eduardo ibarra colado-“the ethics of managerial subjectivity”
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The Ethics of Managerial Subjectivity
Eduardo Ibarra-ColadoStewart R. CleggCarl Rhodes
Martin Kornberger
ABSTRACT. This paper examines ethics in organiza-
tions in relation to the subjectivity of managers. Drawingon the work of Michel Foucault we seek to theorize
ethics in terms of the meaning of being a manager who is
an active ethical subject. Such a manager is so in relation
to the organizational structures and norms that govern the
conduct of ethics. Our approach locates ethics in the
relation between individual morality and organizationally
prescribed principles assumed to guide personal action. In
this way we see ethics as a practice that is powerfullyintertwined in an individuals freedom to make choices
about what to do and who to be, and the organizational
context in which those choices are situated, framed and
governed.
KEY WORDS: ethics, Foucault, power, subjectivity
Eduardo Ibarra-Colado is Head of the Department of Institutional
Studies at the Autonomous Metropolitan University, Campus
Cuajimalpa and professor of Management and Organization
Studies. He obtained his Ph.D in Sociology with Honors at the
Universidad Nacional Autonomade Mexico. He is a NationalResearcher of theMexican National System of Research-
ers, and regular member of the Mexican Academy of Sci-
ences. One of his best recognized books is La universidad en
Mexico hoy: gubernamentalidad y modernizacion [The
Mexican University Today: Governmentality and
Modernization], which won theAutonomous Metropol-
itan UniversityAnnual Research Competitionfor the best
research in Social Sciences and Humanities in 2003. He has
published a large number of contributions in the fields of
Organization Studies and Higher Education Studies in
Mexico and Internationally. He is currently working on a re-
search Project on Corporate Ethics, Corruption andGovernance,paying particular attention to the case of Mexico.
Stewart R. Clegg completed a first degreeat theUniversity of Aston
(1971) and a Doctorate at Bradford University (1974).
Stewart is currently a Professor at the University of Technology,
Sydney, and Director of ICAN Research (Innovative Col-
laborations, Alliances and Networks Research), a Key Uni-
versity Research Centre. He also holds Chairs at Aston
University, University of Maastricht and Vrije Universiteit,
Amsterdam. He has published extensively in many journals
and has contributed a large number of books to the literature,
including the award-winning Handbook of Organization
Studies (London: Sage, second edition 2006, co-edited with
Cynthia Hardy, Walter Nord and Tom Lawrence). His most
recent book is Managing and Organizations: an intro-
duction to theory and practice (London: Sage, 2005, with
Martin Kornberger and Tyrone Pitsis), and he has a number of
volumes in press at present.
Carl Rhodes is Associate Professor in the School of Management atthe University of Technology Sydney (UTS). He has
researched andwritten widely on issuesrelated to ethics, learning
and culture in organizations. Within this he has explored at
length research methodologies based on narrative and discourse
approaches. Current research projects focus on the practice of
ethics in management, and the relationship between organiza-
tions in popular culture. Carl is author of Writing Organi-
zation: (Re)presentation and Control in Narratives at
Work (Benjamins, 2001), co-author of Reconstructing
the Lifelong Learner (Routledge, 2003) and co-editor of
Research and Knowledge at Work (Routledge, 2000).
His next book Management Ethics-ContemporaryContexts (co-edited with Stewart Clegg) will appear in 2006.
He has published in journals such as Organization,
Organization Studies, The Leadership Quarterly, and
Qualitative Inquiry.
Martin Kornberger received hisPhD from theUniversity of Vienna
and the University of Innsbruck. After enjoying two years as
postdoctoral research fellow he is currently working at the
University of Technology as Senior Lecturer in the School of
Management and the School of Design. He is also a lecturer at
the School of Management at the University of St Andrews,
Scotland. His current research interests include business ethics as
practice, strategy, and creative professions such as architecture,
design, and digital production.
