windows, doors, bowls, spoons, forks, fangs,

carriage, jumper, blade, scratch, dust, dirt, and hundreds of millions more are created andintroduced only by some ‘elite authorities’? In truth, the many English names derived their

origin from the ordinary Greek and Roman words. In our country, many of our words can be

traced to Chinese, Malays, Sanskrit, Spanish and English terms. Still, many others are customarythat is, words that are handed down from generation to generation. Indeed, so many words,

Filipino and English, are used out of habit and custom. The misconception of the writer arises

from his belief that whatever that is not his creation is necessarily and absolutely and simply

created by ‘authorities’ and therefore, if one can, must be rejected. The writer seems to have

forgotten the fact that many of our words are words that have evolved and thus it cannot be

traced, as to their origin, to a single or even several people, or what he calls ‘authorities’, alone.

The writer also claims that the mere existence of words which he has not himself created but has to adopt means that he is not free since he has ‘no choice’ but to use them. This claim

only proves that what the writer is espousing is solipsism. The writer believes that whatever it is

that he has not ‘created’ but he has to use is necessarily and absolutely against ‘freedom’. Thus

since we are born in this world with so many things already established, the writer feels that, bythat reason alone, he is not free. His conception of ‘real freedom’ then is when he alone ‘creates’

everything solely and absolutely out of his personal likings and preferences.But this is not only an oblique denial of the need for everyone to be in the social world

but also this totally rejects the idea of social collective action and collaboration forged to attain

worthy ideals and goals. The writer simply did not bother himself to make necessary distinction

between healthy social participation like participating in quest for social justice and equalityfrom a kind of social arrangement that restricts freedom. The writer seems to be totally obsessed

with the idea that whatever (a universal concept) it is that binds one to anything is necessarily

detrimental to personal development. That is why he regards deviants as free. According to thewriter:

Unless deviants will set their own standards… then they confidently act their way…Most of their

action came from dissatisfaction to participate what people say and standards, to say that they

will participate in it is impossible [an absolute and universal claim-Eisen]. Their acts were signsto achieve their freedom. Where in fact it would lead to anarchy, it is still free [blackened word/ phrases are my emphases]

That is, even if the actions of deviants lead to anarchy i.e. destruction not only of the material

foundations of society e.g. roads, buildings, etc. but also of immaterial foundations like sense of social justice, social equality, social respect, social identity etc. as long as they act from their

‘dissatisfaction’ and preferences, they are free.

Freedom indeed for the writer is acting solely and absolutely from one’s own preferencesdisregarding any form of standards and norms. This is the reason why the writer claims that he is

not free when he writes his paper (passages 2 and 3 above) since he has to observe ‘ethics in

writing’. Thus for the writer, any (a universal concept) standard or norm is against freedom.Passages 2 and 3 above are not just about following ‘standards of writing’. At the heart

of these passages the real issue is indeed about language. Why? Well, writing is, first and

foremost, putting into papers spoken languages. Thus by rejecting the ‘standard of writing’ the

real issue here is the rejection of language. And since it is very clear that the message of the



passages of the writer is that any standard or norm is a negation of freedom, language therefore,

which has rules on its own, must be viewed as enslaver and ideally must be rejected.

Now let us first look at what is the writer’s concept of ‘standard of writing’. Passage 3actually gives us the answer. It says:

I want to write anything that I wanted without any connection from another topic because I am free [my emphasis]

Thus the ‘standard of writing’ which the writer speaks of and wants to reject is nothing but the art of delivering or presenting ideas clearly and coherently. In essence what the writer

claims is that to deliver an idea clearly and consistently is just an oppressive norm. Again, it only

shows that at the heart of passages 2 and 3 the real issue is language since this is the paramount

role of language that is, to make it possible for us to connect to others clearly and coherently.The writer then essentially claims that to connect to others clearly and coherently is just one of

those alienating norms imposed by ‘authorities’ to “dwarf us” so we would not grow. This

practice then of connecting to others clearly must be, ideally, rejected.

Now is it true that language is just another norm imposed on us by some ‘authorities’with the sole intention of dwarfing us? Again the writer has run counter against the dynamics of

language.Any language of any particular race, culture, ethnicity and nationality of any particular

age is something which is not intentionally created. As Hayek explains it, it is one of those

institutions which develops and grows spontaneously without any one determining it. In fact,

this institution which spontaneously grows on its own is not subject to direct human interventionand manipulation. For example, one, even if she is an ‘authority’, cannot just simply pass a law

stating that she is changing altogether the meaning of all words spoken by a particular nation or

country. Language does not operate that way. Whatever is the present form of any particular language of any particular culture, race or nationality, is a form that is shaped over time i.e.

from one generation to another to another to another and so on. Or put another way, language

itself evolves. Its changes are not determined by any one. In contrast, the changes a language hasundergone are very gradual for anyone to notice much less to determine. In other words language

has its own dynamics. And since a language is a social and cultural institution that spontaneously

develops and grows on its own, the issue of it is just another imposition by some ‘authorities’ isout of the question.

As I have said, language is a social and cultural institution. The fact that there are

different languages spoken by different people of different race and culture attest to the reality

that language is an integral and indispensable tool of people. Its paramount and essential role, being a social institution, is to facilitate connection to other human beings. Without language the

civilization of mankind would not be possible.