Journal of Business Ethics (2006) 64: 4555 Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10551-005-3325-z
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Introduction
Being ethical has emerged in the early 21st centuryas one of the major challenges for organizations. In
addressing this challenge, for researchers and man-
agers alike, it is important to understand the way that
ethics are constituted in organizations. There is a
relationship between the actions of individuals and
the ethicality of organizations. Sometimes this rela-
tionship is understood in terms of ethical norms and
rules (formal and informal) and the way that the
members of the organization adhere to them. Seen
this way being an ethical individual means acting in a
way that is detached from personal privileges, pas-sions, and emotions (du Gay, 2000) and adhering to
agreed ethical standards that can be managed.
Such an ethics focuses on how prescriptions (should)
govern everyday actions (see Beyer and Nino, 1999;
Jackson, 2000; Stevens, 1994; Warren, 1993). Other
writers see management that uses ethical rules and
norms as, perversely, antithetical to the possibility of
business ethics (Barker, 1993; Sims and Brinkmann,
2003; Thorne and Saunders, 2002). Instead, ethical
conduct is seen in such situations to emerge directly
from the individual (Soares, 2003). Here, being eth-
ical requires being a person whose individual moralresponsibility leads one to be morally assertive so
as to mediate corporate priorities (Watson, 2003).
The individual is responsible for ethical behaviour
and so organizations should avoid restricting indi-
viduality through rules and instead create an
empowering ethics that enable people to realize
and meet their ethical responsibilities (Kjonstad and
Willmott, 1995; Styhre, 2001).
In this paper, we turn to the ethical theorizing of
Michel Foucault and relate it to a consideration of
ethics in organizations. Specifically, we use Fou-caults work in order to develop an understanding of
ethics and management in a way that mediates
between an understanding of ethics as an individual
responsibility and ethics as organizationally deter-
mined. The means through which a manager acts in
relation to both ethics and organizations are the
central issue. Thus, in this perspective, the subjectivity
of managers is located at the centre stage of ethical
discussion. Subjectivity is a means through which to
think of individual people not as being distinct or
self-contained but as necessarily social; however a
person might consider themself to be an individ-
ual, such a consideration is always done in relation
to others (Mansfield, 2000) and to social institutions,
such as organizations. It is in this sense that we seekto theorize ethics in terms of what it means for a
manager to be an active ethical subject. Being active
entails managing subjectivity as an ethical enterprise
in relation to organizational structures and norms.
Thus, ethics are not the property of the individual,
despite the organization, nor something that orga-
nizations control either formally or informally
instead they are a complex and mutually constituting
relationship between the two.
Foucaults work is valuable because his concern for
ethics is principally about how people constitutethemselves as moral subjects of their actions (Fou-
cault 1984d) while, at the same time, being disci-
plined by institutions into being particular types of
people (Foucault, 1975). For Foucault ethics is a
conscious practice of freedom (1984a: 284)
through which people develop a notion of self that
can be considered ethical. Such practice, however, is
not free in the sense that it is done in the absence of
constraint, but rather in the sense that the ethical self
emerges in relation to (or even against) those social
and organizational rules and norms which seek to
determine or dictate what a person should or shouldnot be. On this basis, our approach seeks to locate
ethics in the relation between individual morality and
organizationally prescribed principles assumed to
guide individual action (Chan and Garrick, 2002;
Kelemen and Peltonen, 2001). We argue that a
complex interaction exists between these elements
an interaction through which individual managers
must negotiate their own ethical conduct. The paper
examines the manager as a moral subject in relation to
subjectivity at work. Such an ethics involves re-
imagining and re-inventing the different ways inwhich people are self-constituted in relation to the
institutions and procedures within which they
operate (OLeary, 2002).
Foucaults ethics
In turning to Foucault as a means to understand
ethics and organizations, it is worth noting the
intellectual context and lineage in which his work is
situated. In this sense, Foucaults work can be
regarded as a response to the traditions of Marxism
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and phenomenology that dominated French intel-
lectual life in the immediate post Second World War
period. In relation to Marxism, this was a response toa teleological conception of history unfolding to a
predetermined outcome. In terms of phenomenol-
ogy, it was a response to a notion of truth as existing
prior to the human subject (Danaher et al., 2000). In
this context Foucaults work, following the philo-
sophical lineage of Nietzsche and the methodologi-
cal/historical legacy of Bloch, (Delacampagne,
1999), provides a historical critique of the presumed
objectivity of scientific truth, and examines how
subjectivity is created through the relations between
language and power (Mansfield, 2000).Foucault is also part of an intellectual lineage back
to Kant while he breaks from Kantian transcen-
dentalism, he retains a privileging of critique in
relation to knowledge. As he puts it: criticism is no
longer going to be practiced in the search for formal
structures with universal value, but rather as a his-
torical investigation in to the events that have led us
to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as
subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.
(Foucault, 1986: 46)1. It is in Foucaults later work
that this concern with critique and subjectivity
emerged in relation to the analysis of the self for-mation of an ethical subject (Rabinow, 2000). In
this context, that Foucaults work can be brought to
bear on a consideration of business ethics, because he
provides a way of thinking about the very means
through which people at work constitute them-
selves, as subjects, in relation to ethics.
For Foucault, ethics is centrally about what it
means to be a person in the world it is understood
in terms of how we constitute ourselves as moral
subjects of our own actions (Davidson, 1994: 118).
As Foucault himself defined it, ethics is:
a process in which the individual delimits that
part of himself that will form the object of his
moral practice, defines his position relative to
the precept he will follow, and decides on a
certain mode of being that will serve as his
moral goal. And this requires him to act upon
himself, to monitor, test, improve, and trans-
form himself. There is no specific moral action
that does not refer to a unified moral conduct;
no moral conduct that does not call for the
forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no
forming of the ethical subject without modes
of subjectivation and an ascetics or prac-
tices of the self that support them (Foucault,1984b: 28)
Following such a definition, we can see a close
relationship between ethics and being a person in the
world. Foucault alerts us to ethics as an active process
through which people assert particular moral prin-
ciples and then act to follow them. The important
distinction that Foucault makes is that moral action
requires a person to regard themself as a particular
type of ethical subject whom s/he wishes to
become and is free to try to become. As Foucault
explains: For what is ethics, if not the practice of
freedom, the conscious practice of freedom? ...
Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But
ethics is the considered form that freedom takes
when it is informed by reflection (Foucault, 1984a:
284). Foucaults ethics provides an invitation to a
practice of freedom that seeks to open possibilities
for new relations to self and events in the world
(Bernauer and Mahon, 1994: 154).
Foucault concern with freedom is not in relation
to a self-contained individual who can do as s/he
pleases, but rather a subject whose freedom is bothlocated and constituted in relations of power. It is this
focus on power that enables a relation to be estab-
lished between individual morality and organiza-
tional ethics. Foucaults work has been concerned
with how particular social discourses (including
ethical ones) discipline the self into particular modes
of being. To this end, one of the significant effects of
Foucaults work has been a consideration of how, in
late modern times, we can still consider ourselves to
be free beings in a world that, despite its dominant
rhetoric, seems on close and lucid inspection so often
to deny the reality of that freedom (Fillion, 2004:
115). Reading Foucault this way suggests a need to
contribute to the creation and construction of
spaces where we can be free within and against the
constraints of the particular regimes of truth we
inhabit (ibid, p. 122). In Foucaults own words,
these regimes can be understood as the systems of
ordered procedures for the production, regulation,
distribution, circulation, and operation of state-
ments (Foucault, 1980a: 132). Such procedures
provide the discursive architecture through which
different ways of understandings the world are
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sanctioned through statements which include
ethical positioning. Thus, while persons necessarily
operate within powerfully determining and institu-tionalized regimes of truth, Foucault concerns him-
self with the possibilities of freedom, not outside of
those regimes, but rather in relation to them and in
relation to their intersections (Dumm, 1996).
By drawing on Foucault, we suggest that an
important issue for a consideration of ethics and
management is how managers constitute themselves
as the moral subjects of their own actions within
those regimes of truth in which they find them-
selves at work (Foucault, 1980a). Management, as a
practice, has built-in moral technologies (Foucault,1975) that attempt to govern the dispositions making
up managerial identity (Chan and Garrick, 2002).