It is through language that we express our hopes and fears, frustrations and desires,wishes and agonies, convictions and resentments, sympathies and resistance. It is through

language that we express our very being. Language is in fact one of most important creations of

human kind. Through language we can, as creatures of the social world, express our collectiveaspirations and ideals. It is a symbol of our identity.

I cannot understand why the writer, who professes his belief in man’s capacity to reason

and regards it as his natural faculty would want to reject one of reason’s very own creation

(unless the writer is not aware of the implications of what he has written). As I have said,



language has undergone an evolution of its own. The Filipino language, as we have it today, is

very much different from that used some 100-200 years ago. That is, its form today is not shaped

in a single instance by only one or several Filipinos. There is a long history behind our languageand this is also true to all other languages. Thus language is, like so many others, a social

invention. In fact, even the concept or idea of ‘language’ is social in nature. The writer believes

that only when he alone ‘creates’ his own words he can consider himself free. It has not occurredto the writer that alone he is nothing but a beast since concepts or ideas like ‘language’,

‘freedom’ and even ‘self’ are social in nature that is, these concepts will be nothing if the world

is merely his own.There is a controversial experiment done a long time ago. A child which has grown

enough to be left alone but has not yet acquired self-consciousness and social norms is left inside

a closed experimental room with no human interaction whatsoever. There is only a small

opening on one lower side of the room by which the experimenters slipped food and water. Theyalso slipped objects to observe what the child would do with them. The poor child since left

without any human interaction acts like an animal. The child walks using all his limbs like a dog.

He creates unintelligible noises, his face soaked in his own saliva and he constantly plays his

genital. The child does the same thing over and over again without any sign that he will become‘conscious’ like humans with social interactions do.

Since the writer’s concept of ‘real freedom’ is one absolutely detached from ‘influences’,norms and standards, in other words absolutely detached from the innovations and creations of

human civilization and human reason, then what he really aims for is this state of the child (since

the child is absolutely detached from ‘influences’, norms and standards) which is nothing less

than that of a beast. The experiment only proves that man, when left alone, is nothing but a bare beast. Now if in spite of this the writer would claim that, since man has the power of reason, he

can still become conscious even without social interactions whatsoever, or as he prejudicially

calls it even without ‘influences’ (as I have shown, concepts such as ‘self’, ‘freedom’, ‘I’ aresocial in nature i.e. developed by reason through social interaction, thus they are ‘influences’ of

others), then we should remind the writer that the power of reason is a mere potential, its

actualization lies on interactions and discourse with other fellow human beings. Thus conceptssuch as ‘freedom’ and ‘self’ are social in nature.

Now it is apparent that if you are this child you are definitely not free even though you

are not ‘influenced’ by ‘standards’ and ‘norms’. This is because freedom necessitates

consciousness of one’s self , that is, the consciousness that ‘I’ choose, decide, act, commit,

pursue, wish, indulge, protest, etc. A person who loses entirely his sense of self is therefore not

free; freedom being the product of reason or rational deliberation. Now if you lose your sense of

self, you also lose your power of judgment, inference, and thought. This is why, contrary againto what the writer claims, ‘abnormal’ people are not free.

The question now is why does the writer claim that ‘abnormal’ people are free? This is so

since the writer’s notion of freedom seems to be too egoistically narrow. For the writer freedomis simply doing what one wants anywhere, anytime without regard to anything. Since abnormal

people do things anytime and anywhere they want, for the writer, in virtue of that alone, they are

free. This is the reason why the writer does not make a distinction between conscious ‘deviants’from abnormal people. As long as both do things whenever and wherever they want, they are

‘really free’.

Here the writer commits an inconsistency. Since the notion of freedom itself is a product

of reason through man’s interaction with one another, how can an abnormal person who loses her



sense of self be considered free? That is, how can a person who loses her power of reason be

free where in fact the exercise of freedom necessitates the exercise of reason? How can a

conscious deviant and an unconscious abnormal person be equally free? The only answer that the writer can give us, which indeed only proves his seemingly narrow appreciation of the

concept of freedom, is because both do things as they like, when they like without regard to

anything.Here using the argument of the writer on how deviants can be considered free, we can see

an inconsistency and his seemingly unconscious admission that ‘freedom’ necessitates self-

consciousness. Again using that very same argument of the writer we can see that hisappreciation of the notion of freedom is indeed too narrow. According to the writer:

Unless deiviants will set their own standards…

In order to be free, one should act in accordance with his preferences…

This statement implicitly affirms that freedom necessitates self-consciousness that is, the

consciousness, for example, that ‘I’ set my own standards or ‘I’ do things based on my own

preferences. Now following his argument, if freedom means doing things based on our owndecisions, preferences and assessments, in short using our capacity to think for ourselves, the

question is, how can an abnormal person who loses the capacity to decide, prefer, and assessthings on her own or who loses the capacity to think for herself, be free? If the writer would ask

how can we be so sure that abnormal people lose their sense of selves, and consequently their

capacity to think or reason, the answer is pretty much obvious. The capacity to reason simply

means, among others, the capacity to recognize and discern norms and standards. We are not

talking here whether these norms and standards are oppressive or not. We are just saying that the

capacity to reason is the capacity to discern and recognize them. The deviants certainly have

this capacity. They do recognize and can discern what are the norms and standards of society; itis just that they do not want to follow these norms. Following the argument earlier that you can

only reject something meaningfully when, first and foremost, you know what you are rejecting,

these deviants then have the power to reason or think and that it is precisely the basis of their being deviants. That is, since they can recognize and discern when a certain norm or standard is

oppressive, they therefore have a basis for their deviancy. Deviants therefore are conscious of

themselves that is why they can say that ‘they do not want to follow this or that norm and soon’.