Such a conception does not involve grand claims
about business ethics or corporate morality, but in-
stead concerns itself with how a manager defines
their ethical position in relation to everyday practice
(Bernauer and Mahon, 1994; Chan and Garrick,
2002; Keleman and Peltonen, 2001). The moral
predicament that managers face concerns the way
that they bring morality to bear on their interaction
with organizational rules and requirements (ten Bos
1997). The processes of self formation at work showhow the identity of the manager might be ethically
constituted. Indeed, one interpretation would have
Foucault saying that by actively seeking to control
the ethical behaviour of individual managers, orga-
nizations unwittingly restrict freedom and hence the
possibilities for ethics.
Following Foucault (1984d, see also Davidson,
1994), the ethics of management emerges through
four interrelated questions the answers to which
can be thought of as forming the basis of ethical
subjectivity.
Ethical Substance Which aspects of manage-
rial behaviour are considered to be con-
cerned with ethical judgement?
Mode of Subjection In what ways do manag-
ers establish their relationships to ethical rules
and obligations?
Practices of the Self In what practices do
managers engage in order to consider them-
selves ethical?
Aspirations for the Self What are the ethics of
the idealised managerial that managers aspire to?
How such questions might relate to a particular
manager can be expected to vary just as they will
between organizations. Further, one might expectthat in the name of ethics, organizations will seek to
answer these questions on behalf of managers. In this
sense, when ethics is invoked in organizations as an
attempt to govern the behaviour, comportment, or
even attitudes of employees, such an invocation is
less about ethics and more about attempts to deter-
mine (or at least limit) individual opportunities to
think and act. Or, to put it differently, individual
ethical action is undertaken in relation to power as it
is instantiated in the relations between people. These
issues of the relationship between organizationalattempts to govern ethics and their effects on indi-
vidual ethical conduct are central to understanding
how ethical conduct gets played out. Such rela-
tionships can best be understood in terms of Fou-
caults concept of governmentality (Foucault,
1978; Chan and Garrick, 2002, 1981, 1984a).
[...] governmentality implies the relationship of
the self to itself, and I intend this concept of
governmentality to cover the whole range of
practices that constitute, define, organize, and
instrumentalize the strategies that individuals intheir freedom can use in dealing with each
other. Those who try to control, determine, and
limit the freedom of others are themselves free
individuals who have at their disposal certain
instruments they can use to govern others.
Thus, the basis for all this is freedom, the rela-
tionship of the self to itself and the relationship
to the other. [...] the concept of governmentali-
ty makes it possible to bring out the freedom of
the subject and its relationship to others
which constitutes the very stuff [matiere] of eth-ics (Foucault, 1984a: 300).
The value of the concept of governmentality lies in
the possibilities it offers for examining the connec-
tions between power and ethics, which enable a
connection between a political component (the
governing of others, i.e. management) and a sub-
jective component (the governing of oneself).
Governmentality concerns the government of the
self by oneself in its articulation with relations to
others (Foucault, 1981: 88) it breaks the com-
promise that is set up in the proposed duality
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between individual and organizational ethics. This
concern with governmentality is contrasted with
that of sovereignty that is the juridical right toexercise legal authority over a particular state or
territory. With governmentality, the focus shifts
towards how thought operates within our
organized way of doing things, our regimes of
practice, and with its ambitions and effects (Dean,
1999: 18). Importantly this proposes a mode of
governing that exceeds formal authority. In terms of
organizations it also suggests that the ethical conduct
of people at work is not limited to formal regulatory
regimes, but is also governed by particular knowl-
edge structures which seek to define moral characterand conduct in particular ways. Thus, it is through
governmentality that we can anlyse the politico-
cultural relations woven by individuals, groups,
organizations, systems of organizations and institu-
tions in order to produce these spaces of practices
and mentalities under certain modes of rationality.