This does not mean however that deviants are always right, contrary again to what the

writer claims that when you become a deviant you are necessarily right. Again, this is a too

simplistic account of the phenomenon of deviancy. We can cite many examples to show that not

because you become deviant, you are necessarily right and free. In this case, the writer again

exhibited the tendency to take things, which are essentially complex, as simple and black and

white.Abnormal people certainly lack the capacity to discern and recognize norms. Also they

lack consciousness of their being. These are proven by their openness to inflict harm not only to

others but to themselves as well, for no apparent reason whatsoever. Their temerity to do thingswhich are offensive to others’ sensitivities, for example, they masturbate their genitals whenever

they feel like it even if they are in front of so many people, proves that they have no control over

their actions. In fact, abnormal people, contrary to again to what the writer claims, are often only



driven or moved by their bodily desires, hence they are slaves of their untamed bodily appetites.

In other words, abnormal people are far from being free.

The question is if indeed the concept of freedom, as the writer himself unconsciouslyadmits, necessitates consciousness of one’s self, which is also the basis of such claims as ‘ I’

reject, and also necessitates the capacity to think or reason, why does the writer claim that

abnormal people are free where in fact they have no such capacity? The answer, again, only proves the writer’s narrow definition of freedom, which is, you are free when you do things

whenever and wherever you like them. Again, this is the reason why the writer does not

differentiate ‘deviants’ (who are conscious but not necessarily right) from abnormal people (whoare not conscious at all).

The reason behind this narrow appreciation of the concept of freedom emanates from the

writer’s indiscriminate notion of ‘authority’. The writer, because he seems to have a personal

loathing against ‘authority’, does not bother to differentiate between kinds of ‘authorities’. I personally believe that political ‘authorities’ like the Marcoses must be condemned but I respect

and admire ‘authorities’ like Randy David. The writer believes that all ‘authorities’ are against

freedom and therefore must be rejected, even at least theoretically. That is why he even included

norms and standards, social and political institutions and even the fact that things in the worldhave already been given names as things that must be rejected for these are, according to the

writer, merely works of ‘authorities’ and therefore necessarily and absolutely ‘anti-freedom’.But this claim, if the writer is not aware of it, is in essence a rejection of the value and

virtue of social collective actions that can be used to achieve just and equal social order which

can, in turn, promote genuine trust and respect among citizens. Put another way, the fact that we

have the capacity to think and that fact that this capacity is brought and developed by our socialinteractions mean that we can use this very reason to construct social institutions embedded with

principles or norms that can and will promote the exercise of our individual freedom. That is, we

can construct social institutions, norms and standards which are not against personal freedom butin fact can establish a social world wherein we can fully exercise our freedom. This is in sharp

contrast to the cynicism of the writer that claims that social institutions and norms are

necessarily and absolutely against freedom.Again, I cannot understand why the writer, who claims that reason is man’s natural

faculty, would categorically shun the possibility of using this reason to create social institutions

that can and will promote the exercise of personal freedom. In truth, freedom and society are not

essentially and necessarily contradictory, contrary again to what the writer suggests. These two

concepts can complement each other through the use of reason so as to establish a free and well-

ordered society.

Here I would like to present cases which can totally make the writer abandon his previousclaims regarding ‘authority, jargons and deviancy. These examples can also make the writer

accept that not all norms or standards are ‘anti-freedom’.

Suppose that, late at night 6 men barged into the house of the writer and raped his femalesiblings and his mother. When these men were finally caught, the reason they offered why they

did what they did is because they are ‘deviants’ and therefore ‘free’. And being deviants it is

“impossible” for anyone to expect them to follow social norms and standards, in this case thenorm they violated is “respect to others’ well-being”. If we will follow the arguments presented

by the writer, these men being deviants, are right and therefore have not committed any wrong

doing when they barged in and raped the writer’s siblings and mother. Also being deviants they

only want to reject established social norms and standards which necessarily curtail, according to



the writer, personal freedom. Certainly, the writer will say that their action is not a case of

freedom since it has violated the rights of others. But if the writer will make this statement, then

we should remind him that his concept of freedom starts and ends with the person who will act“(In order to be free, one should act) in accordance with his preferences…” and therefore not on

the consequences of a person’s preferred action. Furthermore, the writer’s concept of “deviants’

freedom” is ‘unless deviants will set their own standards… where in fact it would lead toanarchy, it is still free’ i.e. even if their actions would lead to anarchy as long as they acted out of

their ‘own standards’ they are free, regardless of consequences. Well, barging into the house of

somebody else and raping the women who live there is anarchy. But following the writer, this isfreedom.

Now if the writer would claim that this is not freedom since what they did is against

reason, following again the writer, we can ask him how he came with such a statement? If he

says because they violated the rights of others, he again would essentially contradict himself.This is because, aside from the reason I have cited above regarding the writer’s notion that we

are free as long as we act based on our own preference and his notion of freedom of deviants, to

say that they acted against reason is to say that there is a principle which these rapists violated.

And that this principle therefore is obviously a guide for our actions and interactions with others.That is, if one does not observe this principle then we can claim that one has committed a

violation. Without this guiding principle such claims that others violated some right is senselessand empty. If indeed the writer would claim that what they did is against reason and therefore not

freedom, then the only basis of that claim would be his unconscious recognition that the

reasonable exercise of freedom necessitates the observance of norms. As I have cited above,

neither can the writer claim that they are not deviants for his formulation of ‘deviants’ are thosewho act solely based on their own preference even if their actions would lead to anarchy.