Self creation
Freedom, in the context of governmentality, is
important to the Foucaldian notion of what it meansto be a self in the world. For Foucault, ones relation
with oneself, and thus to the operations carried out
in relation to ones body and soul, is a practice of
conscience and knowledge as secularized practices of
self-knowledge (Foucault, 1976, 1981, 1982a); in
other words, the modes through which one acts
upon oneself to carry out transformations in ones
behaviour, with the aim of situating oneself and
achieving ones personal realization. Foucault writes
of the forms and transformations of morality and
the moral practices that lead to the arts of existence.These assume the establishment of certain modes of
conduct through which individuals become partic-
ular types of people by assuming certain ways of
life (Foucault, 1984b, 1984c). Foucault refers to
these processes as the technologies of self that enable
individuals to produce themselves, govern their own
behaviour and that of others. It is in this way that
governmental regimes are not necessarily restrictive,
but can also enable the emergence of particular types
of self.
For Foucault, technologies of self determine ways
of being, both in the individual sphere as well as at
the level of work, politics and society (Foucault,
1982b). Among these ways of being, there are two
that are especially relevant for understanding thegovernance of conducts in modern times: first, self-
examination, as an effort at self-acknowledgement
and the objectification of oneself in relation to
oneself; second, the confession that, supported by the
will to know as expressed in the first, assumes the
obligation of verbalizing to others the truth regard-
ing oneself (Foucault, 1980b; 1982c). For instance,
the role of confession in organizations has been
operated by personnel counseling and group
dynamics technologies that facilitate the re-fabrica-
tion of identities. It is by considering such practicesthat Foucault is able to consider the self not as being
singular and determined but rather as something that
is actively and creatively produced in a reflexive
relation to one-self, to others and to society.
Foucaults notion of the selfs relation to the self
can be seen in the contemporary spread of consul-
tation practices, best represented as psy[sci]ences
(Rose, 1989, 1996) psychology, psychiatry, psy-
chotherapy and so forth. Foucault argues that the
development of these disciplines provide practical
advice to guide oneself, achieve success and find
happiness. Such texts are certainly a key part ofmanagement theory and practice from its early
inception as a science of engineering design, oriented
to the new men of modernity, the disciplined factory
workers (e.g. Foucault, 1982b, 1984b; Taylor, 1911).
As Foucault pointed out, these are
[...] texts written for the purpose of offering rules,
opinions, and advice on how to behave as one
should: practical texts, which are themselves
objects of a practice in that they were designed
to be read, learned, reflected upon, and tested out,and they were intended to constitute the eventual
framework of everyday conduct. These texts thus
served as functional devices that would enable
individuals to question their own conduct, to
watch over and give shape to it, and to shape
themselves as ethical subjects... (Foucault, 1984b:
1213)
The selfs relation to itself is one whereby people are
able to reflexively consider themselves as selves
that can be modified or even improved. In this sense,
various forms of self-reflection are geared to enable a
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person to define both who s/he is and who s/he
aspires to be. In this sense, the individual is consti-
tuted as a moral subject on the basis of self-orderingknowledge that permits one to discover oneself as
responsible for ones own acts, and consequently, as
a free individual that may shift the limits that define
ones being, modifying certain behaviours in order
to constitute oneself in another way. Such a form of
self-subjection is also assisted by highly diverse
expert knowledges, especially those centring their
attention on individual behaviour and interior con-
duct. Their recommendations assist individuals to
find themselves, providing rules of conduct with
which to act as they should. Without the existenceof such knowledge outside of the individual, no
notion of self would be possible. Conduct is guided
through a certain moral code that establishes basic
norms for judging ones vocation and aptitude, and
for understanding intentions and actions.
In terms of the notion of subjectivity described
above, contemporary management practices, such as
teamwork and empowerment, are illustrative cases
in point (Styhre, 2001). Teamwork, for example, is
not commonly considered to be a mechanism of
power, although, recent theory has suggested the
contrary (Barker, 1993; Sewell, 1998). As Sewellnotes, teamwork is usually associated with the
rhetoric of empowerment, trust and enhanced dis-
cretion and sometimes it is thought of as giving
away power. There is, indeed, a flood of popular
management books whose message is cast in terms of
this normative rhetoric, as analysis by Barley and
Kunda (1992) demonstrates, texts often espousing
single-answer solutions for harried managers. These
include TQM (Total Quality Management), BPR
(Business Process Reengineering), kaizen, organiza-
tional learning and lean production. What all ofthese methods have in common, Sewell (1998)
suggests, is a reversal of the highly individualistic
approach to the employee that earlier perspectives
such as scientific management had championed.