There are several points my example proved and these are:

1- That the exercise of freedom necessitates the exercise of reason

2- That reason and freedom are inseparable from each other

3- That it is actually reason which substantiates or gives nature to freedom. That is there isno such thing as ‘freedom itself’; its content and extent is expressed by reason

4- It is actually reason which expresses guidelines in terms of principles which we can use

to make our actions and interactions with others reasonable5- That the exercise of freedom necessitates a recognition that we live in a social world and

hence the recognition of the need to respect societal norms

6- That the exercise of freedom necessitates respect of others’ social spaces and well-being

which would render anarchism as not a case of ‘freedom’ contrary to what the writer claims

7- Deviancy for deviancy’s sake is worthless and senseless; in our example, the rapists are

indeed deviants, following the writer’s formulation, for they do not recognize establishednorms

Given the essential relation of reason and freedom, principles, norms, standards andsocial institutions, especially those well-thought of, are not necessarily against freedom,

contrary to what the writer suggests. The rapists, though they act based on their own preference,

are not free for they violated a norm or standard of society which says that we should respect the

dignity of others. This only proves that not all norms and standards of society are ‘anti-freedom’.



In fact, such norms, when everybody observes them, would facilitate the exercise of personal

freedom, since if all observes such norms, we are free from coercion and fear. But again the

writer does not bother to make a distinction between norms that facilitate social order conducivefor the exercise of personal freedom, from mere guidelines that oppress or alienate others.

Here I will present another case that can change the writer’s view regarding ‘authorities’

and their jargons. According to the ‘world of medicine’ which is full of ‘authorities’ a.k.a.medical doctors, sexual intercourse within family members should not be practiced. This is so

since the chances of reproducing a baby with many congenital diseases are much higher when

one engages in sexual intercourse with family members than when one would with a non-familymember. Since the writer argues that anything these ‘authorities’ claim is nothing but statements

aimed to enslave us, will the writer then be open to the idea of having a sexual intercourse with

his female siblings or even with his own mother? If he says, in response, that even if these

‘authorities’ did not make this claim, he would still not engage in sexual intercourse with themsince this is immoral, then we should ask him that is not the concept of “having sex with a family

member is immoral” is itself merely a norm or standard of society? In fact, the writer who is so

fond of using the idea of ‘nature’ or ‘natural’ should not reject the idea of sexual intercourse

with his family members because the idea of ‘family’ itself is a creation of society, while the actof procreation is the most, if not the most, as Aristotle says, natural acts of living creatures.

Now the ‘world of medicine’ filled with ‘authorities’ a.k.a. medical doctors argues thatsex with members of a family should be avoided because of the reason cited above. And that

explanation I think is reasonable enough. Indeed, who would want to reproduce a child who can

possible sustain many diseases? If the writer honestly believes that all the pronouncements of the

‘authorities’ are useless and senseless, then the writer is very much open to engage in sexualintercourse with his ‘family’ members, since again, even the concept of ‘family’ is just a product

of institutionalization of society.

Aside from the obvious point this example makes, there is also a point it wants to convey:that not all things considered as ‘natural’, which the writer somewhat wants to achieve, are good.

There are natural things or acts which can be destructive or harmful to us.

On The Substance of Freedom

[This is a very brief introduction of the theme I will be discussing in my next paper]

As I have mentioned time and again, the exercise of freedom necessitates the exercise of reason. There is no such thing as freedom itself; its content and extent are expressed by reason.

Note here the words ‘extent’ and ‘content’. The writer has, in a way, recognized that one cannot

get away from society although he also essentially claims that ‘real freedom’ is a condition free

from anything and therefore free from society, since society is ‘something’. Thus for the writer,society limits freedom and that the need to cooperate with others is essentially against freedom.

It has not occurred to the writer that freedom is not about doing anything out of your own

preferences. The essence of freedom, its content and extent, is what our reason expressed for it.We can use this general statement to understand what I mean: since reason has the capacity to

formulate principles and since man by using this reason can freely formulate principles that can

serve as his guidelines for his actions and interactions with others, then so long as he acts basedon that principles, which he has freely arrived at without any force or coercion from others, he



can consider himself free. Notice the very obvious point here. Since freedom is expressed by

reason in terms of principles, the notion of freedom therefore ceases to be that narrow conception

of just ‘doing things based solely on one’s preferences’. Now, for instance, if the principles you freely arrived at are ‘respect to others’ social

spaces and consideration of the consequences of your actions to others’ well-being’, when you

act on these principles you can consider yourself free for they are principles expressed by reasonand are arrived at freely. Having and adhering to these principles mean, in turn, that you would

not commit an act contrary to what your principles express, for example, you would not

transgress against others’ social spaces. Notice again the very obvious point here. When you do

not transgress against others’ social spaces, meaning when there is something you would and

could not do, it does not mean that you are not free. On the contrary, by refusing to commit such

transgression, what you are doing is really to affirm your conception of freedom, which is based

on principles. Or to put it another way, when you affirm and adopt a particular principle, thereare actions which are necessarily rejected i.e. those actions which are against the principles you

affirm. Thus when you affirm, for example, the principle of ‘respect to others’, you necessarily

reject actions that are contrary to that principle which you affirm. This only shows that freedom,

contrary again to what the writer claims, is never about doing just anything you like, for if itwere the case, you would eventually contradict your self. Freedom is expressed by reason and is

substantiated by reason. Notice again that those actions which are necessarily rejected and which you would not

commit are not the limitation of your freedom. On the contrary, the reason why you will not

commit them is because they are violations of the principles you affirmed freely.

[I will discuss this topic fully in the next installment of my paper. But before I proceed tothe third part of this paper, which is my reply to some metaphysical claims made by the writer in

his essay, I would like first to comment on some other ideas raised by the write regarding

‘authorities’]According to the writer:

Philosophical terms and meanings were difficult to grasp”, perhaps because of its’ being tooanalytical. That is the common people would say about it and I have no doubt and confusion why

does it often the case as you would know it. But after grasping its scope you’ll find that it’s just a

simple case in your life

True, but the thing is, things that we regard as ‘obvious’ might turn out, as often is thecase, to be misunderstood. And that precisely is the function, not only of philosophy, but other

social sciences as well that is, among others, to expose the meanings of, and give valuations to,

our ordinary experiences, which we more often than not take as ‘given’. In fact we live our livestaking so many things for granted and unexamined. The role of philosophy is not, if one is aware

of its long history, to create a circle of elites. It is not a secret that even among the philosophers,

in fact even those that are separated by thousands and thousands of years, criticisms and debatesensued and continue to ensue. If philosophy is simply a case of elite-making enterprise, then its

diverse ramifications would not have existed. Indeed, who would give a damn about what really

being is?! No one in his right mind would spend practically his lifetime, and, in the case of Marx

among the many others, would even have not only himself but his entire family starve just to



make it or be included to the ‘clique’. No, what is at stake here is not that seemingly elusive

fantasy of being ‘in’ but rather what each and every one of them thought as truth; that truth

which commands an overwhelming awe so as to drive these thinkers out of their sanity. But of course it is totally a different matter who among them professes the Truth and that matter, I

think, is beyond their intellectual prowess, or anybody’s intellectual prowess for that matter, to

solve. But the fact that it is almost impossible to know what is ‘The Truth’, if there is indeed‘The Truth’, does not make these philosophers just a bunch of ignoramuses.

Now, do they look at themselves and present themselves as authorities? One reason why

the writer’s inveigh and criticism against the philosophers and ‘authorities’ is wrong is that hehas approached and presented them tainted with his own personal loathing. For one, the used of

the word ‘authorities’, when referring to the philosophers, carries with it an attitude and a point

that is meant to win the approval of the readers even without considering first the merit of his

arguments. Of course, when you present philosophers as ‘authorities’ the tendency of the peopleis to distance themselves from them. This is because the term ‘authority’ has acquired a

contemptuous connotation, thanks to the politicians who use their ‘authority’ to oppress the

people. It is no wonder that in our society today there is a drive to rebel against ‘authority’.

Hence the writer is riding on this cynicism to win a point for his argument. But by so doing, theresulting thesis is not free from personal biases and in this case even loathing. The thesis

manifests the attitude of the writer towards the philosophers.This does not mean however that the philosophers are not considered authorities. In fact,

many philosophers are considered authorities not only in the philosophical circle itself but also in

different areas, like Descartes who is regarded as an authority also in the field of mathematics.

But the thing is, such reputations are ‘given’ to them that is to say, they do not philosophize because they simply want to be known as authorities. Surely we cannot blame these philosophers

when, in the first place, somebody else, and not themselves, has regarded them as authorities.

Now true, we can, at the most part, only second guess about their intentions but one thing is surethough, that they have acquired such reputations because of what they have accomplished. You

would not acknowledge someone who has done nothing. The case is like that of a painter, say

Leonardo Da Vinci, who accomplished something worthy of admiration. We look at him as anauthority not because he imposes that idea to us but because we are all a living witness to his

masterpiece. Thus his creation is worthy of emulation, not because we simply want to ‘copy’ so

we can pretend to be just as great, but because we know what commitment really is in a certainfield, and this we come to know through the examples shown to us by these people who lived

before us and who boldly engaged in different fields. These people are therefore exemplars in

their respective endeavors.

According again to the writer:

Of course it is not just a simple talk if we put it in an academic world but to put it in an actual

situation one may not even bother his self to think all of its labyrinth formulation

Exactly! But this situation is actually peculiar to modernity. That is, because of thecomplexity of modern society, people usually are bereft of time to reflect. Thus such situation is

a historical situation, meaning, it (i.e. the bereavement of time to reflect) is brought about by the

changed in the circumstances of the social world. Having said this, it is obvious that the reason

why many of us now don’t even bother to discuss such questions is not because such attitude to



inquire is not part of our natural propensity (and just to avoid another misconception, I am not

saying that it is a part; this matter is open for debate) but rather, because modern society is much

more complex, many find themselves engaged in different things or in the complex division of labor or at the very least doing something else, rather than ‘thinking philosophically’. In

contrast, in much less complex societies, like the Medieval Period, the general attitude of the

people is characterized by inquisitiveness. In fact, during this period, particularly during theRenaissance, we can hardly distinguish a man’s occupation or profession from his wont. This is

so because, during this time, one’s hobby is also one’s bread and butter, like in the case of

Leonardo Da Vinci, Galileo, Kepler etc. The point is, just because we don’t see the common people now, in contrast to the common people of the old times, engaged in philosophical

discourses does not mean that we are justified in our inveigh against philosophical enterprise.