Rather than isolate, observe, and individually mea-
sure the times taken by individuals for doing stan-
dardized tasks and discouraging them from
communicating with others while doing so, the new
approach encourages communication and sociability.
In so doing, teamwork does not abolish politics but
relies on what Barker (1993) terms concertive
control a horizontal mode of surveillance.
Following Foucault, this new form of govern-
mentality constitutes subjectivity in different ways
(Foucault, 1983; Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994;Townley, 1993, 1994), and frames possible ethics
differently. According to Sthyre (2001) such man-
agement techniques represent technologies of the
self that shape individuals striving to be empowered,
intelligent and creative employees. Such govern-
mental techniques do two things: they constitute
subjectivity and they frame the limits in which ethics
is discussed and enacted. Thus, while such practices
are not a form of domination from which workers
might be liberated, they still enact forms of gov-
ernmental power that no longer involve a coercivepractice, but a practice of self-formation of the
subject (Foucault, 1984a/1997: 282). As Sthyre
(2001) shows, kaizen, for example, triggers a work
ethic that values creativity, flexibility and coopera-
tion. Whether individual conduct is ethical or not is
a question that can only be answered within the
(discursive) frame developed by empowering man-
agement techniques. A bureaucratically ethical
subject (see du Gay, 2000) adhering to rules would
look unethical in this new context. Thus, it is
power relations and their embeddedness in man-
agement techniques (including techniques to resistthem) that first frame possible ethical positions for an
individual. For a manager operating in such a con-
text, the possibilities for them to be regarded as (and
to regard themselves as) ethical are circumscribed by
the practices and relationships that they find them-
selves in organizationally even when those prac-
tices might be resisted or subverted.
Culture and ethics
To be a person imbued with subjectivity means
relating ones self to some form of self-knowledge
as well as knowledge by and of others. As we have
illustrated in our discussion so far, a key part of this
concerns how a person comes to regard themself as
a subject. Importantly, however, being able to
think of oneself as a subject is not done indepen-
dently, but in relation to others who also have a
self-regard as subjects and who might seek to
influence ones own subjectivity. In this sense,
power is extremely important for clarifying the
ethical relations between different people. Such
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relations are typically associated with behaviour in
the workplace, a field of force delimited by the
rules of calculation and the procedures that governthe behaviour of individuals and delimit their col-
lective action in such contexts. Power is exercised
over subjects in order to manage their conduct and
govern their action within an organized space. But
its focus is not so much on the individual subjec-
tivity as on the relation between people and how
to shape these relations. In other words, ethics not
only constitutes the subject in relation to itself but
also through governing possible relations between
subjects.
In contemporary times, a key way in whichorganizations have sought to govern relationships
between members is through culture. Peters and
Waterman (1982), for example suggested that
organizations should be governed by a shared, clear
and compelling normative order that they referred
to as a strong culture. Such an approach, how-
ever, is problematic because it does not account for
the possibility of an active ethical subjectivity, in-
stead always assuming that individual action is
(over)determined by the organization. Thus the
language of corporate culture programmes appears as
a means of controlling the choices and identitiesopen to employees (Willmott, 1993). At one ex-
treme, this suggests that everything must be subor-
dinated to the greater good of the corporate culture
and that only within its frame can organization
members find freedom and value. Despite such
claims of what organizational power might aspire to
be, in practice, the relationships between people and
organizations are more complex. Chan (2003), for
example, stresses the contingent character of power
relations in which there is no place for determinism
because history is written daily by the relations,events, and accidents that characterize everyday life
activities. Thought of in this way, strong culture are
not easily engineered, and function mainly as an
argument(the power of saying) to question actions of
the other, those abnormals who do not accept the
values of the organization. In practice, culture
consists of loosely negotiated, tacit ways of making
sense that are embedded in specific situations in the
organization rather than an all enveloping structure
that somehow contains all who are members. Being
a member doesnt necessarily mean accepting the
formal rhetoric of an organization; indeed, one can
imagine few people whose acceptance of organiza-
tionally sanctioned cultural values is complete and
unquestioning as empirical case studies of dividedmangers have shown (Knights and Murray, 1994).