There is a whole sociology behind such transformation of attitude and this we can trace by

comparing the structure of society in the old times from what we have know in this age of modernity. It is important to note that even in the Philippines we have, in our history, such an

age wherein the Filipinos engaged themselves in such fruitful intellectual activity. I am talking

about the 19th century, particularly the latter part of 19th century. It is noteworthy to say that it is

not only the so-called Ilustrados who preoccupied themselves with philosophical ideals. Wehave many examples to show that even those belonging to the so called Indios e.g., Bonifacio,

had their share of philosophizing.

[Note: The writer has also commented on topics which are essentially about metaphysics. One of

his claims is that the essence of things is change, since change is constant. Here, the writer committed again an error. Things are always whole i.e. composite of matter and form. Now what

changes is actually the matter, since it is by itself mere potency. Form, on the other hand is

always fixed since it is the principle whereby things become substantial. For example, the formof a house, which in this case is its purpose [to shelter people and properties], is something ideal

in nature thus it cannot be destroyed. While the materials that constitutes it can and will

definitely change. A house made of wood can change or collapse since, for one, woods aresusceptible to decay but its form, even if its materials collapsed, will continue to be ‘one’. This

does not mean however that all things i.e. human artifacts have, as their form or essence, their

purpose. They are some things which have as their essence, among others, the manner of howthey were created, for instance, the juice drinks called ‘four season’ whose form lies in its

ingredients (the four) and not its purpose.

The subject of the third paper is rather difficult. It requires some effort to be understood.

Nevertheless, I believe that the writer, to whom this paper is really intended, can understand itsarguments, since for one, the writer has background of metaphysics. I myself had a tough time

before I finally understand what Aristotle talks about. But if I can understand Aristotle, so can

the writer. Now to facilitate its reading, I intend to list here some definitions.

Quiddity-simply means essencePrivation-is the absence or lack of being. For example, matter which in itself a mere

potentiality and therefore has no being of its own. But, as Aquinas

says, matter itself is not privation since if it were, it cannot receive

form without destroying it. But as I have said above, things in the world are



always composite, at least in Aristotle’s philosophy

Let us now proceed to the text]

Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics:

On Defintion

In the seventh book of the Metaphysics∗

, Aristotle discusses what he considers as the primary type of being, that is, the type that points to the whatness of being in an unqualified

sense, being qua being. In the discussion he contends that only primary beings or substances i.e.,

particular living things can be given real definition. And to grasp the real definition of particular

living things is to grasp their whatness. This is so since real definition, according to Aristotle, isderived from the very essence of a thing being defined. Hence, Aristotle is saying that only

things that can be given real definition are things that have essences, properly speaking.

The question therefore that we should ask and must answer is what makes this particular living things the proper subject of real definition? Also, why does real definition actually pertain

to their essence?

To answer these questions, we have to investigate, in turn, the principles which constitute particular living things or primary substances as Aristotle claims them to be, that accorded them

the priority of definition. Now, as a necessary preliminary, let me present the essential ideas

discussed by Aristotle regarding substance, form and matter, and their corollary ideas, all of which have played an important role in Aristotle’s disquisition on definition.

As pointed out, the primary type of being is the one that answers or points to the

whatness of a thing. For to ask what a thing is, is to ask not about its quality, quantity, and/or any

other limits that can be imposed on a body. He makes this point clear by explaining the manner by which we make predications. When we say what sort a thing is, we either say that it is good or

bad, but this pertains to quality. Likewise, to say that a thing is three feet long is to point to its

quantity. But neither quality nor quantity answers the whatness of a thing, for a thing can either be big or small, or either good or bad but still none of these affects the thing itself. Thus, not one

of these tells us essentially what a thing is in an unqualified sense but only what sort a thing is.

And this is true of all the other genera. On the other hand, when we say that a particular thing is ahorse or is a man, we are, says Aristotle, speaking of things in an unqualified sense. Such terms

then are terms that signify substance; for substance indicates what a thing is in an unqualified

sense. Thus substance pertains to (the nature of) being since being signifies the whatness of a

thing. It follows from this that to know what a thing is, is to know its substance. Now, though quality, quantity, activity etc., are not the primary type of being, they can

nevertheless be considered as being but only in so far as they are connected with substance, that

is, the primary being. This is so since, according both to Aristotle and Aquinas, the term being is

used in many senses, and one of them of course is the primary sense that pertains to the whatnessof a thing, while others are those that pertain to accidents. Thus ‘being healthy’, for example, is

being only in so far as it is taken as belonging to a substance, say to a man. Taken abstractly, itwill become a non-being. The reason is because, and this is also the reason why genera are

treated as accidents, it is not fitted by nature to exist of itself. And things that exist by reason of

Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. English trans. John P. Rowan



others are considered less than that whereby they exist. But accidents are of such kind of being

thus they cannot exist outside of substance.

It is clear then from this consideration that substance, which points to the whatness of athing, is the primary type of being while the rest exists with some qualification.

Since accidents cannot exist of themselves but only in virtue of a substance, terms

therefore such as ‘to be healthy’, ‘to sit’, ‘to walk’, etc., are terms that signify a definite categoryin virtue of which they exist. And this category is substance. This does not mean however that

the category of substance is part of the meaning of such terms, but only such terms signify

accidents as inhering in substance. Thus substance is prior to accidents. And it is prior, accordingto Aristotle, in every respect that is, in time, in the order of knowing and in definition. Let us

therefore consider briefly the arguments presented by Aristotle on this matter.

One reason we can adduce why it is said that substance is prior to accidents in time is

that, again, terms pertaining to accidents signify a substance in virtue of which they exist. Thatis, accidents cannot possibly exist without substance, as was proven above. And here we can add

that while accidents cannot exist of themselves without substance, there can be substances even

without accidents. In virtue of this, substance is prior to accidents in time.

Also, and this is essentially connected to the first, it is apparent that substance is first inthe order of knowing. For what explains a thing best is prior to those that cannot. Now, it is

obvious that we can only know a thing when we know what it is and not what sort it is. Butaccidents merely tell us the sort of a thing while substance points us to its whatness. And since

accidents merely inhere in substance, to know a particular accident therefore is to know

ultimately the substance in which they inhere. Thus, substance is prior in the order of knowing.

Given all this, it is apparent that substance is also prior to accidents in definition. Since,again, accidents exists only by inhering in a substance and therefore of themselves they have no

being, their definition then will necessarily include the definition of their respective substances.

Now, those things that are given in the intelligible expression of others are considered to be prior to the ones to which the intelligible expression is intended. And this is precisely the

case with the definition of accidents. That is, they can be defined only in reference to the

definition of the subject in which they exist, for they have no beings on their own. Thus,substance is prior to accidents in definition.

It is more evident then from the reasons given above that substance is the primary type of

being by which all others are being only in relation to it; for some are its activity; others itsquality and quantity; others its motion, etc. But still it remains to be discussed what substance is

actually. Let us therefore pursue this matter.

Substance, says Aristotle, is that which all other things are predicated while itself is not

predicated of anything else. This type of substance then is the principal and chief kind of substance, for accidents, and even species and genera, are predicated of it. Indeed, Aristotle

claims that species and genera have no independent existence apart from particular substances∗

.

It is the particular substances which give rise to species and genera. Thus genera, say animal,and species, for example man, are subsequent to particular substances, say Socrates, to which

they and also accidents, are predicated. From this consideration substances can also be regarded

as a subject since a subject is also that of which all is predicated while itself is not predicated of anything else.

J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 120.



Individual or particular things therefore are the basic items in the world in which all other

things depend for their existence. But here we should make the necessary qualification. That is,

it is not just individual things but rather individual ‘living’ things belonging to natural kind i.e.,living things belonging to a specie under a particular genus which are the basic items in the

world. One of the reasons for this is that, while it is true that there are stones and sticks and

clothes and hammer in the world, these things do not have the power to sustain and reproducethemselves unlike particular living things, for example human beings, who regularly procreate,

and aside from the fact that they have their own nature. On a metaphysical aspect this regular

procreation of living things, according to Aristotle, is due to their desire to imitate the eternal being of God. Now this natural procreation is just an admission that the one and the same living

thing cannot attain such a lofty goal. Thus by process of reproducing something like itself (man

begets man), the living things, though not the same animal or plant itself but through their

species, can share in the eternal existence of God.Procreation therefore is one of the most, if not the most, natural acts carried out by living

things. Now it is apparent that stones, sticks, clothes, hammer etc., have no such power. Thus

they cannot be accounted as primary substances.

It is established then that individual living things are the basic items or the primarysubstances in the world. Let us now, in turn, consider the principles that constitute primary

substances.Individual living things being particular things are composite of matter and form. Living

things then are wholes composed of parts. And thus, matter, form and their composite are the

principles constituting primary substances. This however is not one of a univocal division of

primary things. For, although the three are considered as particular substances, they are notsubstances in the same order. This is so since one is predicated essentially while the others are

predicated denominatively. Let us, at the moment, consider the three substances.

Matter, says Aristotle, differs from form since matter in itself is mere potentiality i.e., ithas no being on its own while form is the principle through which it becomes actual. Matter then

relies on other, that is form, for its being. From this it is evident that matter cannot be accounted

as the primary substance for substance, properly speaking, is that which has the power to exist of itself and therefore has the property of ‘thisness’.

In characterizing matter, Aristotle has mentioned that it can be known only through its

essential attribute which is motion since it is, as stated, a mere potency. According to Aristotlethe principle of motion states that its subject, that is the one that undergoes change, differs

essentially from the limits that it will be gaining and thus itself remains even after the process of

change has occurred. For instance, we can only say that a certain cat moves from point A to

point B if we can ascertain that the cat which is now in point B is the same cat that earlier is in point A. Now matter is the first subject that underlies not only quantitative and qualitative

movement, but also those that are substantial. Hence, following the argument, just as matter

differs essentially from quantitative and qualitative limits, so too it differs essentially from itsacquired being.

But more than this argument, what Aristotle used to show that matter differs essentially

from all forms is the method of predication. Generally this method says that something predicated of a subject differs essentially from the being of which it is predicated. Therefore

matter that becomes something is essentially different from that being. But here it is prudent to

heed the advice of Aquinas that this is not meant to be applied to univocal predication in which

genera are predicted of their species. This is so since, obviously, in this kind of predication the



subject is essentially the same as its predicate as in the statement ‘man is an animal’. This then is

to be applied to cases of concrete or denominative predication in which the part of the intelligible

expression is predicated only accidentally as in ‘man is white’, for the quiddity of man differsfrom that of white. The case with matter then is a case of denominative predication. It is

predicated of substance only denominatively not essentially.