Despite the constraints that organizations might
place on peoples ethical conduct, these never totally
determine an individuals personal stance. As Bevir
(1999) explains, because different people adopt
different beliefs and perform different actions against
the background of the same social structure, there
must be an undecided space in front of these struc-
tures where individual subjects decide what beliefs to
hold and what actions to perform for reasons of their
own (p. 358). Ethics are located within such aspace, we suggest. In this sense we each regulate a
position within the cultural spaces created for and
around us. Because culture is overwhelmingly situ-
ational, it will usually be quite fragmentary, forming
around certain emergent issues and then dissolving,
unfolding in process. Ethical judgements are always
situated, and, as such, rarely accord with either
formal rules or strong cultures as their surrogate,
except perhaps in ideological or values inspired
organizations, such as those with faith-based reli-
gious values or sectarian political ideologies. Orga-
nizations present people with boundless opportunities toreinvent themselves ethically (Schwartz, 1999), even if
the accomplishment is somewhat more difficult. In
organizations, the power exercised through net-
works of relations among people is not something
separate from the ability to fashion oneself as an
ethical subject.
Seeing people as active and ethical subjects
operating through power and governmentality,
rather than as being at the mercy of organizationally
dictated ethics, enables a consideration of organiza-
tional ethics in relation to both individuality andorganizational control. The ability of a person to be
regarded, and to regard themselves as an ethical
subject depends on their relationship to others as
well as the ways in which regimes of governmen-
tality constitutes these relations in organizations. For
instance, Taylorism produced subjects who saw
themselves as possessive individuals vying against
others regarded the same, competing to maximize
production bonuses. Thus, ethics is part of both the
history of subjectivity and the history of govern-
mentality (Davidson, 1994). On the basis of our
discussion, we suggest that ethics cannot be con-
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sidered as being either organizationally driven or
individually driven; rather, the individual (regarded
as such) is a result of the governmental conjunctureof self, others, and organizations. As such, ethics are
not a result of the actions of a self-contained human
essence that is restrained by organizations. Such a
view would, itself, be an effect of a specific ethical
constitution by a particular regime of governmen-
tality. Instead, the ethical subject is one who seeks
creative relations in the world (Bernauer and
Mahon, 1994), especially those that enable them to
be reflexive about their own and others constitution.
Concluding comments
The approach to Foucaults ethics we have discussed
in this paper has important implications for the study
of ethics in organizations. Ethics cannot be consid-
ered only in terms of the organization but must be
considered in terms of the relationship between
governmental practices and the way they enable
people to fashion themselves into being particular
types of subjects. Further, understanding ethics is
concerned with the ways that people exercise free-dom in relation to those practices. In this sense,
business ethics becomes a practice of re-forming
structures of recognition constitutive of subjectivity
and uncovering new ways of acting and being ... [by]
... engaging with organizational realities of power
(and possibly of change) (Chan and Garrick, 2002:
693).
Ethics are not something controlled by organiza-
tions through rules, codes of conducts and govern-
mental practices, because that control will always be
mediated through at least a modicum of freedom tobe reflexive as one constitutes ones self as a governed
subject. Conversely, relying solely on a notion of
absolute or transcendental ethical freedom is no way
to view ethics because individuality can only ever be
achieved in relation to others and to the possible
disciplinary and governmental regimes socially
enacted. It is in the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the organization that persons, as they are
constituted organizationally, become organization-
ally ethical. Of course, they may bring extra-
organizational learning to the situation (Bible class,
Koranic teaching, the Torah, or whatever). This
situatedness of practice has important implications
for understanding the ethics of organizational man-
agement. Indeed, this suggests a research programthat abandons analyses of whether management and
managers are ethical or unethical, per se, and that
eschews a theory that uses ethics as a mechanism of
power that passes judgment on the ethics of others.