This does not mean however that matter is in contrariety with form essentially, that is,matter is not its privation. In fact privations, just as forms, belong to matter only accidentally.

For, as Aquinas says, if privations belong essentially to matter it cannot possibly receive forms

without destroying them. But the fact that there are beings and the fact that they can procreate point to the natural aptitude of matter to receive form. Later, I will consider how form and

matter naturally tends toward each other.

From the above consideration it is evident that form or the specifying principle is prior to

matter. It is what causes the potential to become actual; and what is actual is prior to potential innature. Thus, it is also being to a greater degree because that by which anything is such is

greater.

And since form is prior to matter, it is also prior to their composite, since the composite

shares in something secondary. Furthermore, the whole is said to be subsequent to its principlesfor its being is due to them while their being points to something else. And since form is prior to

matter, their composite then is also subsequent to form.So of the three, form is considered as the primary substance since it is the cause of the

substantial being of the compound. Form then is the essence of a thing.

Now essence is what makes a thing what it is in an unqualified sense and it is what causes

the being of a thing. Thus essence is what a thing is in itself, whose presence a thing’s identitydepends. A change therefore in essence would make a thing different.

Also, essence, being the form, is that which is predicated of a thing essentially while it, in

itself, needs no predication i.e., it can stand on its own. But here Aristotle reminds us that not allthat is predicated essentially points to the essence of a thing, for some property is predicated of

a thing essentially and yet that property cannot be regarded as the essence of the thing to which it

is predicated. Now, such properties are predicated essentially of their subject because in defining them

the definition of their subject must also be given. For instance, the definition of smooth will

necessarily include the term surface and so in effect its definition because we can alwayssubstitute the definition to the word itself. Hence the definition of smooth as ‘that which has an

even surface’ can also be ‘that which has an even face of a solid ’. To prove that properties,

which are predicated essentially of a subject, are not the subject’s essence, let us consider the

following argument.A subject, says Aristotle, serves as a means to many accidental predicates. Hence a

particular subject can be predicated of many properties for instance, smooth and rough which are

essentially predicated of surface. Now since both smoothness and roughness are essentially predicated of surface as its properties, then it will mean that smoothness is the same as

roughness. For, if the quiddity of property is the same as the quiddity of its subject, then

smoothness is the same as surface. But since roughness is also predicated essentially of surface,it will also mean that roughness is the same as surface. Now, things that are identical to some

other things are themselves identical. Hence, smoothness and roughness will turn out to be one

and the same thing which is false. Thus, properties that are predicated essentially of a subject are

not its essence.



As it turns out, though the properties are essentially predicated, the predication is

necessarily an accidental one. This is so since the predication is one of addition i.e., the adding

of the proper subject of the property being defined. But the subject is added to the definition of property not because the property is part of the definition of the subject; rather the subject is part

of the definition of property. Thus the property can exist only as inhering in its proper subject.

But attributes predicated of a thing belong to it essentially when in defining them their subject is not given. Animal then is man’s essence, for the definition of animal does not include

the definition of man.

As stated above, essence belongs only to definite things, for to have an essence is to be adefinite thing. But when an attribute is predicated of a subject accidentally, this is not a definite

thing but only sort of a thing. We have also seen that to be a definite thing is to be a whole.

Thus, the notion of definiteness belongs solely to substances which are composite. Essence then

is to be found only on things that are classed among the species of some genus. And so specieswho belong to a genus are the only ones that can be defined without resorting to accidental

attributes, affections, qualities, etc. Whereas all other things are to be defined through the

attributes and thus making them just sort of things and not things themselves.

Now, while it is true that things which are not classed among species can have definition,such definition nevertheless is merely secondary. For properly speaking, only things that have

essence can have real definition. For instance, though the term tailor, says Aristotle, has adefinition, it does not mean however that it has an essence. This is so since a tailor is first and

foremost an individual man who performs a certain occupation. And thus his remaining the

same individual does not require him to remain a tailor but it does require him to remain a man.

But what makes a thing a particular thing is its essence. Thus definition is proper only to thosethat have essence and these, as stated, are the primary substances.

Let us now consider the statement I made earlier that matter and form have a natural

propensity to coalesce with each other.Although form is regarded as the primary substance as against matter and their

composite, form nevertheless is not being in itself but only the principle through which things

can have being. Thus, according to Aquinas, ‘forms do not have beings…but are rather the principles by which things have beings.’ Therefore ‘just as accidents have complete being only

in so far as they belong to a subject, in a similar fashion forms have a complete being only in so

far as they belong to their proper matter.’ This is more evident it the process whereby primarysubstances generate their kind.

Every generation, says Aristotle, be it natural or artificial, involves something by which

things are generated, and is from something as the principle of generation and must always have

something generated which is the terminus of the generation. In natural generation, that bywhich the generation proceeds is nature or the principle of motion inherent in a thing. Thus, it is

apparent that the principle from which the generation comes about is matter, being itself pure

movement; this is so since every generation is a process of coming to be, a movement fromnonbeing to being. It means only that the things generated is at one time not be and at another

be. But the element that has such character is matter. Moreover, generation can only proceed if

there is something that pre-exists, for nothing comes from nothing. In the case of naturalgeneration, and also artificial generation, it is apparent that matter pre-exists since it is present in

the thing generated. But form is also present in the thing generated, for without it, the generation

is pointless since the terminus of the generation is substantial being. Furthermore, in natural

generation, that by which the generation proceeds, the specific nature or the agent, generates its

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