Instead, what can be imagined is a research agenda
that is concerned with understanding the present,
and with appreciating how people make sense of
situations as ethically charged and to which spheres
of knowledge they make reference to in so doing.
The issue to be raised, we suggest, is powers
constitutive effect on ethics. Thus, we argue thatpower be considered as central in any discussion of
ethics in organizations; not in terms of whether
powers exercise be judged as ethical or not, but
rather in terms of how power enables different forms
of ethics. Thus, power should not be regarded as
something to which ethics can be analytically ap-
plied, but rather ethics should be considered as being
embedded in the power relations that constitute
organizations. Here ethics is powerful in that it
influences, and is influenced by, peoples sense of self
and ethicality. We are not dealing with a meta-
physical ethics that floats, transcendentally, highabove the mundane world of practice; instead,
through Foucault, we suggest an approach that res-
olutely sees ethics as a form of practice enacted by
managers and embedded in organizations. We pro-
pose that ethics resides in what people actually do
when they engage with ethics and how that doing is
manifested in relationships between self, others and
organizations. Ethics are a socially constructed real-
ity, and it is through an analysis of the process of
construction that we might reveal the practice of
ethics. By understanding ethics as practice we seek tounderstand how this ethical reality is actually fabri-
cated.
By way of conclusion, we suggest that Foucaults
theorization of ethics vis-a-vis freedom and gov-
ernmentality has the potential to open up new pos-
sibilities for theory and research since it makes it
possible to consider administration as an act of
government, and organizations as spaces for relations
between forces in which diverse modes of existence
and ethical projects confront each other (Clegg et al.,
2002; Pitsis et al., 2003). Rather than considering
ethics as being locked in a confrontation between
52 Eduardo Ibarra-Colado et al.
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individuals and organizations, it enables a consider-
ation of ethics in terms of the mutually constitutive
relationship between the two. Ethical practice, forFoucault, concerns an aesthetics of existence in
this sense to be an ethical subject requires a practice
of the self a procedure of self-creation and self-
transformation. It is this shift of attention away from
an ethics discourse grounded in maxims and
practical reason (ethical saying) to an ethics discourse
premised on human existence as an aesthetic phe-
nomenon (ethical showing) (Chan and Garrick,
2002: 695, italics in original) which is important. A
person exercises critical judgment in relation to those
beliefs and practices that s/he encounters includingthose beliefs and practices that others might claim as
moral. As management practices in organizations
have demonstrated so long, such claims have no
transcendental basis, however.
Acknowledgments
This article is part of a larger research project into
the nature of business ethics as practice that is part-
ly funded by the Australia Research Council and
the Austrian Science Fund FWF. Martin would
like to thank Stephan Laske, Silke Seemann and
other colleagues at the University of Innsbruck for
their input on this project.
Note
1 Although not the specific focus of this paper, it is
worth noting that numerous contemporary European
thinkers other than Foucault have reflected on Kants
critical philosophy and developed quite different projects
as a result (e.g. Arendt, Lyotard and Habermas). Amongst
these, it is Habermas Kantian notion of critique that ismost antithetical to that of Foucault. While Foucault
develops a critical ontology of self-formation and self-
legislation, Habermas takes on the Kantian project of cri-
tique more wholeheartedly and uses it to develop his
conception of critical theory (Hutchings, 1995).
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Eduardo Ibarra-Colado
Jefe del Departamento de Estudios Institucionales,
UAM-Cuajimalpa,
MexicoE-mail: [email protected]
Stewart R. Clegg
School of Management,
University of Technology,
Sydney,
Australia
E-mail: [email protected]
Carl Rhodes
School of Management,
University of Technology,
Sydney,
Australia
E-mail: [email protected]
Martin Kornberger
School of Management,
University of Technology,
Sydney,Australia
E-mail: [email protected]
The Ethics of Managerial Subjectivity 55